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From: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kasan-dev@googlegroups.com,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 10/20] x86: Insure that memory areas are encrypted when possible
Date: Fri, 9 Sep 2016 17:53:06 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160909155305.bmm2fvw7ndjjhqvo@pd.tnic> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160822223722.29880.94331.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>

On Mon, Aug 22, 2016 at 05:37:23PM -0500, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> Encrypt memory areas in place when possible (e.g. zero page, etc.) so
> that special handling isn't needed afterwards.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kernel/head64.c |   93 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>  arch/x86/kernel/setup.c  |    8 ++++
>  2 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

...

> +int __init early_make_pgtable(unsigned long address)
> +{
> +	unsigned long physaddr = address - __PAGE_OFFSET;
> +	pmdval_t pmd;
> +
> +	pmd = (physaddr & PMD_MASK) + early_pmd_flags;
> +
> +	return __early_make_pgtable(address, pmd);
> +}
> +
> +static void __init create_unencrypted_mapping(void *address, unsigned long size)
> +{
> +	unsigned long physaddr = (unsigned long)address - __PAGE_OFFSET;
> +	pmdval_t pmd_flags, pmd;
> +
> +	if (!sme_me_mask)
> +		return;
> +
> +	/* Clear the encryption mask from the early_pmd_flags */
> +	pmd_flags = early_pmd_flags & ~sme_me_mask;
> +
> +	do {
> +		pmd = (physaddr & PMD_MASK) + pmd_flags;
> +		__early_make_pgtable((unsigned long)address, pmd);
> +
> +		address += PMD_SIZE;
> +		physaddr += PMD_SIZE;
> +		size = (size < PMD_SIZE) ? 0 : size - PMD_SIZE;
> +	} while (size);
> +}
> +
> +static void __init __clear_mapping(unsigned long address)

Should be called something with "pmd" in the name as it clears a PMD,
i.e. __clear_pmd_mapping or so.

> +{
> +	unsigned long physaddr = address - __PAGE_OFFSET;
> +	pgdval_t pgd, *pgd_p;
> +	pudval_t pud, *pud_p;
> +	pmdval_t *pmd_p;
> +
> +	/* Invalid address or early pgt is done ?  */
> +	if (physaddr >= MAXMEM ||
> +	    read_cr3() != __sme_pa_nodebug(early_level4_pgt))
> +		return;
> +
> +	pgd_p = &early_level4_pgt[pgd_index(address)].pgd;
> +	pgd = *pgd_p;
> +
> +	if (!pgd)
> +		return;
> +
> +	/*
> +	 * The use of __START_KERNEL_map rather than __PAGE_OFFSET here matches
> +	 * __early_make_pgtable where the entry was created.
> +	 */
> +	pud_p = (pudval_t *)((pgd & PTE_PFN_MASK) + __START_KERNEL_map - phys_base);
> +	pud_p += pud_index(address);
> +	pud = *pud_p;
> +
> +	if (!pud)
> +		return;
> +
> +	pmd_p = (pmdval_t *)((pud & PTE_PFN_MASK) + __START_KERNEL_map - phys_base);
> +	pmd_p[pmd_index(address)] = 0;
> +}
> +
> +static void __init clear_mapping(void *address, unsigned long size)
> +{
> +	if (!sme_me_mask)
> +		return;
> +
> +	do {
> +		__clear_mapping((unsigned long)address);
> +
> +		address += PMD_SIZE;
> +		size = (size < PMD_SIZE) ? 0 : size - PMD_SIZE;
> +	} while (size);
> +}
> +
> +static void __init sme_memcpy(void *dst, void *src, unsigned long size)
> +{
> +	create_unencrypted_mapping(src, size);
> +	memcpy(dst, src, size);
> +	clear_mapping(src, size);
> +}
> +

In any case, this whole functionality is SME-specific and should be
somewhere in an SME-specific file. arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c or so...

