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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 4.18 19/79] cpu/hotplug: Provide knobs to control SMT
Date: Tue, 14 Aug 2018 19:16:38 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180814171337.541934514@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180814171336.799314117@linuxfoundation.org>

4.18-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

Provide a command line and a sysfs knob to control SMT.

The command line options are:

 'nosmt':	Enumerate secondary threads, but do not online them

 'nosmt=force': Ignore secondary threads completely during enumeration
 		via MP table and ACPI/MADT.

The sysfs control file has the following states (read/write):

 'on':		 SMT is enabled. Secondary threads can be freely onlined
 'off':		 SMT is disabled. Secondary threads, even if enumerated
 		 cannot be onlined
 'forceoff':	 SMT is permanentely disabled. Writes to the control
 		 file are rejected.
 'notsupported': SMT is not supported by the CPU

The command line option 'nosmt' sets the sysfs control to 'off'. This
can be changed to 'on' to reenable SMT during runtime.

The command line option 'nosmt=force' sets the sysfs control to
'forceoff'. This cannot be changed during runtime.

When SMT is 'on' and the control file is changed to 'off' then all online
secondary threads are offlined and attempts to online a secondary thread
later on are rejected.

When SMT is 'off' and the control file is changed to 'on' then secondary
threads can be onlined again. The 'off' -> 'on' transition does not
automatically online the secondary threads.

When the control file is set to 'forceoff', the behaviour is the same as
setting it to 'off', but the operation is irreversible and later writes to
the control file are rejected.

When the control status is 'notsupported' then writes to the control file
are rejected.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu |   20 ++
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt    |    8 
 arch/Kconfig                                       |    3 
 arch/x86/Kconfig                                   |    1 
 include/linux/cpu.h                                |   13 +
 kernel/cpu.c                                       |  170 +++++++++++++++++++++
 6 files changed, 215 insertions(+)

--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-devices-system-cpu
@@ -487,3 +487,23 @@ Description:	Information about CPU vulne
 		"Not affected"	  CPU is not affected by the vulnerability
 		"Vulnerable"	  CPU is affected and no mitigation in effect
 		"Mitigation: $M"  CPU is affected and mitigation $M is in effect
+
+What:		/sys/devices/system/cpu/smt
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/active
+		/sys/devices/system/cpu/smt/control
+Date:		June 2018
+Contact:	Linux kernel mailing list <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
+Description:	Control Symetric Multi Threading (SMT)
+
+		active:  Tells whether SMT is active (enabled and siblings online)
+
+		control: Read/write interface to control SMT. Possible
+			 values:
+
+			 "on"		SMT is enabled
+			 "off"		SMT is disabled
+			 "forceoff"	SMT is force disabled. Cannot be changed.
+			 "notsupported" SMT is not supported by the CPU
+
+			 If control status is "forceoff" or "notsupported" writes
+			 are rejected.
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -2687,6 +2687,14 @@
 	nosmt		[KNL,S390] Disable symmetric multithreading (SMT).
 			Equivalent to smt=1.
 
+			[KNL,x86] Disable symmetric multithreading (SMT).
+			nosmt=force: Force disable SMT, similar to disabling
+				     it in the BIOS except that some of the
+				     resource partitioning effects which are
+				     caused by having SMT enabled in the BIOS
+				     cannot be undone. Depending on the CPU
+				     type this might have a performance impact.
+
 	nospectre_v2	[X86] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2
 			(indirect branch prediction) vulnerability. System may
 			allow data leaks with this option, which is equivalent
--- a/arch/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/Kconfig
@@ -13,6 +13,9 @@ config KEXEC_CORE
 config HAVE_IMA_KEXEC
 	bool
 
+config HOTPLUG_SMT
+	bool
+
 config OPROFILE
 	tristate "OProfile system profiling"
 	depends on PROFILING
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -187,6 +187,7 @@ config X86
 	select HAVE_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINTS
 	select HAVE_UNSTABLE_SCHED_CLOCK
 	select HAVE_USER_RETURN_NOTIFIER
+	select HOTPLUG_SMT			if SMP
 	select IRQ_FORCED_THREADING
 	select NEED_SG_DMA_LENGTH
 	select PCI_LOCKLESS_CONFIG
--- a/include/linux/cpu.h
+++ b/include/linux/cpu.h
@@ -168,4 +168,17 @@ void cpuhp_report_idle_dead(void);
 static inline void cpuhp_report_idle_dead(void) { }
 #endif /* #ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU */
 
