[PATCH 4.9 00/53] 4.9.264-rc1 review

[PATCH 4.9 00/53] 4.9.264-rc1 review

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.264 release.
There are 53 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
let me know.

Responses should be made by Wed, 31 Mar 2021 07:55:56 +0000.
Anything received after that time might be too late.

The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.264-rc1.gz
or in the git tree and branch at:
	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
and the diffstat can be found below.

thanks,

greg k-h

-------------
Pseudo-Shortlog of commits:

Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
    Linux 4.9.264-rc1

Markus Theil <markus.theil@tu-ilmenau.de>
    mac80211: fix double free in ibss_leave

Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    net: qrtr: fix a kernel-infoleak in qrtr_recvmsg()

Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    net: sched: validate stab values

Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
    can: dev: Move device back to init netns on owning netns delete

Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
    futex: Handle transient "ownerless" rtmutex state correctly

Mateusz Nosek <mateusznosek0@gmail.com>
    futex: Fix incorrect should_fail_futex() handling

Yang Tao <yang.tao172@zte.com.cn>
    futex: Prevent robust futex exit race

Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
    arm64: futex: Bound number of LDXR/STXR loops in FUTEX_WAKE_OP

Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
    locking/futex: Allow low-level atomic operations to return -EAGAIN

Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
    futex: Fix (possible) missed wakeup

Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
    futex: Handle early deadlock return correctly

Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
    futex,rt_mutex: Fix rt_mutex_cleanup_proxy_lock()

Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
    futex: Avoid freeing an active timer

Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
    futex: Drop hb->lock before enqueueing on the rtmutex

Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
    futex: Rework futex_lock_pi() to use rt_mutex_*_proxy_lock()

Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
    futex,rt_mutex: Introduce rt_mutex_init_waiter()

Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
    futex: Use smp_store_release() in mark_wake_futex()

Matthew Wilcox <willy@linux.intel.com>
    idr: add ida_is_empty

Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
    perf auxtrace: Fix auxtrace queue conflict

Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
    ACPI: scan: Use unique number for instance_no

Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
    ACPI: scan: Rearrange memory allocation in acpi_device_add()

Potnuri Bharat Teja <bharat@chelsio.com>
    RDMA/cxgb4: Fix adapter LE hash errors while destroying ipv6 listening server

Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
    net: cdc-phonet: fix data-interface release on probe failure

Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
    mac80211: fix rate mask reset

Torin Cooper-Bennun <torin@maxiluxsystems.com>
    can: m_can: m_can_do_rx_poll(): fix extraneous msg loss warning

Tong Zhang <ztong0001@gmail.com>
    can: c_can: move runtime PM enable/disable to c_can_platform

Tong Zhang <ztong0001@gmail.com>
    can: c_can_pci: c_can_pci_remove(): fix use-after-free

Lv Yunlong <lyl2019@mail.ustc.edu.cn>
    net/qlcnic: Fix a use after free in qlcnic_83xx_get_minidump_template

Dinghao Liu <dinghao.liu@zju.edu.cn>
    e1000e: Fix error handling in e1000_set_d0_lplu_state_82571

Vitaly Lifshits <vitaly.lifshits@intel.com>
    e1000e: add rtnl_lock() to e1000_reset_task

Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
    net: dsa: bcm_sf2: Qualify phydev->dev_flags based on port

Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
    macvlan: macvlan_count_rx() needs to be aware of preemption

Grygorii Strashko <grygorii.strashko@ti.com>
    bus: omap_l3_noc: mark l3 irqs as IRQF_NO_THREAD

Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
    arm64: dts: ls1043a: mark crypto engine dma coherent

Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk>
    squashfs: fix xattr id and id lookup sanity checks

Sean Nyekjaer <sean@geanix.com>
    squashfs: fix inode lookup sanity checks

Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
    x86/tlb: Flush global mappings when KAISER is disabled

Sergei Trofimovich <slyfox@gentoo.org>
    ia64: fix ptrace(PTRACE_SYSCALL_INFO_EXIT) sign

Sergei Trofimovich <slyfox@gentoo.org>
    ia64: fix ia64_syscall_get_set_arguments() for break-based syscalls

J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
    nfs: we don't support removing system.nfs4_acl

Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
    u64_stats,lockdep: Fix u64_stats_init() vs lockdep

Tong Zhang <ztong0001@gmail.com>
    atm: idt77252: fix null-ptr-dereference

Tong Zhang <ztong0001@gmail.com>
    atm: uPD98402: fix incorrect allocation

Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>
    net: wan: fix error return code of uhdlc_init()

Frank Sorenson <sorenson@redhat.com>
    NFS: Correct size calculation for create reply length

Timo Rothenpieler <timo@rothenpieler.org>
    nfs: fix PNFS_FLEXFILE_LAYOUT Kconfig default

Denis Efremov <efremov@linux.com>
    sun/niu: fix wrong RXMAC_BC_FRM_CNT_COUNT count

Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>
    net: tehuti: fix error return code in bdx_probe()

Dinghao Liu <dinghao.liu@zju.edu.cn>
    ixgbe: Fix memleak in ixgbe_configure_clsu32

