From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
To: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
Nadav Amit <namit@vmware.com>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
Jason Baron <jbaron@akamai.com>, Jiri Kosina <jkosina@suse.cz>,
David Laight <David.Laight@ACULAB.COM>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Julia Cartwright <julia@ni.com>,
Jessica Yu <jeyu@kernel.org>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Rasmus Villemoes <linux@rasmusvillemoes.dk>,
Edward Cree <ecree@solarflare.com>,
Daniel Bristot de Oliveira <bristot@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 5/6] x86/alternative: Use a single access in text_poke() where possible
Date: Thu, 10 Jan 2019 12:21:19 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190110182119.56uw7aghymh2txke@treble> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190110180428.GG16556@linux.intel.com>
On Thu, Jan 10, 2019 at 10:04:28AM -0800, Sean Christopherson wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 10, 2019 at 12:57:57PM -0500, Steven Rostedt wrote:
> > On Thu, 10 Jan 2019 09:42:57 -0800
> > Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> wrote:
> >
> > > On Thu, Jan 10, 2019 at 12:32:43PM -0500, Steven Rostedt wrote:
> > > > On Thu, 10 Jan 2019 11:20:04 -0600
> > > > Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com> wrote:
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > > > While I can't find a reason for hypervisors to emulate this instruction,
> > > > > > smarter people might find ways to turn it into a security exploit.
> > > > >
> > > > > Interesting point... but I wonder if it's a realistic concern. BTW,
> > > > > text_poke_bp() also relies on undocumented behavior.
> > > >
> > > > But we did get an official OK from Intel that it will work. Took a bit
> > > > of arm twisting to get them to do so, but they did. And it really is
> > > > pretty robust.
> > >
> > > Did we (they?) list any caveats for this behavior? E.g. I'm fairly
> > > certain atomicity guarantees go out the window if WC memtype is used.
> >
> > Note, the text_poke_bp() process was this: (nothing to do with atomic
> > guarantees)
> >
> > add breakpoint (one byte) to instruction.
> >
> > Sync all cores (send an IPI to each one).
> >
> > change the back half of the instruction (the rest of the instruction
> > after the breakpoint).
> >
> > Sync all cores
> >
> > Remove the breakpoint with the new byte of the new instruction.
> >
> >
> > What atomicity guarantee does the above require?
>
> I was asking in the context of static calls. My understanding is that
> the write to change the imm32 of the CALL needs to be atomic from a
> code fetch perspective so that we don't jump to a junk address.
>
> Or were you saying that Intel gave an official OK on text_poke_bp()?
Yeah, I'm pretty sure he was saying that.
Whose arms can we twist for finding out about static calls? :-)
--
Josh
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-01-10 18:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 90+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-01-09 22:59 [PATCH v3 0/6] Static calls Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-09 22:59 ` [PATCH v3 1/6] compiler.h: Make __ADDRESSABLE() symbol truly unique Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-09 22:59 ` [PATCH v3 2/6] static_call: Add basic static call infrastructure Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-10 14:03 ` Edward Cree
2019-01-10 18:37 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-09 22:59 ` [PATCH v3 3/6] x86/static_call: Add out-of-line static call implementation Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-10 0:16 ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-10 16:28 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-09 22:59 ` [PATCH v3 4/6] static_call: Add inline static call infrastructure Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-09 22:59 ` [PATCH v3 5/6] x86/alternative: Use a single access in text_poke() where possible Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-10 9:32 ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-10 17:20 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-10 17:29 ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-10 17:32 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-01-10 17:42 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-01-10 17:57 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-01-10 18:04 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-01-10 18:21 ` Josh Poimboeuf [this message]
2019-01-10 18:24 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-01-11 12:10 ` Alexandre Chartre
2019-01-11 15:28 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-11 16:46 ` Alexandre Chartre
2019-01-11 16:57 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-11 17:41 ` Jason Baron
2019-01-11 17:54 ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-15 11:10 ` Alexandre Chartre
2019-01-15 16:19 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-01-15 16:45 ` Alexandre Chartre
2019-01-11 0:59 ` hpa
2019-01-11 1:34 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-01-11 8:13 ` hpa
2019-01-09 22:59 ` [PATCH v3 6/6] x86/static_call: Add inline static call implementation for x86-64 Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-10 1:21 ` [PATCH v3 0/6] Static calls Nadav Amit
2019-01-10 16:44 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-10 17:32 ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-10 18:18 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-10 19:45 ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-10 20:32 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-10 20:48 ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-10 20:57 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-10 21:47 ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-10 17:31 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-01-10 20:51 ` H. Peter Anvin
2019-01-10 20:30 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-01-10 20:52 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-10 23:02 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-01-11 0:56 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-01-11 1:47 ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-11 15:15 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-11 15:48 ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-11 16:07 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-11 17:23 ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-11 19:03 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-01-11 19:17 ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-11 19:23 ` hpa
2019-01-11 19:33 ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-11 19:34 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-01-13 0:34 ` hpa
2019-01-13 0:36 ` hpa
2019-01-11 19:39 ` Jiri Kosina
2019-01-14 2:31 ` H. Peter Anvin
2019-01-14 2:40 ` H. Peter Anvin
2019-01-14 20:11 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-01-14 22:00 ` H. Peter Anvin
2019-01-14 22:54 ` H. Peter Anvin
2019-01-15 3:05 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-01-15 5:01 ` H. Peter Anvin
2019-01-15 5:37 ` H. Peter Anvin
2019-01-14 23:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-01-14 23:51 ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-15 2:28 ` hpa
2019-01-11 20:04 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-11 20:12 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-01-11 20:31 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-11 20:46 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-01-11 21:05 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-01-11 21:10 ` Linus Torvalds
2019-01-11 21:32 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-14 12:28 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-01-11 21:22 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-11 21:23 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-11 21:25 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-11 21:36 ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-11 21:41 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2019-01-11 21:55 ` Steven Rostedt
2019-01-11 21:59 ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-11 21:56 ` Nadav Amit
2019-01-12 23:54 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-02-17 21:10 ` Jann Horn
2020-02-17 21:57 ` Steven Rostedt
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