* [PATCH 4.4 001/113] x86/vdso: Use RDPID in preference to LSL when available
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 002/113] KVM: x86: emulate RDPID Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (115 subsequent siblings)
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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Megha Dey, Andy Lutomirski,
Borislav Petkov, Brian Gerst, Denys Vlasenko, H. Peter Anvin,
Josh Poimboeuf, Linus Torvalds, Peter Zijlstra, Thomas Gleixner,
Ingo Molnar
From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
commit a582c540ac1b10f0a7d37415e04c4af42409fd08 upstream.
RDPID is a new instruction that reads MSR_TSC_AUX quickly. This
should be considerably faster than reading the GDT. Add a
cpufeature for it and use it from __vdso_getcpu() when available.
Tested-by: Megha Dey <megha.dey@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/4f6c3a22012d10f1c65b9ca15800e01b42c7d39d.1479320367.git.luto@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
arch/x86/include/asm/vgtod.h | 7 ++++++-
2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -301,6 +301,7 @@
/* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:0 (ecx), word 16 */
#define X86_FEATURE_PKU (16*32+ 3) /* Protection Keys for Userspace */
#define X86_FEATURE_OSPKE (16*32+ 4) /* OS Protection Keys Enable */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RDPID (16*32+ 22) /* RDPID instruction */
/* AMD-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x80000007 (ebx), word 17 */
#define X86_FEATURE_OVERFLOW_RECOV (17*32+0) /* MCA overflow recovery support */
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/vgtod.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/vgtod.h
@@ -83,8 +83,13 @@ static inline unsigned int __getcpu(void
* works on all CPUs. This is volatile so that it orders
* correctly wrt barrier() and to keep gcc from cleverly
* hoisting it out of the calling function.
+ *
+ * If RDPID is available, use it.
*/
- asm volatile ("lsl %1,%0" : "=r" (p) : "r" (__PER_CPU_SEG));
+ alternative_io ("lsl %[p],%[seg]",
+ ".byte 0xf3,0x0f,0xc7,0xf8", /* RDPID %eax/rax */
+ X86_FEATURE_RDPID,
+ [p] "=a" (p), [seg] "r" (__PER_CPU_SEG));
return p;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 002/113] KVM: x86: emulate RDPID
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 001/113] x86/vdso: Use RDPID in preference to LSL when available Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 003/113] ALSA: hda: Use scnprintf() for printing texts for sysfs/procfs Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (114 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Wanpeng Li, Paolo Bonzini
From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
commit fb6d4d340e0532032c808a9933eaaa7b8de435ab upstream.
This is encoded as F3 0F C7 /7 with a register argument. The register
argument is the second array in the group9 GroupDual, while F3 is the
fourth element of a Prefix.
Reviewed-by: Wanpeng Li <wanpeng.li@hotmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 7 ++++++-
arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 22 +++++++++++++++++++++-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -267,13 +267,18 @@ static int __do_cpuid_ent_emulated(struc
{
switch (func) {
case 0:
- entry->eax = 1; /* only one leaf currently */
+ entry->eax = 7;
++*nent;
break;
case 1:
entry->ecx = F(MOVBE);
++*nent;
break;
+ case 7:
+ entry->flags |= KVM_CPUID_FLAG_SIGNIFCANT_INDEX;
+ if (index == 0)
+ entry->ecx = F(RDPID);
+ ++*nent;
default:
break;
}
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c
@@ -3519,6 +3519,16 @@ static int em_cwd(struct x86_emulate_ctx
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
+static int em_rdpid(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
+{
+ u64 tsc_aux = 0;
+
+ if (ctxt->ops->get_msr(ctxt, MSR_TSC_AUX, &tsc_aux))
+ return emulate_gp(ctxt, 0);
+ ctxt->dst.val = tsc_aux;
+ return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
static int em_rdtsc(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt)
{
u64 tsc = 0;
@@ -4379,10 +4389,20 @@ static const struct opcode group8[] = {
F(DstMem | SrcImmByte | Lock | PageTable, em_btc),
};
+/*
+ * The "memory" destination is actually always a register, since we come
+ * from the register case of group9.
+ */
+static const struct gprefix pfx_0f_c7_7 = {
+ N, N, N, II(DstMem | ModRM | Op3264 | EmulateOnUD, em_rdpid, rdtscp),
+};
+
+
static const struct group_dual group9 = { {
N, I(DstMem64 | Lock | PageTable, em_cmpxchg8b), N, N, N, N, N, N,
}, {
- N, N, N, N, N, N, N, N,
+ N, N, N, N, N, N, N,
+ GP(0, &pfx_0f_c7_7),
} };
static const struct opcode group11[] = {
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -10744,6 +10744,21 @@ static int vmx_check_intercept(struct kv
struct x86_instruction_info *info,
enum x86_intercept_stage stage)
{
+ struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+ struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt = &vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt;
+
+ /*
+ * RDPID causes #UD if disabled through secondary execution controls.
+ * Because it is marked as EmulateOnUD, we need to intercept it here.
+ */
+ if (info->intercept == x86_intercept_rdtscp &&
+ !nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_RDTSCP)) {
+ ctxt->exception.vector = UD_VECTOR;
+ ctxt->exception.error_code_valid = false;
+ return X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT;
+ }
+
+ /* TODO: check more intercepts... */
return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 003/113] ALSA: hda: Use scnprintf() for printing texts for sysfs/procfs
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 001/113] x86/vdso: Use RDPID in preference to LSL when available Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 002/113] KVM: x86: emulate RDPID Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 004/113] ecryptfs: fix a memory leak bug in parse_tag_1_packet() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (113 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Takashi Iwai
From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
commit 44eeb081b8630bb3ad3cd381d1ae1831463e48bb upstream.
Some code in HD-audio driver calls snprintf() in a loop and still
expects that the return value were actually written size, while
snprintf() returns the expected would-be length instead. When the
given buffer limit were small, this leads to a buffer overflow.
Use scnprintf() for addressing those issues. It returns the actually
written size unlike snprintf().
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200218091409.27162-1-tiwai@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
sound/pci/hda/hda_codec.c | 2 +-
sound/pci/hda/hda_eld.c | 2 +-
sound/pci/hda/hda_sysfs.c | 4 ++--
3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/sound/pci/hda/hda_codec.c
+++ b/sound/pci/hda/hda_codec.c
@@ -4098,7 +4098,7 @@ void snd_print_pcm_bits(int pcm, char *b
for (i = 0, j = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(bits); i++)
if (pcm & (AC_SUPPCM_BITS_8 << i))
- j += snprintf(buf + j, buflen - j, " %d", bits[i]);
+ j += scnprintf(buf + j, buflen - j, " %d", bits[i]);
buf[j] = '\0'; /* necessary when j == 0 */
}
--- a/sound/pci/hda/hda_eld.c
+++ b/sound/pci/hda/hda_eld.c
@@ -385,7 +385,7 @@ static void hdmi_print_pcm_rates(int pcm
for (i = 0, j = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(alsa_rates); i++)
if (pcm & (1 << i))
- j += snprintf(buf + j, buflen - j, " %d",
+ j += scnprintf(buf + j, buflen - j, " %d",
alsa_rates[i]);
buf[j] = '\0'; /* necessary when j == 0 */
--- a/sound/pci/hda/hda_sysfs.c
+++ b/sound/pci/hda/hda_sysfs.c
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ static ssize_t init_verbs_show(struct de
mutex_lock(&codec->user_mutex);
for (i = 0; i < codec->init_verbs.used; i++) {
struct hda_verb *v = snd_array_elem(&codec->init_verbs, i);
- len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
+ len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
"0x%02x 0x%03x 0x%04x\n",
v->nid, v->verb, v->param);
}
@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ static ssize_t hints_show(struct device
mutex_lock(&codec->user_mutex);
for (i = 0; i < codec->hints.used; i++) {
struct hda_hint *hint = snd_array_elem(&codec->hints, i);
- len += snprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
+ len += scnprintf(buf + len, PAGE_SIZE - len,
"%s = %s\n", hint->key, hint->val);
}
mutex_unlock(&codec->user_mutex);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 004/113] ecryptfs: fix a memory leak bug in parse_tag_1_packet()
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 003/113] ALSA: hda: Use scnprintf() for printing texts for sysfs/procfs Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 005/113] ecryptfs: fix a memory leak bug in ecryptfs_init_messaging() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (112 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Wenwen Wang, Tyler Hicks
From: Wenwen Wang <wenwen@cs.uga.edu>
commit fe2e082f5da5b4a0a92ae32978f81507ef37ec66 upstream.
In parse_tag_1_packet(), if tag 1 packet contains a key larger than
ECRYPTFS_MAX_ENCRYPTED_KEY_BYTES, no cleanup is executed, leading to a
memory leak on the allocated 'auth_tok_list_item'. To fix this issue, go to
the label 'out_free' to perform the cleanup work.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: dddfa461fc89 ("[PATCH] eCryptfs: Public key; packet management")
Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang <wenwen@cs.uga.edu>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c
@@ -1280,7 +1280,7 @@ parse_tag_1_packet(struct ecryptfs_crypt
printk(KERN_ERR "Enter w/ first byte != 0x%.2x\n",
ECRYPTFS_TAG_1_PACKET_TYPE);
rc = -EINVAL;
- goto out;
+ goto out_free;
}
/* Released: wipe_auth_tok_list called in ecryptfs_parse_packet_set or
* at end of function upon failure */
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 005/113] ecryptfs: fix a memory leak bug in ecryptfs_init_messaging()
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 004/113] ecryptfs: fix a memory leak bug in parse_tag_1_packet() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 006/113] ALSA: usb-audio: Apply sample rate quirk for Audioengine D1 Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (111 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Wenwen Wang, Tyler Hicks
From: Wenwen Wang <wenwen@cs.uga.edu>
commit b4a81b87a4cfe2bb26a4a943b748d96a43ef20e8 upstream.
In ecryptfs_init_messaging(), if the allocation for 'ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr'
fails, the previously allocated 'ecryptfs_daemon_hash' is not deallocated,
leading to a memory leak bug. To fix this issue, free
'ecryptfs_daemon_hash' before returning the error.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 88b4a07e6610 ("[PATCH] eCryptfs: Public key transport mechanism")
Signed-off-by: Wenwen Wang <wenwen@cs.uga.edu>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/ecryptfs/messaging.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/fs/ecryptfs/messaging.c
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/messaging.c
@@ -397,6 +397,7 @@ int __init ecryptfs_init_messaging(void)
* ecryptfs_message_buf_len),
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!ecryptfs_msg_ctx_arr) {
+ kfree(ecryptfs_daemon_hash);
rc = -ENOMEM;
printk(KERN_ERR "%s: Failed to allocate memory\n", __func__);
goto out;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 006/113] ALSA: usb-audio: Apply sample rate quirk for Audioengine D1
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 005/113] ecryptfs: fix a memory leak bug in ecryptfs_init_messaging() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 007/113] ubifs: Fix deadlock in concurrent bulk-read and writepage Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (110 subsequent siblings)
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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Arvind Sankar, Takashi Iwai
From: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>
commit 93f9d1a4ac5930654c17412e3911b46ece73755a upstream.
The Audioengine D1 (0x2912:0x30c8) does support reading the sample rate,
but it returns the rate in byte-reversed order.
When setting sampling rate, the driver produces these warning messages:
[168840.944226] usb 3-2.2: current rate 4500480 is different from the runtime rate 44100
[168854.930414] usb 3-2.2: current rate 8436480 is different from the runtime rate 48000
[168905.185825] usb 3-2.1.2: current rate 30465 is different from the runtime rate 96000
As can be seen from the hexadecimal conversion, the current rate read
back is byte-reversed from the rate that was set.
44100 == 0x00ac44, 4500480 == 0x44ac00
48000 == 0x00bb80, 8436480 == 0x80bb00
96000 == 0x017700, 30465 == 0x007701
Rather than implementing a new quirk to reverse the order, just skip
checking the rate to avoid spamming the log.
Signed-off-by: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200211162235.1639889-1-nivedita@alum.mit.edu
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
sound/usb/quirks.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/sound/usb/quirks.c
+++ b/sound/usb/quirks.c
@@ -1150,6 +1150,7 @@ bool snd_usb_get_sample_rate_quirk(struc
case USB_ID(0x1de7, 0x0014): /* Phoenix Audio TMX320 */
case USB_ID(0x1de7, 0x0114): /* Phoenix Audio MT202pcs */
case USB_ID(0x21B4, 0x0081): /* AudioQuest DragonFly */
+ case USB_ID(0x2912, 0x30c8): /* Audioengine D1 */
return true;
}
return false;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 007/113] ubifs: Fix deadlock in concurrent bulk-read and writepage
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 006/113] ALSA: usb-audio: Apply sample rate quirk for Audioengine D1 Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 008/113] ext4: fix checksum errors with indexed dirs Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (109 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Zhihao Cheng, zhangyi (F),
Stable, Richard Weinberger
From: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com>
commit f5de5b83303e61b1f3fb09bd77ce3ac2d7a475f2 upstream.
In ubifs, concurrent execution of writepage and bulk read on the same file
may cause ABBA deadlock, for example (Reproduce method see Link):
Process A(Bulk-read starts from page4) Process B(write page4 back)
vfs_read wb_workfn or fsync
... ...
generic_file_buffered_read write_cache_pages
ubifs_readpage LOCK(page4)
ubifs_bulk_read ubifs_writepage
LOCK(ui->ui_mutex) ubifs_write_inode
ubifs_do_bulk_read LOCK(ui->ui_mutex)
find_or_create_page(alloc page4) ↑
LOCK(page4) <-- ABBA deadlock occurs!
In order to ensure the serialization execution of bulk read, we can't
remove the big lock 'ui->ui_mutex' in ubifs_bulk_read(). Instead, we
allow ubifs_do_bulk_read() to lock page failed by replacing
find_or_create_page(FGP_LOCK) with
pagecache_get_page(FGP_LOCK | FGP_NOWAIT).
Signed-off-by: Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com>
Suggested-by: zhangyi (F) <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Cc: <Stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 4793e7c5e1c ("UBIFS: add bulk-read facility")
Link: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206153
Signed-off-by: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/ubifs/file.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/ubifs/file.c
+++ b/fs/ubifs/file.c
@@ -782,8 +782,9 @@ static int ubifs_do_bulk_read(struct ubi
if (page_offset > end_index)
break;
- page = find_or_create_page(mapping, page_offset,
- GFP_NOFS | __GFP_COLD);
+ page = pagecache_get_page(mapping, page_offset,
+ FGP_LOCK|FGP_ACCESSED|FGP_CREAT|FGP_NOWAIT,
+ GFP_NOFS | __GFP_COLD);
if (!page)
break;
if (!PageUptodate(page))
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 008/113] ext4: fix checksum errors with indexed dirs
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 007/113] ubifs: Fix deadlock in concurrent bulk-read and writepage Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 009/113] Btrfs: fix race between using extent maps and merging them Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (108 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Andreas Dilger, Jan Kara,
Theodore Tso, stable
From: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
commit 48a34311953d921235f4d7bbd2111690d2e469cf upstream.
DIR_INDEX has been introduced as a compat ext4 feature. That means that
even kernels / tools that don't understand the feature may modify the
filesystem. This works because for kernels not understanding indexed dir
format, internal htree nodes appear just as empty directory entries.
Index dir aware kernels then check the htree structure is still
consistent before using the data. This all worked reasonably well until
metadata checksums were introduced. The problem is that these
effectively made DIR_INDEX only ro-compatible because internal htree
nodes store checksums in a different place than normal directory blocks.
Thus any modification ignorant to DIR_INDEX (or just clearing
EXT4_INDEX_FL from the inode) will effectively cause checksum mismatch
and trigger kernel errors. So we have to be more careful when dealing
with indexed directories on filesystems with checksumming enabled.
1) We just disallow loading any directory inodes with EXT4_INDEX_FL when
DIR_INDEX is not enabled. This is harsh but it should be very rare (it
means someone disabled DIR_INDEX on existing filesystem and didn't run
e2fsck), e2fsck can fix the problem, and we don't want to answer the
difficult question: "Should we rather corrupt the directory more or
should we ignore that DIR_INDEX feature is not set?"
2) When we find out htree structure is corrupted (but the filesystem and
the directory should in support htrees), we continue just ignoring htree
information for reading but we refuse to add new entries to the
directory to avoid corrupting it more.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200210144316.22081-1-jack@suse.cz
Fixes: dbe89444042a ("ext4: Calculate and verify checksums for htree nodes")
Reviewed-by: Andreas Dilger <adilger@dilger.ca>
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/ext4/dir.c | 14 ++++++++------
fs/ext4/ext4.h | 5 ++++-
fs/ext4/inode.c | 12 ++++++++++++
fs/ext4/namei.c | 7 +++++++
4 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/ext4/dir.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/dir.c
@@ -125,12 +125,14 @@ static int ext4_readdir(struct file *fil
if (err != ERR_BAD_DX_DIR) {
return err;
}
- /*
- * We don't set the inode dirty flag since it's not
- * critical that it get flushed back to the disk.
- */
- ext4_clear_inode_flag(file_inode(file),
- EXT4_INODE_INDEX);
+ /* Can we just clear INDEX flag to ignore htree information? */
+ if (!ext4_has_metadata_csum(sb)) {
+ /*
+ * We don't set the inode dirty flag since it's not
+ * critical that it gets flushed back to the disk.
+ */
+ ext4_clear_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_INDEX);
+ }
}
if (ext4_has_inline_data(inode)) {
--- a/fs/ext4/ext4.h
+++ b/fs/ext4/ext4.h
@@ -2381,8 +2381,11 @@ int ext4_insert_dentry(struct inode *dir
struct ext4_filename *fname);
static inline void ext4_update_dx_flag(struct inode *inode)
{
- if (!ext4_has_feature_dir_index(inode->i_sb))
+ if (!ext4_has_feature_dir_index(inode->i_sb)) {
+ /* ext4_iget() should have caught this... */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(ext4_has_feature_metadata_csum(inode->i_sb));
ext4_clear_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_INDEX);
+ }
}
static unsigned char ext4_filetype_table[] = {
DT_UNKNOWN, DT_REG, DT_DIR, DT_CHR, DT_BLK, DT_FIFO, DT_SOCK, DT_LNK
--- a/fs/ext4/inode.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c
@@ -4325,6 +4325,18 @@ struct inode *ext4_iget(struct super_blo
ret = -EFSCORRUPTED;
goto bad_inode;
}
+ /*
+ * If dir_index is not enabled but there's dir with INDEX flag set,
+ * we'd normally treat htree data as empty space. But with metadata
+ * checksumming that corrupts checksums so forbid that.
+ */
+ if (!ext4_has_feature_dir_index(sb) && ext4_has_metadata_csum(sb) &&
+ ext4_test_inode_flag(inode, EXT4_INODE_INDEX)) {
+ EXT4_ERROR_INODE(inode,
+ "iget: Dir with htree data on filesystem without dir_index feature.");
+ ret = -EFSCORRUPTED;
+ goto bad_inode;
+ }
ei->i_disksize = inode->i_size;
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
ei->i_reserved_quota = 0;
--- a/fs/ext4/namei.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/namei.c
@@ -2121,6 +2121,13 @@ static int ext4_add_entry(handle_t *hand
retval = ext4_dx_add_entry(handle, &fname, dentry, inode);
if (!retval || (retval != ERR_BAD_DX_DIR))
goto out;
+ /* Can we just ignore htree data? */
+ if (ext4_has_metadata_csum(sb)) {
+ EXT4_ERROR_INODE(dir,
+ "Directory has corrupted htree index.");
+ retval = -EFSCORRUPTED;
+ goto out;
+ }
ext4_clear_inode_flag(dir, EXT4_INODE_INDEX);
dx_fallback++;
ext4_mark_inode_dirty(handle, dir);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 009/113] Btrfs: fix race between using extent maps and merging them
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (7 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 008/113] ext4: fix checksum errors with indexed dirs Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 010/113] btrfs: log message when rw remount is attempted with unclean tree-log Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (107 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, ryusuke1925, Koki Mitani,
Josef Bacik, Filipe Manana, David Sterba
From: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
commit ac05ca913e9f3871126d61da275bfe8516ff01ca upstream.
We have a few cases where we allow an extent map that is in an extent map
tree to be merged with other extents in the tree. Such cases include the
unpinning of an extent after the respective ordered extent completed or
after logging an extent during a fast fsync. This can lead to subtle and
dangerous problems because when doing the merge some other task might be
using the same extent map and as consequence see an inconsistent state of
the extent map - for example sees the new length but has seen the old start
offset.
With luck this triggers a BUG_ON(), and not some silent bug, such as the
following one in __do_readpage():
$ cat -n fs/btrfs/extent_io.c
3061 static int __do_readpage(struct extent_io_tree *tree,
3062 struct page *page,
(...)
3127 em = __get_extent_map(inode, page, pg_offset, cur,
3128 end - cur + 1, get_extent, em_cached);
3129 if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(em)) {
3130 SetPageError(page);
3131 unlock_extent(tree, cur, end);
3132 break;
3133 }
3134 extent_offset = cur - em->start;
3135 BUG_ON(extent_map_end(em) <= cur);
(...)
Consider the following example scenario, where we end up hitting the
BUG_ON() in __do_readpage().
We have an inode with a size of 8KiB and 2 extent maps:
extent A: file offset 0, length 4KiB, disk_bytenr = X, persisted on disk by
a previous transaction
extent B: file offset 4KiB, length 4KiB, disk_bytenr = X + 4KiB, not yet
persisted but writeback started for it already. The extent map
is pinned since there's writeback and an ordered extent in
progress, so it can not be merged with extent map A yet
The following sequence of steps leads to the BUG_ON():
1) The ordered extent for extent B completes, the respective page gets its
writeback bit cleared and the extent map is unpinned, at that point it
is not yet merged with extent map A because it's in the list of modified
extents;
2) Due to memory pressure, or some other reason, the MM subsystem releases
the page corresponding to extent B - btrfs_releasepage() is called and
returns 1, meaning the page can be released as it's not dirty, not under
writeback anymore and the extent range is not locked in the inode's
iotree. However the extent map is not released, either because we are
not in a context that allows memory allocations to block or because the
inode's size is smaller than 16MiB - in this case our inode has a size
of 8KiB;
3) Task B needs to read extent B and ends up __do_readpage() through the
btrfs_readpage() callback. At __do_readpage() it gets a reference to
extent map B;
4) Task A, doing a fast fsync, calls clear_em_loggin() against extent map B
while holding the write lock on the inode's extent map tree - this
results in try_merge_map() being called and since it's possible to merge
extent map B with extent map A now (the extent map B was removed from
the list of modified extents), the merging begins - it sets extent map
B's start offset to 0 (was 4KiB), but before it increments the map's
length to 8KiB (4kb + 4KiB), task A is at:
BUG_ON(extent_map_end(em) <= cur);
The call to extent_map_end() sees the extent map has a start of 0
and a length still at 4KiB, so it returns 4KiB and 'cur' is 4KiB, so
the BUG_ON() is triggered.
So it's dangerous to modify an extent map that is in the tree, because some
other task might have got a reference to it before and still using it, and
needs to see a consistent map while using it. Generally this is very rare
since most paths that lookup and use extent maps also have the file range
locked in the inode's iotree. The fsync path is pretty much the only
exception where we don't do it to avoid serialization with concurrent
reads.
Fix this by not allowing an extent map do be merged if if it's being used
by tasks other then the one attempting to merge the extent map (when the
reference count of the extent map is greater than 2).
Reported-by: ryusuke1925 <st13s20@gm.ibaraki-ct.ac.jp>
Reported-by: Koki Mitani <koki.mitani.xg@hco.ntt.co.jp>
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206211
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/btrfs/extent_map.c | 11 +++++++++++
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/btrfs/extent_map.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/extent_map.c
@@ -227,6 +227,17 @@ static void try_merge_map(struct extent_
struct extent_map *merge = NULL;
struct rb_node *rb;
+ /*
+ * We can't modify an extent map that is in the tree and that is being
+ * used by another task, as it can cause that other task to see it in
+ * inconsistent state during the merging. We always have 1 reference for
+ * the tree and 1 for this task (which is unpinning the extent map or
+ * clearing the logging flag), so anything > 2 means it's being used by
+ * other tasks too.
+ */
+ if (atomic_read(&em->refs) > 2)
+ return;
+
if (em->start != 0) {
rb = rb_prev(&em->rb_node);
if (rb)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 010/113] btrfs: log message when rw remount is attempted with unclean tree-log
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (8 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 009/113] Btrfs: fix race between using extent maps and merging them Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 011/113] padata: Remove broken queue flushing Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (106 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Anand Jain, Johannes Thumshirn, David Sterba
From: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
commit 10a3a3edc5b89a8cd095bc63495fb1e0f42047d9 upstream.
A remount to a read-write filesystem is not safe when there's tree-log
to be replayed. Files that could be opened until now might be affected
by the changes in the tree-log.
A regular mount is needed to replay the log so the filesystem presents
the consistent view with the pending changes included.
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/btrfs/super.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
--- a/fs/btrfs/super.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/super.c
@@ -1702,6 +1702,8 @@ static int btrfs_remount(struct super_bl
}
if (btrfs_super_log_root(fs_info->super_copy) != 0) {
+ btrfs_warn(fs_info,
+ "mount required to replay tree-log, cannot remount read-write");
ret = -EINVAL;
goto restore;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 011/113] padata: Remove broken queue flushing
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (9 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 010/113] btrfs: log message when rw remount is attempted with unclean tree-log Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 012/113] s390/time: Fix clk type in get_tod_clock Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (105 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Herbert Xu, Daniel Jordan
From: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
commit 07928d9bfc81640bab36f5190e8725894d93b659 upstream.
The function padata_flush_queues is fundamentally broken because
it cannot force padata users to complete the request that is
underway. IOW padata has to passively wait for the completion
of any outstanding work.
As it stands flushing is used in two places. Its use in padata_stop
is simply unnecessary because nothing depends on the queues to
be flushed afterwards.
The other use in padata_replace is more substantial as we depend
on it to free the old pd structure. This patch instead uses the
pd->refcnt to dynamically free the pd structure once all requests
are complete.
Fixes: 2b73b07ab8a4 ("padata: Flush the padata queues actively")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
[dj: leave "pd->pinst = pinst" assignment in padata_alloc_pd()]
Signed-off-by: Daniel Jordan <daniel.m.jordan@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
kernel/padata.c | 45 ++++++++++++---------------------------------
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)
--- a/kernel/padata.c
+++ b/kernel/padata.c
@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@
#define MAX_OBJ_NUM 1000
+static void padata_free_pd(struct parallel_data *pd);
+
static int padata_index_to_cpu(struct parallel_data *pd, int cpu_index)
{
int cpu, target_cpu;
@@ -300,6 +302,7 @@ static void padata_serial_worker(struct
struct padata_serial_queue *squeue;
struct parallel_data *pd;
LIST_HEAD(local_list);
+ int cnt;
local_bh_disable();
squeue = container_of(serial_work, struct padata_serial_queue, work);
@@ -309,6 +312,8 @@ static void padata_serial_worker(struct
list_replace_init(&squeue->serial.list, &local_list);
spin_unlock(&squeue->serial.lock);
+ cnt = 0;
+
while (!list_empty(&local_list)) {
struct padata_priv *padata;
@@ -318,9 +323,12 @@ static void padata_serial_worker(struct
list_del_init(&padata->list);
padata->serial(padata);
- atomic_dec(&pd->refcnt);
+ cnt++;
}
local_bh_enable();
+
+ if (atomic_sub_and_test(cnt, &pd->refcnt))
+ padata_free_pd(pd);
}
/**
@@ -443,7 +451,7 @@ static struct parallel_data *padata_allo
setup_timer(&pd->timer, padata_reorder_timer, (unsigned long)pd);
atomic_set(&pd->seq_nr, -1);
atomic_set(&pd->reorder_objects, 0);
- atomic_set(&pd->refcnt, 0);
+ atomic_set(&pd->refcnt, 1);
pd->pinst = pinst;
spin_lock_init(&pd->lock);
@@ -468,31 +476,6 @@ static void padata_free_pd(struct parall
kfree(pd);
}
-/* Flush all objects out of the padata queues. */
-static void padata_flush_queues(struct parallel_data *pd)
-{
- int cpu;
- struct padata_parallel_queue *pqueue;
- struct padata_serial_queue *squeue;
-
- for_each_cpu(cpu, pd->cpumask.pcpu) {
- pqueue = per_cpu_ptr(pd->pqueue, cpu);
- flush_work(&pqueue->work);
- }
-
- del_timer_sync(&pd->timer);
-
- if (atomic_read(&pd->reorder_objects))
- padata_reorder(pd);
-
- for_each_cpu(cpu, pd->cpumask.cbcpu) {
- squeue = per_cpu_ptr(pd->squeue, cpu);
- flush_work(&squeue->work);
- }
-
- BUG_ON(atomic_read(&pd->refcnt) != 0);
-}
-
static void __padata_start(struct padata_instance *pinst)
{
pinst->flags |= PADATA_INIT;
@@ -506,10 +489,6 @@ static void __padata_stop(struct padata_
pinst->flags &= ~PADATA_INIT;
synchronize_rcu();
-
- get_online_cpus();
- padata_flush_queues(pinst->pd);
- put_online_cpus();
}
/* Replace the internal control structure with a new one. */
@@ -530,8 +509,8 @@ static void padata_replace(struct padata
if (!cpumask_equal(pd_old->cpumask.cbcpu, pd_new->cpumask.cbcpu))
notification_mask |= PADATA_CPU_SERIAL;
- padata_flush_queues(pd_old);
- padata_free_pd(pd_old);
+ if (atomic_dec_and_test(&pd_old->refcnt))
+ padata_free_pd(pd_old);
if (notification_mask)
blocking_notifier_call_chain(&pinst->cpumask_change_notifier,
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 012/113] s390/time: Fix clk type in get_tod_clock
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (10 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 011/113] padata: Remove broken queue flushing Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 013/113] hwmon: (pmbus/ltc2978) Fix PMBus polling of MFR_COMMON definitions Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (104 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Nick Desaulniers, Nathan Chancellor,
Vasily Gorbik
From: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
commit 0f8a206df7c920150d2aa45574fba0ab7ff6be4f upstream.
Clang warns:
In file included from ../arch/s390/boot/startup.c:3:
In file included from ../include/linux/elf.h:5:
In file included from ../arch/s390/include/asm/elf.h:132:
In file included from ../include/linux/compat.h:10:
In file included from ../include/linux/time.h:74:
In file included from ../include/linux/time32.h:13:
In file included from ../include/linux/timex.h:65:
../arch/s390/include/asm/timex.h:160:20: warning: passing 'unsigned char
[16]' to parameter of type 'char *' converts between pointers to integer
types with different sign [-Wpointer-sign]
get_tod_clock_ext(clk);
^~~
../arch/s390/include/asm/timex.h:149:44: note: passing argument to
parameter 'clk' here
static inline void get_tod_clock_ext(char *clk)
^
Change clk's type to just be char so that it matches what happens in
get_tod_clock_ext.
Fixes: 57b28f66316d ("[S390] s390_hypfs: Add new attributes")
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/861
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200208140858.47970-1-natechancellor@gmail.com
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/s390/include/asm/timex.h | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/timex.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/timex.h
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ static inline void get_tod_clock_ext(cha
static inline unsigned long long get_tod_clock(void)
{
- unsigned char clk[STORE_CLOCK_EXT_SIZE];
+ char clk[STORE_CLOCK_EXT_SIZE];
get_tod_clock_ext(clk);
return *((unsigned long long *)&clk[1]);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 013/113] hwmon: (pmbus/ltc2978) Fix PMBus polling of MFR_COMMON definitions.
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (11 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 012/113] s390/time: Fix clk type in get_tod_clock Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 014/113] jbd2: move the clearing of b_modified flag to the journal_unmap_buffer() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (103 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Mike Jones, Guenter Roeck
From: Mike Jones <michael-a1.jones@analog.com>
commit cf2b012c90e74e85d8aea7d67e48868069cfee0c upstream.
Change 21537dc driver PMBus polling of MFR_COMMON from bits 5/4 to
bits 6/5. This fixs a LTC297X family bug where polling always returns
not busy even when the part is busy. This fixes a LTC388X and
LTM467X bug where polling used PEND and NOT_IN_TRANS, and BUSY was
not polled, which can lead to NACKing of commands. LTC388X and
LTM467X modules now poll BUSY and PEND, increasing reliability by
eliminating NACKing of commands.
Signed-off-by: Mike Jones <michael-a1.jones@analog.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1580234400-2829-2-git-send-email-michael-a1.jones@analog.com
Fixes: e04d1ce9bbb49 ("hwmon: (ltc2978) Add polling for chips requiring it")
Signed-off-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/hwmon/pmbus/ltc2978.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/hwmon/pmbus/ltc2978.c
+++ b/drivers/hwmon/pmbus/ltc2978.c
@@ -89,8 +89,8 @@ enum chips { ltc2974, ltc2975, ltc2977,
#define LTC_POLL_TIMEOUT 100 /* in milli-seconds */
-#define LTC_NOT_BUSY BIT(5)
-#define LTC_NOT_PENDING BIT(4)
+#define LTC_NOT_BUSY BIT(6)
+#define LTC_NOT_PENDING BIT(5)
/*
* LTC2978 clears peak data whenever the CLEAR_FAULTS command is executed, which
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 014/113] jbd2: move the clearing of b_modified flag to the journal_unmap_buffer()
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (12 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 013/113] hwmon: (pmbus/ltc2978) Fix PMBus polling of MFR_COMMON definitions Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 015/113] jbd2: do not clear the BH_Mapped flag when forgetting a metadata buffer Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (102 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Jan Kara, zhangyi (F),
Theodore Tso, stable, Sasha Levin
From: zhangyi (F) <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
[ Upstream commit 6a66a7ded12baa6ebbb2e3e82f8cb91382814839 ]
There is no need to delay the clearing of b_modified flag to the
transaction committing time when unmapping the journalled buffer, so
just move it to the journal_unmap_buffer().
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200213063821.30455-2-yi.zhang@huawei.com
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: zhangyi (F) <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
fs/jbd2/commit.c | 43 +++++++++++++++----------------------------
fs/jbd2/transaction.c | 10 ++++++----
2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/jbd2/commit.c b/fs/jbd2/commit.c
index ebbd7d054cabd..3bf86d912b76f 100644
--- a/fs/jbd2/commit.c
+++ b/fs/jbd2/commit.c
@@ -987,34 +987,21 @@ void jbd2_journal_commit_transaction(journal_t *journal)
* it. */
/*
- * A buffer which has been freed while still being journaled by
- * a previous transaction.
- */
- if (buffer_freed(bh)) {
- /*
- * If the running transaction is the one containing
- * "add to orphan" operation (b_next_transaction !=
- * NULL), we have to wait for that transaction to
- * commit before we can really get rid of the buffer.
- * So just clear b_modified to not confuse transaction
- * credit accounting and refile the buffer to
- * BJ_Forget of the running transaction. If the just
- * committed transaction contains "add to orphan"
- * operation, we can completely invalidate the buffer
- * now. We are rather through in that since the
- * buffer may be still accessible when blocksize <
- * pagesize and it is attached to the last partial
- * page.
- */
- jh->b_modified = 0;
- if (!jh->b_next_transaction) {
- clear_buffer_freed(bh);
- clear_buffer_jbddirty(bh);
- clear_buffer_mapped(bh);
- clear_buffer_new(bh);
- clear_buffer_req(bh);
- bh->b_bdev = NULL;
- }
+ * A buffer which has been freed while still being journaled
+ * by a previous transaction, refile the buffer to BJ_Forget of
+ * the running transaction. If the just committed transaction
+ * contains "add to orphan" operation, we can completely
+ * invalidate the buffer now. We are rather through in that
+ * since the buffer may be still accessible when blocksize <
+ * pagesize and it is attached to the last partial page.
+ */
+ if (buffer_freed(bh) && !jh->b_next_transaction) {
+ clear_buffer_freed(bh);
+ clear_buffer_jbddirty(bh);
+ clear_buffer_mapped(bh);
+ clear_buffer_new(bh);
+ clear_buffer_req(bh);
+ bh->b_bdev = NULL;
}
if (buffer_jbddirty(bh)) {
diff --git a/fs/jbd2/transaction.c b/fs/jbd2/transaction.c
index c34433432d471..6457023d8fac1 100644
--- a/fs/jbd2/transaction.c
+++ b/fs/jbd2/transaction.c
@@ -2223,14 +2223,16 @@ static int journal_unmap_buffer(journal_t *journal, struct buffer_head *bh,
return -EBUSY;
}
/*
- * OK, buffer won't be reachable after truncate. We just set
- * j_next_transaction to the running transaction (if there is
- * one) and mark buffer as freed so that commit code knows it
- * should clear dirty bits when it is done with the buffer.
+ * OK, buffer won't be reachable after truncate. We just clear
+ * b_modified to not confuse transaction credit accounting, and
+ * set j_next_transaction to the running transaction (if there
+ * is one) and mark buffer as freed so that commit code knows
+ * it should clear dirty bits when it is done with the buffer.
*/
set_buffer_freed(bh);
if (journal->j_running_transaction && buffer_jbddirty(bh))
jh->b_next_transaction = journal->j_running_transaction;
+ jh->b_modified = 0;
jbd2_journal_put_journal_head(jh);
spin_unlock(&journal->j_list_lock);
jbd_unlock_bh_state(bh);
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 015/113] jbd2: do not clear the BH_Mapped flag when forgetting a metadata buffer
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (13 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 014/113] jbd2: move the clearing of b_modified flag to the journal_unmap_buffer() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 016/113] btrfs: print message when tree-log replay starts Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (101 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Jan Kara, zhangyi (F),
Theodore Tso, stable, Sasha Levin
From: zhangyi (F) <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
[ Upstream commit c96dceeabf765d0b1b1f29c3bf50a5c01315b820 ]
Commit 904cdbd41d74 ("jbd2: clear dirty flag when revoking a buffer from
an older transaction") set the BH_Freed flag when forgetting a metadata
buffer which belongs to the committing transaction, it indicate the
committing process clear dirty bits when it is done with the buffer. But
it also clear the BH_Mapped flag at the same time, which may trigger
below NULL pointer oops when block_size < PAGE_SIZE.
rmdir 1 kjournald2 mkdir 2
jbd2_journal_commit_transaction
commit transaction N
jbd2_journal_forget
set_buffer_freed(bh1)
jbd2_journal_commit_transaction
commit transaction N+1
...
clear_buffer_mapped(bh1)
ext4_getblk(bh2 ummapped)
...
grow_dev_page
init_page_buffers
bh1->b_private=NULL
bh2->b_private=NULL
jbd2_journal_put_journal_head(jh1)
__journal_remove_journal_head(hb1)
jh1 is NULL and trigger oops
*) Dir entry block bh1 and bh2 belongs to one page, and the bh2 has
already been unmapped.
For the metadata buffer we forgetting, we should always keep the mapped
flag and clear the dirty flags is enough, so this patch pick out the
these buffers and keep their BH_Mapped flag.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200213063821.30455-3-yi.zhang@huawei.com
Fixes: 904cdbd41d74 ("jbd2: clear dirty flag when revoking a buffer from an older transaction")
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: zhangyi (F) <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
fs/jbd2/commit.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/jbd2/commit.c b/fs/jbd2/commit.c
index 3bf86d912b76f..7fe61edb1bb9e 100644
--- a/fs/jbd2/commit.c
+++ b/fs/jbd2/commit.c
@@ -996,12 +996,29 @@ void jbd2_journal_commit_transaction(journal_t *journal)
* pagesize and it is attached to the last partial page.
*/
if (buffer_freed(bh) && !jh->b_next_transaction) {
+ struct address_space *mapping;
+
clear_buffer_freed(bh);
clear_buffer_jbddirty(bh);
- clear_buffer_mapped(bh);
- clear_buffer_new(bh);
- clear_buffer_req(bh);
- bh->b_bdev = NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * Block device buffers need to stay mapped all the
+ * time, so it is enough to clear buffer_jbddirty and
+ * buffer_freed bits. For the file mapping buffers (i.e.
+ * journalled data) we need to unmap buffer and clear
+ * more bits. We also need to be careful about the check
+ * because the data page mapping can get cleared under
+ * out hands, which alse need not to clear more bits
+ * because the page and buffers will be freed and can
+ * never be reused once we are done with them.
+ */
+ mapping = READ_ONCE(bh->b_page->mapping);
+ if (mapping && !sb_is_blkdev_sb(mapping->host->i_sb)) {
+ clear_buffer_mapped(bh);
+ clear_buffer_new(bh);
+ clear_buffer_req(bh);
+ bh->b_bdev = NULL;
+ }
}
if (buffer_jbddirty(bh)) {
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 016/113] btrfs: print message when tree-log replay starts
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (14 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 015/113] jbd2: do not clear the BH_Mapped flag when forgetting a metadata buffer Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 017/113] scsi: qla2xxx: fix a potential NULL pointer dereference Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (100 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Chris Murphy, Anand Jain,
Johannes Thumshirn, David Sterba, Sasha Levin
From: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
[ Upstream commit e8294f2f6aa6208ed0923aa6d70cea3be178309a ]
There's no logged information about tree-log replay although this is
something that points to previous unclean unmount. Other filesystems
report that as well.
Suggested-by: Chris Murphy <lists@colorremedies.com>
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Anand Jain <anand.jain@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
fs/btrfs/disk-io.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c
index 2fb533233e8e3..656f0b7681855 100644
--- a/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/disk-io.c
@@ -2972,6 +2972,7 @@ int open_ctree(struct super_block *sb,
/* do not make disk changes in broken FS */
if (btrfs_super_log_root(disk_super) != 0) {
+ btrfs_info(fs_info, "start tree-log replay");
ret = btrfs_replay_log(fs_info, fs_devices);
if (ret) {
err = ret;
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 017/113] scsi: qla2xxx: fix a potential NULL pointer dereference
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (15 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 016/113] btrfs: print message when tree-log replay starts Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 018/113] Revert "KVM: VMX: Add non-canonical check on writes to RTIT address MSRs" Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (99 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Allen Pais, Martin Wilck,
Himanshu Madhani, Martin K. Petersen, Ajay Kaher
From: Allen Pais <allen.pais@oracle.com>
commit 35a79a63517981a8aea395497c548776347deda8 upstream.
alloc_workqueue is not checked for errors and as a result a potential
NULL dereference could occur.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1568824618-4366-1-git-send-email-allen.pais@oracle.com
Signed-off-by: Allen Pais <allen.pais@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Martin Wilck <mwilck@suse.com>
Acked-by: Himanshu Madhani <hmadhani@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
[Ajay: Rewrote this patch for v4.4.y, as 4.4.y codebase is different from mainline]
Signed-off-by: Ajay Kaher <akaher@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_os.c | 19 +++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_os.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_os.c
@@ -429,6 +429,12 @@ static int qla25xx_setup_mode(struct scs
goto fail;
}
if (ql2xmultique_tag) {
+ ha->wq = alloc_workqueue("qla2xxx_wq", WQ_MEM_RECLAIM, 1);
+ if (unlikely(!ha->wq)) {
+ ql_log(ql_log_warn, vha, 0x01e0,
+ "Failed to alloc workqueue.\n");
+ goto fail;
+ }
/* create a request queue for IO */
options |= BIT_7;
req = qla25xx_create_req_que(ha, options, 0, 0, -1,
@@ -436,9 +442,8 @@ static int qla25xx_setup_mode(struct scs
if (!req) {
ql_log(ql_log_warn, vha, 0x00e0,
"Failed to create request queue.\n");
- goto fail;
+ goto fail2;
}
- ha->wq = alloc_workqueue("qla2xxx_wq", WQ_MEM_RECLAIM, 1);
vha->req = ha->req_q_map[req];
options |= BIT_1;
for (ques = 1; ques < ha->max_rsp_queues; ques++) {
@@ -446,7 +451,7 @@ static int qla25xx_setup_mode(struct scs
if (!ret) {
ql_log(ql_log_warn, vha, 0x00e8,
"Failed to create response queue.\n");
- goto fail2;
+ goto fail3;
}
}
ha->flags.cpu_affinity_enabled = 1;
@@ -460,11 +465,13 @@ static int qla25xx_setup_mode(struct scs
ha->max_rsp_queues, ha->max_req_queues);
}
return 0;
-fail2:
+
+fail3:
qla25xx_delete_queues(vha);
- destroy_workqueue(ha->wq);
- ha->wq = NULL;
vha->req = ha->req_q_map[0];
+fail2:
+ destroy_workqueue(ha->wq);
+ ha->wq = NULL;
fail:
ha->mqenable = 0;
kfree(ha->req_q_map);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 018/113] Revert "KVM: VMX: Add non-canonical check on writes to RTIT address MSRs"
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (16 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 017/113] scsi: qla2xxx: fix a potential NULL pointer dereference Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 019/113] drm/gma500: Fixup fbdev stolen size usage evaluation Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (98 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Sasha Levin
This reverts commit 57211b7366cc2abf784c35e537b256e7fcddc91e.
This patch isn't needed on 4.19 and older.
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 8033 ----------------------------------------
1 file changed, 8033 deletions(-)
delete mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 3791ce8d269e0..0000000000000
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,8033 +0,0 @@
-// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
-/*
- * Kernel-based Virtual Machine driver for Linux
- *
- * This module enables machines with Intel VT-x extensions to run virtual
- * machines without emulation or binary translation.
- *
- * Copyright (C) 2006 Qumranet, Inc.
- * Copyright 2010 Red Hat, Inc. and/or its affiliates.
- *
- * Authors:
- * Avi Kivity <avi@qumranet.com>
- * Yaniv Kamay <yaniv@qumranet.com>
- */
-
-#include <linux/frame.h>
-#include <linux/highmem.h>
-#include <linux/hrtimer.h>
-#include <linux/kernel.h>
-#include <linux/kvm_host.h>
-#include <linux/module.h>
-#include <linux/moduleparam.h>
-#include <linux/mod_devicetable.h>
-#include <linux/mm.h>
-#include <linux/sched.h>
-#include <linux/sched/smt.h>
-#include <linux/slab.h>
-#include <linux/tboot.h>
-#include <linux/trace_events.h>
-
-#include <asm/apic.h>
-#include <asm/asm.h>
-#include <asm/cpu.h>
-#include <asm/debugreg.h>
-#include <asm/desc.h>
-#include <asm/fpu/internal.h>
-#include <asm/io.h>
-#include <asm/irq_remapping.h>
-#include <asm/kexec.h>
-#include <asm/perf_event.h>
-#include <asm/mce.h>
-#include <asm/mmu_context.h>
-#include <asm/mshyperv.h>
-#include <asm/spec-ctrl.h>
-#include <asm/virtext.h>
-#include <asm/vmx.h>
-
-#include "capabilities.h"
-#include "cpuid.h"
-#include "evmcs.h"
-#include "irq.h"
-#include "kvm_cache_regs.h"
-#include "lapic.h"
-#include "mmu.h"
-#include "nested.h"
-#include "ops.h"
-#include "pmu.h"
-#include "trace.h"
-#include "vmcs.h"
-#include "vmcs12.h"
-#include "vmx.h"
-#include "x86.h"
-
-MODULE_AUTHOR("Qumranet");
-MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
-
-static const struct x86_cpu_id vmx_cpu_id[] = {
- X86_FEATURE_MATCH(X86_FEATURE_VMX),
- {}
-};
-MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(x86cpu, vmx_cpu_id);
-
-bool __read_mostly enable_vpid = 1;
-module_param_named(vpid, enable_vpid, bool, 0444);
-
-static bool __read_mostly enable_vnmi = 1;
-module_param_named(vnmi, enable_vnmi, bool, S_IRUGO);
-
-bool __read_mostly flexpriority_enabled = 1;
-module_param_named(flexpriority, flexpriority_enabled, bool, S_IRUGO);
-
-bool __read_mostly enable_ept = 1;
-module_param_named(ept, enable_ept, bool, S_IRUGO);
-
-bool __read_mostly enable_unrestricted_guest = 1;
-module_param_named(unrestricted_guest,
- enable_unrestricted_guest, bool, S_IRUGO);
-
-bool __read_mostly enable_ept_ad_bits = 1;
-module_param_named(eptad, enable_ept_ad_bits, bool, S_IRUGO);
-
-static bool __read_mostly emulate_invalid_guest_state = true;
-module_param(emulate_invalid_guest_state, bool, S_IRUGO);
-
-static bool __read_mostly fasteoi = 1;
-module_param(fasteoi, bool, S_IRUGO);
-
-static bool __read_mostly enable_apicv = 1;
-module_param(enable_apicv, bool, S_IRUGO);
-
-/*
- * If nested=1, nested virtualization is supported, i.e., guests may use
- * VMX and be a hypervisor for its own guests. If nested=0, guests may not
- * use VMX instructions.
- */
-static bool __read_mostly nested = 1;
-module_param(nested, bool, S_IRUGO);
-
-bool __read_mostly enable_pml = 1;
-module_param_named(pml, enable_pml, bool, S_IRUGO);
-
-static bool __read_mostly dump_invalid_vmcs = 0;
-module_param(dump_invalid_vmcs, bool, 0644);
-
-#define MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC 1
-#define MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV 2
-
-#define KVM_VMX_TSC_MULTIPLIER_MAX 0xffffffffffffffffULL
-
-/* Guest_tsc -> host_tsc conversion requires 64-bit division. */
-static int __read_mostly cpu_preemption_timer_multi;
-static bool __read_mostly enable_preemption_timer = 1;
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-module_param_named(preemption_timer, enable_preemption_timer, bool, S_IRUGO);
-#endif
-
-#define KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_OFF (X86_CR0_NW | X86_CR0_CD)
-#define KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_ON_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST X86_CR0_NE
-#define KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_ON \
- (KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_ON_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST | \
- X86_CR0_WP | X86_CR0_PG | X86_CR0_PE)
-#define KVM_CR4_GUEST_OWNED_BITS \
- (X86_CR4_PVI | X86_CR4_DE | X86_CR4_PCE | X86_CR4_OSFXSR \
- | X86_CR4_OSXMMEXCPT | X86_CR4_LA57 | X86_CR4_TSD)
-
-#define KVM_VM_CR4_ALWAYS_ON_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST X86_CR4_VMXE
-#define KVM_PMODE_VM_CR4_ALWAYS_ON (X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_VMXE)
-#define KVM_RMODE_VM_CR4_ALWAYS_ON (X86_CR4_VME | X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_VMXE)
-
-#define RMODE_GUEST_OWNED_EFLAGS_BITS (~(X86_EFLAGS_IOPL | X86_EFLAGS_VM))
-
-#define MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS_MASK (~(RTIT_STATUS_FILTEREN | \
- RTIT_STATUS_CONTEXTEN | RTIT_STATUS_TRIGGEREN | \
- RTIT_STATUS_ERROR | RTIT_STATUS_STOPPED | \
- RTIT_STATUS_BYTECNT))
-
-#define MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE_MASK \
- (~((1UL << cpuid_query_maxphyaddr(vcpu)) - 1) | 0x7f)
-
-/*
- * These 2 parameters are used to config the controls for Pause-Loop Exiting:
- * ple_gap: upper bound on the amount of time between two successive
- * executions of PAUSE in a loop. Also indicate if ple enabled.
- * According to test, this time is usually smaller than 128 cycles.
- * ple_window: upper bound on the amount of time a guest is allowed to execute
- * in a PAUSE loop. Tests indicate that most spinlocks are held for
- * less than 2^12 cycles
- * Time is measured based on a counter that runs at the same rate as the TSC,
- * refer SDM volume 3b section 21.6.13 & 22.1.3.
- */
-static unsigned int ple_gap = KVM_DEFAULT_PLE_GAP;
-module_param(ple_gap, uint, 0444);
-
-static unsigned int ple_window = KVM_VMX_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW;
-module_param(ple_window, uint, 0444);
-
-/* Default doubles per-vcpu window every exit. */
-static unsigned int ple_window_grow = KVM_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW_GROW;
-module_param(ple_window_grow, uint, 0444);
-
-/* Default resets per-vcpu window every exit to ple_window. */
-static unsigned int ple_window_shrink = KVM_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW_SHRINK;
-module_param(ple_window_shrink, uint, 0444);
-
-/* Default is to compute the maximum so we can never overflow. */
-static unsigned int ple_window_max = KVM_VMX_DEFAULT_PLE_WINDOW_MAX;
-module_param(ple_window_max, uint, 0444);
-
-/* Default is SYSTEM mode, 1 for host-guest mode */
-int __read_mostly pt_mode = PT_MODE_SYSTEM;
-module_param(pt_mode, int, S_IRUGO);
-
-static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(vmx_l1d_should_flush);
-static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(vmx_l1d_flush_cond);
-static DEFINE_MUTEX(vmx_l1d_flush_mutex);
-
-/* Storage for pre module init parameter parsing */
-static enum vmx_l1d_flush_state __read_mostly vmentry_l1d_flush_param = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO;
-
-static const struct {
- const char *option;
- bool for_parse;
-} vmentry_l1d_param[] = {
- [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO] = {"auto", true},
- [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER] = {"never", true},
- [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND] = {"cond", true},
- [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_ALWAYS] = {"always", true},
- [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_EPT_DISABLED] = {"EPT disabled", false},
- [VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NOT_REQUIRED] = {"not required", false},
-};
-
-#define L1D_CACHE_ORDER 4
-static void *vmx_l1d_flush_pages;
-
-static int vmx_setup_l1d_flush(enum vmx_l1d_flush_state l1tf)
-{
- struct page *page;
- unsigned int i;
-
- if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_L1TF)) {
- l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NOT_REQUIRED;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (!enable_ept) {
- l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_EPT_DISABLED;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ARCH_CAPABILITIES)) {
- u64 msr;
-
- rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES, msr);
- if (msr & ARCH_CAP_SKIP_VMENTRY_L1DFLUSH) {
- l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NOT_REQUIRED;
- return 0;
- }
- }
-
- /* If set to auto use the default l1tf mitigation method */
- if (l1tf == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO) {
- switch (l1tf_mitigation) {
- case L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF:
- l1tf = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER;
- break;
- case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN:
- case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH:
- case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT:
- l1tf = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND;
- break;
- case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL:
- case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL_FORCE:
- l1tf = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_ALWAYS;
- break;
- }
- } else if (l1tf_mitigation == L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL_FORCE) {
- l1tf = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_ALWAYS;
- }
-
- if (l1tf != VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER && !vmx_l1d_flush_pages &&
- !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D)) {
- /*
- * This allocation for vmx_l1d_flush_pages is not tied to a VM
- * lifetime and so should not be charged to a memcg.
- */
- page = alloc_pages(GFP_KERNEL, L1D_CACHE_ORDER);
- if (!page)
- return -ENOMEM;
- vmx_l1d_flush_pages = page_address(page);
-
- /*
- * Initialize each page with a different pattern in
- * order to protect against KSM in the nested
- * virtualization case.
- */
- for (i = 0; i < 1u << L1D_CACHE_ORDER; ++i) {
- memset(vmx_l1d_flush_pages + i * PAGE_SIZE, i + 1,
- PAGE_SIZE);
- }
- }
-
- l1tf_vmx_mitigation = l1tf;
-
- if (l1tf != VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER)
- static_branch_enable(&vmx_l1d_should_flush);
- else
- static_branch_disable(&vmx_l1d_should_flush);
-
- if (l1tf == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_COND)
- static_branch_enable(&vmx_l1d_flush_cond);
- else
- static_branch_disable(&vmx_l1d_flush_cond);
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int vmentry_l1d_flush_parse(const char *s)
-{
- unsigned int i;
-
- if (s) {
- for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(vmentry_l1d_param); i++) {
- if (vmentry_l1d_param[i].for_parse &&
- sysfs_streq(s, vmentry_l1d_param[i].option))
- return i;
- }
- }
- return -EINVAL;
-}
-
-static int vmentry_l1d_flush_set(const char *s, const struct kernel_param *kp)
-{
- int l1tf, ret;
-
- l1tf = vmentry_l1d_flush_parse(s);
- if (l1tf < 0)
- return l1tf;
-
- if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_L1TF))
- return 0;
-
- /*
- * Has vmx_init() run already? If not then this is the pre init
- * parameter parsing. In that case just store the value and let
- * vmx_init() do the proper setup after enable_ept has been
- * established.
- */
- if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO) {
- vmentry_l1d_flush_param = l1tf;
- return 0;
- }
-
- mutex_lock(&vmx_l1d_flush_mutex);
- ret = vmx_setup_l1d_flush(l1tf);
- mutex_unlock(&vmx_l1d_flush_mutex);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int vmentry_l1d_flush_get(char *s, const struct kernel_param *kp)
-{
- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(l1tf_vmx_mitigation >= ARRAY_SIZE(vmentry_l1d_param)))
- return sprintf(s, "???\n");
-
- return sprintf(s, "%s\n", vmentry_l1d_param[l1tf_vmx_mitigation].option);
-}
-
-static const struct kernel_param_ops vmentry_l1d_flush_ops = {
- .set = vmentry_l1d_flush_set,
- .get = vmentry_l1d_flush_get,
-};
-module_param_cb(vmentry_l1d_flush, &vmentry_l1d_flush_ops, NULL, 0644);
-
-static bool guest_state_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
-static u32 vmx_segment_access_rights(struct kvm_segment *var);
-static __always_inline void vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap,
- u32 msr, int type);
-
-void vmx_vmexit(void);
-
-#define vmx_insn_failed(fmt...) \
-do { \
- WARN_ONCE(1, fmt); \
- pr_warn_ratelimited(fmt); \
-} while (0)
-
-asmlinkage void vmread_error(unsigned long field, bool fault)
-{
- if (fault)
- kvm_spurious_fault();
- else
- vmx_insn_failed("kvm: vmread failed: field=%lx\n", field);
-}
-
-noinline void vmwrite_error(unsigned long field, unsigned long value)
-{
- vmx_insn_failed("kvm: vmwrite failed: field=%lx val=%lx err=%d\n",
- field, value, vmcs_read32(VM_INSTRUCTION_ERROR));
-}
-
-noinline void vmclear_error(struct vmcs *vmcs, u64 phys_addr)
-{
- vmx_insn_failed("kvm: vmclear failed: %p/%llx\n", vmcs, phys_addr);
-}
-
-noinline void vmptrld_error(struct vmcs *vmcs, u64 phys_addr)
-{
- vmx_insn_failed("kvm: vmptrld failed: %p/%llx\n", vmcs, phys_addr);
-}
-
-noinline void invvpid_error(unsigned long ext, u16 vpid, gva_t gva)
-{
- vmx_insn_failed("kvm: invvpid failed: ext=0x%lx vpid=%u gva=0x%lx\n",
- ext, vpid, gva);
-}
-
-noinline void invept_error(unsigned long ext, u64 eptp, gpa_t gpa)
-{
- vmx_insn_failed("kvm: invept failed: ext=0x%lx eptp=%llx gpa=0x%llx\n",
- ext, eptp, gpa);
-}
-
-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vmcs *, vmxarea);
-DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct vmcs *, current_vmcs);
-/*
- * We maintain a per-CPU linked-list of VMCS loaded on that CPU. This is needed
- * when a CPU is brought down, and we need to VMCLEAR all VMCSs loaded on it.
- */
-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct list_head, loaded_vmcss_on_cpu);
-
-/*
- * We maintian a per-CPU linked-list of vCPU, so in wakeup_handler() we
- * can find which vCPU should be waken up.
- */
-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct list_head, blocked_vcpu_on_cpu);
-static DEFINE_PER_CPU(spinlock_t, blocked_vcpu_on_cpu_lock);
-
-static DECLARE_BITMAP(vmx_vpid_bitmap, VMX_NR_VPIDS);
-static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(vmx_vpid_lock);
-
-struct vmcs_config vmcs_config;
-struct vmx_capability vmx_capability;
-
-#define VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD(seg) \
- [VCPU_SREG_##seg] = { \
- .selector = GUEST_##seg##_SELECTOR, \
- .base = GUEST_##seg##_BASE, \
- .limit = GUEST_##seg##_LIMIT, \
- .ar_bytes = GUEST_##seg##_AR_BYTES, \
- }
-
-static const struct kvm_vmx_segment_field {
- unsigned selector;
- unsigned base;
- unsigned limit;
- unsigned ar_bytes;
-} kvm_vmx_segment_fields[] = {
- VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD(CS),
- VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD(DS),
- VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD(ES),
- VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD(FS),
- VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD(GS),
- VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD(SS),
- VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD(TR),
- VMX_SEGMENT_FIELD(LDTR),
-};
-
-u64 host_efer;
-static unsigned long host_idt_base;
-
-/*
- * Though SYSCALL is only supported in 64-bit mode on Intel CPUs, kvm
- * will emulate SYSCALL in legacy mode if the vendor string in guest
- * CPUID.0:{EBX,ECX,EDX} is "AuthenticAMD" or "AMDisbetter!" To
- * support this emulation, IA32_STAR must always be included in
- * vmx_msr_index[], even in i386 builds.
- */
-const u32 vmx_msr_index[] = {
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
- MSR_SYSCALL_MASK, MSR_LSTAR, MSR_CSTAR,
-#endif
- MSR_EFER, MSR_TSC_AUX, MSR_STAR,
- MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL,
-};
-
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV)
-static bool __read_mostly enlightened_vmcs = true;
-module_param(enlightened_vmcs, bool, 0444);
-
-/* check_ept_pointer() should be under protection of ept_pointer_lock. */
-static void check_ept_pointer_match(struct kvm *kvm)
-{
- struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
- u64 tmp_eptp = INVALID_PAGE;
- int i;
-
- kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
- if (!VALID_PAGE(tmp_eptp)) {
- tmp_eptp = to_vmx(vcpu)->ept_pointer;
- } else if (tmp_eptp != to_vmx(vcpu)->ept_pointer) {
- to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->ept_pointers_match
- = EPT_POINTERS_MISMATCH;
- return;
- }
- }
-
- to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->ept_pointers_match = EPT_POINTERS_MATCH;
-}
-
-static int kvm_fill_hv_flush_list_func(struct hv_guest_mapping_flush_list *flush,
- void *data)
-{
- struct kvm_tlb_range *range = data;
-
- return hyperv_fill_flush_guest_mapping_list(flush, range->start_gfn,
- range->pages);
-}
-
-static inline int __hv_remote_flush_tlb_with_range(struct kvm *kvm,
- struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_tlb_range *range)
-{
- u64 ept_pointer = to_vmx(vcpu)->ept_pointer;
-
- /*
- * FLUSH_GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS_SPACE hypercall needs address
- * of the base of EPT PML4 table, strip off EPT configuration
- * information.
- */
- if (range)
- return hyperv_flush_guest_mapping_range(ept_pointer & PAGE_MASK,
- kvm_fill_hv_flush_list_func, (void *)range);
- else
- return hyperv_flush_guest_mapping(ept_pointer & PAGE_MASK);
-}
-
-static int hv_remote_flush_tlb_with_range(struct kvm *kvm,
- struct kvm_tlb_range *range)
-{
- struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
- int ret = 0, i;
-
- spin_lock(&to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->ept_pointer_lock);
-
- if (to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->ept_pointers_match == EPT_POINTERS_CHECK)
- check_ept_pointer_match(kvm);
-
- if (to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->ept_pointers_match != EPT_POINTERS_MATCH) {
- kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm) {
- /* If ept_pointer is invalid pointer, bypass flush request. */
- if (VALID_PAGE(to_vmx(vcpu)->ept_pointer))
- ret |= __hv_remote_flush_tlb_with_range(
- kvm, vcpu, range);
- }
- } else {
- ret = __hv_remote_flush_tlb_with_range(kvm,
- kvm_get_vcpu(kvm, 0), range);
- }
-
- spin_unlock(&to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->ept_pointer_lock);
- return ret;
-}
-static int hv_remote_flush_tlb(struct kvm *kvm)
-{
- return hv_remote_flush_tlb_with_range(kvm, NULL);
-}
-
-static int hv_enable_direct_tlbflush(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct hv_enlightened_vmcs *evmcs;
- struct hv_partition_assist_pg **p_hv_pa_pg =
- &vcpu->kvm->arch.hyperv.hv_pa_pg;
- /*
- * Synthetic VM-Exit is not enabled in current code and so All
- * evmcs in singe VM shares same assist page.
- */
- if (!*p_hv_pa_pg)
- *p_hv_pa_pg = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
-
- if (!*p_hv_pa_pg)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- evmcs = (struct hv_enlightened_vmcs *)to_vmx(vcpu)->loaded_vmcs->vmcs;
-
- evmcs->partition_assist_page =
- __pa(*p_hv_pa_pg);
- evmcs->hv_vm_id = (unsigned long)vcpu->kvm;
- evmcs->hv_enlightenments_control.nested_flush_hypercall = 1;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV) */
-
-/*
- * Comment's format: document - errata name - stepping - processor name.
- * Refer from
- * https://www.virtualbox.org/svn/vbox/trunk/src/VBox/VMM/VMMR0/HMR0.cpp
- */
-static u32 vmx_preemption_cpu_tfms[] = {
-/* 323344.pdf - BA86 - D0 - Xeon 7500 Series */
-0x000206E6,
-/* 323056.pdf - AAX65 - C2 - Xeon L3406 */
-/* 322814.pdf - AAT59 - C2 - i7-600, i5-500, i5-400 and i3-300 Mobile */
-/* 322911.pdf - AAU65 - C2 - i5-600, i3-500 Desktop and Pentium G6950 */
-0x00020652,
-/* 322911.pdf - AAU65 - K0 - i5-600, i3-500 Desktop and Pentium G6950 */
-0x00020655,
-/* 322373.pdf - AAO95 - B1 - Xeon 3400 Series */
-/* 322166.pdf - AAN92 - B1 - i7-800 and i5-700 Desktop */
-/*
- * 320767.pdf - AAP86 - B1 -
- * i7-900 Mobile Extreme, i7-800 and i7-700 Mobile
- */
-0x000106E5,
-/* 321333.pdf - AAM126 - C0 - Xeon 3500 */
-0x000106A0,
-/* 321333.pdf - AAM126 - C1 - Xeon 3500 */
-0x000106A1,
-/* 320836.pdf - AAJ124 - C0 - i7-900 Desktop Extreme and i7-900 Desktop */
-0x000106A4,
- /* 321333.pdf - AAM126 - D0 - Xeon 3500 */
- /* 321324.pdf - AAK139 - D0 - Xeon 5500 */
- /* 320836.pdf - AAJ124 - D0 - i7-900 Extreme and i7-900 Desktop */
-0x000106A5,
- /* Xeon E3-1220 V2 */
-0x000306A8,
-};
-
-static inline bool cpu_has_broken_vmx_preemption_timer(void)
-{
- u32 eax = cpuid_eax(0x00000001), i;
-
- /* Clear the reserved bits */
- eax &= ~(0x3U << 14 | 0xfU << 28);
- for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(vmx_preemption_cpu_tfms); i++)
- if (eax == vmx_preemption_cpu_tfms[i])
- return true;
-
- return false;
-}
-
-static inline bool cpu_need_virtualize_apic_accesses(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- return flexpriority_enabled && lapic_in_kernel(vcpu);
-}
-
-static inline bool report_flexpriority(void)
-{
- return flexpriority_enabled;
-}
-
-static inline int __find_msr_index(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr)
-{
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < vmx->nmsrs; ++i)
- if (vmx_msr_index[vmx->guest_msrs[i].index] == msr)
- return i;
- return -1;
-}
-
-struct shared_msr_entry *find_msr_entry(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u32 msr)
-{
- int i;
-
- i = __find_msr_index(vmx, msr);
- if (i >= 0)
- return &vmx->guest_msrs[i];
- return NULL;
-}
-
-static int vmx_set_guest_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, struct shared_msr_entry *msr, u64 data)
-{
- int ret = 0;
-
- u64 old_msr_data = msr->data;
- msr->data = data;
- if (msr - vmx->guest_msrs < vmx->save_nmsrs) {
- preempt_disable();
- ret = kvm_set_shared_msr(msr->index, msr->data,
- msr->mask);
- preempt_enable();
- if (ret)
- msr->data = old_msr_data;
- }
- return ret;
-}
-
-void loaded_vmcs_init(struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs)
-{
- vmcs_clear(loaded_vmcs->vmcs);
- if (loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs && loaded_vmcs->launched)
- vmcs_clear(loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs);
- loaded_vmcs->cpu = -1;
- loaded_vmcs->launched = 0;
-}
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE
-/*
- * This bitmap is used to indicate whether the vmclear
- * operation is enabled on all cpus. All disabled by
- * default.
- */
-static cpumask_t crash_vmclear_enabled_bitmap = CPU_MASK_NONE;
-
-static inline void crash_enable_local_vmclear(int cpu)
-{
- cpumask_set_cpu(cpu, &crash_vmclear_enabled_bitmap);
-}
-
-static inline void crash_disable_local_vmclear(int cpu)
-{
- cpumask_clear_cpu(cpu, &crash_vmclear_enabled_bitmap);
-}
-
-static inline int crash_local_vmclear_enabled(int cpu)
-{
- return cpumask_test_cpu(cpu, &crash_vmclear_enabled_bitmap);
-}
-
-static void crash_vmclear_local_loaded_vmcss(void)
-{
- int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
- struct loaded_vmcs *v;
-
- if (!crash_local_vmclear_enabled(cpu))
- return;
-
- list_for_each_entry(v, &per_cpu(loaded_vmcss_on_cpu, cpu),
- loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link)
- vmcs_clear(v->vmcs);
-}
-#else
-static inline void crash_enable_local_vmclear(int cpu) { }
-static inline void crash_disable_local_vmclear(int cpu) { }
-#endif /* CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE */
-
-static void __loaded_vmcs_clear(void *arg)
-{
- struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs = arg;
- int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
-
- if (loaded_vmcs->cpu != cpu)
- return; /* vcpu migration can race with cpu offline */
- if (per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) == loaded_vmcs->vmcs)
- per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) = NULL;
- crash_disable_local_vmclear(cpu);
- list_del(&loaded_vmcs->loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link);
-
- /*
- * we should ensure updating loaded_vmcs->loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link
- * is before setting loaded_vmcs->vcpu to -1 which is done in
- * loaded_vmcs_init. Otherwise, other cpu can see vcpu = -1 fist
- * then adds the vmcs into percpu list before it is deleted.
- */
- smp_wmb();
-
- loaded_vmcs_init(loaded_vmcs);
- crash_enable_local_vmclear(cpu);
-}
-
-void loaded_vmcs_clear(struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs)
-{
- int cpu = loaded_vmcs->cpu;
-
- if (cpu != -1)
- smp_call_function_single(cpu,
- __loaded_vmcs_clear, loaded_vmcs, 1);
-}
-
-static bool vmx_segment_cache_test_set(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned seg,
- unsigned field)
-{
- bool ret;
- u32 mask = 1 << (seg * SEG_FIELD_NR + field);
-
- if (!kvm_register_is_available(&vmx->vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_SEGMENTS)) {
- kvm_register_mark_available(&vmx->vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_SEGMENTS);
- vmx->segment_cache.bitmask = 0;
- }
- ret = vmx->segment_cache.bitmask & mask;
- vmx->segment_cache.bitmask |= mask;
- return ret;
-}
-
-static u16 vmx_read_guest_seg_selector(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned seg)
-{
- u16 *p = &vmx->segment_cache.seg[seg].selector;
-
- if (!vmx_segment_cache_test_set(vmx, seg, SEG_FIELD_SEL))
- *p = vmcs_read16(kvm_vmx_segment_fields[seg].selector);
- return *p;
-}
-
-static ulong vmx_read_guest_seg_base(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned seg)
-{
- ulong *p = &vmx->segment_cache.seg[seg].base;
-
- if (!vmx_segment_cache_test_set(vmx, seg, SEG_FIELD_BASE))
- *p = vmcs_readl(kvm_vmx_segment_fields[seg].base);
- return *p;
-}
-
-static u32 vmx_read_guest_seg_limit(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned seg)
-{
- u32 *p = &vmx->segment_cache.seg[seg].limit;
-
- if (!vmx_segment_cache_test_set(vmx, seg, SEG_FIELD_LIMIT))
- *p = vmcs_read32(kvm_vmx_segment_fields[seg].limit);
- return *p;
-}
-
-static u32 vmx_read_guest_seg_ar(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned seg)
-{
- u32 *p = &vmx->segment_cache.seg[seg].ar;
-
- if (!vmx_segment_cache_test_set(vmx, seg, SEG_FIELD_AR))
- *p = vmcs_read32(kvm_vmx_segment_fields[seg].ar_bytes);
- return *p;
-}
-
-void update_exception_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- u32 eb;
-
- eb = (1u << PF_VECTOR) | (1u << UD_VECTOR) | (1u << MC_VECTOR) |
- (1u << DB_VECTOR) | (1u << AC_VECTOR);
- /*
- * Guest access to VMware backdoor ports could legitimately
- * trigger #GP because of TSS I/O permission bitmap.
- * We intercept those #GP and allow access to them anyway
- * as VMware does.
- */
- if (enable_vmware_backdoor)
- eb |= (1u << GP_VECTOR);
- if ((vcpu->guest_debug &
- (KVM_GUESTDBG_ENABLE | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_SW_BP)) ==
- (KVM_GUESTDBG_ENABLE | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_SW_BP))
- eb |= 1u << BP_VECTOR;
- if (to_vmx(vcpu)->rmode.vm86_active)
- eb = ~0;
- if (enable_ept)
- eb &= ~(1u << PF_VECTOR); /* bypass_guest_pf = 0 */
-
- /* When we are running a nested L2 guest and L1 specified for it a
- * certain exception bitmap, we must trap the same exceptions and pass
- * them to L1. When running L2, we will only handle the exceptions
- * specified above if L1 did not want them.
