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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH 4.18 46/79] x86/litf: Introduce vmx status variable
Date: Tue, 14 Aug 2018 19:17:05 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180814171338.719707018@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180814171336.799314117@linuxfoundation.org>

4.18-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

Store the effective mitigation of VMX in a status variable and use it to
report the VMX state in the l1tf sysfs file.

Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180713142322.433098358@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h |    9 +++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c |   36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c         |   22 +++++++++++-----------
 3 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h
@@ -576,4 +576,13 @@ enum vm_instruction_error_number {
 	VMXERR_INVALID_OPERAND_TO_INVEPT_INVVPID = 28,
 };
 
+enum vmx_l1d_flush_state {
+	VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO,
+	VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER,
+	VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND,
+	VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_ALWAYS,
+};
+
+extern enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf_vmx_mitigation;
+
 #endif
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
 #include <asm/processor-flags.h>
 #include <asm/fpu/internal.h>
 #include <asm/msr.h>
+#include <asm/vmx.h>
 #include <asm/paravirt.h>
 #include <asm/alternative.h>
 #include <asm/pgtable.h>
@@ -636,6 +637,12 @@ void x86_spec_ctrl_setup_ap(void)
 
 #undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)	"L1TF: " fmt
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)
+enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf_vmx_mitigation __ro_after_init = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO;
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l1tf_vmx_mitigation);
+#endif
+
 static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void)
 {
 	u64 half_pa;
@@ -665,6 +672,32 @@ static void __init l1tf_select_mitigatio
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_SYSFS
 
+#define L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG "Mitigation: PTE Inversion"
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)
+static const char *l1tf_vmx_states[] = {
+	[VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO]	= "auto",
+	[VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER]	= "vulnerable",
+	[VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND]	= "conditional cache flushes",
+	[VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_ALWAYS]	= "cache flushes",
+};
+
+static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+	if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO)
+		return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG);
+
+	return sprintf(buf, "%s; VMX: SMT %s, L1D %s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG,
+		       cpu_smt_control == CPU_SMT_ENABLED ? "vulnerable" : "disabled",
+		       l1tf_vmx_states[l1tf_vmx_mitigation]);
+}
+#else
+static ssize_t l1tf_show_state(char *buf)
+{
+	return sprintf(buf, "%s\n", L1TF_DEFAULT_MSG);
+}
+#endif
+
 static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
 			       char *buf, unsigned int bug)
 {
@@ -695,9 +728,8 @@ static ssize_t cpu_show_common(struct de
 
 	case X86_BUG_L1TF:
 		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_L1TF_PTEINV))
-			return sprintf(buf, "Mitigation: Page Table Inversion\n");
+			return l1tf_show_state(buf);
 		break;
-
 	default:
 		break;
 	}
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -193,19 +193,13 @@ extern const ulong vmx_return;
 
 static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(vmx_l1d_should_flush);
 
-/* These MUST be in sync with vmentry_l1d_param order. */
-enum vmx_l1d_flush_state {
-	VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER,
-	VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND,
-	VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_ALWAYS,
-};
-
 static enum vmx_l1d_flush_state __read_mostly vmentry_l1d_flush = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND;
 
 static const struct {
 	const char *option;
 	enum vmx_l1d_flush_state cmd;
 } vmentry_l1d_param[] = {
+	{"auto",	VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO},
 	{"never",	VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER},
 	{"cond",	VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND},
 	{"always",	VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_ALWAYS},
@@ -13323,8 +13317,12 @@ static int __init vmx_setup_l1d_flush(vo
 {
 	struct page *page;
 
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF))
+		return 0;
+
+	l1tf_vmx_mitigation = vmentry_l1d_flush;
+
 	if (vmentry_l1d_flush == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER ||
-	    !boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF) ||
 	    vmx_l1d_use_msr_save_list())
 		return 0;
 
