[PATCH] random: Move rand_initialize() earlier

[PATCH] random: Move rand_initialize() earlier

[Kees Cook]

Right now rand_initialize() is run as an early_initcall(), but it only
depends on timekeeping_init() (for mixing ktime_get_real() into the
pools). However, the call to boot_init_stack_canary() for stack canary
initialization runs earlier, which triggers a warning at boot:

random: get_random_bytes called from start_kernel+0x357/0x548 with crng_init=0

Instead, this moves rand_initialize() to after timekeeping_init(), and moves
canary initialization here as well.

Note that this warning may still remain for machines that do not have
UEFI RNG support (which initializes the RNG pools during setup_arch()),
or for x86 machines without RDRAND (or booting without "random.trust=on"
or CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU=y).

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
Alternatively, ktime_get_real() could get mixed into the pools after
timekeeping_init(), and rand_initialize() could be run MUCH early,
like after setup_arch()...
---
 drivers/char/random.c  |  5 ++---
 include/linux/random.h |  1 +
 init/main.c            | 21 ++++++++++++++-------
 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c
index c75b6cdf0053..deff1aa4d000 100644
--- a/drivers/char/random.c
+++ b/drivers/char/random.c
@@ -1784,7 +1784,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_bytes_arch);
  * data into the pool to prepare it for use. The pool is not cleared
  * as that can only decrease the entropy in the pool.
  */
-static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r)
+static void __init init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r)
 {
 	int i;
 	ktime_t now = ktime_get_real();
@@ -1811,7 +1811,7 @@ static void init_std_data(struct entropy_store *r)
  * take care not to overwrite the precious per platform data
  * we were given.
  */
-static int rand_initialize(void)
+int __init rand_initialize(void)
 {
 	init_std_data(&input_pool);
 	init_std_data(&blocking_pool);
@@ -1823,7 +1823,6 @@ static int rand_initialize(void)
 	}
 	return 0;
 }
-early_initcall(rand_initialize);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_BLOCK
 void rand_initialize_disk(struct gendisk *disk)
diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h
index 445a0ea4ff49..13aeaf5a4bd4 100644
--- a/include/linux/random.h
+++ b/include/linux/random.h
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags) __latent_entropy;
 
 extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes);
 extern int wait_for_random_bytes(void);
+extern int __init rand_initialize(void);
 extern bool rng_is_initialized(void);
 extern int add_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
 extern void del_random_ready_callback(struct random_ready_callback *rdy);
diff --git a/init/main.c b/init/main.c
index 18f8f0140fa0..e2b073bf846f 100644
--- a/init/main.c
+++ b/init/main.c
@@ -550,13 +550,6 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init start_kernel(void)
 	page_address_init();
 	pr_notice("%s", linux_banner);
 	setup_arch(&command_line);
-	/*
-	 * Set up the the initial canary and entropy after arch
-	 * and after adding latent and command line entropy.
-	 */
-	add_latent_entropy();
-	add_device_randomness(command_line, strlen(command_line));
-	boot_init_stack_canary();
 	mm_init_cpumask(&init_mm);
 	setup_command_line(command_line);
 	setup_nr_cpu_ids();
@@ -641,6 +634,20 @@ asmlinkage __visible void __init start_kernel(void)
 	hrtimers_init();
 	softirq_init();
 	timekeeping_init();
+
+	/*
+	 * For best initial stack canary entropy, prepare it after:
+	 * - setup_arch() for any UEFI RNG entropy and boot cmdline access
+	 * - timekeeping_init() for ktime entropy used in rand_initialize()
+	 * - rand_initialize() to get any arch-specific entropy like RDRAND
+	 * - add_latent_entropy() to get any latent entropy
+	 * - adding command line entropy
+	 */
+	rand_initialize();
+	add_latent_entropy();
+	add_device_randomness(command_line, strlen(command_line));
+	boot_init_stack_canary();
+
 	time_init();
 	printk_safe_init();
 	perf_event_init();
-- 
2.17.1


-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security

Re: [PATCH] random: Move rand_initialize() earlier

[Arnd Bergmann]

On Fri, Oct 12, 2018 at 12:54 AM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>
> Right now rand_initialize() is run as an early_initcall(), but it only
> depends on timekeeping_init() (for mixing ktime_get_real() into the
> pools). However, the call to boot_init_stack_canary() for stack canary
> initialization runs earlier, which triggers a warning at boot:
>
> random: get_random_bytes called from start_kernel+0x357/0x548 with crng_init=0
>
> Instead, this moves rand_initialize() to after timekeeping_init(), and moves
> canary initialization here as well.
>
> Note that this warning may still remain for machines that do not have
> UEFI RNG support (which initializes the RNG pools during setup_arch()),
> or for x86 machines without RDRAND (or booting without "random.trust=on"
> or CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU=y).
>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> ---
> Alternatively, ktime_get_real() could get mixed into the pools after
> timekeeping_init(), and rand_initialize() could be run MUCH early,
> like after setup_arch()...