- */
- if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
- eb |= get_vmcs12(vcpu)->exception_bitmap;
-
- vmcs_write32(EXCEPTION_BITMAP, eb);
-}
-
-/*
- * Check if MSR is intercepted for currently loaded MSR bitmap.
- */
-static bool msr_write_intercepted(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 msr)
-{
- unsigned long *msr_bitmap;
- int f = sizeof(unsigned long);
-
- if (!cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
- return true;
-
- msr_bitmap = to_vmx(vcpu)->loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap;
-
- if (msr <= 0x1fff) {
- return !!test_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x800 / f);
- } else if ((msr >= 0xc0000000) && (msr <= 0xc0001fff)) {
- msr &= 0x1fff;
- return !!test_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0xc00 / f);
- }
-
- return true;
-}
-
-static void clear_atomic_switch_msr_special(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx,
- unsigned long entry, unsigned long exit)
-{
- vm_entry_controls_clearbit(vmx, entry);
- vm_exit_controls_clearbit(vmx, exit);
-}
-
-int vmx_find_msr_index(struct vmx_msrs *m, u32 msr)
-{
- unsigned int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < m->nr; ++i) {
- if (m->val[i].index == msr)
- return i;
- }
- return -ENOENT;
-}
-
-static void clear_atomic_switch_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned msr)
-{
- int i;
- struct msr_autoload *m = &vmx->msr_autoload;
-
- switch (msr) {
- case MSR_EFER:
- if (cpu_has_load_ia32_efer()) {
- clear_atomic_switch_msr_special(vmx,
- VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER,
- VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER);
- return;
- }
- break;
- case MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL:
- if (cpu_has_load_perf_global_ctrl()) {
- clear_atomic_switch_msr_special(vmx,
- VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL,
- VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL);
- return;
- }
- break;
- }
- i = vmx_find_msr_index(&m->guest, msr);
- if (i < 0)
- goto skip_guest;
- --m->guest.nr;
- m->guest.val[i] = m->guest.val[m->guest.nr];
- vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, m->guest.nr);
-
-skip_guest:
- i = vmx_find_msr_index(&m->host, msr);
- if (i < 0)
- return;
-
- --m->host.nr;
- m->host.val[i] = m->host.val[m->host.nr];
- vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, m->host.nr);
-}
-
-static void add_atomic_switch_msr_special(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx,
- unsigned long entry, unsigned long exit,
- unsigned long guest_val_vmcs, unsigned long host_val_vmcs,
- u64 guest_val, u64 host_val)
-{
- vmcs_write64(guest_val_vmcs, guest_val);
- if (host_val_vmcs != HOST_IA32_EFER)
- vmcs_write64(host_val_vmcs, host_val);
- vm_entry_controls_setbit(vmx, entry);
- vm_exit_controls_setbit(vmx, exit);
-}
-
-static void add_atomic_switch_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned msr,
- u64 guest_val, u64 host_val, bool entry_only)
-{
- int i, j = 0;
- struct msr_autoload *m = &vmx->msr_autoload;
-
- switch (msr) {
- case MSR_EFER:
- if (cpu_has_load_ia32_efer()) {
- add_atomic_switch_msr_special(vmx,
- VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER,
- VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER,
- GUEST_IA32_EFER,
- HOST_IA32_EFER,
- guest_val, host_val);
- return;
- }
- break;
- case MSR_CORE_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL:
- if (cpu_has_load_perf_global_ctrl()) {
- add_atomic_switch_msr_special(vmx,
- VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL,
- VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL,
- GUEST_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL,
- HOST_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL,
- guest_val, host_val);
- return;
- }
- break;
- case MSR_IA32_PEBS_ENABLE:
- /* PEBS needs a quiescent period after being disabled (to write
- * a record). Disabling PEBS through VMX MSR swapping doesn't
- * provide that period, so a CPU could write host's record into
- * guest's memory.
- */
- wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PEBS_ENABLE, 0);
- }
-
- i = vmx_find_msr_index(&m->guest, msr);
- if (!entry_only)
- j = vmx_find_msr_index(&m->host, msr);
-
- if ((i < 0 && m->guest.nr == NR_LOADSTORE_MSRS) ||
- (j < 0 && m->host.nr == NR_LOADSTORE_MSRS)) {
- printk_once(KERN_WARNING "Not enough msr switch entries. "
- "Can't add msr %x\n", msr);
- return;
- }
- if (i < 0) {
- i = m->guest.nr++;
- vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, m->guest.nr);
- }
- m->guest.val[i].index = msr;
- m->guest.val[i].value = guest_val;
-
- if (entry_only)
- return;
-
- if (j < 0) {
- j = m->host.nr++;
- vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, m->host.nr);
- }
- m->host.val[j].index = msr;
- m->host.val[j].value = host_val;
-}
-
-static bool update_transition_efer(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, int efer_offset)
-{
- u64 guest_efer = vmx->vcpu.arch.efer;
- u64 ignore_bits = 0;
-
- /* Shadow paging assumes NX to be available. */
- if (!enable_ept)
- guest_efer |= EFER_NX;
-
- /*
- * LMA and LME handled by hardware; SCE meaningless outside long mode.
- */
- ignore_bits |= EFER_SCE;
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
- ignore_bits |= EFER_LMA | EFER_LME;
- /* SCE is meaningful only in long mode on Intel */
- if (guest_efer & EFER_LMA)
- ignore_bits &= ~(u64)EFER_SCE;
-#endif
-
- /*
- * On EPT, we can't emulate NX, so we must switch EFER atomically.
- * On CPUs that support "load IA32_EFER", always switch EFER
- * atomically, since it's faster than switching it manually.
- */
- if (cpu_has_load_ia32_efer() ||
- (enable_ept && ((vmx->vcpu.arch.efer ^ host_efer) & EFER_NX))) {
- if (!(guest_efer & EFER_LMA))
- guest_efer &= ~EFER_LME;
- if (guest_efer != host_efer)
- add_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_EFER,
- guest_efer, host_efer, false);
- else
- clear_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_EFER);
- return false;
- } else {
- clear_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_EFER);
-
- guest_efer &= ~ignore_bits;
- guest_efer |= host_efer & ignore_bits;
-
- vmx->guest_msrs[efer_offset].data = guest_efer;
- vmx->guest_msrs[efer_offset].mask = ~ignore_bits;
-
- return true;
- }
-}
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
-/*
- * On 32-bit kernels, VM exits still load the FS and GS bases from the
- * VMCS rather than the segment table. KVM uses this helper to figure
- * out the current bases to poke them into the VMCS before entry.
- */
-static unsigned long segment_base(u16 selector)
-{
- struct desc_struct *table;
- unsigned long v;
-
- if (!(selector & ~SEGMENT_RPL_MASK))
- return 0;
-
- table = get_current_gdt_ro();
-
- if ((selector & SEGMENT_TI_MASK) == SEGMENT_LDT) {
- u16 ldt_selector = kvm_read_ldt();
-
- if (!(ldt_selector & ~SEGMENT_RPL_MASK))
- return 0;
-
- table = (struct desc_struct *)segment_base(ldt_selector);
- }
- v = get_desc_base(&table[selector >> 3]);
- return v;
-}
-#endif
-
-static inline void pt_load_msr(struct pt_ctx *ctx, u32 addr_range)
-{
- u32 i;
-
- wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS, ctx->status);
- wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE, ctx->output_base);
- wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_MASK, ctx->output_mask);
- wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CR3_MATCH, ctx->cr3_match);
- for (i = 0; i < addr_range; i++) {
- wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A + i * 2, ctx->addr_a[i]);
- wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_B + i * 2, ctx->addr_b[i]);
- }
-}
-
-static inline void pt_save_msr(struct pt_ctx *ctx, u32 addr_range)
-{
- u32 i;
-
- rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS, ctx->status);
- rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE, ctx->output_base);
- rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_MASK, ctx->output_mask);
- rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CR3_MATCH, ctx->cr3_match);
- for (i = 0; i < addr_range; i++) {
- rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A + i * 2, ctx->addr_a[i]);
- rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_B + i * 2, ctx->addr_b[i]);
- }
-}
-
-static void pt_guest_enter(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
-{
- if (pt_mode == PT_MODE_SYSTEM)
- return;
-
- /*
- * GUEST_IA32_RTIT_CTL is already set in the VMCS.
- * Save host state before VM entry.
- */
- rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, vmx->pt_desc.host.ctl);
- if (vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) {
- wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, 0);
- pt_save_msr(&vmx->pt_desc.host, vmx->pt_desc.addr_range);
- pt_load_msr(&vmx->pt_desc.guest, vmx->pt_desc.addr_range);
- }
-}
-
-static void pt_guest_exit(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
-{
- if (pt_mode == PT_MODE_SYSTEM)
- return;
-
- if (vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) {
- pt_save_msr(&vmx->pt_desc.guest, vmx->pt_desc.addr_range);
- pt_load_msr(&vmx->pt_desc.host, vmx->pt_desc.addr_range);
- }
-
- /* Reload host state (IA32_RTIT_CTL will be cleared on VM exit). */
- wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL, vmx->pt_desc.host.ctl);
-}
-
-void vmx_set_host_fs_gs(struct vmcs_host_state *host, u16 fs_sel, u16 gs_sel,
- unsigned long fs_base, unsigned long gs_base)
-{
- if (unlikely(fs_sel != host->fs_sel)) {
- if (!(fs_sel & 7))
- vmcs_write16(HOST_FS_SELECTOR, fs_sel);
- else
- vmcs_write16(HOST_FS_SELECTOR, 0);
- host->fs_sel = fs_sel;
- }
- if (unlikely(gs_sel != host->gs_sel)) {
- if (!(gs_sel & 7))
- vmcs_write16(HOST_GS_SELECTOR, gs_sel);
- else
- vmcs_write16(HOST_GS_SELECTOR, 0);
- host->gs_sel = gs_sel;
- }
- if (unlikely(fs_base != host->fs_base)) {
- vmcs_writel(HOST_FS_BASE, fs_base);
- host->fs_base = fs_base;
- }
- if (unlikely(gs_base != host->gs_base)) {
- vmcs_writel(HOST_GS_BASE, gs_base);
- host->gs_base = gs_base;
- }
-}
-
-void vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- struct vmcs_host_state *host_state;
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
- int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
-#endif
- unsigned long fs_base, gs_base;
- u16 fs_sel, gs_sel;
- int i;
-
- vmx->req_immediate_exit = false;
-
- /*
- * Note that guest MSRs to be saved/restored can also be changed
- * when guest state is loaded. This happens when guest transitions
- * to/from long-mode by setting MSR_EFER.LMA.
- */
- if (!vmx->guest_msrs_ready) {
- vmx->guest_msrs_ready = true;
- for (i = 0; i < vmx->save_nmsrs; ++i)
- kvm_set_shared_msr(vmx->guest_msrs[i].index,
- vmx->guest_msrs[i].data,
- vmx->guest_msrs[i].mask);
-
- }
- if (vmx->guest_state_loaded)
- return;
-
- host_state = &vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state;
-
- /*
- * Set host fs and gs selectors. Unfortunately, 22.2.3 does not
- * allow segment selectors with cpl > 0 or ti == 1.
- */
- host_state->ldt_sel = kvm_read_ldt();
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
- savesegment(ds, host_state->ds_sel);
- savesegment(es, host_state->es_sel);
-
- gs_base = cpu_kernelmode_gs_base(cpu);
- if (likely(is_64bit_mm(current->mm))) {
- save_fsgs_for_kvm();
- fs_sel = current->thread.fsindex;
- gs_sel = current->thread.gsindex;
- fs_base = current->thread.fsbase;
- vmx->msr_host_kernel_gs_base = current->thread.gsbase;
- } else {
- savesegment(fs, fs_sel);
- savesegment(gs, gs_sel);
- fs_base = read_msr(MSR_FS_BASE);
- vmx->msr_host_kernel_gs_base = read_msr(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE);
- }
-
- wrmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base);
-#else
- savesegment(fs, fs_sel);
- savesegment(gs, gs_sel);
- fs_base = segment_base(fs_sel);
- gs_base = segment_base(gs_sel);
-#endif
-
- vmx_set_host_fs_gs(host_state, fs_sel, gs_sel, fs_base, gs_base);
- vmx->guest_state_loaded = true;
-}
-
-static void vmx_prepare_switch_to_host(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
-{
- struct vmcs_host_state *host_state;
-
- if (!vmx->guest_state_loaded)
- return;
-
- host_state = &vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state;
-
- ++vmx->vcpu.stat.host_state_reload;
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
- rdmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base);
-#endif
- if (host_state->ldt_sel || (host_state->gs_sel & 7)) {
- kvm_load_ldt(host_state->ldt_sel);
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
- load_gs_index(host_state->gs_sel);
-#else
- loadsegment(gs, host_state->gs_sel);
-#endif
- }
- if (host_state->fs_sel & 7)
- loadsegment(fs, host_state->fs_sel);
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
- if (unlikely(host_state->ds_sel | host_state->es_sel)) {
- loadsegment(ds, host_state->ds_sel);
- loadsegment(es, host_state->es_sel);
- }
-#endif
- invalidate_tss_limit();
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
- wrmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, vmx->msr_host_kernel_gs_base);
-#endif
- load_fixmap_gdt(raw_smp_processor_id());
- vmx->guest_state_loaded = false;
- vmx->guest_msrs_ready = false;
-}
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-static u64 vmx_read_guest_kernel_gs_base(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
-{
- preempt_disable();
- if (vmx->guest_state_loaded)
- rdmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base);
- preempt_enable();
- return vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base;
-}
-
-static void vmx_write_guest_kernel_gs_base(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, u64 data)
-{
- preempt_disable();
- if (vmx->guest_state_loaded)
- wrmsrl(MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, data);
- preempt_enable();
- vmx->msr_guest_kernel_gs_base = data;
-}
-#endif
-
-static void vmx_vcpu_pi_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
-{
- struct pi_desc *pi_desc = vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu);
- struct pi_desc old, new;
- unsigned int dest;
-
- /*
- * In case of hot-plug or hot-unplug, we may have to undo
- * vmx_vcpu_pi_put even if there is no assigned device. And we
- * always keep PI.NDST up to date for simplicity: it makes the
- * code easier, and CPU migration is not a fast path.
- */
- if (!pi_test_sn(pi_desc) && vcpu->cpu == cpu)
- return;
-
- /*
- * If the 'nv' field is POSTED_INTR_WAKEUP_VECTOR, do not change
- * PI.NDST: pi_post_block is the one expected to change PID.NDST and the
- * wakeup handler expects the vCPU to be on the blocked_vcpu_list that
- * matches PI.NDST. Otherwise, a vcpu may not be able to be woken up
- * correctly.
- */
- if (pi_desc->nv == POSTED_INTR_WAKEUP_VECTOR || vcpu->cpu == cpu) {
- pi_clear_sn(pi_desc);
- goto after_clear_sn;
- }
-
- /* The full case. */
- do {
- old.control = new.control = pi_desc->control;
-
- dest = cpu_physical_id(cpu);
-
- if (x2apic_enabled())
- new.ndst = dest;
- else
- new.ndst = (dest << 8) & 0xFF00;
-
- new.sn = 0;
- } while (cmpxchg64(&pi_desc->control, old.control,
- new.control) != old.control);
-
-after_clear_sn:
-
- /*
- * Clear SN before reading the bitmap. The VT-d firmware
- * writes the bitmap and reads SN atomically (5.2.3 in the
- * spec), so it doesn't really have a memory barrier that
- * pairs with this, but we cannot do that and we need one.
- */
- smp_mb__after_atomic();
-
- if (!pi_is_pir_empty(pi_desc))
- pi_set_on(pi_desc);
-}
-
-void vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- bool already_loaded = vmx->loaded_vmcs->cpu == cpu;
-
- if (!already_loaded) {
- loaded_vmcs_clear(vmx->loaded_vmcs);
- local_irq_disable();
- crash_disable_local_vmclear(cpu);
-
- /*
- * Read loaded_vmcs->cpu should be before fetching
- * loaded_vmcs->loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link.
- * See the comments in __loaded_vmcs_clear().
- */
- smp_rmb();
-
- list_add(&vmx->loaded_vmcs->loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link,
- &per_cpu(loaded_vmcss_on_cpu, cpu));
- crash_enable_local_vmclear(cpu);
- local_irq_enable();
- }
-
- if (per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) != vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs) {
- per_cpu(current_vmcs, cpu) = vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs;
- vmcs_load(vmx->loaded_vmcs->vmcs);
- indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
- }
-
- if (!already_loaded) {
- void *gdt = get_current_gdt_ro();
- unsigned long sysenter_esp;
-
- kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH, vcpu);
-
- /*
- * Linux uses per-cpu TSS and GDT, so set these when switching
- * processors. See 22.2.4.
- */
- vmcs_writel(HOST_TR_BASE,
- (unsigned long)&get_cpu_entry_area(cpu)->tss.x86_tss);
- vmcs_writel(HOST_GDTR_BASE, (unsigned long)gdt); /* 22.2.4 */
-
- rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, sysenter_esp);
- vmcs_writel(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, sysenter_esp); /* 22.2.3 */
-
- vmx->loaded_vmcs->cpu = cpu;
- }
-
- /* Setup TSC multiplier */
- if (kvm_has_tsc_control &&
- vmx->current_tsc_ratio != vcpu->arch.tsc_scaling_ratio)
- decache_tsc_multiplier(vmx);
-}
-
-/*
- * Switches to specified vcpu, until a matching vcpu_put(), but assumes
- * vcpu mutex is already taken.
- */
-void vmx_vcpu_load(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
-
- vmx_vcpu_load_vmcs(vcpu, cpu);
-
- vmx_vcpu_pi_load(vcpu, cpu);
-
- vmx->host_pkru = read_pkru();
- vmx->host_debugctlmsr = get_debugctlmsr();
-}
-
-static void vmx_vcpu_pi_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct pi_desc *pi_desc = vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu);
-
- if (!kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(vcpu->kvm) ||
- !irq_remapping_cap(IRQ_POSTING_CAP) ||
- !kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
- return;
-
- /* Set SN when the vCPU is preempted */
- if (vcpu->preempted)
- pi_set_sn(pi_desc);
-}
-
-static void vmx_vcpu_put(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- vmx_vcpu_pi_put(vcpu);
-
- vmx_prepare_switch_to_host(to_vmx(vcpu));
-}
-
-static bool emulation_required(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- return emulate_invalid_guest_state && !guest_state_valid(vcpu);
-}
-
-static void vmx_decache_cr0_guest_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);
-
-unsigned long vmx_get_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- unsigned long rflags, save_rflags;
-
- if (!kvm_register_is_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_RFLAGS)) {
- kvm_register_mark_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_RFLAGS);
- rflags = vmcs_readl(GUEST_RFLAGS);
- if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active) {
- rflags &= RMODE_GUEST_OWNED_EFLAGS_BITS;
- save_rflags = vmx->rmode.save_rflags;
- rflags |= save_rflags & ~RMODE_GUEST_OWNED_EFLAGS_BITS;
- }
- vmx->rflags = rflags;
- }
- return vmx->rflags;
-}
-
-void vmx_set_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long rflags)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- unsigned long old_rflags;
-
- if (enable_unrestricted_guest) {
- kvm_register_mark_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_RFLAGS);
- vmx->rflags = rflags;
- vmcs_writel(GUEST_RFLAGS, rflags);
- return;
- }
-
- old_rflags = vmx_get_rflags(vcpu);
- vmx->rflags = rflags;
- if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active) {
- vmx->rmode.save_rflags = rflags;
- rflags |= X86_EFLAGS_IOPL | X86_EFLAGS_VM;
- }
- vmcs_writel(GUEST_RFLAGS, rflags);
-
- if ((old_rflags ^ vmx->rflags) & X86_EFLAGS_VM)
- vmx->emulation_required = emulation_required(vcpu);
-}
-
-u32 vmx_get_interrupt_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- u32 interruptibility = vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO);
- int ret = 0;
-
- if (interruptibility & GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI)
- ret |= KVM_X86_SHADOW_INT_STI;
- if (interruptibility & GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS)
- ret |= KVM_X86_SHADOW_INT_MOV_SS;
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-void vmx_set_interrupt_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int mask)
-{
- u32 interruptibility_old = vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO);
- u32 interruptibility = interruptibility_old;
-
- interruptibility &= ~(GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI | GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS);
-
- if (mask & KVM_X86_SHADOW_INT_MOV_SS)
- interruptibility |= GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS;
- else if (mask & KVM_X86_SHADOW_INT_STI)
- interruptibility |= GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI;
-
- if ((interruptibility != interruptibility_old))
- vmcs_write32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO, interruptibility);
-}
-
-static int vmx_rtit_ctl_check(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 data)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- unsigned long value;
-
- /*
- * Any MSR write that attempts to change bits marked reserved will
- * case a #GP fault.
- */
- if (data & vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask)
- return 1;
-
- /*
- * Any attempt to modify IA32_RTIT_CTL while TraceEn is set will
- * result in a #GP unless the same write also clears TraceEn.
- */
- if ((vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) &&
- ((vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl ^ data) & ~RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN))
- return 1;
-
- /*
- * WRMSR to IA32_RTIT_CTL that sets TraceEn but clears this bit
- * and FabricEn would cause #GP, if
- * CPUID.(EAX=14H, ECX=0):ECX.SNGLRGNOUT[bit 2] = 0
- */
- if ((data & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) && !(data & RTIT_CTL_TOPA) &&
- !(data & RTIT_CTL_FABRIC_EN) &&
- !intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
- PT_CAP_single_range_output))
- return 1;
-
- /*
- * MTCFreq, CycThresh and PSBFreq encodings check, any MSR write that
- * utilize encodings marked reserved will casue a #GP fault.
- */
- value = intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_mtc_periods);
- if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_mtc) &&
- !test_bit((data & RTIT_CTL_MTC_RANGE) >>
- RTIT_CTL_MTC_RANGE_OFFSET, &value))
- return 1;
- value = intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
- PT_CAP_cycle_thresholds);
- if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_psb_cyc) &&
- !test_bit((data & RTIT_CTL_CYC_THRESH) >>
- RTIT_CTL_CYC_THRESH_OFFSET, &value))
- return 1;
- value = intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_psb_periods);
- if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_psb_cyc) &&
- !test_bit((data & RTIT_CTL_PSB_FREQ) >>
- RTIT_CTL_PSB_FREQ_OFFSET, &value))
- return 1;
-
- /*
- * If ADDRx_CFG is reserved or the encodings is >2 will
- * cause a #GP fault.
- */
- value = (data & RTIT_CTL_ADDR0) >> RTIT_CTL_ADDR0_OFFSET;
- if ((value && (vmx->pt_desc.addr_range < 1)) || (value > 2))
- return 1;
- value = (data & RTIT_CTL_ADDR1) >> RTIT_CTL_ADDR1_OFFSET;
- if ((value && (vmx->pt_desc.addr_range < 2)) || (value > 2))
- return 1;
- value = (data & RTIT_CTL_ADDR2) >> RTIT_CTL_ADDR2_OFFSET;
- if ((value && (vmx->pt_desc.addr_range < 3)) || (value > 2))
- return 1;
- value = (data & RTIT_CTL_ADDR3) >> RTIT_CTL_ADDR3_OFFSET;
- if ((value && (vmx->pt_desc.addr_range < 4)) || (value > 2))
- return 1;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- unsigned long rip;
-
- /*
- * Using VMCS.VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN on EPT misconfig depends on
- * undefined behavior: Intel's SDM doesn't mandate the VMCS field be
- * set when EPT misconfig occurs. In practice, real hardware updates
- * VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN on EPT misconfig, but other hypervisors
- * (namely Hyper-V) don't set it due to it being undefined behavior,
- * i.e. we end up advancing IP with some random value.
- */
- if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR) ||
- to_vmx(vcpu)->exit_reason != EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG) {
- rip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu);
- rip += vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN);
- kvm_rip_write(vcpu, rip);
- } else {
- if (!kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, EMULTYPE_SKIP))
- return 0;
- }
-
- /* skipping an emulated instruction also counts */
- vmx_set_interrupt_shadow(vcpu, 0);
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static void vmx_clear_hlt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- /*
- * Ensure that we clear the HLT state in the VMCS. We don't need to
- * explicitly skip the instruction because if the HLT state is set,
- * then the instruction is already executing and RIP has already been
- * advanced.
- */
- if (kvm_hlt_in_guest(vcpu->kvm) &&
- vmcs_read32(GUEST_ACTIVITY_STATE) == GUEST_ACTIVITY_HLT)
- vmcs_write32(GUEST_ACTIVITY_STATE, GUEST_ACTIVITY_ACTIVE);
-}
-
-static void vmx_queue_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- unsigned nr = vcpu->arch.exception.nr;
- bool has_error_code = vcpu->arch.exception.has_error_code;
- u32 error_code = vcpu->arch.exception.error_code;
- u32 intr_info = nr | INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK;
-
- kvm_deliver_exception_payload(vcpu);
-
- if (has_error_code) {
- vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_EXCEPTION_ERROR_CODE, error_code);
- intr_info |= INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK;
- }
-
- if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active) {
- int inc_eip = 0;
- if (kvm_exception_is_soft(nr))
- inc_eip = vcpu->arch.event_exit_inst_len;
- kvm_inject_realmode_interrupt(vcpu, nr, inc_eip);
- return;
- }
-
- WARN_ON_ONCE(vmx->emulation_required);
-
- if (kvm_exception_is_soft(nr)) {
- vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN,
- vmx->vcpu.arch.event_exit_inst_len);
- intr_info |= INTR_TYPE_SOFT_EXCEPTION;
- } else
- intr_info |= INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION;
-
- vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD, intr_info);
-
- vmx_clear_hlt(vcpu);
-}
-
-static bool vmx_rdtscp_supported(void)
-{
- return cpu_has_vmx_rdtscp();
-}
-
-static bool vmx_invpcid_supported(void)
-{
- return cpu_has_vmx_invpcid();
-}
-
-/*
- * Swap MSR entry in host/guest MSR entry array.
- */
-static void move_msr_up(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, int from, int to)
-{
- struct shared_msr_entry tmp;
-
- tmp = vmx->guest_msrs[to];
- vmx->guest_msrs[to] = vmx->guest_msrs[from];
- vmx->guest_msrs[from] = tmp;
-}
-
-/*
- * Set up the vmcs to automatically save and restore system
- * msrs. Don't touch the 64-bit msrs if the guest is in legacy
- * mode, as fiddling with msrs is very expensive.
- */
-static void setup_msrs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
-{
- int save_nmsrs, index;
-
- save_nmsrs = 0;
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
- /*
- * The SYSCALL MSRs are only needed on long mode guests, and only
- * when EFER.SCE is set.
- */
- if (is_long_mode(&vmx->vcpu) && (vmx->vcpu.arch.efer & EFER_SCE)) {
- index = __find_msr_index(vmx, MSR_STAR);
- if (index >= 0)
- move_msr_up(vmx, index, save_nmsrs++);
- index = __find_msr_index(vmx, MSR_LSTAR);
- if (index >= 0)
- move_msr_up(vmx, index, save_nmsrs++);
- index = __find_msr_index(vmx, MSR_SYSCALL_MASK);
- if (index >= 0)
- move_msr_up(vmx, index, save_nmsrs++);
- }
-#endif
- index = __find_msr_index(vmx, MSR_EFER);
- if (index >= 0 && update_transition_efer(vmx, index))
- move_msr_up(vmx, index, save_nmsrs++);
- index = __find_msr_index(vmx, MSR_TSC_AUX);
- if (index >= 0 && guest_cpuid_has(&vmx->vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP))
- move_msr_up(vmx, index, save_nmsrs++);
- index = __find_msr_index(vmx, MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL);
- if (index >= 0)
- move_msr_up(vmx, index, save_nmsrs++);
-
- vmx->save_nmsrs = save_nmsrs;
- vmx->guest_msrs_ready = false;
-
- if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
- vmx_update_msr_bitmap(&vmx->vcpu);
-}
-
-static u64 vmx_read_l1_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
-
- if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
- (vmcs12->cpu_based_vm_exec_control & CPU_BASED_USE_TSC_OFFSETTING))
- return vcpu->arch.tsc_offset - vmcs12->tsc_offset;
-
- return vcpu->arch.tsc_offset;
-}
-
-static u64 vmx_write_l1_tsc_offset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 offset)
-{
- struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
- u64 g_tsc_offset = 0;
-
- /*
- * We're here if L1 chose not to trap WRMSR to TSC. According
- * to the spec, this should set L1's TSC; The offset that L1
- * set for L2 remains unchanged, and still needs to be added
- * to the newly set TSC to get L2's TSC.
- */
- if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
- (vmcs12->cpu_based_vm_exec_control & CPU_BASED_USE_TSC_OFFSETTING))
- g_tsc_offset = vmcs12->tsc_offset;
-
- trace_kvm_write_tsc_offset(vcpu->vcpu_id,
- vcpu->arch.tsc_offset - g_tsc_offset,
- offset);
- vmcs_write64(TSC_OFFSET, offset + g_tsc_offset);
- return offset + g_tsc_offset;
-}
-
-/*
- * nested_vmx_allowed() checks whether a guest should be allowed to use VMX
- * instructions and MSRs (i.e., nested VMX). Nested VMX is disabled for
- * all guests if the "nested" module option is off, and can also be disabled
- * for a single guest by disabling its VMX cpuid bit.
- */
-bool nested_vmx_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- return nested && guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_VMX);
-}
-
-static inline bool vmx_feature_control_msr_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
- uint64_t val)
-{
- uint64_t valid_bits = to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits;
-
- return !(val & ~valid_bits);
-}
-
-static int vmx_get_msr_feature(struct kvm_msr_entry *msr)
-{
- switch (msr->index) {
- case MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC ... MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC:
- if (!nested)
- return 1;
- return vmx_get_vmx_msr(&vmcs_config.nested, msr->index, &msr->data);
- default:
- return 1;
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Reads an msr value (of 'msr_index') into 'pdata'.
- * Returns 0 on success, non-0 otherwise.
- * Assumes vcpu_load() was already called.
- */
-static int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- struct shared_msr_entry *msr;
- u32 index;
-
- switch (msr_info->index) {
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
- case MSR_FS_BASE:
- msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_FS_BASE);
- break;
- case MSR_GS_BASE:
- msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_GS_BASE);
- break;
- case MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE:
- msr_info->data = vmx_read_guest_kernel_gs_base(vmx);
- break;
-#endif
- case MSR_EFER:
- return kvm_get_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
- case MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL:
- if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
- !(vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))
- return 1;
- goto find_shared_msr;
- case MSR_IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL:
- if (!msr_info->host_initiated && !vmx_has_waitpkg(vmx))
- return 1;
-
- msr_info->data = vmx->msr_ia32_umwait_control;
- break;
- case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
- if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
- !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
- return 1;
-
- msr_info->data = to_vmx(vcpu)->spec_ctrl;
- break;
- case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS:
- msr_info->data = vmcs_read32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS);
- break;
- case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP:
- msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP);
- break;
- case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP:
- msr_info->data = vmcs_readl(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP);
- break;
- case MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS:
- if (!kvm_mpx_supported() ||
- (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
- !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_MPX)))
- return 1;
- msr_info->data = vmcs_read64(GUEST_BNDCFGS);
- break;
- case MSR_IA32_MCG_EXT_CTL:
- if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
- !(vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control &
- FEATURE_CONTROL_LMCE))
- return 1;
- msr_info->data = vcpu->arch.mcg_ext_ctl;
- break;
- case MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL:
- msr_info->data = vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control;
- break;
- case MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC ... MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC:
- if (!nested_vmx_allowed(vcpu))
- return 1;
- return vmx_get_vmx_msr(&vmx->nested.msrs, msr_info->index,
- &msr_info->data);
- case MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL:
- if (pt_mode != PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST)
- return 1;
- msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl;
- break;
- case MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS:
- if (pt_mode != PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST)
- return 1;
- msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.status;
- break;
- case MSR_IA32_RTIT_CR3_MATCH:
- if ((pt_mode != PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST) ||
- !intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
- PT_CAP_cr3_filtering))
- return 1;
- msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.cr3_match;
- break;
- case MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE:
- if ((pt_mode != PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST) ||
- (!intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
- PT_CAP_topa_output) &&
- !intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
- PT_CAP_single_range_output)))
- return 1;
- msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.output_base;
- break;
- case MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_MASK:
- if ((pt_mode != PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST) ||
- (!intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
- PT_CAP_topa_output) &&
- !intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
- PT_CAP_single_range_output)))
- return 1;
- msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.output_mask;
- break;
- case MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A ... MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR3_B:
- index = msr_info->index - MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A;
- if ((pt_mode != PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST) ||
- (index >= 2 * intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
- PT_CAP_num_address_ranges)))
- return 1;
- if (is_noncanonical_address(data, vcpu))
- return 1;
- if (index % 2)
- msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.addr_b[index / 2];
- else
- msr_info->data = vmx->pt_desc.guest.addr_a[index / 2];
- break;
- case MSR_TSC_AUX:
- if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
- !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP))
- return 1;
- goto find_shared_msr;
- default:
- find_shared_msr:
- msr = find_msr_entry(vmx, msr_info->index);
- if (msr) {
- msr_info->data = msr->data;
- break;
- }
- return kvm_get_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Writes msr value into the appropriate "register".
- * Returns 0 on success, non-0 otherwise.
- * Assumes vcpu_load() was already called.
- */
-static int vmx_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- struct shared_msr_entry *msr;
- int ret = 0;
- u32 msr_index = msr_info->index;
- u64 data = msr_info->data;
- u32 index;
-
- switch (msr_index) {
- case MSR_EFER:
- ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
- break;
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
- case MSR_FS_BASE:
- vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx);
- vmcs_writel(GUEST_FS_BASE, data);
- break;
- case MSR_GS_BASE:
- vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx);
- vmcs_writel(GUEST_GS_BASE, data);
- break;
- case MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE:
- vmx_write_guest_kernel_gs_base(vmx, data);
- break;
-#endif
- case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS:
- if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
- get_vmcs12(vcpu)->guest_sysenter_cs = data;
- vmcs_write32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS, data);
- break;
- case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP:
- if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
- get_vmcs12(vcpu)->guest_sysenter_eip = data;
- vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP, data);
- break;
- case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP:
- if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
- get_vmcs12(vcpu)->guest_sysenter_esp = data;
- vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP, data);
- break;
- case MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR:
- if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && get_vmcs12(vcpu)->vm_exit_controls &
- VM_EXIT_SAVE_DEBUG_CONTROLS)
- get_vmcs12(vcpu)->guest_ia32_debugctl = data;
-
- ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
- break;
-
- case MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS:
- if (!kvm_mpx_supported() ||
- (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
- !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_MPX)))
- return 1;
- if (is_noncanonical_address(data & PAGE_MASK, vcpu) ||
- (data & MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS_RSVD))
- return 1;
- vmcs_write64(GUEST_BNDCFGS, data);
- break;
- case MSR_IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL:
- if (!msr_info->host_initiated && !vmx_has_waitpkg(vmx))
- return 1;
-
- /* The reserved bit 1 and non-32 bit [63:32] should be zero */
- if (data & (BIT_ULL(1) | GENMASK_ULL(63, 32)))
- return 1;
-
- vmx->msr_ia32_umwait_control = data;
- break;
- case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
- if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
- !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
- return 1;
-
- /* The STIBP bit doesn't fault even if it's not advertised */
- if (data & ~(SPEC_CTRL_IBRS | SPEC_CTRL_STIBP | SPEC_CTRL_SSBD))
- return 1;
-
- vmx->spec_ctrl = data;
-
- if (!data)
- break;
-
- /*
- * For non-nested:
- * When it's written (to non-zero) for the first time, pass
- * it through.
- *
- * For nested:
- * The handling of the MSR bitmap for L2 guests is done in
- * nested_vmx_prepare_msr_bitmap. We should not touch the
- * vmcs02.msr_bitmap here since it gets completely overwritten
- * in the merging. We update the vmcs01 here for L1 as well
- * since it will end up touching the MSR anyway now.
- */
- vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap,
- MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL,
- MSR_TYPE_RW);
- break;
- case MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL:
- if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
- !(vcpu->arch.arch_capabilities & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR))
- return 1;
- if (data & ~(TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE | TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR))
- return 1;
- goto find_shared_msr;
- case MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD:
- if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
- !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL))
- return 1;
-
- if (data & ~PRED_CMD_IBPB)
- return 1;
-
- if (!data)
- break;
-
- wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, PRED_CMD_IBPB);
-
- /*
- * For non-nested:
- * When it's written (to non-zero) for the first time, pass
- * it through.
- *
- * For nested:
- * The handling of the MSR bitmap for L2 guests is done in
- * nested_vmx_prepare_msr_bitmap. We should not touch the
- * vmcs02.msr_bitmap here since it gets completely overwritten
- * in the merging.
- */
- vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD,
- MSR_TYPE_W);
- break;
- case MSR_IA32_CR_PAT:
- if (!kvm_pat_valid(data))
- return 1;
-
- if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
- get_vmcs12(vcpu)->vm_exit_controls & VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_PAT)
- get_vmcs12(vcpu)->guest_ia32_pat = data;
-
- if (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT) {
- vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_PAT, data);
- vcpu->arch.pat = data;
- break;
- }
- ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
- break;
- case MSR_IA32_TSC_ADJUST:
- ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
- break;
- case MSR_IA32_MCG_EXT_CTL:
- if ((!msr_info->host_initiated &&
- !(to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_feature_control &
- FEATURE_CONTROL_LMCE)) ||
- (data & ~MCG_EXT_CTL_LMCE_EN))
- return 1;
- vcpu->arch.mcg_ext_ctl = data;
- break;
- case MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL:
- if (!vmx_feature_control_msr_valid(vcpu, data) ||
- (to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_feature_control &
- FEATURE_CONTROL_LOCKED && !msr_info->host_initiated))
- return 1;
- vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control = data;
- if (msr_info->host_initiated && data == 0)
- vmx_leave_nested(vcpu);
- break;
- case MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC ... MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC:
- if (!msr_info->host_initiated)
- return 1; /* they are read-only */
- if (!nested_vmx_allowed(vcpu))
- return 1;
- return vmx_set_vmx_msr(vcpu, msr_index, data);
- case MSR_IA32_RTIT_CTL:
- if ((pt_mode != PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST) ||
- vmx_rtit_ctl_check(vcpu, data) ||
- vmx->nested.vmxon)
- return 1;
- vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_RTIT_CTL, data);
- vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl = data;
- pt_update_intercept_for_msr(vmx);
- break;
- case MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS:
- if ((pt_mode != PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST) ||
- (vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) ||
- (data & MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS_MASK))
- return 1;
- vmx->pt_desc.guest.status = data;
- break;
- case MSR_IA32_RTIT_CR3_MATCH:
- if ((pt_mode != PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST) ||
- (vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) ||
- !intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
- PT_CAP_cr3_filtering))
- return 1;
- vmx->pt_desc.guest.cr3_match = data;
- break;
- case MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE:
- if ((pt_mode != PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST) ||
- (vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) ||
- (!intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
- PT_CAP_topa_output) &&
- !intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
- PT_CAP_single_range_output)) ||
- (data & MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE_MASK))
- return 1;
- vmx->pt_desc.guest.output_base = data;
- break;
- case MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_MASK:
- if ((pt_mode != PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST) ||
- (vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) ||
- (!intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
- PT_CAP_topa_output) &&
- !intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
- PT_CAP_single_range_output)))
- return 1;
- vmx->pt_desc.guest.output_mask = data;
- break;
- case MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A ... MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR3_B:
- index = msr_info->index - MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A;
- if ((pt_mode != PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST) ||
- (vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN) ||
- (index >= 2 * intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
- PT_CAP_num_address_ranges)))
- return 1;
- if (is_noncanonical_address(data, vcpu))
- return 1;
- if (index % 2)
- vmx->pt_desc.guest.addr_b[index / 2] = data;
- else
- vmx->pt_desc.guest.addr_a[index / 2] = data;
- break;
- case MSR_TSC_AUX:
- if (!msr_info->host_initiated &&
- !guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP))
- return 1;
- /* Check reserved bit, higher 32 bits should be zero */
- if ((data >> 32) != 0)
- return 1;
- goto find_shared_msr;
-
- default:
- find_shared_msr:
- msr = find_msr_entry(vmx, msr_index);
- if (msr)
- ret = vmx_set_guest_msr(vmx, msr, data);
- else
- ret = kvm_set_msr_common(vcpu, msr_info);
- }
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-static void vmx_cache_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_reg reg)
-{
- kvm_register_mark_available(vcpu, reg);
-
- switch (reg) {
- case VCPU_REGS_RSP:
- vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSP] = vmcs_readl(GUEST_RSP);
- break;
- case VCPU_REGS_RIP:
- vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RIP] = vmcs_readl(GUEST_RIP);
- break;
- case VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR:
- if (enable_ept)
- ept_save_pdptrs(vcpu);
- break;
- case VCPU_EXREG_CR3:
- if (enable_unrestricted_guest || (enable_ept && is_paging(vcpu)))
- vcpu->arch.cr3 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR3);
- break;
- default:
- WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
- break;
- }
-}
-
-static __init int cpu_has_kvm_support(void)
-{
- return cpu_has_vmx();
-}
-
-static __init int vmx_disabled_by_bios(void)
-{
- u64 msr;
-
- rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL, msr);
- if (msr & FEATURE_CONTROL_LOCKED) {
- /* launched w/ TXT and VMX disabled */
- if (!(msr & FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX)
- && tboot_enabled())
- return 1;
- /* launched w/o TXT and VMX only enabled w/ TXT */
- if (!(msr & FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX)
- && (msr & FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX)
- && !tboot_enabled()) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "kvm: disable TXT in the BIOS or "
- "activate TXT before enabling KVM\n");
- return 1;
- }
- /* launched w/o TXT and VMX disabled */
- if (!(msr & FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX)
- && !tboot_enabled())
- return 1;
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void kvm_cpu_vmxon(u64 addr)
-{
- cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_VMXE);
- intel_pt_handle_vmx(1);
-
- asm volatile ("vmxon %0" : : "m"(addr));
-}
-
-static int hardware_enable(void)
-{
- int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
- u64 phys_addr = __pa(per_cpu(vmxarea, cpu));
- u64 old, test_bits;
-
- if (cr4_read_shadow() & X86_CR4_VMXE)
- return -EBUSY;
-
- /*
- * This can happen if we hot-added a CPU but failed to allocate
- * VP assist page for it.
- */
- if (static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs) &&
- !hv_get_vp_assist_page(cpu))
- return -EFAULT;
-
- INIT_LIST_HEAD(&per_cpu(loaded_vmcss_on_cpu, cpu));
- INIT_LIST_HEAD(&per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu, cpu));
- spin_lock_init(&per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu_lock, cpu));
-
- /*
- * Now we can enable the vmclear operation in kdump
- * since the loaded_vmcss_on_cpu list on this cpu
- * has been initialized.
- *
- * Though the cpu is not in VMX operation now, there
- * is no problem to enable the vmclear operation
- * for the loaded_vmcss_on_cpu list is empty!
- */
- crash_enable_local_vmclear(cpu);
-
- rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL, old);
-
- test_bits = FEATURE_CONTROL_LOCKED;
- test_bits |= FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX;
- if (tboot_enabled())
- test_bits |= FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX;
-
- if ((old & test_bits) != test_bits) {
- /* enable and lock */
- wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_FEATURE_CONTROL, old | test_bits);
- }
- kvm_cpu_vmxon(phys_addr);
- if (enable_ept)
- ept_sync_global();
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void vmclear_local_loaded_vmcss(void)
-{
- int cpu = raw_smp_processor_id();
- struct loaded_vmcs *v, *n;
-
- list_for_each_entry_safe(v, n, &per_cpu(loaded_vmcss_on_cpu, cpu),
- loaded_vmcss_on_cpu_link)
- __loaded_vmcs_clear(v);
-}
-
-
-/* Just like cpu_vmxoff(), but with the __kvm_handle_fault_on_reboot()
- * tricks.
- */
-static void kvm_cpu_vmxoff(void)
-{
- asm volatile (__ex("vmxoff"));
-
- intel_pt_handle_vmx(0);
- cr4_clear_bits(X86_CR4_VMXE);
-}
-
-static void hardware_disable(void)
-{
- vmclear_local_loaded_vmcss();
- kvm_cpu_vmxoff();
-}
-
-static __init int adjust_vmx_controls(u32 ctl_min, u32 ctl_opt,
- u32 msr, u32 *result)
-{
- u32 vmx_msr_low, vmx_msr_high;
- u32 ctl = ctl_min | ctl_opt;
-
- rdmsr(msr, vmx_msr_low, vmx_msr_high);
-
- ctl &= vmx_msr_high; /* bit == 0 in high word ==> must be zero */
- ctl |= vmx_msr_low; /* bit == 1 in low word ==> must be one */
-
- /* Ensure minimum (required) set of control bits are supported. */
- if (ctl_min & ~ctl)
- return -EIO;
-
- *result = ctl;
- return 0;
-}
-
-static __init int setup_vmcs_config(struct vmcs_config *vmcs_conf,
- struct vmx_capability *vmx_cap)
-{
- u32 vmx_msr_low, vmx_msr_high;
- u32 min, opt, min2, opt2;
- u32 _pin_based_exec_control = 0;
- u32 _cpu_based_exec_control = 0;
- u32 _cpu_based_2nd_exec_control = 0;
- u32 _vmexit_control = 0;
- u32 _vmentry_control = 0;
-
- memset(vmcs_conf, 0, sizeof(*vmcs_conf));
- min = CPU_BASED_HLT_EXITING |
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
- CPU_BASED_CR8_LOAD_EXITING |
- CPU_BASED_CR8_STORE_EXITING |
-#endif
- CPU_BASED_CR3_LOAD_EXITING |
- CPU_BASED_CR3_STORE_EXITING |
- CPU_BASED_UNCOND_IO_EXITING |
- CPU_BASED_MOV_DR_EXITING |
- CPU_BASED_USE_TSC_OFFSETTING |
- CPU_BASED_MWAIT_EXITING |
- CPU_BASED_MONITOR_EXITING |
- CPU_BASED_INVLPG_EXITING |
- CPU_BASED_RDPMC_EXITING;
-
- opt = CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW |
- CPU_BASED_USE_MSR_BITMAPS |
- CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS;
- if (adjust_vmx_controls(min, opt, MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS,
- &_cpu_based_exec_control) < 0)
- return -EIO;
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
- if ((_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW))
- _cpu_based_exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_CR8_LOAD_EXITING &
- ~CPU_BASED_CR8_STORE_EXITING;
-#endif
- if (_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS) {
- min2 = 0;
- opt2 = SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES |
- SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE |
- SECONDARY_EXEC_WBINVD_EXITING |
- SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID |
- SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT |
- SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST |
- SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING |
- SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC |
- SECONDARY_EXEC_RDTSCP |
- SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID |
- SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT |
- SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY |
- SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS |
- SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES |
- SECONDARY_EXEC_RDSEED_EXITING |
- SECONDARY_EXEC_RDRAND_EXITING |
- SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML |
- SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING |
- SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USR_WAIT_PAUSE |
- SECONDARY_EXEC_PT_USE_GPA |
- SECONDARY_EXEC_PT_CONCEAL_VMX |
- SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VMFUNC |
- SECONDARY_EXEC_ENCLS_EXITING;
- if (adjust_vmx_controls(min2, opt2,
- MSR_IA32_VMX_PROCBASED_CTLS2,
- &_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control) < 0)
- return -EIO;
- }
-#ifndef CONFIG_X86_64
- if (!(_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control &
- SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES))
- _cpu_based_exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW;
-#endif
-
- if (!(_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW))
- _cpu_based_2nd_exec_control &= ~(
- SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT |
- SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE |
- SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY);
-
- rdmsr_safe(MSR_IA32_VMX_EPT_VPID_CAP,
- &vmx_cap->ept, &vmx_cap->vpid);
-
- if (_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT) {
- /* CR3 accesses and invlpg don't need to cause VM Exits when EPT
- enabled */
- _cpu_based_exec_control &= ~(CPU_BASED_CR3_LOAD_EXITING |
- CPU_BASED_CR3_STORE_EXITING |
- CPU_BASED_INVLPG_EXITING);
- } else if (vmx_cap->ept) {
- vmx_cap->ept = 0;
- pr_warn_once("EPT CAP should not exist if not support "
- "1-setting enable EPT VM-execution control\n");
- }
- if (!(_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID) &&
- vmx_cap->vpid) {
- vmx_cap->vpid = 0;
- pr_warn_once("VPID CAP should not exist if not support "
- "1-setting enable VPID VM-execution control\n");
- }
-
- min = VM_EXIT_SAVE_DEBUG_CONTROLS | VM_EXIT_ACK_INTR_ON_EXIT;
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
- min |= VM_EXIT_HOST_ADDR_SPACE_SIZE;
-#endif
- opt = VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL |
- VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PAT |
- VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER |
- VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS |
- VM_EXIT_PT_CONCEAL_PIP |
- VM_EXIT_CLEAR_IA32_RTIT_CTL;
- if (adjust_vmx_controls(min, opt, MSR_IA32_VMX_EXIT_CTLS,
- &_vmexit_control) < 0)
- return -EIO;
-
- min = PIN_BASED_EXT_INTR_MASK | PIN_BASED_NMI_EXITING;
- opt = PIN_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMIS | PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR |
- PIN_BASED_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER;
- if (adjust_vmx_controls(min, opt, MSR_IA32_VMX_PINBASED_CTLS,
- &_pin_based_exec_control) < 0)
- return -EIO;
-
- if (cpu_has_broken_vmx_preemption_timer())
- _pin_based_exec_control &= ~PIN_BASED_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER;
- if (!(_cpu_based_2nd_exec_control &
- SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY))
- _pin_based_exec_control &= ~PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR;
-
- min = VM_ENTRY_LOAD_DEBUG_CONTROLS;
- opt = VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL |
- VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT |
- VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER |
- VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS |
- VM_ENTRY_PT_CONCEAL_PIP |
- VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_RTIT_CTL;
- if (adjust_vmx_controls(min, opt, MSR_IA32_VMX_ENTRY_CTLS,
- &_vmentry_control) < 0)
- return -EIO;
-
- /*
- * Some cpus support VM_{ENTRY,EXIT}_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL but they
- * can't be used due to an errata where VM Exit may incorrectly clear
- * IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL[34:32]. Workaround the errata by using the
- * MSR load mechanism to switch IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL.
- */
- if (boot_cpu_data.x86 == 0x6) {
- switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_model) {
- case 26: /* AAK155 */
- case 30: /* AAP115 */
- case 37: /* AAT100 */
- case 44: /* BC86,AAY89,BD102 */
- case 46: /* BA97 */
- _vmentry_control &= ~VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL;
- _vmexit_control &= ~VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL;
- pr_warn_once("kvm: VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL "
- "does not work properly. Using workaround\n");
- break;
- default:
- break;
- }
- }
-
-
- rdmsr(MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC, vmx_msr_low, vmx_msr_high);
-
- /* IA-32 SDM Vol 3B: VMCS size is never greater than 4kB. */
- if ((vmx_msr_high & 0x1fff) > PAGE_SIZE)
- return -EIO;
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
- /* IA-32 SDM Vol 3B: 64-bit CPUs always have VMX_BASIC_MSR[48]==0. */
- if (vmx_msr_high & (1u<<16))
- return -EIO;
-#endif
-
- /* Require Write-Back (WB) memory type for VMCS accesses. */
- if (((vmx_msr_high >> 18) & 15) != 6)
- return -EIO;
-
- vmcs_conf->size = vmx_msr_high & 0x1fff;
- vmcs_conf->order = get_order(vmcs_conf->size);
- vmcs_conf->basic_cap = vmx_msr_high & ~0x1fff;
-
- vmcs_conf->revision_id = vmx_msr_low;
-
- vmcs_conf->pin_based_exec_ctrl = _pin_based_exec_control;
- vmcs_conf->cpu_based_exec_ctrl = _cpu_based_exec_control;
- vmcs_conf->cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl = _cpu_based_2nd_exec_control;
- vmcs_conf->vmexit_ctrl = _vmexit_control;
- vmcs_conf->vmentry_ctrl = _vmentry_control;
-
- if (static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs))
- evmcs_sanitize_exec_ctrls(vmcs_conf);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-struct vmcs *alloc_vmcs_cpu(bool shadow, int cpu, gfp_t flags)
-{
- int node = cpu_to_node(cpu);
- struct page *pages;
- struct vmcs *vmcs;
-
- pages = __alloc_pages_node(node, flags, vmcs_config.order);
- if (!pages)
- return NULL;
- vmcs = page_address(pages);
- memset(vmcs, 0, vmcs_config.size);
-
- /* KVM supports Enlightened VMCS v1 only */
- if (static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs))
- vmcs->hdr.revision_id = KVM_EVMCS_VERSION;
- else
- vmcs->hdr.revision_id = vmcs_config.revision_id;
-
- if (shadow)
- vmcs->hdr.shadow_vmcs = 1;
- return vmcs;
-}
-
-void free_vmcs(struct vmcs *vmcs)
-{
- free_pages((unsigned long)vmcs, vmcs_config.order);
-}
-
-/*
- * Free a VMCS, but before that VMCLEAR it on the CPU where it was last loaded
- */
-void free_loaded_vmcs(struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs)
-{
- if (!loaded_vmcs->vmcs)
- return;
- loaded_vmcs_clear(loaded_vmcs);
- free_vmcs(loaded_vmcs->vmcs);
- loaded_vmcs->vmcs = NULL;
- if (loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap)
- free_page((unsigned long)loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap);
- WARN_ON(loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs != NULL);
-}
-
-int alloc_loaded_vmcs(struct loaded_vmcs *loaded_vmcs)
-{
- loaded_vmcs->vmcs = alloc_vmcs(false);
- if (!loaded_vmcs->vmcs)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- loaded_vmcs->shadow_vmcs = NULL;
- loaded_vmcs->hv_timer_soft_disabled = false;
- loaded_vmcs_init(loaded_vmcs);
-
- if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap()) {
- loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap = (unsigned long *)
- __get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
- if (!loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap)
- goto out_vmcs;
- memset(loaded_vmcs->msr_bitmap, 0xff, PAGE_SIZE);
-
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV) &&
- static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs) &&
- (ms_hyperv.nested_features & HV_X64_NESTED_MSR_BITMAP)) {
- struct hv_enlightened_vmcs *evmcs =
- (struct hv_enlightened_vmcs *)loaded_vmcs->vmcs;
-
- evmcs->hv_enlightenments_control.msr_bitmap = 1;
- }
- }
-
- memset(&loaded_vmcs->host_state, 0, sizeof(struct vmcs_host_state));
- memset(&loaded_vmcs->controls_shadow, 0,
- sizeof(struct vmcs_controls_shadow));
-
- return 0;
-
-out_vmcs:
- free_loaded_vmcs(loaded_vmcs);
- return -ENOMEM;
-}
-
-static void free_kvm_area(void)
-{
- int cpu;
-
- for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
- free_vmcs(per_cpu(vmxarea, cpu));
- per_cpu(vmxarea, cpu) = NULL;
- }
-}
-
-static __init int alloc_kvm_area(void)
-{
- int cpu;
-
- for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
- struct vmcs *vmcs;
-
- vmcs = alloc_vmcs_cpu(false, cpu, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!vmcs) {
- free_kvm_area();
- return -ENOMEM;
- }
-
- /*
- * When eVMCS is enabled, alloc_vmcs_cpu() sets
- * vmcs->revision_id to KVM_EVMCS_VERSION instead of
- * revision_id reported by MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC.
- *
- * However, even though not explicitly documented by
- * TLFS, VMXArea passed as VMXON argument should
- * still be marked with revision_id reported by
- * physical CPU.
- */
- if (static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs))
- vmcs->hdr.revision_id = vmcs_config.revision_id;
-
- per_cpu(vmxarea, cpu) = vmcs;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void fix_pmode_seg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int seg,
- struct kvm_segment *save)
-{
- if (!emulate_invalid_guest_state) {
- /*
- * CS and SS RPL should be equal during guest entry according
- * to VMX spec, but in reality it is not always so. Since vcpu
- * is in the middle of the transition from real mode to
- * protected mode it is safe to assume that RPL 0 is a good
- * default value.
- */
- if (seg == VCPU_SREG_CS || seg == VCPU_SREG_SS)
- save->selector &= ~SEGMENT_RPL_MASK;
- save->dpl = save->selector & SEGMENT_RPL_MASK;
- save->s = 1;
- }
- vmx_set_segment(vcpu, save, seg);
-}
-
-static void enter_pmode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- unsigned long flags;
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
-
- /*
- * Update real mode segment cache. It may be not up-to-date if sement
- * register was written while vcpu was in a guest mode.
- */
- vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_ES], VCPU_SREG_ES);
- vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_DS], VCPU_SREG_DS);
- vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_FS], VCPU_SREG_FS);
- vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_GS], VCPU_SREG_GS);
- vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_SS], VCPU_SREG_SS);
- vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_CS], VCPU_SREG_CS);
-
- vmx->rmode.vm86_active = 0;
-
- vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx);
-
- vmx_set_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_TR], VCPU_SREG_TR);
-
- flags = vmcs_readl(GUEST_RFLAGS);
- flags &= RMODE_GUEST_OWNED_EFLAGS_BITS;
- flags |= vmx->rmode.save_rflags & ~RMODE_GUEST_OWNED_EFLAGS_BITS;
- vmcs_writel(GUEST_RFLAGS, flags);
-
- vmcs_writel(GUEST_CR4, (vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR4) & ~X86_CR4_VME) |
- (vmcs_readl(CR4_READ_SHADOW) & X86_CR4_VME));
-
- update_exception_bitmap(vcpu);
-
- fix_pmode_seg(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_CS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_CS]);
- fix_pmode_seg(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_SS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_SS]);
- fix_pmode_seg(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_ES, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_ES]);
- fix_pmode_seg(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_DS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_DS]);
- fix_pmode_seg(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_FS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_FS]);
- fix_pmode_seg(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_GS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_GS]);
-}
-
-static void fix_rmode_seg(int seg, struct kvm_segment *save)
-{
- const struct kvm_vmx_segment_field *sf = &kvm_vmx_segment_fields[seg];
- struct kvm_segment var = *save;
-
- var.dpl = 0x3;
- if (seg == VCPU_SREG_CS)
- var.type = 0x3;
-
- if (!emulate_invalid_guest_state) {
- var.selector = var.base >> 4;
- var.base = var.base & 0xffff0;
- var.limit = 0xffff;
- var.g = 0;
- var.db = 0;
- var.present = 1;
- var.s = 1;
- var.l = 0;
- var.unusable = 0;
- var.type = 0x3;
- var.avl = 0;
- if (save->base & 0xf)
- printk_once(KERN_WARNING "kvm: segment base is not "
- "paragraph aligned when entering "
- "protected mode (seg=%d)", seg);
- }
-
- vmcs_write16(sf->selector, var.selector);
- vmcs_writel(sf->base, var.base);
- vmcs_write32(sf->limit, var.limit);
- vmcs_write32(sf->ar_bytes, vmx_segment_access_rights(&var));
-}
-
-static void enter_rmode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- unsigned long flags;
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- struct kvm_vmx *kvm_vmx = to_kvm_vmx(vcpu->kvm);
-
- vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_TR], VCPU_SREG_TR);
- vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_ES], VCPU_SREG_ES);
- vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_DS], VCPU_SREG_DS);
- vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_FS], VCPU_SREG_FS);
- vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_GS], VCPU_SREG_GS);
- vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_SS], VCPU_SREG_SS);
- vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_CS], VCPU_SREG_CS);
-
- vmx->rmode.vm86_active = 1;
-
- /*
- * Very old userspace does not call KVM_SET_TSS_ADDR before entering
- * vcpu. Warn the user that an update is overdue.
- */
- if (!kvm_vmx->tss_addr)
- printk_once(KERN_WARNING "kvm: KVM_SET_TSS_ADDR need to be "
- "called before entering vcpu\n");
-
- vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx);
-
- vmcs_writel(GUEST_TR_BASE, kvm_vmx->tss_addr);
- vmcs_write32(GUEST_TR_LIMIT, RMODE_TSS_SIZE - 1);
- vmcs_write32(GUEST_TR_AR_BYTES, 0x008b);
-
- flags = vmcs_readl(GUEST_RFLAGS);
- vmx->rmode.save_rflags = flags;
-
- flags |= X86_EFLAGS_IOPL | X86_EFLAGS_VM;
-
- vmcs_writel(GUEST_RFLAGS, flags);
- vmcs_writel(GUEST_CR4, vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR4) | X86_CR4_VME);
- update_exception_bitmap(vcpu);
-
- fix_rmode_seg(VCPU_SREG_SS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_SS]);
- fix_rmode_seg(VCPU_SREG_CS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_CS]);
- fix_rmode_seg(VCPU_SREG_ES, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_ES]);
- fix_rmode_seg(VCPU_SREG_DS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_DS]);
- fix_rmode_seg(VCPU_SREG_GS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_GS]);
- fix_rmode_seg(VCPU_SREG_FS, &vmx->rmode.segs[VCPU_SREG_FS]);
-
- kvm_mmu_reset_context(vcpu);
-}
-
-void vmx_set_efer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 efer)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- struct shared_msr_entry *msr = find_msr_entry(vmx, MSR_EFER);
-
- if (!msr)
- return;
-
- vcpu->arch.efer = efer;
- if (efer & EFER_LMA) {
- vm_entry_controls_setbit(to_vmx(vcpu), VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE);
- msr->data = efer;
- } else {
- vm_entry_controls_clearbit(to_vmx(vcpu), VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE);
-
- msr->data = efer & ~EFER_LME;
- }
- setup_msrs(vmx);
-}
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-
-static void enter_lmode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- u32 guest_tr_ar;
-
- vmx_segment_cache_clear(to_vmx(vcpu));
-
- guest_tr_ar = vmcs_read32(GUEST_TR_AR_BYTES);
- if ((guest_tr_ar & VMX_AR_TYPE_MASK) != VMX_AR_TYPE_BUSY_64_TSS) {
- pr_debug_ratelimited("%s: tss fixup for long mode. \n",
- __func__);
- vmcs_write32(GUEST_TR_AR_BYTES,
- (guest_tr_ar & ~VMX_AR_TYPE_MASK)
- | VMX_AR_TYPE_BUSY_64_TSS);
- }
- vmx_set_efer(vcpu, vcpu->arch.efer | EFER_LMA);
-}
-
-static void exit_lmode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- vm_entry_controls_clearbit(to_vmx(vcpu), VM_ENTRY_IA32E_MODE);
- vmx_set_efer(vcpu, vcpu->arch.efer & ~EFER_LMA);
-}
-
-#endif
-
-static void vmx_flush_tlb_gva(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gva_t addr)
-{
- int vpid = to_vmx(vcpu)->vpid;
-
- if (!vpid_sync_vcpu_addr(vpid, addr))
- vpid_sync_context(vpid);
-
- /*
- * If VPIDs are not supported or enabled, then the above is a no-op.
- * But we don't really need a TLB flush in that case anyway, because
- * each VM entry/exit includes an implicit flush when VPID is 0.
- */
-}
-
-static void vmx_decache_cr0_guest_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- ulong cr0_guest_owned_bits = vcpu->arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits;
-
- vcpu->arch.cr0 &= ~cr0_guest_owned_bits;
- vcpu->arch.cr0 |= vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR0) & cr0_guest_owned_bits;
-}
-
-static void vmx_decache_cr4_guest_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- ulong cr4_guest_owned_bits = vcpu->arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits;
-
- vcpu->arch.cr4 &= ~cr4_guest_owned_bits;
- vcpu->arch.cr4 |= vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR4) & cr4_guest_owned_bits;
-}
-
-static void ept_load_pdptrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.walk_mmu;
-
- if (!kvm_register_is_dirty(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR))
- return;
-
- if (is_pae_paging(vcpu)) {
- vmcs_write64(GUEST_PDPTR0, mmu->pdptrs[0]);
- vmcs_write64(GUEST_PDPTR1, mmu->pdptrs[1]);
- vmcs_write64(GUEST_PDPTR2, mmu->pdptrs[2]);
- vmcs_write64(GUEST_PDPTR3, mmu->pdptrs[3]);
- }
-}
-
-void ept_save_pdptrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct kvm_mmu *mmu = vcpu->arch.walk_mmu;
-
- if (is_pae_paging(vcpu)) {
- mmu->pdptrs[0] = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR0);
- mmu->pdptrs[1] = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR1);
- mmu->pdptrs[2] = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR2);
- mmu->pdptrs[3] = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR3);
- }
-
- kvm_register_mark_dirty(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR);
-}
-
-static void ept_update_paging_mode_cr0(unsigned long *hw_cr0,
- unsigned long cr0,
- struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
-
- if (!kvm_register_is_available(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_CR3))
- vmx_cache_reg(vcpu, VCPU_EXREG_CR3);
- if (!(cr0 & X86_CR0_PG)) {
- /* From paging/starting to nonpaging */
- exec_controls_setbit(vmx, CPU_BASED_CR3_LOAD_EXITING |
- CPU_BASED_CR3_STORE_EXITING);
- vcpu->arch.cr0 = cr0;
- vmx_set_cr4(vcpu, kvm_read_cr4(vcpu));
- } else if (!is_paging(vcpu)) {
- /* From nonpaging to paging */
- exec_controls_clearbit(vmx, CPU_BASED_CR3_LOAD_EXITING |
- CPU_BASED_CR3_STORE_EXITING);
- vcpu->arch.cr0 = cr0;
- vmx_set_cr4(vcpu, kvm_read_cr4(vcpu));
- }
-
- if (!(cr0 & X86_CR0_WP))
- *hw_cr0 &= ~X86_CR0_WP;
-}
-
-void vmx_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- unsigned long hw_cr0;
-
- hw_cr0 = (cr0 & ~KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_OFF);
- if (enable_unrestricted_guest)
- hw_cr0 |= KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_ON_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST;
- else {
- hw_cr0 |= KVM_VM_CR0_ALWAYS_ON;
-
- if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active && (cr0 & X86_CR0_PE))
- enter_pmode(vcpu);
-
- if (!vmx->rmode.vm86_active && !(cr0 & X86_CR0_PE))
- enter_rmode(vcpu);
- }
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
- if (vcpu->arch.efer & EFER_LME) {
- if (!is_paging(vcpu) && (cr0 & X86_CR0_PG))
- enter_lmode(vcpu);
- if (is_paging(vcpu) && !(cr0 & X86_CR0_PG))
- exit_lmode(vcpu);
- }
-#endif
-
- if (enable_ept && !enable_unrestricted_guest)
- ept_update_paging_mode_cr0(&hw_cr0, cr0, vcpu);
-
- vmcs_writel(CR0_READ_SHADOW, cr0);
- vmcs_writel(GUEST_CR0, hw_cr0);
- vcpu->arch.cr0 = cr0;
-
- /* depends on vcpu->arch.cr0 to be set to a new value */
- vmx->emulation_required = emulation_required(vcpu);
-}
-
-static int get_ept_level(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- if (cpu_has_vmx_ept_5levels() && (cpuid_maxphyaddr(vcpu) > 48))
- return 5;
- return 4;
-}
-
-u64 construct_eptp(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long root_hpa)
-{
- u64 eptp = VMX_EPTP_MT_WB;
-
- eptp |= (get_ept_level(vcpu) == 5) ? VMX_EPTP_PWL_5 : VMX_EPTP_PWL_4;
-
- if (enable_ept_ad_bits &&
- (!is_guest_mode(vcpu) || nested_ept_ad_enabled(vcpu)))
- eptp |= VMX_EPTP_AD_ENABLE_BIT;
- eptp |= (root_hpa & PAGE_MASK);
-
- return eptp;
-}
-
-void vmx_set_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr3)
-{
- struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
- bool update_guest_cr3 = true;
- unsigned long guest_cr3;
- u64 eptp;
-
- guest_cr3 = cr3;
- if (enable_ept) {
- eptp = construct_eptp(vcpu, cr3);
- vmcs_write64(EPT_POINTER, eptp);
-
- if (kvm_x86_ops->tlb_remote_flush) {
- spin_lock(&to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->ept_pointer_lock);
- to_vmx(vcpu)->ept_pointer = eptp;
- to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->ept_pointers_match
- = EPT_POINTERS_CHECK;
- spin_unlock(&to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->ept_pointer_lock);
- }
-
- /* Loading vmcs02.GUEST_CR3 is handled by nested VM-Enter. */
- if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
- update_guest_cr3 = false;
- else if (!enable_unrestricted_guest && !is_paging(vcpu))
- guest_cr3 = to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->ept_identity_map_addr;
- else if (test_bit(VCPU_EXREG_CR3, (ulong *)&vcpu->arch.regs_avail))
- guest_cr3 = vcpu->arch.cr3;
- else /* vmcs01.GUEST_CR3 is already up-to-date. */
- update_guest_cr3 = false;
- ept_load_pdptrs(vcpu);
- }
-
- if (update_guest_cr3)
- vmcs_writel(GUEST_CR3, guest_cr3);
-}
-
-int vmx_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- /*
- * Pass through host's Machine Check Enable value to hw_cr4, which
- * is in force while we are in guest mode. Do not let guests control
- * this bit, even if host CR4.MCE == 0.
- */
- unsigned long hw_cr4;
-
- hw_cr4 = (cr4_read_shadow() & X86_CR4_MCE) | (cr4 & ~X86_CR4_MCE);
- if (enable_unrestricted_guest)
- hw_cr4 |= KVM_VM_CR4_ALWAYS_ON_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST;
- else if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active)
- hw_cr4 |= KVM_RMODE_VM_CR4_ALWAYS_ON;
- else
- hw_cr4 |= KVM_PMODE_VM_CR4_ALWAYS_ON;
-
- if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_UMIP) && vmx_umip_emulated()) {
- if (cr4 & X86_CR4_UMIP) {
- secondary_exec_controls_setbit(vmx, SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC);
- hw_cr4 &= ~X86_CR4_UMIP;
- } else if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu) ||
- !nested_cpu_has2(get_vmcs12(vcpu), SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC)) {
- secondary_exec_controls_clearbit(vmx, SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC);
- }
- }
-
- if (cr4 & X86_CR4_VMXE) {
- /*
- * To use VMXON (and later other VMX instructions), a guest
- * must first be able to turn on cr4.VMXE (see handle_vmon()).
- * So basically the check on whether to allow nested VMX
- * is here. We operate under the default treatment of SMM,
- * so VMX cannot be enabled under SMM.
- */
- if (!nested_vmx_allowed(vcpu) || is_smm(vcpu))
- return 1;
- }
-
- if (vmx->nested.vmxon && !nested_cr4_valid(vcpu, cr4))
- return 1;
-
- vcpu->arch.cr4 = cr4;
-
- if (!enable_unrestricted_guest) {
- if (enable_ept) {
- if (!is_paging(vcpu)) {
- hw_cr4 &= ~X86_CR4_PAE;
- hw_cr4 |= X86_CR4_PSE;
- } else if (!(cr4 & X86_CR4_PAE)) {
- hw_cr4 &= ~X86_CR4_PAE;
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * SMEP/SMAP/PKU is disabled if CPU is in non-paging mode in
- * hardware. To emulate this behavior, SMEP/SMAP/PKU needs
- * to be manually disabled when guest switches to non-paging
- * mode.
- *
- * If !enable_unrestricted_guest, the CPU is always running
- * with CR0.PG=1 and CR4 needs to be modified.
- * If enable_unrestricted_guest, the CPU automatically
- * disables SMEP/SMAP/PKU when the guest sets CR0.PG=0.
- */
- if (!is_paging(vcpu))
- hw_cr4 &= ~(X86_CR4_SMEP | X86_CR4_SMAP | X86_CR4_PKE);
- }
-
- vmcs_writel(CR4_READ_SHADOW, cr4);
- vmcs_writel(GUEST_CR4, hw_cr4);
- return 0;
-}
-
-void vmx_get_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_segment *var, int seg)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- u32 ar;
-
- if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active && seg != VCPU_SREG_LDTR) {
- *var = vmx->rmode.segs[seg];
- if (seg == VCPU_SREG_TR
- || var->selector == vmx_read_guest_seg_selector(vmx, seg))
- return;
- var->base = vmx_read_guest_seg_base(vmx, seg);
- var->selector = vmx_read_guest_seg_selector(vmx, seg);
- return;
- }
- var->base = vmx_read_guest_seg_base(vmx, seg);
- var->limit = vmx_read_guest_seg_limit(vmx, seg);
- var->selector = vmx_read_guest_seg_selector(vmx, seg);
- ar = vmx_read_guest_seg_ar(vmx, seg);
- var->unusable = (ar >> 16) & 1;
- var->type = ar & 15;
- var->s = (ar >> 4) & 1;
- var->dpl = (ar >> 5) & 3;
- /*
- * Some userspaces do not preserve unusable property. Since usable
- * segment has to be present according to VMX spec we can use present
- * property to amend userspace bug by making unusable segment always
- * nonpresent. vmx_segment_access_rights() already marks nonpresent
- * segment as unusable.
