From: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
To: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [RFC][PATCH v2 10/22] x86: switch setup_sigcontext() to unsafe_put_user()
Date: Fri, 27 Mar 2020 02:31:53 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200327023205.881896-10-viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200327023205.881896-1-viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
From: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/sighandling.h | 3 --
arch/x86/kernel/signal.c | 88 +++++++++++++++++++-------------------
2 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sighandling.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sighandling.h
index 2fcbd6f33ef7..35e0b579ffcb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sighandling.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sighandling.h
@@ -14,9 +14,6 @@
X86_EFLAGS_CF | X86_EFLAGS_RF)
void signal_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, void __user *frame, char *where);
-int setup_sigcontext(struct sigcontext __user *sc, void __user *fpstate,
- struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long mask);
-
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_X32_ABI
asmlinkage long sys32_x32_rt_sigreturn(void);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c b/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c
index 83563e98f0be..3b4ca484cfc2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/signal.c
@@ -140,63 +140,65 @@ static int restore_sigcontext(struct pt_regs *regs,
IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32));
}
-int setup_sigcontext(struct sigcontext __user *sc, void __user *fpstate,
+static int setup_sigcontext(struct sigcontext __user *sc, void __user *fpstate,
struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long mask)
{
- int err = 0;
-
- put_user_try {
+ if (!user_access_begin(sc, sizeof(struct sigcontext)))
+ return -EFAULT;
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
- put_user_ex(get_user_gs(regs), (unsigned int __user *)&sc->gs);
- put_user_ex(regs->fs, (unsigned int __user *)&sc->fs);
- put_user_ex(regs->es, (unsigned int __user *)&sc->es);
- put_user_ex(regs->ds, (unsigned int __user *)&sc->ds);
+ unsafe_put_user(get_user_gs(regs),
+ (unsigned int __user *)&sc->gs, Efault);
+ unsafe_put_user(regs->fs, (unsigned int __user *)&sc->fs, Efault);
+ unsafe_put_user(regs->es, (unsigned int __user *)&sc->es, Efault);
+ unsafe_put_user(regs->ds, (unsigned int __user *)&sc->ds, Efault);
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_32 */
- put_user_ex(regs->di, &sc->di);
- put_user_ex(regs->si, &sc->si);
- put_user_ex(regs->bp, &sc->bp);
- put_user_ex(regs->sp, &sc->sp);
- put_user_ex(regs->bx, &sc->bx);
- put_user_ex(regs->dx, &sc->dx);
- put_user_ex(regs->cx, &sc->cx);
- put_user_ex(regs->ax, &sc->ax);
+ unsafe_put_user(regs->di, &sc->di, Efault);
+ unsafe_put_user(regs->si, &sc->si, Efault);
+ unsafe_put_user(regs->bp, &sc->bp, Efault);
+ unsafe_put_user(regs->sp, &sc->sp, Efault);
+ unsafe_put_user(regs->bx, &sc->bx, Efault);
+ unsafe_put_user(regs->dx, &sc->dx, Efault);
+ unsafe_put_user(regs->cx, &sc->cx, Efault);
+ unsafe_put_user(regs->ax, &sc->ax, Efault);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
- put_user_ex(regs->r8, &sc->r8);
- put_user_ex(regs->r9, &sc->r9);
- put_user_ex(regs->r10, &sc->r10);
- put_user_ex(regs->r11, &sc->r11);
- put_user_ex(regs->r12, &sc->r12);
- put_user_ex(regs->r13, &sc->r13);
- put_user_ex(regs->r14, &sc->r14);
- put_user_ex(regs->r15, &sc->r15);
+ unsafe_put_user(regs->r8, &sc->r8, Efault);
+ unsafe_put_user(regs->r9, &sc->r9, Efault);
+ unsafe_put_user(regs->r10, &sc->r10, Efault);
+ unsafe_put_user(regs->r11, &sc->r11, Efault);