I wonder if mixing in ktime_get_real() is flawed to start with:
This depends on read_persistent_clock64() actually returning
a meaningful time, but in many cases it does not; x86 being
a notable exception.

We have three ways of setting the initial time:

* At early boot using read_persistent_clock64(). This may read
  the time from the hypervisor (if any), and on some older
  architectures that have a custom RTC abstraction, it
  reads from the RTC directly. We generally move away from
  the RTC method in favor of the proper rtc class interfaces
  (see below)

* At late_initcall time, in rtc_hctosys(). If an RTC driver has
  been loaded successfully at this time, it will be read from
  there. We also move away from this.

* From user space, which reads the RTC time or NTP,
  and then sets the system time from that.

The latter two end up in do_settimeofday64(), but there
is no mixing in of the time into the random seed that I can
see, and it's not clear whether there should be (it
can be called with arbitrary times from user space,
provided CAP_SYS_TIME permissions).

       Arnd

Re: [PATCH] random: Move rand_initialize() earlier

[Theodore Y. Ts'o]

On Thu, Oct 11, 2018 at 03:54:21PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> Right now rand_initialize() is run as an early_initcall(), but it only
> depends on timekeeping_init() (for mixing ktime_get_real() into the
> pools). However, the call to boot_init_stack_canary() for stack canary
> initialization runs earlier, which triggers a warning at boot:
> 
> random: get_random_bytes called from start_kernel+0x357/0x548 with crng_init=0
> 
> Instead, this moves rand_initialize() to after timekeeping_init(), and moves
> canary initialization here as well.
> 
> Note that this warning may still remain for machines that do not have
> UEFI RNG support (which initializes the RNG pools durting setup_arch()),
> or for x86 machines without RDRAND (or booting without "random.trust=on"
> or CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU=y).
> 
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

This seems reasonable to me.  Were you hoping to get this in for -rc8?
It looks sane, and I don't see any _obvious_ unintended consequences
of such a change, but it's rather late in the development cycle, and
it isn't regression fix.

My druthers would be wait until -rc2, as a minor low-risk improvement
that goes in after the merge window, although some people are of the
belief that -rc2 should be a strict feature freeze delimiter.  My
personal opinion is no major feature changes except during the merge
window, and we go into bug-fix only mode after -rc4, and by -rc6 it's
regression and major security fixes only.  (This is however not a
universally held opinion; see the "bug-introducing patches" thread
which Sasha started on the ksummit-discuss thread.)

					- Ted

Re: [PATCH] random: Move rand_initialize() earlier

[Theodore Y. Ts'o]

On Fri, Oct 12, 2018 at 10:42:39AM +0200, Arnd Bergmann wrote:
> I wonder if mixing in ktime_get_real() is flawed to start with:
> This depends on read_persistent_clock64() actually returning
> a meaningful time, but in many cases it does not; x86 being
> a notable exception.
> 
> We have three ways of setting the initial time:
> 
> * At early boot using read_persistent_clock64(). This may read
>   the time from the hypervisor (if any), and on some older
>   architectures that have a custom RTC abstraction, it
>   reads from the RTC directly. We generally move away from
>   the RTC method in favor of the proper rtc class interfaces
>   (see below)
> 
> * At late_initcall time, in rtc_hctosys(). If an RTC driver has
>   been loaded successfully at this time, it will be read from
>   there. We also move away from this.
> 
> * From user space, which reads the RTC time or NTP,
>   and then sets the system time from that.
> 
> The latter two end up in do_settimeofday64(), but there
> is no mixing in of the time into the random seed that I can
> see, and it's not clear whether there should be (it
> can be called with arbitrary times from user space,
> provided CAP_SYS_TIME permissions).