- */
- var->present = !var->unusable;
- var->avl = (ar >> 12) & 1;
- var->l = (ar >> 13) & 1;
- var->db = (ar >> 14) & 1;
- var->g = (ar >> 15) & 1;
-}
-
-static u64 vmx_get_segment_base(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int seg)
-{
- struct kvm_segment s;
-
- if (to_vmx(vcpu)->rmode.vm86_active) {
- vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &s, seg);
- return s.base;
- }
- return vmx_read_guest_seg_base(to_vmx(vcpu), seg);
-}
-
-int vmx_get_cpl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
-
- if (unlikely(vmx->rmode.vm86_active))
- return 0;
- else {
- int ar = vmx_read_guest_seg_ar(vmx, VCPU_SREG_SS);
- return VMX_AR_DPL(ar);
- }
-}
-
-static u32 vmx_segment_access_rights(struct kvm_segment *var)
-{
- u32 ar;
-
- if (var->unusable || !var->present)
- ar = 1 << 16;
- else {
- ar = var->type & 15;
- ar |= (var->s & 1) << 4;
- ar |= (var->dpl & 3) << 5;
- ar |= (var->present & 1) << 7;
- ar |= (var->avl & 1) << 12;
- ar |= (var->l & 1) << 13;
- ar |= (var->db & 1) << 14;
- ar |= (var->g & 1) << 15;
- }
-
- return ar;
-}
-
-void vmx_set_segment(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_segment *var, int seg)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- const struct kvm_vmx_segment_field *sf = &kvm_vmx_segment_fields[seg];
-
- vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx);
-
- if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active && seg != VCPU_SREG_LDTR) {
- vmx->rmode.segs[seg] = *var;
- if (seg == VCPU_SREG_TR)
- vmcs_write16(sf->selector, var->selector);
- else if (var->s)
- fix_rmode_seg(seg, &vmx->rmode.segs[seg]);
- goto out;
- }
-
- vmcs_writel(sf->base, var->base);
- vmcs_write32(sf->limit, var->limit);
- vmcs_write16(sf->selector, var->selector);
-
- /*
- * Fix the "Accessed" bit in AR field of segment registers for older
- * qemu binaries.
- * IA32 arch specifies that at the time of processor reset the
- * "Accessed" bit in the AR field of segment registers is 1. And qemu
- * is setting it to 0 in the userland code. This causes invalid guest
- * state vmexit when "unrestricted guest" mode is turned on.
- * Fix for this setup issue in cpu_reset is being pushed in the qemu
- * tree. Newer qemu binaries with that qemu fix would not need this
- * kvm hack.
- */
- if (enable_unrestricted_guest && (seg != VCPU_SREG_LDTR))
- var->type |= 0x1; /* Accessed */
-
- vmcs_write32(sf->ar_bytes, vmx_segment_access_rights(var));
-
-out:
- vmx->emulation_required = emulation_required(vcpu);
-}
-
-static void vmx_get_cs_db_l_bits(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int *db, int *l)
-{
- u32 ar = vmx_read_guest_seg_ar(to_vmx(vcpu), VCPU_SREG_CS);
-
- *db = (ar >> 14) & 1;
- *l = (ar >> 13) & 1;
-}
-
-static void vmx_get_idt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
-{
- dt->size = vmcs_read32(GUEST_IDTR_LIMIT);
- dt->address = vmcs_readl(GUEST_IDTR_BASE);
-}
-
-static void vmx_set_idt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
-{
- vmcs_write32(GUEST_IDTR_LIMIT, dt->size);
- vmcs_writel(GUEST_IDTR_BASE, dt->address);
-}
-
-static void vmx_get_gdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
-{
- dt->size = vmcs_read32(GUEST_GDTR_LIMIT);
- dt->address = vmcs_readl(GUEST_GDTR_BASE);
-}
-
-static void vmx_set_gdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)
-{
- vmcs_write32(GUEST_GDTR_LIMIT, dt->size);
- vmcs_writel(GUEST_GDTR_BASE, dt->address);
-}
-
-static bool rmode_segment_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int seg)
-{
- struct kvm_segment var;
- u32 ar;
-
- vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &var, seg);
- var.dpl = 0x3;
- if (seg == VCPU_SREG_CS)
- var.type = 0x3;
- ar = vmx_segment_access_rights(&var);
-
- if (var.base != (var.selector << 4))
- return false;
- if (var.limit != 0xffff)
- return false;
- if (ar != 0xf3)
- return false;
-
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool code_segment_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct kvm_segment cs;
- unsigned int cs_rpl;
-
- vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &cs, VCPU_SREG_CS);
- cs_rpl = cs.selector & SEGMENT_RPL_MASK;
-
- if (cs.unusable)
- return false;
- if (~cs.type & (VMX_AR_TYPE_CODE_MASK|VMX_AR_TYPE_ACCESSES_MASK))
- return false;
- if (!cs.s)
- return false;
- if (cs.type & VMX_AR_TYPE_WRITEABLE_MASK) {
- if (cs.dpl > cs_rpl)
- return false;
- } else {
- if (cs.dpl != cs_rpl)
- return false;
- }
- if (!cs.present)
- return false;
-
- /* TODO: Add Reserved field check, this'll require a new member in the kvm_segment_field structure */
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool stack_segment_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct kvm_segment ss;
- unsigned int ss_rpl;
-
- vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &ss, VCPU_SREG_SS);
- ss_rpl = ss.selector & SEGMENT_RPL_MASK;
-
- if (ss.unusable)
- return true;
- if (ss.type != 3 && ss.type != 7)
- return false;
- if (!ss.s)
- return false;
- if (ss.dpl != ss_rpl) /* DPL != RPL */
- return false;
- if (!ss.present)
- return false;
-
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool data_segment_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int seg)
-{
- struct kvm_segment var;
- unsigned int rpl;
-
- vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &var, seg);
- rpl = var.selector & SEGMENT_RPL_MASK;
-
- if (var.unusable)
- return true;
- if (!var.s)
- return false;
- if (!var.present)
- return false;
- if (~var.type & (VMX_AR_TYPE_CODE_MASK|VMX_AR_TYPE_WRITEABLE_MASK)) {
- if (var.dpl < rpl) /* DPL < RPL */
- return false;
- }
-
- /* TODO: Add other members to kvm_segment_field to allow checking for other access
- * rights flags
- */
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool tr_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct kvm_segment tr;
-
- vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &tr, VCPU_SREG_TR);
-
- if (tr.unusable)
- return false;
- if (tr.selector & SEGMENT_TI_MASK) /* TI = 1 */
- return false;
- if (tr.type != 3 && tr.type != 11) /* TODO: Check if guest is in IA32e mode */
- return false;
- if (!tr.present)
- return false;
-
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool ldtr_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct kvm_segment ldtr;
-
- vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &ldtr, VCPU_SREG_LDTR);
-
- if (ldtr.unusable)
- return true;
- if (ldtr.selector & SEGMENT_TI_MASK) /* TI = 1 */
- return false;
- if (ldtr.type != 2)
- return false;
- if (!ldtr.present)
- return false;
-
- return true;
-}
-
-static bool cs_ss_rpl_check(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct kvm_segment cs, ss;
-
- vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &cs, VCPU_SREG_CS);
- vmx_get_segment(vcpu, &ss, VCPU_SREG_SS);
-
- return ((cs.selector & SEGMENT_RPL_MASK) ==
- (ss.selector & SEGMENT_RPL_MASK));
-}
-
-/*
- * Check if guest state is valid. Returns true if valid, false if
- * not.
- * We assume that registers are always usable
- */
-static bool guest_state_valid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- if (enable_unrestricted_guest)
- return true;
-
- /* real mode guest state checks */
- if (!is_protmode(vcpu) || (vmx_get_rflags(vcpu) & X86_EFLAGS_VM)) {
- if (!rmode_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_CS))
- return false;
- if (!rmode_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_SS))
- return false;
- if (!rmode_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_DS))
- return false;
- if (!rmode_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_ES))
- return false;
- if (!rmode_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_FS))
- return false;
- if (!rmode_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_GS))
- return false;
- } else {
- /* protected mode guest state checks */
- if (!cs_ss_rpl_check(vcpu))
- return false;
- if (!code_segment_valid(vcpu))
- return false;
- if (!stack_segment_valid(vcpu))
- return false;
- if (!data_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_DS))
- return false;
- if (!data_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_ES))
- return false;
- if (!data_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_FS))
- return false;
- if (!data_segment_valid(vcpu, VCPU_SREG_GS))
- return false;
- if (!tr_valid(vcpu))
- return false;
- if (!ldtr_valid(vcpu))
- return false;
- }
- /* TODO:
- * - Add checks on RIP
- * - Add checks on RFLAGS
- */
-
- return true;
-}
-
-static int init_rmode_tss(struct kvm *kvm)
-{
- gfn_t fn;
- u16 data = 0;
- int idx, r;
-
- idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
- fn = to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->tss_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
- r = kvm_clear_guest_page(kvm, fn, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
- if (r < 0)
- goto out;
- data = TSS_BASE_SIZE + TSS_REDIRECTION_SIZE;
- r = kvm_write_guest_page(kvm, fn++, &data,
- TSS_IOPB_BASE_OFFSET, sizeof(u16));
- if (r < 0)
- goto out;
- r = kvm_clear_guest_page(kvm, fn++, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
- if (r < 0)
- goto out;
- r = kvm_clear_guest_page(kvm, fn, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
- if (r < 0)
- goto out;
- data = ~0;
- r = kvm_write_guest_page(kvm, fn, &data,
- RMODE_TSS_SIZE - 2 * PAGE_SIZE - 1,
- sizeof(u8));
-out:
- srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx);
- return r;
-}
-
-static int init_rmode_identity_map(struct kvm *kvm)
-{
- struct kvm_vmx *kvm_vmx = to_kvm_vmx(kvm);
- int i, idx, r = 0;
- kvm_pfn_t identity_map_pfn;
- u32 tmp;
-
- /* Protect kvm_vmx->ept_identity_pagetable_done. */
- mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
-
- if (likely(kvm_vmx->ept_identity_pagetable_done))
- goto out2;
-
- if (!kvm_vmx->ept_identity_map_addr)
- kvm_vmx->ept_identity_map_addr = VMX_EPT_IDENTITY_PAGETABLE_ADDR;
- identity_map_pfn = kvm_vmx->ept_identity_map_addr >> PAGE_SHIFT;
-
- r = __x86_set_memory_region(kvm, IDENTITY_PAGETABLE_PRIVATE_MEMSLOT,
- kvm_vmx->ept_identity_map_addr, PAGE_SIZE);
- if (r < 0)
- goto out2;
-
- idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->srcu);
- r = kvm_clear_guest_page(kvm, identity_map_pfn, 0, PAGE_SIZE);
- if (r < 0)
- goto out;
- /* Set up identity-mapping pagetable for EPT in real mode */
- for (i = 0; i < PT32_ENT_PER_PAGE; i++) {
- tmp = (i << 22) + (_PAGE_PRESENT | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_USER |
- _PAGE_ACCESSED | _PAGE_DIRTY | _PAGE_PSE);
- r = kvm_write_guest_page(kvm, identity_map_pfn,
- &tmp, i * sizeof(tmp), sizeof(tmp));
- if (r < 0)
- goto out;
- }
- kvm_vmx->ept_identity_pagetable_done = true;
-
-out:
- srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->srcu, idx);
-
-out2:
- mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
- return r;
-}
-
-static void seg_setup(int seg)
-{
- const struct kvm_vmx_segment_field *sf = &kvm_vmx_segment_fields[seg];
- unsigned int ar;
-
- vmcs_write16(sf->selector, 0);
- vmcs_writel(sf->base, 0);
- vmcs_write32(sf->limit, 0xffff);
- ar = 0x93;
- if (seg == VCPU_SREG_CS)
- ar |= 0x08; /* code segment */
-
- vmcs_write32(sf->ar_bytes, ar);
-}
-
-static int alloc_apic_access_page(struct kvm *kvm)
-{
- struct page *page;
- int r = 0;
-
- mutex_lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
- if (kvm->arch.apic_access_page_done)
- goto out;
- r = __x86_set_memory_region(kvm, APIC_ACCESS_PAGE_PRIVATE_MEMSLOT,
- APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE, PAGE_SIZE);
- if (r)
- goto out;
-
- page = gfn_to_page(kvm, APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE >> PAGE_SHIFT);
- if (is_error_page(page)) {
- r = -EFAULT;
- goto out;
- }
-
- /*
- * Do not pin the page in memory, so that memory hot-unplug
- * is able to migrate it.
- */
- put_page(page);
- kvm->arch.apic_access_page_done = true;
-out:
- mutex_unlock(&kvm->slots_lock);
- return r;
-}
-
-int allocate_vpid(void)
-{
- int vpid;
-
- if (!enable_vpid)
- return 0;
- spin_lock(&vmx_vpid_lock);
- vpid = find_first_zero_bit(vmx_vpid_bitmap, VMX_NR_VPIDS);
- if (vpid < VMX_NR_VPIDS)
- __set_bit(vpid, vmx_vpid_bitmap);
- else
- vpid = 0;
- spin_unlock(&vmx_vpid_lock);
- return vpid;
-}
-
-void free_vpid(int vpid)
-{
- if (!enable_vpid || vpid == 0)
- return;
- spin_lock(&vmx_vpid_lock);
- __clear_bit(vpid, vmx_vpid_bitmap);
- spin_unlock(&vmx_vpid_lock);
-}
-
-static __always_inline void vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap,
- u32 msr, int type)
-{
- int f = sizeof(unsigned long);
-
- if (!cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
- return;
-
- if (static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs))
- evmcs_touch_msr_bitmap();
-
- /*
- * See Intel PRM Vol. 3, 20.6.9 (MSR-Bitmap Address). Early manuals
- * have the write-low and read-high bitmap offsets the wrong way round.
- * We can control MSRs 0x00000000-0x00001fff and 0xc0000000-0xc0001fff.
- */
- if (msr <= 0x1fff) {
- if (type & MSR_TYPE_R)
- /* read-low */
- __clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x000 / f);
-
- if (type & MSR_TYPE_W)
- /* write-low */
- __clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x800 / f);
-
- } else if ((msr >= 0xc0000000) && (msr <= 0xc0001fff)) {
- msr &= 0x1fff;
- if (type & MSR_TYPE_R)
- /* read-high */
- __clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x400 / f);
-
- if (type & MSR_TYPE_W)
- /* write-high */
- __clear_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0xc00 / f);
-
- }
-}
-
-static __always_inline void vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap,
- u32 msr, int type)
-{
- int f = sizeof(unsigned long);
-
- if (!cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
- return;
-
- if (static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs))
- evmcs_touch_msr_bitmap();
-
- /*
- * See Intel PRM Vol. 3, 20.6.9 (MSR-Bitmap Address). Early manuals
- * have the write-low and read-high bitmap offsets the wrong way round.
- * We can control MSRs 0x00000000-0x00001fff and 0xc0000000-0xc0001fff.
- */
- if (msr <= 0x1fff) {
- if (type & MSR_TYPE_R)
- /* read-low */
- __set_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x000 / f);
-
- if (type & MSR_TYPE_W)
- /* write-low */
- __set_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x800 / f);
-
- } else if ((msr >= 0xc0000000) && (msr <= 0xc0001fff)) {
- msr &= 0x1fff;
- if (type & MSR_TYPE_R)
- /* read-high */
- __set_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0x400 / f);
-
- if (type & MSR_TYPE_W)
- /* write-high */
- __set_bit(msr, msr_bitmap + 0xc00 / f);
-
- }
-}
-
-static __always_inline void vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(unsigned long *msr_bitmap,
- u32 msr, int type, bool value)
-{
- if (value)
- vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, msr, type);
- else
- vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, msr, type);
-}
-
-static u8 vmx_msr_bitmap_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- u8 mode = 0;
-
- if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls() &&
- (secondary_exec_controls_get(to_vmx(vcpu)) &
- SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE)) {
- mode |= MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC;
- if (enable_apicv && kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
- mode |= MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV;
- }
-
- return mode;
-}
-
-static void vmx_update_msr_bitmap_x2apic(unsigned long *msr_bitmap,
- u8 mode)
-{
- int msr;
-
- for (msr = 0x800; msr <= 0x8ff; msr += BITS_PER_LONG) {
- unsigned word = msr / BITS_PER_LONG;
- msr_bitmap[word] = (mode & MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV) ? 0 : ~0;
- msr_bitmap[word + (0x800 / sizeof(long))] = ~0;
- }
-
- if (mode & MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC) {
- /*
- * TPR reads and writes can be virtualized even if virtual interrupt
- * delivery is not in use.
- */
- vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TASKPRI), MSR_TYPE_RW);
- if (mode & MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV) {
- vmx_enable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_TMCCT), MSR_TYPE_R);
- vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_EOI), MSR_TYPE_W);
- vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, X2APIC_MSR(APIC_SELF_IPI), MSR_TYPE_W);
- }
- }
-}
-
-void vmx_update_msr_bitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- unsigned long *msr_bitmap = vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap;
- u8 mode = vmx_msr_bitmap_mode(vcpu);
- u8 changed = mode ^ vmx->msr_bitmap_mode;
-
- if (!changed)
- return;
-
- if (changed & (MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC | MSR_BITMAP_MODE_X2APIC_APICV))
- vmx_update_msr_bitmap_x2apic(msr_bitmap, mode);
-
- vmx->msr_bitmap_mode = mode;
-}
-
-void pt_update_intercept_for_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
-{
- unsigned long *msr_bitmap = vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap;
- bool flag = !(vmx->pt_desc.guest.ctl & RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN);
- u32 i;
-
- vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_RTIT_STATUS,
- MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
- vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_BASE,
- MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
- vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_RTIT_OUTPUT_MASK,
- MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
- vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_RTIT_CR3_MATCH,
- MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
- for (i = 0; i < vmx->pt_desc.addr_range; i++) {
- vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap,
- MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_A + i * 2, MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
- vmx_set_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap,
- MSR_IA32_RTIT_ADDR0_B + i * 2, MSR_TYPE_RW, flag);
- }
-}
-
-static bool vmx_get_enable_apicv(struct kvm *kvm)
-{
- return enable_apicv;
-}
-
-static bool vmx_guest_apic_has_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- void *vapic_page;
- u32 vppr;
- int rvi;
-
- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!is_guest_mode(vcpu)) ||
- !nested_cpu_has_vid(get_vmcs12(vcpu)) ||
- WARN_ON_ONCE(!vmx->nested.virtual_apic_map.gfn))
- return false;
-
- rvi = vmx_get_rvi();
-
- vapic_page = vmx->nested.virtual_apic_map.hva;
- vppr = *((u32 *)(vapic_page + APIC_PROCPRI));
-
- return ((rvi & 0xf0) > (vppr & 0xf0));
-}
-
-static inline bool kvm_vcpu_trigger_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
- bool nested)
-{
-#ifdef CONFIG_SMP
- int pi_vec = nested ? POSTED_INTR_NESTED_VECTOR : POSTED_INTR_VECTOR;
-
- if (vcpu->mode == IN_GUEST_MODE) {
- /*
- * The vector of interrupt to be delivered to vcpu had
- * been set in PIR before this function.
- *
- * Following cases will be reached in this block, and
- * we always send a notification event in all cases as
- * explained below.
- *
- * Case 1: vcpu keeps in non-root mode. Sending a
- * notification event posts the interrupt to vcpu.
- *
- * Case 2: vcpu exits to root mode and is still
- * runnable. PIR will be synced to vIRR before the
- * next vcpu entry. Sending a notification event in
- * this case has no effect, as vcpu is not in root
- * mode.
- *
- * Case 3: vcpu exits to root mode and is blocked.
- * vcpu_block() has already synced PIR to vIRR and
- * never blocks vcpu if vIRR is not cleared. Therefore,
- * a blocked vcpu here does not wait for any requested
- * interrupts in PIR, and sending a notification event
- * which has no effect is safe here.
- */
-
- apic->send_IPI_mask(get_cpu_mask(vcpu->cpu), pi_vec);
- return true;
- }
-#endif
- return false;
-}
-
-static int vmx_deliver_nested_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
- int vector)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
-
- if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
- vector == vmx->nested.posted_intr_nv) {
- /*
- * If a posted intr is not recognized by hardware,
- * we will accomplish it in the next vmentry.
- */
- vmx->nested.pi_pending = true;
- kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
- /* the PIR and ON have been set by L1. */
- if (!kvm_vcpu_trigger_posted_interrupt(vcpu, true))
- kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);
- return 0;
- }
- return -1;
-}
-/*
- * Send interrupt to vcpu via posted interrupt way.
- * 1. If target vcpu is running(non-root mode), send posted interrupt
- * notification to vcpu and hardware will sync PIR to vIRR atomically.
- * 2. If target vcpu isn't running(root mode), kick it to pick up the
- * interrupt from PIR in next vmentry.
- */
-static void vmx_deliver_posted_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int vector)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- int r;
-
- r = vmx_deliver_nested_posted_interrupt(vcpu, vector);
- if (!r)
- return;
-
- if (pi_test_and_set_pir(vector, &vmx->pi_desc))
- return;
-
- /* If a previous notification has sent the IPI, nothing to do. */
- if (pi_test_and_set_on(&vmx->pi_desc))
- return;
-
- if (!kvm_vcpu_trigger_posted_interrupt(vcpu, false))
- kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);
-}
-
-/*
- * Set up the vmcs's constant host-state fields, i.e., host-state fields that
- * will not change in the lifetime of the guest.
- * Note that host-state that does change is set elsewhere. E.g., host-state
- * that is set differently for each CPU is set in vmx_vcpu_load(), not here.
- */
-void vmx_set_constant_host_state(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
-{
- u32 low32, high32;
- unsigned long tmpl;
- unsigned long cr0, cr3, cr4;
-
- cr0 = read_cr0();
- WARN_ON(cr0 & X86_CR0_TS);
- vmcs_writel(HOST_CR0, cr0); /* 22.2.3 */
-
- /*
- * Save the most likely value for this task's CR3 in the VMCS.
- * We can't use __get_current_cr3_fast() because we're not atomic.
- */
- cr3 = __read_cr3();
- vmcs_writel(HOST_CR3, cr3); /* 22.2.3 FIXME: shadow tables */
- vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr3 = cr3;
-
- /* Save the most likely value for this task's CR4 in the VMCS. */
- cr4 = cr4_read_shadow();
- vmcs_writel(HOST_CR4, cr4); /* 22.2.3, 22.2.5 */
- vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr4 = cr4;
-
- vmcs_write16(HOST_CS_SELECTOR, __KERNEL_CS); /* 22.2.4 */
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
- /*
- * Load null selectors, so we can avoid reloading them in
- * vmx_prepare_switch_to_host(), in case userspace uses
- * the null selectors too (the expected case).
- */
- vmcs_write16(HOST_DS_SELECTOR, 0);
- vmcs_write16(HOST_ES_SELECTOR, 0);
-#else
- vmcs_write16(HOST_DS_SELECTOR, __KERNEL_DS); /* 22.2.4 */
- vmcs_write16(HOST_ES_SELECTOR, __KERNEL_DS); /* 22.2.4 */
-#endif
- vmcs_write16(HOST_SS_SELECTOR, __KERNEL_DS); /* 22.2.4 */
- vmcs_write16(HOST_TR_SELECTOR, GDT_ENTRY_TSS*8); /* 22.2.4 */
-
- vmcs_writel(HOST_IDTR_BASE, host_idt_base); /* 22.2.4 */
-
- vmcs_writel(HOST_RIP, (unsigned long)vmx_vmexit); /* 22.2.5 */
-
- rdmsr(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, low32, high32);
- vmcs_write32(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, low32);
- rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, tmpl);
- vmcs_writel(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, tmpl); /* 22.2.3 */
-
- if (vmcs_config.vmexit_ctrl & VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PAT) {
- rdmsr(MSR_IA32_CR_PAT, low32, high32);
- vmcs_write64(HOST_IA32_PAT, low32 | ((u64) high32 << 32));
- }
-
- if (cpu_has_load_ia32_efer())
- vmcs_write64(HOST_IA32_EFER, host_efer);
-}
-
-void set_cr4_guest_host_mask(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
-{
- vmx->vcpu.arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits = KVM_CR4_GUEST_OWNED_BITS;
- if (enable_ept)
- vmx->vcpu.arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits |= X86_CR4_PGE;
- if (is_guest_mode(&vmx->vcpu))
- vmx->vcpu.arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits &=
- ~get_vmcs12(&vmx->vcpu)->cr4_guest_host_mask;
- vmcs_writel(CR4_GUEST_HOST_MASK, ~vmx->vcpu.arch.cr4_guest_owned_bits);
-}
-
-u32 vmx_pin_based_exec_ctrl(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
-{
- u32 pin_based_exec_ctrl = vmcs_config.pin_based_exec_ctrl;
-
- if (!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(&vmx->vcpu))
- pin_based_exec_ctrl &= ~PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR;
-
- if (!enable_vnmi)
- pin_based_exec_ctrl &= ~PIN_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMIS;
-
- if (!enable_preemption_timer)
- pin_based_exec_ctrl &= ~PIN_BASED_VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER;
-
- return pin_based_exec_ctrl;
-}
-
-static void vmx_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
-
- pin_controls_set(vmx, vmx_pin_based_exec_ctrl(vmx));
- if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls()) {
- if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
- secondary_exec_controls_setbit(vmx,
- SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT |
- SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY);
- else
- secondary_exec_controls_clearbit(vmx,
- SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT |
- SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY);
- }
-
- if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
- vmx_update_msr_bitmap(vcpu);
-}
-
-u32 vmx_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
-{
- u32 exec_control = vmcs_config.cpu_based_exec_ctrl;
-
- if (vmx->vcpu.arch.switch_db_regs & KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT)
- exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_MOV_DR_EXITING;
-
- if (!cpu_need_tpr_shadow(&vmx->vcpu)) {
- exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW;
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
- exec_control |= CPU_BASED_CR8_STORE_EXITING |
- CPU_BASED_CR8_LOAD_EXITING;
-#endif
- }
- if (!enable_ept)
- exec_control |= CPU_BASED_CR3_STORE_EXITING |
- CPU_BASED_CR3_LOAD_EXITING |
- CPU_BASED_INVLPG_EXITING;
- if (kvm_mwait_in_guest(vmx->vcpu.kvm))
- exec_control &= ~(CPU_BASED_MWAIT_EXITING |
- CPU_BASED_MONITOR_EXITING);
- if (kvm_hlt_in_guest(vmx->vcpu.kvm))
- exec_control &= ~CPU_BASED_HLT_EXITING;
- return exec_control;
-}
-
-
-static void vmx_compute_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
-{
- struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &vmx->vcpu;
-
- u32 exec_control = vmcs_config.cpu_based_2nd_exec_ctrl;
-
- if (pt_mode == PT_MODE_SYSTEM)
- exec_control &= ~(SECONDARY_EXEC_PT_USE_GPA | SECONDARY_EXEC_PT_CONCEAL_VMX);
- if (!cpu_need_virtualize_apic_accesses(vcpu))
- exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES;
- if (vmx->vpid == 0)
- exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID;
- if (!enable_ept) {
- exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT;
- enable_unrestricted_guest = 0;
- }
- if (!enable_unrestricted_guest)
- exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST;
- if (kvm_pause_in_guest(vmx->vcpu.kvm))
- exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING;
- if (!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
- exec_control &= ~(SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT |
- SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY);
- exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE;
-
- /* SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC is enabled/disabled on writes to CR4.UMIP,
- * in vmx_set_cr4. */
- exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC;
-
- /* SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS is enabled when L1 executes VMPTRLD
- (handle_vmptrld).
- We can NOT enable shadow_vmcs here because we don't have yet
- a current VMCS12
- */
- exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS;
-
- if (!enable_pml)
- exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML;
-
- if (vmx_xsaves_supported()) {
- /* Exposing XSAVES only when XSAVE is exposed */
- bool xsaves_enabled =
- guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVE) &&
- guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_XSAVES);
-
- vcpu->arch.xsaves_enabled = xsaves_enabled;
-
- if (!xsaves_enabled)
- exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES;
-
- if (nested) {
- if (xsaves_enabled)
- vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high |=
- SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES;
- else
- vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high &=
- ~SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES;
- }
- }
-
- if (vmx_rdtscp_supported()) {
- bool rdtscp_enabled = guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDTSCP);
- if (!rdtscp_enabled)
- exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_RDTSCP;
-
- if (nested) {
- if (rdtscp_enabled)
- vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high |=
- SECONDARY_EXEC_RDTSCP;
- else
- vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high &=
- ~SECONDARY_EXEC_RDTSCP;
- }
- }
-
- if (vmx_invpcid_supported()) {
- /* Exposing INVPCID only when PCID is exposed */
- bool invpcid_enabled =
- guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_INVPCID) &&
- guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_PCID);
-
- if (!invpcid_enabled) {
- exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID;
- guest_cpuid_clear(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_INVPCID);
- }
-
- if (nested) {
- if (invpcid_enabled)
- vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high |=
- SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID;
- else
- vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high &=
- ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID;
- }
- }
-
- if (vmx_rdrand_supported()) {
- bool rdrand_enabled = guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDRAND);
- if (rdrand_enabled)
- exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_RDRAND_EXITING;
-
- if (nested) {
- if (rdrand_enabled)
- vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high |=
- SECONDARY_EXEC_RDRAND_EXITING;
- else
- vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high &=
- ~SECONDARY_EXEC_RDRAND_EXITING;
- }
- }
-
- if (vmx_rdseed_supported()) {
- bool rdseed_enabled = guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RDSEED);
- if (rdseed_enabled)
- exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_RDSEED_EXITING;
-
- if (nested) {
- if (rdseed_enabled)
- vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high |=
- SECONDARY_EXEC_RDSEED_EXITING;
- else
- vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high &=
- ~SECONDARY_EXEC_RDSEED_EXITING;
- }
- }
-
- if (vmx_waitpkg_supported()) {
- bool waitpkg_enabled =
- guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_WAITPKG);
-
- if (!waitpkg_enabled)
- exec_control &= ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USR_WAIT_PAUSE;
-
- if (nested) {
- if (waitpkg_enabled)
- vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high |=
- SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USR_WAIT_PAUSE;
- else
- vmx->nested.msrs.secondary_ctls_high &=
- ~SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_USR_WAIT_PAUSE;
- }
- }
-
- vmx->secondary_exec_control = exec_control;
-}
-
-static void ept_set_mmio_spte_mask(void)
-{
- /*
- * EPT Misconfigurations can be generated if the value of bits 2:0
- * of an EPT paging-structure entry is 110b (write/execute).
- */
- kvm_mmu_set_mmio_spte_mask(VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK,
- VMX_EPT_MISCONFIG_WX_VALUE, 0);
-}
-
-#define VMX_XSS_EXIT_BITMAP 0
-
-/*
- * Noting that the initialization of Guest-state Area of VMCS is in
- * vmx_vcpu_reset().
- */
-static void init_vmcs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
-{
- if (nested)
- nested_vmx_set_vmcs_shadowing_bitmap();
-
- if (cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap())
- vmcs_write64(MSR_BITMAP, __pa(vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap));
-
- vmcs_write64(VMCS_LINK_POINTER, -1ull); /* 22.3.1.5 */
-
- /* Control */
- pin_controls_set(vmx, vmx_pin_based_exec_ctrl(vmx));
-
- exec_controls_set(vmx, vmx_exec_control(vmx));
-
- if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls()) {
- vmx_compute_secondary_exec_control(vmx);
- secondary_exec_controls_set(vmx, vmx->secondary_exec_control);
- }
-
- if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(&vmx->vcpu)) {
- vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP0, 0);
- vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP1, 0);
- vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP2, 0);
- vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP3, 0);
-
- vmcs_write16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS, 0);
-
- vmcs_write16(POSTED_INTR_NV, POSTED_INTR_VECTOR);
- vmcs_write64(POSTED_INTR_DESC_ADDR, __pa((&vmx->pi_desc)));
- }
-
- if (!kvm_pause_in_guest(vmx->vcpu.kvm)) {
- vmcs_write32(PLE_GAP, ple_gap);
- vmx->ple_window = ple_window;
- vmx->ple_window_dirty = true;
- }
-
- vmcs_write32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MASK, 0);
- vmcs_write32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MATCH, 0);
- vmcs_write32(CR3_TARGET_COUNT, 0); /* 22.2.1 */
-
- vmcs_write16(HOST_FS_SELECTOR, 0); /* 22.2.4 */
- vmcs_write16(HOST_GS_SELECTOR, 0); /* 22.2.4 */
- vmx_set_constant_host_state(vmx);
- vmcs_writel(HOST_FS_BASE, 0); /* 22.2.4 */
- vmcs_writel(HOST_GS_BASE, 0); /* 22.2.4 */
-
- if (cpu_has_vmx_vmfunc())
- vmcs_write64(VM_FUNCTION_CONTROL, 0);
-
- vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_STORE_COUNT, 0);
- vmcs_write32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, 0);
- vmcs_write64(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_ADDR, __pa(vmx->msr_autoload.host.val));
- vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT, 0);
- vmcs_write64(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_ADDR, __pa(vmx->msr_autoload.guest.val));
-
- if (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT)
- vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_PAT, vmx->vcpu.arch.pat);
-
- vm_exit_controls_set(vmx, vmx_vmexit_ctrl());
-
- /* 22.2.1, 20.8.1 */
- vm_entry_controls_set(vmx, vmx_vmentry_ctrl());
-
- vmx->vcpu.arch.cr0_guest_owned_bits = X86_CR0_TS;
- vmcs_writel(CR0_GUEST_HOST_MASK, ~X86_CR0_TS);
-
- set_cr4_guest_host_mask(vmx);
-
- if (vmx->vpid != 0)
- vmcs_write16(VIRTUAL_PROCESSOR_ID, vmx->vpid);
-
- if (vmx_xsaves_supported())
- vmcs_write64(XSS_EXIT_BITMAP, VMX_XSS_EXIT_BITMAP);
-
- if (enable_pml) {
- vmcs_write64(PML_ADDRESS, page_to_phys(vmx->pml_pg));
- vmcs_write16(GUEST_PML_INDEX, PML_ENTITY_NUM - 1);
- }
-
- if (cpu_has_vmx_encls_vmexit())
- vmcs_write64(ENCLS_EXITING_BITMAP, -1ull);
-
- if (pt_mode == PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST) {
- memset(&vmx->pt_desc, 0, sizeof(vmx->pt_desc));
- /* Bit[6~0] are forced to 1, writes are ignored. */
- vmx->pt_desc.guest.output_mask = 0x7F;
- vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_RTIT_CTL, 0);
- }
-}
-
-static void vmx_vcpu_reset(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool init_event)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- struct msr_data apic_base_msr;
- u64 cr0;
-
- vmx->rmode.vm86_active = 0;
- vmx->spec_ctrl = 0;
-
- vmx->msr_ia32_umwait_control = 0;
-
- vcpu->arch.microcode_version = 0x100000000ULL;
- vmx->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX] = get_rdx_init_val();
- vmx->hv_deadline_tsc = -1;
- kvm_set_cr8(vcpu, 0);
-
- if (!init_event) {
- apic_base_msr.data = APIC_DEFAULT_PHYS_BASE |
- MSR_IA32_APICBASE_ENABLE;
- if (kvm_vcpu_is_reset_bsp(vcpu))
- apic_base_msr.data |= MSR_IA32_APICBASE_BSP;
- apic_base_msr.host_initiated = true;
- kvm_set_apic_base(vcpu, &apic_base_msr);
- }
-
- vmx_segment_cache_clear(vmx);
-
- seg_setup(VCPU_SREG_CS);
- vmcs_write16(GUEST_CS_SELECTOR, 0xf000);
- vmcs_writel(GUEST_CS_BASE, 0xffff0000ul);
-
- seg_setup(VCPU_SREG_DS);
- seg_setup(VCPU_SREG_ES);
- seg_setup(VCPU_SREG_FS);
- seg_setup(VCPU_SREG_GS);
- seg_setup(VCPU_SREG_SS);
-
- vmcs_write16(GUEST_TR_SELECTOR, 0);
- vmcs_writel(GUEST_TR_BASE, 0);
- vmcs_write32(GUEST_TR_LIMIT, 0xffff);
- vmcs_write32(GUEST_TR_AR_BYTES, 0x008b);
-
- vmcs_write16(GUEST_LDTR_SELECTOR, 0);
- vmcs_writel(GUEST_LDTR_BASE, 0);
- vmcs_write32(GUEST_LDTR_LIMIT, 0xffff);
- vmcs_write32(GUEST_LDTR_AR_BYTES, 0x00082);
-
- if (!init_event) {
- vmcs_write32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS, 0);
- vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP, 0);
- vmcs_writel(GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP, 0);
- vmcs_write64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL, 0);
- }
-
- kvm_set_rflags(vcpu, X86_EFLAGS_FIXED);
- kvm_rip_write(vcpu, 0xfff0);
-
- vmcs_writel(GUEST_GDTR_BASE, 0);
- vmcs_write32(GUEST_GDTR_LIMIT, 0xffff);
-
- vmcs_writel(GUEST_IDTR_BASE, 0);
- vmcs_write32(GUEST_IDTR_LIMIT, 0xffff);
-
- vmcs_write32(GUEST_ACTIVITY_STATE, GUEST_ACTIVITY_ACTIVE);
- vmcs_write32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO, 0);
- vmcs_writel(GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS, 0);
- if (kvm_mpx_supported())
- vmcs_write64(GUEST_BNDCFGS, 0);
-
- setup_msrs(vmx);
-
- vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD, 0); /* 22.2.1 */
-
- if (cpu_has_vmx_tpr_shadow() && !init_event) {
- vmcs_write64(VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR, 0);
- if (cpu_need_tpr_shadow(vcpu))
- vmcs_write64(VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR,
- __pa(vcpu->arch.apic->regs));
- vmcs_write32(TPR_THRESHOLD, 0);
- }
-
- kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_APIC_PAGE_RELOAD, vcpu);
-
- cr0 = X86_CR0_NW | X86_CR0_CD | X86_CR0_ET;
- vmx->vcpu.arch.cr0 = cr0;
- vmx_set_cr0(vcpu, cr0); /* enter rmode */
- vmx_set_cr4(vcpu, 0);
- vmx_set_efer(vcpu, 0);
-
- update_exception_bitmap(vcpu);
-
- vpid_sync_context(vmx->vpid);
- if (init_event)
- vmx_clear_hlt(vcpu);
-}
-
-static void enable_irq_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- exec_controls_setbit(to_vmx(vcpu), CPU_BASED_INTR_WINDOW_EXITING);
-}
-
-static void enable_nmi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- if (!enable_vnmi ||
- vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) & GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI) {
- enable_irq_window(vcpu);
- return;
- }
-
- exec_controls_setbit(to_vmx(vcpu), CPU_BASED_NMI_WINDOW_EXITING);
-}
-
-static void vmx_inject_irq(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- uint32_t intr;
- int irq = vcpu->arch.interrupt.nr;
-
- trace_kvm_inj_virq(irq);
-
- ++vcpu->stat.irq_injections;
- if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active) {
- int inc_eip = 0;
- if (vcpu->arch.interrupt.soft)
- inc_eip = vcpu->arch.event_exit_inst_len;
- kvm_inject_realmode_interrupt(vcpu, irq, inc_eip);
- return;
- }
- intr = irq | INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK;
- if (vcpu->arch.interrupt.soft) {
- intr |= INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR;
- vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN,
- vmx->vcpu.arch.event_exit_inst_len);
- } else
- intr |= INTR_TYPE_EXT_INTR;
- vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD, intr);
-
- vmx_clear_hlt(vcpu);
-}
-
-static void vmx_inject_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
-
- if (!enable_vnmi) {
- /*
- * Tracking the NMI-blocked state in software is built upon
- * finding the next open IRQ window. This, in turn, depends on
- * well-behaving guests: They have to keep IRQs disabled at
- * least as long as the NMI handler runs. Otherwise we may
- * cause NMI nesting, maybe breaking the guest. But as this is
- * highly unlikely, we can live with the residual risk.
- */
- vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked = 1;
- vmx->loaded_vmcs->vnmi_blocked_time = 0;
- }
-
- ++vcpu->stat.nmi_injections;
- vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked = false;
-
- if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active) {
- kvm_inject_realmode_interrupt(vcpu, NMI_VECTOR, 0);
- return;
- }
-
- vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD,
- INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR | INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK | NMI_VECTOR);
-
- vmx_clear_hlt(vcpu);
-}
-
-bool vmx_get_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- bool masked;
-
- if (!enable_vnmi)
- return vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked;
- if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked)
- return false;
- masked = vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) & GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI;
- vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked = !masked;
- return masked;
-}
-
-void vmx_set_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool masked)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
-
- if (!enable_vnmi) {
- if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked != masked) {
- vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked = masked;
- vmx->loaded_vmcs->vnmi_blocked_time = 0;
- }
- } else {
- vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked = !masked;
- if (masked)
- vmcs_set_bits(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO,
- GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
- else
- vmcs_clear_bits(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO,
- GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
- }
-}
-
-static int vmx_nmi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- if (to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.nested_run_pending)
- return 0;
-
- if (!enable_vnmi &&
- to_vmx(vcpu)->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked)
- return 0;
-
- return !(vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) &
- (GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS | GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI
- | GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI));
-}
-
-static int vmx_interrupt_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- return (!to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.nested_run_pending &&
- vmcs_readl(GUEST_RFLAGS) & X86_EFLAGS_IF) &&
- !(vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) &
- (GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI | GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS));
-}
-
-static int vmx_set_tss_addr(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int addr)
-{
- int ret;
-
- if (enable_unrestricted_guest)
- return 0;
-
- ret = x86_set_memory_region(kvm, TSS_PRIVATE_MEMSLOT, addr,
- PAGE_SIZE * 3);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
- to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->tss_addr = addr;
- return init_rmode_tss(kvm);
-}
-
-static int vmx_set_identity_map_addr(struct kvm *kvm, u64 ident_addr)
-{
- to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->ept_identity_map_addr = ident_addr;
- return 0;
-}
-
-static bool rmode_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int vec)
-{
- switch (vec) {
- case BP_VECTOR:
- /*
- * Update instruction length as we may reinject the exception
- * from user space while in guest debugging mode.
- */
- to_vmx(vcpu)->vcpu.arch.event_exit_inst_len =
- vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN);
- if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_SW_BP)
- return false;
- /* fall through */
- case DB_VECTOR:
- if (vcpu->guest_debug &
- (KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP))
- return false;
- /* fall through */
- case DE_VECTOR:
- case OF_VECTOR:
- case BR_VECTOR:
- case UD_VECTOR:
- case DF_VECTOR:
- case SS_VECTOR:
- case GP_VECTOR:
- case MF_VECTOR:
- return true;
- break;
- }
- return false;
-}
-
-static int handle_rmode_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
- int vec, u32 err_code)
-{
- /*
- * Instruction with address size override prefix opcode 0x67
- * Cause the #SS fault with 0 error code in VM86 mode.
- */
- if (((vec == GP_VECTOR) || (vec == SS_VECTOR)) && err_code == 0) {
- if (kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0)) {
- if (vcpu->arch.halt_request) {
- vcpu->arch.halt_request = 0;
- return kvm_vcpu_halt(vcpu);
- }
- return 1;
- }
- return 0;
- }
-
- /*
- * Forward all other exceptions that are valid in real mode.
- * FIXME: Breaks guest debugging in real mode, needs to be fixed with
- * the required debugging infrastructure rework.
- */
- kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, vec);
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * Trigger machine check on the host. We assume all the MSRs are already set up
- * by the CPU and that we still run on the same CPU as the MCE occurred on.
- * We pass a fake environment to the machine check handler because we want
- * the guest to be always treated like user space, no matter what context
- * it used internally.
- */
-static void kvm_machine_check(void)
-{
-#if defined(CONFIG_X86_MCE) && defined(CONFIG_X86_64)
- struct pt_regs regs = {
- .cs = 3, /* Fake ring 3 no matter what the guest ran on */
- .flags = X86_EFLAGS_IF,
- };
-
- do_machine_check(®s, 0);
-#endif
-}
-
-static int handle_machine_check(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- /* handled by vmx_vcpu_run() */
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int handle_exception_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- struct kvm_run *kvm_run = vcpu->run;
- u32 intr_info, ex_no, error_code;
- unsigned long cr2, rip, dr6;
- u32 vect_info;
-
- vect_info = vmx->idt_vectoring_info;
- intr_info = vmx->exit_intr_info;
-
- if (is_machine_check(intr_info) || is_nmi(intr_info))
- return 1; /* handled by handle_exception_nmi_irqoff() */
-
- if (is_invalid_opcode(intr_info))
- return handle_ud(vcpu);
-
- error_code = 0;
- if (intr_info & INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK)
- error_code = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE);
-
- if (!vmx->rmode.vm86_active && is_gp_fault(intr_info)) {
- WARN_ON_ONCE(!enable_vmware_backdoor);
-
- /*
- * VMware backdoor emulation on #GP interception only handles
- * IN{S}, OUT{S}, and RDPMC, none of which generate a non-zero
- * error code on #GP.
- */
- if (error_code) {
- kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, GP_VECTOR, error_code);
- return 1;
- }
- return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, EMULTYPE_VMWARE_GP);
- }
-
- /*
- * The #PF with PFEC.RSVD = 1 indicates the guest is accessing
- * MMIO, it is better to report an internal error.
- * See the comments in vmx_handle_exit.
- */
- if ((vect_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK) &&
- !(is_page_fault(intr_info) && !(error_code & PFERR_RSVD_MASK))) {
- vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_SIMUL_EX;
- vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 3;
- vcpu->run->internal.data[0] = vect_info;
- vcpu->run->internal.data[1] = intr_info;
- vcpu->run->internal.data[2] = error_code;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (is_page_fault(intr_info)) {
- cr2 = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
- /* EPT won't cause page fault directly */
- WARN_ON_ONCE(!vcpu->arch.apf.host_apf_reason && enable_ept);
- return kvm_handle_page_fault(vcpu, error_code, cr2, NULL, 0);
- }
-
- ex_no = intr_info & INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK;
-
- if (vmx->rmode.vm86_active && rmode_exception(vcpu, ex_no))
- return handle_rmode_exception(vcpu, ex_no, error_code);
-
- switch (ex_no) {
- case AC_VECTOR:
- kvm_queue_exception_e(vcpu, AC_VECTOR, error_code);
- return 1;
- case DB_VECTOR:
- dr6 = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
- if (!(vcpu->guest_debug &
- (KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP | KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP))) {
- vcpu->arch.dr6 &= ~DR_TRAP_BITS;
- vcpu->arch.dr6 |= dr6 | DR6_RTM;
- if (is_icebp(intr_info))
- WARN_ON(!skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu));
-
- kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, DB_VECTOR);
- return 1;
- }
- kvm_run->debug.arch.dr6 = dr6 | DR6_FIXED_1;
- kvm_run->debug.arch.dr7 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_DR7);
- /* fall through */
- case BP_VECTOR:
- /*
- * Update instruction length as we may reinject #BP from
- * user space while in guest debugging mode. Reading it for
- * #DB as well causes no harm, it is not used in that case.
- */
- vmx->vcpu.arch.event_exit_inst_len =
- vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN);
- kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_DEBUG;
- rip = kvm_rip_read(vcpu);
- kvm_run->debug.arch.pc = vmcs_readl(GUEST_CS_BASE) + rip;
- kvm_run->debug.arch.exception = ex_no;
- break;
- default:
- kvm_run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_EXCEPTION;
- kvm_run->ex.exception = ex_no;
- kvm_run->ex.error_code = error_code;
- break;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-static __always_inline int handle_external_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- ++vcpu->stat.irq_exits;
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int handle_triple_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_SHUTDOWN;
- vcpu->mmio_needed = 0;
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int handle_io(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- unsigned long exit_qualification;
- int size, in, string;
- unsigned port;
-
- exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
- string = (exit_qualification & 16) != 0;
-
- ++vcpu->stat.io_exits;
-
- if (string)
- return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0);
-
- port = exit_qualification >> 16;
- size = (exit_qualification & 7) + 1;
- in = (exit_qualification & 8) != 0;
-
- return kvm_fast_pio(vcpu, size, port, in);
-}
-
-static void
-vmx_patch_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned char *hypercall)
-{
- /*
- * Patch in the VMCALL instruction:
- */
- hypercall[0] = 0x0f;
- hypercall[1] = 0x01;
- hypercall[2] = 0xc1;
-}
-
-/* called to set cr0 as appropriate for a mov-to-cr0 exit. */
-static int handle_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val)
-{
- if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
- struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
- unsigned long orig_val = val;
-
- /*
- * We get here when L2 changed cr0 in a way that did not change
- * any of L1's shadowed bits (see nested_vmx_exit_handled_cr),
- * but did change L0 shadowed bits. So we first calculate the
- * effective cr0 value that L1 would like to write into the
- * hardware. It consists of the L2-owned bits from the new
- * value combined with the L1-owned bits from L1's guest_cr0.
- */
- val = (val & ~vmcs12->cr0_guest_host_mask) |
- (vmcs12->guest_cr0 & vmcs12->cr0_guest_host_mask);
-
- if (!nested_guest_cr0_valid(vcpu, val))
- return 1;
-
- if (kvm_set_cr0(vcpu, val))
- return 1;
- vmcs_writel(CR0_READ_SHADOW, orig_val);
- return 0;
- } else {
- if (to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.vmxon &&
- !nested_host_cr0_valid(vcpu, val))
- return 1;
-
- return kvm_set_cr0(vcpu, val);
- }
-}
-
-static int handle_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val)
-{
- if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
- struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
- unsigned long orig_val = val;
-
- /* analogously to handle_set_cr0 */
- val = (val & ~vmcs12->cr4_guest_host_mask) |
- (vmcs12->guest_cr4 & vmcs12->cr4_guest_host_mask);
- if (kvm_set_cr4(vcpu, val))
- return 1;
- vmcs_writel(CR4_READ_SHADOW, orig_val);
- return 0;
- } else
- return kvm_set_cr4(vcpu, val);
-}
-
-static int handle_desc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- WARN_ON(!(vcpu->arch.cr4 & X86_CR4_UMIP));
- return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0);
-}
-
-static int handle_cr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- unsigned long exit_qualification, val;
- int cr;
- int reg;
- int err;
- int ret;
-
- exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
- cr = exit_qualification & 15;
- reg = (exit_qualification >> 8) & 15;
- switch ((exit_qualification >> 4) & 3) {
- case 0: /* mov to cr */
- val = kvm_register_readl(vcpu, reg);
- trace_kvm_cr_write(cr, val);
- switch (cr) {
- case 0:
- err = handle_set_cr0(vcpu, val);
- return kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
- case 3:
- WARN_ON_ONCE(enable_unrestricted_guest);
- err = kvm_set_cr3(vcpu, val);
- return kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
- case 4:
- err = handle_set_cr4(vcpu, val);
- return kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
- case 8: {
- u8 cr8_prev = kvm_get_cr8(vcpu);
- u8 cr8 = (u8)val;
- err = kvm_set_cr8(vcpu, cr8);
- ret = kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
- if (lapic_in_kernel(vcpu))
- return ret;
- if (cr8_prev <= cr8)
- return ret;
- /*
- * TODO: we might be squashing a
- * KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP-triggered
- * KVM_EXIT_DEBUG here.
- */
- vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_SET_TPR;
- return 0;
- }
- }
- break;
- case 2: /* clts */
- WARN_ONCE(1, "Guest should always own CR0.TS");
- vmx_set_cr0(vcpu, kvm_read_cr0_bits(vcpu, ~X86_CR0_TS));
- trace_kvm_cr_write(0, kvm_read_cr0(vcpu));
- return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
- case 1: /*mov from cr*/
- switch (cr) {
- case 3:
- WARN_ON_ONCE(enable_unrestricted_guest);
- val = kvm_read_cr3(vcpu);
- kvm_register_write(vcpu, reg, val);
- trace_kvm_cr_read(cr, val);
- return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
- case 8:
- val = kvm_get_cr8(vcpu);
- kvm_register_write(vcpu, reg, val);
- trace_kvm_cr_read(cr, val);
- return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
- }
- break;
- case 3: /* lmsw */
- val = (exit_qualification >> LMSW_SOURCE_DATA_SHIFT) & 0x0f;
- trace_kvm_cr_write(0, (kvm_read_cr0(vcpu) & ~0xful) | val);
- kvm_lmsw(vcpu, val);
-
- return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
- default:
- break;
- }
- vcpu->run->exit_reason = 0;
- vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "unhandled control register: op %d cr %d\n",
- (int)(exit_qualification >> 4) & 3, cr);
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int handle_dr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- unsigned long exit_qualification;
- int dr, dr7, reg;
-
- exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
- dr = exit_qualification & DEBUG_REG_ACCESS_NUM;
-
- /* First, if DR does not exist, trigger UD */
- if (!kvm_require_dr(vcpu, dr))
- return 1;
-
- /* Do not handle if the CPL > 0, will trigger GP on re-entry */
- if (!kvm_require_cpl(vcpu, 0))
- return 1;
- dr7 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_DR7);
- if (dr7 & DR7_GD) {
- /*
- * As the vm-exit takes precedence over the debug trap, we
- * need to emulate the latter, either for the host or the
- * guest debugging itself.
- */
- if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_HW_BP) {
- vcpu->run->debug.arch.dr6 = vcpu->arch.dr6;
- vcpu->run->debug.arch.dr7 = dr7;
- vcpu->run->debug.arch.pc = kvm_get_linear_rip(vcpu);
- vcpu->run->debug.arch.exception = DB_VECTOR;
- vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_DEBUG;
- return 0;
- } else {
- vcpu->arch.dr6 &= ~DR_TRAP_BITS;
- vcpu->arch.dr6 |= DR6_BD | DR6_RTM;
- kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, DB_VECTOR);
- return 1;
- }
- }
-
- if (vcpu->guest_debug == 0) {
- exec_controls_clearbit(to_vmx(vcpu), CPU_BASED_MOV_DR_EXITING);
-
- /*
- * No more DR vmexits; force a reload of the debug registers
- * and reenter on this instruction. The next vmexit will
- * retrieve the full state of the debug registers.
- */
- vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs |= KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT;
- return 1;
- }
-
- reg = DEBUG_REG_ACCESS_REG(exit_qualification);
- if (exit_qualification & TYPE_MOV_FROM_DR) {
- unsigned long val;
-
- if (kvm_get_dr(vcpu, dr, &val))
- return 1;
- kvm_register_write(vcpu, reg, val);
- } else
- if (kvm_set_dr(vcpu, dr, kvm_register_readl(vcpu, reg)))
- return 1;
-
- return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
-}
-
-static u64 vmx_get_dr6(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- return vcpu->arch.dr6;
-}
-
-static void vmx_set_dr6(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val)
-{
-}
-
-static void vmx_sync_dirty_debug_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.db[0], 0);
- get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.db[1], 1);
- get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.db[2], 2);
- get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.db[3], 3);
- get_debugreg(vcpu->arch.dr6, 6);
- vcpu->arch.dr7 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_DR7);
-
- vcpu->arch.switch_db_regs &= ~KVM_DEBUGREG_WONT_EXIT;
- exec_controls_setbit(to_vmx(vcpu), CPU_BASED_MOV_DR_EXITING);
-}
-
-static void vmx_set_dr7(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long val)
-{
- vmcs_writel(GUEST_DR7, val);
-}
-
-static int handle_tpr_below_threshold(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- kvm_apic_update_ppr(vcpu);
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int handle_interrupt_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- exec_controls_clearbit(to_vmx(vcpu), CPU_BASED_INTR_WINDOW_EXITING);
-
- kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
-
- ++vcpu->stat.irq_window_exits;
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int handle_vmcall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- return kvm_emulate_hypercall(vcpu);
-}
-
-static int handle_invd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0);
-}
-
-static int handle_invlpg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- unsigned long exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
-
- kvm_mmu_invlpg(vcpu, exit_qualification);
- return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
-}
-
-static int handle_rdpmc(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- int err;
-
- err = kvm_rdpmc(vcpu);
- return kvm_complete_insn_gp(vcpu, err);
-}
-
-static int handle_wbinvd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- return kvm_emulate_wbinvd(vcpu);
-}
-
-static int handle_xsetbv(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- u64 new_bv = kvm_read_edx_eax(vcpu);
- u32 index = kvm_rcx_read(vcpu);
-
- if (kvm_set_xcr(vcpu, index, new_bv) == 0)
- return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int handle_apic_access(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- if (likely(fasteoi)) {
- unsigned long exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
- int access_type, offset;
-
- access_type = exit_qualification & APIC_ACCESS_TYPE;
- offset = exit_qualification & APIC_ACCESS_OFFSET;
- /*
- * Sane guest uses MOV to write EOI, with written value
- * not cared. So make a short-circuit here by avoiding
- * heavy instruction emulation.
- */
- if ((access_type == TYPE_LINEAR_APIC_INST_WRITE) &&
- (offset == APIC_EOI)) {
- kvm_lapic_set_eoi(vcpu);
- return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
- }
- }
- return kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0);
-}
-
-static int handle_apic_eoi_induced(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- unsigned long exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
- int vector = exit_qualification & 0xff;
-
- /* EOI-induced VM exit is trap-like and thus no need to adjust IP */
- kvm_apic_set_eoi_accelerated(vcpu, vector);
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int handle_apic_write(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- unsigned long exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
- u32 offset = exit_qualification & 0xfff;
-
- /* APIC-write VM exit is trap-like and thus no need to adjust IP */
- kvm_apic_write_nodecode(vcpu, offset);
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int handle_task_switch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- unsigned long exit_qualification;
- bool has_error_code = false;
- u32 error_code = 0;
- u16 tss_selector;
- int reason, type, idt_v, idt_index;
-
- idt_v = (vmx->idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK);
- idt_index = (vmx->idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VECTOR_MASK);
- type = (vmx->idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_TYPE_MASK);
-
- exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
-
- reason = (u32)exit_qualification >> 30;
- if (reason == TASK_SWITCH_GATE && idt_v) {
- switch (type) {
- case INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR:
- vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = false;
- vmx_set_nmi_mask(vcpu, true);
- break;
- case INTR_TYPE_EXT_INTR:
- case INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR:
- kvm_clear_interrupt_queue(vcpu);
- break;
- case INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION:
- if (vmx->idt_vectoring_info &
- VECTORING_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK) {
- has_error_code = true;
- error_code =
- vmcs_read32(IDT_VECTORING_ERROR_CODE);
- }
- /* fall through */
- case INTR_TYPE_SOFT_EXCEPTION:
- kvm_clear_exception_queue(vcpu);
- break;
- default:
- break;
- }
- }
- tss_selector = exit_qualification;
-
- if (!idt_v || (type != INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION &&
- type != INTR_TYPE_EXT_INTR &&
- type != INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR))
- WARN_ON(!skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu));
-
- /*
- * TODO: What about debug traps on tss switch?
- * Are we supposed to inject them and update dr6?
- */
- return kvm_task_switch(vcpu, tss_selector,
- type == INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR ? idt_index : -1,
- reason, has_error_code, error_code);
-}
-
-static int handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- unsigned long exit_qualification;
- gpa_t gpa;
- u64 error_code;
-
- exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
-
- /*
- * EPT violation happened while executing iret from NMI,
- * "blocked by NMI" bit has to be set before next VM entry.
- * There are errata that may cause this bit to not be set:
- * AAK134, BY25.
- */
- if (!(to_vmx(vcpu)->idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK) &&
- enable_vnmi &&
- (exit_qualification & INTR_INFO_UNBLOCK_NMI))
- vmcs_set_bits(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO, GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
-
- gpa = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS);
- trace_kvm_page_fault(gpa, exit_qualification);
-
- /* Is it a read fault? */
- error_code = (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_READ)
- ? PFERR_USER_MASK : 0;
- /* Is it a write fault? */
- error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_WRITE)
- ? PFERR_WRITE_MASK : 0;
- /* Is it a fetch fault? */
- error_code |= (exit_qualification & EPT_VIOLATION_ACC_INSTR)
- ? PFERR_FETCH_MASK : 0;
- /* ept page table entry is present? */
- error_code |= (exit_qualification &
- (EPT_VIOLATION_READABLE | EPT_VIOLATION_WRITABLE |
- EPT_VIOLATION_EXECUTABLE))
- ? PFERR_PRESENT_MASK : 0;
-
- error_code |= (exit_qualification & 0x100) != 0 ?
- PFERR_GUEST_FINAL_MASK : PFERR_GUEST_PAGE_MASK;
-
- vcpu->arch.exit_qualification = exit_qualification;
- return kvm_mmu_page_fault(vcpu, gpa, error_code, NULL, 0);
-}
-
-static int handle_ept_misconfig(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- gpa_t gpa;
-
- /*
- * A nested guest cannot optimize MMIO vmexits, because we have an
- * nGPA here instead of the required GPA.
- */
- gpa = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS);
- if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
- !kvm_io_bus_write(vcpu, KVM_FAST_MMIO_BUS, gpa, 0, NULL)) {
- trace_kvm_fast_mmio(gpa);
- return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
- }
-
- return kvm_mmu_page_fault(vcpu, gpa, PFERR_RSVD_MASK, NULL, 0);
-}
-
-static int handle_nmi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- WARN_ON_ONCE(!enable_vnmi);
- exec_controls_clearbit(to_vmx(vcpu), CPU_BASED_NMI_WINDOW_EXITING);
- ++vcpu->stat.nmi_window_exits;
- kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int handle_invalid_guest_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- bool intr_window_requested;
- unsigned count = 130;
-
- /*
- * We should never reach the point where we are emulating L2
- * due to invalid guest state as that means we incorrectly
- * allowed a nested VMEntry with an invalid vmcs12.
- */
- WARN_ON_ONCE(vmx->emulation_required && vmx->nested.nested_run_pending);
-
- intr_window_requested = exec_controls_get(vmx) &
- CPU_BASED_INTR_WINDOW_EXITING;
-
- while (vmx->emulation_required && count-- != 0) {
- if (intr_window_requested && vmx_interrupt_allowed(vcpu))
- return handle_interrupt_window(&vmx->vcpu);
-
- if (kvm_test_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu))
- return 1;
-
- if (!kvm_emulate_instruction(vcpu, 0))
- return 0;
-
- if (vmx->emulation_required && !vmx->rmode.vm86_active &&
- vcpu->arch.exception.pending) {
- vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- vcpu->run->internal.suberror =
- KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_EMULATION;
- vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 0;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (vcpu->arch.halt_request) {
- vcpu->arch.halt_request = 0;
- return kvm_vcpu_halt(vcpu);
- }
-
- /*
- * Note, return 1 and not 0, vcpu_run() is responsible for
- * morphing the pending signal into the proper return code.
- */
- if (signal_pending(current))
- return 1;
-
- if (need_resched())
- schedule();
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static void grow_ple_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- unsigned int old = vmx->ple_window;
-
- vmx->ple_window = __grow_ple_window(old, ple_window,
- ple_window_grow,
- ple_window_max);
-
- if (vmx->ple_window != old) {
- vmx->ple_window_dirty = true;
- trace_kvm_ple_window_update(vcpu->vcpu_id,
- vmx->ple_window, old);
- }
-}
-
-static void shrink_ple_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- unsigned int old = vmx->ple_window;
-
- vmx->ple_window = __shrink_ple_window(old, ple_window,
- ple_window_shrink,
- ple_window);
-
- if (vmx->ple_window != old) {
- vmx->ple_window_dirty = true;
- trace_kvm_ple_window_update(vcpu->vcpu_id,
- vmx->ple_window, old);
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Handler for POSTED_INTERRUPT_WAKEUP_VECTOR.
- */
-static void wakeup_handler(void)
-{
- struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
- int cpu = smp_processor_id();
-
- spin_lock(&per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu_lock, cpu));
- list_for_each_entry(vcpu, &per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu, cpu),
- blocked_vcpu_list) {
- struct pi_desc *pi_desc = vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu);
-
- if (pi_test_on(pi_desc) == 1)
- kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);
- }
- spin_unlock(&per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu_lock, cpu));
-}
-
-static void vmx_enable_tdp(void)
-{
- kvm_mmu_set_mask_ptes(VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK,
- enable_ept_ad_bits ? VMX_EPT_ACCESS_BIT : 0ull,
- enable_ept_ad_bits ? VMX_EPT_DIRTY_BIT : 0ull,
- 0ull, VMX_EPT_EXECUTABLE_MASK,
- cpu_has_vmx_ept_execute_only() ? 0ull : VMX_EPT_READABLE_MASK,
- VMX_EPT_RWX_MASK, 0ull);
-
- ept_set_mmio_spte_mask();
- kvm_enable_tdp();
-}
-
-/*
- * Indicate a busy-waiting vcpu in spinlock. We do not enable the PAUSE
- * exiting, so only get here on cpu with PAUSE-Loop-Exiting.
- */
-static int handle_pause(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- if (!kvm_pause_in_guest(vcpu->kvm))
- grow_ple_window(vcpu);
-
- /*
- * Intel sdm vol3 ch-25.1.3 says: The "PAUSE-loop exiting"
- * VM-execution control is ignored if CPL > 0. OTOH, KVM
- * never set PAUSE_EXITING and just set PLE if supported,
- * so the vcpu must be CPL=0 if it gets a PAUSE exit.
- */
- kvm_vcpu_on_spin(vcpu, true);
- return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
-}
-
-static int handle_nop(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
-}
-
-static int handle_mwait(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- printk_once(KERN_WARNING "kvm: MWAIT instruction emulated as NOP!\n");
- return handle_nop(vcpu);
-}
-
-static int handle_invalid_op(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int handle_monitor_trap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int handle_monitor(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- printk_once(KERN_WARNING "kvm: MONITOR instruction emulated as NOP!\n");
- return handle_nop(vcpu);
-}
-
-static int handle_invpcid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- u32 vmx_instruction_info;
- unsigned long type;
- bool pcid_enabled;
- gva_t gva;
- struct x86_exception e;
- unsigned i;
- unsigned long roots_to_free = 0;
- struct {
- u64 pcid;
- u64 gla;
- } operand;
-
- if (!guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_INVPCID)) {
- kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
- return 1;
- }
-
- vmx_instruction_info = vmcs_read32(VMX_INSTRUCTION_INFO);
- type = kvm_register_readl(vcpu, (vmx_instruction_info >> 28) & 0xf);
-
- if (type > 3) {
- kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
- return 1;
- }
-
- /* According to the Intel instruction reference, the memory operand
- * is read even if it isn't needed (e.g., for type==all)
- */
- if (get_vmx_mem_address(vcpu, vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION),
- vmx_instruction_info, false,
- sizeof(operand), &gva))
- return 1;
-
- if (kvm_read_guest_virt(vcpu, gva, &operand, sizeof(operand), &e)) {
- kvm_inject_page_fault(vcpu, &e);
- return 1;
- }
-
- if (operand.pcid >> 12 != 0) {
- kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
- return 1;
- }
-
- pcid_enabled = kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_PCIDE);
-
- switch (type) {
- case INVPCID_TYPE_INDIV_ADDR:
- if ((!pcid_enabled && (operand.pcid != 0)) ||
- is_noncanonical_address(operand.gla, vcpu)) {
- kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
- return 1;
- }
- kvm_mmu_invpcid_gva(vcpu, operand.gla, operand.pcid);
- return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
-
- case INVPCID_TYPE_SINGLE_CTXT:
- if (!pcid_enabled && (operand.pcid != 0)) {
- kvm_inject_gp(vcpu, 0);
- return 1;
- }
-
- if (kvm_get_active_pcid(vcpu) == operand.pcid) {
- kvm_mmu_sync_roots(vcpu);
- kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_TLB_FLUSH, vcpu);
- }
-
- for (i = 0; i < KVM_MMU_NUM_PREV_ROOTS; i++)
- if (kvm_get_pcid(vcpu, vcpu->arch.mmu->prev_roots[i].cr3)
- == operand.pcid)
- roots_to_free |= KVM_MMU_ROOT_PREVIOUS(i);
-
- kvm_mmu_free_roots(vcpu, vcpu->arch.mmu, roots_to_free);
- /*
- * If neither the current cr3 nor any of the prev_roots use the
- * given PCID, then nothing needs to be done here because a
- * resync will happen anyway before switching to any other CR3.
- */
-
- return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
-
- case INVPCID_TYPE_ALL_NON_GLOBAL:
- /*
- * Currently, KVM doesn't mark global entries in the shadow
- * page tables, so a non-global flush just degenerates to a
- * global flush. If needed, we could optimize this later by
- * keeping track of global entries in shadow page tables.
- */
-
- /* fall-through */
- case INVPCID_TYPE_ALL_INCL_GLOBAL:
- kvm_mmu_unload(vcpu);
- return kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
-
- default:
- BUG(); /* We have already checked above that type <= 3 */
- }
-}
-
-static int handle_pml_full(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- unsigned long exit_qualification;
-
- trace_kvm_pml_full(vcpu->vcpu_id);
-
- exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
-
- /*
- * PML buffer FULL happened while executing iret from NMI,
- * "blocked by NMI" bit has to be set before next VM entry.
- */
- if (!(to_vmx(vcpu)->idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK) &&
- enable_vnmi &&
- (exit_qualification & INTR_INFO_UNBLOCK_NMI))
- vmcs_set_bits(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO,
- GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
-
- /*
- * PML buffer already flushed at beginning of VMEXIT. Nothing to do
- * here.., and there's no userspace involvement needed for PML.
- */
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int handle_preemption_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
-
- if (!vmx->req_immediate_exit &&
- !unlikely(vmx->loaded_vmcs->hv_timer_soft_disabled))
- kvm_lapic_expired_hv_timer(vcpu);
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * When nested=0, all VMX instruction VM Exits filter here. The handlers
- * are overwritten by nested_vmx_setup() when nested=1.
- */
-static int handle_vmx_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int handle_encls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- /*
- * SGX virtualization is not yet supported. There is no software
- * enable bit for SGX, so we have to trap ENCLS and inject a #UD
- * to prevent the guest from executing ENCLS.
- */
- kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
- return 1;
-}
-
-/*
- * The exit handlers return 1 if the exit was handled fully and guest execution
- * may resume. Otherwise they set the kvm_run parameter to indicate what needs
- * to be done to userspace and return 0.
- */
-static int (*kvm_vmx_exit_handlers[])(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) = {
- [EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI] = handle_exception_nmi,
- [EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT] = handle_external_interrupt,
- [EXIT_REASON_TRIPLE_FAULT] = handle_triple_fault,
- [EXIT_REASON_NMI_WINDOW] = handle_nmi_window,
- [EXIT_REASON_IO_INSTRUCTION] = handle_io,
- [EXIT_REASON_CR_ACCESS] = handle_cr,
- [EXIT_REASON_DR_ACCESS] = handle_dr,
- [EXIT_REASON_CPUID] = kvm_emulate_cpuid,
- [EXIT_REASON_MSR_READ] = kvm_emulate_rdmsr,
- [EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE] = kvm_emulate_wrmsr,
- [EXIT_REASON_INTERRUPT_WINDOW] = handle_interrupt_window,
- [EXIT_REASON_HLT] = kvm_emulate_halt,
- [EXIT_REASON_INVD] = handle_invd,
- [EXIT_REASON_INVLPG] = handle_invlpg,
- [EXIT_REASON_RDPMC] = handle_rdpmc,
- [EXIT_REASON_VMCALL] = handle_vmcall,
- [EXIT_REASON_VMCLEAR] = handle_vmx_instruction,
- [EXIT_REASON_VMLAUNCH] = handle_vmx_instruction,
- [EXIT_REASON_VMPTRLD] = handle_vmx_instruction,
- [EXIT_REASON_VMPTRST] = handle_vmx_instruction,
- [EXIT_REASON_VMREAD] = handle_vmx_instruction,
- [EXIT_REASON_VMRESUME] = handle_vmx_instruction,
- [EXIT_REASON_VMWRITE] = handle_vmx_instruction,
- [EXIT_REASON_VMOFF] = handle_vmx_instruction,
- [EXIT_REASON_VMON] = handle_vmx_instruction,
- [EXIT_REASON_TPR_BELOW_THRESHOLD] = handle_tpr_below_threshold,
- [EXIT_REASON_APIC_ACCESS] = handle_apic_access,
- [EXIT_REASON_APIC_WRITE] = handle_apic_write,
- [EXIT_REASON_EOI_INDUCED] = handle_apic_eoi_induced,
- [EXIT_REASON_WBINVD] = handle_wbinvd,
- [EXIT_REASON_XSETBV] = handle_xsetbv,
- [EXIT_REASON_TASK_SWITCH] = handle_task_switch,
- [EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY] = handle_machine_check,
- [EXIT_REASON_GDTR_IDTR] = handle_desc,
- [EXIT_REASON_LDTR_TR] = handle_desc,
- [EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION] = handle_ept_violation,
- [EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG] = handle_ept_misconfig,
- [EXIT_REASON_PAUSE_INSTRUCTION] = handle_pause,
- [EXIT_REASON_MWAIT_INSTRUCTION] = handle_mwait,
- [EXIT_REASON_MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG] = handle_monitor_trap,
- [EXIT_REASON_MONITOR_INSTRUCTION] = handle_monitor,
- [EXIT_REASON_INVEPT] = handle_vmx_instruction,
- [EXIT_REASON_INVVPID] = handle_vmx_instruction,
- [EXIT_REASON_RDRAND] = handle_invalid_op,
- [EXIT_REASON_RDSEED] = handle_invalid_op,
- [EXIT_REASON_PML_FULL] = handle_pml_full,
- [EXIT_REASON_INVPCID] = handle_invpcid,
- [EXIT_REASON_VMFUNC] = handle_vmx_instruction,
- [EXIT_REASON_PREEMPTION_TIMER] = handle_preemption_timer,
- [EXIT_REASON_ENCLS] = handle_encls,
-};
-
-static const int kvm_vmx_max_exit_handlers =
- ARRAY_SIZE(kvm_vmx_exit_handlers);
-
-static void vmx_get_exit_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *info1, u64 *info2)
-{
- *info1 = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
- *info2 = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO);
-}
-
-static void vmx_destroy_pml_buffer(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
-{
- if (vmx->pml_pg) {
- __free_page(vmx->pml_pg);
- vmx->pml_pg = NULL;
- }
-}
-
-static void vmx_flush_pml_buffer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- u64 *pml_buf;
- u16 pml_idx;
-
- pml_idx = vmcs_read16(GUEST_PML_INDEX);
-
- /* Do nothing if PML buffer is empty */
- if (pml_idx == (PML_ENTITY_NUM - 1))
- return;
-
- /* PML index always points to next available PML buffer entity */
- if (pml_idx >= PML_ENTITY_NUM)
- pml_idx = 0;
- else
- pml_idx++;
-
- pml_buf = page_address(vmx->pml_pg);
- for (; pml_idx < PML_ENTITY_NUM; pml_idx++) {
- u64 gpa;
-
- gpa = pml_buf[pml_idx];
- WARN_ON(gpa & (PAGE_SIZE - 1));
- kvm_vcpu_mark_page_dirty(vcpu, gpa >> PAGE_SHIFT);
- }
-
- /* reset PML index */
- vmcs_write16(GUEST_PML_INDEX, PML_ENTITY_NUM - 1);
-}
-
-/*
- * Flush all vcpus' PML buffer and update logged GPAs to dirty_bitmap.
