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From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	the arch/x86 maintainers <x86@kernel.org>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [RFC][PATCH 13/22] x86: ia32_setup_sigcontext(): lift user_access_{begin,end}() into the callers
Date: Mon, 23 Mar 2020 21:42:48 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200323214248.GF23230@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAHk-=wgQjm2=Z6e9ZLffsNmnc_e2wz_W3SYTD2_EXZT7yYYbRA@mail.gmail.com>

On Mon, Mar 23, 2020 at 11:53:39AM -0700, Linus Torvalds wrote:
> On Mon, Mar 23, 2020 at 11:39 AM Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> wrote:
> >
> > -static int ia32_setup_sigcontext(struct sigcontext_32 __user *sc,
> > +static __always_inline int ia32_setup_sigcontext(struct sigcontext_32 __user *sc,
> 
> Please rename this at the same time (to "unsafe_ia32_setup_sigcontext()").
> 
> I absolutely _hate_ how we have historically split the "__get_user()"
> calls from the "access_ok()" calls, and then have had bugs when we had
> ways to reach the user access without checking it.
> 
> Yes, we have static checking for the unsafe stuff in objtool now, but
> I still want this to be explicit on the source level too: if you do
> unsafe user accesses, you make it very very explicit in the naming, so
> that you can't possibly even by mistake have a "let's call this
> function withou having done the user_access_begin()" calls.

Umm...  OK, but I wonder if unsafe_... makes the right naming conventions
for such cases.  Note that towards the end of that series we get

#define unsafe_put_sigcontext(sc, fpstate, regs, set, label)    \
do {                                                            \
        if (setup_sigcontext(sc, fpstate, regs, set->sig[0]))   \
                goto label;                                     \
} while(0);

and that's not an uncommon pattern.  We generally have unsafe_...
mean "doesn't return anything, takes a label, needs to be called
from under user_access_begin" and I suspect that it would make sense
to have another recognizable naming pattern for "it must be called
from under user_access_begin() and you need to look at return value".

In this case we could grit teeth and turn that sucker into a macro.
But what about e.g. lifting user_access_{begin,end}() out of
raw_copy_from_user()?  unsafe_copy_from_user() would imply
"all or nothing" kind of calling conventions, like e.g.
unsafe_copy_to_user() currently does.  Which is fine in some
situations, and it's a good helper to have, but we definitely
want a "how much is left to copy" variant as well.

Hmm...  raw_setup_sigcontext(), perhaps, along with the
macro above for unsafe_put_sigcontext()?