@@ -13339,12 +13337,14 @@ static int __init vmx_setup_l1d_flush(vo
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static void vmx_free_l1d_flush_pages(void)
+static void vmx_cleanup_l1d_flush(void)
 {
 	if (vmx_l1d_flush_pages) {
 		free_pages((unsigned long)vmx_l1d_flush_pages, L1D_CACHE_ORDER);
 		vmx_l1d_flush_pages = NULL;
 	}
+	/* Restore state so sysfs ignores VMX */
+	l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO;
 }
 
 static int __init vmx_init(void)
@@ -13387,7 +13387,7 @@ static int __init vmx_init(void)
 	r = kvm_init(&vmx_x86_ops, sizeof(struct vcpu_vmx),
 		     __alignof__(struct vcpu_vmx), THIS_MODULE);
 	if (r) {
-		vmx_free_l1d_flush_pages();
+		vmx_cleanup_l1d_flush();
 		return r;
 	}
 
@@ -13431,7 +13431,7 @@ static void __exit vmx_exit(void)
 		static_branch_disable(&enable_evmcs);
 	}
 #endif
-	vmx_free_l1d_flush_pages();
+	vmx_cleanup_l1d_flush();
 }
 
 module_init(vmx_init)



  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-08-14 17:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 83+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-08-14 17:16 [PATCH 4.18 00/79] 4.18.1-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 01/79] x86/paravirt: Fix spectre-v2 mitigations for paravirt guests Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 02/79] x86/speculation: Protect against userspace-userspace spectreRSB Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 03/79] kprobes/x86: Fix %p uses in error messages Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 04/79] x86/irqflags: Provide a declaration for native_save_fl Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 05/79] x86/speculation/l1tf: Increase 32bit PAE __PHYSICAL_PAGE_SHIFT Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 06/79] x86/speculation/l1tf: Change order of offset/type in swap entry Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 07/79] x86/speculation/l1tf: Protect swap entries against L1TF Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 08/79] x86/speculation/l1tf: Protect PROT_NONE PTEs against speculation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 09/79] x86/speculation/l1tf: Make sure the first page is always reserved Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 10/79] x86/speculation/l1tf: Add sysfs reporting for l1tf Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 11/79] x86/speculation/l1tf: Disallow non privileged high MMIO PROT_NONE mappings Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 12/79] x86/speculation/l1tf: Limit swap file size to MAX_PA/2 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 13/79] x86/bugs: Move the l1tf function and define pr_fmt properly Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 14/79] sched/smt: Update sched_smt_present at runtime Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 15/79] x86/smp: Provide topology_is_primary_thread() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 16/79] x86/topology: Provide topology_smt_supported() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 17/79] cpu/hotplug: Make bringup/teardown of smp threads symmetric Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 18/79] cpu/hotplug: Split do_cpu_down() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 19/79] cpu/hotplug: Provide knobs to control SMT Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 20/79] x86/cpu: Remove the pointless CPU printout Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 21/79] x86/cpu/AMD: Remove the pointless detect_ht() call Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 22/79] x86/cpu/common: Provide detect_ht_early() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 23/79] x86/cpu/topology: Provide detect_extended_topology_early() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 24/79] x86/cpu/intel: Evaluate smp_num_siblings early Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 25/79] x86/CPU/AMD: Do not check CPUID max ext level before parsing SMP info Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 26/79] x86/cpu/AMD: Evaluate smp_num_siblings early Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 28/79] x86/speculation/l1tf: Extend 64bit swap file size limit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 29/79] x86/cpufeatures: Add detection of L1D cache flush support Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 30/79] x86/CPU/AMD: Move TOPOEXT reenablement before reading smp_num_siblings Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 31/79] x86/speculation/l1tf: Protect PAE swap entries against L1TF Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 32/79] x86/speculation/l1tf: Fix up pte->pfn conversion for PAE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 33/79] Revert "x86/apic: Ignore secondary threads if nosmt=force" Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 34/79] cpu/hotplug: Boot HT siblings at least once Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 35/79] x86/KVM: Warn user if KVM is loaded SMT and L1TF CPU bug being present Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 36/79] x86/KVM/VMX: Add module argument for L1TF mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 37/79] x86/KVM/VMX: Add L1D flush algorithm Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 38/79] x86/KVM/VMX: Add L1D MSR based flush Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 39/79] x86/KVM/VMX: Add L1D flush logic Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:16 ` [PATCH 4.18 40/79] x86/KVM/VMX: Split the VMX MSR LOAD structures to have an host/guest numbers Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 41/79] x86/KVM/VMX: Add find_msr() helper function Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 42/79] x86/KVM/VMX: Separate the VMX AUTOLOAD guest/host number accounting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 43/79] x86/KVM/VMX: Extend add_atomic_switch_msr() to allow VMENTER only MSRs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 44/79] x86/KVM/VMX: Use MSR save list for IA32_FLUSH_CMD if required Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 45/79] cpu/hotplug: Online siblings when SMT control is turned on Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 47/79] x86/kvm: Drop L1TF MSR list approach Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 48/79] x86/l1tf: Handle EPT disabled state proper Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 49/79] x86/kvm: Move l1tf setup function Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 50/79] x86/kvm: Add static key for flush always Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 51/79] x86/kvm: Serialize L1D flush parameter setter Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 52/79] x86/kvm: Allow runtime control of L1D flush Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 53/79] cpu/hotplug: Expose SMT control init function Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 54/79] cpu/hotplug: Set CPU_SMT_NOT_SUPPORTED early Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 55/79] x86/bugs, kvm: Introduce boot-time control of L1TF mitigations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 56/79] Documentation: Add section about CPU vulnerabilities Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 57/79] x86/speculation/l1tf: Unbreak !__HAVE_ARCH_PFN_MODIFY_ALLOWED architectures Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 58/79] x86/KVM/VMX: Initialize the vmx_l1d_flush_pages content Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 59/79] Documentation/l1tf: Fix typos Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 60/79] cpu/hotplug: detect SMT disabled by BIOS Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 61/79] x86/KVM/VMX: Dont set l1tf_flush_l1d to true from vmx_l1d_flush() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 62/79] x86/KVM/VMX: Replace vmx_l1d_flush_always with vmx_l1d_flush_cond Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 63/79] x86/KVM/VMX: Move the l1tf_flush_l1d test to vmx_l1d_flush() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 64/79] x86/irq: Demote irq_cpustat_t::__softirq_pending to u16 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 65/79] x86/KVM/VMX: Introduce per-host-cpu analogue of l1tf_flush_l1d Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 66/79] x86: Dont include linux/irq.h from asm/hardirq.h Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 67/79] x86/irq: Let interrupt handlers set kvm_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 68/79] x86/KVM/VMX: Dont set l1tf_flush_l1d from vmx_handle_external_intr() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 69/79] Documentation/l1tf: Remove Yonah processors from not vulnerable list Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 70/79] x86/speculation: Simplify sysfs report of VMX L1TF vulnerability Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 71/79] x86/speculation: Use ARCH_CAPABILITIES to skip L1D flush on vmentry Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 72/79] KVM: VMX: Tell the nested hypervisor " Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 73/79] cpu/hotplug: Fix SMT supported evaluation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 74/79] x86/speculation/l1tf: Invert all not present mappings Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 75/79] x86/speculation/l1tf: Make pmd/pud_mknotpresent() invert Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 76/79] x86/mm/pat: Make set_memory_np() L1TF safe Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 77/79] x86/mm/kmmio: Make the tracer robust against L1TF Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 78/79] tools headers: Synchronise x86 cpufeatures.h for L1TF additions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-14 17:17 ` [PATCH 4.18 79/79] x86/microcode: Allow late microcode loading with SMT disabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-15  6:12 ` [PATCH 4.18 00/79] 4.18.1-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-15 13:16 ` Guenter Roeck
2018-08-15 15:32   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-08-15 20:12 ` Dan Rue

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