- * Called before reporting dirty_bitmap to userspace.
- */
-static void kvm_flush_pml_buffers(struct kvm *kvm)
-{
- int i;
- struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
- /*
- * We only need to kick vcpu out of guest mode here, as PML buffer
- * is flushed at beginning of all VMEXITs, and it's obvious that only
- * vcpus running in guest are possible to have unflushed GPAs in PML
- * buffer.
- */
- kvm_for_each_vcpu(i, vcpu, kvm)
- kvm_vcpu_kick(vcpu);
-}
-
-static void vmx_dump_sel(char *name, uint32_t sel)
-{
- pr_err("%s sel=0x%04x, attr=0x%05x, limit=0x%08x, base=0x%016lx\n",
- name, vmcs_read16(sel),
- vmcs_read32(sel + GUEST_ES_AR_BYTES - GUEST_ES_SELECTOR),
- vmcs_read32(sel + GUEST_ES_LIMIT - GUEST_ES_SELECTOR),
- vmcs_readl(sel + GUEST_ES_BASE - GUEST_ES_SELECTOR));
-}
-
-static void vmx_dump_dtsel(char *name, uint32_t limit)
-{
- pr_err("%s limit=0x%08x, base=0x%016lx\n",
- name, vmcs_read32(limit),
- vmcs_readl(limit + GUEST_GDTR_BASE - GUEST_GDTR_LIMIT));
-}
-
-void dump_vmcs(void)
-{
- u32 vmentry_ctl, vmexit_ctl;
- u32 cpu_based_exec_ctrl, pin_based_exec_ctrl, secondary_exec_control;
- unsigned long cr4;
- u64 efer;
- int i, n;
-
- if (!dump_invalid_vmcs) {
- pr_warn_ratelimited("set kvm_intel.dump_invalid_vmcs=1 to dump internal KVM state.\n");
- return;
- }
-
- vmentry_ctl = vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_CONTROLS);
- vmexit_ctl = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_CONTROLS);
- cpu_based_exec_ctrl = vmcs_read32(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
- pin_based_exec_ctrl = vmcs_read32(PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
- cr4 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR4);
- efer = vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_EFER);
- secondary_exec_control = 0;
- if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls())
- secondary_exec_control = vmcs_read32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);
-
- pr_err("*** Guest State ***\n");
- pr_err("CR0: actual=0x%016lx, shadow=0x%016lx, gh_mask=%016lx\n",
- vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR0), vmcs_readl(CR0_READ_SHADOW),
- vmcs_readl(CR0_GUEST_HOST_MASK));
- pr_err("CR4: actual=0x%016lx, shadow=0x%016lx, gh_mask=%016lx\n",
- cr4, vmcs_readl(CR4_READ_SHADOW), vmcs_readl(CR4_GUEST_HOST_MASK));
- pr_err("CR3 = 0x%016lx\n", vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR3));
- if ((secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT) &&
- (cr4 & X86_CR4_PAE) && !(efer & EFER_LMA))
- {
- pr_err("PDPTR0 = 0x%016llx PDPTR1 = 0x%016llx\n",
- vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR0), vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR1));
- pr_err("PDPTR2 = 0x%016llx PDPTR3 = 0x%016llx\n",
- vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR2), vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR3));
- }
- pr_err("RSP = 0x%016lx RIP = 0x%016lx\n",
- vmcs_readl(GUEST_RSP), vmcs_readl(GUEST_RIP));
- pr_err("RFLAGS=0x%08lx DR7 = 0x%016lx\n",
- vmcs_readl(GUEST_RFLAGS), vmcs_readl(GUEST_DR7));
- pr_err("Sysenter RSP=%016lx CS:RIP=%04x:%016lx\n",
- vmcs_readl(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP),
- vmcs_read32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS), vmcs_readl(GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP));
- vmx_dump_sel("CS: ", GUEST_CS_SELECTOR);
- vmx_dump_sel("DS: ", GUEST_DS_SELECTOR);
- vmx_dump_sel("SS: ", GUEST_SS_SELECTOR);
- vmx_dump_sel("ES: ", GUEST_ES_SELECTOR);
- vmx_dump_sel("FS: ", GUEST_FS_SELECTOR);
- vmx_dump_sel("GS: ", GUEST_GS_SELECTOR);
- vmx_dump_dtsel("GDTR:", GUEST_GDTR_LIMIT);
- vmx_dump_sel("LDTR:", GUEST_LDTR_SELECTOR);
- vmx_dump_dtsel("IDTR:", GUEST_IDTR_LIMIT);
- vmx_dump_sel("TR: ", GUEST_TR_SELECTOR);
- if ((vmexit_ctl & (VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_PAT | VM_EXIT_SAVE_IA32_EFER)) ||
- (vmentry_ctl & (VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT | VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER)))
- pr_err("EFER = 0x%016llx PAT = 0x%016llx\n",
- efer, vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_PAT));
- pr_err("DebugCtl = 0x%016llx DebugExceptions = 0x%016lx\n",
- vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL),
- vmcs_readl(GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS));
- if (cpu_has_load_perf_global_ctrl() &&
- vmentry_ctl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL)
- pr_err("PerfGlobCtl = 0x%016llx\n",
- vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL));
- if (vmentry_ctl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS)
- pr_err("BndCfgS = 0x%016llx\n", vmcs_read64(GUEST_BNDCFGS));
- pr_err("Interruptibility = %08x ActivityState = %08x\n",
- vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO),
- vmcs_read32(GUEST_ACTIVITY_STATE));
- if (secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY)
- pr_err("InterruptStatus = %04x\n",
- vmcs_read16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS));
-
- pr_err("*** Host State ***\n");
- pr_err("RIP = 0x%016lx RSP = 0x%016lx\n",
- vmcs_readl(HOST_RIP), vmcs_readl(HOST_RSP));
- pr_err("CS=%04x SS=%04x DS=%04x ES=%04x FS=%04x GS=%04x TR=%04x\n",
- vmcs_read16(HOST_CS_SELECTOR), vmcs_read16(HOST_SS_SELECTOR),
- vmcs_read16(HOST_DS_SELECTOR), vmcs_read16(HOST_ES_SELECTOR),
- vmcs_read16(HOST_FS_SELECTOR), vmcs_read16(HOST_GS_SELECTOR),
- vmcs_read16(HOST_TR_SELECTOR));
- pr_err("FSBase=%016lx GSBase=%016lx TRBase=%016lx\n",
- vmcs_readl(HOST_FS_BASE), vmcs_readl(HOST_GS_BASE),
- vmcs_readl(HOST_TR_BASE));
- pr_err("GDTBase=%016lx IDTBase=%016lx\n",
- vmcs_readl(HOST_GDTR_BASE), vmcs_readl(HOST_IDTR_BASE));
- pr_err("CR0=%016lx CR3=%016lx CR4=%016lx\n",
- vmcs_readl(HOST_CR0), vmcs_readl(HOST_CR3),
- vmcs_readl(HOST_CR4));
- pr_err("Sysenter RSP=%016lx CS:RIP=%04x:%016lx\n",
- vmcs_readl(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP),
- vmcs_read32(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_CS),
- vmcs_readl(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP));
- if (vmexit_ctl & (VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PAT | VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER))
- pr_err("EFER = 0x%016llx PAT = 0x%016llx\n",
- vmcs_read64(HOST_IA32_EFER),
- vmcs_read64(HOST_IA32_PAT));
- if (cpu_has_load_perf_global_ctrl() &&
- vmexit_ctl & VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL)
- pr_err("PerfGlobCtl = 0x%016llx\n",
- vmcs_read64(HOST_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL));
-
- pr_err("*** Control State ***\n");
- pr_err("PinBased=%08x CPUBased=%08x SecondaryExec=%08x\n",
- pin_based_exec_ctrl, cpu_based_exec_ctrl, secondary_exec_control);
- pr_err("EntryControls=%08x ExitControls=%08x\n", vmentry_ctl, vmexit_ctl);
- pr_err("ExceptionBitmap=%08x PFECmask=%08x PFECmatch=%08x\n",
- vmcs_read32(EXCEPTION_BITMAP),
- vmcs_read32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MASK),
- vmcs_read32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MATCH));
- pr_err("VMEntry: intr_info=%08x errcode=%08x ilen=%08x\n",
- vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD),
- vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_EXCEPTION_ERROR_CODE),
- vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN));
- pr_err("VMExit: intr_info=%08x errcode=%08x ilen=%08x\n",
- vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO),
- vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE),
- vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN));
- pr_err(" reason=%08x qualification=%016lx\n",
- vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_REASON), vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION));
- pr_err("IDTVectoring: info=%08x errcode=%08x\n",
- vmcs_read32(IDT_VECTORING_INFO_FIELD),
- vmcs_read32(IDT_VECTORING_ERROR_CODE));
- pr_err("TSC Offset = 0x%016llx\n", vmcs_read64(TSC_OFFSET));
- if (secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING)
- pr_err("TSC Multiplier = 0x%016llx\n",
- vmcs_read64(TSC_MULTIPLIER));
- if (cpu_based_exec_ctrl & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW) {
- if (secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY) {
- u16 status = vmcs_read16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS);
- pr_err("SVI|RVI = %02x|%02x ", status >> 8, status & 0xff);
- }
- pr_cont("TPR Threshold = 0x%02x\n", vmcs_read32(TPR_THRESHOLD));
- if (secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES)
- pr_err("APIC-access addr = 0x%016llx ", vmcs_read64(APIC_ACCESS_ADDR));
- pr_cont("virt-APIC addr = 0x%016llx\n", vmcs_read64(VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR));
- }
- if (pin_based_exec_ctrl & PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR)
- pr_err("PostedIntrVec = 0x%02x\n", vmcs_read16(POSTED_INTR_NV));
- if ((secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT))
- pr_err("EPT pointer = 0x%016llx\n", vmcs_read64(EPT_POINTER));
- n = vmcs_read32(CR3_TARGET_COUNT);
- for (i = 0; i + 1 < n; i += 4)
- pr_err("CR3 target%u=%016lx target%u=%016lx\n",
- i, vmcs_readl(CR3_TARGET_VALUE0 + i * 2),
- i + 1, vmcs_readl(CR3_TARGET_VALUE0 + i * 2 + 2));
- if (i < n)
- pr_err("CR3 target%u=%016lx\n",
- i, vmcs_readl(CR3_TARGET_VALUE0 + i * 2));
- if (secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING)
- pr_err("PLE Gap=%08x Window=%08x\n",
- vmcs_read32(PLE_GAP), vmcs_read32(PLE_WINDOW));
- if (secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID)
- pr_err("Virtual processor ID = 0x%04x\n",
- vmcs_read16(VIRTUAL_PROCESSOR_ID));
-}
-
-/*
- * The guest has exited. See if we can fix it or if we need userspace
- * assistance.
- */
-static int vmx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
- enum exit_fastpath_completion exit_fastpath)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- u32 exit_reason = vmx->exit_reason;
- u32 vectoring_info = vmx->idt_vectoring_info;
-
- trace_kvm_exit(exit_reason, vcpu, KVM_ISA_VMX);
-
- /*
- * Flush logged GPAs PML buffer, this will make dirty_bitmap more
- * updated. Another good is, in kvm_vm_ioctl_get_dirty_log, before
- * querying dirty_bitmap, we only need to kick all vcpus out of guest
- * mode as if vcpus is in root mode, the PML buffer must has been
- * flushed already.
- */
- if (enable_pml)
- vmx_flush_pml_buffer(vcpu);
-
- /* If guest state is invalid, start emulating */
- if (vmx->emulation_required)
- return handle_invalid_guest_state(vcpu);
-
- if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && nested_vmx_exit_reflected(vcpu, exit_reason))
- return nested_vmx_reflect_vmexit(vcpu, exit_reason);
-
- if (exit_reason & VMX_EXIT_REASONS_FAILED_VMENTRY) {
- dump_vmcs();
- vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_FAIL_ENTRY;
- vcpu->run->fail_entry.hardware_entry_failure_reason
- = exit_reason;
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (unlikely(vmx->fail)) {
- dump_vmcs();
- vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_FAIL_ENTRY;
- vcpu->run->fail_entry.hardware_entry_failure_reason
- = vmcs_read32(VM_INSTRUCTION_ERROR);
- return 0;
- }
-
- /*
- * Note:
- * Do not try to fix EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG if it caused by
- * delivery event since it indicates guest is accessing MMIO.
- * The vm-exit can be triggered again after return to guest that
- * will cause infinite loop.
- */
- if ((vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK) &&
- (exit_reason != EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI &&
- exit_reason != EXIT_REASON_EPT_VIOLATION &&
- exit_reason != EXIT_REASON_PML_FULL &&
- exit_reason != EXIT_REASON_TASK_SWITCH)) {
- vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- vcpu->run->internal.suberror = KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_DELIVERY_EV;
- vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 3;
- vcpu->run->internal.data[0] = vectoring_info;
- vcpu->run->internal.data[1] = exit_reason;
- vcpu->run->internal.data[2] = vcpu->arch.exit_qualification;
- if (exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG) {
- vcpu->run->internal.ndata++;
- vcpu->run->internal.data[3] =
- vmcs_read64(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS);
- }
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (unlikely(!enable_vnmi &&
- vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked)) {
- if (vmx_interrupt_allowed(vcpu)) {
- vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked = 0;
- } else if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->vnmi_blocked_time > 1000000000LL &&
- vcpu->arch.nmi_pending) {
- /*
- * This CPU don't support us in finding the end of an
- * NMI-blocked window if the guest runs with IRQs
- * disabled. So we pull the trigger after 1 s of
- * futile waiting, but inform the user about this.
- */
- printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: Breaking out of NMI-blocked "
- "state on VCPU %d after 1 s timeout\n",
- __func__, vcpu->vcpu_id);
- vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked = 0;
- }
- }
-
- if (exit_fastpath == EXIT_FASTPATH_SKIP_EMUL_INS) {
- kvm_skip_emulated_instruction(vcpu);
- return 1;
- } else if (exit_reason < kvm_vmx_max_exit_handlers
- && kvm_vmx_exit_handlers[exit_reason]) {
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
- if (exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE)
- return kvm_emulate_wrmsr(vcpu);
- else if (exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_PREEMPTION_TIMER)
- return handle_preemption_timer(vcpu);
- else if (exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_INTERRUPT_WINDOW)
- return handle_interrupt_window(vcpu);
- else if (exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT)
- return handle_external_interrupt(vcpu);
- else if (exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_HLT)
- return kvm_emulate_halt(vcpu);
- else if (exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG)
- return handle_ept_misconfig(vcpu);
-#endif
- return kvm_vmx_exit_handlers[exit_reason](vcpu);
- } else {
- vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "vmx: unexpected exit reason 0x%x\n",
- exit_reason);
- dump_vmcs();
- vcpu->run->exit_reason = KVM_EXIT_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- vcpu->run->internal.suberror =
- KVM_INTERNAL_ERROR_UNEXPECTED_EXIT_REASON;
- vcpu->run->internal.ndata = 1;
- vcpu->run->internal.data[0] = exit_reason;
- return 0;
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * Software based L1D cache flush which is used when microcode providing
- * the cache control MSR is not loaded.
- *
- * The L1D cache is 32 KiB on Nehalem and later microarchitectures, but to
- * flush it is required to read in 64 KiB because the replacement algorithm
- * is not exactly LRU. This could be sized at runtime via topology
- * information but as all relevant affected CPUs have 32KiB L1D cache size
- * there is no point in doing so.
- */
-static void vmx_l1d_flush(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- int size = PAGE_SIZE << L1D_CACHE_ORDER;
-
- /*
- * This code is only executed when the the flush mode is 'cond' or
- * 'always'
- */
- if (static_branch_likely(&vmx_l1d_flush_cond)) {
- bool flush_l1d;
-
- /*
- * Clear the per-vcpu flush bit, it gets set again
- * either from vcpu_run() or from one of the unsafe
- * VMEXIT handlers.
- */
- flush_l1d = vcpu->arch.l1tf_flush_l1d;
- vcpu->arch.l1tf_flush_l1d = false;
-
- /*
- * Clear the per-cpu flush bit, it gets set again from
- * the interrupt handlers.
- */
- flush_l1d |= kvm_get_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d();
- kvm_clear_cpu_l1tf_flush_l1d();
-
- if (!flush_l1d)
- return;
- }
-
- vcpu->stat.l1d_flush++;
-
- if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_FLUSH_L1D)) {
- wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_FLUSH_CMD, L1D_FLUSH);
- return;
- }
-
- asm volatile(
- /* First ensure the pages are in the TLB */
- "xorl %%eax, %%eax\n"
- ".Lpopulate_tlb:\n\t"
- "movzbl (%[flush_pages], %%" _ASM_AX "), %%ecx\n\t"
- "addl $4096, %%eax\n\t"
- "cmpl %%eax, %[size]\n\t"
- "jne .Lpopulate_tlb\n\t"
- "xorl %%eax, %%eax\n\t"
- "cpuid\n\t"
- /* Now fill the cache */
- "xorl %%eax, %%eax\n"
- ".Lfill_cache:\n"
- "movzbl (%[flush_pages], %%" _ASM_AX "), %%ecx\n\t"
- "addl $64, %%eax\n\t"
- "cmpl %%eax, %[size]\n\t"
- "jne .Lfill_cache\n\t"
- "lfence\n"
- :: [flush_pages] "r" (vmx_l1d_flush_pages),
- [size] "r" (size)
- : "eax", "ebx", "ecx", "edx");
-}
-
-static void update_cr8_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int tpr, int irr)
-{
- struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
- int tpr_threshold;
-
- if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
- nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW))
- return;
-
- tpr_threshold = (irr == -1 || tpr < irr) ? 0 : irr;
- if (is_guest_mode(vcpu))
- to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.l1_tpr_threshold = tpr_threshold;
- else
- vmcs_write32(TPR_THRESHOLD, tpr_threshold);
-}
-
-void vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- u32 sec_exec_control;
-
- if (!lapic_in_kernel(vcpu))
- return;
-
- if (!flexpriority_enabled &&
- !cpu_has_vmx_virtualize_x2apic_mode())
- return;
-
- /* Postpone execution until vmcs01 is the current VMCS. */
- if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
- vmx->nested.change_vmcs01_virtual_apic_mode = true;
- return;
- }
-
- sec_exec_control = secondary_exec_controls_get(vmx);
- sec_exec_control &= ~(SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES |
- SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE);
-
- switch (kvm_get_apic_mode(vcpu)) {
- case LAPIC_MODE_INVALID:
- WARN_ONCE(true, "Invalid local APIC state");
- case LAPIC_MODE_DISABLED:
- break;
- case LAPIC_MODE_XAPIC:
- if (flexpriority_enabled) {
- sec_exec_control |=
- SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES;
- vmx_flush_tlb(vcpu, true);
- }
- break;
- case LAPIC_MODE_X2APIC:
- if (cpu_has_vmx_virtualize_x2apic_mode())
- sec_exec_control |=
- SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE;
- break;
- }
- secondary_exec_controls_set(vmx, sec_exec_control);
-
- vmx_update_msr_bitmap(vcpu);
-}
-
-static void vmx_set_apic_access_page_addr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, hpa_t hpa)
-{
- if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
- vmcs_write64(APIC_ACCESS_ADDR, hpa);
- vmx_flush_tlb(vcpu, true);
- }
-}
-
-static void vmx_hwapic_isr_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int max_isr)
-{
- u16 status;
- u8 old;
-
- if (max_isr == -1)
- max_isr = 0;
-
- status = vmcs_read16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS);
- old = status >> 8;
- if (max_isr != old) {
- status &= 0xff;
- status |= max_isr << 8;
- vmcs_write16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS, status);
- }
-}
-
-static void vmx_set_rvi(int vector)
-{
- u16 status;
- u8 old;
-
- if (vector == -1)
- vector = 0;
-
- status = vmcs_read16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS);
- old = (u8)status & 0xff;
- if ((u8)vector != old) {
- status &= ~0xff;
- status |= (u8)vector;
- vmcs_write16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS, status);
- }
-}
-
-static void vmx_hwapic_irr_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int max_irr)
-{
- /*
- * When running L2, updating RVI is only relevant when
- * vmcs12 virtual-interrupt-delivery enabled.
- * However, it can be enabled only when L1 also
- * intercepts external-interrupts and in that case
- * we should not update vmcs02 RVI but instead intercept
- * interrupt. Therefore, do nothing when running L2.
- */
- if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu))
- vmx_set_rvi(max_irr);
-}
-
-static int vmx_sync_pir_to_irr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- int max_irr;
- bool max_irr_updated;
-
- WARN_ON(!vcpu->arch.apicv_active);
- if (pi_test_on(&vmx->pi_desc)) {
- pi_clear_on(&vmx->pi_desc);
- /*
- * IOMMU can write to PID.ON, so the barrier matters even on UP.
- * But on x86 this is just a compiler barrier anyway.
- */
- smp_mb__after_atomic();
- max_irr_updated =
- kvm_apic_update_irr(vcpu, vmx->pi_desc.pir, &max_irr);
-
- /*
- * If we are running L2 and L1 has a new pending interrupt
- * which can be injected, we should re-evaluate
- * what should be done with this new L1 interrupt.
- * If L1 intercepts external-interrupts, we should
- * exit from L2 to L1. Otherwise, interrupt should be
- * delivered directly to L2.
- */
- if (is_guest_mode(vcpu) && max_irr_updated) {
- if (nested_exit_on_intr(vcpu))
- kvm_vcpu_exiting_guest_mode(vcpu);
- else
- kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
- }
- } else {
- max_irr = kvm_lapic_find_highest_irr(vcpu);
- }
- vmx_hwapic_irr_update(vcpu, max_irr);
- return max_irr;
-}
-
-static bool vmx_dy_apicv_has_pending_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct pi_desc *pi_desc = vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu);
-
- return pi_test_on(pi_desc) ||
- (pi_test_sn(pi_desc) && !pi_is_pir_empty(pi_desc));
-}
-
-static void vmx_load_eoi_exitmap(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 *eoi_exit_bitmap)
-{
- if (!kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
- return;
-
- vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP0, eoi_exit_bitmap[0]);
- vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP1, eoi_exit_bitmap[1]);
- vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP2, eoi_exit_bitmap[2]);
- vmcs_write64(EOI_EXIT_BITMAP3, eoi_exit_bitmap[3]);
-}
-
-static void vmx_apicv_post_state_restore(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
-
- pi_clear_on(&vmx->pi_desc);
- memset(vmx->pi_desc.pir, 0, sizeof(vmx->pi_desc.pir));
-}
-
-static void handle_exception_nmi_irqoff(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
-{
- vmx->exit_intr_info = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO);
-
- /* if exit due to PF check for async PF */
- if (is_page_fault(vmx->exit_intr_info))
- vmx->vcpu.arch.apf.host_apf_reason = kvm_read_and_reset_pf_reason();
-
- /* Handle machine checks before interrupts are enabled */
- if (is_machine_check(vmx->exit_intr_info))
- kvm_machine_check();
-
- /* We need to handle NMIs before interrupts are enabled */
- if (is_nmi(vmx->exit_intr_info)) {
- kvm_before_interrupt(&vmx->vcpu);
- asm("int $2");
- kvm_after_interrupt(&vmx->vcpu);
- }
-}
-
-static void handle_external_interrupt_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- unsigned int vector;
- unsigned long entry;
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
- unsigned long tmp;
-#endif
- gate_desc *desc;
- u32 intr_info;
-
- intr_info = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO);
- if (WARN_ONCE(!is_external_intr(intr_info),
- "KVM: unexpected VM-Exit interrupt info: 0x%x", intr_info))
- return;
-
- vector = intr_info & INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK;
- desc = (gate_desc *)host_idt_base + vector;
- entry = gate_offset(desc);
-
- kvm_before_interrupt(vcpu);
-
- asm volatile(
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
- "mov %%" _ASM_SP ", %[sp]\n\t"
- "and $0xfffffffffffffff0, %%" _ASM_SP "\n\t"
- "push $%c[ss]\n\t"
- "push %[sp]\n\t"
-#endif
- "pushf\n\t"
- __ASM_SIZE(push) " $%c[cs]\n\t"
- CALL_NOSPEC
- :
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
- [sp]"=&r"(tmp),
-#endif
- ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT
- :
- THUNK_TARGET(entry),
- [ss]"i"(__KERNEL_DS),
- [cs]"i"(__KERNEL_CS)
- );
-
- kvm_after_interrupt(vcpu);
-}
-STACK_FRAME_NON_STANDARD(handle_external_interrupt_irqoff);
-
-static void vmx_handle_exit_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
- enum exit_fastpath_completion *exit_fastpath)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
-
- if (vmx->exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT)
- handle_external_interrupt_irqoff(vcpu);
- else if (vmx->exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_EXCEPTION_NMI)
- handle_exception_nmi_irqoff(vmx);
- else if (!is_guest_mode(vcpu) &&
- vmx->exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE)
- *exit_fastpath = handle_fastpath_set_msr_irqoff(vcpu);
-}
-
-static bool vmx_has_emulated_msr(int index)
-{
- switch (index) {
- case MSR_IA32_SMBASE:
- /*
- * We cannot do SMM unless we can run the guest in big
- * real mode.
- */
- return enable_unrestricted_guest || emulate_invalid_guest_state;
- case MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC ... MSR_IA32_VMX_VMFUNC:
- return nested;
- case MSR_AMD64_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL:
- /* This is AMD only. */
- return false;
- default:
- return true;
- }
-}
-
-static bool vmx_pt_supported(void)
-{
- return pt_mode == PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST;
-}
-
-static void vmx_recover_nmi_blocking(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
-{
- u32 exit_intr_info;
- bool unblock_nmi;
- u8 vector;
- bool idtv_info_valid;
-
- idtv_info_valid = vmx->idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK;
-
- if (enable_vnmi) {
- if (vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked)
- return;
- /*
- * Can't use vmx->exit_intr_info since we're not sure what
- * the exit reason is.
- */
- exit_intr_info = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO);
- unblock_nmi = (exit_intr_info & INTR_INFO_UNBLOCK_NMI) != 0;
- vector = exit_intr_info & INTR_INFO_VECTOR_MASK;
- /*
- * SDM 3: 27.7.1.2 (September 2008)
- * Re-set bit "block by NMI" before VM entry if vmexit caused by
- * a guest IRET fault.
- * SDM 3: 23.2.2 (September 2008)
- * Bit 12 is undefined in any of the following cases:
- * If the VM exit sets the valid bit in the IDT-vectoring
- * information field.
- * If the VM exit is due to a double fault.
- */
- if ((exit_intr_info & INTR_INFO_VALID_MASK) && unblock_nmi &&
- vector != DF_VECTOR && !idtv_info_valid)
- vmcs_set_bits(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO,
- GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
- else
- vmx->loaded_vmcs->nmi_known_unmasked =
- !(vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO)
- & GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);
- } else if (unlikely(vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked))
- vmx->loaded_vmcs->vnmi_blocked_time +=
- ktime_to_ns(ktime_sub(ktime_get(),
- vmx->loaded_vmcs->entry_time));
-}
-
-static void __vmx_complete_interrupts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
- u32 idt_vectoring_info,
- int instr_len_field,
- int error_code_field)
-{
- u8 vector;
- int type;
- bool idtv_info_valid;
-
- idtv_info_valid = idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VALID_MASK;
-
- vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = false;
- kvm_clear_exception_queue(vcpu);
- kvm_clear_interrupt_queue(vcpu);
-
- if (!idtv_info_valid)
- return;
-
- kvm_make_request(KVM_REQ_EVENT, vcpu);
-
- vector = idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_VECTOR_MASK;
- type = idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_TYPE_MASK;
-
- switch (type) {
- case INTR_TYPE_NMI_INTR:
- vcpu->arch.nmi_injected = true;
- /*
- * SDM 3: 27.7.1.2 (September 2008)
- * Clear bit "block by NMI" before VM entry if a NMI
- * delivery faulted.
- */
- vmx_set_nmi_mask(vcpu, false);
- break;
- case INTR_TYPE_SOFT_EXCEPTION:
- vcpu->arch.event_exit_inst_len = vmcs_read32(instr_len_field);
- /* fall through */
- case INTR_TYPE_HARD_EXCEPTION:
- if (idt_vectoring_info & VECTORING_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK) {
- u32 err = vmcs_read32(error_code_field);
- kvm_requeue_exception_e(vcpu, vector, err);
- } else
- kvm_requeue_exception(vcpu, vector);
- break;
- case INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR:
- vcpu->arch.event_exit_inst_len = vmcs_read32(instr_len_field);
- /* fall through */
- case INTR_TYPE_EXT_INTR:
- kvm_queue_interrupt(vcpu, vector, type == INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR);
- break;
- default:
- break;
- }
-}
-
-static void vmx_complete_interrupts(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
-{
- __vmx_complete_interrupts(&vmx->vcpu, vmx->idt_vectoring_info,
- VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN,
- IDT_VECTORING_ERROR_CODE);
-}
-
-static void vmx_cancel_injection(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- __vmx_complete_interrupts(vcpu,
- vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD),
- VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN,
- VM_ENTRY_EXCEPTION_ERROR_CODE);
-
- vmcs_write32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD, 0);
-}
-
-static void atomic_switch_perf_msrs(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
-{
- int i, nr_msrs;
- struct perf_guest_switch_msr *msrs;
-
- msrs = perf_guest_get_msrs(&nr_msrs);
-
- if (!msrs)
- return;
-
- for (i = 0; i < nr_msrs; i++)
- if (msrs[i].host == msrs[i].guest)
- clear_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, msrs[i].msr);
- else
- add_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, msrs[i].msr, msrs[i].guest,
- msrs[i].host, false);
-}
-
-static void atomic_switch_umwait_control_msr(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
-{
- u32 host_umwait_control;
-
- if (!vmx_has_waitpkg(vmx))
- return;
-
- host_umwait_control = get_umwait_control_msr();
-
- if (vmx->msr_ia32_umwait_control != host_umwait_control)
- add_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL,
- vmx->msr_ia32_umwait_control,
- host_umwait_control, false);
- else
- clear_atomic_switch_msr(vmx, MSR_IA32_UMWAIT_CONTROL);
-}
-
-static void vmx_update_hv_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- u64 tscl;
- u32 delta_tsc;
-
- if (vmx->req_immediate_exit) {
- vmcs_write32(VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER_VALUE, 0);
- vmx->loaded_vmcs->hv_timer_soft_disabled = false;
- } else if (vmx->hv_deadline_tsc != -1) {
- tscl = rdtsc();
- if (vmx->hv_deadline_tsc > tscl)
- /* set_hv_timer ensures the delta fits in 32-bits */
- delta_tsc = (u32)((vmx->hv_deadline_tsc - tscl) >>
- cpu_preemption_timer_multi);
- else
- delta_tsc = 0;
-
- vmcs_write32(VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER_VALUE, delta_tsc);
- vmx->loaded_vmcs->hv_timer_soft_disabled = false;
- } else if (!vmx->loaded_vmcs->hv_timer_soft_disabled) {
- vmcs_write32(VMX_PREEMPTION_TIMER_VALUE, -1);
- vmx->loaded_vmcs->hv_timer_soft_disabled = true;
- }
-}
-
-void vmx_update_host_rsp(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long host_rsp)
-{
- if (unlikely(host_rsp != vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.rsp)) {
- vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.rsp = host_rsp;
- vmcs_writel(HOST_RSP, host_rsp);
- }
-}
-
-bool __vmx_vcpu_run(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned long *regs, bool launched);
-
-static void vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- unsigned long cr3, cr4;
-
- /* Record the guest's net vcpu time for enforced NMI injections. */
- if (unlikely(!enable_vnmi &&
- vmx->loaded_vmcs->soft_vnmi_blocked))
- vmx->loaded_vmcs->entry_time = ktime_get();
-
- /* Don't enter VMX if guest state is invalid, let the exit handler
- start emulation until we arrive back to a valid state */
- if (vmx->emulation_required)
- return;
-
- if (vmx->ple_window_dirty) {
- vmx->ple_window_dirty = false;
- vmcs_write32(PLE_WINDOW, vmx->ple_window);
- }
-
- if (vmx->nested.need_vmcs12_to_shadow_sync)
- nested_sync_vmcs12_to_shadow(vcpu);
-
- if (kvm_register_is_dirty(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RSP))
- vmcs_writel(GUEST_RSP, vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSP]);
- if (kvm_register_is_dirty(vcpu, VCPU_REGS_RIP))
- vmcs_writel(GUEST_RIP, vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RIP]);
-
- cr3 = __get_current_cr3_fast();
- if (unlikely(cr3 != vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr3)) {
- vmcs_writel(HOST_CR3, cr3);
- vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr3 = cr3;
- }
-
- cr4 = cr4_read_shadow();
- if (unlikely(cr4 != vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr4)) {
- vmcs_writel(HOST_CR4, cr4);
- vmx->loaded_vmcs->host_state.cr4 = cr4;
- }
-
- /* When single-stepping over STI and MOV SS, we must clear the
- * corresponding interruptibility bits in the guest state. Otherwise
- * vmentry fails as it then expects bit 14 (BS) in pending debug
- * exceptions being set, but that's not correct for the guest debugging
- * case. */
- if (vcpu->guest_debug & KVM_GUESTDBG_SINGLESTEP)
- vmx_set_interrupt_shadow(vcpu, 0);
-
- kvm_load_guest_xsave_state(vcpu);
-
- if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PKU) &&
- kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_PKE) &&
- vcpu->arch.pkru != vmx->host_pkru)
- __write_pkru(vcpu->arch.pkru);
-
- pt_guest_enter(vmx);
-
- atomic_switch_perf_msrs(vmx);
- atomic_switch_umwait_control_msr(vmx);
-
- if (enable_preemption_timer)
- vmx_update_hv_timer(vcpu);
-
- if (lapic_in_kernel(vcpu) &&
- vcpu->arch.apic->lapic_timer.timer_advance_ns)
- kvm_wait_lapic_expire(vcpu);
-
- /*
- * If this vCPU has touched SPEC_CTRL, restore the guest's value if
- * it's non-zero. Since vmentry is serialising on affected CPUs, there
- * is no need to worry about the conditional branch over the wrmsr
- * being speculatively taken.
- */
- x86_spec_ctrl_set_guest(vmx->spec_ctrl, 0);
-
- /* L1D Flush includes CPU buffer clear to mitigate MDS */
- if (static_branch_unlikely(&vmx_l1d_should_flush))
- vmx_l1d_flush(vcpu);
- else if (static_branch_unlikely(&mds_user_clear))
- mds_clear_cpu_buffers();
-
- if (vcpu->arch.cr2 != read_cr2())
- write_cr2(vcpu->arch.cr2);
-
- vmx->fail = __vmx_vcpu_run(vmx, (unsigned long *)&vcpu->arch.regs,
- vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched);
-
- vcpu->arch.cr2 = read_cr2();
-
- /*
- * We do not use IBRS in the kernel. If this vCPU has used the
- * SPEC_CTRL MSR it may have left it on; save the value and
- * turn it off. This is much more efficient than blindly adding
- * it to the atomic save/restore list. Especially as the former
- * (Saving guest MSRs on vmexit) doesn't even exist in KVM.
- *
- * For non-nested case:
- * If the L01 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to
- * save it.
- *
- * For nested case:
- * If the L02 MSR bitmap does not intercept the MSR, then we need to
- * save it.
- */
- if (unlikely(!msr_write_intercepted(vcpu, MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL)))
- vmx->spec_ctrl = native_read_msr(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL);
-
- x86_spec_ctrl_restore_host(vmx->spec_ctrl, 0);
-
- /* All fields are clean at this point */
- if (static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs))
- current_evmcs->hv_clean_fields |=
- HV_VMX_ENLIGHTENED_CLEAN_FIELD_ALL;
-
- if (static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs))
- current_evmcs->hv_vp_id = vcpu->arch.hyperv.vp_index;
-
- /* MSR_IA32_DEBUGCTLMSR is zeroed on vmexit. Restore it if needed */
- if (vmx->host_debugctlmsr)
- update_debugctlmsr(vmx->host_debugctlmsr);
-
-#ifndef CONFIG_X86_64
- /*
- * The sysexit path does not restore ds/es, so we must set them to
- * a reasonable value ourselves.
- *
- * We can't defer this to vmx_prepare_switch_to_host() since that
- * function may be executed in interrupt context, which saves and
- * restore segments around it, nullifying its effect.
- */
- loadsegment(ds, __USER_DS);
- loadsegment(es, __USER_DS);
-#endif
-
- vcpu->arch.regs_avail = ~((1 << VCPU_REGS_RIP) | (1 << VCPU_REGS_RSP)
- | (1 << VCPU_EXREG_RFLAGS)
- | (1 << VCPU_EXREG_PDPTR)
- | (1 << VCPU_EXREG_SEGMENTS)
- | (1 << VCPU_EXREG_CR3));
- vcpu->arch.regs_dirty = 0;
-
- pt_guest_exit(vmx);
-
- /*
- * eager fpu is enabled if PKEY is supported and CR4 is switched
- * back on host, so it is safe to read guest PKRU from current
- * XSAVE.
- */
- if (static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PKU) &&
- kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_PKE)) {
- vcpu->arch.pkru = rdpkru();
- if (vcpu->arch.pkru != vmx->host_pkru)
- __write_pkru(vmx->host_pkru);
- }
-
- kvm_load_host_xsave_state(vcpu);
-
- vmx->nested.nested_run_pending = 0;
- vmx->idt_vectoring_info = 0;
-
- vmx->exit_reason = vmx->fail ? 0xdead : vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_REASON);
- if ((u16)vmx->exit_reason == EXIT_REASON_MCE_DURING_VMENTRY)
- kvm_machine_check();
-
- if (vmx->fail || (vmx->exit_reason & VMX_EXIT_REASONS_FAILED_VMENTRY))
- return;
-
- vmx->loaded_vmcs->launched = 1;
- vmx->idt_vectoring_info = vmcs_read32(IDT_VECTORING_INFO_FIELD);
-
- vmx_recover_nmi_blocking(vmx);
- vmx_complete_interrupts(vmx);
-}
-
-static struct kvm *vmx_vm_alloc(void)
-{
- struct kvm_vmx *kvm_vmx = __vmalloc(sizeof(struct kvm_vmx),
- GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO,
- PAGE_KERNEL);
- return &kvm_vmx->kvm;
-}
-
-static void vmx_vm_free(struct kvm *kvm)
-{
- kfree(kvm->arch.hyperv.hv_pa_pg);
- vfree(to_kvm_vmx(kvm));
-}
-
-static void vmx_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
-
- if (enable_pml)
- vmx_destroy_pml_buffer(vmx);
- free_vpid(vmx->vpid);
- nested_vmx_free_vcpu(vcpu);
- free_loaded_vmcs(vmx->loaded_vmcs);
- kvm_vcpu_uninit(vcpu);
- kmem_cache_free(x86_fpu_cache, vmx->vcpu.arch.user_fpu);
- kmem_cache_free(x86_fpu_cache, vmx->vcpu.arch.guest_fpu);
- kmem_cache_free(kvm_vcpu_cache, vmx);
-}
-
-static struct kvm_vcpu *vmx_create_vcpu(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int id)
-{
- int err;
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx;
- unsigned long *msr_bitmap;
- int i, cpu;
-
- BUILD_BUG_ON_MSG(offsetof(struct vcpu_vmx, vcpu) != 0,
- "struct kvm_vcpu must be at offset 0 for arch usercopy region");
-
- vmx = kmem_cache_zalloc(kvm_vcpu_cache, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
- if (!vmx)
- return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
-
- vmx->vcpu.arch.user_fpu = kmem_cache_zalloc(x86_fpu_cache,
- GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
- if (!vmx->vcpu.arch.user_fpu) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "kvm: failed to allocate kvm userspace's fpu\n");
- err = -ENOMEM;
- goto free_partial_vcpu;
- }
-
- vmx->vcpu.arch.guest_fpu = kmem_cache_zalloc(x86_fpu_cache,
- GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
- if (!vmx->vcpu.arch.guest_fpu) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "kvm: failed to allocate vcpu's fpu\n");
- err = -ENOMEM;
- goto free_user_fpu;
- }
-
- vmx->vpid = allocate_vpid();
-
- err = kvm_vcpu_init(&vmx->vcpu, kvm, id);
- if (err)
- goto free_vcpu;
-
- err = -ENOMEM;
-
- /*
- * If PML is turned on, failure on enabling PML just results in failure
- * of creating the vcpu, therefore we can simplify PML logic (by
- * avoiding dealing with cases, such as enabling PML partially on vcpus
- * for the guest), etc.
- */
- if (enable_pml) {
- vmx->pml_pg = alloc_page(GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT | __GFP_ZERO);
- if (!vmx->pml_pg)
- goto uninit_vcpu;
- }
-
- BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(vmx_msr_index) != NR_SHARED_MSRS);
-
- for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(vmx_msr_index); ++i) {
- u32 index = vmx_msr_index[i];
- u32 data_low, data_high;
- int j = vmx->nmsrs;
-
- if (rdmsr_safe(index, &data_low, &data_high) < 0)
- continue;
- if (wrmsr_safe(index, data_low, data_high) < 0)
- continue;
-
- vmx->guest_msrs[j].index = i;
- vmx->guest_msrs[j].data = 0;
- switch (index) {
- case MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL:
- /*
- * No need to pass TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR through, so
- * let's avoid changing CPUID bits under the host
- * kernel's feet.
- */
- vmx->guest_msrs[j].mask = ~(u64)TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR;
- break;
- default:
- vmx->guest_msrs[j].mask = -1ull;
- break;
- }
- ++vmx->nmsrs;
- }
-
- err = alloc_loaded_vmcs(&vmx->vmcs01);
- if (err < 0)
- goto free_pml;
-
- msr_bitmap = vmx->vmcs01.msr_bitmap;
- vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_TSC, MSR_TYPE_R);
- vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_FS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW);
- vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_GS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW);
- vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_KERNEL_GS_BASE, MSR_TYPE_RW);
- vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS, MSR_TYPE_RW);
- vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP, MSR_TYPE_RW);
- vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP, MSR_TYPE_RW);
- if (kvm_cstate_in_guest(kvm)) {
- vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_CORE_C1_RES, MSR_TYPE_R);
- vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_CORE_C3_RESIDENCY, MSR_TYPE_R);
- vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_CORE_C6_RESIDENCY, MSR_TYPE_R);
- vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(msr_bitmap, MSR_CORE_C7_RESIDENCY, MSR_TYPE_R);
- }
- vmx->msr_bitmap_mode = 0;
-
- vmx->loaded_vmcs = &vmx->vmcs01;
- cpu = get_cpu();
- vmx_vcpu_load(&vmx->vcpu, cpu);
- vmx->vcpu.cpu = cpu;
- init_vmcs(vmx);
- vmx_vcpu_put(&vmx->vcpu);
- put_cpu();
- if (cpu_need_virtualize_apic_accesses(&vmx->vcpu)) {
- err = alloc_apic_access_page(kvm);
- if (err)
- goto free_vmcs;
- }
-
- if (enable_ept && !enable_unrestricted_guest) {
- err = init_rmode_identity_map(kvm);
- if (err)
- goto free_vmcs;
- }
-
- if (nested)
- nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs(&vmx->nested.msrs,
- vmx_capability.ept,
- kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(&vmx->vcpu));
- else
- memset(&vmx->nested.msrs, 0, sizeof(vmx->nested.msrs));
-
- vmx->nested.posted_intr_nv = -1;
- vmx->nested.current_vmptr = -1ull;
-
- vmx->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits = FEATURE_CONTROL_LOCKED;
-
- /*
- * Enforce invariant: pi_desc.nv is always either POSTED_INTR_VECTOR
- * or POSTED_INTR_WAKEUP_VECTOR.
- */
- vmx->pi_desc.nv = POSTED_INTR_VECTOR;
- vmx->pi_desc.sn = 1;
-
- vmx->ept_pointer = INVALID_PAGE;
-
- return &vmx->vcpu;
-
-free_vmcs:
- free_loaded_vmcs(vmx->loaded_vmcs);
-free_pml:
- vmx_destroy_pml_buffer(vmx);
-uninit_vcpu:
- kvm_vcpu_uninit(&vmx->vcpu);
-free_vcpu:
- free_vpid(vmx->vpid);
- kmem_cache_free(x86_fpu_cache, vmx->vcpu.arch.guest_fpu);
-free_user_fpu:
- kmem_cache_free(x86_fpu_cache, vmx->vcpu.arch.user_fpu);
-free_partial_vcpu:
- kmem_cache_free(kvm_vcpu_cache, vmx);
- return ERR_PTR(err);
-}
-
-#define L1TF_MSG_SMT "L1TF CPU bug present and SMT on, data leak possible. See CVE-2018-3646 and https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.html for details.\n"
-#define L1TF_MSG_L1D "L1TF CPU bug present and virtualization mitigation disabled, data leak possible. See CVE-2018-3646 and https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.html for details.\n"
-
-static int vmx_vm_init(struct kvm *kvm)
-{
- spin_lock_init(&to_kvm_vmx(kvm)->ept_pointer_lock);
-
- if (!ple_gap)
- kvm->arch.pause_in_guest = true;
-
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_BUG_L1TF) && enable_ept) {
- switch (l1tf_mitigation) {
- case L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF:
- case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOWARN:
- /* 'I explicitly don't care' is set */
- break;
- case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH:
- case L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH_NOSMT:
- case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL:
- /*
- * Warn upon starting the first VM in a potentially
- * insecure environment.
- */
- if (sched_smt_active())
- pr_warn_once(L1TF_MSG_SMT);
- if (l1tf_vmx_mitigation == VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_NEVER)
- pr_warn_once(L1TF_MSG_L1D);
- break;
- case L1TF_MITIGATION_FULL_FORCE:
- /* Flush is enforced */
- break;
- }
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int __init vmx_check_processor_compat(void)
-{
- struct vmcs_config vmcs_conf;
- struct vmx_capability vmx_cap;
-
- if (setup_vmcs_config(&vmcs_conf, &vmx_cap) < 0)
- return -EIO;
- if (nested)
- nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs(&vmcs_conf.nested, vmx_cap.ept,
- enable_apicv);
- if (memcmp(&vmcs_config, &vmcs_conf, sizeof(struct vmcs_config)) != 0) {
- printk(KERN_ERR "kvm: CPU %d feature inconsistency!\n",
- smp_processor_id());
- return -EIO;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-static u64 vmx_get_mt_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gfn_t gfn, bool is_mmio)
-{
- u8 cache;
- u64 ipat = 0;
-
- /* For VT-d and EPT combination
- * 1. MMIO: always map as UC
- * 2. EPT with VT-d:
- * a. VT-d without snooping control feature: can't guarantee the
- * result, try to trust guest.
- * b. VT-d with snooping control feature: snooping control feature of
- * VT-d engine can guarantee the cache correctness. Just set it
- * to WB to keep consistent with host. So the same as item 3.
- * 3. EPT without VT-d: always map as WB and set IPAT=1 to keep
- * consistent with host MTRR
- */
- if (is_mmio) {
- cache = MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE;
- goto exit;
- }
-
- if (!kvm_arch_has_noncoherent_dma(vcpu->kvm)) {
- ipat = VMX_EPT_IPAT_BIT;
- cache = MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK;
- goto exit;
- }
-
- if (kvm_read_cr0(vcpu) & X86_CR0_CD) {
- ipat = VMX_EPT_IPAT_BIT;
- if (kvm_check_has_quirk(vcpu->kvm, KVM_X86_QUIRK_CD_NW_CLEARED))
- cache = MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK;
- else
- cache = MTRR_TYPE_UNCACHABLE;
- goto exit;
- }
-
- cache = kvm_mtrr_get_guest_memory_type(vcpu, gfn);
-
-exit:
- return (cache << VMX_EPT_MT_EPTE_SHIFT) | ipat;
-}
-
-static int vmx_get_lpage_level(void)
-{
- if (enable_ept && !cpu_has_vmx_ept_1g_page())
- return PT_DIRECTORY_LEVEL;
- else
- /* For shadow and EPT supported 1GB page */
- return PT_PDPE_LEVEL;
-}
-
-static void vmcs_set_secondary_exec_control(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)
-{
- /*
- * These bits in the secondary execution controls field
- * are dynamic, the others are mostly based on the hypervisor
- * architecture and the guest's CPUID. Do not touch the
- * dynamic bits.
- */
- u32 mask =
- SECONDARY_EXEC_SHADOW_VMCS |
- SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE |
- SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES |
- SECONDARY_EXEC_DESC;
-
- u32 new_ctl = vmx->secondary_exec_control;
- u32 cur_ctl = secondary_exec_controls_get(vmx);
-
- secondary_exec_controls_set(vmx, (new_ctl & ~mask) | (cur_ctl & mask));
-}
-
-/*
- * Generate MSR_IA32_VMX_CR{0,4}_FIXED1 according to CPUID. Only set bits
- * (indicating "allowed-1") if they are supported in the guest's CPUID.
- */
-static void nested_vmx_cr_fixed1_bits_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry;
-
- vmx->nested.msrs.cr0_fixed1 = 0xffffffff;
- vmx->nested.msrs.cr4_fixed1 = X86_CR4_PCE;
-
-#define cr4_fixed1_update(_cr4_mask, _reg, _cpuid_mask) do { \
- if (entry && (entry->_reg & (_cpuid_mask))) \
- vmx->nested.msrs.cr4_fixed1 |= (_cr4_mask); \
-} while (0)
-
- entry = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x1, 0);
- cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_VME, edx, bit(X86_FEATURE_VME));
- cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_PVI, edx, bit(X86_FEATURE_VME));
- cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_TSD, edx, bit(X86_FEATURE_TSC));
- cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_DE, edx, bit(X86_FEATURE_DE));
- cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_PSE, edx, bit(X86_FEATURE_PSE));
- cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_PAE, edx, bit(X86_FEATURE_PAE));
- cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_MCE, edx, bit(X86_FEATURE_MCE));
- cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_PGE, edx, bit(X86_FEATURE_PGE));
- cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_OSFXSR, edx, bit(X86_FEATURE_FXSR));
- cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_OSXMMEXCPT, edx, bit(X86_FEATURE_XMM));
- cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_VMXE, ecx, bit(X86_FEATURE_VMX));
- cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_SMXE, ecx, bit(X86_FEATURE_SMX));
- cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_PCIDE, ecx, bit(X86_FEATURE_PCID));
- cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_OSXSAVE, ecx, bit(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE));
-
- entry = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x7, 0);
- cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_FSGSBASE, ebx, bit(X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE));
- cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_SMEP, ebx, bit(X86_FEATURE_SMEP));
- cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_SMAP, ebx, bit(X86_FEATURE_SMAP));
- cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_PKE, ecx, bit(X86_FEATURE_PKU));
- cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_UMIP, ecx, bit(X86_FEATURE_UMIP));
- cr4_fixed1_update(X86_CR4_LA57, ecx, bit(X86_FEATURE_LA57));
-
-#undef cr4_fixed1_update
-}
-
-static void nested_vmx_entry_exit_ctls_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
-
- if (kvm_mpx_supported()) {
- bool mpx_enabled = guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_MPX);
-
- if (mpx_enabled) {
- vmx->nested.msrs.entry_ctls_high |= VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS;
- vmx->nested.msrs.exit_ctls_high |= VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS;
- } else {
- vmx->nested.msrs.entry_ctls_high &= ~VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS;
- vmx->nested.msrs.exit_ctls_high &= ~VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS;
- }
- }
-}
-
-static void update_intel_pt_cfg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *best = NULL;
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < PT_CPUID_LEAVES; i++) {
- best = kvm_find_cpuid_entry(vcpu, 0x14, i);
- if (!best)
- return;
- vmx->pt_desc.caps[CPUID_EAX + i*PT_CPUID_REGS_NUM] = best->eax;
- vmx->pt_desc.caps[CPUID_EBX + i*PT_CPUID_REGS_NUM] = best->ebx;
- vmx->pt_desc.caps[CPUID_ECX + i*PT_CPUID_REGS_NUM] = best->ecx;
- vmx->pt_desc.caps[CPUID_EDX + i*PT_CPUID_REGS_NUM] = best->edx;
- }
-
- /* Get the number of configurable Address Ranges for filtering */
- vmx->pt_desc.addr_range = intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps,
- PT_CAP_num_address_ranges);
-
- /* Initialize and clear the no dependency bits */
- vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask = ~(RTIT_CTL_TRACEEN | RTIT_CTL_OS |
- RTIT_CTL_USR | RTIT_CTL_TSC_EN | RTIT_CTL_DISRETC);
-
- /*
- * If CPUID.(EAX=14H,ECX=0):EBX[0]=1 CR3Filter can be set otherwise
- * will inject an #GP
- */
- if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_cr3_filtering))
- vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask &= ~RTIT_CTL_CR3EN;
-
- /*
- * If CPUID.(EAX=14H,ECX=0):EBX[1]=1 CYCEn, CycThresh and
- * PSBFreq can be set
- */
- if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_psb_cyc))
- vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask &= ~(RTIT_CTL_CYCLEACC |
- RTIT_CTL_CYC_THRESH | RTIT_CTL_PSB_FREQ);
-
- /*
- * If CPUID.(EAX=14H,ECX=0):EBX[3]=1 MTCEn BranchEn and
- * MTCFreq can be set
- */
- if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_mtc))
- vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask &= ~(RTIT_CTL_MTC_EN |
- RTIT_CTL_BRANCH_EN | RTIT_CTL_MTC_RANGE);
-
- /* If CPUID.(EAX=14H,ECX=0):EBX[4]=1 FUPonPTW and PTWEn can be set */
- if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_ptwrite))
- vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask &= ~(RTIT_CTL_FUP_ON_PTW |
- RTIT_CTL_PTW_EN);
-
- /* If CPUID.(EAX=14H,ECX=0):EBX[5]=1 PwrEvEn can be set */
- if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_power_event_trace))
- vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask &= ~RTIT_CTL_PWR_EVT_EN;
-
- /* If CPUID.(EAX=14H,ECX=0):ECX[0]=1 ToPA can be set */
- if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_topa_output))
- vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask &= ~RTIT_CTL_TOPA;
-
- /* If CPUID.(EAX=14H,ECX=0):ECX[3]=1 FabircEn can be set */
- if (intel_pt_validate_cap(vmx->pt_desc.caps, PT_CAP_output_subsys))
- vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask &= ~RTIT_CTL_FABRIC_EN;
-
- /* unmask address range configure area */
- for (i = 0; i < vmx->pt_desc.addr_range; i++)
- vmx->pt_desc.ctl_bitmask &= ~(0xfULL << (32 + i * 4));
-}
-
-static void vmx_cpuid_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
-
- /* xsaves_enabled is recomputed in vmx_compute_secondary_exec_control(). */
- vcpu->arch.xsaves_enabled = false;
-
- if (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls()) {
- vmx_compute_secondary_exec_control(vmx);
- vmcs_set_secondary_exec_control(vmx);
- }
-
- if (nested_vmx_allowed(vcpu))
- to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits |=
- FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX |
- FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX;
- else
- to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits &=
- ~(FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_INSIDE_SMX |
- FEATURE_CONTROL_VMXON_ENABLED_OUTSIDE_SMX);
-
- if (nested_vmx_allowed(vcpu)) {
- nested_vmx_cr_fixed1_bits_update(vcpu);
- nested_vmx_entry_exit_ctls_update(vcpu);
- }
-
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT) &&
- guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_INTEL_PT))
- update_intel_pt_cfg(vcpu);
-
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RTM)) {
- struct shared_msr_entry *msr;
- msr = find_msr_entry(vmx, MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL);
- if (msr) {
- bool enabled = guest_cpuid_has(vcpu, X86_FEATURE_RTM);
- vmx_set_guest_msr(vmx, msr, enabled ? 0 : TSX_CTRL_RTM_DISABLE);
- }
- }
-}
-
-static void vmx_set_supported_cpuid(u32 func, struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry)
-{
- if (func == 1 && nested)
- entry->ecx |= bit(X86_FEATURE_VMX);
-}
-
-static void vmx_request_immediate_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- to_vmx(vcpu)->req_immediate_exit = true;
-}
-
-static int vmx_check_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
- struct x86_instruction_info *info,
- enum x86_intercept_stage stage)
-{
- struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
- struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt = &vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt;
-
- /*
- * RDPID causes #UD if disabled through secondary execution controls.
- * Because it is marked as EmulateOnUD, we need to intercept it here.
- */
- if (info->intercept == x86_intercept_rdtscp &&
- !nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_RDTSCP)) {
- ctxt->exception.vector = UD_VECTOR;
- ctxt->exception.error_code_valid = false;
- return X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT;
- }
-
- /* TODO: check more intercepts... */
- return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
-}
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
-/* (a << shift) / divisor, return 1 if overflow otherwise 0 */
-static inline int u64_shl_div_u64(u64 a, unsigned int shift,
- u64 divisor, u64 *result)
-{
- u64 low = a << shift, high = a >> (64 - shift);
-
- /* To avoid the overflow on divq */
- if (high >= divisor)
- return 1;
-
- /* Low hold the result, high hold rem which is discarded */
- asm("divq %2\n\t" : "=a" (low), "=d" (high) :
- "rm" (divisor), "0" (low), "1" (high));
- *result = low;
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int vmx_set_hv_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 guest_deadline_tsc,
- bool *expired)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx;
- u64 tscl, guest_tscl, delta_tsc, lapic_timer_advance_cycles;
- struct kvm_timer *ktimer = &vcpu->arch.apic->lapic_timer;
-
- if (kvm_mwait_in_guest(vcpu->kvm) ||
- kvm_can_post_timer_interrupt(vcpu))
- return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-
- vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- tscl = rdtsc();
- guest_tscl = kvm_read_l1_tsc(vcpu, tscl);
- delta_tsc = max(guest_deadline_tsc, guest_tscl) - guest_tscl;
- lapic_timer_advance_cycles = nsec_to_cycles(vcpu,
- ktimer->timer_advance_ns);
-
- if (delta_tsc > lapic_timer_advance_cycles)
- delta_tsc -= lapic_timer_advance_cycles;
- else
- delta_tsc = 0;
-
- /* Convert to host delta tsc if tsc scaling is enabled */
- if (vcpu->arch.tsc_scaling_ratio != kvm_default_tsc_scaling_ratio &&
- delta_tsc && u64_shl_div_u64(delta_tsc,
- kvm_tsc_scaling_ratio_frac_bits,
- vcpu->arch.tsc_scaling_ratio, &delta_tsc))
- return -ERANGE;
-
- /*
- * If the delta tsc can't fit in the 32 bit after the multi shift,
- * we can't use the preemption timer.
- * It's possible that it fits on later vmentries, but checking
- * on every vmentry is costly so we just use an hrtimer.
- */
- if (delta_tsc >> (cpu_preemption_timer_multi + 32))
- return -ERANGE;
-
- vmx->hv_deadline_tsc = tscl + delta_tsc;
- *expired = !delta_tsc;
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void vmx_cancel_hv_timer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- to_vmx(vcpu)->hv_deadline_tsc = -1;
-}
-#endif
-
-static void vmx_sched_in(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
-{
- if (!kvm_pause_in_guest(vcpu->kvm))
- shrink_ple_window(vcpu);
-}
-
-static void vmx_slot_enable_log_dirty(struct kvm *kvm,
- struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
-{
- kvm_mmu_slot_leaf_clear_dirty(kvm, slot);
- kvm_mmu_slot_largepage_remove_write_access(kvm, slot);
-}
-
-static void vmx_slot_disable_log_dirty(struct kvm *kvm,
- struct kvm_memory_slot *slot)
-{
- kvm_mmu_slot_set_dirty(kvm, slot);
-}
-
-static void vmx_flush_log_dirty(struct kvm *kvm)
-{
- kvm_flush_pml_buffers(kvm);
-}
-
-static int vmx_write_pml_buffer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct vmcs12 *vmcs12;
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- gpa_t gpa, dst;
-
- if (is_guest_mode(vcpu)) {
- WARN_ON_ONCE(vmx->nested.pml_full);
-
- /*
- * Check if PML is enabled for the nested guest.
- * Whether eptp bit 6 is set is already checked
- * as part of A/D emulation.
- */
- vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
- if (!nested_cpu_has_pml(vmcs12))
- return 0;
-
- if (vmcs12->guest_pml_index >= PML_ENTITY_NUM) {
- vmx->nested.pml_full = true;
- return 1;
- }
-
- gpa = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS) & ~0xFFFull;
- dst = vmcs12->pml_address + sizeof(u64) * vmcs12->guest_pml_index;
-
- if (kvm_write_guest_page(vcpu->kvm, gpa_to_gfn(dst), &gpa,
- offset_in_page(dst), sizeof(gpa)))
- return 0;
-
- vmcs12->guest_pml_index--;
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void vmx_enable_log_dirty_pt_masked(struct kvm *kvm,
- struct kvm_memory_slot *memslot,
- gfn_t offset, unsigned long mask)
-{
- kvm_mmu_clear_dirty_pt_masked(kvm, memslot, offset, mask);
-}
-
-static void __pi_post_block(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- struct pi_desc *pi_desc = vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu);
- struct pi_desc old, new;
- unsigned int dest;
-
- do {
- old.control = new.control = pi_desc->control;
- WARN(old.nv != POSTED_INTR_WAKEUP_VECTOR,
- "Wakeup handler not enabled while the VCPU is blocked\n");
-
- dest = cpu_physical_id(vcpu->cpu);
-
- if (x2apic_enabled())
- new.ndst = dest;
- else
- new.ndst = (dest << 8) & 0xFF00;
-
- /* set 'NV' to 'notification vector' */
- new.nv = POSTED_INTR_VECTOR;
- } while (cmpxchg64(&pi_desc->control, old.control,
- new.control) != old.control);
-
- if (!WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu->pre_pcpu == -1)) {
- spin_lock(&per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu_lock, vcpu->pre_pcpu));
- list_del(&vcpu->blocked_vcpu_list);
- spin_unlock(&per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu_lock, vcpu->pre_pcpu));
- vcpu->pre_pcpu = -1;
- }
-}
-
-/*
- * This routine does the following things for vCPU which is going
- * to be blocked if VT-d PI is enabled.
- * - Store the vCPU to the wakeup list, so when interrupts happen
- * we can find the right vCPU to wake up.
- * - Change the Posted-interrupt descriptor as below:
- * 'NDST' <-- vcpu->pre_pcpu
- * 'NV' <-- POSTED_INTR_WAKEUP_VECTOR
- * - If 'ON' is set during this process, which means at least one
- * interrupt is posted for this vCPU, we cannot block it, in
- * this case, return 1, otherwise, return 0.
- *
- */
-static int pi_pre_block(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- unsigned int dest;
- struct pi_desc old, new;
- struct pi_desc *pi_desc = vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu);
-
- if (!kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(vcpu->kvm) ||
- !irq_remapping_cap(IRQ_POSTING_CAP) ||
- !kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
- return 0;
-
- WARN_ON(irqs_disabled());
- local_irq_disable();
- if (!WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu->pre_pcpu != -1)) {
- vcpu->pre_pcpu = vcpu->cpu;
- spin_lock(&per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu_lock, vcpu->pre_pcpu));
- list_add_tail(&vcpu->blocked_vcpu_list,
- &per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu,
- vcpu->pre_pcpu));
- spin_unlock(&per_cpu(blocked_vcpu_on_cpu_lock, vcpu->pre_pcpu));
- }
-
- do {
- old.control = new.control = pi_desc->control;
-
- WARN((pi_desc->sn == 1),
- "Warning: SN field of posted-interrupts "
- "is set before blocking\n");
-
- /*
- * Since vCPU can be preempted during this process,
- * vcpu->cpu could be different with pre_pcpu, we
- * need to set pre_pcpu as the destination of wakeup
- * notification event, then we can find the right vCPU
- * to wakeup in wakeup handler if interrupts happen
- * when the vCPU is in blocked state.
- */
- dest = cpu_physical_id(vcpu->pre_pcpu);
-
- if (x2apic_enabled())
- new.ndst = dest;
- else
- new.ndst = (dest << 8) & 0xFF00;
-
- /* set 'NV' to 'wakeup vector' */
- new.nv = POSTED_INTR_WAKEUP_VECTOR;
- } while (cmpxchg64(&pi_desc->control, old.control,
- new.control) != old.control);
-
- /* We should not block the vCPU if an interrupt is posted for it. */
- if (pi_test_on(pi_desc) == 1)
- __pi_post_block(vcpu);
-
- local_irq_enable();
- return (vcpu->pre_pcpu == -1);
-}
-
-static int vmx_pre_block(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- if (pi_pre_block(vcpu))
- return 1;
-
- if (kvm_lapic_hv_timer_in_use(vcpu))
- kvm_lapic_switch_to_sw_timer(vcpu);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-static void pi_post_block(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- if (vcpu->pre_pcpu == -1)
- return;
-
- WARN_ON(irqs_disabled());
- local_irq_disable();
- __pi_post_block(vcpu);
- local_irq_enable();
-}
-
-static void vmx_post_block(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- if (kvm_x86_ops->set_hv_timer)
- kvm_lapic_switch_to_hv_timer(vcpu);
-
- pi_post_block(vcpu);
-}
-
-/*
- * vmx_update_pi_irte - set IRTE for Posted-Interrupts
- *
- * @kvm: kvm
- * @host_irq: host irq of the interrupt
- * @guest_irq: gsi of the interrupt
- * @set: set or unset PI
- * returns 0 on success, < 0 on failure
- */
-static int vmx_update_pi_irte(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int host_irq,
- uint32_t guest_irq, bool set)
-{
- struct kvm_kernel_irq_routing_entry *e;
- struct kvm_irq_routing_table *irq_rt;
- struct kvm_lapic_irq irq;
- struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu;
- struct vcpu_data vcpu_info;
- int idx, ret = 0;
-
- if (!kvm_arch_has_assigned_device(kvm) ||
- !irq_remapping_cap(IRQ_POSTING_CAP) ||
- !kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(kvm->vcpus[0]))
- return 0;
-
- idx = srcu_read_lock(&kvm->irq_srcu);
- irq_rt = srcu_dereference(kvm->irq_routing, &kvm->irq_srcu);
- if (guest_irq >= irq_rt->nr_rt_entries ||
- hlist_empty(&irq_rt->map[guest_irq])) {
- pr_warn_once("no route for guest_irq %u/%u (broken user space?)\n",
- guest_irq, irq_rt->nr_rt_entries);
- goto out;
- }
-
- hlist_for_each_entry(e, &irq_rt->map[guest_irq], link) {
- if (e->type != KVM_IRQ_ROUTING_MSI)
- continue;
- /*
- * VT-d PI cannot support posting multicast/broadcast
- * interrupts to a vCPU, we still use interrupt remapping
- * for these kind of interrupts.
- *
- * For lowest-priority interrupts, we only support
- * those with single CPU as the destination, e.g. user
- * configures the interrupts via /proc/irq or uses
- * irqbalance to make the interrupts single-CPU.
- *
- * We will support full lowest-priority interrupt later.
- *
- * In addition, we can only inject generic interrupts using
- * the PI mechanism, refuse to route others through it.
- */
-
- kvm_set_msi_irq(kvm, e, &irq);
- if (!kvm_intr_is_single_vcpu(kvm, &irq, &vcpu) ||
- !kvm_irq_is_postable(&irq)) {
- /*
- * Make sure the IRTE is in remapped mode if
- * we don't handle it in posted mode.
- */
- ret = irq_set_vcpu_affinity(host_irq, NULL);
- if (ret < 0) {
- printk(KERN_INFO
- "failed to back to remapped mode, irq: %u\n",
- host_irq);
- goto out;
- }
-
- continue;
- }
-
- vcpu_info.pi_desc_addr = __pa(vcpu_to_pi_desc(vcpu));
- vcpu_info.vector = irq.vector;
-
- trace_kvm_pi_irte_update(host_irq, vcpu->vcpu_id, e->gsi,
- vcpu_info.vector, vcpu_info.pi_desc_addr, set);
-
- if (set)
- ret = irq_set_vcpu_affinity(host_irq, &vcpu_info);
- else
- ret = irq_set_vcpu_affinity(host_irq, NULL);
-
- if (ret < 0) {
- printk(KERN_INFO "%s: failed to update PI IRTE\n",
- __func__);
- goto out;
- }
- }
-
- ret = 0;
-out:
- srcu_read_unlock(&kvm->irq_srcu, idx);
- return ret;
-}
-
-static void vmx_setup_mce(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- if (vcpu->arch.mcg_cap & MCG_LMCE_P)
- to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits |=
- FEATURE_CONTROL_LMCE;
- else
- to_vmx(vcpu)->msr_ia32_feature_control_valid_bits &=
- ~FEATURE_CONTROL_LMCE;
-}
-
-static int vmx_smi_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- /* we need a nested vmexit to enter SMM, postpone if run is pending */
- if (to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.nested_run_pending)
- return 0;
- return 1;
-}
-
-static int vmx_pre_enter_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, char *smstate)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
-
- vmx->nested.smm.guest_mode = is_guest_mode(vcpu);
- if (vmx->nested.smm.guest_mode)
- nested_vmx_vmexit(vcpu, -1, 0, 0);
-
- vmx->nested.smm.vmxon = vmx->nested.vmxon;
- vmx->nested.vmxon = false;
- vmx_clear_hlt(vcpu);
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int vmx_pre_leave_smm(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, const char *smstate)
-{
- struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
- int ret;
-
- if (vmx->nested.smm.vmxon) {
- vmx->nested.vmxon = true;
- vmx->nested.smm.vmxon = false;
- }
-
- if (vmx->nested.smm.guest_mode) {
- ret = nested_vmx_enter_non_root_mode(vcpu, false);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
-
- vmx->nested.smm.guest_mode = false;
- }
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int enable_smi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static bool vmx_need_emulation_on_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- return false;
-}
-
-static bool vmx_apic_init_signal_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
-{
- return to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.vmxon;
-}
-
-static __init int hardware_setup(void)
-{
- unsigned long host_bndcfgs;
- struct desc_ptr dt;
- int r, i;
-
- rdmsrl_safe(MSR_EFER, &host_efer);
-
- store_idt(&dt);
- host_idt_base = dt.address;
-
- for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(vmx_msr_index); ++i)
- kvm_define_shared_msr(i, vmx_msr_index[i]);
-
- if (setup_vmcs_config(&vmcs_config, &vmx_capability) < 0)
- return -EIO;
-
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_NX))
- kvm_enable_efer_bits(EFER_NX);
-
- if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_MPX)) {
- rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_BNDCFGS, host_bndcfgs);
- WARN_ONCE(host_bndcfgs, "KVM: BNDCFGS in host will be lost");
- }
-
- if (!cpu_has_vmx_vpid() || !cpu_has_vmx_invvpid() ||
- !(cpu_has_vmx_invvpid_single() || cpu_has_vmx_invvpid_global()))
- enable_vpid = 0;
-
- if (!cpu_has_vmx_ept() ||
- !cpu_has_vmx_ept_4levels() ||
- !cpu_has_vmx_ept_mt_wb() ||
- !cpu_has_vmx_invept_global())
- enable_ept = 0;
-
- if (!cpu_has_vmx_ept_ad_bits() || !enable_ept)
- enable_ept_ad_bits = 0;
-
- if (!cpu_has_vmx_unrestricted_guest() || !enable_ept)
- enable_unrestricted_guest = 0;
-
- if (!cpu_has_vmx_flexpriority())
- flexpriority_enabled = 0;
-
- if (!cpu_has_virtual_nmis())
- enable_vnmi = 0;
-
- /*
- * set_apic_access_page_addr() is used to reload apic access
- * page upon invalidation. No need to do anything if not
- * using the APIC_ACCESS_ADDR VMCS field.