+ unsafe_put_user(regs->r12, &sc->r12, Efault);
+ unsafe_put_user(regs->r13, &sc->r13, Efault);
+ unsafe_put_user(regs->r14, &sc->r14, Efault);
+ unsafe_put_user(regs->r15, &sc->r15, Efault);
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */
- put_user_ex(current->thread.trap_nr, &sc->trapno);
- put_user_ex(current->thread.error_code, &sc->err);
- put_user_ex(regs->ip, &sc->ip);
+ unsafe_put_user(current->thread.trap_nr, &sc->trapno, Efault);
+ unsafe_put_user(current->thread.error_code, &sc->err, Efault);
+ unsafe_put_user(regs->ip, &sc->ip, Efault);
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_32
- put_user_ex(regs->cs, (unsigned int __user *)&sc->cs);
- put_user_ex(regs->flags, &sc->flags);
- put_user_ex(regs->sp, &sc->sp_at_signal);
- put_user_ex(regs->ss, (unsigned int __user *)&sc->ss);
+ unsafe_put_user(regs->cs, (unsigned int __user *)&sc->cs, Efault);
+ unsafe_put_user(regs->flags, &sc->flags, Efault);
+ unsafe_put_user(regs->sp, &sc->sp_at_signal, Efault);
+ unsafe_put_user(regs->ss, (unsigned int __user *)&sc->ss, Efault);
#else /* !CONFIG_X86_32 */
- put_user_ex(regs->flags, &sc->flags);
- put_user_ex(regs->cs, &sc->cs);
- put_user_ex(0, &sc->gs);
- put_user_ex(0, &sc->fs);
- put_user_ex(regs->ss, &sc->ss);
+ unsafe_put_user(regs->flags, &sc->flags, Efault);
+ unsafe_put_user(regs->cs, &sc->cs, Efault);
+ unsafe_put_user(0, &sc->gs, Efault);
+ unsafe_put_user(0, &sc->fs, Efault);
+ unsafe_put_user(regs->ss, &sc->ss, Efault);
#endif /* CONFIG_X86_32 */
- put_user_ex(fpstate, (unsigned long __user *)&sc->fpstate);
+ unsafe_put_user(fpstate, (unsigned long __user *)&sc->fpstate, Efault);
- /* non-iBCS2 extensions.. */
- put_user_ex(mask, &sc->oldmask);
- put_user_ex(current->thread.cr2, &sc->cr2);
- } put_user_catch(err);
-
- return err;
+ /* non-iBCS2 extensions.. */
+ unsafe_put_user(mask, &sc->oldmask, Efault);
+ unsafe_put_user(current->thread.cr2, &sc->cr2, Efault);
+ user_access_end();
+ return 0;
+Efault:
+ user_access_end();
+ return -EFAULT;
}
/*
--
2.11.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-03-27 2:32 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 71+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-03-23 18:36 [RFC][PATCHSET] x86 uaccess cleanups Al Viro
2020-03-23 18:37 ` [RFC][PATCH 01/22] x86 user stack frame reads: switch to explicit __get_user() Al Viro
2020-03-23 18:37 ` [RFC][PATCH 02/22] x86 kvm page table walks: " Al Viro
2020-03-23 18:38 ` [RFC][PATCH 03/22] x86: switch sigframe sigset handling to explict __get_user()/__put_user() Al Viro
2020-03-23 18:38 ` [RFC][PATCH 04/22] x86: get rid of small constant size cases in raw_copy_{to,from}_user() Al Viro
2020-03-23 18:38 ` [RFC][PATCH 05/22] vm86: get rid of get_user_ex() use Al Viro
2020-03-23 18:38 ` [RFC][PATCH 06/22] x86: get rid of get_user_ex() in ia32_restore_sigcontext() Al Viro
2020-03-23 18:38 ` [RFC][PATCH 07/22] x86: get rid of get_user_ex() in restore_sigcontext() Al Viro
2020-03-23 18:38 ` [RFC][PATCH 08/22] x86: kill get_user_{try,catch,ex} Al Viro
2020-03-23 18:38 ` [RFC][PATCH 09/22] x86: switch save_v86_state() to unsafe_put_user() Al Viro
2020-03-23 18:38 ` [RFC][PATCH 10/22] x86: switch setup_sigcontext() " Al Viro
2020-03-23 18:38 ` [RFC][PATCH 11/22] x86: switch ia32_setup_sigcontext() " Al Viro
2020-03-23 18:38 ` [RFC][PATCH 12/22] x86: get rid of put_user_try in {ia32,x32}_setup_rt_frame() Al Viro
2020-03-23 18:38 ` [RFC][PATCH 13/22] x86: ia32_setup_sigcontext(): lift user_access_{begin,end}() into the callers Al Viro
2020-03-23 18:53 ` Linus Torvalds
2020-03-23 21:42 ` Al Viro
2020-03-23 18:38 ` [RFC][PATCH 14/22] x86: ia32_setup_frame(): consolidate uaccess areas Al Viro
2020-03-23 18:38 ` [RFC][PATCH 15/22] x86: ia32_setup_rt_frame(): " Al Viro