  reply	other threads:[~2020-03-23 21:42 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 71+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-03-23 18:36 [RFC][PATCHSET] x86 uaccess cleanups Al Viro
2020-03-23 18:37 ` [RFC][PATCH 01/22] x86 user stack frame reads: switch to explicit __get_user() Al Viro
2020-03-23 18:37   ` [RFC][PATCH 02/22] x86 kvm page table walks: " Al Viro
2020-03-23 18:38   ` [RFC][PATCH 03/22] x86: switch sigframe sigset handling to explict __get_user()/__put_user() Al Viro
2020-03-23 18:38   ` [RFC][PATCH 04/22] x86: get rid of small constant size cases in raw_copy_{to,from}_user() Al Viro
2020-03-23 18:38   ` [RFC][PATCH 05/22] vm86: get rid of get_user_ex() use Al Viro
2020-03-23 18:38   ` [RFC][PATCH 06/22] x86: get rid of get_user_ex() in ia32_restore_sigcontext() Al Viro
2020-03-23 18:38   ` [RFC][PATCH 07/22] x86: get rid of get_user_ex() in restore_sigcontext() Al Viro
2020-03-23 18:38   ` [RFC][PATCH 08/22] x86: kill get_user_{try,catch,ex} Al Viro
2020-03-23 18:38   ` [RFC][PATCH 09/22] x86: switch save_v86_state() to unsafe_put_user() Al Viro
2020-03-23 18:38   ` [RFC][PATCH 10/22] x86: switch setup_sigcontext() " Al Viro
2020-03-23 18:38   ` [RFC][PATCH 11/22] x86: switch ia32_setup_sigcontext() " Al Viro
2020-03-23 18:38   ` [RFC][PATCH 12/22] x86: get rid of put_user_try in {ia32,x32}_setup_rt_frame() Al Viro
2020-03-23 18:38   ` [RFC][PATCH 13/22] x86: ia32_setup_sigcontext(): lift user_access_{begin,end}() into the callers Al Viro
2020-03-23 18:53     ` Linus Torvalds
2020-03-23 21:42       ` Al Viro [this message]
2020-03-23 18:38   ` [RFC][PATCH 14/22] x86: ia32_setup_frame(): consolidate uaccess areas Al Viro
2020-03-23 18:38   ` [RFC][PATCH 15/22] x86: ia32_setup_rt_frame(): " Al Viro
2020-03-23 18:38   ` [RFC][PATCH 16/22] x86: get rid of put_user_try in __setup_rt_frame() (both 32bit and 64bit) Al Viro
2020-03-23 18:38   ` [RFC][PATCH 17/22] x86: setup_sigcontext(): list user_access_{begin,end}() into callers Al Viro
2020-03-23 18:56     ` Linus Torvalds
2020-03-23 18:38   ` [RFC][PATCH 18/22] x86: __setup_frame(): consolidate uaccess areas Al Viro
2020-03-23 18:38   ` [RFC][PATCH 19/22] x86: __setup_rt_frame(): " Al Viro
2020-03-23 18:38   ` [RFC][PATCH 20/22] x86: x32_setup_rt_frame(): " Al Viro
2020-03-23 18:38   ` [RFC][PATCH 21/22] x86: unsafe_put_... macros for sigcontext and sigmask Al Viro
2020-03-23 18:38   ` [RFC][PATCH 22/22] kill uaccess_try() Al Viro
2020-03-24 15:15   ` [RFC][PATCH 01/22] x86 user stack frame reads: switch to explicit __get_user() Peter Zijlstra
2020-03-28 10:48   ` Ingo Molnar
2020-03-28 11:59     ` Al Viro
2020-03-29  9:26       ` Ingo Molnar
2020-03-29 16:50         ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-29 17:05           ` Linus Torvalds
2020-03-29 17:41           ` David Laight
2020-03-29 17:56             ` Linus Torvalds
2020-03-29 18:03               ` David Laight
2020-03-29 18:16                 ` Linus Torvalds
2020-03-29 18:32                   ` David Laight
2020-03-29 18:55                     ` Linus Torvalds
2020-03-29 21:21                   ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-29 22:06                     ` Linus Torvalds
2020-03-29 22:12                       ` Linus Torvalds
2020-03-29 18:16               ` Al Viro
2020-03-29 18:19                 ` Linus Torvalds
2020-03-29 17:57         ` Al Viro
2020-03-30 15:54           ` David Laight
2020-03-23 19:16 ` [RFC][PATCHSET] x86 uaccess cleanups Linus Torvalds
2020-03-27  2:24 ` [RFC][PATCHSET v2] " Al Viro
2020-03-27  2:26   ` Al Viro
2020-03-27  2:30     ` Al Viro
2020-03-27  2:31       ` [RFC][PATCH v2 01/22] x86 user stack frame reads: switch to explicit __get_user() Al Viro
2020-03-27  2:31         ` [RFC][PATCH v2 02/22] x86 kvm page table walks: " Al Viro
2020-03-27  2:31         ` [RFC][PATCH v2 03/22] x86: switch sigframe sigset handling to explict __get_user()/__put_user() Al Viro
2020-03-27  2:31         ` [RFC][PATCH v2 04/22] x86: get rid of small constant size cases in raw_copy_{to,from}_user() Al Viro
2020-03-27  2:31         ` [RFC][PATCH v2 05/22] vm86: get rid of get_user_ex() use Al Viro
2020-03-27  2:31         ` [RFC][PATCH v2 06/22] x86: get rid of get_user_ex() in ia32_restore_sigcontext() Al Viro
2020-03-27  2:31         ` [RFC][PATCH v2 07/22] x86: get rid of get_user_ex() in restore_sigcontext() Al Viro
2020-03-27  2:31         ` [RFC][PATCH v2 08/22] x86: kill get_user_{try,catch,ex} Al Viro
2020-03-27  2:31         ` [RFC][PATCH v2 09/22] x86: switch save_v86_state() to unsafe_put_user() Al Viro
2020-03-27  2:31         ` [RFC][PATCH v2 10/22] x86: switch setup_sigcontext() " Al Viro
2020-03-27  2:31         ` [RFC][PATCH v2 11/22] x86: switch ia32_setup_sigcontext() " Al Viro
2020-03-27  2:31         ` [RFC][PATCH v2 12/22] x86: get rid of put_user_try in {ia32,x32}_setup_rt_frame() Al Viro
2020-03-27  2:31         ` [RFC][PATCH v2 13/22] x86: ia32_setup_sigcontext(): lift user_access_{begin,end}() into the callers Al Viro
2020-03-27  2:31         ` [RFC][PATCH v2 14/22] x86: ia32_setup_frame(): consolidate uaccess areas Al Viro
2020-03-27  2:31         ` [RFC][PATCH v2 15/22] x86: ia32_setup_rt_frame(): " Al Viro
2020-03-27  2:31         ` [RFC][PATCH v2 16/22] x86: get rid of put_user_try in __setup_rt_frame() (both 32bit and 64bit) Al Viro
2020-03-27  2:32         ` [RFC][PATCH v2 17/22] x86: setup_sigcontext(): list user_access_{begin,end}() into callers Al Viro
2020-03-27  2:32         ` [RFC][PATCH v2 18/22] x86: __setup_frame(): consolidate uaccess areas Al Viro
2020-03-27  2:32         ` [RFC][PATCH v2 19/22] x86: __setup_rt_frame(): " Al Viro
2020-03-27  2:32         ` [RFC][PATCH v2 20/22] x86: x32_setup_rt_frame(): " Al Viro
2020-03-27  2:32         ` [RFC][PATCH v2 21/22] x86: unsafe_put-style macro for sigmask Al Viro
2020-03-27  2:32         ` [RFC][PATCH v2 22/22] kill uaccess_try() Al Viro

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