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From: Jian Cai <jiancai@google.com>
To: unlisted-recipients:; (no To-header on input)
Cc: ndesaulniers@google.com, manojgupta@google.com,
	llozano@google.com, clang-built-linux@googlegroups.com,
	"Jian Cai" <jiancai@google.com>,
	"Nathan Chancellor" <nathan@kernel.org>,
	"David Laight" <David.Laight@aculab.com>,
	"Will Deacon" <will@kernel.org>,
	"Russell King" <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>,
	"Linus Walleij" <linus.walleij@linaro.org>,
	"Russell King" <linux@armlinux.org.uk>,
	"Catalin Marinas" <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Masahiro Yamada" <masahiroy@kernel.org>,
	"Kees Cook" <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"Andreas Färber" <afaerber@suse.de>,
	"Daniel Palmer" <daniel@0x0f.com>,
	"Ard Biesheuvel" <ardb@kernel.org>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@kernel.org>,
	"Vladimir Murzin" <vladimir.murzin@arm.com>,
	"Marc Zyngier" <maz@kernel.org>,
	"Andrew Morton" <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	"Mike Rapoport" <rppt@kernel.org>,
	"Uwe Kleine-König" <u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de>,
	"Mark Rutland" <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	"David Brazdil" <dbrazdil@google.com>,
	"Joey Gouly" <joey.gouly@arm.com>,
	"James Morse" <james.morse@arm.com>,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v6] ARM: Implement SLS mitigation
Date: Thu,  4 Mar 2021 16:53:18 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210305005327.405365-1-jiancai@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210223023542.2287529-1-jiancai@google.com>

This patch adds CONFIG_HARDEN_SLS_ALL that can be used to turn on
-mharden-sls=all, which mitigates the straight-line speculation
vulnerability, speculative execution of the instruction following some
unconditional jumps. Notice -mharden-sls= has other options as below,
and this config turns on the strongest option.

all: enable all mitigations against Straight Line Speculation that are implemented.
none: disable all mitigations against Straight Line Speculation.
retbr: enable the mitigation against Straight Line Speculation for RET and BR instructions.
blr: enable the mitigation against Straight Line Speculation for BLR instructions.

Links:
https://reviews.llvm.org/D93221
https://reviews.llvm.org/D81404
https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability/downloads/straight-line-speculation
https://developer.arm.com/support/arm-security-updates/speculative-processor-vulnerability/frequently-asked-questions#SLS2

Suggested-by: Manoj Gupta <manojgupta@google.com>
Suggested-by: Nick Desaulniers <ndesaulniers@google.com>
Suggested-by: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>
Suggested-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Suggested-by: Russell King <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Suggested-by: Linus Walleij <linus.walleij@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Jian Cai <jiancai@google.com>
---

Changes v1 -> v2:
 Update the description and patch based on Nathan and David's comments.

Changes v2 -> v3:
  Modify linker scripts as Nick suggested to address boot failure
  (verified with qemu). Added more details in Kconfig.hardening
  description. Disable the config by default.

Changes v3 -> v4:
  Address Nathan's comment and replace def_bool with depends on in
  HARDEN_SLS_ALL.

Changes v4 -> v5:
  Removed "default n" and made the description target indepdent in
  Kconfig.hardening.

Changes v5 -> v6:
  Add select HARDEN_SLS_ALL under config HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR. This
  turns on HARDEN_SLS_ALL by default where applicable.


 arch/arm/Makefile                  | 4 ++++
 arch/arm/include/asm/vmlinux.lds.h | 4 ++++
 arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S      | 1 +
 arch/arm/mm/Kconfig                | 1 +
 arch/arm64/Makefile                | 4 ++++
 arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S    | 5 +++++
 security/Kconfig.hardening         | 8 ++++++++
 7 files changed, 27 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/arm/Makefile b/arch/arm/Makefile
index dad5502ecc28..54f9b5ff9682 100644
--- a/arch/arm/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm/Makefile
@@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ CHECKFLAGS	+= -D__ARMEL__
 KBUILD_LDFLAGS	+= -EL
 endif
 