2020-03-23 18:38 ` [RFC][PATCH 16/22] x86: get rid of put_user_try in __setup_rt_frame() (both 32bit and 64bit) Al Viro
2020-03-23 18:38 ` [RFC][PATCH 17/22] x86: setup_sigcontext(): list user_access_{begin,end}() into callers Al Viro
2020-03-23 18:56 ` Linus Torvalds
2020-03-23 18:38 ` [RFC][PATCH 18/22] x86: __setup_frame(): consolidate uaccess areas Al Viro
2020-03-23 18:38 ` [RFC][PATCH 19/22] x86: __setup_rt_frame(): " Al Viro
2020-03-23 18:38 ` [RFC][PATCH 20/22] x86: x32_setup_rt_frame(): " Al Viro
2020-03-23 18:38 ` [RFC][PATCH 21/22] x86: unsafe_put_... macros for sigcontext and sigmask Al Viro
2020-03-23 18:38 ` [RFC][PATCH 22/22] kill uaccess_try() Al Viro
2020-03-24 15:15 ` [RFC][PATCH 01/22] x86 user stack frame reads: switch to explicit __get_user() Peter Zijlstra
2020-03-28 10:48 ` Ingo Molnar
2020-03-28 11:59 ` Al Viro
2020-03-29 9:26 ` Ingo Molnar
2020-03-29 16:50 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-29 17:05 ` Linus Torvalds
2020-03-29 17:41 ` David Laight
2020-03-29 17:56 ` Linus Torvalds
2020-03-29 18:03 ` David Laight
2020-03-29 18:16 ` Linus Torvalds
2020-03-29 18:32 ` David Laight
2020-03-29 18:55 ` Linus Torvalds
2020-03-29 21:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-03-29 22:06 ` Linus Torvalds
2020-03-29 22:12 ` Linus Torvalds
2020-03-29 18:16 ` Al Viro
2020-03-29 18:19 ` Linus Torvalds
2020-03-29 17:57 ` Al Viro
2020-03-30 15:54 ` David Laight
2020-03-23 19:16 ` [RFC][PATCHSET] x86 uaccess cleanups Linus Torvalds
2020-03-27 2:24 ` [RFC][PATCHSET v2] " Al Viro
2020-03-27 2:26 ` Al Viro
2020-03-27 2:30 ` Al Viro
2020-03-27 2:31 ` [RFC][PATCH v2 01/22] x86 user stack frame reads: switch to explicit __get_user() Al Viro
2020-03-27 2:31 ` [RFC][PATCH v2 02/22] x86 kvm page table walks: " Al Viro
2020-03-27 2:31 ` [RFC][PATCH v2 03/22] x86: switch sigframe sigset handling to explict __get_user()/__put_user() Al Viro
2020-03-27 2:31 ` [RFC][PATCH v2 04/22] x86: get rid of small constant size cases in raw_copy_{to,from}_user() Al Viro
2020-03-27 2:31 ` [RFC][PATCH v2 05/22] vm86: get rid of get_user_ex() use Al Viro
2020-03-27 2:31 ` [RFC][PATCH v2 06/22] x86: get rid of get_user_ex() in ia32_restore_sigcontext() Al Viro
2020-03-27 2:31 ` [RFC][PATCH v2 07/22] x86: get rid of get_user_ex() in restore_sigcontext() Al Viro
2020-03-27 2:31 ` [RFC][PATCH v2 08/22] x86: kill get_user_{try,catch,ex} Al Viro
2020-03-27 2:31 ` [RFC][PATCH v2 09/22] x86: switch save_v86_state() to unsafe_put_user() Al Viro
2020-03-27 2:31 ` Al Viro [this message]
2020-03-27 2:31 ` [RFC][PATCH v2 11/22] x86: switch ia32_setup_sigcontext() " Al Viro
2020-03-27 2:31 ` [RFC][PATCH v2 12/22] x86: get rid of put_user_try in {ia32,x32}_setup_rt_frame() Al Viro
2020-03-27 2:31 ` [RFC][PATCH v2 13/22] x86: ia32_setup_sigcontext(): lift user_access_{begin,end}() into the callers Al Viro
2020-03-27 2:31 ` [RFC][PATCH v2 14/22] x86: ia32_setup_frame(): consolidate uaccess areas Al Viro
2020-03-27 2:31 ` [RFC][PATCH v2 15/22] x86: ia32_setup_rt_frame(): " Al Viro
2020-03-27 2:31 ` [RFC][PATCH v2 16/22] x86: get rid of put_user_try in __setup_rt_frame() (both 32bit and 64bit) Al Viro
2020-03-27 2:32 ` [RFC][PATCH v2 17/22] x86: setup_sigcontext(): list user_access_{begin,end}() into callers Al Viro
2020-03-27 2:32 ` [RFC][PATCH v2 18/22] x86: __setup_frame(): consolidate uaccess areas Al Viro
2020-03-27 2:32 ` [RFC][PATCH v2 19/22] x86: __setup_rt_frame(): " Al Viro
2020-03-27 2:32 ` [RFC][PATCH v2 20/22] x86: x32_setup_rt_frame(): " Al Viro
2020-03-27 2:32 ` [RFC][PATCH v2 21/22] x86: unsafe_put-style macro for sigmask Al Viro
2020-03-27 2:32 ` [RFC][PATCH v2 22/22] kill uaccess_try() Al Viro
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