- */
- if (!flexpriority_enabled)
- kvm_x86_ops->set_apic_access_page_addr = NULL;
-
- if (!cpu_has_vmx_tpr_shadow())
- kvm_x86_ops->update_cr8_intercept = NULL;
-
- if (enable_ept && !cpu_has_vmx_ept_2m_page())
- kvm_disable_largepages();
-
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV)
- if (ms_hyperv.nested_features & HV_X64_NESTED_GUEST_MAPPING_FLUSH
- && enable_ept) {
- kvm_x86_ops->tlb_remote_flush = hv_remote_flush_tlb;
- kvm_x86_ops->tlb_remote_flush_with_range =
- hv_remote_flush_tlb_with_range;
- }
-#endif
-
- if (!cpu_has_vmx_ple()) {
- ple_gap = 0;
- ple_window = 0;
- ple_window_grow = 0;
- ple_window_max = 0;
- ple_window_shrink = 0;
- }
-
- if (!cpu_has_vmx_apicv()) {
- enable_apicv = 0;
- kvm_x86_ops->sync_pir_to_irr = NULL;
- }
-
- if (cpu_has_vmx_tsc_scaling()) {
- kvm_has_tsc_control = true;
- kvm_max_tsc_scaling_ratio = KVM_VMX_TSC_MULTIPLIER_MAX;
- kvm_tsc_scaling_ratio_frac_bits = 48;
- }
-
- set_bit(0, vmx_vpid_bitmap); /* 0 is reserved for host */
-
- if (enable_ept)
- vmx_enable_tdp();
- else
- kvm_disable_tdp();
-
- /*
- * Only enable PML when hardware supports PML feature, and both EPT
- * and EPT A/D bit features are enabled -- PML depends on them to work.
- */
- if (!enable_ept || !enable_ept_ad_bits || !cpu_has_vmx_pml())
- enable_pml = 0;
-
- if (!enable_pml) {
- kvm_x86_ops->slot_enable_log_dirty = NULL;
- kvm_x86_ops->slot_disable_log_dirty = NULL;
- kvm_x86_ops->flush_log_dirty = NULL;
- kvm_x86_ops->enable_log_dirty_pt_masked = NULL;
- }
-
- if (!cpu_has_vmx_preemption_timer())
- enable_preemption_timer = false;
-
- if (enable_preemption_timer) {
- u64 use_timer_freq = 5000ULL * 1000 * 1000;
- u64 vmx_msr;
-
- rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_VMX_MISC, vmx_msr);
- cpu_preemption_timer_multi =
- vmx_msr & VMX_MISC_PREEMPTION_TIMER_RATE_MASK;
-
- if (tsc_khz)
- use_timer_freq = (u64)tsc_khz * 1000;
- use_timer_freq >>= cpu_preemption_timer_multi;
-
- /*
- * KVM "disables" the preemption timer by setting it to its max
- * value. Don't use the timer if it might cause spurious exits
- * at a rate faster than 0.1 Hz (of uninterrupted guest time).
- */
- if (use_timer_freq > 0xffffffffu / 10)
- enable_preemption_timer = false;
- }
-
- if (!enable_preemption_timer) {
- kvm_x86_ops->set_hv_timer = NULL;
- kvm_x86_ops->cancel_hv_timer = NULL;
- kvm_x86_ops->request_immediate_exit = __kvm_request_immediate_exit;
- }
-
- kvm_set_posted_intr_wakeup_handler(wakeup_handler);
-
- kvm_mce_cap_supported |= MCG_LMCE_P;
-
- if (pt_mode != PT_MODE_SYSTEM && pt_mode != PT_MODE_HOST_GUEST)
- return -EINVAL;
- if (!enable_ept || !cpu_has_vmx_intel_pt())
- pt_mode = PT_MODE_SYSTEM;
-
- if (nested) {
- nested_vmx_setup_ctls_msrs(&vmcs_config.nested,
- vmx_capability.ept, enable_apicv);
-
- r = nested_vmx_hardware_setup(kvm_vmx_exit_handlers);
- if (r)
- return r;
- }
-
- r = alloc_kvm_area();
- if (r)
- nested_vmx_hardware_unsetup();
- return r;
-}
-
-static __exit void hardware_unsetup(void)
-{
- if (nested)
- nested_vmx_hardware_unsetup();
-
- free_kvm_area();
-}
-
-static struct kvm_x86_ops vmx_x86_ops __ro_after_init = {
- .cpu_has_kvm_support = cpu_has_kvm_support,
- .disabled_by_bios = vmx_disabled_by_bios,
- .hardware_setup = hardware_setup,
- .hardware_unsetup = hardware_unsetup,
- .check_processor_compatibility = vmx_check_processor_compat,
- .hardware_enable = hardware_enable,
- .hardware_disable = hardware_disable,
- .cpu_has_accelerated_tpr = report_flexpriority,
- .has_emulated_msr = vmx_has_emulated_msr,
-
- .vm_init = vmx_vm_init,
- .vm_alloc = vmx_vm_alloc,
- .vm_free = vmx_vm_free,
-
- .vcpu_create = vmx_create_vcpu,
- .vcpu_free = vmx_free_vcpu,
- .vcpu_reset = vmx_vcpu_reset,
-
- .prepare_guest_switch = vmx_prepare_switch_to_guest,
- .vcpu_load = vmx_vcpu_load,
- .vcpu_put = vmx_vcpu_put,
-
- .update_bp_intercept = update_exception_bitmap,
- .get_msr_feature = vmx_get_msr_feature,
- .get_msr = vmx_get_msr,
- .set_msr = vmx_set_msr,
- .get_segment_base = vmx_get_segment_base,
- .get_segment = vmx_get_segment,
- .set_segment = vmx_set_segment,
- .get_cpl = vmx_get_cpl,
- .get_cs_db_l_bits = vmx_get_cs_db_l_bits,
- .decache_cr0_guest_bits = vmx_decache_cr0_guest_bits,
- .decache_cr4_guest_bits = vmx_decache_cr4_guest_bits,
- .set_cr0 = vmx_set_cr0,
- .set_cr3 = vmx_set_cr3,
- .set_cr4 = vmx_set_cr4,
- .set_efer = vmx_set_efer,
- .get_idt = vmx_get_idt,
- .set_idt = vmx_set_idt,
- .get_gdt = vmx_get_gdt,
- .set_gdt = vmx_set_gdt,
- .get_dr6 = vmx_get_dr6,
- .set_dr6 = vmx_set_dr6,
- .set_dr7 = vmx_set_dr7,
- .sync_dirty_debug_regs = vmx_sync_dirty_debug_regs,
- .cache_reg = vmx_cache_reg,
- .get_rflags = vmx_get_rflags,
- .set_rflags = vmx_set_rflags,
-
- .tlb_flush = vmx_flush_tlb,
- .tlb_flush_gva = vmx_flush_tlb_gva,
-
- .run = vmx_vcpu_run,
- .handle_exit = vmx_handle_exit,
- .skip_emulated_instruction = skip_emulated_instruction,
- .set_interrupt_shadow = vmx_set_interrupt_shadow,
- .get_interrupt_shadow = vmx_get_interrupt_shadow,
- .patch_hypercall = vmx_patch_hypercall,
- .set_irq = vmx_inject_irq,
- .set_nmi = vmx_inject_nmi,
- .queue_exception = vmx_queue_exception,
- .cancel_injection = vmx_cancel_injection,
- .interrupt_allowed = vmx_interrupt_allowed,
- .nmi_allowed = vmx_nmi_allowed,
- .get_nmi_mask = vmx_get_nmi_mask,
- .set_nmi_mask = vmx_set_nmi_mask,
- .enable_nmi_window = enable_nmi_window,
- .enable_irq_window = enable_irq_window,
- .update_cr8_intercept = update_cr8_intercept,
- .set_virtual_apic_mode = vmx_set_virtual_apic_mode,
- .set_apic_access_page_addr = vmx_set_apic_access_page_addr,
- .get_enable_apicv = vmx_get_enable_apicv,
- .refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl = vmx_refresh_apicv_exec_ctrl,
- .load_eoi_exitmap = vmx_load_eoi_exitmap,
- .apicv_post_state_restore = vmx_apicv_post_state_restore,
- .hwapic_irr_update = vmx_hwapic_irr_update,
- .hwapic_isr_update = vmx_hwapic_isr_update,
- .guest_apic_has_interrupt = vmx_guest_apic_has_interrupt,
- .sync_pir_to_irr = vmx_sync_pir_to_irr,
- .deliver_posted_interrupt = vmx_deliver_posted_interrupt,
- .dy_apicv_has_pending_interrupt = vmx_dy_apicv_has_pending_interrupt,
-
- .set_tss_addr = vmx_set_tss_addr,
- .set_identity_map_addr = vmx_set_identity_map_addr,
- .get_tdp_level = get_ept_level,
- .get_mt_mask = vmx_get_mt_mask,
-
- .get_exit_info = vmx_get_exit_info,
-
- .get_lpage_level = vmx_get_lpage_level,
-
- .cpuid_update = vmx_cpuid_update,
-
- .rdtscp_supported = vmx_rdtscp_supported,
- .invpcid_supported = vmx_invpcid_supported,
-
- .set_supported_cpuid = vmx_set_supported_cpuid,
-
- .has_wbinvd_exit = cpu_has_vmx_wbinvd_exit,
-
- .read_l1_tsc_offset = vmx_read_l1_tsc_offset,
- .write_l1_tsc_offset = vmx_write_l1_tsc_offset,
-
- .set_tdp_cr3 = vmx_set_cr3,
-
- .check_intercept = vmx_check_intercept,
- .handle_exit_irqoff = vmx_handle_exit_irqoff,
- .mpx_supported = vmx_mpx_supported,
- .xsaves_supported = vmx_xsaves_supported,
- .umip_emulated = vmx_umip_emulated,
- .pt_supported = vmx_pt_supported,
-
- .request_immediate_exit = vmx_request_immediate_exit,
-
- .sched_in = vmx_sched_in,
-
- .slot_enable_log_dirty = vmx_slot_enable_log_dirty,
- .slot_disable_log_dirty = vmx_slot_disable_log_dirty,
- .flush_log_dirty = vmx_flush_log_dirty,
- .enable_log_dirty_pt_masked = vmx_enable_log_dirty_pt_masked,
- .write_log_dirty = vmx_write_pml_buffer,
-
- .pre_block = vmx_pre_block,
- .post_block = vmx_post_block,
-
- .pmu_ops = &intel_pmu_ops,
-
- .update_pi_irte = vmx_update_pi_irte,
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
- .set_hv_timer = vmx_set_hv_timer,
- .cancel_hv_timer = vmx_cancel_hv_timer,
-#endif
-
- .setup_mce = vmx_setup_mce,
-
- .smi_allowed = vmx_smi_allowed,
- .pre_enter_smm = vmx_pre_enter_smm,
- .pre_leave_smm = vmx_pre_leave_smm,
- .enable_smi_window = enable_smi_window,
-
- .check_nested_events = NULL,
- .get_nested_state = NULL,
- .set_nested_state = NULL,
- .get_vmcs12_pages = NULL,
- .nested_enable_evmcs = NULL,
- .nested_get_evmcs_version = NULL,
- .need_emulation_on_page_fault = vmx_need_emulation_on_page_fault,
- .apic_init_signal_blocked = vmx_apic_init_signal_blocked,
-};
-
-static void vmx_cleanup_l1d_flush(void)
-{
- if (vmx_l1d_flush_pages) {
- free_pages((unsigned long)vmx_l1d_flush_pages, L1D_CACHE_ORDER);
- vmx_l1d_flush_pages = NULL;
- }
- /* Restore state so sysfs ignores VMX */
- l1tf_vmx_mitigation = VMENTER_L1D_FLUSH_AUTO;
-}
-
-static void vmx_exit(void)
-{
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE
- RCU_INIT_POINTER(crash_vmclear_loaded_vmcss, NULL);
- synchronize_rcu();
-#endif
-
- kvm_exit();
-
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV)
- if (static_branch_unlikely(&enable_evmcs)) {
- int cpu;
- struct hv_vp_assist_page *vp_ap;
- /*
- * Reset everything to support using non-enlightened VMCS
- * access later (e.g. when we reload the module with
- * enlightened_vmcs=0)
- */
- for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
- vp_ap = hv_get_vp_assist_page(cpu);
-
- if (!vp_ap)
- continue;
-
- vp_ap->nested_control.features.directhypercall = 0;
- vp_ap->current_nested_vmcs = 0;
- vp_ap->enlighten_vmentry = 0;
- }
-
- static_branch_disable(&enable_evmcs);
- }
-#endif
- vmx_cleanup_l1d_flush();
-}
-module_exit(vmx_exit);
-
-static int __init vmx_init(void)
-{
- int r;
-
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_HYPERV)
- /*
- * Enlightened VMCS usage should be recommended and the host needs
- * to support eVMCS v1 or above. We can also disable eVMCS support
- * with module parameter.
- */
- if (enlightened_vmcs &&
- ms_hyperv.hints & HV_X64_ENLIGHTENED_VMCS_RECOMMENDED &&
- (ms_hyperv.nested_features & HV_X64_ENLIGHTENED_VMCS_VERSION) >=
- KVM_EVMCS_VERSION) {
- int cpu;
-
- /* Check that we have assist pages on all online CPUs */
- for_each_online_cpu(cpu) {
- if (!hv_get_vp_assist_page(cpu)) {
- enlightened_vmcs = false;
- break;
- }
- }
-
- if (enlightened_vmcs) {
- pr_info("KVM: vmx: using Hyper-V Enlightened VMCS\n");
- static_branch_enable(&enable_evmcs);
- }
-
- if (ms_hyperv.nested_features & HV_X64_NESTED_DIRECT_FLUSH)
- vmx_x86_ops.enable_direct_tlbflush
- = hv_enable_direct_tlbflush;
-
- } else {
- enlightened_vmcs = false;
- }
-#endif
-
- r = kvm_init(&vmx_x86_ops, sizeof(struct vcpu_vmx),
- __alignof__(struct vcpu_vmx), THIS_MODULE);
- if (r)
- return r;
-
- /*
- * Must be called after kvm_init() so enable_ept is properly set
- * up. Hand the parameter mitigation value in which was stored in
- * the pre module init parser. If no parameter was given, it will
- * contain 'auto' which will be turned into the default 'cond'
- * mitigation mode.
- */
- r = vmx_setup_l1d_flush(vmentry_l1d_flush_param);
- if (r) {
- vmx_exit();
- return r;
- }
-
-#ifdef CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE
- rcu_assign_pointer(crash_vmclear_loaded_vmcss,
- crash_vmclear_local_loaded_vmcss);
-#endif
- vmx_check_vmcs12_offsets();
-
- return 0;
-}
-module_init(vmx_init);
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 019/113] drm/gma500: Fixup fbdev stolen size usage evaluation
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (17 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 018/113] Revert "KVM: VMX: Add non-canonical check on writes to RTIT address MSRs" Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 020/113] brcmfmac: Fix use after free in brcmf_sdio_readframes() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (97 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Paul Kocialkowski, Patrik Jakobsson,
Sasha Levin
From: Paul Kocialkowski <paul.kocialkowski@bootlin.com>
[ Upstream commit fd1a5e521c3c083bb43ea731aae0f8b95f12b9bd ]
psbfb_probe performs an evaluation of the required size from the stolen
GTT memory, but gets it wrong in two distinct ways:
- The resulting size must be page-size-aligned;
- The size to allocate is derived from the surface dimensions, not the fb
dimensions.
When two connectors are connected with different modes, the smallest will
be stored in the fb dimensions, but the size that needs to be allocated must
match the largest (surface) dimensions. This is what is used in the actual
allocation code.
Fix this by correcting the evaluation to conform to the two points above.
It allows correctly switching to 16bpp when one connector is e.g. 1920x1080
and the other is 1024x768.
Signed-off-by: Paul Kocialkowski <paul.kocialkowski@bootlin.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrik Jakobsson <patrik.r.jakobsson@gmail.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20191107153048.843881-1-paul.kocialkowski@bootlin.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/gma500/framebuffer.c | 8 ++++++--
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/gma500/framebuffer.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/gma500/framebuffer.c
index 2eaf1b31c7bd8..ef60bb1971951 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/gma500/framebuffer.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/gma500/framebuffer.c
@@ -533,6 +533,7 @@ static int psbfb_probe(struct drm_fb_helper *helper,
container_of(helper, struct psb_fbdev, psb_fb_helper);
struct drm_device *dev = psb_fbdev->psb_fb_helper.dev;
struct drm_psb_private *dev_priv = dev->dev_private;
+ unsigned int fb_size;
int bytespp;
bytespp = sizes->surface_bpp / 8;
@@ -542,8 +543,11 @@ static int psbfb_probe(struct drm_fb_helper *helper,
/* If the mode will not fit in 32bit then switch to 16bit to get
a console on full resolution. The X mode setting server will
allocate its own 32bit GEM framebuffer */
- if (ALIGN(sizes->fb_width * bytespp, 64) * sizes->fb_height >
- dev_priv->vram_stolen_size) {
+ fb_size = ALIGN(sizes->surface_width * bytespp, 64) *
+ sizes->surface_height;
+ fb_size = ALIGN(fb_size, PAGE_SIZE);
+
+ if (fb_size > dev_priv->vram_stolen_size) {
sizes->surface_bpp = 16;
sizes->surface_depth = 16;
}
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 020/113] brcmfmac: Fix use after free in brcmf_sdio_readframes()
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (18 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 019/113] drm/gma500: Fixup fbdev stolen size usage evaluation Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 021/113] gianfar: Fix TX timestamping with a stacked DSA driver Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (96 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Dan Carpenter, Franky Lin,
Kalle Valo, Sasha Levin
From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
[ Upstream commit 216b44000ada87a63891a8214c347e05a4aea8fe ]
The brcmu_pkt_buf_free_skb() function frees "pkt" so it leads to a
static checker warning:
drivers/net/wireless/broadcom/brcm80211/brcmfmac/sdio.c:1974 brcmf_sdio_readframes()
error: dereferencing freed memory 'pkt'
It looks like there was supposed to be a continue after we free "pkt".
Fixes: 4754fceeb9a6 ("brcmfmac: streamline SDIO read frame routine")
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Acked-by: Franky Lin <franky.lin@broadcom.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/net/wireless/brcm80211/brcmfmac/sdio.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/brcm80211/brcmfmac/sdio.c b/drivers/net/wireless/brcm80211/brcmfmac/sdio.c
index 9954e641c943d..8bb028f740fd8 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/brcm80211/brcmfmac/sdio.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/brcm80211/brcmfmac/sdio.c
@@ -2027,6 +2027,7 @@ static uint brcmf_sdio_readframes(struct brcmf_sdio *bus, uint maxframes)
BRCMF_SDIO_FT_NORMAL)) {
rd->len = 0;
brcmu_pkt_buf_free_skb(pkt);
+ continue;
}
bus->sdcnt.rx_readahead_cnt++;
if (rd->len != roundup(rd_new.len, 16)) {
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 021/113] gianfar: Fix TX timestamping with a stacked DSA driver
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (19 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 020/113] brcmfmac: Fix use after free in brcmf_sdio_readframes() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 022/113] pinctrl: sh-pfc: sh7264: Fix CAN function GPIOs Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (95 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Vladimir Oltean, Richard Cochran,
David S. Miller, Sasha Levin
From: Vladimir Oltean <olteanv@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit c26a2c2ddc0115eb088873f5c309cf46b982f522 ]
The driver wrongly assumes that it is the only entity that can set the
SKBTX_IN_PROGRESS bit of the current skb. Therefore, in the
gfar_clean_tx_ring function, where the TX timestamp is collected if
necessary, the aforementioned bit is used to discriminate whether or not
the TX timestamp should be delivered to the socket's error queue.
But a stacked driver such as a DSA switch can also set the
SKBTX_IN_PROGRESS bit, which is actually exactly what it should do in
order to denote that the hardware timestamping process is undergoing.
Therefore, gianfar would misinterpret the "in progress" bit as being its
own, and deliver a second skb clone in the socket's error queue,
completely throwing off a PTP process which is not expecting to receive
it, _even though_ TX timestamping is not enabled for gianfar.
There have been discussions [0] as to whether non-MAC drivers need or
not to set SKBTX_IN_PROGRESS at all (whose purpose is to avoid sending 2
timestamps, a sw and a hw one, to applications which only expect one).
But as of this patch, there are at least 2 PTP drivers that would break
in conjunction with gianfar: the sja1105 DSA switch and the felix
switch, by way of its ocelot core driver.
So regardless of that conclusion, fix the gianfar driver to not do stuff
based on flags set by others and not intended for it.
[0]: https://www.spinics.net/lists/netdev/msg619699.html
Fixes: f0ee7acfcdd4 ("gianfar: Add hardware TX timestamping support")
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Oltean <olteanv@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/gianfar.c | 10 +++++++---
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/gianfar.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/gianfar.c
index 2d61369f586f7..37cc1f838dd8b 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/gianfar.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/gianfar.c
@@ -2679,13 +2679,17 @@ static void gfar_clean_tx_ring(struct gfar_priv_tx_q *tx_queue)
skb_dirtytx = tx_queue->skb_dirtytx;
while ((skb = tx_queue->tx_skbuff[skb_dirtytx])) {
+ bool do_tstamp;
+
+ do_tstamp = (skb_shinfo(skb)->tx_flags & SKBTX_HW_TSTAMP) &&
+ priv->hwts_tx_en;
frags = skb_shinfo(skb)->nr_frags;
/* When time stamping, one additional TxBD must be freed.
* Also, we need to dma_unmap_single() the TxPAL.
*/
- if (unlikely(skb_shinfo(skb)->tx_flags & SKBTX_IN_PROGRESS))
+ if (unlikely(do_tstamp))
nr_txbds = frags + 2;
else
nr_txbds = frags + 1;
@@ -2699,7 +2703,7 @@ static void gfar_clean_tx_ring(struct gfar_priv_tx_q *tx_queue)
(lstatus & BD_LENGTH_MASK))
break;
- if (unlikely(skb_shinfo(skb)->tx_flags & SKBTX_IN_PROGRESS)) {
+ if (unlikely(do_tstamp)) {
next = next_txbd(bdp, base, tx_ring_size);
buflen = be16_to_cpu(next->length) +
GMAC_FCB_LEN + GMAC_TXPAL_LEN;
@@ -2709,7 +2713,7 @@ static void gfar_clean_tx_ring(struct gfar_priv_tx_q *tx_queue)
dma_unmap_single(priv->dev, be32_to_cpu(bdp->bufPtr),
buflen, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
- if (unlikely(skb_shinfo(skb)->tx_flags & SKBTX_IN_PROGRESS)) {
+ if (unlikely(do_tstamp)) {
struct skb_shared_hwtstamps shhwtstamps;
u64 *ns = (u64 *)(((uintptr_t)skb->data + 0x10) &
~0x7UL);
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 022/113] pinctrl: sh-pfc: sh7264: Fix CAN function GPIOs
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (20 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 021/113] gianfar: Fix TX timestamping with a stacked DSA driver Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 023/113] media: i2c: mt9v032: fix enum mbus codes and frame sizes Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (94 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Geert Uytterhoeven, Sasha Levin
From: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
[ Upstream commit 55b1cb1f03ad5eea39897d0c74035e02deddcff2 ]
pinmux_func_gpios[] contains a hole due to the missing function GPIO
definition for the "CTX0&CTX1" signal, which is the logical "AND" of the
two CAN outputs.
Fix this by:
- Renaming CRX0_CRX1_MARK to CTX0_CTX1_MARK, as PJ2MD[2:0]=010
configures the combined "CTX0&CTX1" output signal,
- Renaming CRX0X1_MARK to CRX0_CRX1_MARK, as PJ3MD[1:0]=10 configures
the shared "CRX0/CRX1" input signal, which is fed to both CAN
inputs,
- Adding the missing function GPIO definition for "CTX0&CTX1" to
pinmux_func_gpios[],
- Moving all CAN enums next to each other.
See SH7262 Group, SH7264 Group User's Manual: Hardware, Rev. 4.00:
[1] Figure 1.2 (3) (Pin Assignment for the SH7264 Group (1-Mbyte
Version),
[2] Figure 1.2 (4) Pin Assignment for the SH7264 Group (640-Kbyte
Version,
[3] Table 1.4 List of Pins,
[4] Figure 20.29 Connection Example when Using This Module as 1-Channel
Module (64 Mailboxes x 1 Channel),
[5] Table 32.10 Multiplexed Pins (Port J),
[6] Section 32.2.30 (3) Port J Control Register 0 (PJCR0).
Note that the last 2 disagree about PJ2MD[2:0], which is probably the
root cause of this bug. But considering [4], "CTx0&CTx1" in [5] must
be correct, and "CRx0&CRx1" in [6] must be wrong.
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191218194812.12741-4-geert+renesas@glider.be
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/pinctrl/sh-pfc/pfc-sh7264.c | 9 ++++-----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/pinctrl/sh-pfc/pfc-sh7264.c b/drivers/pinctrl/sh-pfc/pfc-sh7264.c
index e1c34e19222ee..3ddb9565ed804 100644
--- a/drivers/pinctrl/sh-pfc/pfc-sh7264.c
+++ b/drivers/pinctrl/sh-pfc/pfc-sh7264.c
@@ -500,17 +500,15 @@ enum {
SD_WP_MARK, SD_CLK_MARK, SD_CMD_MARK,
CRX0_MARK, CRX1_MARK,
CTX0_MARK, CTX1_MARK,
+ CRX0_CRX1_MARK, CTX0_CTX1_MARK,
PWM1A_MARK, PWM1B_MARK, PWM1C_MARK, PWM1D_MARK,
PWM1E_MARK, PWM1F_MARK, PWM1G_MARK, PWM1H_MARK,
PWM2A_MARK, PWM2B_MARK, PWM2C_MARK, PWM2D_MARK,
PWM2E_MARK, PWM2F_MARK, PWM2G_MARK, PWM2H_MARK,
IERXD_MARK, IETXD_MARK,
- CRX0_CRX1_MARK,
WDTOVF_MARK,
- CRX0X1_MARK,
-
/* DMAC */
TEND0_MARK, DACK0_MARK, DREQ0_MARK,
TEND1_MARK, DACK1_MARK, DREQ1_MARK,
@@ -998,12 +996,12 @@ static const u16 pinmux_data[] = {
PINMUX_DATA(PJ3_DATA, PJ3MD_00),
PINMUX_DATA(CRX1_MARK, PJ3MD_01),
- PINMUX_DATA(CRX0X1_MARK, PJ3MD_10),
+ PINMUX_DATA(CRX0_CRX1_MARK, PJ3MD_10),
PINMUX_DATA(IRQ1_PJ_MARK, PJ3MD_11),
PINMUX_DATA(PJ2_DATA, PJ2MD_000),
PINMUX_DATA(CTX1_MARK, PJ2MD_001),
- PINMUX_DATA(CRX0_CRX1_MARK, PJ2MD_010),
+ PINMUX_DATA(CTX0_CTX1_MARK, PJ2MD_010),
PINMUX_DATA(CS2_MARK, PJ2MD_011),
PINMUX_DATA(SCK0_MARK, PJ2MD_100),
PINMUX_DATA(LCD_M_DISP_MARK, PJ2MD_101),
@@ -1248,6 +1246,7 @@ static const struct pinmux_func pinmux_func_gpios[] = {
GPIO_FN(CTX1),
GPIO_FN(CRX1),
GPIO_FN(CTX0),
+ GPIO_FN(CTX0_CTX1),
GPIO_FN(CRX0),
GPIO_FN(CRX0_CRX1),
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 023/113] media: i2c: mt9v032: fix enum mbus codes and frame sizes
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (21 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 022/113] pinctrl: sh-pfc: sh7264: Fix CAN function GPIOs Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 024/113] media: sti: bdisp: fix a possible sleep-in-atomic-context bug in bdisp_device_run() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (93 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Wenyou Yang, Eugen Hristev,
Laurent Pinchart, Sakari Ailus, Mauro Carvalho Chehab,
Sasha Levin
From: Eugen Hristev <eugen.hristev@microchip.com>
[ Upstream commit 1451d5ae351d938a0ab1677498c893f17b9ee21d ]
This driver supports both the mt9v032 (color) and the mt9v022 (mono)
sensors. Depending on which sensor is used, the format from the sensor is
different. The format.code inside the dev struct holds this information.
The enum mbus and enum frame sizes need to take into account both type of
sensors, not just the color one. To solve this, use the format.code in
these functions instead of the hardcoded bayer color format (which is only
used for mt9v032).
[Sakari Ailus: rewrapped commit message]
Suggested-by: Wenyou Yang <wenyou.yang@microchip.com>
Signed-off-by: Eugen Hristev <eugen.hristev@microchip.com>
Reviewed-by: Laurent Pinchart <laurent.pinchart@ideasonboard.com>
Signed-off-by: Sakari Ailus <sakari.ailus@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/media/i2c/mt9v032.c | 10 ++++++++--
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/media/i2c/mt9v032.c b/drivers/media/i2c/mt9v032.c
index a68ce94ee0976..cacdab30fece0 100644
--- a/drivers/media/i2c/mt9v032.c
+++ b/drivers/media/i2c/mt9v032.c
@@ -454,10 +454,12 @@ static int mt9v032_enum_mbus_code(struct v4l2_subdev *subdev,
struct v4l2_subdev_pad_config *cfg,
struct v4l2_subdev_mbus_code_enum *code)
{
+ struct mt9v032 *mt9v032 = to_mt9v032(subdev);
+
if (code->index > 0)
return -EINVAL;
- code->code = MEDIA_BUS_FMT_SGRBG10_1X10;
+ code->code = mt9v032->format.code;
return 0;
}
@@ -465,7 +467,11 @@ static int mt9v032_enum_frame_size(struct v4l2_subdev *subdev,
struct v4l2_subdev_pad_config *cfg,
struct v4l2_subdev_frame_size_enum *fse)
{
- if (fse->index >= 3 || fse->code != MEDIA_BUS_FMT_SGRBG10_1X10)
+ struct mt9v032 *mt9v032 = to_mt9v032(subdev);
+
+ if (fse->index >= 3)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (mt9v032->format.code != fse->code)
return -EINVAL;
fse->min_width = MT9V032_WINDOW_WIDTH_DEF / (1 << fse->index);
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 024/113] media: sti: bdisp: fix a possible sleep-in-atomic-context bug in bdisp_device_run()
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (22 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 023/113] media: i2c: mt9v032: fix enum mbus codes and frame sizes Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 025/113] efi/x86: Map the entire EFI vendor string before copying it Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (92 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Jia-Ju Bai, Fabien Dessenne,
Hans Verkuil, Mauro Carvalho Chehab, Sasha Levin
From: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit bb6d42061a05d71dd73f620582d9e09c8fbf7f5b ]
The driver may sleep while holding a spinlock.
The function call path (from bottom to top) in Linux 4.19 is:
drivers/media/platform/sti/bdisp/bdisp-hw.c, 385:
msleep in bdisp_hw_reset
drivers/media/platform/sti/bdisp/bdisp-v4l2.c, 341:
bdisp_hw_reset in bdisp_device_run
drivers/media/platform/sti/bdisp/bdisp-v4l2.c, 317:
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave in bdisp_device_run
To fix this bug, msleep() is replaced with udelay().
This bug is found by a static analysis tool STCheck written by myself.
Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Fabien Dessenne <fabien.dessenne@st.com>
Signed-off-by: Hans Verkuil <hverkuil-cisco@xs4all.nl>
Signed-off-by: Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab+huawei@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/media/platform/sti/bdisp/bdisp-hw.c | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/media/platform/sti/bdisp/bdisp-hw.c b/drivers/media/platform/sti/bdisp/bdisp-hw.c
index 052c932ac9426..0792db43ce9db 100644
--- a/drivers/media/platform/sti/bdisp/bdisp-hw.c
+++ b/drivers/media/platform/sti/bdisp/bdisp-hw.c
@@ -14,8 +14,8 @@
#define MAX_SRC_WIDTH 2048
/* Reset & boot poll config */
-#define POLL_RST_MAX 50
-#define POLL_RST_DELAY_MS 20
+#define POLL_RST_MAX 500
+#define POLL_RST_DELAY_MS 2
enum bdisp_target_plan {
BDISP_RGB,
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ int bdisp_hw_reset(struct bdisp_dev *bdisp)
for (i = 0; i < POLL_RST_MAX; i++) {
if (readl(bdisp->regs + BLT_STA1) & BLT_STA1_IDLE)
break;
- msleep(POLL_RST_DELAY_MS);
+ udelay(POLL_RST_DELAY_MS * 1000);
}
if (i == POLL_RST_MAX)
dev_err(bdisp->dev, "Reset timeout\n");
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 025/113] efi/x86: Map the entire EFI vendor string before copying it
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (23 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 024/113] media: sti: bdisp: fix a possible sleep-in-atomic-context bug in bdisp_device_run() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 026/113] MIPS: Loongson: Fix potential NULL dereference in loongson3_platform_init() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (91 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Ard Biesheuvel, Andy Lutomirski,
Ard Biesheuvel, Arvind Sankar, Matthew Garrett, linux-efi,
Ingo Molnar, Sasha Levin
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit ffc2760bcf2dba0dbef74013ed73eea8310cc52c ]
Fix a couple of issues with the way we map and copy the vendor string:
- we map only 2 bytes, which usually works since you get at least a
page, but if the vendor string happens to cross a page boundary,
a crash will result
- only call early_memunmap() if early_memremap() succeeded, or we will
call it with a NULL address which it doesn't like,
- while at it, switch to early_memremap_ro(), and array indexing rather
than pointer dereferencing to read the CHAR16 characters.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>
Cc: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5b83683f32b1 ("x86: EFI runtime service support")
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200103113953.9571-5-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 13 +++++++------
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
index 4bc352fc08f19..105872617be08 100644
--- a/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
+++ b/arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c
@@ -465,7 +465,6 @@ void __init efi_init(void)
efi_char16_t *c16;
char vendor[100] = "unknown";
int i = 0;
- void *tmp;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
if (boot_params.efi_info.efi_systab_hi ||
@@ -490,14 +489,16 @@ void __init efi_init(void)
/*
* Show what we know for posterity
*/
- c16 = tmp = early_memremap(efi.systab->fw_vendor, 2);
+ c16 = early_memremap_ro(efi.systab->fw_vendor,
+ sizeof(vendor) * sizeof(efi_char16_t));
if (c16) {
- for (i = 0; i < sizeof(vendor) - 1 && *c16; ++i)
- vendor[i] = *c16++;
+ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(vendor) - 1 && c16[i]; ++i)
+ vendor[i] = c16[i];
vendor[i] = '\0';
- } else
+ early_memunmap(c16, sizeof(vendor) * sizeof(efi_char16_t));
+ } else {
pr_err("Could not map the firmware vendor!\n");
- early_memunmap(tmp, 2);
+ }
pr_info("EFI v%u.%.02u by %s\n",
efi.systab->hdr.revision >> 16,
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 026/113] MIPS: Loongson: Fix potential NULL dereference in loongson3_platform_init()
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (24 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 025/113] efi/x86: Map the entire EFI vendor string before copying it Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 027/113] uio: fix a sleep-in-atomic-context bug in uio_dmem_genirq_irqcontrol() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (90 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Tiezhu Yang, Paul Burton,
Ralf Baechle, Huacai Chen, Jiaxun Yang, linux-mips, Sasha Levin
From: Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@loongson.cn>
[ Upstream commit 72d052e28d1d2363f9107be63ef3a3afdea6143c ]
If kzalloc fails, it should return -ENOMEM, otherwise may trigger a NULL
pointer dereference.
Fixes: 3adeb2566b9b ("MIPS: Loongson: Improve LEFI firmware interface")
Signed-off-by: Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@loongson.cn>
Signed-off-by: Paul Burton <paulburton@kernel.org>
Cc: Ralf Baechle <ralf@linux-mips.org>
Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhc@lemote.com>
Cc: Jiaxun Yang <jiaxun.yang@flygoat.com>
Cc: linux-mips@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
arch/mips/loongson64/loongson-3/platform.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/mips/loongson64/loongson-3/platform.c b/arch/mips/loongson64/loongson-3/platform.c
index 25a97cc0ee336..0db4cc3196ebd 100644
--- a/arch/mips/loongson64/loongson-3/platform.c
+++ b/arch/mips/loongson64/loongson-3/platform.c
@@ -31,6 +31,9 @@ static int __init loongson3_platform_init(void)
continue;
pdev = kzalloc(sizeof(struct platform_device), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!pdev)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
pdev->name = loongson_sysconf.sensors[i].name;
pdev->id = loongson_sysconf.sensors[i].id;
pdev->dev.platform_data = &loongson_sysconf.sensors[i];
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 027/113] uio: fix a sleep-in-atomic-context bug in uio_dmem_genirq_irqcontrol()
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (25 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 026/113] MIPS: Loongson: Fix potential NULL dereference in loongson3_platform_init() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 028/113] usb: gadget: udc: fix possible sleep-in-atomic-context bugs in gr_probe() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (89 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Jia-Ju Bai, Sasha Levin
From: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit b74351287d4bd90636c3f48bc188c2f53824c2d4 ]
The driver may sleep while holding a spinlock.
The function call path (from bottom to top) in Linux 4.19 is:
kernel/irq/manage.c, 523:
synchronize_irq in disable_irq
drivers/uio/uio_dmem_genirq.c, 140:
disable_irq in uio_dmem_genirq_irqcontrol
drivers/uio/uio_dmem_genirq.c, 134:
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave in uio_dmem_genirq_irqcontrol
synchronize_irq() can sleep at runtime.
To fix this bug, disable_irq() is called without holding the spinlock.
This bug is found by a static analysis tool STCheck written by myself.
Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191218094405.6009-1-baijiaju1990@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/uio/uio_dmem_genirq.c | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/uio/uio_dmem_genirq.c b/drivers/uio/uio_dmem_genirq.c
index e1134a4d97f3f..a00b4aee6c799 100644
--- a/drivers/uio/uio_dmem_genirq.c
+++ b/drivers/uio/uio_dmem_genirq.c
@@ -135,11 +135,13 @@ static int uio_dmem_genirq_irqcontrol(struct uio_info *dev_info, s32 irq_on)
if (irq_on) {
if (test_and_clear_bit(0, &priv->flags))
enable_irq(dev_info->irq);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->lock, flags);
} else {
- if (!test_and_set_bit(0, &priv->flags))
+ if (!test_and_set_bit(0, &priv->flags)) {
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->lock, flags);
disable_irq(dev_info->irq);
+ }
}
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->lock, flags);
return 0;
}
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 028/113] usb: gadget: udc: fix possible sleep-in-atomic-context bugs in gr_probe()
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (26 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 027/113] uio: fix a sleep-in-atomic-context bug in uio_dmem_genirq_irqcontrol() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 029/113] nfs: NFS_SWAP should depend on SWAP Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (88 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Jia-Ju Bai, Felipe Balbi, Sasha Levin
From: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit 9c1ed62ae0690dfe5d5e31d8f70e70a95cb48e52 ]
The driver may sleep while holding a spinlock.
The function call path (from bottom to top) in Linux 4.19 is:
drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c, 1175:
kzalloc(GFP_KERNEL) in usb_add_gadget_udc_release
drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c, 1272:
usb_add_gadget_udc_release in usb_add_gadget_udc
drivers/usb/gadget/udc/gr_udc.c, 2186:
usb_add_gadget_udc in gr_probe
drivers/usb/gadget/udc/gr_udc.c, 2183:
spin_lock in gr_probe
drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c, 1195:
mutex_lock in usb_add_gadget_udc_release
drivers/usb/gadget/udc/core.c, 1272:
usb_add_gadget_udc_release in usb_add_gadget_udc
drivers/usb/gadget/udc/gr_udc.c, 2186:
usb_add_gadget_udc in gr_probe
drivers/usb/gadget/udc/gr_udc.c, 2183:
spin_lock in gr_probe
drivers/usb/gadget/udc/gr_udc.c, 212:
debugfs_create_file in gr_probe
drivers/usb/gadget/udc/gr_udc.c, 2197:
gr_dfs_create in gr_probe
drivers/usb/gadget/udc/gr_udc.c, 2183:
spin_lock in gr_probe
drivers/usb/gadget/udc/gr_udc.c, 2114:
devm_request_threaded_irq in gr_request_irq
drivers/usb/gadget/udc/gr_udc.c, 2202:
gr_request_irq in gr_probe
drivers/usb/gadget/udc/gr_udc.c, 2183:
spin_lock in gr_probe
kzalloc(GFP_KERNEL), mutex_lock(), debugfs_create_file() and
devm_request_threaded_irq() can sleep at runtime.
To fix these possible bugs, usb_add_gadget_udc(), gr_dfs_create() and
gr_request_irq() are called without handling the spinlock.
These bugs are found by a static analysis tool STCheck written by myself.
Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Felipe Balbi <balbi@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/usb/gadget/udc/gr_udc.c | 16 +++++++++-------
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/gr_udc.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/gr_udc.c
index b9429bc425116..594639e5cbf82 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/gr_udc.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/udc/gr_udc.c
@@ -2201,8 +2201,6 @@ static int gr_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
return -ENOMEM;
}
- spin_lock(&dev->lock);
-
/* Inside lock so that no gadget can use this udc until probe is done */
retval = usb_add_gadget_udc(dev->dev, &dev->gadget);
if (retval) {
@@ -2211,15 +2209,21 @@ static int gr_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
}
dev->added = 1;
+ spin_lock(&dev->lock);
+
retval = gr_udc_init(dev);
- if (retval)
+ if (retval) {
+ spin_unlock(&dev->lock);
goto out;
-
- gr_dfs_create(dev);
+ }
/* Clear all interrupt enables that might be left on since last boot */
gr_disable_interrupts_and_pullup(dev);
+ spin_unlock(&dev->lock);
+
+ gr_dfs_create(dev);
+
retval = gr_request_irq(dev, dev->irq);
if (retval) {
dev_err(dev->dev, "Failed to request irq %d\n", dev->irq);
@@ -2248,8 +2252,6 @@ static int gr_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
dev_info(dev->dev, "regs: %p, irq %d\n", dev->regs, dev->irq);
out:
- spin_unlock(&dev->lock);
-
if (retval)
gr_remove(pdev);
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 029/113] nfs: NFS_SWAP should depend on SWAP
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (27 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 028/113] usb: gadget: udc: fix possible sleep-in-atomic-context bugs in gr_probe() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 030/113] jbd2: clear JBD2_ABORT flag before journal_reset to update log tail info when load journal Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (87 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Geert Uytterhoeven, Anna Schumaker,
Sasha Levin
From: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
[ Upstream commit 474c4f306eefbb21b67ebd1de802d005c7d7ecdc ]
If CONFIG_SWAP=n, it does not make much sense to offer the user the
option to enable support for swapping over NFS, as that will still fail
at run time:
# swapon /swap
swapon: /swap: swapon failed: Function not implemented
Fix this by adding a dependency on CONFIG_SWAP.
Fixes: a564b8f0398636ba ("nfs: enable swap on NFS")
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
fs/nfs/Kconfig | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/nfs/Kconfig b/fs/nfs/Kconfig
index b1daeafbea920..c3428767332c2 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/Kconfig
+++ b/fs/nfs/Kconfig
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ config NFS_V4
config NFS_SWAP
bool "Provide swap over NFS support"
default n
- depends on NFS_FS
+ depends on NFS_FS && SWAP
select SUNRPC_SWAP
help
This option enables swapon to work on files located on NFS mounts.
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 030/113] jbd2: clear JBD2_ABORT flag before journal_reset to update log tail info when load journal
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (28 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 029/113] nfs: NFS_SWAP should depend on SWAP Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 031/113] tracing: Fix very unlikely race of registering two stat tracers Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (86 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Kai Li, Theodore Tso, Sasha Levin
From: Kai Li <li.kai4@h3c.com>
[ Upstream commit a09decff5c32060639a685581c380f51b14e1fc2 ]
If the journal is dirty when the filesystem is mounted, jbd2 will replay
the journal but the journal superblock will not be updated by
journal_reset() because JBD2_ABORT flag is still set (it was set in
journal_init_common()). This is problematic because when a new transaction
is then committed, it will be recorded in block 1 (journal->j_tail was set
to 1 in journal_reset()). If unclean shutdown happens again before the
journal superblock is updated, the new recorded transaction will not be
replayed during the next mount (because of stale sb->s_start and
sb->s_sequence values) which can lead to filesystem corruption.
Fixes: 85e0c4e89c1b ("jbd2: if the journal is aborted then don't allow update of the log tail")
Signed-off-by: Kai Li <li.kai4@h3c.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200111022542.5008-1-li.kai4@h3c.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
fs/jbd2/journal.c | 6 +++++-
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/jbd2/journal.c b/fs/jbd2/journal.c
index 9398d1b70545c..deb3300299709 100644
--- a/fs/jbd2/journal.c
+++ b/fs/jbd2/journal.c
@@ -1656,6 +1656,11 @@ int jbd2_journal_load(journal_t *journal)
journal->j_devname);
return -EFSCORRUPTED;
}
+ /*
+ * clear JBD2_ABORT flag initialized in journal_init_common
+ * here to update log tail information with the newest seq.
+ */
+ journal->j_flags &= ~JBD2_ABORT;
/* OK, we've finished with the dynamic journal bits:
* reinitialise the dynamic contents of the superblock in memory
@@ -1663,7 +1668,6 @@ int jbd2_journal_load(journal_t *journal)
if (journal_reset(journal))
goto recovery_error;
- journal->j_flags &= ~JBD2_ABORT;
journal->j_flags |= JBD2_LOADED;
return 0;
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 031/113] tracing: Fix very unlikely race of registering two stat tracers
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (29 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 030/113] jbd2: clear JBD2_ABORT flag before journal_reset to update log tail info when load journal Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 032/113] ext4, jbd2: ensure panic when aborting with zero errno Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (85 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Luis Henriques,
Steven Rostedt (VMware),
Sasha Levin
From: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
[ Upstream commit dfb6cd1e654315168e36d947471bd2a0ccd834ae ]
Looking through old emails in my INBOX, I came across a patch from Luis
Henriques that attempted to fix a race of two stat tracers registering the
same stat trace (extremely unlikely, as this is done in the kernel, and
probably doesn't even exist). The submitted patch wasn't quite right as it
needed to deal with clean up a bit better (if two stat tracers were the
same, it would have the same files).
But to make the code cleaner, all we needed to do is to keep the
all_stat_sessions_mutex held for most of the registering function.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1410299375-20068-1-git-send-email-luis.henriques@canonical.com
Fixes: 002bb86d8d42f ("tracing/ftrace: separate events tracing and stats tracing engine")
Reported-by: Luis Henriques <luis.henriques@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
kernel/trace/trace_stat.c | 19 +++++++++----------
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_stat.c b/kernel/trace/trace_stat.c
index 6cf9353167696..a2081a7f0c2cd 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace_stat.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_stat.c
@@ -302,7 +302,7 @@ static int init_stat_file(struct stat_session *session)
int register_stat_tracer(struct tracer_stat *trace)
{
struct stat_session *session, *node;
- int ret;
+ int ret = -EINVAL;
if (!trace)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -313,17 +313,15 @@ int register_stat_tracer(struct tracer_stat *trace)
/* Already registered? */
mutex_lock(&all_stat_sessions_mutex);
list_for_each_entry(node, &all_stat_sessions, session_list) {
- if (node->ts == trace) {
- mutex_unlock(&all_stat_sessions_mutex);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
+ if (node->ts == trace)
+ goto out;
}
- mutex_unlock(&all_stat_sessions_mutex);
+ ret = -ENOMEM;
/* Init the session */
session = kzalloc(sizeof(*session), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!session)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
session->ts = trace;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&session->session_list);
@@ -332,15 +330,16 @@ int register_stat_tracer(struct tracer_stat *trace)
ret = init_stat_file(session);
if (ret) {
destroy_session(session);
- return ret;
+ goto out;
}
+ ret = 0;
/* Register */
- mutex_lock(&all_stat_sessions_mutex);
list_add_tail(&session->session_list, &all_stat_sessions);
+ out:
mutex_unlock(&all_stat_sessions_mutex);
- return 0;
+ return ret;
}
void unregister_stat_tracer(struct tracer_stat *trace)
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 032/113] ext4, jbd2: ensure panic when aborting with zero errno
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (30 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 031/113] tracing: Fix very unlikely race of registering two stat tracers Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 033/113] kconfig: fix broken dependency in randconfig-generated .config Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (84 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, zhangyi (F),
Jan Kara, Theodore Tso, Sasha Levin
From: zhangyi (F) <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
[ Upstream commit 51f57b01e4a3c7d7bdceffd84de35144e8c538e7 ]
JBD2_REC_ERR flag used to indicate the errno has been updated when jbd2
aborted, and then __ext4_abort() and ext4_handle_error() can invoke
panic if ERRORS_PANIC is specified. But if the journal has been aborted
with zero errno, jbd2_journal_abort() didn't set this flag so we can
no longer panic. Fix this by always record the proper errno in the
journal superblock.
Fixes: 4327ba52afd03 ("ext4, jbd2: ensure entering into panic after recording an error in superblock")
Signed-off-by: zhangyi (F) <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191204124614.45424-3-yi.zhang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
fs/jbd2/checkpoint.c | 2 +-
fs/jbd2/journal.c | 15 ++++-----------
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/jbd2/checkpoint.c b/fs/jbd2/checkpoint.c
index 4d5a5a4cc017c..addb0784dd1c4 100644
--- a/fs/jbd2/checkpoint.c
+++ b/fs/jbd2/checkpoint.c
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ void __jbd2_log_wait_for_space(journal_t *journal)
"journal space in %s\n", __func__,
journal->j_devname);
WARN_ON(1);
- jbd2_journal_abort(journal, 0);
+ jbd2_journal_abort(journal, -EIO);
}
write_lock(&journal->j_state_lock);
} else {
diff --git a/fs/jbd2/journal.c b/fs/jbd2/journal.c
index deb3300299709..d62435897d0d0 100644
--- a/fs/jbd2/journal.c
+++ b/fs/jbd2/journal.c
@@ -2086,12 +2086,10 @@ static void __journal_abort_soft (journal_t *journal, int errno)
__jbd2_journal_abort_hard(journal);
- if (errno) {
- jbd2_journal_update_sb_errno(journal);
- write_lock(&journal->j_state_lock);
- journal->j_flags |= JBD2_REC_ERR;
- write_unlock(&journal->j_state_lock);
- }
+ jbd2_journal_update_sb_errno(journal);
+ write_lock(&journal->j_state_lock);
+ journal->j_flags |= JBD2_REC_ERR;
+ write_unlock(&journal->j_state_lock);
}
/**
@@ -2133,11 +2131,6 @@ static void __journal_abort_soft (journal_t *journal, int errno)
* failure to disk. ext3_error, for example, now uses this
* functionality.
*
- * Errors which originate from within the journaling layer will NOT
- * supply an errno; a null errno implies that absolutely no further
- * writes are done to the journal (unless there are any already in
- * progress).
- *
*/
void jbd2_journal_abort(journal_t *journal, int errno)
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 033/113] kconfig: fix broken dependency in randconfig-generated .config
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (31 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 032/113] ext4, jbd2: ensure panic when aborting with zero errno Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 034/113] clk: qcom: rcg2: Dont crash if our parent cant be found; return an error Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (83 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Vincenzo Frascino, Masahiro Yamada,
Sasha Levin
From: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit c8fb7d7e48d11520ad24808cfce7afb7b9c9f798 ]
Running randconfig on arm64 using KCONFIG_SEED=0x40C5E904 (e.g. on v5.5)
produces the .config with CONFIG_EFI=y and CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN=y,
which does not meet the !CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN dependency.
This is because the user choice for CONFIG_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN vs
CONFIG_CPU_BIG_ENDIAN is set by randomize_choice_values() after the
value of CONFIG_EFI is calculated.
When this happens, the has_changed flag should be set.
Currently, it takes the result from the last iteration. It should
accumulate all the results of the loop.
Fixes: 3b9a19e08960 ("kconfig: loop as long as we changed some symbols in randconfig")
Reported-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
scripts/kconfig/confdata.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/scripts/kconfig/confdata.c b/scripts/kconfig/confdata.c
index 138d7f100f7e8..4216940e875df 100644
--- a/scripts/kconfig/confdata.c
+++ b/scripts/kconfig/confdata.c
@@ -1236,7 +1236,7 @@ bool conf_set_all_new_symbols(enum conf_def_mode mode)
sym_calc_value(csym);
if (mode == def_random)
- has_changed = randomize_choice_values(csym);
+ has_changed |= randomize_choice_values(csym);
else {
set_all_choice_values(csym);
has_changed = true;
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 034/113] clk: qcom: rcg2: Dont crash if our parent cant be found; return an error
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (32 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 033/113] kconfig: fix broken dependency in randconfig-generated .config Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 035/113] drm/amdgpu: remove 4 set but not used variable in amdgpu_atombios_get_connector_info_from_object_table Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (82 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Douglas Anderson, Matthias Kaehlcke,
Stephen Boyd, Sasha Levin
From: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
[ Upstream commit 908b050114d8fefdddc57ec9fbc213c3690e7f5f ]
When I got my clock parenting slightly wrong I ended up with a crash
that looked like this:
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual
address 0000000000000000
...
pc : clk_hw_get_rate+0x14/0x44
...
Call trace:
clk_hw_get_rate+0x14/0x44
_freq_tbl_determine_rate+0x94/0xfc
clk_rcg2_determine_rate+0x2c/0x38
clk_core_determine_round_nolock+0x4c/0x88
clk_core_round_rate_nolock+0x6c/0xa8
clk_core_round_rate_nolock+0x9c/0xa8
clk_core_set_rate_nolock+0x70/0x180
clk_set_rate+0x3c/0x6c
of_clk_set_defaults+0x254/0x360
platform_drv_probe+0x28/0xb0
really_probe+0x120/0x2dc
driver_probe_device+0x64/0xfc
device_driver_attach+0x4c/0x6c
__driver_attach+0xac/0xc0
bus_for_each_dev+0x84/0xcc
driver_attach+0x2c/0x38
bus_add_driver+0xfc/0x1d0
driver_register+0x64/0xf8
__platform_driver_register+0x4c/0x58
msm_drm_register+0x5c/0x60
...
It turned out that clk_hw_get_parent_by_index() was returning NULL and
we weren't checking. Let's check it so that we don't crash.
Fixes: ac269395cdd8 ("clk: qcom: Convert to clk_hw based provider APIs")
Signed-off-by: Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Matthias Kaehlcke <mka@chromium.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200203103049.v4.1.I7487325fe8e701a68a07d3be8a6a4b571eca9cfa@changeid
Signed-off-by: Stephen Boyd <sboyd@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/clk/qcom/clk-rcg2.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/clk/qcom/clk-rcg2.c b/drivers/clk/qcom/clk-rcg2.c
index 350a01f748706..8b549ece9f13c 100644
--- a/drivers/clk/qcom/clk-rcg2.c
+++ b/drivers/clk/qcom/clk-rcg2.c
@@ -194,6 +194,9 @@ static int _freq_tbl_determine_rate(struct clk_hw *hw,
clk_flags = clk_hw_get_flags(hw);
p = clk_hw_get_parent_by_index(hw, index);
+ if (!p)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
if (clk_flags & CLK_SET_RATE_PARENT) {
if (f->pre_div) {
if (!rate)
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 035/113] drm/amdgpu: remove 4 set but not used variable in amdgpu_atombios_get_connector_info_from_object_table
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (33 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 034/113] clk: qcom: rcg2: Dont crash if our parent cant be found; return an error Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-03-11 9:07 ` nobuhiro1.iwamatsu
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 036/113] regulator: rk808: Lower log level on optional GPIOs being not available Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (81 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 1 reply; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, yu kuai, Alex Deucher, Sasha Levin
From: yu kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
[ Upstream commit bae028e3e521e8cb8caf2cc16a455ce4c55f2332 ]
Fixes gcc '-Wunused-but-set-variable' warning:
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_atombios.c: In function
'amdgpu_atombios_get_connector_info_from_object_table':
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_atombios.c:376:26: warning: variable
'grph_obj_num' set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_atombios.c:376:13: warning: variable
'grph_obj_id' set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_atombios.c:341:37: warning: variable
'con_obj_type' set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_atombios.c:341:24: warning: variable
'con_obj_num' set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
They are never used, so can be removed.
Fixes: d38ceaf99ed0 ("drm/amdgpu: add core driver (v4)")
Signed-off-by: yu kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_atombios.c | 19 ++-----------------
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_atombios.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_atombios.c
index 3e90ddcbb24a7..d799927d3a5de 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_atombios.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_atombios.c
@@ -319,17 +319,9 @@ bool amdgpu_atombios_get_connector_info_from_object_table(struct amdgpu_device *
path_size += le16_to_cpu(path->usSize);
if (device_support & le16_to_cpu(path->usDeviceTag)) {
- uint8_t con_obj_id, con_obj_num, con_obj_type;
-
- con_obj_id =
+ uint8_t con_obj_id =
(le16_to_cpu(path->usConnObjectId) & OBJECT_ID_MASK)
>> OBJECT_ID_SHIFT;
- con_obj_num =
- (le16_to_cpu(path->usConnObjectId) & ENUM_ID_MASK)
- >> ENUM_ID_SHIFT;
- con_obj_type =
- (le16_to_cpu(path->usConnObjectId) &
- OBJECT_TYPE_MASK) >> OBJECT_TYPE_SHIFT;
/* Skip TV/CV support */
if ((le16_to_cpu(path->usDeviceTag) ==
@@ -354,14 +346,7 @@ bool amdgpu_atombios_get_connector_info_from_object_table(struct amdgpu_device *
router.ddc_valid = false;
router.cd_valid = false;
for (j = 0; j < ((le16_to_cpu(path->usSize) - 8) / 2); j++) {
- uint8_t grph_obj_id, grph_obj_num, grph_obj_type;
-
- grph_obj_id =
- (le16_to_cpu(path->usGraphicObjIds[j]) &
- OBJECT_ID_MASK) >> OBJECT_ID_SHIFT;
- grph_obj_num =
- (le16_to_cpu(path->usGraphicObjIds[j]) &
- ENUM_ID_MASK) >> ENUM_ID_SHIFT;
+ uint8_t grph_obj_type=
grph_obj_type =
(le16_to_cpu(path->usGraphicObjIds[j]) &
OBJECT_TYPE_MASK) >> OBJECT_TYPE_SHIFT;
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* RE: [PATCH 4.4 035/113] drm/amdgpu: remove 4 set but not used variable in amdgpu_atombios_get_connector_info_from_object_table
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 035/113] drm/amdgpu: remove 4 set but not used variable in amdgpu_atombios_get_connector_info_from_object_table Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-03-11 9:07 ` nobuhiro1.iwamatsu
2020-03-16 10:53 ` Greg KH
0 siblings, 1 reply; 120+ messages in thread
From: nobuhiro1.iwamatsu @ 2020-03-11 9:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: gregkh, linux-kernel; +Cc: stable, yukuai3, alexander.deucher, sashal
Hi,
This commit has a issue with duplicate grph_obj_type declarations.
And this has been fixed in commit:d785476c608c621b345dd9396e8b21e90375cb0.
----
commit d785476c608c621b345dd9396e8b21e90375cb0e
Author: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Date: Fri Nov 8 14:45:27 2019 +0000
drm/amd/display: remove duplicated assignment to grph_obj_type
Variable grph_obj_type is being assigned twice, one of these is
redundant so remove it.
Addresses-Coverity: ("Evaluation order violation")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
----
Please apply to all LTS without 3.16.y.
Best regards,
Nobuhiro
> -----Original Message-----
> From: stable-owner@vger.kernel.org
> [mailto:stable-owner@vger.kernel.org] On Behalf Of Greg Kroah-Hartman
> Sent: Thursday, February 27, 2020 10:36 PM
> To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
> Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>;
> stable@vger.kernel.org; yu kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>; Alex Deucher
> <alexander.deucher@amd.com>; Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
> Subject: [PATCH 4.4 035/113] drm/amdgpu: remove 4 set but not used
> variable in amdgpu_atombios_get_connector_info_from_object_table
>
> From: yu kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
>
> [ Upstream commit bae028e3e521e8cb8caf2cc16a455ce4c55f2332 ]
>
> Fixes gcc '-Wunused-but-set-variable' warning:
>
> drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_atombios.c: In function
> 'amdgpu_atombios_get_connector_info_from_object_table':
> drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_atombios.c:376:26: warning:
> variable 'grph_obj_num' set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
> drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_atombios.c:376:13: warning:
> variable 'grph_obj_id' set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
> drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_atombios.c:341:37: warning:
> variable 'con_obj_type' set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
> drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_atombios.c:341:24: warning:
> variable 'con_obj_num' set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
>
> They are never used, so can be removed.
>
> Fixes: d38ceaf99ed0 ("drm/amdgpu: add core driver (v4)")
> Signed-off-by: yu kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
> Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
> ---
> drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_atombios.c | 19 ++-----------------
> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_atombios.c
> b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_atombios.c
> index 3e90ddcbb24a7..d799927d3a5de 100644
> --- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_atombios.c
> +++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_atombios.c
> @@ -319,17 +319,9 @@ bool
> amdgpu_atombios_get_connector_info_from_object_table(struct
> amdgpu_device *
> path_size += le16_to_cpu(path->usSize);
>
> if (device_support & le16_to_cpu(path->usDeviceTag)) {
> - uint8_t con_obj_id, con_obj_num, con_obj_type;
> -
> - con_obj_id =
> + uint8_t con_obj_id =
> (le16_to_cpu(path->usConnObjectId) &
> OBJECT_ID_MASK)
> >> OBJECT_ID_SHIFT;
> - con_obj_num =
> - (le16_to_cpu(path->usConnObjectId) &
> ENUM_ID_MASK)
> - >> ENUM_ID_SHIFT;
> - con_obj_type =
> - (le16_to_cpu(path->usConnObjectId) &
> - OBJECT_TYPE_MASK) >> OBJECT_TYPE_SHIFT;
>
> /* Skip TV/CV support */
> if ((le16_to_cpu(path->usDeviceTag) == @@
> -354,14 +346,7 @@ bool
> amdgpu_atombios_get_connector_info_from_object_table(struct
> amdgpu_device *
> router.ddc_valid = false;
> router.cd_valid = false;
> for (j = 0; j < ((le16_to_cpu(path->usSize) - 8)
> / 2); j++) {
> - uint8_t grph_obj_id, grph_obj_num,
> grph_obj_type;
> -
> - grph_obj_id =
> -
> (le16_to_cpu(path->usGraphicObjIds[j]) &
> - OBJECT_ID_MASK) >>
> OBJECT_ID_SHIFT;
> - grph_obj_num =
> -
> (le16_to_cpu(path->usGraphicObjIds[j]) &
> - ENUM_ID_MASK) >> ENUM_ID_SHIFT;
> + uint8_t grph_obj_type=
> grph_obj_type =
>
> (le16_to_cpu(path->usGraphicObjIds[j]) &
> OBJECT_TYPE_MASK) >>
> OBJECT_TYPE_SHIFT;
> --
> 2.20.1
>
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 4.4 035/113] drm/amdgpu: remove 4 set but not used variable in amdgpu_atombios_get_connector_info_from_object_table
2020-03-11 9:07 ` nobuhiro1.iwamatsu
@ 2020-03-16 10:53 ` Greg KH
0 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg KH @ 2020-03-16 10:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: nobuhiro1.iwamatsu
Cc: linux-kernel, stable, yukuai3, alexander.deucher, sashal
On Wed, Mar 11, 2020 at 09:07:47AM +0000, nobuhiro1.iwamatsu@toshiba.co.jp wrote:
> Hi,
>
> This commit has a issue with duplicate grph_obj_type declarations.
> And this has been fixed in commit:d785476c608c621b345dd9396e8b21e90375cb0.
>
> ----
> commit d785476c608c621b345dd9396e8b21e90375cb0e
> Author: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
> Date: Fri Nov 8 14:45:27 2019 +0000
>
> drm/amd/display: remove duplicated assignment to grph_obj_type
>
> Variable grph_obj_type is being assigned twice, one of these is
> redundant so remove it.
>
> Addresses-Coverity: ("Evaluation order violation")
> Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
> Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
> ----
>
> Please apply to all LTS without 3.16.y.
Now applied, thanks.
greg k-h
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 4.4 036/113] regulator: rk808: Lower log level on optional GPIOs being not available
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (34 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 035/113] drm/amdgpu: remove 4 set but not used variable in amdgpu_atombios_get_connector_info_from_object_table Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 037/113] NFC: port100: Convert cpu_to_le16(le16_to_cpu(E1) + E2) to use le16_add_cpu() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (80 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Miquel Raynal, Mark Brown, Sasha Levin
From: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
[ Upstream commit b8a039d37792067c1a380dc710361905724b9b2f ]
RK808 can leverage a couple of GPIOs to tweak the ramp rate during DVS
(Dynamic Voltage Scaling). These GPIOs are entirely optional but a
dev_warn() appeared when cleaning this driver to use a more up-to-date
gpiod API. At least reduce the log level to 'info' as it is totally
fine to not populate these GPIO on a hardware design.
This change is trivial but it is worth not polluting the logs during
bringup phase by having real warnings and errors sorted out
correctly.
Fixes: a13eaf02e2d6 ("regulator: rk808: make better use of the gpiod API")
Signed-off-by: Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191203164709.11127-1-miquel.raynal@bootlin.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/regulator/rk808-regulator.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/regulator/rk808-regulator.c b/drivers/regulator/rk808-regulator.c
index d86a3dcd61e24..b96d50a03022c 100644
--- a/drivers/regulator/rk808-regulator.c
+++ b/drivers/regulator/rk808-regulator.c
@@ -551,7 +551,7 @@ static int rk808_regulator_dt_parse_pdata(struct device *dev,
}
if (!pdata->dvs_gpio[i]) {
- dev_warn(dev, "there is no dvs%d gpio\n", i);
+ dev_info(dev, "there is no dvs%d gpio\n", i);
continue;
}
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 037/113] NFC: port100: Convert cpu_to_le16(le16_to_cpu(E1) + E2) to use le16_add_cpu().
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (35 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 036/113] regulator: rk808: Lower log level on optional GPIOs being not available Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 038/113] reiserfs: Fix spurious unlock in reiserfs_fill_super() error handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (79 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Hulk Robot, Mao Wenan,
David S. Miller, Sasha Levin
From: Mao Wenan <maowenan@huawei.com>
[ Upstream commit 718eae277e62a26e5862eb72a830b5e0fe37b04a ]
Convert cpu_to_le16(le16_to_cpu(frame->datalen) + len) to
use le16_add_cpu(), which is more concise and does the same thing.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Mao Wenan <maowenan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/nfc/port100.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/nfc/port100.c b/drivers/nfc/port100.c
index 87d5099967040..3ffbed72adf75 100644
--- a/drivers/nfc/port100.c
+++ b/drivers/nfc/port100.c
@@ -545,7 +545,7 @@ static void port100_tx_update_payload_len(void *_frame, int len)
{
struct port100_frame *frame = _frame;
- frame->datalen = cpu_to_le16(le16_to_cpu(frame->datalen) + len);
+ le16_add_cpu(&frame->datalen, len);
}
static bool port100_rx_frame_is_valid(void *_frame)
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 038/113] reiserfs: Fix spurious unlock in reiserfs_fill_super() error handling
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (36 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 037/113] NFC: port100: Convert cpu_to_le16(le16_to_cpu(E1) + E2) to use le16_add_cpu() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 039/113] ALSA: usx2y: Adjust indentation in snd_usX2Y_hwdep_dsp_status Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (78 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Jan Kara, Sasha Levin
From: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
[ Upstream commit 4d5c1adaf893b8aa52525d2b81995e949bcb3239 ]
When we fail to allocate string for journal device name we jump to
'error' label which tries to unlock reiserfs write lock which is not
held. Jump to 'error_unlocked' instead.
Fixes: f32485be8397 ("reiserfs: delay reiserfs lock until journal initialization")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
fs/reiserfs/super.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/reiserfs/super.c b/fs/reiserfs/super.c
index 519bf410e65b2..f9796fd515315 100644
--- a/fs/reiserfs/super.c
+++ b/fs/reiserfs/super.c
@@ -1921,7 +1921,7 @@ static int reiserfs_fill_super(struct super_block *s, void *data, int silent)
if (!sbi->s_jdev) {
SWARN(silent, s, "", "Cannot allocate memory for "
"journal device name");
- goto error;
+ goto error_unlocked;
}
}
#ifdef CONFIG_QUOTA
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 039/113] ALSA: usx2y: Adjust indentation in snd_usX2Y_hwdep_dsp_status
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (37 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 038/113] reiserfs: Fix spurious unlock in reiserfs_fill_super() error handling Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 040/113] b43legacy: Fix -Wcast-function-type Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (77 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Nathan Chancellor, Takashi Iwai, Sasha Levin
From: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit df4654bd6e42125d9b85ce3a26eaca2935290b98 ]
Clang warns:
../sound/usb/usx2y/usX2Yhwdep.c:122:3: warning: misleading indentation;
statement is not part of the previous 'if' [-Wmisleading-indentation]
info->version = USX2Y_DRIVER_VERSION;
^
../sound/usb/usx2y/usX2Yhwdep.c:120:2: note: previous statement is here
if (us428->chip_status & USX2Y_STAT_CHIP_INIT)
^
1 warning generated.
This warning occurs because there is a space before the tab on this
line. Remove it so that the indentation is consistent with the Linux
kernel coding style and clang no longer warns.
This was introduced before the beginning of git history so no fixes tag.
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/831
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191218034257.54535-1-natechancellor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
sound/usb/usx2y/usX2Yhwdep.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/sound/usb/usx2y/usX2Yhwdep.c b/sound/usb/usx2y/usX2Yhwdep.c
index 0b34dbc8f3020..7dcb33d3886bc 100644
--- a/sound/usb/usx2y/usX2Yhwdep.c
+++ b/sound/usb/usx2y/usX2Yhwdep.c
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ static int snd_usX2Y_hwdep_dsp_status(struct snd_hwdep *hw,
info->num_dsps = 2; // 0: Prepad Data, 1: FPGA Code
if (us428->chip_status & USX2Y_STAT_CHIP_INIT)
info->chip_ready = 1;
- info->version = USX2Y_DRIVER_VERSION;
+ info->version = USX2Y_DRIVER_VERSION;
return 0;
}
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 040/113] b43legacy: Fix -Wcast-function-type
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (38 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 039/113] ALSA: usx2y: Adjust indentation in snd_usX2Y_hwdep_dsp_status Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 041/113] ipw2x00: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (76 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Larry Finger, Phong Tran, Kees Cook,
Kalle Valo, Sasha Levin
From: Phong Tran <tranmanphong@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit 475eec112e4267232d10f4afe2f939a241692b6c ]
correct usage prototype of callback in tasklet_init().
Report by https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/20
Tested-by: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net>
Signed-off-by: Phong Tran <tranmanphong@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/net/wireless/b43legacy/main.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/b43legacy/main.c b/drivers/net/wireless/b43legacy/main.c
index afc1fb3e38dfe..bd35a702382fb 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/b43legacy/main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/b43legacy/main.c
@@ -1304,8 +1304,9 @@ static void handle_irq_ucode_debug(struct b43legacy_wldev *dev)
}
/* Interrupt handler bottom-half */
-static void b43legacy_interrupt_tasklet(struct b43legacy_wldev *dev)
+static void b43legacy_interrupt_tasklet(unsigned long data)
{
+ struct b43legacy_wldev *dev = (struct b43legacy_wldev *)data;
u32 reason;
u32 dma_reason[ARRAY_SIZE(dev->dma_reason)];
u32 merged_dma_reason = 0;
@@ -3775,7 +3776,7 @@ static int b43legacy_one_core_attach(struct ssb_device *dev,
b43legacy_set_status(wldev, B43legacy_STAT_UNINIT);
wldev->bad_frames_preempt = modparam_bad_frames_preempt;
tasklet_init(&wldev->isr_tasklet,
- (void (*)(unsigned long))b43legacy_interrupt_tasklet,
+ b43legacy_interrupt_tasklet,
(unsigned long)wldev);
if (modparam_pio)
wldev->__using_pio = true;
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 041/113] ipw2x00: Fix -Wcast-function-type
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (39 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 040/113] b43legacy: Fix -Wcast-function-type Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 042/113] iwlegacy: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (75 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Phong Tran, Kees Cook, Kalle Valo,
Sasha Levin
From: Phong Tran <tranmanphong@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit ebd77feb27e91bb5fe35a7818b7c13ea7435fb98 ]
correct usage prototype of callback in tasklet_init().
