From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>, Matt Fleming <mfleming@suse.de>
Cc: kasan-dev <kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>,
"linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-arch <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
"linux-doc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
"linux-mm@kvack.org" <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>, "Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, "X86 ML" <x86@kernel.org>,
"kvm list" <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 11/20] mm: Access BOOT related data in the clear
Date: Mon, 12 Sep 2016 09:55:09 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrUk2kRSzKfwhio6KV3iuYaSV2uxybd-e95kK3vY=yTSfg@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160822223738.29880.6909.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>
On Aug 22, 2016 6:53 PM, "Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> wrote:
>
> BOOT data (such as EFI related data) is not encyrpted when the system is
> booted and needs to be accessed as non-encrypted. Add support to the
> early_memremap API to identify the type of data being accessed so that
> the proper encryption attribute can be applied. Currently, two types
> of data are defined, KERNEL_DATA and BOOT_DATA.
What happens when you memremap boot services data outside of early
boot? Matt just added code that does this.
IMO this API is not so great. It scatters a specialized consideration
all over the place. Could early_memremap not look up the PA to figure
out what to do?
--Andy
[leaving the rest here for Matt's benefit]
> unsigned long size,
> + enum memremap_owner owner,
> + pgprot_t prot)
> +{
> + return prot;
> +}
> +
> void __init early_ioremap_reset(void)
> {
> early_ioremap_shutdown();
> @@ -213,16 +221,23 @@ early_ioremap(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size)
>
> /* Remap memory */
> void __init *
> -early_memremap(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size)
> +early_memremap(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
> + enum memremap_owner owner)
> {
> - return (__force void *)__early_ioremap(phys_addr, size,
> - FIXMAP_PAGE_NORMAL);
> + pgprot_t prot = early_memremap_pgprot_adjust(phys_addr, size, owner,
> + FIXMAP_PAGE_NORMAL);
> +
> + return (__force void *)__early_ioremap(phys_addr, size, prot);
> }
> #ifdef FIXMAP_PAGE_RO
> void __init *
> -early_memremap_ro(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size)
> +early_memremap_ro(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
> + enum memremap_owner owner)
> {
> - return (__force void *)__early_ioremap(phys_addr, size, FIXMAP_PAGE_RO);
> + pgprot_t prot = early_memremap_pgprot_adjust(phys_addr, size, owner,
> + FIXMAP_PAGE_RO);
> +
> + return (__force void *)__early_ioremap(phys_addr, size, prot);
> }
> #endif
>
> @@ -236,7 +251,8 @@ early_memremap_prot(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
>
> #define MAX_MAP_CHUNK (NR_FIX_BTMAPS << PAGE_SHIFT)
>
> -void __init copy_from_early_mem(void *dest, phys_addr_t src, unsigned long size)
> +void __init copy_from_early_mem(void *dest, phys_addr_t src, unsigned long size,
> + enum memremap_owner owner)
> {
> unsigned long slop, clen;
> char *p;
> @@ -246,7 +262,7 @@ void __init copy_from_early_mem(void *dest, phys_addr_t src, unsigned long size)
> clen = size;
> if (clen > MAX_MAP_CHUNK - slop)
> clen = MAX_MAP_CHUNK - slop;
> - p = early_memremap(src & PAGE_MASK, clen + slop);
> + p = early_memremap(src & PAGE_MASK, clen + slop, owner);
> memcpy(dest, p + slop, clen);
> early_memunmap(p, clen + slop);
> dest += clen;
> @@ -265,12 +281,14 @@ early_ioremap(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size)
>
> /* Remap memory */
> void __init *
> -early_memremap(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size)
> +early_memremap(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
> + enum memremap_owner owner)
> {
> return (void *)phys_addr;
> }
> void __init *
> -early_memremap_ro(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size)
> +early_memremap_ro(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size,
> + enum memremap_owner owner)
> {
> return (void *)phys_addr;
> }
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-09-12 16:55 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 82+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-08-22 22:35 [RFC PATCH v2 00/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/20] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
2016-09-02 8:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:02 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 15:23 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/20] x86: Set the write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
2016-08-25 3:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) build enablement Tom Lendacky
2016-09-02 11:03 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:03 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2016-08-25 13:04 ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-08-30 13:19 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-30 14:57 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-31 13:26 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/20] x86: Add the Secure Memory Encryption cpu feature Tom Lendacky
2016-09-02 14:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:07 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/20] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/20] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-09-02 18:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:11 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-05 8:48 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:16 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-05 15:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:19 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-06 9:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:30 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 15:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-08 13:26 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-08 13:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 13:43 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/20] x86: Extend the early_memmap support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/20] x86: Add support for early encryption/decryption of memory Tom Lendacky
2016-09-06 16:12 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/20] x86: Insure that memory areas are encrypted when possible Tom Lendacky
2016-09-09 15:53 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 15:05 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:11 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/20] mm: Access BOOT related data in the clear Tom Lendacky
2016-09-09 16:38 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 15:14 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:35 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 16:55 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2016-09-14 14:20 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-15 9:57 ` Matt Fleming
2016-09-15 16:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/20] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky
2016-09-09 17:23 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 15:41 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 13/20] x86: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2016-09-09 17:34 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 15:43 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 14/20] x86: DMA support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 10:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 13:36 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 15/20] iommu/amd: AMD IOMMU " Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 11:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 13:45 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-15 16:57 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-16 7:08 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 16/20] x86: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 12:17 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 13:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:43 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:12 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 17/20] x86: Do not specify encrypted memory for VGA mapping Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 18/20] x86/kvm: Enable Secure Memory Encryption of nested page tables Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 14:35 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:02 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 19/20] x86: Access the setup data through debugfs un-encrypted Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:29 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-15 17:08 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-16 7:11 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:39 ` [RFC PATCH v2 20/20] x86: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 17:08 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:31 ` Tom Lendacky
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