+enum cpuhp_smt_control {
+	CPU_SMT_ENABLED,
+	CPU_SMT_DISABLED,
+	CPU_SMT_FORCE_DISABLED,
+	CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED,
+};
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_SMP) && defined(CONFIG_HOTPLUG_SMT)
+extern enum cpuhp_smt_control cpu_smt_control;
+#else
+# define cpu_smt_control		(CPU_SMT_ENABLED)
+#endif
+
 #endif /* _LINUX_CPU_H_ */
--- a/kernel/cpu.c
+++ b/kernel/cpu.c
@@ -933,6 +933,29 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(cpu_down);
 #define takedown_cpu		NULL
 #endif /*CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU*/
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_SMT
+enum cpuhp_smt_control cpu_smt_control __read_mostly = CPU_SMT_ENABLED;
+
+static int __init smt_cmdline_disable(char *str)
+{
+	cpu_smt_control = CPU_SMT_DISABLED;
+	if (str && !strcmp(str, "force")) {
+		pr_info("SMT: Force disabled\n");
+		cpu_smt_control = CPU_SMT_FORCE_DISABLED;
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+early_param("nosmt", smt_cmdline_disable);
+
+static inline bool cpu_smt_allowed(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+	return cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED ||
+		topology_is_primary_thread(cpu);
+}
+#else
+static inline bool cpu_smt_allowed(unsigned int cpu) { return true; }
+#endif
+
 /**
  * notify_cpu_starting(cpu) - Invoke the callbacks on the starting CPU
  * @cpu: cpu that just started
@@ -1056,6 +1079,10 @@ static int do_cpu_up(unsigned int cpu, e
 		err = -EBUSY;
 		goto out;
 	}
+	if (!cpu_smt_allowed(cpu)) {
+		err = -EPERM;
+		goto out;
+	}
 
 	err = _cpu_up(cpu, 0, target);
 out:
@@ -1904,10 +1931,153 @@ static const struct attribute_group cpuh
 	NULL
 };
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_HOTPLUG_SMT
+
+static const char *smt_states[] = {
+	[CPU_SMT_ENABLED]		= "on",
+	[CPU_SMT_DISABLED]		= "off",
+	[CPU_SMT_FORCE_DISABLED]	= "forceoff",
+	[CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED]		= "notsupported",
+};
+
+static ssize_t
+show_smt_control(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE - 2, "%s\n", smt_states[cpu_smt_control]);
+}
+
+static void cpuhp_offline_cpu_device(unsigned int cpu)
+{
+	struct device *dev = get_cpu_device(cpu);
+
+	dev->offline = true;
+	/* Tell user space about the state change */
+	kobject_uevent(&dev->kobj, KOBJ_OFFLINE);
+}
+
+static int cpuhp_smt_disable(enum cpuhp_smt_control ctrlval)
+{
+	int cpu, ret = 0;
+
+	cpu_maps_update_begin();
+	for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
+		if (topology_is_primary_thread(cpu))
+			continue;
+		ret = cpu_down_maps_locked(cpu, CPUHP_OFFLINE);
+		if (ret)
+			break;
+		/*
+		 * As this needs to hold the cpu maps lock it's impossible
+		 * to call device_offline() because that ends up calling
+		 * cpu_down() which takes cpu maps lock. cpu maps lock
+		 * needs to be held as this might race against in kernel
+		 * abusers of the hotplug machinery (thermal management).
+		 *
+		 * So nothing would update device:offline state. That would
+		 * leave the sysfs entry stale and prevent onlining after
+		 * smt control has been changed to 'off' again. This is
+		 * called under the sysfs hotplug lock, so it is properly
+		 * serialized against the regular offline usage.
+		 */
+		cpuhp_offline_cpu_device(cpu);
+	}
+	if (!ret)
+		cpu_smt_control = ctrlval;
+	cpu_maps_update_done();
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static void cpuhp_smt_enable(void)
+{
+	cpu_maps_update_begin();
+	cpu_smt_control = CPU_SMT_ENABLED;
+	cpu_maps_update_done();
+}
+
+static ssize_t
+store_smt_control(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
+		  const char *buf, size_t count)
+{
+	int ctrlval, ret;
+
+	if (sysfs_streq(buf, "on"))
+		ctrlval = CPU_SMT_ENABLED;
+	else if (sysfs_streq(buf, "off"))
+		ctrlval = CPU_SMT_DISABLED;
+	else if (sysfs_streq(buf, "forceoff"))
+		ctrlval = CPU_SMT_FORCE_DISABLED;
+	else
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_FORCE_DISABLED)
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	if (cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED)
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	ret = lock_device_hotplug_sysfs();
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	if (ctrlval != cpu_smt_control) {
+		switch (ctrlval) {
+		case CPU_SMT_ENABLED:
+			cpuhp_smt_enable();
+			break;
+		case CPU_SMT_DISABLED:
+		case CPU_SMT_FORCE_DISABLED:
+			ret = cpuhp_smt_disable(ctrlval);
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+
+	unlock_device_hotplug();
+	return ret ? ret : count;
+}
+static DEVICE_ATTR(control, 0644, show_smt_control, store_smt_control);
+
+static ssize_t
+show_smt_active(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr, char *buf)
+{
+	bool active = topology_max_smt_threads() > 1;
+
+	return snprintf(buf, PAGE_SIZE - 2, "%d\n", active);
+}
+static DEVICE_ATTR(active, 0444, show_smt_active, NULL);
+
+static struct attribute *cpuhp_smt_attrs[] = {
+	&dev_attr_control.attr,
+	&dev_attr_active.attr,
+	NULL
+};
+
+static const struct attribute_group cpuhp_smt_attr_group = {
+	.attrs = cpuhp_smt_attrs,
+	.name = "smt",
+	NULL
+};
+
+static int __init cpu_smt_state_init(void)
+{
+	if (!topology_smt_supported())
+		cpu_smt_control = CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+
+	return sysfs_create_group(&cpu_subsys.dev_root->kobj,
+				  &cpuhp_smt_attr_group);
+}
+
+#else
+static inline int cpu_smt_state_init(void) { return 0; }
+#endif
+
 static int __init cpuhp_sysfs_init(void)
 {
 	int cpu, ret;
 