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_HARDEN_SLS_ALL), y)
+KBUILD_CFLAGS  += -mharden-sls=all
+endif
+
 #
 # The Scalar Replacement of Aggregates (SRA) optimization pass in GCC 4.9 and
 # later may result in code being generated that handles signed short and signed
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/vmlinux.lds.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/vmlinux.lds.h
index 4a91428c324d..c7f9717511ca 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/vmlinux.lds.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/vmlinux.lds.h
@@ -145,3 +145,7 @@
 		__edtcm_data = .;					\
 	}								\
 	. = __dtcm_start + SIZEOF(.data_dtcm);
+
+#define SLS_TEXT							\
+		ALIGN_FUNCTION();					\
+		*(.text.__llvm_slsblr_thunk_*)
diff --git a/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
index f7f4620d59c3..e71f2bc97bae 100644
--- a/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
+++ b/arch/arm/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ SECTIONS
 	.text : {			/* Real text segment		*/
 		_stext = .;		/* Text and read-only data	*/
 		ARM_TEXT
+		SLS_TEXT
 	}
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_ALIGN_RODATA
diff --git a/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig b/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig
index 35f43d0aa056..bdb63e7b1bec 100644
--- a/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/arm/mm/Kconfig
@@ -837,6 +837,7 @@ config HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
 	bool "Harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks" if EXPERT
 	depends on CPU_SPECTRE
 	default y
+	select HARDEN_SLS_ALL
 	help
 	   Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors rely
 	   on being able to manipulate the branch predictor for a victim
diff --git a/arch/arm64/Makefile b/arch/arm64/Makefile
index 5b84aec31ed3..e233bfbdb1c2 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/Makefile
+++ b/arch/arm64/Makefile
@@ -34,6 +34,10 @@ $(warning LSE atomics not supported by binutils)
   endif
 endif
 
+ifeq ($(CONFIG_HARDEN_SLS_ALL), y)
+KBUILD_CFLAGS  += -mharden-sls=all
+endif
+
 cc_has_k_constraint := $(call try-run,echo				\
 	'int main(void) {						\
 		asm volatile("and w0, w0, %w0" :: "K" (4294967295));	\
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
index 7eea7888bb02..d5c892605862 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
@@ -103,6 +103,10 @@ jiffies = jiffies_64;
 #define TRAMP_TEXT
 #endif
 
+#define SLS_TEXT					\
+	ALIGN_FUNCTION();				\
+	*(.text.__llvm_slsblr_thunk_*)
+
 /*
  * The size of the PE/COFF section that covers the kernel image, which
  * runs from _stext to _edata, must be a round multiple of the PE/COFF
@@ -154,6 +158,7 @@ SECTIONS
 			HIBERNATE_TEXT
 			TRAMP_TEXT
 			*(.fixup)
+			SLS_TEXT
 			*(.gnu.warning)
 		. = ALIGN(16);
 		*(.got)			/* Global offset table		*/
diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening
index 269967c4fc1b..db76ad732c14 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig.hardening
+++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening
@@ -121,6 +121,14 @@ choice
 
 endchoice
 
+config HARDEN_SLS_ALL
+	bool "enable SLS vulnerability hardening"
+	depends on $(cc-option,-mharden-sls=all)
+	help
+	  Enables straight-line speculation vulnerability hardening. This inserts
+	  speculation barrier instruction sequences after certain unconditional jumps
+	  to prevent speculative execution past those barriers.
+
 config GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK_VERBOSE
 	bool "Report forcefully initialized variables"
 	depends on GCC_PLUGIN_STRUCTLEAK
-- 
2.30.1.766.gb4fecdf3b7-goog


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-03-05  0:53 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-02-12  5:14 [PATCH] ARM: Implement Clang's " Jian Cai
2021-02-12  5:55 ` Nathan Chancellor
2021-02-12 10:41   ` David Laight
2021-02-12 19:52     ` [PATCH v2] " Jian Cai
2021-02-17  9:49       ` Will Deacon
2021-02-17 11:05         ` David Laight
2021-03-25 14:01         ` Linus Walleij
2021-02-17 18:20       ` Nick Desaulniers
2021-02-19 20:18       ` [PATCH v3] ARM: Implement " Jian Cai
2021-02-19 20:30         ` Nathan Chancellor
2021-02-19 23:08         ` [PATCH v4] " Jian Cai
2021-02-21 10:13           ` Russell King - ARM Linux admin
2021-02-22 11:58           ` Will Deacon
2021-02-22 21:50             ` Jian Cai
2021-02-23 10:04               ` Will Deacon
2021-03-03 15:18                 ` Linus Walleij
2021-03-03 15:29                   ` David Laight
2021-03-03 15:31                     ` Linus Walleij
2021-02-23  2:31           ` [PATCH v5] " Jian Cai
2021-02-23  2:35             ` Jian Cai
2021-03-03 15:04               ` Linus Walleij
2021-03-04 23:22                 ` Jian Cai
2021-03-06 12:25                   ` Linus Walleij
2021-03-10  4:43                     ` Jian Cai
2021-03-22 11:45                       ` Linus Walleij
2021-03-23 22:39                         ` Jian Cai
2021-03-05  0:53               ` Jian Cai [this message]
2021-03-05  9:52                 ` [PATCH v6] " Will Deacon
2021-03-06 12:27                   ` Linus Walleij

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