Report by https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/20
Signed-off-by: Phong Tran <tranmanphong@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/net/wireless/ipw2x00/ipw2100.c | 7 ++++---
drivers/net/wireless/ipw2x00/ipw2200.c | 5 +++--
2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ipw2x00/ipw2100.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ipw2x00/ipw2100.c
index 36818c7f30b96..11cfc5822eb03 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ipw2x00/ipw2100.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ipw2x00/ipw2100.c
@@ -3213,8 +3213,9 @@ static void ipw2100_tx_send_data(struct ipw2100_priv *priv)
}
}
-static void ipw2100_irq_tasklet(struct ipw2100_priv *priv)
+static void ipw2100_irq_tasklet(unsigned long data)
{
+ struct ipw2100_priv *priv = (struct ipw2100_priv *)data;
struct net_device *dev = priv->net_dev;
unsigned long flags;
u32 inta, tmp;
@@ -6022,7 +6023,7 @@ static void ipw2100_rf_kill(struct work_struct *work)
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&priv->low_lock, flags);
}
-static void ipw2100_irq_tasklet(struct ipw2100_priv *priv);
+static void ipw2100_irq_tasklet(unsigned long data);
static const struct net_device_ops ipw2100_netdev_ops = {
.ndo_open = ipw2100_open,
@@ -6151,7 +6152,7 @@ static struct net_device *ipw2100_alloc_device(struct pci_dev *pci_dev,
INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&priv->rf_kill, ipw2100_rf_kill);
INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&priv->scan_event, ipw2100_scan_event);
- tasklet_init(&priv->irq_tasklet, (void (*)(unsigned long))
+ tasklet_init(&priv->irq_tasklet,
ipw2100_irq_tasklet, (unsigned long)priv);
/* NOTE: We do not start the deferred work for status checks yet */
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ipw2x00/ipw2200.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ipw2x00/ipw2200.c
index ed0adaf1eec44..1e08f94dc4da3 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ipw2x00/ipw2200.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ipw2x00/ipw2200.c
@@ -1968,8 +1968,9 @@ static void notify_wx_assoc_event(struct ipw_priv *priv)
wireless_send_event(priv->net_dev, SIOCGIWAP, &wrqu, NULL);
}
-static void ipw_irq_tasklet(struct ipw_priv *priv)
+static void ipw_irq_tasklet(unsigned long data)
{
+ struct ipw_priv *priv = (struct ipw_priv *)data;
u32 inta, inta_mask, handled = 0;
unsigned long flags;
int rc = 0;
@@ -10705,7 +10706,7 @@ static int ipw_setup_deferred_work(struct ipw_priv *priv)
INIT_WORK(&priv->qos_activate, ipw_bg_qos_activate);
#endif /* CONFIG_IPW2200_QOS */
- tasklet_init(&priv->irq_tasklet, (void (*)(unsigned long))
+ tasklet_init(&priv->irq_tasklet,
ipw_irq_tasklet, (unsigned long)priv);
return ret;
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 042/113] iwlegacy: Fix -Wcast-function-type
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (40 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 041/113] ipw2x00: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 043/113] rtlwifi: rtl_pci: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (74 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Phong Tran, Kees Cook, Kalle Valo,
Sasha Levin
From: Phong Tran <tranmanphong@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit da5e57e8a6a3e69dac2937ba63fa86355628fbb2 ]
correct usage prototype of callback in tasklet_init().
Report by https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/20
Signed-off-by: Phong Tran <tranmanphong@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/net/wireless/iwlegacy/3945-mac.c | 5 +++--
drivers/net/wireless/iwlegacy/4965-mac.c | 5 +++--
2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/iwlegacy/3945-mac.c b/drivers/net/wireless/iwlegacy/3945-mac.c
index af1b3e6839fa6..775f5e7791d48 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/iwlegacy/3945-mac.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/iwlegacy/3945-mac.c
@@ -1399,8 +1399,9 @@ il3945_dump_nic_error_log(struct il_priv *il)
}
static void
-il3945_irq_tasklet(struct il_priv *il)
+il3945_irq_tasklet(unsigned long data)
{
+ struct il_priv *il = (struct il_priv *)data;
u32 inta, handled = 0;
u32 inta_fh;
unsigned long flags;
@@ -3432,7 +3433,7 @@ il3945_setup_deferred_work(struct il_priv *il)
setup_timer(&il->watchdog, il_bg_watchdog, (unsigned long)il);
tasklet_init(&il->irq_tasklet,
- (void (*)(unsigned long))il3945_irq_tasklet,
+ il3945_irq_tasklet,
(unsigned long)il);
}
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/iwlegacy/4965-mac.c b/drivers/net/wireless/iwlegacy/4965-mac.c
index 04b0349a6ad9f..b1925bdb11718 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/iwlegacy/4965-mac.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/iwlegacy/4965-mac.c
@@ -4361,8 +4361,9 @@ il4965_synchronize_irq(struct il_priv *il)
}
static void
-il4965_irq_tasklet(struct il_priv *il)
+il4965_irq_tasklet(unsigned long data)
{
+ struct il_priv *il = (struct il_priv *)data;
u32 inta, handled = 0;
u32 inta_fh;
unsigned long flags;
@@ -6257,7 +6258,7 @@ il4965_setup_deferred_work(struct il_priv *il)
setup_timer(&il->watchdog, il_bg_watchdog, (unsigned long)il);
tasklet_init(&il->irq_tasklet,
- (void (*)(unsigned long))il4965_irq_tasklet,
+ il4965_irq_tasklet,
(unsigned long)il);
}
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 043/113] rtlwifi: rtl_pci: Fix -Wcast-function-type
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (41 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 042/113] iwlegacy: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:35 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 044/113] orinoco: avoid assertion in case of NULL pointer Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (73 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Phong Tran, Kees Cook, Kalle Valo,
Sasha Levin
From: Phong Tran <tranmanphong@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit cb775c88da5d48a85d99d95219f637b6fad2e0e9 ]
correct usage prototype of callback in tasklet_init().
Report by https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/20
Signed-off-by: Phong Tran <tranmanphong@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/pci.c | 10 ++++++----
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/pci.c b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/pci.c
index b51815eccdb3b..17a07d6b961c7 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/pci.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/pci.c
@@ -1096,13 +1096,15 @@ done:
return ret;
}
-static void _rtl_pci_irq_tasklet(struct ieee80211_hw *hw)
+static void _rtl_pci_irq_tasklet(unsigned long data)
{
+ struct ieee80211_hw *hw = (struct ieee80211_hw *)data;
_rtl_pci_tx_chk_waitq(hw);
}
-static void _rtl_pci_prepare_bcn_tasklet(struct ieee80211_hw *hw)
+static void _rtl_pci_prepare_bcn_tasklet(unsigned long data)
{
+ struct ieee80211_hw *hw = (struct ieee80211_hw *)data;
struct rtl_priv *rtlpriv = rtl_priv(hw);
struct rtl_pci *rtlpci = rtl_pcidev(rtl_pcipriv(hw));
struct rtl_mac *mac = rtl_mac(rtl_priv(hw));
@@ -1223,10 +1225,10 @@ static void _rtl_pci_init_struct(struct ieee80211_hw *hw,
/*task */
tasklet_init(&rtlpriv->works.irq_tasklet,
- (void (*)(unsigned long))_rtl_pci_irq_tasklet,
+ _rtl_pci_irq_tasklet,
(unsigned long)hw);
tasklet_init(&rtlpriv->works.irq_prepare_bcn_tasklet,
- (void (*)(unsigned long))_rtl_pci_prepare_bcn_tasklet,
+ _rtl_pci_prepare_bcn_tasklet,
(unsigned long)hw);
INIT_WORK(&rtlpriv->works.lps_change_work,
rtl_lps_change_work_callback);
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 044/113] orinoco: avoid assertion in case of NULL pointer
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (42 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:35 ` [PATCH 4.4 043/113] rtlwifi: rtl_pci: " Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 045/113] ACPICA: Disassembler: create buffer fields in ACPI_PARSE_LOAD_PASS1 Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (72 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Aditya Pakki, Kalle Valo, Sasha Levin
From: Aditya Pakki <pakki001@umn.edu>
[ Upstream commit c705f9fc6a1736dcf6ec01f8206707c108dca824 ]
In ezusb_init, if upriv is NULL, the code crashes. However, the caller
in ezusb_probe can handle the error and print the failure message.
The patch replaces the BUG_ON call to error return.
Signed-off-by: Aditya Pakki <pakki001@umn.edu>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/net/wireless/orinoco/orinoco_usb.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/orinoco/orinoco_usb.c b/drivers/net/wireless/orinoco/orinoco_usb.c
index e434f7ca8ff36..3c5baccd67922 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/orinoco/orinoco_usb.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/orinoco/orinoco_usb.c
@@ -1351,7 +1351,8 @@ static int ezusb_init(struct hermes *hw)
int retval;
BUG_ON(in_interrupt());
- BUG_ON(!upriv);
+ if (!upriv)
+ return -EINVAL;
upriv->reply_count = 0;
/* Write the MAGIC number on the simulated registers to keep
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 045/113] ACPICA: Disassembler: create buffer fields in ACPI_PARSE_LOAD_PASS1
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (43 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 044/113] orinoco: avoid assertion in case of NULL pointer Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 046/113] scsi: aic7xxx: Adjust indentation in ahc_find_syncrate Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (71 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Elia Geretto, Bob Moore, Erik Kaneda,
Rafael J. Wysocki, Sasha Levin
From: Erik Kaneda <erik.kaneda@intel.com>
[ Upstream commit 5ddbd77181dfca61b16d2e2222382ea65637f1b9 ]
ACPICA commit 29cc8dbc5463a93625bed87d7550a8bed8913bf4
create_buffer_field is a deferred op that is typically processed in
load pass 2. However, disassembly of control method contents walk the
parse tree with ACPI_PARSE_LOAD_PASS1 and AML_CREATE operators are
processed in a later walk. This is a problem when there is a control
method that has the same name as the AML_CREATE object. In this case,
any use of the name segment will be detected as a method call rather
than a reference to a buffer field. If this is detected as a method
call, it can result in a mal-formed parse tree if the control methods
have parameters.
This change in processing AML_CREATE ops earlier solves this issue by
inserting the named object in the ACPI namespace so that references
to this name would be detected as a name string rather than a method
call.
Link: https://github.com/acpica/acpica/commit/29cc8dbc
Reported-by: Elia Geretto <elia.f.geretto@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Elia Geretto <elia.f.geretto@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Bob Moore <robert.moore@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Erik Kaneda <erik.kaneda@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/acpi/acpica/dsfield.c | 2 +-
drivers/acpi/acpica/dswload.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/acpica/dsfield.c b/drivers/acpi/acpica/dsfield.c
index 20de148594fdc..d56cbcda37c13 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/acpica/dsfield.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/acpica/dsfield.c
@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ cleanup:
* FUNCTION: acpi_ds_get_field_names
*
* PARAMETERS: info - create_field info structure
- * ` walk_state - Current method state
+ * walk_state - Current method state
* arg - First parser arg for the field name list
*
* RETURN: Status
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/acpica/dswload.c b/drivers/acpi/acpica/dswload.c
index 097188a6b1c1b..35f1d7657927a 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/acpica/dswload.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/acpica/dswload.c
@@ -440,6 +440,27 @@ acpi_status acpi_ds_load1_end_op(struct acpi_walk_state *walk_state)
ACPI_DEBUG_PRINT((ACPI_DB_DISPATCH, "Op=%p State=%p\n", op,
walk_state));
+ /*
+ * Disassembler: handle create field operators here.
+ *
+ * create_buffer_field is a deferred op that is typically processed in load
+ * pass 2. However, disassembly of control method contents walk the parse
+ * tree with ACPI_PARSE_LOAD_PASS1 and AML_CREATE operators are processed
+ * in a later walk. This is a problem when there is a control method that
+ * has the same name as the AML_CREATE object. In this case, any use of the
+ * name segment will be detected as a method call rather than a reference
+ * to a buffer field.
+ *
+ * This earlier creation during disassembly solves this issue by inserting
+ * the named object in the ACPI namespace so that references to this name
+ * would be a name string rather than a method call.
+ */
+ if ((walk_state->parse_flags & ACPI_PARSE_DISASSEMBLE) &&
+ (walk_state->op_info->flags & AML_CREATE)) {
+ status = acpi_ds_create_buffer_field(op, walk_state);
+ return_ACPI_STATUS(status);
+ }
+
/* We are only interested in opcodes that have an associated name */
if (!(walk_state->op_info->flags & (AML_NAMED | AML_FIELD))) {
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 046/113] scsi: aic7xxx: Adjust indentation in ahc_find_syncrate
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (44 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 045/113] ACPICA: Disassembler: create buffer fields in ACPI_PARSE_LOAD_PASS1 Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 047/113] ARM: dts: r8a7779: Add device node for ARM global timer Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (70 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Nathan Chancellor,
Martin K. Petersen, Sasha Levin
From: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit 4dbc96ad65c45cdd4e895ed7ae4c151b780790c5 ]
Clang warns:
../drivers/scsi/aic7xxx/aic7xxx_core.c:2317:5: warning: misleading
indentation; statement is not part of the previous 'if'
[-Wmisleading-indentation]
if ((syncrate->sxfr_u2 & ST_SXFR) != 0)
^
../drivers/scsi/aic7xxx/aic7xxx_core.c:2310:4: note: previous statement
is here
if (syncrate == &ahc_syncrates[maxsync])
^
1 warning generated.
This warning occurs because there is a space amongst the tabs on this
line. Remove it so that the indentation is consistent with the Linux kernel
coding style and clang no longer warns.
This has been a problem since the beginning of git history hence no fixes
tag.
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/817
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191218014220.52746-1-natechancellor@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/scsi/aic7xxx/aic7xxx_core.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/aic7xxx/aic7xxx_core.c b/drivers/scsi/aic7xxx/aic7xxx_core.c
index 64ab9eaec428c..def3208dd2905 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/aic7xxx/aic7xxx_core.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/aic7xxx/aic7xxx_core.c
@@ -2321,7 +2321,7 @@ ahc_find_syncrate(struct ahc_softc *ahc, u_int *period,
* At some speeds, we only support
* ST transfers.
*/
- if ((syncrate->sxfr_u2 & ST_SXFR) != 0)
+ if ((syncrate->sxfr_u2 & ST_SXFR) != 0)
*ppr_options &= ~MSG_EXT_PPR_DT_REQ;
break;
}
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 047/113] ARM: dts: r8a7779: Add device node for ARM global timer
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (45 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 046/113] scsi: aic7xxx: Adjust indentation in ahc_find_syncrate Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 048/113] x86/vdso: Provide missing include file Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (69 subsequent siblings)
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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Geert Uytterhoeven, Sasha Levin
From: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
[ Upstream commit 8443ffd1bbd5be74e9b12db234746d12e8ea93e2 ]
Add a device node for the global timer, which is part of the Cortex-A9
MPCore.
The global timer can serve as an accurate (4 ns) clock source for
scheduling and delay loops.
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191211135222.26770-4-geert+renesas@glider.be
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
arch/arm/boot/dts/r8a7779.dtsi | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/arm/boot/dts/r8a7779.dtsi b/arch/arm/boot/dts/r8a7779.dtsi
index 6afa909865b52..8636e2321ab71 100644
--- a/arch/arm/boot/dts/r8a7779.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm/boot/dts/r8a7779.dtsi
@@ -63,6 +63,14 @@
<0xf0000100 0x100>;
};
+ timer@f0000200 {
+ compatible = "arm,cortex-a9-global-timer";
+ reg = <0xf0000200 0x100>;
+ interrupts = <GIC_PPI 11
+ (GIC_CPU_MASK_SIMPLE(4) | IRQ_TYPE_EDGE_RISING)>;
+ clocks = <&cpg_clocks R8A7779_CLK_ZS>;
+ };
+
timer@f0000600 {
compatible = "arm,cortex-a9-twd-timer";
reg = <0xf0000600 0x20>;
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 048/113] x86/vdso: Provide missing include file
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (46 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 047/113] ARM: dts: r8a7779: Add device node for ARM global timer Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 049/113] pinctrl: sh-pfc: sh7269: Fix CAN function GPIOs Greg Kroah-Hartman
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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Valdis Kletnieks, Borislav Petkov,
H. Peter Anvin, Andy Lutomirski, Ingo Molnar, Thomas Gleixner,
x86-ml, Sasha Levin
From: Valdis Klētnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu>
[ Upstream commit bff47c2302cc249bcd550b17067f8dddbd4b6f77 ]
When building with C=1, sparse issues a warning:
CHECK arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32-setup.c
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32-setup.c:28:28: warning: symbol 'vdso32_enabled' was not declared. Should it be static?
Provide the missing header file.
Signed-off-by: Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: x86-ml <x86@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/36224.1575599767@turing-police
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32-setup.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32-setup.c b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32-setup.c
index 3f9d1a83891ad..50c1f77cab150 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32-setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32-setup.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include <linux/smp.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/mm_types.h>
+#include <linux/elf.h>
#include <asm/processor.h>
#include <asm/vdso.h>
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 049/113] pinctrl: sh-pfc: sh7269: Fix CAN function GPIOs
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2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 048/113] x86/vdso: Provide missing include file Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 050/113] ALSA: sh: Fix compile warning wrt const Greg Kroah-Hartman
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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Geert Uytterhoeven, Sasha Levin
From: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
[ Upstream commit 02aeb2f21530c98fc3ca51028eda742a3fafbd9f ]
pinmux_func_gpios[] contains a hole due to the missing function GPIO
definition for the "CTX0&CTX1" signal, which is the logical "AND" of the
first two CAN outputs.
A closer look reveals other issues:
- Some functionality is available on alternative pins, but the
PINMUX_DATA() entries is using the wrong marks,
- Several configurations are missing.
Fix this by:
- Renaming CTX0CTX1CTX2_MARK, CRX0CRX1_PJ22_MARK, and
CRX0CRX1CRX2_PJ20_MARK to CTX0_CTX1_CTX2_MARK, CRX0_CRX1_PJ22_MARK,
resp. CRX0_CRX1_CRX2_PJ20_MARK for consistency with the
corresponding enum IDs,
- Adding all missing enum IDs and marks,
- Use the right (*_PJ2x) variants for alternative pins,
- Adding all missing configurations to pinmux_data[],
- Adding all missing function GPIO definitions to pinmux_func_gpios[].
See SH7268 Group, SH7269 Group User’s Manual: Hardware, Rev. 2.00:
[1] Table 1.4 List of Pins
[2] Figure 23.29 Connection Example when Using Channels 0 and 1 as One
Channel (64 Mailboxes × 1 Channel) and Channel 2 as One Channel
(32 Mailboxes × 1 Channel),
[3] Figure 23.30 Connection Example when Using Channels 0, 1, and 2 as
One Channel (96 Mailboxes × 1 Channel),
[4] Table 48.3 Multiplexed Pins (Port B),
[5] Table 48.4 Multiplexed Pins (Port C),
[6] Table 48.10 Multiplexed Pins (Port J),
[7] Section 48.2.4 Port B Control Registers 0 to 5 (PBCR0 to PBCR5).
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191218194812.12741-5-geert+renesas@glider.be
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
arch/sh/include/cpu-sh2a/cpu/sh7269.h | 11 ++++++--
drivers/pinctrl/sh-pfc/pfc-sh7269.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++---------
2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/sh/include/cpu-sh2a/cpu/sh7269.h b/arch/sh/include/cpu-sh2a/cpu/sh7269.h
index 2a0ca8780f0d8..e4caddd443daf 100644
--- a/arch/sh/include/cpu-sh2a/cpu/sh7269.h
+++ b/arch/sh/include/cpu-sh2a/cpu/sh7269.h
@@ -79,8 +79,15 @@ enum {
GPIO_FN_WDTOVF,
/* CAN */
- GPIO_FN_CTX1, GPIO_FN_CRX1, GPIO_FN_CTX0, GPIO_FN_CTX0_CTX1,
- GPIO_FN_CRX0, GPIO_FN_CRX0_CRX1, GPIO_FN_CRX0_CRX1_CRX2,
+ GPIO_FN_CTX2, GPIO_FN_CRX2,
+ GPIO_FN_CTX1, GPIO_FN_CRX1,
+ GPIO_FN_CTX0, GPIO_FN_CRX0,
+ GPIO_FN_CTX0_CTX1, GPIO_FN_CRX0_CRX1,
+ GPIO_FN_CTX0_CTX1_CTX2, GPIO_FN_CRX0_CRX1_CRX2,
+ GPIO_FN_CTX2_PJ21, GPIO_FN_CRX2_PJ20,
+ GPIO_FN_CTX1_PJ23, GPIO_FN_CRX1_PJ22,
+ GPIO_FN_CTX0_CTX1_PJ23, GPIO_FN_CRX0_CRX1_PJ22,
+ GPIO_FN_CTX0_CTX1_CTX2_PJ21, GPIO_FN_CRX0_CRX1_CRX2_PJ20,
/* DMAC */
GPIO_FN_TEND0, GPIO_FN_DACK0, GPIO_FN_DREQ0,
diff --git a/drivers/pinctrl/sh-pfc/pfc-sh7269.c b/drivers/pinctrl/sh-pfc/pfc-sh7269.c
index cfdb4fc177c3e..3df0c0d139d08 100644
--- a/drivers/pinctrl/sh-pfc/pfc-sh7269.c
+++ b/drivers/pinctrl/sh-pfc/pfc-sh7269.c
@@ -740,13 +740,12 @@ enum {
CRX0_MARK, CTX0_MARK,
CRX1_MARK, CTX1_MARK,
CRX2_MARK, CTX2_MARK,
- CRX0_CRX1_MARK,
- CRX0_CRX1_CRX2_MARK,
- CTX0CTX1CTX2_MARK,
+ CRX0_CRX1_MARK, CTX0_CTX1_MARK,
+ CRX0_CRX1_CRX2_MARK, CTX0_CTX1_CTX2_MARK,
CRX1_PJ22_MARK, CTX1_PJ23_MARK,
CRX2_PJ20_MARK, CTX2_PJ21_MARK,
- CRX0CRX1_PJ22_MARK,
- CRX0CRX1CRX2_PJ20_MARK,
+ CRX0_CRX1_PJ22_MARK, CTX0_CTX1_PJ23_MARK,
+ CRX0_CRX1_CRX2_PJ20_MARK, CTX0_CTX1_CTX2_PJ21_MARK,
/* VDC */
DV_CLK_MARK,
@@ -824,6 +823,7 @@ static const u16 pinmux_data[] = {
PINMUX_DATA(CS3_MARK, PC8MD_001),
PINMUX_DATA(TXD7_MARK, PC8MD_010),
PINMUX_DATA(CTX1_MARK, PC8MD_011),
+ PINMUX_DATA(CTX0_CTX1_MARK, PC8MD_100),
PINMUX_DATA(PC7_DATA, PC7MD_000),
PINMUX_DATA(CKE_MARK, PC7MD_001),
@@ -836,11 +836,12 @@ static const u16 pinmux_data[] = {
PINMUX_DATA(CAS_MARK, PC6MD_001),
PINMUX_DATA(SCK7_MARK, PC6MD_010),
PINMUX_DATA(CTX0_MARK, PC6MD_011),
+ PINMUX_DATA(CTX0_CTX1_CTX2_MARK, PC6MD_100),
PINMUX_DATA(PC5_DATA, PC5MD_000),
PINMUX_DATA(RAS_MARK, PC5MD_001),
PINMUX_DATA(CRX0_MARK, PC5MD_011),
- PINMUX_DATA(CTX0CTX1CTX2_MARK, PC5MD_100),
+ PINMUX_DATA(CTX0_CTX1_CTX2_MARK, PC5MD_100),
PINMUX_DATA(IRQ0_PC_MARK, PC5MD_101),
PINMUX_DATA(PC4_DATA, PC4MD_00),
@@ -1292,30 +1293,32 @@ static const u16 pinmux_data[] = {
PINMUX_DATA(LCD_DATA23_PJ23_MARK, PJ23MD_010),
PINMUX_DATA(LCD_TCON6_MARK, PJ23MD_011),
PINMUX_DATA(IRQ3_PJ_MARK, PJ23MD_100),
- PINMUX_DATA(CTX1_MARK, PJ23MD_101),
+ PINMUX_DATA(CTX1_PJ23_MARK, PJ23MD_101),
+ PINMUX_DATA(CTX0_CTX1_PJ23_MARK, PJ23MD_110),
PINMUX_DATA(PJ22_DATA, PJ22MD_000),
PINMUX_DATA(DV_DATA22_MARK, PJ22MD_001),
PINMUX_DATA(LCD_DATA22_PJ22_MARK, PJ22MD_010),
PINMUX_DATA(LCD_TCON5_MARK, PJ22MD_011),
PINMUX_DATA(IRQ2_PJ_MARK, PJ22MD_100),
- PINMUX_DATA(CRX1_MARK, PJ22MD_101),
- PINMUX_DATA(CRX0_CRX1_MARK, PJ22MD_110),
+ PINMUX_DATA(CRX1_PJ22_MARK, PJ22MD_101),
+ PINMUX_DATA(CRX0_CRX1_PJ22_MARK, PJ22MD_110),
PINMUX_DATA(PJ21_DATA, PJ21MD_000),
PINMUX_DATA(DV_DATA21_MARK, PJ21MD_001),
PINMUX_DATA(LCD_DATA21_PJ21_MARK, PJ21MD_010),
PINMUX_DATA(LCD_TCON4_MARK, PJ21MD_011),
PINMUX_DATA(IRQ1_PJ_MARK, PJ21MD_100),
- PINMUX_DATA(CTX2_MARK, PJ21MD_101),
+ PINMUX_DATA(CTX2_PJ21_MARK, PJ21MD_101),
+ PINMUX_DATA(CTX0_CTX1_CTX2_PJ21_MARK, PJ21MD_110),
PINMUX_DATA(PJ20_DATA, PJ20MD_000),
PINMUX_DATA(DV_DATA20_MARK, PJ20MD_001),
PINMUX_DATA(LCD_DATA20_PJ20_MARK, PJ20MD_010),
PINMUX_DATA(LCD_TCON3_MARK, PJ20MD_011),
PINMUX_DATA(IRQ0_PJ_MARK, PJ20MD_100),
- PINMUX_DATA(CRX2_MARK, PJ20MD_101),
- PINMUX_DATA(CRX0CRX1CRX2_PJ20_MARK, PJ20MD_110),
+ PINMUX_DATA(CRX2_PJ20_MARK, PJ20MD_101),
+ PINMUX_DATA(CRX0_CRX1_CRX2_PJ20_MARK, PJ20MD_110),
PINMUX_DATA(PJ19_DATA, PJ19MD_000),
PINMUX_DATA(DV_DATA19_MARK, PJ19MD_001),
@@ -1666,12 +1669,24 @@ static const struct pinmux_func pinmux_func_gpios[] = {
GPIO_FN(WDTOVF),
/* CAN */
+ GPIO_FN(CTX2),
+ GPIO_FN(CRX2),
GPIO_FN(CTX1),
GPIO_FN(CRX1),
GPIO_FN(CTX0),
GPIO_FN(CRX0),
+ GPIO_FN(CTX0_CTX1),
GPIO_FN(CRX0_CRX1),
+ GPIO_FN(CTX0_CTX1_CTX2),
GPIO_FN(CRX0_CRX1_CRX2),
+ GPIO_FN(CTX2_PJ21),
+ GPIO_FN(CRX2_PJ20),
+ GPIO_FN(CTX1_PJ23),
+ GPIO_FN(CRX1_PJ22),
+ GPIO_FN(CTX0_CTX1_PJ23),
+ GPIO_FN(CRX0_CRX1_PJ22),
+ GPIO_FN(CTX0_CTX1_CTX2_PJ21),
+ GPIO_FN(CRX0_CRX1_CRX2_PJ20),
/* DMAC */
GPIO_FN(TEND0),
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 050/113] ALSA: sh: Fix compile warning wrt const
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (48 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 049/113] pinctrl: sh-pfc: sh7269: Fix CAN function GPIOs Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 051/113] tools lib api fs: Fix gcc9 stringop-truncation compilation error Greg Kroah-Hartman
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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Takashi Iwai, Sasha Levin
From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
[ Upstream commit f1dd4795b1523fbca7ab4344dd5a8bb439cc770d ]
A long-standing compile warning was seen during build test:
sound/sh/aica.c: In function 'load_aica_firmware':
sound/sh/aica.c:521:25: warning: passing argument 2 of 'spu_memload' discards 'const' qualifier from pointer target type [-Wdiscarded-qualifiers]
Fixes: 198de43d758c ("[ALSA] Add ALSA support for the SEGA Dreamcast PCM device")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200105144823.29547-69-tiwai@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
sound/sh/aica.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/sound/sh/aica.c b/sound/sh/aica.c
index ad3d9ae380349..dd601b39f69ef 100644
--- a/sound/sh/aica.c
+++ b/sound/sh/aica.c
@@ -120,10 +120,10 @@ static void spu_memset(u32 toi, u32 what, int length)
}
/* spu_memload - write to SPU address space */
-static void spu_memload(u32 toi, void *from, int length)
+static void spu_memload(u32 toi, const void *from, int length)
{
unsigned long flags;
- u32 *froml = from;
+ const u32 *froml = from;
u32 __iomem *to = (u32 __iomem *) (SPU_MEMORY_BASE + toi);
int i;
u32 val;
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 051/113] tools lib api fs: Fix gcc9 stringop-truncation compilation error
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (49 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 050/113] ALSA: sh: Fix compile warning wrt const Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 052/113] usbip: Fix unsafe unaligned pointer usage Greg Kroah-Hartman
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116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Andrey Zhizhikin, Petr Mladek,
Jiri Olsa, Alexei Starovoitov, Andrii Nakryiko, Daniel Borkmann,
Kefeng Wang, Martin KaFai Lau, Sergey Senozhatsky, Song Liu,
Yonghong Song, bpf, netdev, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo,
Sasha Levin
From: Andrey Zhizhikin <andrey.z@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit 6794200fa3c9c3e6759dae099145f23e4310f4f7 ]
GCC9 introduced string hardening mechanisms, which exhibits the error
during fs api compilation:
error: '__builtin_strncpy' specified bound 4096 equals destination size
[-Werror=stringop-truncation]
This comes when the length of copy passed to strncpy is is equal to
destination size, which could potentially lead to buffer overflow.
There is a need to mitigate this potential issue by limiting the size of
destination by 1 and explicitly terminate the destination with NULL.
Signed-off-by: Andrey Zhizhikin <andrey.zhizhikin@leica-geosystems.com>
Reviewed-by: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Cc: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Cc: Kefeng Wang <wangkefeng.wang@huawei.com>
Cc: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>
Cc: Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>
Cc: Sergey Senozhatsky <sergey.senozhatsky@gmail.com>
Cc: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
Cc: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com>
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20191211080109.18765-1-andrey.zhizhikin@leica-geosystems.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
tools/lib/api/fs/fs.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/tools/lib/api/fs/fs.c b/tools/lib/api/fs/fs.c
index 459599d1b6c41..58f05748dd39e 100644
--- a/tools/lib/api/fs/fs.c
+++ b/tools/lib/api/fs/fs.c
@@ -179,6 +179,7 @@ static bool fs__env_override(struct fs *fs)
size_t name_len = strlen(fs->name);
/* name + "_PATH" + '\0' */
char upper_name[name_len + 5 + 1];
+
memcpy(upper_name, fs->name, name_len);
mem_toupper(upper_name, name_len);
strcpy(&upper_name[name_len], "_PATH");
@@ -188,7 +189,8 @@ static bool fs__env_override(struct fs *fs)
return false;
fs->found = true;
- strncpy(fs->path, override_path, sizeof(fs->path));
+ strncpy(fs->path, override_path, sizeof(fs->path) - 1);
+ fs->path[sizeof(fs->path) - 1] = '\0';
return true;
}
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 052/113] usbip: Fix unsafe unaligned pointer usage
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (50 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 051/113] tools lib api fs: Fix gcc9 stringop-truncation compilation error Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 053/113] soc/tegra: fuse: Correct straps address for older Tegra124 device trees Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (64 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Shuah Khan, Sasha Levin
From: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
[ Upstream commit 585c91f40d201bc564d4e76b83c05b3b5363fe7e ]
Fix unsafe unaligned pointer usage in usbip network interfaces. usbip tool
build fails with new gcc -Werror=address-of-packed-member checks.
usbip_network.c: In function ‘usbip_net_pack_usb_device’:
usbip_network.c:79:32: error: taking address of packed member of ‘struct usbip_usb_device’ may result in an unaligned pointer value [-Werror=address-of-packed-member]
79 | usbip_net_pack_uint32_t(pack, &udev->busnum);
Fix with minor changes to pass by value instead of by address.
Signed-off-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200109012416.2875-1-skhan@linuxfoundation.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
tools/usb/usbip/src/usbip_network.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++------------
tools/usb/usbip/src/usbip_network.h | 12 +++------
2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/usb/usbip/src/usbip_network.c b/tools/usb/usbip/src/usbip_network.c
index b4c37e76a6e08..187dfaa67d0a2 100644
--- a/tools/usb/usbip/src/usbip_network.c
+++ b/tools/usb/usbip/src/usbip_network.c
@@ -62,39 +62,39 @@ void usbip_setup_port_number(char *arg)
info("using port %d (\"%s\")", usbip_port, usbip_port_string);
}
-void usbip_net_pack_uint32_t(int pack, uint32_t *num)
+uint32_t usbip_net_pack_uint32_t(int pack, uint32_t num)
{
uint32_t i;
if (pack)
- i = htonl(*num);
+ i = htonl(num);
else
- i = ntohl(*num);
+ i = ntohl(num);
- *num = i;
+ return i;
}
-void usbip_net_pack_uint16_t(int pack, uint16_t *num)
+uint16_t usbip_net_pack_uint16_t(int pack, uint16_t num)
{
uint16_t i;
if (pack)
- i = htons(*num);
+ i = htons(num);
else
- i = ntohs(*num);
+ i = ntohs(num);
- *num = i;
+ return i;
}
void usbip_net_pack_usb_device(int pack, struct usbip_usb_device *udev)
{
- usbip_net_pack_uint32_t(pack, &udev->busnum);
- usbip_net_pack_uint32_t(pack, &udev->devnum);
- usbip_net_pack_uint32_t(pack, &udev->speed);
+ udev->busnum = usbip_net_pack_uint32_t(pack, udev->busnum);
+ udev->devnum = usbip_net_pack_uint32_t(pack, udev->devnum);
+ udev->speed = usbip_net_pack_uint32_t(pack, udev->speed);
- usbip_net_pack_uint16_t(pack, &udev->idVendor);
- usbip_net_pack_uint16_t(pack, &udev->idProduct);
- usbip_net_pack_uint16_t(pack, &udev->bcdDevice);
+ udev->idVendor = usbip_net_pack_uint16_t(pack, udev->idVendor);
+ udev->idProduct = usbip_net_pack_uint16_t(pack, udev->idProduct);
+ udev->bcdDevice = usbip_net_pack_uint16_t(pack, udev->bcdDevice);
}
void usbip_net_pack_usb_interface(int pack __attribute__((unused)),
@@ -141,6 +141,14 @@ ssize_t usbip_net_send(int sockfd, void *buff, size_t bufflen)
return usbip_net_xmit(sockfd, buff, bufflen, 1);
}
+static inline void usbip_net_pack_op_common(int pack,
+ struct op_common *op_common)
+{
+ op_common->version = usbip_net_pack_uint16_t(pack, op_common->version);
+ op_common->code = usbip_net_pack_uint16_t(pack, op_common->code);
+ op_common->status = usbip_net_pack_uint32_t(pack, op_common->status);
+}
+
int usbip_net_send_op_common(int sockfd, uint32_t code, uint32_t status)
{
struct op_common op_common;
@@ -152,7 +160,7 @@ int usbip_net_send_op_common(int sockfd, uint32_t code, uint32_t status)
op_common.code = code;
op_common.status = status;
- PACK_OP_COMMON(1, &op_common);
+ usbip_net_pack_op_common(1, &op_common);
rc = usbip_net_send(sockfd, &op_common, sizeof(op_common));
if (rc < 0) {
@@ -176,7 +184,7 @@ int usbip_net_recv_op_common(int sockfd, uint16_t *code)
goto err;
}
- PACK_OP_COMMON(0, &op_common);
+ usbip_net_pack_op_common(0, &op_common);
if (op_common.version != USBIP_VERSION) {
dbg("version mismatch: %d %d", op_common.version,
diff --git a/tools/usb/usbip/src/usbip_network.h b/tools/usb/usbip/src/usbip_network.h
index c1e875cf1078c..573fa839b66b7 100644
--- a/tools/usb/usbip/src/usbip_network.h
+++ b/tools/usb/usbip/src/usbip_network.h
@@ -33,12 +33,6 @@ struct op_common {
} __attribute__((packed));
-#define PACK_OP_COMMON(pack, op_common) do {\
- usbip_net_pack_uint16_t(pack, &(op_common)->version);\
- usbip_net_pack_uint16_t(pack, &(op_common)->code);\
- usbip_net_pack_uint32_t(pack, &(op_common)->status);\
-} while (0)
-
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* Dummy Code */
#define OP_UNSPEC 0x00
@@ -164,11 +158,11 @@ struct op_devlist_reply_extra {
} while (0)
#define PACK_OP_DEVLIST_REPLY(pack, reply) do {\
- usbip_net_pack_uint32_t(pack, &(reply)->ndev);\
+ (reply)->ndev = usbip_net_pack_uint32_t(pack, (reply)->ndev);\
} while (0)
-void usbip_net_pack_uint32_t(int pack, uint32_t *num);
-void usbip_net_pack_uint16_t(int pack, uint16_t *num);
+uint32_t usbip_net_pack_uint32_t(int pack, uint32_t num);
+uint16_t usbip_net_pack_uint16_t(int pack, uint16_t num);
void usbip_net_pack_usb_device(int pack, struct usbip_usb_device *udev);
void usbip_net_pack_usb_interface(int pack, struct usbip_usb_interface *uinf);
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 053/113] soc/tegra: fuse: Correct straps address for older Tegra124 device trees
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (51 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 052/113] usbip: Fix unsafe unaligned pointer usage Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 054/113] rcu: Use WRITE_ONCE() for assignments to ->pprev for hlist_nulls Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (63 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Dmitry Osipenko, Thierry Reding, Sasha Levin
From: Dmitry Osipenko <digetx@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit 2d9ea1934f8ef0dfb862d103389562cc28b4fc03 ]
Trying to read out Chip ID before APBMISC registers are mapped won't
succeed, in a result Tegra124 gets a wrong address for the HW straps
register if machine uses an old outdated device tree.
Fixes: 297c4f3dcbff ("soc/tegra: fuse: Restrict legacy code to 32-bit ARM")
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Osipenko <digetx@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thierry Reding <treding@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/soc/tegra/fuse/tegra-apbmisc.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/soc/tegra/fuse/tegra-apbmisc.c b/drivers/soc/tegra/fuse/tegra-apbmisc.c
index 5b18f6ffa45c7..cd61c883c19f5 100644
--- a/drivers/soc/tegra/fuse/tegra-apbmisc.c
+++ b/drivers/soc/tegra/fuse/tegra-apbmisc.c
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ void __init tegra_init_apbmisc(void)
apbmisc.flags = IORESOURCE_MEM;
/* strapping options */
- if (tegra_get_chip_id() == TEGRA124) {
+ if (of_machine_is_compatible("nvidia,tegra124")) {
straps.start = 0x7000e864;
straps.end = 0x7000e867;
} else {
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 054/113] rcu: Use WRITE_ONCE() for assignments to ->pprev for hlist_nulls
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (52 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 053/113] soc/tegra: fuse: Correct straps address for older Tegra124 device trees Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 055/113] Input: edt-ft5x06 - work around first register access error Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (62 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Paul E. McKenney, Sasha Levin, Eric Dumazet
From: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit 860c8802ace14c646864795e057349c9fb2d60ad ]
Eric Dumazet supplied a KCSAN report of a bug that forces use
of hlist_unhashed_lockless() from sk_unhashed():
------------------------------------------------------------------------
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in inet_unhash / inet_unhash
write to 0xffff8880a69a0170 of 8 bytes by interrupt on cpu 1:
__hlist_nulls_del include/linux/list_nulls.h:88 [inline]
hlist_nulls_del_init_rcu include/linux/rculist_nulls.h:36 [inline]
__sk_nulls_del_node_init_rcu include/net/sock.h:676 [inline]
inet_unhash+0x38f/0x4a0 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:612
tcp_set_state+0xfa/0x3e0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2249
tcp_done+0x93/0x1e0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:3854
tcp_write_err+0x7e/0xc0 net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:56
tcp_retransmit_timer+0x9b8/0x16d0 net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:479
tcp_write_timer_handler+0x42d/0x510 net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:599
tcp_write_timer+0xd1/0xf0 net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:619
call_timer_fn+0x5f/0x2f0 kernel/time/timer.c:1404
expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1449 [inline]
__run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1773 [inline]
__run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1740 [inline]
run_timer_softirq+0xc0c/0xcd0 kernel/time/timer.c:1786
__do_softirq+0x115/0x33f kernel/softirq.c:292
invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:373 [inline]
irq_exit+0xbb/0xe0 kernel/softirq.c:413
exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:536 [inline]
smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0xe6/0x280 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1137
apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:830
native_safe_halt+0xe/0x10 arch/x86/kernel/paravirt.c:71
arch_cpu_idle+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:571
default_idle_call+0x1e/0x40 kernel/sched/idle.c:94
cpuidle_idle_call kernel/sched/idle.c:154 [inline]
do_idle+0x1af/0x280 kernel/sched/idle.c:263
cpu_startup_entry+0x1b/0x20 kernel/sched/idle.c:355
start_secondary+0x208/0x260 arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.c:264
secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S:241
read to 0xffff8880a69a0170 of 8 bytes by interrupt on cpu 0:
sk_unhashed include/net/sock.h:607 [inline]
inet_unhash+0x3d/0x4a0 net/ipv4/inet_hashtables.c:592
tcp_set_state+0xfa/0x3e0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:2249
tcp_done+0x93/0x1e0 net/ipv4/tcp.c:3854
tcp_write_err+0x7e/0xc0 net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:56
tcp_retransmit_timer+0x9b8/0x16d0 net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:479
tcp_write_timer_handler+0x42d/0x510 net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:599
tcp_write_timer+0xd1/0xf0 net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:619
call_timer_fn+0x5f/0x2f0 kernel/time/timer.c:1404
expire_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1449 [inline]
__run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1773 [inline]
__run_timers kernel/time/timer.c:1740 [inline]
run_timer_softirq+0xc0c/0xcd0 kernel/time/timer.c:1786
__do_softirq+0x115/0x33f kernel/softirq.c:292
invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:373 [inline]
irq_exit+0xbb/0xe0 kernel/softirq.c:413
exiting_irq arch/x86/include/asm/apic.h:536 [inline]
smp_apic_timer_interrupt+0xe6/0x280 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1137
apic_timer_interrupt+0xf/0x20 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:830
native_safe_halt+0xe/0x10 arch/x86/kernel/paravirt.c:71
arch_cpu_idle+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:571
default_idle_call+0x1e/0x40 kernel/sched/idle.c:94
cpuidle_idle_call kernel/sched/idle.c:154 [inline]
do_idle+0x1af/0x280 kernel/sched/idle.c:263
cpu_startup_entry+0x1b/0x20 kernel/sched/idle.c:355
rest_init+0xec/0xf6 init/main.c:452
arch_call_rest_init+0x17/0x37
start_kernel+0x838/0x85e init/main.c:786
x86_64_start_reservations+0x29/0x2b arch/x86/kernel/head64.c:490
x86_64_start_kernel+0x72/0x76 arch/x86/kernel/head64.c:471
secondary_startup_64+0xa4/0xb0 arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S:241
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.4.0-rc6+ #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine,
BIOS Google 01/01/2011
------------------------------------------------------------------------
This commit therefore replaces C-language assignments with WRITE_ONCE()
in include/linux/list_nulls.h and include/linux/rculist_nulls.h.
Reported-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com> # For KCSAN
Signed-off-by: Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
include/linux/list_nulls.h | 8 ++++----
include/linux/rculist_nulls.h | 8 ++++----
2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/list_nulls.h b/include/linux/list_nulls.h
index 444d2b1313bda..703928e4fd42d 100644
--- a/include/linux/list_nulls.h
+++ b/include/linux/list_nulls.h
@@ -66,10 +66,10 @@ static inline void hlist_nulls_add_head(struct hlist_nulls_node *n,
struct hlist_nulls_node *first = h->first;
n->next = first;
- n->pprev = &h->first;
+ WRITE_ONCE(n->pprev, &h->first);
h->first = n;
if (!is_a_nulls(first))
- first->pprev = &n->next;
+ WRITE_ONCE(first->pprev, &n->next);
}
static inline void __hlist_nulls_del(struct hlist_nulls_node *n)
@@ -79,13 +79,13 @@ static inline void __hlist_nulls_del(struct hlist_nulls_node *n)
WRITE_ONCE(*pprev, next);
if (!is_a_nulls(next))
- next->pprev = pprev;
+ WRITE_ONCE(next->pprev, pprev);
}
static inline void hlist_nulls_del(struct hlist_nulls_node *n)
{
__hlist_nulls_del(n);
- n->pprev = LIST_POISON2;
+ WRITE_ONCE(n->pprev, LIST_POISON2);
}
/**
diff --git a/include/linux/rculist_nulls.h b/include/linux/rculist_nulls.h
index 1c33dd7da4a7d..f35dc0a1d6ebc 100644
--- a/include/linux/rculist_nulls.h
+++ b/include/linux/rculist_nulls.h
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ static inline void hlist_nulls_del_init_rcu(struct hlist_nulls_node *n)
{
if (!hlist_nulls_unhashed(n)) {
__hlist_nulls_del(n);
- n->pprev = NULL;
+ WRITE_ONCE(n->pprev, NULL);
}
}
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static inline void hlist_nulls_del_init_rcu(struct hlist_nulls_node *n)
static inline void hlist_nulls_del_rcu(struct hlist_nulls_node *n)
{
__hlist_nulls_del(n);
- n->pprev = LIST_POISON2;
+ WRITE_ONCE(n->pprev, LIST_POISON2);
}
/**
@@ -93,10 +93,10 @@ static inline void hlist_nulls_add_head_rcu(struct hlist_nulls_node *n,
struct hlist_nulls_node *first = h->first;
n->next = first;
- n->pprev = &h->first;
+ WRITE_ONCE(n->pprev, &h->first);
rcu_assign_pointer(hlist_nulls_first_rcu(h), n);
if (!is_a_nulls(first))
- first->pprev = &n->next;
+ WRITE_ONCE(first->pprev, &n->next);
}
/**
* hlist_nulls_for_each_entry_rcu - iterate over rcu list of given type
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 055/113] Input: edt-ft5x06 - work around first register access error
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (53 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 054/113] rcu: Use WRITE_ONCE() for assignments to ->pprev for hlist_nulls Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 056/113] wan: ixp4xx_hss: fix compile-testing on 64-bit Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (61 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Philipp Zabel, Marco Felsch,
Andy Shevchenko, Dmitry Torokhov, Sasha Levin
From: Philipp Zabel <p.zabel@pengutronix.de>
[ Upstream commit e112324cc0422c046f1cf54c56f333d34fa20885 ]
The EP0700MLP1 returns bogus data on the first register read access
(reading the threshold parameter from register 0x00):
edt_ft5x06 2-0038: crc error: 0xfc expected, got 0x40
It ignores writes until then. This patch adds a dummy read after which
the number of sensors and parameter read/writes work correctly.
Signed-off-by: Philipp Zabel <p.zabel@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Marco Felsch <m.felsch@pengutronix.de>
Tested-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dmitry Torokhov <dmitry.torokhov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/input/touchscreen/edt-ft5x06.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/input/touchscreen/edt-ft5x06.c b/drivers/input/touchscreen/edt-ft5x06.c
index 0b0f8c17f3f7e..a9d97d577a7e9 100644
--- a/drivers/input/touchscreen/edt-ft5x06.c
+++ b/drivers/input/touchscreen/edt-ft5x06.c
@@ -880,6 +880,7 @@ static int edt_ft5x06_ts_probe(struct i2c_client *client,
{
const struct edt_i2c_chip_data *chip_data;
struct edt_ft5x06_ts_data *tsdata;
+ u8 buf[2] = { 0xfc, 0x00 };
struct input_dev *input;
unsigned long irq_flags;
int error;
@@ -949,6 +950,12 @@ static int edt_ft5x06_ts_probe(struct i2c_client *client,
return error;
}
+ /*
+ * Dummy read access. EP0700MLP1 returns bogus data on the first
+ * register read access and ignores writes.
+ */
+ edt_ft5x06_ts_readwrite(tsdata->client, 2, buf, 2, buf);
+
edt_ft5x06_ts_set_regs(tsdata);
edt_ft5x06_ts_get_defaults(&client->dev, tsdata);
edt_ft5x06_ts_get_parameters(tsdata);
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 056/113] wan: ixp4xx_hss: fix compile-testing on 64-bit
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (54 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 055/113] Input: edt-ft5x06 - work around first register access error Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 057/113] ASoC: atmel: fix build error with CONFIG_SND_ATMEL_SOC_DMA=m Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (60 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Arnd Bergmann, Linus Walleij,
Jakub Kicinski, Sasha Levin
From: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
[ Upstream commit 504c28c853ec5c626900b914b5833daf0581a344 ]
Change the driver to use portable integer types to avoid
warnings during compile testing:
drivers/net/wan/ixp4xx_hss.c:863:21: error: cast to 'u32 *' (aka 'unsigned int *') from smaller integer type 'int' [-Werror,-Wint-to-pointer-cast]
memcpy_swab32(mem, (u32 *)((int)skb->data & ~3), bytes / 4);
^
drivers/net/wan/ixp4xx_hss.c:979:12: error: incompatible pointer types passing 'u32 *' (aka 'unsigned int *') to parameter of type 'dma_addr_t *' (aka 'unsigned long long *') [-Werror,-Wincompatible-pointer-types]
&port->desc_tab_phys)))
^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
include/linux/dmapool.h:27:20: note: passing argument to parameter 'handle' here
dma_addr_t *handle);
^
Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Signed-off-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/net/wan/ixp4xx_hss.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/wan/ixp4xx_hss.c b/drivers/net/wan/ixp4xx_hss.c
index e7bbdb7af53ac..97968e6a6a4eb 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wan/ixp4xx_hss.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wan/ixp4xx_hss.c
@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ struct port {
struct hss_plat_info *plat;
buffer_t *rx_buff_tab[RX_DESCS], *tx_buff_tab[TX_DESCS];
struct desc *desc_tab; /* coherent */
- u32 desc_tab_phys;
+ dma_addr_t desc_tab_phys;
unsigned int id;
unsigned int clock_type, clock_rate, loopback;
unsigned int initialized, carrier;
@@ -861,7 +861,7 @@ static int hss_hdlc_xmit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct net_device *dev)
dev->stats.tx_dropped++;
return NETDEV_TX_OK;
}
- memcpy_swab32(mem, (u32 *)((int)skb->data & ~3), bytes / 4);
+ memcpy_swab32(mem, (u32 *)((uintptr_t)skb->data & ~3), bytes / 4);
dev_kfree_skb(skb);
#endif
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 057/113] ASoC: atmel: fix build error with CONFIG_SND_ATMEL_SOC_DMA=m
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (55 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 056/113] wan: ixp4xx_hss: fix compile-testing on 64-bit Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 058/113] PCI: Dont disable bridge BARs when assigning bus resources Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (59 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Hulk Robot, Chen Zhou, Mark Brown,
Sasha Levin
From: Chen Zhou <chenzhou10@huawei.com>
[ Upstream commit 8fea78029f5e6ed734ae1957bef23cfda1af4354 ]
If CONFIG_SND_ATMEL_SOC_DMA=m, build error:
sound/soc/atmel/atmel_ssc_dai.o: In function `atmel_ssc_set_audio':
(.text+0x7cd): undefined reference to `atmel_pcm_dma_platform_register'
Function atmel_pcm_dma_platform_register is defined under
CONFIG SND_ATMEL_SOC_DMA, so select SND_ATMEL_SOC_DMA in
CONFIG SND_ATMEL_SOC_SSC, same to CONFIG_SND_ATMEL_SOC_PDC.
Reported-by: Hulk Robot <hulkci@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Chen Zhou <chenzhou10@huawei.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200113133242.144550-1-chenzhou10@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
sound/soc/atmel/Kconfig | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/sound/soc/atmel/Kconfig b/sound/soc/atmel/Kconfig
index 2d30464b81cef..d7b471c69f4fb 100644
--- a/sound/soc/atmel/Kconfig
+++ b/sound/soc/atmel/Kconfig
@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ config SND_ATMEL_SOC_DMA
config SND_ATMEL_SOC_SSC_DMA
tristate
+ select SND_ATMEL_SOC_DMA
+ select SND_ATMEL_SOC_PDC
config SND_ATMEL_SOC_SSC
tristate
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 058/113] PCI: Dont disable bridge BARs when assigning bus resources
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (56 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 057/113] ASoC: atmel: fix build error with CONFIG_SND_ATMEL_SOC_DMA=m Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 059/113] driver core: Print device when resources present in really_probe() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (58 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Kit Chow, Logan Gunthorpe,
Bjorn Helgaas, Sasha Levin
From: Logan Gunthorpe <logang@deltatee.com>
[ Upstream commit 9db8dc6d0785225c42a37be7b44d1b07b31b8957 ]
Some PCI bridges implement BARs in addition to bridge windows. For
example, here's a PLX switch:
04:00.0 PCI bridge: PLX Technology, Inc. PEX 8724 24-Lane, 6-Port PCI
Express Gen 3 (8 GT/s) Switch, 19 x 19mm FCBGA (rev ca)
(prog-if 00 [Normal decode])
Flags: bus master, fast devsel, latency 0, IRQ 30, NUMA node 0
Memory at 90a00000 (32-bit, non-prefetchable) [size=256K]
Bus: primary=04, secondary=05, subordinate=0a, sec-latency=0
I/O behind bridge: 00002000-00003fff
Memory behind bridge: 90000000-909fffff
Prefetchable memory behind bridge: 0000380000800000-0000380000bfffff
Previously, when the kernel assigned resource addresses (with the
pci=realloc command line parameter, for example) it could clear the struct
resource corresponding to the BAR. When this happened, lspci would report
this BAR as "ignored":
Region 0: Memory at <ignored> (32-bit, non-prefetchable) [size=256K]
This is because the kernel reports a zero start address and zero flags
in the corresponding sysfs resource file and in /proc/bus/pci/devices.
Investigation with 'lspci -x', however, shows the BIOS-assigned address
will still be programmed in the device's BAR registers.
It's clearly a bug that the kernel lost track of the BAR value, but in most
cases, this still won't result in a visible issue because nothing uses the
memory, so nothing is affected. However, when an IOMMU is in use, it will
not reserve this space in the IOVA because the kernel no longer thinks the
range is valid. (See dmar_init_reserved_ranges() for the Intel
implementation of this.)
Without the proper reserved range, a DMA mapping may allocate an IOVA that
matches a bridge BAR, which results in DMA accesses going to the BAR
instead of the intended RAM.
The problem was in pci_assign_unassigned_root_bus_resources(). When any
resource from a bridge device fails to get assigned, the code set the
resource's flags to zero. This makes sense for bridge windows, as they
will be re-enabled later, but for regular BARs, it makes the kernel
permanently lose track of the fact that they decode address space.
Change pci_assign_unassigned_root_bus_resources() and
pci_assign_unassigned_bridge_resources() so they only clear "res->flags"
for bridge *windows*, not bridge BARs.
Fixes: da7822e5ad71 ("PCI: update bridge resources to get more big ranges when allocating space (again)")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200108213208.4612-1-logang@deltatee.com
[bhelgaas: commit log, check for pci_is_bridge()]
Reported-by: Kit Chow <kchow@gigaio.com>
Signed-off-by: Logan Gunthorpe <logang@deltatee.com>
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/pci/setup-bus.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/pci/setup-bus.c b/drivers/pci/setup-bus.c
index 1723ac1b30e10..fe2865a0da395 100644
--- a/drivers/pci/setup-bus.c
+++ b/drivers/pci/setup-bus.c
@@ -1760,12 +1760,18 @@ again:
/* restore size and flags */
list_for_each_entry(fail_res, &fail_head, list) {
struct resource *res = fail_res->res;
+ int idx;
res->start = fail_res->start;
res->end = fail_res->end;
res->flags = fail_res->flags;
- if (fail_res->dev->subordinate)
- res->flags = 0;
+
+ if (pci_is_bridge(fail_res->dev)) {
+ idx = res - &fail_res->dev->resource[0];
+ if (idx >= PCI_BRIDGE_RESOURCES &&
+ idx <= PCI_BRIDGE_RESOURCE_END)
+ res->flags = 0;
+ }
}
free_list(&fail_head);
@@ -1826,12 +1832,18 @@ again:
/* restore size and flags */
list_for_each_entry(fail_res, &fail_head, list) {
struct resource *res = fail_res->res;
+ int idx;
res->start = fail_res->start;
res->end = fail_res->end;
res->flags = fail_res->flags;
- if (fail_res->dev->subordinate)
- res->flags = 0;
+
+ if (pci_is_bridge(fail_res->dev)) {
+ idx = res - &fail_res->dev->resource[0];
+ if (idx >= PCI_BRIDGE_RESOURCES &&
+ idx <= PCI_BRIDGE_RESOURCE_END)
+ res->flags = 0;
+ }
}
free_list(&fail_head);
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 059/113] driver core: Print device when resources present in really_probe()
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (57 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 058/113] PCI: Dont disable bridge BARs when assigning bus resources Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 060/113] drm/nouveau: Fix copy-paste error in nouveau_fence_wait_uevent_handler Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (57 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Geert Uytterhoeven, Sasha Levin
From: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
[ Upstream commit 7c35e699c88bd60734277b26962783c60e04b494 ]
If a device already has devres items attached before probing, a warning
backtrace is printed. However, this backtrace does not reveal the
offending device, leaving the user uninformed. Furthermore, using
WARN_ON() causes systems with panic-on-warn to reboot.
Fix this by replacing the WARN_ON() by a dev_crit() message.
Abort probing the device, to prevent doing more damage to the device's
resources.
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191206132219.28908-1-geert+renesas@glider.be
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/base/dd.c | 5 ++++-
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/base/dd.c b/drivers/base/dd.c
index 1dffb018a7feb..04a923186081f 100644
--- a/drivers/base/dd.c
+++ b/drivers/base/dd.c
@@ -283,7 +283,10 @@ static int really_probe(struct device *dev, struct device_driver *drv)
atomic_inc(&probe_count);
pr_debug("bus: '%s': %s: probing driver %s with device %s\n",
drv->bus->name, __func__, drv->name, dev_name(dev));
- WARN_ON(!list_empty(&dev->devres_head));
+ if (!list_empty(&dev->devres_head)) {
+ dev_crit(dev, "Resources present before probing\n");
+ return -EBUSY;
+ }
dev->driver = drv;
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 060/113] drm/nouveau: Fix copy-paste error in nouveau_fence_wait_uevent_handler
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (58 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 059/113] driver core: Print device when resources present in really_probe() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 061/113] drm/vmwgfx: prevent memory leak in vmw_cmdbuf_res_add Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (56 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, YueHaibing, Ben Skeggs, Sasha Levin
From: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
[ Upstream commit 1eb013473bff5f95b6fe1ca4dd7deda47257b9c2 ]
Like other cases, it should use rcu protected 'chan' rather
than 'fence->channel' in nouveau_fence_wait_uevent_handler.
Fixes: 0ec5f02f0e2c ("drm/nouveau: prevent stale fence->channel pointers, and protect with rcu")
Signed-off-by: YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Ben Skeggs <bskeggs@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_fence.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_fence.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_fence.c
index 574c36b492ee4..fccec23731e24 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_fence.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_fence.c
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ nouveau_fence_wait_uevent_handler(struct nvif_notify *notify)
fence = list_entry(fctx->pending.next, typeof(*fence), head);
chan = rcu_dereference_protected(fence->channel, lockdep_is_held(&fctx->lock));
- if (nouveau_fence_update(fence->channel, fctx))
+ if (nouveau_fence_update(chan, fctx))
ret = NVIF_NOTIFY_DROP;
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&fctx->lock, flags);
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 061/113] drm/vmwgfx: prevent memory leak in vmw_cmdbuf_res_add
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (59 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 060/113] drm/nouveau: Fix copy-paste error in nouveau_fence_wait_uevent_handler Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 062/113] iommu/arm-smmu-v3: Use WRITE_ONCE() when changing validity of an STE Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (55 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Navid Emamdoost, Thomas Hellstrom,
Sasha Levin
From: Navid Emamdoost <navid.emamdoost@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit 40efb09a7f53125719e49864da008495e39aaa1e ]
In vmw_cmdbuf_res_add if drm_ht_insert_item fails the allocated memory
for cres should be released.
Fixes: 18e4a4669c50 ("drm/vmwgfx: Fix compat shader namespace")
Signed-off-by: Navid Emamdoost <navid.emamdoost@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Hellstrom <thellstrom@vmware.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_cmdbuf_res.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_cmdbuf_res.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_cmdbuf_res.c
index 1f013d45c9e9a..0c7c3005594cc 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_cmdbuf_res.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_cmdbuf_res.c
@@ -210,8 +210,10 @@ int vmw_cmdbuf_res_add(struct vmw_cmdbuf_res_manager *man,
cres->hash.key = user_key | (res_type << 24);
ret = drm_ht_insert_item(&man->resources, &cres->hash);
- if (unlikely(ret != 0))
+ if (unlikely(ret != 0)) {
+ kfree(cres);
goto out_invalid_key;
+ }
cres->state = VMW_CMDBUF_RES_ADD;
cres->res = vmw_resource_reference(res);
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 062/113] iommu/arm-smmu-v3: Use WRITE_ONCE() when changing validity of an STE
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (60 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 061/113] drm/vmwgfx: prevent memory leak in vmw_cmdbuf_res_add Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 063/113] scsi: iscsi: Dont destroy session if there are outstanding connections Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (54 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Jean-Philippe Brucker, Will Deacon,
Sasha Levin
From: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
[ Upstream commit d71e01716b3606a6648df7e5646ae12c75babde4 ]
If, for some bizarre reason, the compiler decided to split up the write
of STE DWORD 0, we could end up making a partial structure valid.
Although this probably won't happen, follow the example of the
context-descriptor code and use WRITE_ONCE() to ensure atomicity of the
write.
Reported-by: Jean-Philippe Brucker <jean-philippe@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/iommu/arm-smmu-v3.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/iommu/arm-smmu-v3.c b/drivers/iommu/arm-smmu-v3.c
index eb9937225d645..6c10f307a1c98 100644
--- a/drivers/iommu/arm-smmu-v3.c
+++ b/drivers/iommu/arm-smmu-v3.c
@@ -1090,7 +1090,8 @@ static void arm_smmu_write_strtab_ent(struct arm_smmu_device *smmu, u32 sid,
}
arm_smmu_sync_ste_for_sid(smmu, sid);
- dst[0] = cpu_to_le64(val);
+ /* See comment in arm_smmu_write_ctx_desc() */
+ WRITE_ONCE(dst[0], cpu_to_le64(val));
arm_smmu_sync_ste_for_sid(smmu, sid);
/* It's likely that we'll want to use the new STE soon */
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 063/113] scsi: iscsi: Dont destroy session if there are outstanding connections
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (61 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 062/113] iommu/arm-smmu-v3: Use WRITE_ONCE() when changing validity of an STE Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 064/113] cmd64x: potential buffer overflow in cmd64x_program_timings() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (53 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Nick Black, Salman Qazi, Junho Ryu,
Khazhismel Kumykov, Gabriel Krisman Bertazi, Lee Duncan,
Martin K. Petersen, Sasha Levin
From: Nick Black <nlb@google.com>
[ Upstream commit 54155ed4199c7aa3fd20866648024ab63c96d579 ]
A faulty userspace that calls destroy_session() before destroying the
connections can trigger the failure. This patch prevents the issue by
refusing to destroy the session if there are outstanding connections.
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at mm/slub.c:306!
invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 1 PID: 1224 Comm: iscsid Not tainted 5.4.0-rc2.iscsi+ #7
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.12.0-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__slab_free+0x181/0x350
[...]
[ 1209.686056] RSP: 0018:ffffa93d4074fae0 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 1209.686694] RAX: ffff934efa5ad800 RBX: 000000008010000a RCX: ffff934efa5ad800
[ 1209.687651] RDX: ffff934efa5ad800 RSI: ffffeb4041e96b00 RDI: ffff934efd402c40
[ 1209.688582] RBP: ffffa93d4074fb80 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: ffffffffbb5dfa26
[ 1209.689425] R10: ffff934efa5ad800 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffffeb4041e96b00
[ 1209.690285] R13: ffff934efa5ad800 R14: ffff934efd402c40 R15: 0000000000000000
[ 1209.691213] FS: 00007f7945dfb540(0000) GS:ffff934efda80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 1209.692316] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 1209.693013] CR2: 000055877fd3da80 CR3: 0000000077384000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
[ 1209.693897] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 1209.694773] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[ 1209.695631] Call Trace:
[ 1209.695957] ? __wake_up_common_lock+0x8a/0xc0
[ 1209.696712] iscsi_pool_free+0x26/0x40
[ 1209.697263] iscsi_session_teardown+0x2f/0xf0
[ 1209.698117] iscsi_sw_tcp_session_destroy+0x45/0x60
[ 1209.698831] iscsi_if_rx+0xd88/0x14e0
[ 1209.699370] netlink_unicast+0x16f/0x200
[ 1209.699932] netlink_sendmsg+0x21a/0x3e0
[ 1209.700446] sock_sendmsg+0x4f/0x60
[ 1209.700902] ___sys_sendmsg+0x2ae/0x320
[ 1209.701451] ? cp_new_stat+0x150/0x180
[ 1209.701922] __sys_sendmsg+0x59/0xa0
[ 1209.702357] do_syscall_64+0x52/0x160
[ 1209.702812] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[ 1209.703419] RIP: 0033:0x7f7946433914
[...]
[ 1209.706084] RSP: 002b:00007fffb99f2378 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002e
[ 1209.706994] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000055bc869eac20 RCX: 00007f7946433914
[ 1209.708082] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00007fffb99f2390 RDI: 0000000000000005
[ 1209.709120] RBP: 00007fffb99f2390 R08: 000055bc84fe9320 R09: 00007fffb99f1f07
[ 1209.710110] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000038
[ 1209.711085] R13: 000055bc8502306e R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace a2d933ede7f730d8 ]---
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191226203148.2172200-1-krisman@collabora.com
Signed-off-by: Nick Black <nlb@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Salman Qazi <sqazi@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Salman Qazi <sqazi@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Junho Ryu <jayr@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junho Ryu <jayr@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Khazhismel Kumykov <khazhy@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Khazhismel Kumykov <khazhy@google.com>
Co-developed-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.com>
Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi <krisman@collabora.com>
Reviewed-by: Lee Duncan <lduncan@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/scsi/iscsi_tcp.c | 4 ++++
drivers/scsi/scsi_transport_iscsi.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++---
2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/iscsi_tcp.c b/drivers/scsi/iscsi_tcp.c
index fccb8991bd5b7..64a49dccb0b63 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/iscsi_tcp.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/iscsi_tcp.c
@@ -872,6 +872,10 @@ free_host:
static void iscsi_sw_tcp_session_destroy(struct iscsi_cls_session *cls_session)
{
struct Scsi_Host *shost = iscsi_session_to_shost(cls_session);
+ struct iscsi_session *session = cls_session->dd_data;
+
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(session->leadconn))
+ return;
iscsi_tcp_r2tpool_free(cls_session->dd_data);
iscsi_session_teardown(cls_session);
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/scsi_transport_iscsi.c b/drivers/scsi/scsi_transport_iscsi.c
index ab32e60736424..20cf01d6ded7e 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/scsi_transport_iscsi.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/scsi_transport_iscsi.c
@@ -2965,6 +2965,24 @@ iscsi_set_path(struct iscsi_transport *transport, struct iscsi_uevent *ev)
return err;
}
+static int iscsi_session_has_conns(int sid)
+{
+ struct iscsi_cls_conn *conn;
+ unsigned long flags;
+ int found = 0;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&connlock, flags);
+ list_for_each_entry(conn, &connlist, conn_list) {
+ if (iscsi_conn_get_sid(conn) == sid) {
+ found = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&connlock, flags);
+
+ return found;
+}
+
static int
iscsi_set_iface_params(struct iscsi_transport *transport,
struct iscsi_uevent *ev, uint32_t len)
@@ -3539,10 +3557,12 @@ iscsi_if_recv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh, uint32_t *group)
break;
case ISCSI_UEVENT_DESTROY_SESSION:
session = iscsi_session_lookup(ev->u.d_session.sid);
- if (session)
- transport->destroy_session(session);
- else
+ if (!session)
err = -EINVAL;
+ else if (iscsi_session_has_conns(ev->u.d_session.sid))
+ err = -EBUSY;
+ else
+ transport->destroy_session(session);
break;
case ISCSI_UEVENT_UNBIND_SESSION:
session = iscsi_session_lookup(ev->u.d_session.sid);
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 064/113] cmd64x: potential buffer overflow in cmd64x_program_timings()
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (62 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 063/113] scsi: iscsi: Dont destroy session if there are outstanding connections Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 065/113] ide: serverworks: potential overflow in svwks_set_pio_mode() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (52 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Dan Carpenter, David S. Miller, Sasha Levin
From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
[ Upstream commit 117fcc3053606d8db5cef8821dca15022ae578bb ]
The "drive->dn" value is a u8 and it is controlled by root only, but
it could be out of bounds here so let's check.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/ide/cmd64x.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/ide/cmd64x.c b/drivers/ide/cmd64x.c
index b127ed60c7336..9dde8390da09b 100644
--- a/drivers/ide/cmd64x.c
+++ b/drivers/ide/cmd64x.c
@@ -65,6 +65,9 @@ static void cmd64x_program_timings(ide_drive_t *drive, u8 mode)
struct ide_timing t;
u8 arttim = 0;
+ if (drive->dn >= ARRAY_SIZE(drwtim_regs))
+ return;
+
ide_timing_compute(drive, mode, &t, T, 0);
/*
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 065/113] ide: serverworks: potential overflow in svwks_set_pio_mode()
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (63 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 064/113] cmd64x: potential buffer overflow in cmd64x_program_timings() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 066/113] remoteproc: Initialize rproc_class before use Greg Kroah-Hartman
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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Dan Carpenter, David S. Miller, Sasha Levin
From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
[ Upstream commit ce1f31b4c0b9551dd51874dd5364654ed4ca13ae ]
The "drive->dn" variable is a u8 controlled by root.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/ide/serverworks.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/ide/serverworks.c b/drivers/ide/serverworks.c
index a97affca18abe..0f57d45484d1d 100644
--- a/drivers/ide/serverworks.c
+++ b/drivers/ide/serverworks.c
@@ -114,6 +114,9 @@ static void svwks_set_pio_mode(ide_hwif_t *hwif, ide_drive_t *drive)
struct pci_dev *dev = to_pci_dev(hwif->dev);
const u8 pio = drive->pio_mode - XFER_PIO_0;
+ if (drive->dn >= ARRAY_SIZE(drive_pci))
+ return;
+
pci_write_config_byte(dev, drive_pci[drive->dn], pio_modes[pio]);
if (svwks_csb_check(dev)) {
@@ -140,6 +143,9 @@ static void svwks_set_dma_mode(ide_hwif_t *hwif, ide_drive_t *drive)
u8 ultra_enable = 0, ultra_timing = 0, dma_timing = 0;
+ if (drive->dn >= ARRAY_SIZE(drive_pci2))
+ return;
+
pci_read_config_byte(dev, (0x56|hwif->channel), &ultra_timing);
pci_read_config_byte(dev, 0x54, &ultra_enable);
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 066/113] remoteproc: Initialize rproc_class before use
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (64 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 065/113] ide: serverworks: potential overflow in svwks_set_pio_mode() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 067/113] s390/ftrace: generate traced function stack frame Greg Kroah-Hartman
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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Brandon Maier, Bjorn Andersson, Sasha Levin
From: Brandon Maier <brandon.maier@rockwellcollins.com>
[ Upstream commit a8f40111d184098cd2b3dc0c7170c42250a5fa09 ]
The remoteproc_core and remoteproc drivers all initialize with module_init().
However remoteproc drivers need the rproc_class during their probe. If one of
the remoteproc drivers runs init and gets through probe before
remoteproc_init() runs, a NULL pointer access of rproc_class's `glue_dirs`
spinlock occurs.
> Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 000000dc
> pgd = c0004000
> [000000dc] *pgd=00000000
> Internal error: Oops: 5 [#1] PREEMPT ARM
> Modules linked in:
> CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper Tainted: G W 4.14.106-rt56 #1
> Hardware name: Generic OMAP36xx (Flattened Device Tree)
> task: c6050000 task.stack: c604a000
> PC is at rt_spin_lock+0x40/0x6c
> LR is at rt_spin_lock+0x28/0x6c
> pc : [<c0523c90>] lr : [<c0523c78>] psr: 60000013
> sp : c604bdc0 ip : 00000000 fp : 00000000
> r10: 00000000 r9 : c61c7c10 r8 : c6269c20
> r7 : c0905888 r6 : c6269c20 r5 : 00000000 r4 : 000000d4
> r3 : 000000dc r2 : c6050000 r1 : 00000002 r0 : 000000d4
> Flags: nZCv IRQs on FIQs on Mode SVC_32 ISA ARM Segment none
...