+	ret = cpu_smt_state_init();
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
 	ret = sysfs_create_group(&cpu_subsys.dev_root->kobj,
 				 &cpuhp_cpu_root_attr_group);
 	if (ret)



  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-08-14 17:24 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 83+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-08-14 17:16 [PATCH 4.18 00/79] 4.18.1-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 01/79] x86/paravirt: Fix spectre-v2 mitigations for paravirt guests Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 02/79] x86/speculation: Protect against userspace-userspace spectreRSB Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 03/79] kprobes/x86: Fix %p uses in error messages Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 04/79] x86/irqflags: Provide a declaration for native_save_fl Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 05/79] x86/speculation/l1tf: Increase 32bit PAE __PHYSICAL_PAGE_SHIFT Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 06/79] x86/speculation/l1tf: Change order of offset/type in swap entry Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 07/79] x86/speculation/l1tf: Protect swap entries against L1TF Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 08/79] x86/speculation/l1tf: Protect PROT_NONE PTEs against speculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 09/79] x86/speculation/l1tf: Make sure the first page is always reserved Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 10/79] x86/speculation/l1tf: Add sysfs reporting for l1tf Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 11/79] x86/speculation/l1tf: Disallow non privileged high MMIO PROT_NONE mappings Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 12/79] x86/speculation/l1tf: Limit swap file size to MAX_PA/2 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 13/79] x86/bugs: Move the l1tf function and define pr_fmt properly Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 14/79] sched/smt: Update sched_smt_present at runtime Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 15/79] x86/smp: Provide topology_is_primary_thread() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 16/79] x86/topology: Provide topology_smt_supported() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 17/79] cpu/hotplug: Make bringup/teardown of smp threads symmetric Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 18/79] cpu/hotplug: Split do_cpu_down() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 20/79] x86/cpu: Remove the pointless CPU printout Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 21/79] x86/cpu/AMD: Remove the pointless detect_ht() call Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 22/79] x86/cpu/common: Provide detect_ht_early() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 23/79] x86/cpu/topology: Provide detect_extended_topology_early() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 24/79] x86/cpu/intel: Evaluate smp_num_siblings early Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 25/79] x86/CPU/AMD: Do not check CPUID max ext level before parsing SMP info Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 26/79] x86/cpu/AMD: Evaluate smp_num_siblings early Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 28/79] x86/speculation/l1tf: Extend 64bit swap file size limit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 29/79] x86/cpufeatures: Add detection of L1D cache flush support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 30/79] x86/CPU/AMD: Move TOPOEXT reenablement before reading smp_num_siblings Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 31/79] x86/speculation/l1tf: Protect PAE swap entries against L1TF Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 32/79] x86/speculation/l1tf: Fix up pte->pfn conversion for PAE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 33/79] Revert "x86/apic: Ignore secondary threads if nosmt=force" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 34/79] cpu/hotplug: Boot HT siblings at least once Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 35/79] x86/KVM: Warn user if KVM is loaded SMT and L1TF CPU bug being present Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 36/79] x86/KVM/VMX: Add module argument for L1TF mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 37/79] x86/KVM/VMX: Add L1D flush algorithm Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 38/79] x86/KVM/VMX: Add L1D MSR based flush Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 39/79] x86/KVM/VMX: Add L1D flush logic Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 40/79] x86/KVM/VMX: Split the VMX MSR LOAD structures to have an host/guest