Tong Zhang <ztong0001@gmail.com>
    atm: lanai: dont run lanai_dev_close if not open

Tong Zhang <ztong0001@gmail.com>
    atm: eni: dont release is never initialized

Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
    powerpc/4xx: Fix build errors from mfdcr()

Heiko Thiery <heiko.thiery@gmail.com>
    net: fec: ptp: avoid register access when ipg clock is disabled


-------------

Diffstat:

 Makefile                                           |   4 +-
 arch/arm64/boot/dts/freescale/fsl-ls1043a.dtsi     |   1 +
 arch/arm64/include/asm/futex.h                     |  59 ++--
 arch/ia64/include/asm/syscall.h                    |   2 +-
 arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c                          |  24 +-
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/dcr-native.h              |   8 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h                    |  11 +-
 drivers/acpi/internal.h                            |   6 +-
 drivers/acpi/scan.c                                |  88 +++--
 drivers/atm/eni.c                                  |   3 +-
 drivers/atm/idt77105.c                             |   4 +-
 drivers/atm/lanai.c                                |   5 +-
 drivers/atm/uPD98402.c                             |   2 +-
 drivers/bus/omap_l3_noc.c                          |   4 +-
 drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/cm.c                   |   4 +-
 drivers/net/can/c_can/c_can.c                      |  24 +-
 drivers/net/can/c_can/c_can_pci.c                  |   3 +-
 drivers/net/can/c_can/c_can_platform.c             |   6 +-
 drivers/net/can/dev.c                              |   1 +
 drivers/net/can/m_can/m_can.c                      |   3 -
 drivers/net/dsa/bcm_sf2.c                          |   6 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_ptp.c           |   7 +
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/82571.c          |   2 +
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/netdev.c         |   6 +-
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c      |   6 +-
 .../net/ethernet/qlogic/qlcnic/qlcnic_minidump.c   |   3 +
 drivers/net/ethernet/sun/niu.c                     |   2 -
 drivers/net/ethernet/tehuti/tehuti.c               |   1 +
 drivers/net/usb/cdc-phonet.c                       |   2 +
 drivers/net/wan/fsl_ucc_hdlc.c                     |   8 +-
 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_hid.c                |   6 +-
 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_printer.c            |   6 +-
 fs/nfs/Kconfig                                     |   2 +-
 fs/nfs/nfs3xdr.c                                   |   3 +-
 fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c                                  |   3 +
 fs/squashfs/export.c                               |   8 +-
 fs/squashfs/id.c                                   |   6 +-
 fs/squashfs/squashfs_fs.h                          |   1 +
 fs/squashfs/xattr_id.c                             |   6 +-
 include/acpi/acpi_bus.h                            |   1 +
 include/linux/idr.h                                |   5 +
 include/linux/if_macvlan.h                         |   3 +-
 include/linux/u64_stats_sync.h                     |   7 +-
 include/net/red.h                                  |  10 +-
 include/net/rtnetlink.h                            |   2 +
 kernel/futex.c                                     | 393 ++++++++++++++-------
 kernel/locking/rtmutex.c                           | 106 ++++--
 kernel/locking/rtmutex_common.h                    |   5 +-
 net/core/dev.c                                     |   2 +-
 net/mac80211/cfg.c                                 |   4 +-
 net/mac80211/ibss.c                                |   2 +
 net/qrtr/qrtr.c                                    |   5 +
 net/sched/sch_choke.c                              |   7 +-
 net/sched/sch_gred.c                               |   2 +-
 net/sched/sch_red.c                                |   7 +-
 net/sched/sch_sfq.c                                |   2 +-
 tools/perf/util/auxtrace.c                         |   4 -
 57 files changed, 607 insertions(+), 306 deletions(-)

[PATCH 4.9 01/53] net: fec: ptp: avoid register access when ipg clock is disabled

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Heiko Thiery <heiko.thiery@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 6a4d7234ae9a3bb31181f348ade9bbdb55aeb5c5 ]

When accessing the timecounter register on an i.MX8MQ the kernel hangs.
This is only the case when the interface is down. This can be reproduced
by reading with 'phc_ctrl eth0 get'.

Like described in the change in 91c0d987a9788dcc5fe26baafd73bf9242b68900
the igp clock is disabled when the interface is down and leads to a
system hang.

So we check if the ptp clock status before reading the timecounter
register.

Signed-off-by: Heiko Thiery <heiko.thiery@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Richard Cochran <richardcochran@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210225211514.9115-1-heiko.thiery@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_ptp.c | 7 +++++++
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_ptp.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_ptp.c
index f9e74461bdc0..123181612595 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_ptp.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/freescale/fec_ptp.c
@@ -396,9 +396,16 @@ static int fec_ptp_gettime(struct ptp_clock_info *ptp, struct timespec64 *ts)
 	u64 ns;
 	unsigned long flags;
 
+	mutex_lock(&adapter->ptp_clk_mutex);
+	/* Check the ptp clock */
+	if (!adapter->ptp_clk_on) {
+		mutex_unlock(&adapter->ptp_clk_mutex);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&adapter->tmreg_lock, flags);
 	ns = timecounter_read(&adapter->tc);
 	spin_unlock_irqrestore(&adapter->tmreg_lock, flags);
+	mutex_unlock(&adapter->ptp_clk_mutex);
 