> [<c0523c90>] (rt_spin_lock) from [<c03b65a4>] (get_device_parent+0x54/0x17c)
> [<c03b65a4>] (get_device_parent) from [<c03b6bec>] (device_add+0xe0/0x5b4)
> [<c03b6bec>] (device_add) from [<c042adf4>] (rproc_add+0x18/0xd8)
> [<c042adf4>] (rproc_add) from [<c01110e4>] (my_rproc_probe+0x158/0x204)
> [<c01110e4>] (my_rproc_probe) from [<c03bb6b8>] (platform_drv_probe+0x34/0x70)
> [<c03bb6b8>] (platform_drv_probe) from [<c03b9dd4>] (driver_probe_device+0x2c8/0x420)
> [<c03b9dd4>] (driver_probe_device) from [<c03ba02c>] (__driver_attach+0x100/0x11c)
> [<c03ba02c>] (__driver_attach) from [<c03b7d08>] (bus_for_each_dev+0x7c/0xc0)
> [<c03b7d08>] (bus_for_each_dev) from [<c03b910c>] (bus_add_driver+0x1cc/0x264)
> [<c03b910c>] (bus_add_driver) from [<c03ba714>] (driver_register+0x78/0xf8)
> [<c03ba714>] (driver_register) from [<c010181c>] (do_one_initcall+0x100/0x190)
> [<c010181c>] (do_one_initcall) from [<c0800de8>] (kernel_init_freeable+0x130/0x1d0)
> [<c0800de8>] (kernel_init_freeable) from [<c051eee8>] (kernel_init+0x8/0x114)
> [<c051eee8>] (kernel_init) from [<c01175b0>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x24)
> Code: e2843008 e3c2203f f5d3f000 e5922010 (e193cf9f)
> ---[ end trace 0000000000000002 ]---
Signed-off-by: Brandon Maier <brandon.maier@rockwellcollins.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20190530225223.136420-1-brandon.maier@rockwellcollins.com
Signed-off-by: Bjorn Andersson <bjorn.andersson@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_core.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_core.c b/drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_core.c
index 4f7ce0097191d..b76ef5244b655 100644
--- a/drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_core.c
+++ b/drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_core.c
@@ -1477,7 +1477,7 @@ static int __init remoteproc_init(void)
return 0;
}
-module_init(remoteproc_init);
+subsys_initcall(remoteproc_init);
static void __exit remoteproc_exit(void)
{
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 067/113] s390/ftrace: generate traced function stack frame
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` (65 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 066/113] remoteproc: Initialize rproc_class before use Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 068/113] ALSA: hda - Add docking station support for Lenovo Thinkpad T420s Greg Kroah-Hartman
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116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Sven Schnelle, Heiko Carstens,
Vasily Gorbik, Sasha Levin
From: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
[ Upstream commit 45f7a0da600d3c409b5ad8d5ddddacd98ddc8840 ]
Currently backtrace from ftraced function does not contain ftraced
function itself. e.g. for "path_openat":
arch_stack_walk+0x15c/0x2d8
stack_trace_save+0x50/0x68
stack_trace_call+0x15e/0x3d8
ftrace_graph_caller+0x0/0x1c <-- ftrace code
do_filp_open+0x7c/0xe8 <-- ftraced function caller
do_open_execat+0x76/0x1b8
open_exec+0x52/0x78
load_elf_binary+0x180/0x1160
search_binary_handler+0x8e/0x288
load_script+0x2a8/0x2b8
search_binary_handler+0x8e/0x288
__do_execve_file.isra.39+0x6fa/0xb40
__s390x_sys_execve+0x56/0x68
system_call+0xdc/0x2d8
Ftraced function is expected in the backtrace by ftrace kselftests, which
are now failing. It would also be nice to have it for clarity reasons.
"ftrace_caller" itself is called without stack frame allocated for it
and does not store its caller (ftraced function). Instead it simply
allocates a stack frame for "ftrace_trace_function" and sets backchain
to point to ftraced function stack frame (which contains ftraced function
caller in saved r14).
To fix this issue make "ftrace_caller" allocate a stack frame
for itself just to store ftraced function for the stack unwinder.
As a result backtrace looks like the following:
arch_stack_walk+0x15c/0x2d8
stack_trace_save+0x50/0x68
stack_trace_call+0x15e/0x3d8
ftrace_graph_caller+0x0/0x1c <-- ftrace code
path_openat+0x6/0xd60 <-- ftraced function
do_filp_open+0x7c/0xe8 <-- ftraced function caller
do_open_execat+0x76/0x1b8
open_exec+0x52/0x78
load_elf_binary+0x180/0x1160
search_binary_handler+0x8e/0x288
load_script+0x2a8/0x2b8
search_binary_handler+0x8e/0x288
__do_execve_file.isra.39+0x6fa/0xb40
__s390x_sys_execve+0x56/0x68
system_call+0xdc/0x2d8
Reported-by: Sven Schnelle <sven.schnelle@ibm.com>
Tested-by: Sven Schnelle <sven.schnelle@ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
arch/s390/kernel/mcount.S | 15 ++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/mcount.S b/arch/s390/kernel/mcount.S
index 6c1c7d399bf95..78ba14546e007 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/mcount.S
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/mcount.S
@@ -23,6 +23,12 @@ ENTRY(ftrace_stub)
#define STACK_PTREGS (STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD)
#define STACK_PTREGS_GPRS (STACK_PTREGS + __PT_GPRS)
#define STACK_PTREGS_PSW (STACK_PTREGS + __PT_PSW)
+#ifdef __PACK_STACK
+/* allocate just enough for r14, r15 and backchain */
+#define TRACED_FUNC_FRAME_SIZE 24
+#else
+#define TRACED_FUNC_FRAME_SIZE STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD
+#endif
ENTRY(_mcount)
BR_EX %r14
@@ -34,9 +40,16 @@ ENTRY(ftrace_caller)
#ifndef CC_USING_HOTPATCH
aghi %r0,MCOUNT_RETURN_FIXUP
#endif
- aghi %r15,-STACK_FRAME_SIZE
+ # allocate stack frame for ftrace_caller to contain traced function
+ aghi %r15,-TRACED_FUNC_FRAME_SIZE
stg %r1,__SF_BACKCHAIN(%r15)
+ stg %r0,(__SF_GPRS+8*8)(%r15)
+ stg %r15,(__SF_GPRS+9*8)(%r15)
+ # allocate pt_regs and stack frame for ftrace_trace_function
+ aghi %r15,-STACK_FRAME_SIZE
stg %r1,(STACK_PTREGS_GPRS+15*8)(%r15)
+ aghi %r1,-TRACED_FUNC_FRAME_SIZE
+ stg %r1,__SF_BACKCHAIN(%r15)
stg %r0,(STACK_PTREGS_PSW+8)(%r15)
stmg %r2,%r14,(STACK_PTREGS_GPRS+2*8)(%r15)
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_MARCH_Z196_FEATURES
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 068/113] ALSA: hda - Add docking station support for Lenovo Thinkpad T420s
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` (66 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 067/113] s390/ftrace: generate traced function stack frame Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 069/113] jbd2: switch to use jbd2_journal_abort() when failed to submit the commit record Greg Kroah-Hartman
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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Peter Große, Takashi Iwai, Sasha Levin
From: Peter Große <pegro@friiks.de>
[ Upstream commit ef7d84caa5928b40b1c93a26dbe5a3f12737c6ab ]
Lenovo Thinkpad T420s uses the same codec as T420, so apply the
same quirk to enable audio output on a docking station.
Signed-off-by: Peter Große <pegro@friiks.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200122180106.9351-1-pegro@friiks.de
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
sound/pci/hda/patch_conexant.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/sound/pci/hda/patch_conexant.c b/sound/pci/hda/patch_conexant.c
index 05e745e2f4271..3150ddfbdb25e 100644
--- a/sound/pci/hda/patch_conexant.c
+++ b/sound/pci/hda/patch_conexant.c
@@ -866,6 +866,7 @@ static const struct snd_pci_quirk cxt5066_fixups[] = {
SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x215f, "Lenovo T510", CXT_PINCFG_LENOVO_TP410),
SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x21ce, "Lenovo T420", CXT_PINCFG_LENOVO_TP410),
SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x21cf, "Lenovo T520", CXT_PINCFG_LENOVO_TP410),
+ SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x21d2, "Lenovo T420s", CXT_PINCFG_LENOVO_TP410),
SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x21da, "Lenovo X220", CXT_PINCFG_LENOVO_TP410),
SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x21db, "Lenovo X220-tablet", CXT_PINCFG_LENOVO_TP410),
SND_PCI_QUIRK(0x17aa, 0x38af, "Lenovo IdeaPad Z560", CXT_FIXUP_MUTE_LED_EAPD),
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 069/113] jbd2: switch to use jbd2_journal_abort() when failed to submit the commit record
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@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 070/113] ARM: 8951/1: Fix Kexec compilation issue Greg Kroah-Hartman
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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, zhangyi (F),
Jan Kara, Theodore Tso, Sasha Levin
From: zhangyi (F) <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
[ Upstream commit d0a186e0d3e7ac05cc77da7c157dae5aa59f95d9 ]
We invoke jbd2_journal_abort() to abort the journal and record errno
in the jbd2 superblock when committing journal transaction besides the
failure on submitting the commit record. But there is no need for the
case and we can also invoke jbd2_journal_abort() instead of
__jbd2_journal_abort_hard().
Fixes: 818d276ceb83a ("ext4: Add the journal checksum feature")
Signed-off-by: zhangyi (F) <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191204124614.45424-2-yi.zhang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
fs/jbd2/commit.c | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/jbd2/commit.c b/fs/jbd2/commit.c
index 7fe61edb1bb9e..a7d12dd6d56e8 100644
--- a/fs/jbd2/commit.c
+++ b/fs/jbd2/commit.c
@@ -797,7 +797,7 @@ start_journal_io:
err = journal_submit_commit_record(journal, commit_transaction,
&cbh, crc32_sum);
if (err)
- __jbd2_journal_abort_hard(journal);
+ jbd2_journal_abort(journal, err);
}
blk_finish_plug(&plug);
@@ -890,7 +890,7 @@ start_journal_io:
err = journal_submit_commit_record(journal, commit_transaction,
&cbh, crc32_sum);
if (err)
- __jbd2_journal_abort_hard(journal);
+ jbd2_journal_abort(journal, err);
}
if (cbh)
err = journal_wait_on_commit_record(journal, cbh);
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 070/113] ARM: 8951/1: Fix Kexec compilation issue.
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@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 071/113] hostap: Adjust indentation in prism2_hostapd_add_sta Greg Kroah-Hartman
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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Vincenzo Frascino, Russell King, Sasha Levin
From: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
[ Upstream commit 76950f7162cad51d2200ebd22c620c14af38f718 ]
To perform the reserve_crashkernel() operation kexec uses SECTION_SIZE to
find a memblock in a range.
SECTION_SIZE is not defined for nommu systems. Trying to compile kexec in
these conditions results in a build error:
linux/arch/arm/kernel/setup.c: In function ‘reserve_crashkernel’:
linux/arch/arm/kernel/setup.c:1016:25: error: ‘SECTION_SIZE’ undeclared
(first use in this function); did you mean ‘SECTIONS_WIDTH’?
crash_size, SECTION_SIZE);
^~~~~~~~~~~~
SECTIONS_WIDTH
linux/arch/arm/kernel/setup.c:1016:25: note: each undeclared identifier
is reported only once for each function it appears in
linux/scripts/Makefile.build:265: recipe for target 'arch/arm/kernel/setup.o'
failed
Make KEXEC depend on MMU to fix the compilation issue.
Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
arch/arm/Kconfig | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/Kconfig
index 2ba69df49cf86..45f2a5930379a 100644
--- a/arch/arm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm/Kconfig
@@ -2000,7 +2000,7 @@ config XIP_PHYS_ADDR
config KEXEC
bool "Kexec system call (EXPERIMENTAL)"
depends on (!SMP || PM_SLEEP_SMP)
- depends on !CPU_V7M
+ depends on MMU
select KEXEC_CORE
help
kexec is a system call that implements the ability to shutdown your
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 071/113] hostap: Adjust indentation in prism2_hostapd_add_sta
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` (69 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 070/113] ARM: 8951/1: Fix Kexec compilation issue Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 072/113] iwlegacy: ensure loop counter addr does not wrap and cause an infinite loop Greg Kroah-Hartman
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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Nathan Chancellor, Nick Desaulniers,
Kalle Valo, Sasha Levin
From: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit b61156fba74f659d0bc2de8f2dbf5bad9f4b8faf ]
Clang warns:
../drivers/net/wireless/intersil/hostap/hostap_ap.c:2511:3: warning:
misleading indentation; statement is not part of the previous 'if'
[-Wmisleading-indentation]
if (sta->tx_supp_rates & WLAN_RATE_5M5)
^
../drivers/net/wireless/intersil/hostap/hostap_ap.c:2509:2: note:
previous statement is here
if (sta->tx_supp_rates & WLAN_RATE_2M)
^
1 warning generated.
This warning occurs because there is a space before the tab on this
line. Remove it so that the indentation is consistent with the Linux
kernel coding style and clang no longer warns.
Fixes: ff1d2767d5a4 ("Add HostAP wireless driver.")
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/813
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/net/wireless/hostap/hostap_ap.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/hostap/hostap_ap.c b/drivers/net/wireless/hostap/hostap_ap.c
index c995ace153ee6..30171d4c47187 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/hostap/hostap_ap.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/hostap/hostap_ap.c
@@ -2570,7 +2570,7 @@ static int prism2_hostapd_add_sta(struct ap_data *ap,
sta->supported_rates[0] = 2;
if (sta->tx_supp_rates & WLAN_RATE_2M)
sta->supported_rates[1] = 4;
- if (sta->tx_supp_rates & WLAN_RATE_5M5)
+ if (sta->tx_supp_rates & WLAN_RATE_5M5)
sta->supported_rates[2] = 11;
if (sta->tx_supp_rates & WLAN_RATE_11M)
sta->supported_rates[3] = 22;
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 072/113] iwlegacy: ensure loop counter addr does not wrap and cause an infinite loop
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (70 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 071/113] hostap: Adjust indentation in prism2_hostapd_add_sta Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 073/113] drm/nouveau/disp/nv50-: prevent oops when no channel method map provided Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (44 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Colin Ian King, Stanislaw Gruszka,
Kalle Valo, Sasha Levin
From: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
[ Upstream commit c2f9a4e4a5abfc84c01b738496b3fd2d471e0b18 ]
The loop counter addr is a u16 where as the upper limit of the loop
is an int. In the unlikely event that the il->cfg->eeprom_size is
greater than 64K then we end up with an infinite loop since addr will
wrap around an never reach upper loop limit. Fix this by making addr
an int.
Addresses-Coverity: ("Infinite loop")
Fixes: be663ab67077 ("iwlwifi: split the drivers for agn and legacy devices 3945/4965")
Signed-off-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stanislaw Gruszka <stf_xl@wp.pl>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/net/wireless/iwlegacy/common.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/iwlegacy/common.c b/drivers/net/wireless/iwlegacy/common.c
index 887114582583b..544ab3750ea6e 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/iwlegacy/common.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/iwlegacy/common.c
@@ -717,7 +717,7 @@ il_eeprom_init(struct il_priv *il)
u32 gp = _il_rd(il, CSR_EEPROM_GP);
int sz;
int ret;
- u16 addr;
+ int addr;
/* allocate eeprom */
sz = il->cfg->eeprom_size;
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 073/113] drm/nouveau/disp/nv50-: prevent oops when no channel method map provided
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (71 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 072/113] iwlegacy: ensure loop counter addr does not wrap and cause an infinite loop Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 074/113] trigger_next should increase position index Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (43 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Ben Skeggs, Sasha Levin
From: Ben Skeggs <bskeggs@redhat.com>
[ Upstream commit 0e6176c6d286316e9431b4f695940cfac4ffe6c2 ]
The implementations for most channel types contains a map of methods to
priv registers in order to provide debugging info when a disp exception
has been raised.
This info is missing from the implementation of PIO channels as they're
rather simplistic already, however, if an exception is raised by one of
them, we'd end up triggering a NULL-pointer deref. Not ideal...
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206299
Signed-off-by: Ben Skeggs <bskeggs@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/engine/disp/channv50.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/engine/disp/channv50.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/engine/disp/channv50.c
index 01803c0679b68..d012df9fb9df0 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/engine/disp/channv50.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/engine/disp/channv50.c
@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@ nv50_disp_chan_mthd(struct nv50_disp_chan *chan, int debug)
if (debug > subdev->debug)
return;
+ if (!mthd)
+ return;
for (i = 0; (list = mthd->data[i].mthd) != NULL; i++) {
u32 base = chan->head * mthd->addr;
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 074/113] trigger_next should increase position index
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (72 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 073/113] drm/nouveau/disp/nv50-: prevent oops when no channel method map provided Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 075/113] radeon: insert 10ms sleep in dce5_crtc_load_lut Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (42 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Vasily Averin,
Steven Rostedt (VMware),
Sasha Levin
From: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
[ Upstream commit 6722b23e7a2ace078344064a9735fb73e554e9ef ]
if seq_file .next fuction does not change position index,
read after some lseek can generate unexpected output.
Without patch:
# dd bs=30 skip=1 if=/sys/kernel/tracing/events/sched/sched_switch/trigger
dd: /sys/kernel/tracing/events/sched/sched_switch/trigger: cannot skip to specified offset
n traceoff snapshot stacktrace enable_event disable_event enable_hist disable_hist hist
# Available triggers:
# traceon traceoff snapshot stacktrace enable_event disable_event enable_hist disable_hist hist
6+1 records in
6+1 records out
206 bytes copied, 0.00027916 s, 738 kB/s
Notice the printing of "# Available triggers:..." after the line.
With the patch:
# dd bs=30 skip=1 if=/sys/kernel/tracing/events/sched/sched_switch/trigger
dd: /sys/kernel/tracing/events/sched/sched_switch/trigger: cannot skip to specified offset
n traceoff snapshot stacktrace enable_event disable_event enable_hist disable_hist hist
2+1 records in
2+1 records out
88 bytes copied, 0.000526867 s, 167 kB/s
It only prints the end of the file, and does not restart.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/3c35ee24-dd3a-8119-9c19-552ed253388a@virtuozzo.com
https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=206283
Signed-off-by: Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
kernel/trace/trace_events_trigger.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_events_trigger.c b/kernel/trace/trace_events_trigger.c
index 8be66a2b0cacf..6524920c6ebc8 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace_events_trigger.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_events_trigger.c
@@ -121,9 +121,10 @@ static void *trigger_next(struct seq_file *m, void *t, loff_t *pos)
{
struct trace_event_file *event_file = event_file_data(m->private);
- if (t == SHOW_AVAILABLE_TRIGGERS)
+ if (t == SHOW_AVAILABLE_TRIGGERS) {
+ (*pos)++;
return NULL;
-
+ }
return seq_list_next(t, &event_file->triggers, pos);
}
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 075/113] radeon: insert 10ms sleep in dce5_crtc_load_lut
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (73 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 074/113] trigger_next should increase position index Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 076/113] ocfs2: fix a NULL pointer dereference when call ocfs2_update_inode_fsync_trans() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (41 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Alex Deucher, Michel Dänzer,
Daniel Vetter, Sasha Levin
From: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
[ Upstream commit ec3d65082d7dabad6fa8f66a8ef166f2d522d6b2 ]
Per at least one tester this is enough magic to recover the regression
introduced for some people (but not all) in
commit b8e2b0199cc377617dc238f5106352c06dcd3fa2
Author: Peter Rosin <peda@axentia.se>
Date: Tue Jul 4 12:36:57 2017 +0200
drm/fb-helper: factor out pseudo-palette
which for radeon had the side-effect of refactoring out a seemingly
redudant writing of the color palette.
10ms in a fairly slow modeset path feels like an acceptable form of
duct-tape, so maybe worth a shot and see what sticks.
Cc: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Cc: Michel Dänzer <michel.daenzer@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Deucher <alexander.deucher@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_display.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_display.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_display.c
index 446d990623069..4572bfba017c5 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_display.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_display.c
@@ -110,6 +110,8 @@ static void dce5_crtc_load_lut(struct drm_crtc *crtc)
DRM_DEBUG_KMS("%d\n", radeon_crtc->crtc_id);
+ msleep(10);
+
WREG32(NI_INPUT_CSC_CONTROL + radeon_crtc->crtc_offset,
(NI_INPUT_CSC_GRPH_MODE(NI_INPUT_CSC_BYPASS) |
NI_INPUT_CSC_OVL_MODE(NI_INPUT_CSC_BYPASS)));
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 076/113] ocfs2: fix a NULL pointer dereference when call ocfs2_update_inode_fsync_trans()
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (74 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 075/113] radeon: insert 10ms sleep in dce5_crtc_load_lut Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 077/113] lib/scatterlist.c: adjust indentation in __sg_alloc_table Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (40 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Yan Wang, Jun Piao, Mark Fasheh,
Joel Becker, Junxiao Bi, Joseph Qi, Changwei Ge, Gang He,
Andrew Morton, Linus Torvalds, Sasha Levin
From: wangyan <wangyan122@huawei.com>
[ Upstream commit 9f16ca48fc818a17de8be1f75d08e7f4addc4497 ]
I found a NULL pointer dereference in ocfs2_update_inode_fsync_trans(),
handle->h_transaction may be NULL in this situation:
ocfs2_file_write_iter
->__generic_file_write_iter
->generic_perform_write
->ocfs2_write_begin
->ocfs2_write_begin_nolock
->ocfs2_write_cluster_by_desc
->ocfs2_write_cluster
->ocfs2_mark_extent_written
->ocfs2_change_extent_flag
->ocfs2_split_extent
->ocfs2_try_to_merge_extent
->ocfs2_extend_rotate_transaction
->ocfs2_extend_trans
->jbd2_journal_restart
->jbd2__journal_restart
// handle->h_transaction is NULL here
->handle->h_transaction = NULL;
->start_this_handle
/* journal aborted due to storage
network disconnection, return error */
->return -EROFS;
/* line 3806 in ocfs2_try_to_merge_extent (),
it will ignore ret error. */
->ret = 0;
->...
->ocfs2_write_end
->ocfs2_write_end_nolock
->ocfs2_update_inode_fsync_trans
// NULL pointer dereference
->oi->i_sync_tid = handle->h_transaction->t_tid;
The information of NULL pointer dereference as follows:
JBD2: Detected IO errors while flushing file data on dm-11-45
Aborting journal on device dm-11-45.
JBD2: Error -5 detected when updating journal superblock for dm-11-45.
(dd,22081,3):ocfs2_extend_trans:474 ERROR: status = -30
(dd,22081,3):ocfs2_try_to_merge_extent:3877 ERROR: status = -30
Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at
virtual address 0000000000000008
Mem abort info:
ESR = 0x96000004
Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
SET = 0, FnV = 0
EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
Data abort info:
ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000004
CM = 0, WnR = 0
user pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp = 00000000e74e1338
[0000000000000008] pgd=0000000000000000
Internal error: Oops: 96000004 [#1] SMP
Process dd (pid: 22081, stack limit = 0x00000000584f35a9)
CPU: 3 PID: 22081 Comm: dd Kdump: loaded
Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 V2/BC82AMDD, BIOS 0.98 08/25/2019
pstate: 60400009 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO)
pc : ocfs2_write_end_nolock+0x2b8/0x550 [ocfs2]
lr : ocfs2_write_end_nolock+0x2a0/0x550 [ocfs2]
sp : ffff0000459fba70
x29: ffff0000459fba70 x28: 0000000000000000
x27: ffff807ccf7f1000 x26: 0000000000000001
x25: ffff807bdff57970 x24: ffff807caf1d4000
x23: ffff807cc79e9000 x22: 0000000000001000
x21: 000000006c6cd000 x20: ffff0000091d9000
x19: ffff807ccb239db0 x18: ffffffffffffffff
x17: 000000000000000e x16: 0000000000000007
x15: ffff807c5e15bd78 x14: 0000000000000000
x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000001
x9 : 0000000000000228 x8 : 000000000000000c
x7 : 0000000000000fff x6 : ffff807a308ed6b0
x5 : ffff7e01f10967c0 x4 : 0000000000000018
x3 : d0bc661572445600 x2 : 0000000000000000
x1 : 000000001b2e0200 x0 : 0000000000000000
Call trace:
ocfs2_write_end_nolock+0x2b8/0x550 [ocfs2]
ocfs2_write_end+0x4c/0x80 [ocfs2]
generic_perform_write+0x108/0x1a8
__generic_file_write_iter+0x158/0x1c8
ocfs2_file_write_iter+0x668/0x950 [ocfs2]
__vfs_write+0x11c/0x190
vfs_write+0xac/0x1c0
ksys_write+0x6c/0xd8
__arm64_sys_write+0x24/0x30
el0_svc_common+0x78/0x130
el0_svc_handler+0x38/0x78
el0_svc+0x8/0xc
To prevent NULL pointer dereference in this situation, we use
is_handle_aborted() before using handle->h_transaction->t_tid.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/03e750ab-9ade-83aa-b000-b9e81e34e539@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Yan Wang <wangyan122@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Joseph Qi <jiangqi903@gmail.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
fs/ocfs2/journal.h | 8 +++++---
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/journal.h b/fs/ocfs2/journal.h
index f4cd3c3e9fb70..0a4d2cbf512f8 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/journal.h
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/journal.h
@@ -637,9 +637,11 @@ static inline void ocfs2_update_inode_fsync_trans(handle_t *handle,
{
struct ocfs2_inode_info *oi = OCFS2_I(inode);
- oi->i_sync_tid = handle->h_transaction->t_tid;
- if (datasync)
- oi->i_datasync_tid = handle->h_transaction->t_tid;
+ if (!is_handle_aborted(handle)) {
+ oi->i_sync_tid = handle->h_transaction->t_tid;
+ if (datasync)
+ oi->i_datasync_tid = handle->h_transaction->t_tid;
+ }
}
#endif /* OCFS2_JOURNAL_H */
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 077/113] lib/scatterlist.c: adjust indentation in __sg_alloc_table
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (75 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 076/113] ocfs2: fix a NULL pointer dereference when call ocfs2_update_inode_fsync_trans() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 078/113] reiserfs: prevent NULL pointer dereference in reiserfs_insert_item() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (39 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Nathan Chancellor, Andrew Morton,
Linus Torvalds, Sasha Levin
From: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
[ Upstream commit 4e456fee215677584cafa7f67298a76917e89c64 ]
Clang warns:
../lib/scatterlist.c:314:5: warning: misleading indentation; statement
is not part of the previous 'if' [-Wmisleading-indentation]
return -ENOMEM;
^
../lib/scatterlist.c:311:4: note: previous statement is here
if (prv)
^
1 warning generated.
This warning occurs because there is a space before the tab on this
line. Remove it so that the indentation is consistent with the Linux
kernel coding style and clang no longer warns.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191218033606.11942-1-natechancellor@gmail.com
Link: https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/830
Fixes: edce6820a9fd ("scatterlist: prevent invalid free when alloc fails")
Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
lib/scatterlist.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/lib/scatterlist.c b/lib/scatterlist.c
index 0b86b7992f931..1875c09eede91 100644
--- a/lib/scatterlist.c
+++ b/lib/scatterlist.c
@@ -317,7 +317,7 @@ int __sg_alloc_table(struct sg_table *table, unsigned int nents,
if (prv)
table->nents = ++table->orig_nents;
- return -ENOMEM;
+ return -ENOMEM;
}
sg_init_table(sg, alloc_size);
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 078/113] reiserfs: prevent NULL pointer dereference in reiserfs_insert_item()
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (76 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 077/113] lib/scatterlist.c: adjust indentation in __sg_alloc_table Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 079/113] bcache: explicity type cast in bset_bkey_last() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (38 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Yunfeng Ye, zhengbin, Hu Shiyuan,
Feilong Lin, Jan Kara, Andrew Morton, Linus Torvalds,
Sasha Levin
From: Yunfeng Ye <yeyunfeng@huawei.com>
[ Upstream commit aacee5446a2a1aa35d0a49dab289552578657fb4 ]
The variable inode may be NULL in reiserfs_insert_item(), but there is
no check before accessing the member of inode.
Fix this by adding NULL pointer check before calling reiserfs_debug().
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/79c5135d-ff25-1cc9-4e99-9f572b88cc00@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Yunfeng Ye <yeyunfeng@huawei.com>
Cc: zhengbin <zhengbin13@huawei.com>
Cc: Hu Shiyuan <hushiyuan@huawei.com>
Cc: Feilong Lin <linfeilong@huawei.com>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
fs/reiserfs/stree.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/reiserfs/stree.c b/fs/reiserfs/stree.c
index 24cbe013240fa..e3a4cbad9620c 100644
--- a/fs/reiserfs/stree.c
+++ b/fs/reiserfs/stree.c
@@ -2249,7 +2249,8 @@ error_out:
/* also releases the path */
unfix_nodes(&s_ins_balance);
#ifdef REISERQUOTA_DEBUG
- reiserfs_debug(th->t_super, REISERFS_DEBUG_CODE,
+ if (inode)
+ reiserfs_debug(th->t_super, REISERFS_DEBUG_CODE,
"reiserquota insert_item(): freeing %u id=%u type=%c",
quota_bytes, inode->i_uid, head2type(ih));
#endif
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 079/113] bcache: explicity type cast in bset_bkey_last()
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (77 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 078/113] reiserfs: prevent NULL pointer dereference in reiserfs_insert_item() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 080/113] irqchip/gic-v3-its: Reference to its_invall_cmd descriptor when building INVALL Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (37 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, kbuild test robot, Coly Li,
Jens Axboe, Sasha Levin
From: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
[ Upstream commit 7c02b0055f774ed9afb6e1c7724f33bf148ffdc0 ]
In bset.h, macro bset_bkey_last() is defined as,
bkey_idx((struct bkey *) (i)->d, (i)->keys)
Parameter i can be variable type of data structure, the macro always
works once the type of struct i has member 'd' and 'keys'.
bset_bkey_last() is also used in macro csum_set() to calculate the
checksum of a on-disk data structure. When csum_set() is used to
calculate checksum of on-disk bcache super block, the parameter 'i'
data type is struct cache_sb_disk. Inside struct cache_sb_disk (also in
struct cache_sb) the member keys is __u16 type. But bkey_idx() expects
unsigned int (a 32bit width), so there is problem when sending
parameters via stack to call bkey_idx().
Sparse tool from Intel 0day kbuild system reports this incompatible
problem. bkey_idx() is part of user space API, so the simplest fix is
to cast the (i)->keys to unsigned int type in macro bset_bkey_last().
Reported-by: kbuild test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/md/bcache/bset.h | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/md/bcache/bset.h b/drivers/md/bcache/bset.h
index b935839ab79c6..f483041eed986 100644
--- a/drivers/md/bcache/bset.h
+++ b/drivers/md/bcache/bset.h
@@ -380,7 +380,8 @@ void bch_btree_keys_stats(struct btree_keys *, struct bset_stats *);
/* Bkey utility code */
-#define bset_bkey_last(i) bkey_idx((struct bkey *) (i)->d, (i)->keys)
+#define bset_bkey_last(i) bkey_idx((struct bkey *) (i)->d, \
+ (unsigned int)(i)->keys)
static inline struct bkey *bset_bkey_idx(struct bset *i, unsigned idx)
{
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 080/113] irqchip/gic-v3-its: Reference to its_invall_cmd descriptor when building INVALL
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (78 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 079/113] bcache: explicity type cast in bset_bkey_last() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 081/113] microblaze: Prevent the overflow of the start Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (36 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Zenghui Yu, Marc Zyngier, Sasha Levin
From: Zenghui Yu <yuzenghui@huawei.com>
[ Upstream commit 107945227ac5d4c37911c7841b27c64b489ce9a9 ]
It looks like an obvious mistake to use its_mapc_cmd descriptor when
building the INVALL command block. It so far worked by luck because
both its_mapc_cmd.col and its_invall_cmd.col sit at the same offset of
the ITS command descriptor, but we should not rely on it.
Fixes: cc2d3216f53c ("irqchip: GICv3: ITS command queue")
Signed-off-by: Zenghui Yu <yuzenghui@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20191202071021.1251-1-yuzenghui@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3-its.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3-its.c b/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3-its.c
index cf11d43ce2416..d4ae43f71e723 100644
--- a/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3-its.c
+++ b/drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3-its.c
@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ static struct its_collection *its_build_invall_cmd(struct its_cmd_block *cmd,
struct its_cmd_desc *desc)
{
its_encode_cmd(cmd, GITS_CMD_INVALL);
- its_encode_collection(cmd, desc->its_mapc_cmd.col->col_id);
+ its_encode_collection(cmd, desc->its_invall_cmd.col->col_id);
its_fixup_cmd(cmd);
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 081/113] microblaze: Prevent the overflow of the start
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (79 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 080/113] irqchip/gic-v3-its: Reference to its_invall_cmd descriptor when building INVALL Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 082/113] brd: check and limit max_part par Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (35 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Shubhrajyoti Datta, Michal Simek,
Sasha Levin
From: Shubhrajyoti Datta <shubhrajyoti.datta@xilinx.com>
[ Upstream commit 061d2c1d593076424c910cb1b64ecdb5c9a6923f ]
In case the start + cache size is more than the max int the
start overflows.
Prevent the same.
Signed-off-by: Shubhrajyoti Datta <shubhrajyoti.datta@xilinx.com>
Signed-off-by: Michal Simek <michal.simek@xilinx.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
arch/microblaze/kernel/cpu/cache.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/microblaze/kernel/cpu/cache.c b/arch/microblaze/kernel/cpu/cache.c
index 0bde47e4fa694..dcba53803fa5f 100644
--- a/arch/microblaze/kernel/cpu/cache.c
+++ b/arch/microblaze/kernel/cpu/cache.c
@@ -92,7 +92,8 @@ static inline void __disable_dcache_nomsr(void)
#define CACHE_LOOP_LIMITS(start, end, cache_line_length, cache_size) \
do { \
int align = ~(cache_line_length - 1); \
- end = min(start + cache_size, end); \
+ if (start < UINT_MAX - cache_size) \
+ end = min(start + cache_size, end); \
start &= align; \
} while (0)
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 082/113] brd: check and limit max_part par
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (80 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 081/113] microblaze: Prevent the overflow of the start Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 083/113] selinux: ensure we cleanup the internal AVC counters on error in avc_update() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (34 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Zhiqiang Liu, Bob Liu, Ming Lei,
Jens Axboe, Sasha Levin
From: Zhiqiang Liu <liuzhiqiang26@huawei.com>
[ Upstream commit c8ab422553c81a0eb070329c63725df1cd1425bc ]
In brd_init func, rd_nr num of brd_device are firstly allocated
and add in brd_devices, then brd_devices are traversed to add each
brd_device by calling add_disk func. When allocating brd_device,
the disk->first_minor is set to i * max_part, if rd_nr * max_part
is larger than MINORMASK, two different brd_device may have the same
devt, then only one of them can be successfully added.
when rmmod brd.ko, it will cause oops when calling brd_exit.
Follow those steps:
# modprobe brd rd_nr=3 rd_size=102400 max_part=1048576
# rmmod brd
then, the oops will appear.
Oops log:
[ 726.613722] Call trace:
[ 726.614175] kernfs_find_ns+0x24/0x130
[ 726.614852] kernfs_find_and_get_ns+0x44/0x68
[ 726.615749] sysfs_remove_group+0x38/0xb0
[ 726.616520] blk_trace_remove_sysfs+0x1c/0x28
[ 726.617320] blk_unregister_queue+0x98/0x100
[ 726.618105] del_gendisk+0x144/0x2b8
[ 726.618759] brd_exit+0x68/0x560 [brd]
[ 726.619501] __arm64_sys_delete_module+0x19c/0x2a0
[ 726.620384] el0_svc_common+0x78/0x130
[ 726.621057] el0_svc_handler+0x38/0x78
[ 726.621738] el0_svc+0x8/0xc
[ 726.622259] Code: aa0203f6 aa0103f7 aa1e03e0 d503201f (7940e260)
Here, we add brd_check_and_reset_par func to check and limit max_part par.
--
V5->V6:
- remove useless code
V4->V5:(suggested by Ming Lei)
- make sure max_part is not larger than DISK_MAX_PARTS
V3->V4:(suggested by Ming Lei)
- remove useless change
- add one limit of max_part
V2->V3: (suggested by Ming Lei)
- clear .minors when running out of consecutive minor space in brd_alloc
- remove limit of rd_nr
V1->V2:
- add more checks in brd_check_par_valid as suggested by Ming Lei.
Signed-off-by: Zhiqiang Liu <liuzhiqiang26@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Bob Liu <bob.liu@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/block/brd.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/block/brd.c b/drivers/block/brd.c
index 1914c63ca8b1d..58c1138ad5e17 100644
--- a/drivers/block/brd.c
+++ b/drivers/block/brd.c
@@ -581,6 +581,25 @@ static struct kobject *brd_probe(dev_t dev, int *part, void *data)
return kobj;
}
+static inline void brd_check_and_reset_par(void)
+{
+ if (unlikely(!max_part))
+ max_part = 1;
+
+ /*
+ * make sure 'max_part' can be divided exactly by (1U << MINORBITS),
+ * otherwise, it is possiable to get same dev_t when adding partitions.
+ */
+ if ((1U << MINORBITS) % max_part != 0)
+ max_part = 1UL << fls(max_part);
+
+ if (max_part > DISK_MAX_PARTS) {
+ pr_info("brd: max_part can't be larger than %d, reset max_part = %d.\n",
+ DISK_MAX_PARTS, DISK_MAX_PARTS);
+ max_part = DISK_MAX_PARTS;
+ }
+}
+
static int __init brd_init(void)
{
struct brd_device *brd, *next;
@@ -604,8 +623,7 @@ static int __init brd_init(void)
if (register_blkdev(RAMDISK_MAJOR, "ramdisk"))
return -EIO;
- if (unlikely(!max_part))
- max_part = 1;
+ brd_check_and_reset_par();
for (i = 0; i < rd_nr; i++) {
brd = brd_alloc(i);
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 083/113] selinux: ensure we cleanup the internal AVC counters on error in avc_update()
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (81 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 082/113] brd: check and limit max_part par Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 084/113] enic: prevent waking up stopped tx queues over watchdog reset Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (33 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Jaihind Yadav,
Ravi Kumar Siddojigari, Paul Moore, Sasha Levin
From: Jaihind Yadav <jaihindyadav@codeaurora.org>
[ Upstream commit 030b995ad9ece9fa2d218af4429c1c78c2342096 ]
In AVC update we don't call avc_node_kill() when avc_xperms_populate()
fails, resulting in the avc->avc_cache.active_nodes counter having a
false value. In last patch this changes was missed , so correcting it.
Fixes: fa1aa143ac4a ("selinux: extended permissions for ioctls")
Signed-off-by: Jaihind Yadav <jaihindyadav@codeaurora.org>
Signed-off-by: Ravi Kumar Siddojigari <rsiddoji@codeaurora.org>
[PM: merge fuzz, minor description cleanup]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
security/selinux/avc.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index 52f3c550abcc4..f3c473791b698 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -865,7 +865,7 @@ static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u8 driver, u8 xperm, u32 ssid,
if (orig->ae.xp_node) {
rc = avc_xperms_populate(node, orig->ae.xp_node);
if (rc) {
- kmem_cache_free(avc_node_cachep, node);
+ avc_node_kill(node);
goto out_unlock;
}
}
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 084/113] enic: prevent waking up stopped tx queues over watchdog reset
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (82 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 083/113] selinux: ensure we cleanup the internal AVC counters on error in avc_update() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 085/113] floppy: check FDC index for errors before assigning it Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (32 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Firo Yang, David S. Miller
From: Firo Yang <firo.yang@suse.com>
[ Upstream commit 0f90522591fd09dd201065c53ebefdfe3c6b55cb ]
Recent months, our customer reported several kernel crashes all
preceding with following message:
NETDEV WATCHDOG: eth2 (enic): transmit queue 0 timed out
Error message of one of those crashes:
BUG: unable to handle kernel paging request at ffffffffa007e090
After analyzing severl vmcores, I found that most of crashes are
caused by memory corruption. And all the corrupted memory areas
are overwritten by data of network packets. Moreover, I also found
that the tx queues were enabled over watchdog reset.
After going through the source code, I found that in enic_stop(),
the tx queues stopped by netif_tx_disable() could be woken up over
a small time window between netif_tx_disable() and the
napi_disable() by the following code path:
napi_poll->
enic_poll_msix_wq->
vnic_cq_service->
enic_wq_service->
netif_wake_subqueue(enic->netdev, q_number)->
test_and_clear_bit(__QUEUE_STATE_DRV_XOFF, &txq->state)
In turn, upper netowrk stack could queue skb to ENIC NIC though
enic_hard_start_xmit(). And this might introduce some race condition.
Our customer comfirmed that this kind of kernel crash doesn't occur over
90 days since they applied this patch.
Signed-off-by: Firo Yang <firo.yang@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/net/ethernet/cisco/enic/enic_main.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/cisco/enic/enic_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/cisco/enic/enic_main.c
@@ -1807,10 +1807,10 @@ static int enic_stop(struct net_device *
}
netif_carrier_off(netdev);
- netif_tx_disable(netdev);
if (vnic_dev_get_intr_mode(enic->vdev) == VNIC_DEV_INTR_MODE_MSIX)
for (i = 0; i < enic->wq_count; i++)
napi_disable(&enic->napi[enic_cq_wq(enic, i)]);
+ netif_tx_disable(netdev);
if (!enic_is_dynamic(enic) && !enic_is_sriov_vf(enic))
enic_dev_del_station_addr(enic);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 085/113] floppy: check FDC index for errors before assigning it
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (83 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 084/113] enic: prevent waking up stopped tx queues over watchdog reset Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 086/113] staging: android: ashmem: Disallow ashmem memory from being remapped Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (31 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Jordy Zomer, Willy Tarreau,
Dan Carpenter, Linus Torvalds
From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
commit 2e90ca68b0d2f5548804f22f0dd61145516171e3 upstream.
Jordy Zomer reported a KASAN out-of-bounds read in the floppy driver in
wait_til_ready().
Which on the face of it can't happen, since as Willy Tarreau points out,
the function does no particular memory access. Except through the FDCS
macro, which just indexes a static allocation through teh current fdc,
which is always checked against N_FDC.
Except the checking happens after we've already assigned the value.
The floppy driver is a disgrace (a lot of it going back to my original
horrd "design"), and has no real maintainer. Nobody has the hardware,
and nobody really cares. But it still gets used in virtual environment
because it's one of those things that everybody supports.
The whole thing should be re-written, or at least parts of it should be
seriously cleaned up. The 'current fdc' index, which is used by the
FDCS macro, and which is often shadowed by a local 'fdc' variable, is a
prime example of how not to write code.
But because nobody has the hardware or the motivation, let's just fix up
the immediate problem with a nasty band-aid: test the fdc index before
actually assigning it to the static 'fdc' variable.
Reported-by: Jordy Zomer <jordy@simplyhacker.com>
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
Cc: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/block/floppy.c | 7 +++++--
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/block/floppy.c
+++ b/drivers/block/floppy.c
@@ -848,14 +848,17 @@ static void reset_fdc_info(int mode)
/* selects the fdc and drive, and enables the fdc's input/dma. */
static void set_fdc(int drive)
{
+ unsigned int new_fdc = fdc;
+
if (drive >= 0 && drive < N_DRIVE) {
- fdc = FDC(drive);
+ new_fdc = FDC(drive);
current_drive = drive;
}
- if (fdc != 1 && fdc != 0) {
+ if (new_fdc >= N_FDC) {
pr_info("bad fdc value\n");
return;
}
+ fdc = new_fdc;
set_dor(fdc, ~0, 8);
#if N_FDC > 1
set_dor(1 - fdc, ~8, 0);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 086/113] staging: android: ashmem: Disallow ashmem memory from being remapped
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (84 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 085/113] floppy: check FDC index for errors before assigning it Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 087/113] staging: vt6656: fix sign of rx_dbm to bb_pre_ed_rssi Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (30 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Jann Horn, Suren Baghdasaryan,
Todd Kjos, Joel Fernandes (Google)
From: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
commit 6d67b0290b4b84c477e6a2fc6e005e174d3c7786 upstream.
When ashmem file is mmapped, the resulting vma->vm_file points to the
backing shmem file with the generic fops that do not check ashmem
permissions like fops of ashmem do. If an mremap is done on the ashmem
region, then the permission checks will be skipped. Fix that by disallowing
mapping operation on the backing shmem file.
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.4,4.9,4.14,4.18,5.4
Signed-off-by: Todd Kjos <tkjos@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200127235616.48920-1-tkjos@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 28 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c
@@ -357,8 +357,23 @@ static inline vm_flags_t calc_vm_may_fla
_calc_vm_trans(prot, PROT_EXEC, VM_MAYEXEC);
}
+static int ashmem_vmfile_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
+{
+ /* do not allow to mmap ashmem backing shmem file directly */
+ return -EPERM;
+}
+
+static unsigned long
+ashmem_vmfile_get_unmapped_area(struct file *file, unsigned long addr,
+ unsigned long len, unsigned long pgoff,
+ unsigned long flags)
+{
+ return current->mm->get_unmapped_area(file, addr, len, pgoff, flags);
+}
+
static int ashmem_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma)
{
+ static struct file_operations vmfile_fops;
struct ashmem_area *asma = file->private_data;
int ret = 0;
@@ -399,6 +414,19 @@ static int ashmem_mmap(struct file *file
}
vmfile->f_mode |= FMODE_LSEEK;
asma->file = vmfile;
+ /*
+ * override mmap operation of the vmfile so that it can't be
+ * remapped which would lead to creation of a new vma with no
+ * asma permission checks. Have to override get_unmapped_area
+ * as well to prevent VM_BUG_ON check for f_ops modification.
+ */
+ if (!vmfile_fops.mmap) {
+ vmfile_fops = *vmfile->f_op;
+ vmfile_fops.mmap = ashmem_vmfile_mmap;
+ vmfile_fops.get_unmapped_area =
+ ashmem_vmfile_get_unmapped_area;
+ }
+ vmfile->f_op = &vmfile_fops;
}
get_file(asma->file);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 087/113] staging: vt6656: fix sign of rx_dbm to bb_pre_ed_rssi.
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (85 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 086/113] staging: android: ashmem: Disallow ashmem memory from being remapped Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 088/113] usb: uas: fix a plug & unplug racing Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (29 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Malcolm Priestley
From: Malcolm Priestley <tvboxspy@gmail.com>
commit 93134df520f23f4e9998c425b8987edca7016817 upstream.
bb_pre_ed_rssi is an u8 rx_dm always returns negative signed
values add minus operator to always yield positive.
fixes issue where rx sensitivity is always set to maximum because
the unsigned numbers were always greater then 100.
Fixes: 63b9907f58f1 ("staging: vt6656: mac80211 conversion: create rx function.")
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Malcolm Priestley <tvboxspy@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/aceac98c-6e69-3ce1-dfec-2bf27b980221@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/staging/vt6656/dpc.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/staging/vt6656/dpc.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/vt6656/dpc.c
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ int vnt_rx_data(struct vnt_private *priv
vnt_rf_rssi_to_dbm(priv, *rssi, &rx_dbm);
- priv->bb_pre_ed_rssi = (u8)rx_dbm + 1;
+ priv->bb_pre_ed_rssi = (u8)-rx_dbm + 1;
priv->current_rssi = priv->bb_pre_ed_rssi;
frame = skb_data + 8;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 088/113] usb: uas: fix a plug & unplug racing
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (86 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 087/113] staging: vt6656: fix sign of rx_dbm to bb_pre_ed_rssi Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 089/113] USB: Fix novation SourceControl XL after suspend Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (28 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, EJ Hsu, Oliver Neukum
From: EJ Hsu <ejh@nvidia.com>
commit 3e99862c05a9caa5a27969f41566b428696f5a9a upstream.
When a uas disk is plugged into an external hub, uas_probe()
will be called by the hub thread to do the probe. It will
first create a SCSI host and then do the scan for this host.
During the scan, it will probe the LUN using SCSI INQUERY command
which will be packed in the URB and submitted to uas disk.
There might be a chance that this external hub with uas disk
attached is unplugged during the scan. In this case, uas driver
will fail to submit the URB (due to the NOTATTACHED state of uas
device) and try to put this SCSI command back to request queue
waiting for next chance to run.
In normal case, this cycle will terminate when hub thread gets
disconnection event and calls into uas_disconnect() accordingly.
But in this case, uas_disconnect() will not be called because
hub thread of external hub gets stuck waiting for the completion
of this SCSI command. A deadlock happened.
In this fix, uas will call scsi_scan_host() asynchronously to
avoid the blocking of hub thread.
Signed-off-by: EJ Hsu <ejh@nvidia.com>
Acked-by: Oliver Neukum <oneukum@suse.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200130092506.102760-1-ejh@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/storage/uas.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 22 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/usb/storage/uas.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/storage/uas.c
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ struct uas_dev_info {
struct scsi_cmnd *cmnd[MAX_CMNDS];
spinlock_t lock;
struct work_struct work;
+ struct work_struct scan_work; /* for async scanning */
};
enum {
@@ -115,6 +116,17 @@ out:
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&devinfo->lock, flags);
}
+static void uas_scan_work(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+ struct uas_dev_info *devinfo =
+ container_of(work, struct uas_dev_info, scan_work);
+ struct Scsi_Host *shost = usb_get_intfdata(devinfo->intf);
+
+ dev_dbg(&devinfo->intf->dev, "starting scan\n");
+ scsi_scan_host(shost);
+ dev_dbg(&devinfo->intf->dev, "scan complete\n");
+}
+
static void uas_add_work(struct uas_cmd_info *cmdinfo)
{
struct scsi_pointer *scp = (void *)cmdinfo;
@@ -929,6 +941,7 @@ static int uas_probe(struct usb_interfac
init_usb_anchor(&devinfo->data_urbs);
spin_lock_init(&devinfo->lock);
INIT_WORK(&devinfo->work, uas_do_work);
+ INIT_WORK(&devinfo->scan_work, uas_scan_work);
result = uas_configure_endpoints(devinfo);
if (result)
@@ -945,7 +958,9 @@ static int uas_probe(struct usb_interfac
if (result)
goto free_streams;
- scsi_scan_host(shost);
+ /* Submit the delayed_work for SCSI-device scanning */
+ schedule_work(&devinfo->scan_work);
+
return result;
free_streams:
@@ -1113,6 +1128,12 @@ static void uas_disconnect(struct usb_in
usb_kill_anchored_urbs(&devinfo->data_urbs);
uas_zap_pending(devinfo, DID_NO_CONNECT);
+ /*
+ * Prevent SCSI scanning (if it hasn't started yet)
+ * or wait for the SCSI-scanning routine to stop.
+ */
+ cancel_work_sync(&devinfo->scan_work);
+
scsi_remove_host(shost);
uas_free_streams(devinfo);
scsi_host_put(shost);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 089/113] USB: Fix novation SourceControl XL after suspend
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (87 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 088/113] usb: uas: fix a plug & unplug racing Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 090/113] USB: hub: Dont record a connect-change event during reset-resume Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (27 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Richard Dodd
From: Richard Dodd <richard.o.dodd@gmail.com>
commit b692056db8ecc7f452b934f016c17348282b7699 upstream.
Currently, the SourceControl will stay in power-down mode after resuming
from suspend. This patch resets the device after suspend to power it up.
Signed-off-by: Richard Dodd <richard.o.dodd@gmail.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200212142220.36892-1-richard.o.dodd@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/core/quirks.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
--- a/drivers/usb/core/quirks.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/core/quirks.c
@@ -291,6 +291,9 @@ static const struct usb_device_id usb_qu
/* INTEL VALUE SSD */
{ USB_DEVICE(0x8086, 0xf1a5), .driver_info = USB_QUIRK_RESET_RESUME },
+ /* novation SoundControl XL */
+ { USB_DEVICE(0x1235, 0x0061), .driver_info = USB_QUIRK_RESET_RESUME },
+
{ } /* terminating entry must be last */
};
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 090/113] USB: hub: Dont record a connect-change event during reset-resume
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (88 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 089/113] USB: Fix novation SourceControl XL after suspend Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 091/113] staging: rtl8188eu: Fix potential security hole Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (26 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Alan Stern, David Heinzelmann,
Paul Zimmerman
From: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
commit 8099f58f1ecddf4f374f4828a3dff8397c7cbd74 upstream.
Paul Zimmerman reports that his USB Bluetooth adapter sometimes
crashes following system resume, when it receives a
Get-Device-Descriptor request while it is busy doing something else.
Such a request was added by commit a4f55d8b8c14 ("usb: hub: Check
device descriptor before resusciation"). It gets sent when the hub
driver's work thread checks whether a connect-change event on an
enabled port really indicates a new device has been connected, as
opposed to an old device momentarily disconnecting and then
reconnecting (which can happen with xHCI host controllers, since they
automatically enable connected ports).
The same kind of thing occurs when a port's power session is lost
during system suspend. When the system wakes up it sees a
connect-change event on the port, and if the child device's
persist_enabled flag was set then hub_activate() sets the device's
reset_resume flag as well as the port's bit in hub->change_bits. The
reset-resume code then takes responsibility for checking that the same
device is still attached to the port, and it does this as part of the
device's resume pathway. By the time the hub driver's work thread
starts up again, the device has already been fully reinitialized and
is busy doing its own thing. There's no need for the work thread to
do the same check a second time, and in fact this unnecessary check is
what caused the problem that Paul observed.
Note that performing the unnecessary check is not actually a bug.
Devices are supposed to be able to send descriptors back to the host
even when they are busy doing something else. The underlying cause of
Paul's problem lies in his Bluetooth adapter. Nevertheless, we
shouldn't perform the same check twice in a row -- and as a nice side
benefit, removing the extra check allows the Bluetooth adapter to work
more reliably.
The work thread performs its check when it sees that the port's bit is
set in hub->change_bits. In this situation that bit is interpreted as
though a connect-change event had occurred on the port _after_ the
reset-resume, which is not what actually happened.
One possible fix would be to make the reset-resume code clear the
port's bit in hub->change_bits. But it seems simpler to just avoid
setting the bit during hub_activate() in the first place. That's what
this patch does.
(Proving that the patch is correct when CONFIG_PM is disabled requires
a little thought. In that setting hub_activate() will be called only
for initialization and resets, since there won't be any resumes or
reset-resumes. During initialization and hub resets the hub doesn't
have any child devices, and so this code path never gets executed.)
Reported-and-tested-by: Paul Zimmerman <pauldzim@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
Link: https://marc.info/?t=157949360700001&r=1&w=2
CC: David Heinzelmann <heinzelmann.david@gmail.com>
CC: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/Pine.LNX.4.44L0.2001311037460.1577-100000@iolanthe.rowland.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/core/hub.c | 5 -----
1 file changed, 5 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/core/hub.c
@@ -1171,11 +1171,6 @@ static void hub_activate(struct usb_hub
#ifdef CONFIG_PM
udev->reset_resume = 1;
#endif
- /* Don't set the change_bits when the device
- * was powered off.
- */
- if (test_bit(port1, hub->power_bits))
- set_bit(port1, hub->change_bits);
} else {
/* The power session is gone; tell hub_wq */
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 091/113] staging: rtl8188eu: Fix potential security hole
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (89 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 090/113] USB: hub: Dont record a connect-change event during reset-resume Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 092/113] staging: rtl8188eu: Fix potential overuse of kernel memory Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (25 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Pietro Oliva, Larry Finger
From: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net>
commit 499c405b2b80bb3a04425ba3541d20305e014d3e upstream.
In routine rtw_hostapd_ioctl(), the user-controlled p->length is assumed
to be at least the size of struct ieee_param size, but this assumption is
never checked. This could result in out-of-bounds read/write on kernel
heap in case a p->length less than the size of struct ieee_param is
specified by the user. If p->length is allowed to be greater than the size
of the struct, then a malicious user could be wasting kernel memory.
Fixes commit a2c60d42d97c ("Add files for new driver - part 16").
Reported by: Pietro Oliva <pietroliva@gmail.com>
Cc: Pietro Oliva <pietroliva@gmail.com>
Cc: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: a2c60d42d97c ("staging: r8188eu: Add files for new driver - part 16")
Signed-off-by: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200210180235.21691-2-Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c
@@ -2859,7 +2859,7 @@ static int rtw_hostapd_ioctl(struct net_
goto out;
}
- if (!p->pointer) {
+ if (!p->pointer || p->length != sizeof(struct ieee_param)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 092/113] staging: rtl8188eu: Fix potential overuse of kernel memory
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (90 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 091/113] staging: rtl8188eu: Fix potential security hole Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 093/113] x86/mce/amd: Fix kobject lifetime Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (24 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Pietro Oliva, Larry Finger
From: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net>
commit 4ddf8ab8d15ddbc52eefb44eb64e38466ce1f70f upstream.
In routine wpa_supplicant_ioctl(), the user-controlled p->length is
checked to be at least the size of struct ieee_param size, but the code
does not detect the case where p->length is greater than the size
of the struct, thus a malicious user could be wasting kernel memory.
Fixes commit a2c60d42d97c ("Add files for new driver - part 16").
Reported by: Pietro Oliva <pietroliva@gmail.com>
Cc: Pietro Oliva <pietroliva@gmail.com>
Cc: Stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes commit a2c60d42d97c ("Add files for new driver - part 16").
Signed-off-by: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200210180235.21691-4-Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c
@@ -2054,7 +2054,7 @@ static int wpa_supplicant_ioctl(struct n
struct ieee_param *param;
uint ret = 0;
- if (p->length < sizeof(struct ieee_param) || !p->pointer) {
+ if (!p->pointer || p->length != sizeof(struct ieee_param)) {
ret = -EINVAL;
goto out;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 093/113] x86/mce/amd: Fix kobject lifetime
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (91 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 092/113] staging: rtl8188eu: Fix potential overuse of kernel memory Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 094/113] tty: serial: imx: setup the correct sg entry for tx dma Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (23 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Thomas Gleixner, Borislav Petkov
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
commit 51dede9c05df2b78acd6dcf6a17d21f0877d2d7b upstream.
Accessing the MCA thresholding controls in sysfs concurrently with CPU
hotplug can lead to a couple of KASAN-reported issues:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in sysfs_file_ops+0x155/0x180
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888367578940 by task grep/4019
and
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in show_error_count+0x15c/0x180
Read of size 2 at addr ffff888368a05514 by task grep/4454
for example. Both result from the fact that the threshold block
creation/teardown code frees the descriptor memory itself instead of
defining proper ->release function and leaving it to the driver core to
take care of that, after all sysfs accesses have completed.
Do that and get rid of the custom freeing code, fixing the above UAFs in
the process.
[ bp: write commit message. ]
Fixes: 95268664390b ("[PATCH] x86_64: mce_amd support for family 0x10 processors")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200214082801.13836-1-bp@alien8.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce_amd.c | 17 +++++++++++------
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce_amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce_amd.c
@@ -560,9 +560,12 @@ static const struct sysfs_ops threshold_
.store = store,
};
+static void threshold_block_release(struct kobject *kobj);
+
static struct kobj_type threshold_ktype = {
.sysfs_ops = &threshold_ops,
.default_attrs = default_attrs,
+ .release = threshold_block_release,
};
static int allocate_threshold_blocks(unsigned int cpu, unsigned int bank,
@@ -765,8 +768,12 @@ static int threshold_create_device(unsig
return err;
}
-static void deallocate_threshold_block(unsigned int cpu,
- unsigned int bank)
+static void threshold_block_release(struct kobject *kobj)
+{
+ kfree(to_block(kobj));
+}
+
+static void deallocate_threshold_block(unsigned int cpu, unsigned int bank)
{
struct threshold_block *pos = NULL;
struct threshold_block *tmp = NULL;
@@ -776,13 +783,11 @@ static void deallocate_threshold_block(u
return;
list_for_each_entry_safe(pos, tmp, &head->blocks->miscj, miscj) {
- kobject_put(&pos->kobj);
list_del(&pos->miscj);
- kfree(pos);
+ kobject_put(&pos->kobj);
}
- kfree(per_cpu(threshold_banks, cpu)[bank]->blocks);
- per_cpu(threshold_banks, cpu)[bank]->blocks = NULL;
+ kobject_put(&head->blocks->kobj);
}
static void __threshold_remove_blocks(struct threshold_bank *b)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 094/113] tty: serial: imx: setup the correct sg entry for tx dma
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (92 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 093/113] x86/mce/amd: Fix kobject lifetime Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 095/113] Revert "ipc,sem: remove uneeded sem_undo_list lock usage in exit_sem()" Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (22 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Eagle Zhou, Fugang Duan,
Uwe Kleine-König
From: Fugang Duan <fugang.duan@nxp.com>
commit f76707831829530ffdd3888bebc108aecefccaa0 upstream.
There has oops as below happen on i.MX8MP EVK platform that has
6G bytes DDR memory.
when (xmit->tail < xmit->head) && (xmit->head == 0),
it setups one sg entry with sg->length is zero:
sg_set_buf(sgl + 1, xmit->buf, xmit->head);
if xmit->buf is allocated from >4G address space, and SDMA only
support <4G address space, then dma_map_sg() will call swiotlb_map()
to do bounce buffer copying and mapping.
But swiotlb_map() don't allow sg entry's length is zero, otherwise
report BUG_ON().
So the patch is to correct the tx DMA scatter list.
Oops:
[ 287.675715] kernel BUG at kernel/dma/swiotlb.c:497!
[ 287.680592] Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
[ 287.686075] Modules linked in:
[ 287.689133] CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.4.3-00016-g3fdc4e0-dirty #10
[ 287.696872] Hardware name: FSL i.MX8MP EVK (DT)
[ 287.701402] pstate: 80000085 (Nzcv daIf -PAN -UAO)
[ 287.706199] pc : swiotlb_tbl_map_single+0x1fc/0x310
[ 287.711076] lr : swiotlb_map+0x60/0x148
[ 287.714909] sp : ffff800010003c00
[ 287.718221] x29: ffff800010003c00 x28: 0000000000000000
[ 287.723533] x27: 0000000000000040 x26: ffff800011ae0000
[ 287.728844] x25: ffff800011ae09f8 x24: 0000000000000000
[ 287.734155] x23: 00000001b7af9000 x22: 0000000000000000
[ 287.739465] x21: ffff000176409c10 x20: 00000000001f7ffe
[ 287.744776] x19: ffff000176409c10 x18: 000000000000002e
[ 287.750087] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[ 287.755397] x15: 0000000000000000 x14: 0000000000000000
[ 287.760707] x13: ffff00017f334000 x12: 0000000000000001
[ 287.766018] x11: 00000000001fffff x10: 0000000000000000
[ 287.771328] x9 : 0000000000000003 x8 : 0000000000000000
[ 287.776638] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000
[ 287.781949] x5 : 0000000000200000 x4 : 0000000000000000
[ 287.787259] x3 : 0000000000000001 x2 : 00000001b7af9000
[ 287.792570] x1 : 00000000fbfff000 x0 : 0000000000000000
[ 287.797881] Call trace:
[ 287.800328] swiotlb_tbl_map_single+0x1fc/0x310
[ 287.804859] swiotlb_map+0x60/0x148
[ 287.808347] dma_direct_map_page+0xf0/0x130
[ 287.812530] dma_direct_map_sg+0x78/0xe0
[ 287.816453] imx_uart_dma_tx+0x134/0x2f8
[ 287.820374] imx_uart_dma_tx_callback+0xd8/0x168
[ 287.824992] vchan_complete+0x194/0x200
[ 287.828828] tasklet_action_common.isra.0+0x154/0x1a0
[ 287.833879] tasklet_action+0x24/0x30
[ 287.837540] __do_softirq+0x120/0x23c
[ 287.841202] irq_exit+0xb8/0xd8
[ 287.844343] __handle_domain_irq+0x64/0xb8
[ 287.848438] gic_handle_irq+0x5c/0x148
[ 287.852185] el1_irq+0xb8/0x180
[ 287.855327] cpuidle_enter_state+0x84/0x360
[ 287.859508] cpuidle_enter+0x34/0x48
[ 287.863083] call_cpuidle+0x18/0x38
[ 287.866571] do_idle+0x1e0/0x280
[ 287.869798] cpu_startup_entry+0x20/0x40
[ 287.873721] rest_init+0xd4/0xe0
[ 287.876949] arch_call_rest_init+0xc/0x14
[ 287.880958] start_kernel+0x420/0x44c
[ 287.884622] Code: 9124c021 9417aff8 a94363f7 17ffffd5 (d4210000)
[ 287.890718] ---[ end trace 5bc44c4ab6b009ce ]---
[ 287.895334] Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
[ 287.901686] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[ 288.905607] SMP: failed to stop secondary CPUs 0-1
[ 288.910395] Kernel Offset: disabled
[ 288.913882] CPU features: 0x0002,2000200c
[ 288.917888] Memory Limit: none
[ 288.920944] ---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt ]---
Reported-by: Eagle Zhou <eagle.zhou@nxp.com>
Tested-by: Eagle Zhou <eagle.zhou@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Fugang Duan <fugang.duan@nxp.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Fixes: 7942f8577f2a ("serial: imx: TX DMA: clean up sg initialization")
Reviewed-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1581401761-6378-1-git-send-email-fugang.duan@nxp.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/tty/serial/imx.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/tty/serial/imx.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/serial/imx.c
@@ -529,7 +529,7 @@ static void imx_dma_tx(struct imx_port *
sport->tx_bytes = uart_circ_chars_pending(xmit);
- if (xmit->tail < xmit->head) {
+ if (xmit->tail < xmit->head || xmit->head == 0) {
sport->dma_tx_nents = 1;
sg_init_one(sgl, xmit->buf + xmit->tail, sport->tx_bytes);
} else {
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 095/113] Revert "ipc,sem: remove uneeded sem_undo_list lock usage in exit_sem()"
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (93 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 094/113] tty: serial: imx: setup the correct sg entry for tx dma Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 096/113] xhci: apply XHCI_PME_STUCK_QUIRK to Intel Comet Lake platforms Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (21 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Ioanna Alifieraki, Manfred Spraul,
Herton R. Krzesinski, Arnd Bergmann, Catalin Marinas, malat,
Joel Fernandes (Google),
Davidlohr Bueso, Jay Vosburgh, Andrew Morton, Linus Torvalds
From: Ioanna Alifieraki <ioanna-maria.alifieraki@canonical.com>
commit edf28f4061afe4c2d9eb1c3323d90e882c1d6800 upstream.
This reverts commit a97955844807e327df11aa33869009d14d6b7de0.
Commit a97955844807 ("ipc,sem: remove uneeded sem_undo_list lock usage
in exit_sem()") removes a lock that is needed. This leads to a process
looping infinitely in exit_sem() and can also lead to a crash. There is
a reproducer available in [1] and with the commit reverted the issue
does not reproduce anymore.
Using the reproducer found in [1] is fairly easy to reach a point where
one of the child processes is looping infinitely in exit_sem between
for(;;) and if (semid == -1) block, while it's trying to free its last
sem_undo structure which has already been freed by freeary().
Each sem_undo struct is on two lists: one per semaphore set (list_id)
and one per process (list_proc). The list_id list tracks undos by
semaphore set, and the list_proc by process.
Undo structures are removed either by freeary() or by exit_sem(). The
freeary function is invoked when the user invokes a syscall to remove a
semaphore set. During this operation freeary() traverses the list_id
associated with the semaphore set and removes the undo structures from
both the list_id and list_proc lists.
For this case, exit_sem() is called at process exit. Each process
contains a struct sem_undo_list (referred to as "ulp") which contains
the head for the list_proc list. When the process exits, exit_sem()
traverses this list to remove each sem_undo struct. As in freeary(),
whenever a sem_undo struct is removed from list_proc, it is also removed
from the list_id list.
Removing elements from list_id is safe for both exit_sem() and freeary()
due to sem_lock(). Removing elements from list_proc is not safe;
freeary() locks &un->ulp->lock when it performs
list_del_rcu(&un->list_proc) but exit_sem() does not (locking was
removed by commit a97955844807 ("ipc,sem: remove uneeded sem_undo_list
lock usage in exit_sem()").
This can result in the following situation while executing the
reproducer [1] : Consider a child process in exit_sem() and the parent
in freeary() (because of semctl(sid[i], NSEM, IPC_RMID)).
- The list_proc for the child contains the last two undo structs A and
B (the rest have been removed either by exit_sem() or freeary()).
- The semid for A is 1 and semid for B is 2.
- exit_sem() removes A and at the same time freeary() removes B.
- Since A and B have different semid sem_lock() will acquire different
locks for each process and both can proceed.
The bug is that they remove A and B from the same list_proc at the same
time because only freeary() acquires the ulp lock. When exit_sem()
removes A it makes ulp->list_proc.next to point at B and at the same
time freeary() removes B setting B->semid=-1.
At the next iteration of for(;;) loop exit_sem() will try to remove B.
The only way to break from for(;;) is for (&un->list_proc ==
&ulp->list_proc) to be true which is not. Then exit_sem() will check if
B->semid=-1 which is and will continue looping in for(;;) until the
memory for B is reallocated and the value at B->semid is changed.
At that point, exit_sem() will crash attempting to unlink B from the
lists (this can be easily triggered by running the reproducer [1] a
second time).
To prove this scenario instrumentation was added to keep information
about each sem_undo (un) struct that is removed per process and per
semaphore set (sma).
CPU0 CPU1
[caller holds sem_lock(sma for A)] ...
freeary() exit_sem()
... ...
... sem_lock(sma for B)
spin_lock(A->ulp->lock) ...
list_del_rcu(un_A->list_proc) list_del_rcu(un_B->list_proc)
Undo structures A and B have different semid and sem_lock() operations
proceed. However they belong to the same list_proc list and they are
removed at the same time. This results into ulp->list_proc.next
pointing to the address of B which is already removed.
After reverting commit a97955844807 ("ipc,sem: remove uneeded
sem_undo_list lock usage in exit_sem()") the issue was no longer
reproducible.
[1] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1694779
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191211191318.11860-1-ioanna-maria.alifieraki@canonical.com
Fixes: a97955844807 ("ipc,sem: remove uneeded sem_undo_list lock usage in exit_sem()")
Signed-off-by: Ioanna Alifieraki <ioanna-maria.alifieraki@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Manfred Spraul <manfred@colorfullife.com>
Acked-by: Herton R. Krzesinski <herton@redhat.com>
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: <malat@debian.org>
Cc: Joel Fernandes (Google) <joel@joelfernandes.org>
Cc: Davidlohr Bueso <dave@stgolabs.net>
Cc: Jay Vosburgh <jay.vosburgh@canonical.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
ipc/sem.c | 6 ++----
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/ipc/sem.c
+++ b/ipc/sem.c
@@ -2151,11 +2151,9 @@ void exit_sem(struct task_struct *tsk)
ipc_assert_locked_object(&sma->sem_perm);
list_del(&un->list_id);
- /* we are the last process using this ulp, acquiring ulp->lock
- * isn't required. Besides that, we are also protected against
- * IPC_RMID as we hold sma->sem_perm lock now
- */
+ spin_lock(&ulp->lock);
list_del_rcu(&un->list_proc);
+ spin_unlock(&ulp->lock);
/* perform adjustments registered in un */
for (i = 0; i < sma->sem_nsems; i++) {
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 096/113] xhci: apply XHCI_PME_STUCK_QUIRK to Intel Comet Lake platforms
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (94 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 095/113] Revert "ipc,sem: remove uneeded sem_undo_list lock usage in exit_sem()" Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 097/113] VT_RESIZEX: get rid of field-by-field copyin Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (20 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Mathias Nyman
From: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com>
commit a3ae87dce3a5abe0b57c811bab02b2564b574106 upstream.