numbers Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 41/79] x86/KVM/VMX: Add find_msr() helper function Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 42/79] x86/KVM/VMX: Separate the VMX AUTOLOAD guest/host number accounting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 43/79] x86/KVM/VMX: Extend add_atomic_switch_msr() to allow VMENTER only MSRs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 44/79] x86/KVM/VMX: Use MSR save list for IA32_FLUSH_CMD if required Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 45/79] cpu/hotplug: Online siblings when SMT control is turned on Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 46/79] x86/litf: Introduce vmx status variable Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 47/79] x86/kvm: Drop L1TF MSR list approach Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 48/79] x86/l1tf: Handle EPT disabled state proper Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 49/79] x86/kvm: Move l1tf setup function Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 50/79] x86/kvm: Add static key for flush always Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 51/79] x86/kvm: Serialize L1D flush parameter setter Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 52/79] x86/kvm: Allow runtime control of L1D flush Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 53/79] cpu/hotplug: Expose SMT control init function Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 54/79] cpu/hotplug: Set CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED early Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 55/79] x86/bugs, kvm: Introduce boot-time control of L1TF mitigations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 56/79] Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilities Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 57/79] x86/speculation/l1tf: Unbreak !__HAVE_ARCH_PFN_MODIFY_ALLOWED architectures Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 58/79] x86/KVM/VMX: Initialize the vmx_l1d_flush_pages content Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 59/79] Documentation/l1tf: Fix typos Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 60/79] cpu/hotplug: detect SMT disabled by BIOS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 61/79] x86/KVM/VMX: Dont set l1tf_flush_l1d to true from vmx_l1d_flush() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 62/79] x86/KVM/VMX: Replace vmx_l1d_flush_always with vmx_l1d_flush_cond Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 63/79] x86/KVM/VMX: Move the l1tf_flush_l1d test to vmx_l1d_flush() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 64/79] x86/irq: Demote irq_cpustat_t::__softirq_pending to u16 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 65/79] x86/KVM/VMX: Introduce per-host-cpu analogue of l1tf_flush_l1d Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 66/79] x86: Dont include linux/irq.h from asm/hardirq.h Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 67/79] x86/irq: Let interrupt handlers set kvm_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 68/79] x86/KVM/VMX: Dont set l1tf_flush_l1d from vmx_handle_external_intr() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 69/79] Documentation/l1tf: Remove Yonah processors from not vulnerable list Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 70/79] x86/speculation: Simplify sysfs report of VMX L1TF vulnerability Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 71/79] x86/speculation: Use ARCH_CAPABILITIES to skip L1D flush on vmentry Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 72/79] KVM: VMX: Tell the nested hypervisor " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 73/79] cpu/hotplug: Fix SMT supported evaluation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 74/79] x86/speculation/l1tf: Invert all not present mappings Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 75/79] x86/speculation/l1tf: Make pmd/pud_mknotpresent() invert Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 76/79] x86/mm/pat: Make set_memory_np() L1TF safe Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 77/79] x86/mm/kmmio: Make the tracer robust against L1TF Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 78/79] tools headers: Synchronise x86 cpufeatures.h for L1TF additions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 79/79] x86/microcode: Allow late microcode loading with SMT disabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-15  6:12 ` [PATCH 4.18 00/79] 4.18.1-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-15 13:16 ` Guenter Roeck
2018-08-15 15:32   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-15 20:12 ` Dan Rue

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