I think it adds some real value (although perhaps small) in the first
two cases.  In all of the cases, though, since we don't add any
entropy credit, it doesn't hurt to mix it in --- this is the same
argument why it's fine that /dev/[u]random can be world-writeable.
Mixing in user-controlled data is harmless, and if it's not visible to
a remote attacker, it can be helpful.

						- Ted

Re: [PATCH] random: Move rand_initialize() earlier

[Kees Cook]

On Fri, Oct 12, 2018 at 7:29 AM, Theodore Y. Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 11, 2018 at 03:54:21PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
>> Right now rand_initialize() is run as an early_initcall(), but it only
>> depends on timekeeping_init() (for mixing ktime_get_real() into the
>> pools). However, the call to boot_init_stack_canary() for stack canary
>> initialization runs earlier, which triggers a warning at boot:
>>
>> random: get_random_bytes called from start_kernel+0x357/0x548 with crng_init=0
>>
>> Instead, this moves rand_initialize() to after timekeeping_init(), and moves
>> canary initialization here as well.
>>
>> Note that this warning may still remain for machines that do not have
>> UEFI RNG support (which initializes the RNG pools durting setup_arch()),
>> or for x86 machines without RDRAND (or booting without "random.trust=on"
>> or CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU=y).
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
>
> This seems reasonable to me.  Were you hoping to get this in for -rc8?
> It looks sane, and I don't see any _obvious_ unintended consequences
> of such a change, but it's rather late in the development cycle, and
> it isn't regression fix.

Yeah, for sure. I didn't mean this for 4.19. I assumed -next, and
likely further changes based on discussion, etc etc.

-Kees

-- 
Kees Cook
Pixel Security

Re: [PATCH] random: Move rand_initialize() earlier

[Kees Cook]

On Fri, Oct 12, 2018 at 9:45 AM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Oct 12, 2018 at 7:29 AM, Theodore Y. Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> wrote:
> > On Thu, Oct 11, 2018 at 03:54:21PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> >> Right now rand_initialize() is run as an early_initcall(), but it only
> >> depends on timekeeping_init() (for mixing ktime_get_real() into the
> >> pools). However, the call to boot_init_stack_canary() for stack canary
> >> initialization runs earlier, which triggers a warning at boot:
> >>
> >> random: get_random_bytes called from start_kernel+0x357/0x548 with crng_init=0
> >>
> >> Instead, this moves rand_initialize() to after timekeeping_init(), and moves
> >> canary initialization here as well.
> >>
> >> Note that this warning may still remain for machines that do not have
> >> UEFI RNG support (which initializes the RNG pools durting setup_arch()),
> >> or for x86 machines without RDRAND (or booting without "random.trust=on"
> >> or CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU=y).
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> >
> > This seems reasonable to me.  Were you hoping to get this in for -rc8?
> > It looks sane, and I don't see any _obvious_ unintended consequences
> > of such a change, but it's rather late in the development cycle, and
> > it isn't regression fix.
>
> Yeah, for sure. I didn't mean this for 4.19. I assumed -next, and
> likely further changes based on discussion, etc etc.

Hi Ted! Did this get lost? This has come up again, and I don't see it
having landed anywhere yet. Can you take this?

-- 
Kees Cook

Re: [PATCH] random: Move rand_initialize() earlier

[Theodore Ts'o]

On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 10:46:34PM -0500, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Fri, Oct 12, 2018 at 9:45 AM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> >
> > On Fri, Oct 12, 2018 at 7:29 AM, Theodore Y. Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> wrote:
> > > On Thu, Oct 11, 2018 at 03:54:21PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > >> Right now rand_initialize() is run as an early_initcall(), but it only
> > >> depends on timekeeping_init() (for mixing ktime_get_real() into the
> > >> pools). However, the call to boot_init_stack_canary() for stack canary
> > >> initialization runs earlier, which triggers a warning at boot:
> > >>
> > >> random: get_random_bytes called from start_kernel+0x357/0x548 with crng_init=0
> > >>
> > >> Instead, this moves rand_initialize() to after timekeeping_init(), and moves
> > >> canary initialization here as well.
> > >>
> > >> Note that this warning may still remain for machines that do not have
> > >> UEFI RNG support (which initializes the RNG pools durting setup_arch()),
> > >> or for x86 machines without RDRAND (or booting without "random.trust=on"
> > >> or CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU=y).
> > >>
> > >> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> 
> Hi Ted! Did this get lost? This has come up again, and I don't see it
> having landed anywhere yet. Can you take this?