Intel Comet Lake based platform require the XHCI_PME_STUCK_QUIRK
quirk as well. Without this xHC can not enter D3 in runtime suspend.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200210134553.9144-5-mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci.c
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
#define PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_BROXTON_B_XHCI 0x1aa8
#define PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_APL_XHCI 0x5aa8
#define PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_DNV_XHCI 0x19d0
+#define PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_CML_XHCI 0xa3af
static const char hcd_name[] = "xhci_hcd";
@@ -169,7 +170,8 @@ static void xhci_pci_quirks(struct devic
pdev->device == PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_BROXTON_M_XHCI ||
pdev->device == PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_BROXTON_B_XHCI ||
pdev->device == PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_APL_XHCI ||
- pdev->device == PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_DNV_XHCI)) {
+ pdev->device == PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_DNV_XHCI ||
+ pdev->device == PCI_DEVICE_ID_INTEL_CML_XHCI)) {
xhci->quirks |= XHCI_PME_STUCK_QUIRK;
}
if (pdev->vendor == PCI_VENDOR_ID_INTEL &&
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 097/113] VT_RESIZEX: get rid of field-by-field copyin
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (95 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 096/113] xhci: apply XHCI_PME_STUCK_QUIRK to Intel Comet Lake platforms Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 098/113] vt: vt_ioctl: fix race in VT_RESIZEX Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (19 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Al Viro, Sasha Levin
From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
[ Upstream commit 1b3bce4d6bf839304a90951b4b25a5863533bf2a ]
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c | 68 ++++++++++++++++-----------------------
1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 41 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c b/drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c
index a86bc7afb3b28..a1e5c408c931b 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c
@@ -850,58 +850,44 @@ int vt_ioctl(struct tty_struct *tty,
case VT_RESIZEX:
{
- struct vt_consize __user *vtconsize = up;
- ushort ll,cc,vlin,clin,vcol,ccol;
+ struct vt_consize v;
if (!perm)
return -EPERM;
- if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, vtconsize,
- sizeof(struct vt_consize))) {
- ret = -EFAULT;
- break;
- }
+ if (copy_from_user(&v, up, sizeof(struct vt_consize)))
+ return -EFAULT;
/* FIXME: Should check the copies properly */
- __get_user(ll, &vtconsize->v_rows);
- __get_user(cc, &vtconsize->v_cols);
- __get_user(vlin, &vtconsize->v_vlin);
- __get_user(clin, &vtconsize->v_clin);
- __get_user(vcol, &vtconsize->v_vcol);
- __get_user(ccol, &vtconsize->v_ccol);
- vlin = vlin ? vlin : vc->vc_scan_lines;
- if (clin) {
- if (ll) {
- if (ll != vlin/clin) {
- /* Parameters don't add up */
- ret = -EINVAL;
- break;
- }
- } else
- ll = vlin/clin;
+ if (!v.v_vlin)
+ v.v_vlin = vc->vc_scan_lines;
+ if (v.v_clin) {
+ int rows = v.v_vlin/v.v_clin;
+ if (v.v_rows != rows) {
+ if (v.v_rows) /* Parameters don't add up */
+ return -EINVAL;
+ v.v_rows = rows;
+ }
}
- if (vcol && ccol) {
- if (cc) {
- if (cc != vcol/ccol) {
- ret = -EINVAL;
- break;
- }
- } else
- cc = vcol/ccol;
+ if (v.v_vcol && v.v_ccol) {
+ int cols = v.v_vcol/v.v_ccol;
+ if (v.v_cols != cols) {
+ if (v.v_cols)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ v.v_cols = cols;
+ }
}
- if (clin > 32) {
- ret = -EINVAL;
- break;
- }
-
+ if (v.v_clin > 32)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
for (i = 0; i < MAX_NR_CONSOLES; i++) {
if (!vc_cons[i].d)
continue;
console_lock();
- if (vlin)
- vc_cons[i].d->vc_scan_lines = vlin;
- if (clin)
- vc_cons[i].d->vc_font.height = clin;
+ if (v.v_vlin)
+ vc_cons[i].d->vc_scan_lines = v.v_vlin;
+ if (v.v_clin)
+ vc_cons[i].d->vc_font.height = v.v_clin;
vc_cons[i].d->vc_resize_user = 1;
- vc_resize(vc_cons[i].d, cc, ll);
+ vc_resize(vc_cons[i].d, v.v_cols, v.v_rows);
console_unlock();
}
break;
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 098/113] vt: vt_ioctl: fix race in VT_RESIZEX
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (96 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 097/113] VT_RESIZEX: get rid of field-by-field copyin Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 099/113] KVM: nVMX: Dont emulate instructions in guest mode Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (18 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Eric Dumazet, syzbot, Sasha Levin
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
[ Upstream commit 6cd1ed50efd88261298577cd92a14f2768eddeeb ]
We need to make sure vc_cons[i].d is not NULL after grabbing
console_lock(), or risk a crash.
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000068: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000340-0x0000000000000347]
CPU: 1 PID: 19462 Comm: syz-executor.5 Not tainted 5.5.0-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:vt_ioctl+0x1f96/0x26d0 drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:883
Code: 74 41 e8 bd a6 84 fd 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 28 00 0f 85 e4 04 00 00 48 8b 03 48 8d b8 40 03 00 00 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <42> 0f b6 14 2a 84 d2 74 09 80 fa 03 0f 8e b1 05 00 00 44 89 b8 40
RSP: 0018:ffffc900086d7bb0 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff8c34ee88 RCX: ffffc9001415c000
RDX: 0000000000000068 RSI: ffffffff83f0e6e3 RDI: 0000000000000340
RBP: ffffc900086d7cd0 R08: ffff888054ce0100 R09: fffffbfff16a2f6d
R10: ffff888054ce0998 R11: ffff888054ce0100 R12: 000000000000001d
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 1ffff920010daf79 R15: 000000000000ff7f
FS: 00007f7d13c12700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007ffd477e3c38 CR3: 0000000095d0a000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Call Trace:
tty_ioctl+0xa37/0x14f0 drivers/tty/tty_io.c:2660
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:47 [inline]
ksys_ioctl+0x123/0x180 fs/ioctl.c:763
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:772 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:770 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x73/0xb0 fs/ioctl.c:770
do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x790 arch/x86/entry/common.c:294
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
RIP: 0033:0x45b399
Code: ad b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 66 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 0f 83 7b b6 fb ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00
RSP: 002b:00007f7d13c11c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f7d13c126d4 RCX: 000000000045b399
RDX: 0000000020000080 RSI: 000000000000560a RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 000000000075bf20 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000ffffffff
R13: 0000000000000666 R14: 00000000004c7f04 R15: 000000000075bf2c
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace 80970faf7a67eb77 ]---
RIP: 0010:vt_ioctl+0x1f96/0x26d0 drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:883
Code: 74 41 e8 bd a6 84 fd 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 28 00 0f 85 e4 04 00 00 48 8b 03 48 8d b8 40 03 00 00 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <42> 0f b6 14 2a 84 d2 74 09 80 fa 03 0f 8e b1 05 00 00 44 89 b8 40
RSP: 0018:ffffc900086d7bb0 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff8c34ee88 RCX: ffffc9001415c000
RDX: 0000000000000068 RSI: ffffffff83f0e6e3 RDI: 0000000000000340
RBP: ffffc900086d7cd0 R08: ffff888054ce0100 R09: fffffbfff16a2f6d
R10: ffff888054ce0998 R11: ffff888054ce0100 R12: 000000000000001d
R13: dffffc0000000000 R14: 1ffff920010daf79 R15: 000000000000ff7f
FS: 00007f7d13c12700(0000) GS:ffff8880ae900000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007ffd477e3c38 CR3: 0000000095d0a000 CR4: 00000000001406e0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200210190721.200418-1-edumazet@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c | 17 +++++++++++------
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c b/drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c
index a1e5c408c931b..e9d9f9f3dc886 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c
@@ -879,15 +879,20 @@ int vt_ioctl(struct tty_struct *tty,
return -EINVAL;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_NR_CONSOLES; i++) {
+ struct vc_data *vcp;
+
if (!vc_cons[i].d)
continue;
console_lock();
- if (v.v_vlin)
- vc_cons[i].d->vc_scan_lines = v.v_vlin;
- if (v.v_clin)
- vc_cons[i].d->vc_font.height = v.v_clin;
- vc_cons[i].d->vc_resize_user = 1;
- vc_resize(vc_cons[i].d, v.v_cols, v.v_rows);
+ vcp = vc_cons[i].d;
+ if (vcp) {
+ if (v.v_vlin)
+ vcp->vc_scan_lines = v.v_vlin;
+ if (v.v_clin)
+ vcp->vc_font.height = v.v_clin;
+ vcp->vc_resize_user = 1;
+ vc_resize(vcp, v.v_cols, v.v_rows);
+ }
console_unlock();
}
break;
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 099/113] KVM: nVMX: Dont emulate instructions in guest mode
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (97 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 098/113] vt: vt_ioctl: fix race in VT_RESIZEX Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 100/113] netfilter: xt_bpf: add overflow checks Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (17 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Oliver Upton, Paolo Bonzini, Sasha Levin
From: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
[ Upstream commit 07721feee46b4b248402133228235318199b05ec ]
vmx_check_intercept is not yet fully implemented. To avoid emulating
instructions disallowed by the L1 hypervisor, refuse to emulate
instructions by default.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
[Made commit, added commit msg - Oliver]
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -10759,7 +10759,7 @@ static int vmx_check_intercept(struct kv
}
/* TODO: check more intercepts... */
- return X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+ return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
}
static void vmx_sched_in(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpu)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 100/113] netfilter: xt_bpf: add overflow checks
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (98 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 099/113] KVM: nVMX: Dont emulate instructions in guest mode Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 101/113] ext4: fix a data race in EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (16 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Jann Horn, Pablo Neira Ayuso,
Zubin Mithra, Sasha Levin
From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
[ Upstream commit 6ab405114b0b229151ef06f4e31c7834dd09d0c0 ]
Check whether inputs from userspace are too long (explicit length field too
big or string not null-terminated) to avoid out-of-bounds reads.
As far as I can tell, this can at worst lead to very limited kernel heap
memory disclosure or oopses.
This bug can be triggered by an unprivileged user even if the xt_bpf module
is not loaded: iptables is available in network namespaces, and the xt_bpf
module can be autoloaded.
Triggering the bug with a classic BPF filter with fake length 0x1000 causes
the following KASAN report:
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in bpf_prog_create+0x84/0xf0
Read of size 32768 at addr ffff8801eff2c494 by task test/4627
CPU: 0 PID: 4627 Comm: test Not tainted 4.15.0-rc1+ #1
[...]
Call Trace:
dump_stack+0x5c/0x85
print_address_description+0x6a/0x260
kasan_report+0x254/0x370
? bpf_prog_create+0x84/0xf0
memcpy+0x1f/0x50
bpf_prog_create+0x84/0xf0
bpf_mt_check+0x90/0xd6 [xt_bpf]
[...]
Allocated by task 4627:
kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xd0
__kmalloc_node+0x47/0x60
xt_alloc_table_info+0x41/0x70 [x_tables]
[...]
The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8801eff2c3c0
which belongs to the cache kmalloc-2048 of size 2048
The buggy address is located 212 bytes inside of
2048-byte region [ffff8801eff2c3c0, ffff8801eff2cbc0)
[...]
==================================================================
Fixes: e6f30c731718 ("netfilter: x_tables: add xt_bpf match")
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
Signed-off-by: Zubin Mithra <zsm@chromium.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
net/netfilter/xt_bpf.c | 3 +++
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_bpf.c b/net/netfilter/xt_bpf.c
index dffee9d47ec4b..7b993f25aab92 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/xt_bpf.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_bpf.c
@@ -25,6 +25,9 @@ static int bpf_mt_check(const struct xt_mtchk_param *par)
struct xt_bpf_info *info = par->matchinfo;
struct sock_fprog_kern program;
+ if (info->bpf_program_num_elem > XT_BPF_MAX_NUM_INSTR)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
program.len = info->bpf_program_num_elem;
program.filter = info->bpf_program;
--
2.20.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 101/113] ext4: fix a data race in EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (99 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 100/113] netfilter: xt_bpf: add overflow checks Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 102/113] ext4: add cond_resched() to __ext4_find_entry() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (15 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Qian Cai, Theodore Tso, stable
From: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
commit 35df4299a6487f323b0aca120ea3f485dfee2ae3 upstream.
EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize could be accessed concurrently as noticed by
KCSAN,
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in ext4_write_end [ext4] / ext4_writepages [ext4]
write to 0xffff91c6713b00f8 of 8 bytes by task 49268 on cpu 127:
ext4_write_end+0x4e3/0x750 [ext4]
ext4_update_i_disksize at fs/ext4/ext4.h:3032
(inlined by) ext4_update_inode_size at fs/ext4/ext4.h:3046
(inlined by) ext4_write_end at fs/ext4/inode.c:1287
generic_perform_write+0x208/0x2a0
ext4_buffered_write_iter+0x11f/0x210 [ext4]
ext4_file_write_iter+0xce/0x9e0 [ext4]
new_sync_write+0x29c/0x3b0
__vfs_write+0x92/0xa0
vfs_write+0x103/0x260
ksys_write+0x9d/0x130
__x64_sys_write+0x4c/0x60
do_syscall_64+0x91/0xb47
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe
read to 0xffff91c6713b00f8 of 8 bytes by task 24872 on cpu 37:
ext4_writepages+0x10ac/0x1d00 [ext4]
mpage_map_and_submit_extent at fs/ext4/inode.c:2468
(inlined by) ext4_writepages at fs/ext4/inode.c:2772
do_writepages+0x5e/0x130
__writeback_single_inode+0xeb/0xb20
writeback_sb_inodes+0x429/0x900
__writeback_inodes_wb+0xc4/0x150
wb_writeback+0x4bd/0x870
wb_workfn+0x6b4/0x960
process_one_work+0x54c/0xbe0
worker_thread+0x80/0x650
kthread+0x1e0/0x200
ret_from_fork+0x27/0x50
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 37 PID: 24872 Comm: kworker/u261:2 Tainted: G W O L 5.5.0-next-20200204+ #5
Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL385 Gen10/ProLiant DL385 Gen10, BIOS A40 07/10/2019
Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-7:0)
Since only the read is operating as lockless (outside of the
"i_data_sem"), load tearing could introduce a logic bug. Fix it by
adding READ_ONCE() for the read and WRITE_ONCE() for the write.
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1581085751-31793-1-git-send-email-cai@lca.pw
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/ext4/ext4.h | 2 +-
fs/ext4/inode.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/ext4/ext4.h
+++ b/fs/ext4/ext4.h
@@ -2851,7 +2851,7 @@ static inline void ext4_update_i_disksiz
!mutex_is_locked(&inode->i_mutex));
down_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
if (newsize > EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize)
- EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize = newsize;
+ WRITE_ONCE(EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize, newsize);
up_write(&EXT4_I(inode)->i_data_sem);
}
--- a/fs/ext4/inode.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/inode.c
@@ -2320,7 +2320,7 @@ update_disksize:
* truncate are avoided by checking i_size under i_data_sem.
*/
disksize = ((loff_t)mpd->first_page) << PAGE_CACHE_SHIFT;
- if (disksize > EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize) {
+ if (disksize > READ_ONCE(EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize)) {
int err2;
loff_t i_size;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 102/113] ext4: add cond_resched() to __ext4_find_entry()
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (100 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 101/113] ext4: fix a data race in EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 103/113] KVM: nVMX: Refactor IO bitmap checks into helper function Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (14 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Shijie Luo, Theodore Tso, Jan Kara, stable
From: Shijie Luo <luoshijie1@huawei.com>
commit 9424ef56e13a1f14c57ea161eed3ecfdc7b2770e upstream.
We tested a soft lockup problem in linux 4.19 which could also
be found in linux 5.x.
When dir inode takes up a large number of blocks, and if the
directory is growing when we are searching, it's possible the
restart branch could be called many times, and the do while loop
could hold cpu a long time.
Here is the call trace in linux 4.19.
[ 473.756186] Call trace:
[ 473.756196] dump_backtrace+0x0/0x198
[ 473.756199] show_stack+0x24/0x30
[ 473.756205] dump_stack+0xa4/0xcc
[ 473.756210] watchdog_timer_fn+0x300/0x3e8
[ 473.756215] __hrtimer_run_queues+0x114/0x358
[ 473.756217] hrtimer_interrupt+0x104/0x2d8
[ 473.756222] arch_timer_handler_virt+0x38/0x58
[ 473.756226] handle_percpu_devid_irq+0x90/0x248
[ 473.756231] generic_handle_irq+0x34/0x50
[ 473.756234] __handle_domain_irq+0x68/0xc0
[ 473.756236] gic_handle_irq+0x6c/0x150
[ 473.756238] el1_irq+0xb8/0x140
[ 473.756286] ext4_es_lookup_extent+0xdc/0x258 [ext4]
[ 473.756310] ext4_map_blocks+0x64/0x5c0 [ext4]
[ 473.756333] ext4_getblk+0x6c/0x1d0 [ext4]
[ 473.756356] ext4_bread_batch+0x7c/0x1f8 [ext4]
[ 473.756379] ext4_find_entry+0x124/0x3f8 [ext4]
[ 473.756402] ext4_lookup+0x8c/0x258 [ext4]
[ 473.756407] __lookup_hash+0x8c/0xe8
[ 473.756411] filename_create+0xa0/0x170
[ 473.756413] do_mkdirat+0x6c/0x140
[ 473.756415] __arm64_sys_mkdirat+0x28/0x38
[ 473.756419] el0_svc_common+0x78/0x130
[ 473.756421] el0_svc_handler+0x38/0x78
[ 473.756423] el0_svc+0x8/0xc
[ 485.755156] watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#2 stuck for 22s! [tmp:5149]
Add cond_resched() to avoid soft lockup and to provide a better
system responding.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200215080206.13293-1-luoshijie1@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Shijie Luo <luoshijie1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/ext4/namei.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
--- a/fs/ext4/namei.c
+++ b/fs/ext4/namei.c
@@ -1418,6 +1418,7 @@ restart:
/*
* We deal with the read-ahead logic here.
*/
+ cond_resched();
if (ra_ptr >= ra_max) {
/* Refill the readahead buffer */
ra_ptr = 0;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 103/113] KVM: nVMX: Refactor IO bitmap checks into helper function
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (101 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 102/113] ext4: add cond_resched() to __ext4_find_entry() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:36 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:37 ` [PATCH 4.4 104/113] KVM: nVMX: Check IO instruction VM-exit conditions Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (13 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Oliver Upton, Vitaly Kuznetsov,
Paolo Bonzini
From: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com>
commit e71237d3ff1abf9f3388337cfebf53b96df2020d upstream.
Checks against the IO bitmap are useful for both instruction emulation
and VM-exit reflection. Refactor the IO bitmap checks into a helper
function.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -4275,6 +4275,26 @@ static bool cs_ss_rpl_check(struct kvm_v
(ss.selector & SEGMENT_RPL_MASK));
}
+static bool nested_vmx_check_io_bitmaps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ unsigned int port, int size);
+static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled_io(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+{
+ unsigned long exit_qualification;
+ unsigned int port;
+ int size;
+
+ if (!nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_USE_IO_BITMAPS))
+ return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_UNCOND_IO_EXITING);
+
+ exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
+
+ port = exit_qualification >> 16;
+ size = (exit_qualification & 7) + 1;
+
+ return nested_vmx_check_io_bitmaps(vcpu, port, size);
+}
+
/*
* Check if guest state is valid. Returns true if valid, false if
* not.
@@ -7624,23 +7644,17 @@ static int (*const kvm_vmx_exit_handlers
static const int kvm_vmx_max_exit_handlers =
ARRAY_SIZE(kvm_vmx_exit_handlers);
-static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled_io(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
- struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
+/*
+ * Return true if an IO instruction with the specified port and size should cause
+ * a VM-exit into L1.
+ */
+bool nested_vmx_check_io_bitmaps(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned int port,
+ int size)
{
- unsigned long exit_qualification;
+ struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
gpa_t bitmap, last_bitmap;
- unsigned int port;
- int size;
u8 b;
- if (!nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_USE_IO_BITMAPS))
- return nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_UNCOND_IO_EXITING);
-
- exit_qualification = vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION);
-
- port = exit_qualification >> 16;
- size = (exit_qualification & 7) + 1;
-
last_bitmap = (gpa_t)-1;
b = -1;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 104/113] KVM: nVMX: Check IO instruction VM-exit conditions
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (102 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:36 ` [PATCH 4.4 103/113] KVM: nVMX: Refactor IO bitmap checks into helper function Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:37 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:37 ` [PATCH 4.4 105/113] KVM: apic: avoid calculating pending eoi from an uninitialized val Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (12 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Oliver Upton, Paolo Bonzini
From: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com>
commit 35a571346a94fb93b5b3b6a599675ef3384bc75c upstream.
Consult the 'unconditional IO exiting' and 'use IO bitmaps' VM-execution
controls when checking instruction interception. If the 'use IO bitmaps'
VM-execution control is 1, check the instruction access against the IO
bitmaps to determine if the instruction causes a VM-exit.
Signed-off-by: Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 52 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c
@@ -4281,7 +4281,7 @@ static bool nested_vmx_exit_handled_io(s
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12)
{
unsigned long exit_qualification;
- unsigned int port;
+ unsigned short port;
int size;
if (!nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_USE_IO_BITMAPS))
@@ -10754,6 +10754,39 @@ static void nested_vmx_entry_failure(str
to_vmx(vcpu)->nested.sync_shadow_vmcs = true;
}
+static int vmx_check_intercept_io(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
+ struct x86_instruction_info *info)
+{
+ struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
+ unsigned short port;
+ bool intercept;
+ int size;
+
+ if (info->intercept == x86_intercept_in ||
+ info->intercept == x86_intercept_ins) {
+ port = info->src_val;
+ size = info->dst_bytes;
+ } else {
+ port = info->dst_val;
+ size = info->src_bytes;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If the 'use IO bitmaps' VM-execution control is 0, IO instruction
+ * VM-exits depend on the 'unconditional IO exiting' VM-execution
+ * control.
+ *
+ * Otherwise, IO instruction VM-exits are controlled by the IO bitmaps.
+ */
+ if (!nested_cpu_has(vmcs12, CPU_BASED_USE_IO_BITMAPS))
+ intercept = nested_cpu_has(vmcs12,
+ CPU_BASED_UNCOND_IO_EXITING);
+ else
+ intercept = nested_vmx_check_io_bitmaps(vcpu, port, size);
+
+ return intercept ? X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE : X86EMUL_CONTINUE;
+}
+
static int vmx_check_intercept(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct x86_instruction_info *info,
enum x86_intercept_stage stage)
@@ -10761,18 +10794,30 @@ static int vmx_check_intercept(struct kv
struct vmcs12 *vmcs12 = get_vmcs12(vcpu);
struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt = &vcpu->arch.emulate_ctxt;
+ switch (info->intercept) {
/*
* RDPID causes #UD if disabled through secondary execution controls.
* Because it is marked as EmulateOnUD, we need to intercept it here.
*/
- if (info->intercept == x86_intercept_rdtscp &&
- !nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_RDTSCP)) {
- ctxt->exception.vector = UD_VECTOR;
- ctxt->exception.error_code_valid = false;
- return X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT;
- }
+ case x86_intercept_rdtscp:
+ if (!nested_cpu_has2(vmcs12, SECONDARY_EXEC_RDTSCP)) {
+ ctxt->exception.vector = UD_VECTOR;
+ ctxt->exception.error_code_valid = false;
+ return X86EMUL_PROPAGATE_FAULT;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case x86_intercept_in:
+ case x86_intercept_ins:
+ case x86_intercept_out:
+ case x86_intercept_outs:
+ return vmx_check_intercept_io(vcpu, info);
/* TODO: check more intercepts... */
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 105/113] KVM: apic: avoid calculating pending eoi from an uninitialized val
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (103 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:37 ` [PATCH 4.4 104/113] KVM: nVMX: Check IO instruction VM-exit conditions Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:37 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:37 ` [PATCH 4.4 106/113] Btrfs: fix btrfs_wait_ordered_range() so that it waits for all ordered extents Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (11 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Vitaly Kuznetsov, Miaohe Lin, Paolo Bonzini
From: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
commit 23520b2def95205f132e167cf5b25c609975e959 upstream.
When pv_eoi_get_user() fails, 'val' may remain uninitialized and the return
value of pv_eoi_get_pending() becomes random. Fix the issue by initializing
the variable.
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c
@@ -536,9 +536,11 @@ static inline bool pv_eoi_enabled(struct
static bool pv_eoi_get_pending(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
u8 val;
- if (pv_eoi_get_user(vcpu, &val) < 0)
+ if (pv_eoi_get_user(vcpu, &val) < 0) {
apic_debug("Can't read EOI MSR value: 0x%llx\n",
(unsigned long long)vcpu->arch.pv_eoi.msr_val);
+ return false;
+ }
return val & 0x1;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 106/113] Btrfs: fix btrfs_wait_ordered_range() so that it waits for all ordered extents
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (104 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:37 ` [PATCH 4.4 105/113] KVM: apic: avoid calculating pending eoi from an uninitialized val Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:37 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:37 ` [PATCH 4.4 107/113] scsi: Revert "RDMA/isert: Fix a recently introduced regression related to logout" Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (10 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Qu Wenruo, Josef Bacik,
Filipe Manana, David Sterba
From: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
commit e75fd33b3f744f644061a4f9662bd63f5434f806 upstream.
In btrfs_wait_ordered_range() once we find an ordered extent that has
finished with an error we exit the loop and don't wait for any other
ordered extents that might be still in progress.
All the users of btrfs_wait_ordered_range() expect that there are no more
ordered extents in progress after that function returns. So past fixes
such like the ones from the two following commits:
ff612ba7849964 ("btrfs: fix panic during relocation after ENOSPC before
writeback happens")
28aeeac1dd3080 ("Btrfs: fix panic when starting bg cache writeout after
IO error")
don't work when there are multiple ordered extents in the range.
Fix that by making btrfs_wait_ordered_range() wait for all ordered extents
even after it finds one that had an error.
Link: https://github.com/kdave/btrfs-progs/issues/228#issuecomment-569777554
CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c
+++ b/fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c
@@ -820,10 +820,15 @@ int btrfs_wait_ordered_range(struct inod
}
btrfs_start_ordered_extent(inode, ordered, 1);
end = ordered->file_offset;
+ /*
+ * If the ordered extent had an error save the error but don't
+ * exit without waiting first for all other ordered extents in
+ * the range to complete.
+ */
if (test_bit(BTRFS_ORDERED_IOERR, &ordered->flags))
ret = -EIO;
btrfs_put_ordered_extent(ordered);
- if (ret || end == 0 || end == start)
+ if (end == 0 || end == start)
break;
end--;
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 107/113] scsi: Revert "RDMA/isert: Fix a recently introduced regression related to logout"
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (105 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:37 ` [PATCH 4.4 106/113] Btrfs: fix btrfs_wait_ordered_range() so that it waits for all ordered extents Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:37 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:37 ` [PATCH 4.4 108/113] scsi: Revert "target: iscsi: Wait for all commands to finish before freeing a session" Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (9 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Rahul Kundu, Mike Marciniszyn,
Sagi Grimberg, Dakshaja Uppalapati, Bart Van Assche,
Martin K. Petersen
From: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
commit 76261ada16dcc3be610396a46d35acc3efbda682 upstream.
Since commit 04060db41178 introduces soft lockups when toggling network
interfaces, revert it.
Link: https://marc.info/?l=target-devel&m=158157054906196
Cc: Rahul Kundu <rahul.kundu@chelsio.com>
Cc: Mike Marciniszyn <mike.marciniszyn@intel.com>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>
Reported-by: Dakshaja Uppalapati <dakshaja@chelsio.com>
Fixes: 04060db41178 ("scsi: RDMA/isert: Fix a recently introduced regression related to logout")
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c | 12 ++++++++++++
drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c | 6 +++---
2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c
@@ -3295,6 +3295,17 @@ isert_wait4flush(struct isert_conn *iser
wait_for_completion(&isert_conn->wait_comp_err);
}
+static void
+isert_wait4cmds(struct iscsi_conn *conn)
+{
+ isert_info("iscsi_conn %p\n", conn);
+
+ if (conn->sess) {
+ target_sess_cmd_list_set_waiting(conn->sess->se_sess);
+ target_wait_for_sess_cmds(conn->sess->se_sess);
+ }
+}
+
/**
* isert_put_unsol_pending_cmds() - Drop commands waiting for
* unsolicitate dataout
@@ -3350,6 +3361,7 @@ static void isert_wait_conn(struct iscsi
isert_wait4flush(isert_conn);
isert_put_unsol_pending_cmds(conn);
+ isert_wait4cmds(conn);
isert_wait4logout(isert_conn);
queue_work(isert_release_wq, &isert_conn->release_work);
--- a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c
+++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c
@@ -4309,6 +4309,9 @@ int iscsit_close_connection(
iscsit_stop_nopin_response_timer(conn);
iscsit_stop_nopin_timer(conn);
+ if (conn->conn_transport->iscsit_wait_conn)
+ conn->conn_transport->iscsit_wait_conn(conn);
+
/*
* During Connection recovery drop unacknowledged out of order
* commands for this connection, and prepare the other commands
@@ -4394,9 +4397,6 @@ int iscsit_close_connection(
target_sess_cmd_list_set_waiting(sess->se_sess);
target_wait_for_sess_cmds(sess->se_sess);
- if (conn->conn_transport->iscsit_wait_conn)
- conn->conn_transport->iscsit_wait_conn(conn);
-
if (conn->conn_rx_hash.tfm)
crypto_free_hash(conn->conn_rx_hash.tfm);
if (conn->conn_tx_hash.tfm)
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 108/113] scsi: Revert "target: iscsi: Wait for all commands to finish before freeing a session"
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (106 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:37 ` [PATCH 4.4 107/113] scsi: Revert "RDMA/isert: Fix a recently introduced regression related to logout" Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:37 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:37 ` [PATCH 4.4 109/113] ecryptfs: replace BUG_ON with error handling code Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (8 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Rahul Kundu, Mike Marciniszyn,
Sagi Grimberg, Dakshaja Uppalapati, Bart Van Assche,
Martin K. Petersen
From: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
commit 807b9515b7d044cf77df31f1af9d842a76ecd5cb upstream.
Since commit e9d3009cb936 introduced a regression and since the fix for
that regression was not perfect, revert this commit.
Link: https://marc.info/?l=target-devel&m=158157054906195
Cc: Rahul Kundu <rahul.kundu@chelsio.com>
Cc: Mike Marciniszyn <mike.marciniszyn@intel.com>
Cc: Sagi Grimberg <sagi@grimberg.me>
Reported-by: Dakshaja Uppalapati <dakshaja@chelsio.com>
Fixes: e9d3009cb936 ("scsi: target: iscsi: Wait for all commands to finish before freeing a session")
Signed-off-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Signed-off-by: Martin K. Petersen <martin.petersen@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c | 10 ++--------
include/scsi/iscsi_proto.h | 1 -
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
--- a/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c
+++ b/drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c
@@ -993,9 +993,7 @@ int iscsit_setup_scsi_cmd(struct iscsi_c
hdr->cmdsn, be32_to_cpu(hdr->data_length), payload_length,
conn->cid);
- if (target_get_sess_cmd(&cmd->se_cmd, true) < 0)
- return iscsit_add_reject_cmd(cmd,
- ISCSI_REASON_WAITING_FOR_LOGOUT, buf);
+ target_get_sess_cmd(&cmd->se_cmd, true);
cmd->sense_reason = transport_lookup_cmd_lun(&cmd->se_cmd,
scsilun_to_int(&hdr->lun));
@@ -1806,9 +1804,7 @@ iscsit_handle_task_mgt_cmd(struct iscsi_
conn->sess->se_sess, 0, DMA_NONE,
TCM_SIMPLE_TAG, cmd->sense_buffer + 2);
- if (target_get_sess_cmd(&cmd->se_cmd, true) < 0)
- return iscsit_add_reject_cmd(cmd,
- ISCSI_REASON_WAITING_FOR_LOGOUT, buf);
+ target_get_sess_cmd(&cmd->se_cmd, true);
/*
* TASK_REASSIGN for ERL=2 / connection stays inside of
@@ -4394,8 +4390,6 @@ int iscsit_close_connection(
* must wait until they have completed.
*/
iscsit_check_conn_usage_count(conn);
- target_sess_cmd_list_set_waiting(sess->se_sess);
- target_wait_for_sess_cmds(sess->se_sess);
if (conn->conn_rx_hash.tfm)
crypto_free_hash(conn->conn_rx_hash.tfm);
--- a/include/scsi/iscsi_proto.h
+++ b/include/scsi/iscsi_proto.h
@@ -638,7 +638,6 @@ struct iscsi_reject {
#define ISCSI_REASON_BOOKMARK_INVALID 9
#define ISCSI_REASON_BOOKMARK_NO_RESOURCES 10
#define ISCSI_REASON_NEGOTIATION_RESET 11
-#define ISCSI_REASON_WAITING_FOR_LOGOUT 12
/* Max. number of Key=Value pairs in a text message */
#define MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS 8192
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 109/113] ecryptfs: replace BUG_ON with error handling code
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (107 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:37 ` [PATCH 4.4 108/113] scsi: Revert "target: iscsi: Wait for all commands to finish before freeing a session" Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:37 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:37 ` [PATCH 4.4 110/113] ALSA: rawmidi: Avoid bit fields for state flags Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (7 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel; +Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Aditya Pakki, Tyler Hicks
From: Aditya Pakki <pakki001@umn.edu>
commit 2c2a7552dd6465e8fde6bc9cccf8d66ed1c1eb72 upstream.
In crypt_scatterlist, if the crypt_stat argument is not set up
correctly, the kernel crashes. Instead, by returning an error code
upstream, the error is handled safely.
The issue is detected via a static analysis tool written by us.
Fixes: 237fead619984 (ecryptfs: fs/Makefile and fs/Kconfig)
Signed-off-by: Aditya Pakki <pakki001@umn.edu>
Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks <code@tyhicks.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c
+++ b/fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c
@@ -346,8 +346,10 @@ static int crypt_scatterlist(struct ecry
struct extent_crypt_result ecr;
int rc = 0;
- BUG_ON(!crypt_stat || !crypt_stat->tfm
- || !(crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_STRUCT_INITIALIZED));
+ if (!crypt_stat || !crypt_stat->tfm
+ || !(crypt_stat->flags & ECRYPTFS_STRUCT_INITIALIZED))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
if (unlikely(ecryptfs_verbosity > 0)) {
ecryptfs_printk(KERN_DEBUG, "Key size [%zd]; key:\n",
crypt_stat->key_size);
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 110/113] ALSA: rawmidi: Avoid bit fields for state flags
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (108 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:37 ` [PATCH 4.4 109/113] ecryptfs: replace BUG_ON with error handling code Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:37 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:37 ` [PATCH 4.4 111/113] ALSA: seq: Avoid concurrent access to queue flags Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (6 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, syzbot+576cc007eb9f2c968200, Takashi Iwai
From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
commit dfa9a5efe8b932a84b3b319250aa3ac60c20f876 upstream.
The rawmidi state flags (opened, append, active_sensing) are stored in
bit fields that can be potentially racy when concurrently accessed
without any locks. Although the current code should be fine, there is
also no any real benefit by keeping the bitfields for this kind of
short number of members.
This patch changes those bit fields flags to the simple bool fields.
There should be no size increase of the snd_rawmidi_substream by this
change.
Reported-by: syzbot+576cc007eb9f2c968200@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200214111316.26939-4-tiwai@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
include/sound/rawmidi.h | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/include/sound/rawmidi.h
+++ b/include/sound/rawmidi.h
@@ -92,9 +92,9 @@ struct snd_rawmidi_substream {
struct list_head list; /* list of all substream for given stream */
int stream; /* direction */
int number; /* substream number */
- unsigned int opened: 1, /* open flag */
- append: 1, /* append flag (merge more streams) */
- active_sensing: 1; /* send active sensing when close */
+ bool opened; /* open flag */
+ bool append; /* append flag (merge more streams) */
+ bool active_sensing; /* send active sensing when close */
int use_count; /* use counter (for output) */
size_t bytes;
struct snd_rawmidi *rmidi;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 111/113] ALSA: seq: Avoid concurrent access to queue flags
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (109 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:37 ` [PATCH 4.4 110/113] ALSA: rawmidi: Avoid bit fields for state flags Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:37 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:37 ` [PATCH 4.4 112/113] ALSA: seq: Fix concurrent access to queue current tick/time Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (5 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, syzbot+65c6c92d04304d0a8efc,
syzbot+e60ddfa48717579799dd, Takashi Iwai
From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
commit bb51e669fa49feb5904f452b2991b240ef31bc97 upstream.
The queue flags are represented in bit fields and the concurrent
access may result in unexpected results. Although the current code
should be mostly OK as it's only reading a field while writing other
fields as KCSAN reported, it's safer to cover both with a proper
spinlock protection.
This patch fixes the possible concurrent read by protecting with
q->owner_lock. Also the queue owner field is protected as well since
it's the field to be protected by the lock itself.
Reported-by: syzbot+65c6c92d04304d0a8efc@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reported-by: syzbot+e60ddfa48717579799dd@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200214111316.26939-2-tiwai@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
sound/core/seq/seq_queue.c | 20 ++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/sound/core/seq/seq_queue.c
+++ b/sound/core/seq/seq_queue.c
@@ -415,6 +415,7 @@ int snd_seq_queue_check_access(int queue
int snd_seq_queue_set_owner(int queueid, int client, int locked)
{
struct snd_seq_queue *q = queueptr(queueid);
+ unsigned long flags;
if (q == NULL)
return -EINVAL;
@@ -424,8 +425,10 @@ int snd_seq_queue_set_owner(int queueid,
return -EPERM;
}
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&q->owner_lock, flags);
q->locked = locked ? 1 : 0;
q->owner = client;
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&q->owner_lock, flags);
queue_access_unlock(q);
queuefree(q);
@@ -564,15 +567,17 @@ void snd_seq_queue_client_termination(in
unsigned long flags;
int i;
struct snd_seq_queue *q;
+ bool matched;
for (i = 0; i < SNDRV_SEQ_MAX_QUEUES; i++) {
if ((q = queueptr(i)) == NULL)
continue;
spin_lock_irqsave(&q->owner_lock, flags);
- if (q->owner == client)
+ matched = (q->owner == client);
+ if (matched)
q->klocked = 1;
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&q->owner_lock, flags);
- if (q->owner == client) {
+ if (matched) {
if (q->timer->running)
snd_seq_timer_stop(q->timer);
snd_seq_timer_reset(q->timer);
@@ -764,6 +769,8 @@ void snd_seq_info_queues_read(struct snd
int i, bpm;
struct snd_seq_queue *q;
struct snd_seq_timer *tmr;
+ bool locked;
+ int owner;
for (i = 0; i < SNDRV_SEQ_MAX_QUEUES; i++) {
if ((q = queueptr(i)) == NULL)
@@ -775,9 +782,14 @@ void snd_seq_info_queues_read(struct snd
else
bpm = 0;
+ spin_lock_irq(&q->owner_lock);
+ locked = q->locked;
+ owner = q->owner;
+ spin_unlock_irq(&q->owner_lock);
+
snd_iprintf(buffer, "queue %d: [%s]\n", q->queue, q->name);
- snd_iprintf(buffer, "owned by client : %d\n", q->owner);
- snd_iprintf(buffer, "lock status : %s\n", q->locked ? "Locked" : "Free");
+ snd_iprintf(buffer, "owned by client : %d\n", owner);
+ snd_iprintf(buffer, "lock status : %s\n", locked ? "Locked" : "Free");
snd_iprintf(buffer, "queued time events : %d\n", snd_seq_prioq_avail(q->timeq));
snd_iprintf(buffer, "queued tick events : %d\n", snd_seq_prioq_avail(q->tickq));
snd_iprintf(buffer, "timer state : %s\n", tmr->running ? "Running" : "Stopped");
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 112/113] ALSA: seq: Fix concurrent access to queue current tick/time
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (110 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:37 ` [PATCH 4.4 111/113] ALSA: seq: Avoid concurrent access to queue flags Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:37 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 13:37 ` [PATCH 4.4 113/113] xen: Enable interrupts when calling _cond_resched() Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (4 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, syzbot+fd5e0eaa1a32999173b2, Takashi Iwai
From: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
commit dc7497795e014d84699c3b8809ed6df35352dd74 upstream.
snd_seq_check_queue() passes the current tick and time of the given
queue as a pointer to snd_seq_prioq_cell_out(), but those might be
updated concurrently by the seq timer update.
Fix it by retrieving the current tick and time via the proper helper
functions at first, and pass those values to snd_seq_prioq_cell_out()
later in the loops.
snd_seq_timer_get_cur_time() takes a new argument and adjusts with the
current system time only when it's requested so; this update isn't
needed for snd_seq_check_queue(), as it's called either from the
interrupt handler or right after queuing.
Also, snd_seq_timer_get_cur_tick() is changed to read the value in the
spinlock for the concurrency, too.
Reported-by: syzbot+fd5e0eaa1a32999173b2@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200214111316.26939-3-tiwai@suse.de
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c | 4 ++--
sound/core/seq/seq_queue.c | 9 ++++++---
sound/core/seq/seq_timer.c | 13 ++++++++++---
sound/core/seq/seq_timer.h | 3 ++-
4 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
--- a/sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c
+++ b/sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c
@@ -577,7 +577,7 @@ static int update_timestamp_of_queue(str
event->queue = queue;
event->flags &= ~SNDRV_SEQ_TIME_STAMP_MASK;
if (real_time) {
- event->time.time = snd_seq_timer_get_cur_time(q->timer);
+ event->time.time = snd_seq_timer_get_cur_time(q->timer, true);
event->flags |= SNDRV_SEQ_TIME_STAMP_REAL;
} else {
event->time.tick = snd_seq_timer_get_cur_tick(q->timer);
@@ -1694,7 +1694,7 @@ static int snd_seq_ioctl_get_queue_statu
tmr = queue->timer;
status.events = queue->tickq->cells + queue->timeq->cells;
- status.time = snd_seq_timer_get_cur_time(tmr);
+ status.time = snd_seq_timer_get_cur_time(tmr, true);
status.tick = snd_seq_timer_get_cur_tick(tmr);
status.running = tmr->running;
--- a/sound/core/seq/seq_queue.c
+++ b/sound/core/seq/seq_queue.c
@@ -261,6 +261,8 @@ void snd_seq_check_queue(struct snd_seq_
{
unsigned long flags;
struct snd_seq_event_cell *cell;
+ snd_seq_tick_time_t cur_tick;
+ snd_seq_real_time_t cur_time;
if (q == NULL)
return;
@@ -277,17 +279,18 @@ void snd_seq_check_queue(struct snd_seq_
__again:
/* Process tick queue... */
+ cur_tick = snd_seq_timer_get_cur_tick(q->timer);
for (;;) {
- cell = snd_seq_prioq_cell_out(q->tickq,
- &q->timer->tick.cur_tick);
+ cell = snd_seq_prioq_cell_out(q->tickq, &cur_tick);
if (!cell)
break;
snd_seq_dispatch_event(cell, atomic, hop);
}
/* Process time queue... */
+ cur_time = snd_seq_timer_get_cur_time(q->timer, false);
for (;;) {
- cell = snd_seq_prioq_cell_out(q->timeq, &q->timer->cur_time);
+ cell = snd_seq_prioq_cell_out(q->timeq, &cur_time);
if (!cell)
break;
snd_seq_dispatch_event(cell, atomic, hop);
--- a/sound/core/seq/seq_timer.c
+++ b/sound/core/seq/seq_timer.c
@@ -436,14 +436,15 @@ int snd_seq_timer_continue(struct snd_se
}
/* return current 'real' time. use timeofday() to get better granularity. */
-snd_seq_real_time_t snd_seq_timer_get_cur_time(struct snd_seq_timer *tmr)
+snd_seq_real_time_t snd_seq_timer_get_cur_time(struct snd_seq_timer *tmr,
+ bool adjust_ktime)
{
snd_seq_real_time_t cur_time;
unsigned long flags;
spin_lock_irqsave(&tmr->lock, flags);
cur_time = tmr->cur_time;
- if (tmr->running) {
+ if (adjust_ktime && tmr->running) {
struct timeval tm;
int usec;
do_gettimeofday(&tm);
@@ -465,7 +466,13 @@ snd_seq_real_time_t snd_seq_timer_get_cu
high PPQ values) */
snd_seq_tick_time_t snd_seq_timer_get_cur_tick(struct snd_seq_timer *tmr)
{
- return tmr->tick.cur_tick;
+ snd_seq_tick_time_t cur_tick;
+ unsigned long flags;
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(&tmr->lock, flags);
+ cur_tick = tmr->tick.cur_tick;
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(&tmr->lock, flags);
+ return cur_tick;
}
--- a/sound/core/seq/seq_timer.h
+++ b/sound/core/seq/seq_timer.h
@@ -135,7 +135,8 @@ int snd_seq_timer_set_ppq(struct snd_seq
int snd_seq_timer_set_position_tick(struct snd_seq_timer *tmr, snd_seq_tick_time_t position);
int snd_seq_timer_set_position_time(struct snd_seq_timer *tmr, snd_seq_real_time_t position);
int snd_seq_timer_set_skew(struct snd_seq_timer *tmr, unsigned int skew, unsigned int base);
-snd_seq_real_time_t snd_seq_timer_get_cur_time(struct snd_seq_timer *tmr);
+snd_seq_real_time_t snd_seq_timer_get_cur_time(struct snd_seq_timer *tmr,
+ bool adjust_ktime);
snd_seq_tick_time_t snd_seq_timer_get_cur_tick(struct snd_seq_timer *tmr);
extern int seq_default_timer_class;
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* [PATCH 4.4 113/113] xen: Enable interrupts when calling _cond_resched()
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (111 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:37 ` [PATCH 4.4 112/113] ALSA: seq: Fix concurrent access to queue current tick/time Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 13:37 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2020-02-27 15:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Chris Paterson
` (3 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman @ 2020-02-27 13:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, stable, Thomas Gleixner, Juergen Gross,
Boris Ostrovsky
From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
commit 8645e56a4ad6dcbf504872db7f14a2f67db88ef2 upstream.
xen_maybe_preempt_hcall() is called from the exception entry point
xen_do_hypervisor_callback with interrupts disabled.
_cond_resched() evades the might_sleep() check in cond_resched() which
would have caught that and schedule_debug() unfortunately lacks a check
for irqs_disabled().
Enable interrupts around the call and use cond_resched() to catch future
issues.
Fixes: fdfd811ddde3 ("x86/xen: allow privcmd hypercalls to be preempted")
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/878skypjrh.fsf@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
Reviewed-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
drivers/xen/preempt.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/drivers/xen/preempt.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/preempt.c
@@ -37,7 +37,9 @@ asmlinkage __visible void xen_maybe_pree
* cpu.
*/
__this_cpu_write(xen_in_preemptible_hcall, false);
- _cond_resched();
+ local_irq_enable();
+ cond_resched();
+ local_irq_disable();
__this_cpu_write(xen_in_preemptible_hcall, true);
}
}
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* RE: [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (112 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 13:37 ` [PATCH 4.4 113/113] xen: Enable interrupts when calling _cond_resched() Greg Kroah-Hartman
@ 2020-02-27 15:52 ` Chris Paterson
2020-02-27 18:50 ` Jon Hunter
` (2 subsequent siblings)
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Chris Paterson @ 2020-02-27 15:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman, linux-kernel
Cc: torvalds, akpm, linux, shuah, patches, ben.hutchings,
lkft-triage, stable
Hello Greg,
> From: stable-owner@vger.kernel.org <stable-owner@vger.kernel.org> On
> Behalf Of Greg Kroah-Hartman
> Sent: 27 February 2020 13:35
>
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.4.215 release.
> There are 113 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
No issues seen for CIP configs for Linux 4.4.215-rc1 (68572b1fc85a).
Build logs: https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-testing/linux-stable-rc-ci/pipelines/121568293
Pipeline: https://gitlab.com/cip-project/cip-testing/linux-cip-pipelines/-/blob/ba32334b/trees/linux-4.4.y.yml
Kind regards, Chris
>
> Responses should be made by Sat, 29 Feb 2020 13:21:24 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-
> review/patch-4.4.215-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-
> rc.git linux-4.4.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
>
> -------------
> Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:
>
> Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
> Linux 4.4.215-rc1
>
> Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> xen: Enable interrupts when calling _cond_resched()
>
> Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
> ALSA: seq: Fix concurrent access to queue current tick/time
>
> Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
> ALSA: seq: Avoid concurrent access to queue flags
>
> Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
> ALSA: rawmidi: Avoid bit fields for state flags
>
> Aditya Pakki <pakki001@umn.edu>
> ecryptfs: replace BUG_ON with error handling code
>
> Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
> scsi: Revert "target: iscsi: Wait for all commands to finish before freeing a
> session"
>
> Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
> scsi: Revert "RDMA/isert: Fix a recently introduced regression related to
> logout"
>
> Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
> Btrfs: fix btrfs_wait_ordered_range() so that it waits for all ordered
> extents
>
> Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
> KVM: apic: avoid calculating pending eoi from an uninitialized val
>
> Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com>
> KVM: nVMX: Check IO instruction VM-exit conditions
>
> Oliver Upton <oupton@google.com>
> KVM: nVMX: Refactor IO bitmap checks into helper function
>
> Shijie Luo <luoshijie1@huawei.com>
> ext4: add cond_resched() to __ext4_find_entry()
>
> Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
> ext4: fix a data race in EXT4_I(inode)->i_disksize
>
> Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
> netfilter: xt_bpf: add overflow checks
>
> Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> KVM: nVMX: Don't emulate instructions in guest mode
>
> Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
> vt: vt_ioctl: fix race in VT_RESIZEX
>
> Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
> VT_RESIZEX: get rid of field-by-field copyin
>
> Mathias Nyman <mathias.nyman@linux.intel.com>
> xhci: apply XHCI_PME_STUCK_QUIRK to Intel Comet Lake platforms
>
> Ioanna Alifieraki <ioanna-maria.alifieraki@canonical.com>
> Revert "ipc,sem: remove uneeded sem_undo_list lock usage in
> exit_sem()"
>
> Fugang Duan <fugang.duan@nxp.com>
> tty: serial: imx: setup the correct sg entry for tx dma
>
> Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> x86/mce/amd: Fix kobject lifetime
>
> Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net>
> staging: rtl8188eu: Fix potential overuse of kernel memory
>
> Larry Finger <Larry.Finger@lwfinger.net>
> staging: rtl8188eu: Fix potential security hole
>
> Alan Stern <stern@rowland.harvard.edu>
> USB: hub: Don't record a connect-change event during reset-resume
>
> Richard Dodd <richard.o.dodd@gmail.com>
> USB: Fix novation SourceControl XL after suspend
>
> EJ Hsu <ejh@nvidia.com>
> usb: uas: fix a plug & unplug racing
>
> Malcolm Priestley <tvboxspy@gmail.com>
> staging: vt6656: fix sign of rx_dbm to bb_pre_ed_rssi.
>
> Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>
> staging: android: ashmem: Disallow ashmem memory from being
> remapped
>
> Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
> floppy: check FDC index for errors before assigning it
>
> Firo Yang <firo.yang@suse.com>
> enic: prevent waking up stopped tx queues over watchdog reset
>
> Jaihind Yadav <jaihindyadav@codeaurora.org>
> selinux: ensure we cleanup the internal AVC counters on error in
> avc_update()
>
> Zhiqiang Liu <liuzhiqiang26@huawei.com>
> brd: check and limit max_part par
>
> Shubhrajyoti Datta <shubhrajyoti.datta@xilinx.com>
> microblaze: Prevent the overflow of the start
>
> Zenghui Yu <yuzenghui@huawei.com>
> irqchip/gic-v3-its: Reference to its_invall_cmd descriptor when building
> INVALL
>
> Coly Li <colyli@suse.de>
> bcache: explicity type cast in bset_bkey_last()
>
> Yunfeng Ye <yeyunfeng@huawei.com>
> reiserfs: prevent NULL pointer dereference in reiserfs_insert_item()
>
> Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
> lib/scatterlist.c: adjust indentation in __sg_alloc_table
>
> wangyan <wangyan122@huawei.com>
> ocfs2: fix a NULL pointer dereference when call
> ocfs2_update_inode_fsync_trans()
>
> Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
> radeon: insert 10ms sleep in dce5_crtc_load_lut
>
> Vasily Averin <vvs@virtuozzo.com>
> trigger_next should increase position index
>
> Ben Skeggs <bskeggs@redhat.com>
> drm/nouveau/disp/nv50-: prevent oops when no channel method map
> provided
>
> Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
> iwlegacy: ensure loop counter addr does not wrap and cause an infinite
> loop
>
> Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
> hostap: Adjust indentation in prism2_hostapd_add_sta
>
> Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
> ARM: 8951/1: Fix Kexec compilation issue.
>
> zhangyi (F) <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
> jbd2: switch to use jbd2_journal_abort() when failed to submit the commit
> record
>
> Peter Große <pegro@friiks.de>
> ALSA: hda - Add docking station support for Lenovo Thinkpad T420s
>
> Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
> s390/ftrace: generate traced function stack frame
>
> Brandon Maier <brandon.maier@rockwellcollins.com>
> remoteproc: Initialize rproc_class before use
>
> Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
> ide: serverworks: potential overflow in svwks_set_pio_mode()
>
> Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
> cmd64x: potential buffer overflow in cmd64x_program_timings()
>
> Nick Black <nlb@google.com>
> scsi: iscsi: Don't destroy session if there are outstanding connections
>
> Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
> iommu/arm-smmu-v3: Use WRITE_ONCE() when changing validity of an
> STE
>
> Navid Emamdoost <navid.emamdoost@gmail.com>
> drm/vmwgfx: prevent memory leak in vmw_cmdbuf_res_add
>
> YueHaibing <yuehaibing@huawei.com>
> drm/nouveau: Fix copy-paste error in
> nouveau_fence_wait_uevent_handler
>
> Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
> driver core: Print device when resources present in really_probe()
>
> Logan Gunthorpe <logang@deltatee.com>
> PCI: Don't disable bridge BARs when assigning bus resources
>
> Chen Zhou <chenzhou10@huawei.com>
> ASoC: atmel: fix build error with CONFIG_SND_ATMEL_SOC_DMA=m
>
> Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
> wan: ixp4xx_hss: fix compile-testing on 64-bit
>
> Philipp Zabel <p.zabel@pengutronix.de>
> Input: edt-ft5x06 - work around first register access error
>
> Paul E. McKenney <paulmck@kernel.org>
> rcu: Use WRITE_ONCE() for assignments to ->pprev for hlist_nulls
>
> Dmitry Osipenko <digetx@gmail.com>
> soc/tegra: fuse: Correct straps' address for older Tegra124 device trees
>
> Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>
> usbip: Fix unsafe unaligned pointer usage
>
> Andrey Zhizhikin <andrey.z@gmail.com>
> tools lib api fs: Fix gcc9 stringop-truncation compilation error
>
> Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
> ALSA: sh: Fix compile warning wrt const
>
> Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
> pinctrl: sh-pfc: sh7269: Fix CAN function GPIOs
>
> Valdis Kletnieks <valdis.kletnieks@vt.edu>
> x86/vdso: Provide missing include file
>
> Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
> ARM: dts: r8a7779: Add device node for ARM global timer
>
> Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
> scsi: aic7xxx: Adjust indentation in ahc_find_syncrate
>
> Erik Kaneda <erik.kaneda@intel.com>
> ACPICA: Disassembler: create buffer fields in ACPI_PARSE_LOAD_PASS1
>
> Aditya Pakki <pakki001@umn.edu>
> orinoco: avoid assertion in case of NULL pointer
>
> Phong Tran <tranmanphong@gmail.com>
> rtlwifi: rtl_pci: Fix -Wcast-function-type
>
> Phong Tran <tranmanphong@gmail.com>
> iwlegacy: Fix -Wcast-function-type
>
> Phong Tran <tranmanphong@gmail.com>
> ipw2x00: Fix -Wcast-function-type
>
> Phong Tran <tranmanphong@gmail.com>
> b43legacy: Fix -Wcast-function-type
>
> Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
> ALSA: usx2y: Adjust indentation in snd_usX2Y_hwdep_dsp_status
>
> Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
> reiserfs: Fix spurious unlock in reiserfs_fill_super() error handling
>
> Mao Wenan <maowenan@huawei.com>
> NFC: port100: Convert cpu_to_le16(le16_to_cpu(E1) + E2) to use
> le16_add_cpu().
>
> Miquel Raynal <miquel.raynal@bootlin.com>
> regulator: rk808: Lower log level on optional GPIOs being not available
>
> yu kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
> drm/amdgpu: remove 4 set but not used variable in
> amdgpu_atombios_get_connector_info_from_object_table
>
> Douglas Anderson <dianders@chromium.org>
> clk: qcom: rcg2: Don't crash if our parent can't be found; return an error
>
> Masahiro Yamada <masahiroy@kernel.org>
> kconfig: fix broken dependency in randconfig-generated .config
>
> zhangyi (F) <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
> ext4, jbd2: ensure panic when aborting with zero errno
>
> Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
> tracing: Fix very unlikely race of registering two stat tracers
>
> Kai Li <li.kai4@h3c.com>
> jbd2: clear JBD2_ABORT flag before journal_reset to update log tail info
> when load journal
>
> Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
> nfs: NFS_SWAP should depend on SWAP
>
> Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>
> usb: gadget: udc: fix possible sleep-in-atomic-context bugs in gr_probe()
>
> Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>
> uio: fix a sleep-in-atomic-context bug in uio_dmem_genirq_irqcontrol()
>
> Tiezhu Yang <yangtiezhu@loongson.cn>
> MIPS: Loongson: Fix potential NULL dereference in
> loongson3_platform_init()
>
> Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
> efi/x86: Map the entire EFI vendor string before copying it
>
> Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>
> media: sti: bdisp: fix a possible sleep-in-atomic-context bug in
> bdisp_device_run()
>
> Eugen Hristev <eugen.hristev@microchip.com>
> media: i2c: mt9v032: fix enum mbus codes and frame sizes
>
> Geert Uytterhoeven <geert+renesas@glider.be>
> pinctrl: sh-pfc: sh7264: Fix CAN function GPIOs
>
> Vladimir Oltean <olteanv@gmail.com>
> gianfar: Fix TX timestamping with a stacked DSA driver
>
> Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
> brcmfmac: Fix use after free in brcmf_sdio_readframes()
>
> Paul Kocialkowski <paul.kocialkowski@bootlin.com>
> drm/gma500: Fixup fbdev stolen size usage evaluation
>
> Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
> Revert "KVM: VMX: Add non-canonical check on writes to RTIT address
> MSRs"
>
> Allen Pais <allen.pais@oracle.com>
> scsi: qla2xxx: fix a potential NULL pointer dereference
>
> David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
> btrfs: print message when tree-log replay starts
>
> zhangyi (F) <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
> jbd2: do not clear the BH_Mapped flag when forgetting a metadata buffer
>
> zhangyi (F) <yi.zhang@huawei.com>
> jbd2: move the clearing of b_modified flag to the journal_unmap_buffer()
>
> Mike Jones <michael-a1.jones@analog.com>
> hwmon: (pmbus/ltc2978) Fix PMBus polling of MFR_COMMON definitions.
>
> Nathan Chancellor <natechancellor@gmail.com>
> s390/time: Fix clk type in get_tod_clock
>
> Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
> padata: Remove broken queue flushing
>
> David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
> btrfs: log message when rw remount is attempted with unclean tree-log
>
> Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
> Btrfs: fix race between using extent maps and merging them
>
> Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
> ext4: fix checksum errors with indexed dirs
>
> Zhihao Cheng <chengzhihao1@huawei.com>
> ubifs: Fix deadlock in concurrent bulk-read and writepage
>
> Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>
> ALSA: usb-audio: Apply sample rate quirk for Audioengine D1
>
> Wenwen Wang <wenwen@cs.uga.edu>
> ecryptfs: fix a memory leak bug in ecryptfs_init_messaging()
>
> Wenwen Wang <wenwen@cs.uga.edu>
> ecryptfs: fix a memory leak bug in parse_tag_1_packet()
>
> Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
> ALSA: hda: Use scnprintf() for printing texts for sysfs/procfs
>
> Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> KVM: x86: emulate RDPID
>
> Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
> x86/vdso: Use RDPID in preference to LSL when available
>
>
> -------------
>
> Diffstat:
>
> Makefile | 4 +-
> arch/arm/Kconfig | 2 +-
> arch/arm/boot/dts/r8a7779.dtsi | 8 +
> arch/microblaze/kernel/cpu/cache.c | 3 +-
> arch/mips/loongson64/loongson-3/platform.c | 3 +
> arch/s390/include/asm/timex.h | 2 +-
> arch/s390/kernel/mcount.S | 15 +-
> arch/sh/include/cpu-sh2a/cpu/sh7269.h | 11 +-
> arch/x86/entry/vdso/vdso32-setup.c | 1 +
> arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
> arch/x86/include/asm/vgtod.h | 7 +-
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mcheck/mce_amd.c | 17 +-
> arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 7 +-
> arch/x86/kvm/emulate.c | 22 +-
> arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c | 4 +-
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx.c | 102 +-
> arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 8033 --------------------
> arch/x86/platform/efi/efi.c | 13 +-
> drivers/acpi/acpica/dsfield.c | 2 +-
> drivers/acpi/acpica/dswload.c | 21 +
> drivers/base/dd.c | 5 +-
> drivers/block/brd.c | 22 +-
> drivers/block/floppy.c | 7 +-
> drivers/clk/qcom/clk-rcg2.c | 3 +
> drivers/gpu/drm/amd/amdgpu/amdgpu_atombios.c | 19 +-
> drivers/gpu/drm/gma500/framebuffer.c | 8 +-
> drivers/gpu/drm/nouveau/nouveau_fence.c | 2 +-
> .../gpu/drm/nouveau/nvkm/engine/disp/channv50.c | 2 +
> drivers/gpu/drm/radeon/radeon_display.c | 2 +
> drivers/gpu/drm/vmwgfx/vmwgfx_cmdbuf_res.c | 4 +-
> drivers/hwmon/pmbus/ltc2978.c | 4 +-
> drivers/ide/cmd64x.c | 3 +
> drivers/ide/serverworks.c | 6 +
> drivers/infiniband/ulp/isert/ib_isert.c | 12 +
> drivers/input/touchscreen/edt-ft5x06.c | 7 +
> drivers/iommu/arm-smmu-v3.c | 3 +-
> drivers/irqchip/irq-gic-v3-its.c | 2 +-
> drivers/md/bcache/bset.h | 3 +-
> drivers/media/i2c/mt9v032.c | 10 +-
> drivers/media/platform/sti/bdisp/bdisp-hw.c | 6 +-
> drivers/net/ethernet/cisco/enic/enic_main.c | 2 +-
> drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/gianfar.c | 10 +-
> drivers/net/wan/ixp4xx_hss.c | 4 +-
> drivers/net/wireless/b43legacy/main.c | 5 +-
> drivers/net/wireless/brcm80211/brcmfmac/sdio.c | 1 +
> drivers/net/wireless/hostap/hostap_ap.c | 2 +-
> drivers/net/wireless/ipw2x00/ipw2100.c | 7 +-
> drivers/net/wireless/ipw2x00/ipw2200.c | 5 +-
> drivers/net/wireless/iwlegacy/3945-mac.c | 5 +-
> drivers/net/wireless/iwlegacy/4965-mac.c | 5 +-
> drivers/net/wireless/iwlegacy/common.c | 2 +-
> drivers/net/wireless/orinoco/orinoco_usb.c | 3 +-
> drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtlwifi/pci.c | 10 +-
> drivers/nfc/port100.c | 2 +-
> drivers/pci/setup-bus.c | 20 +-
> drivers/pinctrl/sh-pfc/pfc-sh7264.c | 9 +-
> drivers/pinctrl/sh-pfc/pfc-sh7269.c | 39 +-
> drivers/regulator/rk808-regulator.c | 2 +-
> drivers/remoteproc/remoteproc_core.c | 2 +-
> drivers/scsi/aic7xxx/aic7xxx_core.c | 2 +-
> drivers/scsi/iscsi_tcp.c | 4 +
> drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_os.c | 19 +-
> drivers/scsi/scsi_transport_iscsi.c | 26 +-
> drivers/soc/tegra/fuse/tegra-apbmisc.c | 2 +-
> drivers/staging/android/ashmem.c | 28 +
> drivers/staging/rtl8188eu/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c | 4 +-
> drivers/staging/vt6656/dpc.c | 2 +-
> drivers/target/iscsi/iscsi_target.c | 16 +-
> drivers/tty/serial/imx.c | 2 +-
> drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c | 75 +-
> drivers/uio/uio_dmem_genirq.c | 6 +-
> drivers/usb/core/hub.c | 5 -
> drivers/usb/core/quirks.c | 3 +
> drivers/usb/gadget/udc/gr_udc.c | 16 +-
> drivers/usb/host/xhci-pci.c | 4 +-
> drivers/usb/storage/uas.c | 23 +-
> drivers/xen/preempt.c | 4 +-
> fs/btrfs/disk-io.c | 1 +
> fs/btrfs/extent_map.c | 11 +
> fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c | 7 +-
> fs/btrfs/super.c | 2 +
> fs/ecryptfs/crypto.c | 6 +-
> fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c | 2 +-
> fs/ecryptfs/messaging.c | 1 +
> fs/ext4/dir.c | 14 +-
> fs/ext4/ext4.h | 7 +-
> fs/ext4/inode.c | 14 +-
> fs/ext4/namei.c | 8 +
> fs/jbd2/checkpoint.c | 2 +-
> fs/jbd2/commit.c | 50 +-
> fs/jbd2/journal.c | 21 +-
> fs/jbd2/transaction.c | 10 +-
> fs/nfs/Kconfig | 2 +-
> fs/ocfs2/journal.h | 8 +-
> fs/reiserfs/stree.c | 3 +-
> fs/reiserfs/super.c | 2 +-
> fs/ubifs/file.c | 5 +-
> include/linux/list_nulls.h | 8 +-
> include/linux/rculist_nulls.h | 8 +-
> include/scsi/iscsi_proto.h | 1 -
> include/sound/rawmidi.h | 6 +-
> ipc/sem.c | 6 +-
> kernel/padata.c | 45 +-
> kernel/trace/trace_events_trigger.c | 5 +-
> kernel/trace/trace_stat.c | 19 +-
> lib/scatterlist.c | 2 +-
> net/netfilter/xt_bpf.c | 3 +
> scripts/kconfig/confdata.c | 2 +-
> security/selinux/avc.c | 2 +-
> sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c | 4 +-
> sound/core/seq/seq_queue.c | 29 +-
> sound/core/seq/seq_timer.c | 13 +-
> sound/core/seq/seq_timer.h | 3 +-
> sound/pci/hda/hda_codec.c | 2 +-
> sound/pci/hda/hda_eld.c | 2 +-
> sound/pci/hda/hda_sysfs.c | 4 +-
> sound/pci/hda/patch_conexant.c | 1 +
> sound/sh/aica.c | 4 +-
> sound/soc/atmel/Kconfig | 2 +
> sound/usb/quirks.c | 1 +
> sound/usb/usx2y/usX2Yhwdep.c | 2 +-
> tools/lib/api/fs/fs.c | 4 +-
> tools/usb/usbip/src/usbip_network.c | 40 +-
> tools/usb/usbip/src/usbip_network.h | 12 +-
> 124 files changed, 778 insertions(+), 8412 deletions(-)
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (113 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 15:52 ` [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Chris Paterson
@ 2020-02-27 18:50 ` Jon Hunter
2020-02-27 19:37 ` Guenter Roeck
2020-02-28 11:11 ` Naresh Kamboju
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Jon Hunter @ 2020-02-27 18:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman, linux-kernel
Cc: torvalds, akpm, linux, shuah, patches, ben.hutchings,
lkft-triage, stable, linux-tegra
On 27/02/2020 13:35, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.4.215 release.
> There are 113 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Sat, 29 Feb 2020 13:21:24 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.4.215-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.4.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
All tests are passing for Tegra ...
Test results for stable-v4.4:
6 builds: 6 pass, 0 fail
12 boots: 12 pass, 0 fail
19 tests: 19 pass, 0 fail
Linux version: 4.4.215-rc1-g68572b1fc85a
Boards tested: tegra124-jetson-tk1, tegra20-ventana,
tegra30-cardhu-a04
Cheers
Jon
--
nvpublic
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (114 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 18:50 ` Jon Hunter
@ 2020-02-27 19:37 ` Guenter Roeck
2020-02-28 11:11 ` Naresh Kamboju
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Guenter Roeck @ 2020-02-27 19:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman
Cc: linux-kernel, torvalds, akpm, shuah, patches, ben.hutchings,
lkft-triage, stable
On Thu, Feb 27, 2020 at 02:35:16PM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.4.215 release. There
> are 113 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response to this one.
> If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Sat, 29 Feb 2020 13:21:24 +0000. Anything
> received after that time might be too late.
>
Build results:
total: 170 pass: 170 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
total: 330 pass: 330 fail: 0
Guenter
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review
2020-02-27 13:35 [PATCH 4.4 000/113] 4.4.215-stable review Greg Kroah-Hartman
` (115 preceding siblings ...)
2020-02-27 19:37 ` Guenter Roeck
@ 2020-02-28 11:11 ` Naresh Kamboju
116 siblings, 0 replies; 120+ messages in thread
From: Naresh Kamboju @ 2020-02-28 11:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman
Cc: open list, Linus Torvalds, Andrew Morton, Guenter Roeck,
Shuah Khan, patches, Ben Hutchings, lkft-triage, linux- stable
On Thu, 27 Feb 2020 at 19:10, Greg Kroah-Hartman
<gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.4.215 release.
> There are 113 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one. If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Sat, 29 Feb 2020 13:21:24 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.4.215-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.4.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h
Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.
Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------
kernel: 4.4.215-rc1
git repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
git branch: linux-4.4.y
git commit: 68572b1fc85aad5f46827fabaefbc6aaaa1f92be
git describe: v4.4.214-114-g68572b1fc85a
Test details: https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-4.4-oe/build/v4.4.214-114-g68572b1fc85a
No regressions (compared to build v4.4.214)
No fixes (compared to build v4.4.214)
Ran 23132 total tests in the following environments and test suites.
Environments
--------------
- i386
- juno-r2 - arm64
- qemu_arm
- qemu_arm64
- qemu_i386
- qemu_x86_64
- x15 - arm
- x86_64
Test Suites
-----------
* build
* kselftest
* libhugetlbfs
* linux-log-parser
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests
* ltp-commands-tests
* ltp-containers-tests
* ltp-cpuhotplug-tests
* ltp-cve-tests
* ltp-dio-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests
* ltp-filecaps-tests
* ltp-fs-tests
* ltp-fs_bind-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests
* ltp-fsx-tests
* ltp-hugetlb-tests
* ltp-io-tests
* ltp-ipc-tests
* ltp-math-tests
* ltp-mm-tests
* ltp-nptl-tests
* ltp-open-posix-tests
* ltp-pty-tests
* ltp-sched-tests
* ltp-securebits-tests
* ltp-syscalls-tests
* network-basic-tests
* perf
* prep-tmp-disk
* spectre-meltdown-checker-test
* kvm-unit-tests
* ltp-cap_bounds-64k-page_size-tests
* ltp-cap_bounds-kasan-tests
* ltp-commands-64k-page_size-tests
* ltp-commands-kasan-tests
* ltp-containers-64k-page_size-tests
* ltp-containers-kasan-tests
* ltp-cpuhotplug-64k-page_size-tests
* ltp-cpuhotplug-kasan-tests
* ltp-crypto-64k-page_size-tests
* ltp-crypto-kasan-tests
* ltp-crypto-tests
* ltp-cve-64k-page_size-tests
* ltp-cve-kasan-tests
* ltp-dio-64k-page_size-tests
* ltp-dio-kasan-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-64k-page_size-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-kasan-tests
* ltp-filecaps-64k-page_size-tests
* ltp-filecaps-kasan-tests
* ltp-fs-64k-page_size-tests
* ltp-fs-kasan-tests
* ltp-fs_bind-64k-page_size-tests
* ltp-fs_bind-kasan-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-64k-page_size-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-kasan-tests
* ltp-fsx-64k-page_size-tests
* ltp-fsx-kasan-tests
* ltp-hugetlb-64k-page_size-tests
* ltp-hugetlb-kasan-tests
* ltp-io-64k-page_size-tests
* ltp-io-kasan-tests
* ltp-ipc-64k-page_size-tests
* ltp-ipc-kasan-tests
* ltp-math-64k-page_size-tests
* ltp-math-kasan-tests
* ltp-mm-64k-page_size-tests
* ltp-mm-kasan-tests
* ltp-nptl-64k-page_size-tests
* ltp-nptl-kasan-tests
* ltp-pty-64k-page_size-tests
* ltp-pty-kasan-tests
* ltp-sched-64k-page_size-tests
* ltp-sched-kasan-tests
* ltp-securebits-64k-page_size-tests
* ltp-securebits-kasan-tests
* ltp-syscalls-64k-page_size-tests
* ltp-syscalls-compat-tests
* ltp-syscalls-kasan-tests
* v4l2-compliance
* install-android-platform-tools-r2600
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-native
* kselftest-vsyscall-mode-none
* ssuite
Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------
kernel: 4.4.215-rc1
git repo: https://git.linaro.org/lkft/arm64-stable-rc.git
git branch: 4.4.215-rc1-hikey-20200227-658
git commit: 1a36ae5dee37518be5191e87733744dc02f99366
git describe: 4.4.215-rc1-hikey-20200227-658
Test details: https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linaro-hikey-stable-rc-4.4-oe/build/4.4.215-rc1-hikey-20200227-658
No regressions (compared to build 4.4.215-rc1-hikey-20200227-657)
No fixes (compared to build 4.4.215-rc1-hikey-20200227-657)
Ran 1682 total tests in the following environments and test suites.
Environments
--------------
- hi6220-hikey - arm64
Test Suites
-----------
* build
* install-android-platform-tools-r2600
* kselftest
* libhugetlbfs
* linux-log-parser
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests
* ltp-commands-tests
* ltp-containers-tests
* ltp-cpuhotplug-tests
* ltp-cve-tests
* ltp-dio-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests
* ltp-filecaps-tests
* ltp-fs-tests
* ltp-fs_bind-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests
* ltp-fsx-tests
* ltp-hugetlb-tests
* ltp-io-tests
* ltp-ipc-tests
* ltp-math-tests
* ltp-mm-tests
* ltp-nptl-tests
* ltp-pty-tests
* ltp-sched-tests
* ltp-securebits-tests
* ltp-syscalls-tests
* perf
* spectre-meltdown-checker-test
* v4l2-compliance
--
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 120+ messages in thread