>  /* Don't add a printk in there. printk relies on the PDA which is not initialized 
>     yet. */
>  static void __init clear_bss(void)
> @@ -122,12 +205,12 @@ static void __init copy_bootdata(char *real_mode_data)
>  	char * command_line;
>  	unsigned long cmd_line_ptr;
>  
> -	memcpy(&boot_params, real_mode_data, sizeof boot_params);
> +	sme_memcpy(&boot_params, real_mode_data, sizeof boot_params);

checkpatch.pl:

WARNING: sizeof boot_params should be sizeof(boot_params)
#155: FILE: arch/x86/kernel/head64.c:208:
+       sme_memcpy(&boot_params, real_mode_data, sizeof boot_params);

>  	sanitize_boot_params(&boot_params);
>  	cmd_line_ptr = get_cmd_line_ptr();
>  	if (cmd_line_ptr) {
>  		command_line = __va(cmd_line_ptr);
> -		memcpy(boot_command_line, command_line, COMMAND_LINE_SIZE);
> +		sme_memcpy(boot_command_line, command_line, COMMAND_LINE_SIZE);
>  	}
>  }
>  
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
> index 1489da8..1fdaa11 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
> @@ -114,6 +114,7 @@
>  #include <asm/microcode.h>
>  #include <asm/mmu_context.h>
>  #include <asm/kaslr.h>
> +#include <asm/mem_encrypt.h>
>  
>  /*
>   * max_low_pfn_mapped: highest direct mapped pfn under 4GB
> @@ -376,6 +377,13 @@ static void __init reserve_initrd(void)
>  	    !ramdisk_image || !ramdisk_size)
>  		return;		/* No initrd provided by bootloader */
>  
> +	/*
> +	 * This memory is marked encrypted by the kernel but the ramdisk
> +	 * was loaded in the clear by the bootloader, so make sure that
> +	 * the ramdisk image is encrypted.
> +	 */
> +	sme_early_mem_enc(ramdisk_image, ramdisk_end - ramdisk_image);

What happens if we go and relocate the ramdisk? I.e., the function above
this one: relocate_initrd(). We have to encrypt it then too, I presume.

-- 
Regards/Gruss,
    Boris.

ECO tip #101: Trim your mails when you reply.

  reply	other threads:[~2016-09-09 15:53 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 82+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-08-22 22:35 [RFC PATCH v2 00/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/20] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
2016-09-02  8:50   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:02     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 15:23       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/20] x86: Set the write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
2016-08-25  3:58   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) build enablement Tom Lendacky
2016-09-02 11:03   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:03     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2016-08-25 13:04   ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-08-30 13:19     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-30 14:57       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-31 13:26         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/20] x86: Add the Secure Memory Encryption cpu feature Tom Lendacky
2016-09-02 14:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:07     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/20] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/20] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-09-02 18:14   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:11     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-05  8:48   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:16     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-05 15:22   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:19     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-06  9:31   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:30     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 15:55       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-08 13:26         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-08 13:55           ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 13:43             ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/20] x86: Extend the early_memmap support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/20] x86: Add support for early encryption/decryption of memory Tom Lendacky
2016-09-06 16:12   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/20] x86: Insure that memory areas are encrypted when possible Tom Lendacky
2016-09-09 15:53   ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2016-09-12 15:05     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:33       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:11         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/20] mm: Access BOOT related data in the clear Tom Lendacky
2016-09-09 16:38   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 15:14     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:35       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 16:55   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-14 14:20     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-15  9:57       ` Matt Fleming
2016-09-15 16:52         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/20] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky
2016-09-09 17:23   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 15:41     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:41       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 13/20] x86: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2016-09-09 17:34   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 15:43     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 14/20] x86: DMA support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 10:58   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 13:36     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 15/20] iommu/amd: AMD IOMMU " Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 11:45   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 13:45     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:41       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-15 16:57         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-16  7:08           ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 16/20] x86: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 12:17   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 13:50     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:43   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:12     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 17/20] x86: Do not specify encrypted memory for VGA mapping Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 18/20] x86/kvm: Enable Secure Memory Encryption of nested page tables Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 14:35   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:02     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 19/20] x86: Access the setup data through debugfs un-encrypted Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:59   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:29     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:51       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-15 17:08         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-16  7:11           ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:39 ` [RFC PATCH v2 20/20] x86: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 17:08   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:31     ` Tom Lendacky

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