Yeah, sorry, it got lost; my bad.  I'll take it and push it out at the
next merge window.

      	     	    	     	   	- Ted

Re: [PATCH] random: Move rand_initialize() earlier

[Kees Cook]

On Tue, Apr 16, 2019 at 11:09 AM Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 10:46:34PM -0500, Kees Cook wrote:
> > On Fri, Oct 12, 2018 at 9:45 AM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Fri, Oct 12, 2018 at 7:29 AM, Theodore Y. Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> wrote:
> > > > On Thu, Oct 11, 2018 at 03:54:21PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > > >> Right now rand_initialize() is run as an early_initcall(), but it only
> > > >> depends on timekeeping_init() (for mixing ktime_get_real() into the
> > > >> pools). However, the call to boot_init_stack_canary() for stack canary
> > > >> initialization runs earlier, which triggers a warning at boot:
> > > >>
> > > >> random: get_random_bytes called from start_kernel+0x357/0x548 with crng_init=0
> > > >>
> > > >> Instead, this moves rand_initialize() to after timekeeping_init(), and moves
> > > >> canary initialization here as well.
> > > >>
> > > >> Note that this warning may still remain for machines that do not have
> > > >> UEFI RNG support (which initializes the RNG pools durting setup_arch()),
> > > >> or for x86 machines without RDRAND (or booting without "random.trust=on"
> > > >> or CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU=y).
> > > >>
> > > >> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> >
> > Hi Ted! Did this get lost? This has come up again, and I don't see it
> > having landed anywhere yet. Can you take this?
>
> Yeah, sorry, it got lost; my bad.  I'll take it and push it out at the
> next merge window.

Awesome; thanks!

-- 
Kees Cook

Re: [PATCH] random: Move rand_initialize() earlier

[Kees Cook]

On Tue, Apr 16, 2019 at 9:09 AM Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Apr 15, 2019 at 10:46:34PM -0500, Kees Cook wrote:
> > On Fri, Oct 12, 2018 at 9:45 AM Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
> > >
> > > On Fri, Oct 12, 2018 at 7:29 AM, Theodore Y. Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> wrote:
> > > > On Thu, Oct 11, 2018 at 03:54:21PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > > >> Right now rand_initialize() is run as an early_initcall(), but it only
> > > >> depends on timekeeping_init() (for mixing ktime_get_real() into the
> > > >> pools). However, the call to boot_init_stack_canary() for stack canary
> > > >> initialization runs earlier, which triggers a warning at boot:
> > > >>
> > > >> random: get_random_bytes called from start_kernel+0x357/0x548 with crng_init=0
> > > >>
> > > >> Instead, this moves rand_initialize() to after timekeeping_init(), and moves
> > > >> canary initialization here as well.
> > > >>
> > > >> Note that this warning may still remain for machines that do not have
> > > >> UEFI RNG support (which initializes the RNG pools durting setup_arch()),
> > > >> or for x86 machines without RDRAND (or booting without "random.trust=on"
> > > >> or CONFIG_RANDOM_TRUST_CPU=y).
> > > >>
> > > >> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> >
> > Hi Ted! Did this get lost? This has come up again, and I don't see it
> > having landed anywhere yet. Can you take this?
>
> Yeah, sorry, it got lost; my bad.  I'll take it and push it out at the
> next merge window.

Gentle poke. :) I still don't see this in -next...

-- 
Kees Cook

Re: [PATCH] random: Move rand_initialize() earlier

[Theodore Ts'o]

On Tue, Apr 23, 2019 at 03:20:58PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > Yeah, sorry, it got lost; my bad.  I'll take it and push it out at the
> > next merge window.
> 
> Gentle poke. :) I still don't see this in -next...

Oops, sorry, I pushed it out to the master branch, and I forgot that
the -next branch was pulling from the dev branch.   Fixed.

    	  	     	     	      - Ted

Re: [PATCH] random: Move rand_initialize() earlier

[Kees Cook]

On Wed, Apr 24, 2019 at 3:10 PM Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu> wrote:
>
> On Tue, Apr 23, 2019 at 03:20:58PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > > Yeah, sorry, it got lost; my bad.  I'll take it and push it out at the
> > > next merge window.
> >
> > Gentle poke. :) I still don't see this in -next...
>
> Oops, sorry, I pushed it out to the master branch, and I forgot that
> the -next branch was pulling from the dev branch.   Fixed.

Ah-ha! Thanks. :)

-- 
Kees Cook