 	*ts = ns_to_timespec64(ns);
 
-- 
2.30.1

[PATCH 4.9 02/53] powerpc/4xx: Fix build errors from mfdcr()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>

[ Upstream commit eead089311f4d935ab5d1d8fbb0c42ad44699ada ]

lkp reported a build error in fsp2.o:

  CC      arch/powerpc/platforms/44x/fsp2.o
  {standard input}:577: Error: unsupported relocation against base

Which comes from:

  pr_err("GESR0: 0x%08x\n", mfdcr(base + PLB4OPB_GESR0));

Where our mfdcr() macro is stringifying "base + PLB4OPB_GESR0", and
passing that to the assembler, which obviously doesn't work.

The mfdcr() macro already checks that the argument is constant using
__builtin_constant_p(), and if not calls the out-of-line version of
mfdcr(). But in this case GCC is smart enough to notice that "base +
PLB4OPB_GESR0" will be constant, even though it's not something we can
immediately stringify into a register number.

Segher pointed out that passing the register number to the inline asm
as a constant would be better, and in fact it fixes the build error,
presumably because it gives GCC a chance to resolve the value.

While we're at it, change mtdcr() similarly.

Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Suggested-by: Segher Boessenkool <segher@kernel.crashing.org>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Acked-by: Feng Tang <feng.tang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210218123058.748882-1-mpe@ellerman.id.au
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/powerpc/include/asm/dcr-native.h | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/dcr-native.h b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/dcr-native.h
index 4a2beef74277..86fdda16bb73 100644
--- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/dcr-native.h
+++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/dcr-native.h
@@ -65,8 +65,8 @@ static inline void mtdcrx(unsigned int reg, unsigned int val)
 #define mfdcr(rn)						\
 	({unsigned int rval;					\
 	if (__builtin_constant_p(rn) && rn < 1024)		\
-		asm volatile("mfdcr %0," __stringify(rn)	\
-		              : "=r" (rval));			\
+		asm volatile("mfdcr %0, %1" : "=r" (rval)	\
+			      : "n" (rn));			\
 	else if (likely(cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_INDEXED_DCR)))	\
 		rval = mfdcrx(rn);				\
 	else							\
@@ -76,8 +76,8 @@ static inline void mtdcrx(unsigned int reg, unsigned int val)
 #define mtdcr(rn, v)						\
 do {								\
 	if (__builtin_constant_p(rn) && rn < 1024)		\
-		asm volatile("mtdcr " __stringify(rn) ",%0"	\
-			      : : "r" (v)); 			\
+		asm volatile("mtdcr %0, %1"			\
+			      : : "n" (rn), "r" (v));		\
 	else if (likely(cpu_has_feature(CPU_FTR_INDEXED_DCR)))	\
 		mtdcrx(rn, v);					\
 	else							\
-- 
2.30.1

[PATCH 4.9 03/53] atm: eni: dont release is never initialized

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Tong Zhang <ztong0001@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 4deb550bc3b698a1f03d0332cde3df154d1b6c1e ]

label err_eni_release is reachable when eni_start() fail.
In eni_start() it calls dev->phy->start() in the last step, if start()
fail we don't need to call phy->stop(), if start() is never called, we
neither need to call phy->stop(), otherwise null-ptr-deref will happen.

In order to fix this issue, don't call phy->stop() in label err_eni_release

[    4.875714] ==================================================================
[    4.876091] BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in suni_stop+0x47/0x100 [suni]
[    4.876433] Read of size 8 at addr 0000000000000030 by task modprobe/95
[    4.876778]
[    4.876862] CPU: 0 PID: 95 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 5.11.0-rc7-00090-gdcc0b49040c7 #2
[    4.877290] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-48-gd94
[    4.877876] Call Trace:
[    4.878009]  dump_stack+0x7d/0xa3
[    4.878191]  kasan_report.cold+0x10c/0x10e
[    4.878410]  ? __slab_free+0x2f0/0x340
[    4.878612]  ? suni_stop+0x47/0x100 [suni]
[    4.878832]  suni_stop+0x47/0x100 [suni]
[    4.879043]  eni_do_release+0x3b/0x70 [eni]
[    4.879269]  eni_init_one.cold+0x1152/0x1747 [eni]
[    4.879528]  ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x7b/0xd0
[    4.879768]  ? eni_ioctl+0x270/0x270 [eni]
[    4.879990]  ? __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x10/0x10
[    4.880226]  ? eni_ioctl+0x270/0x270 [eni]
[    4.880448]  local_pci_probe+0x6f/0xb0
[    4.880650]  pci_device_probe+0x171/0x240
[    4.880864]  ? pci_device_remove+0xe0/0xe0
[    4.881086]  ? kernfs_create_link+0xb6/0x110
[    4.881315]  ? sysfs_do_create_link_sd.isra.0+0x76/0xe0
[    4.881594]  really_probe+0x161/0x420
[    4.881791]  driver_probe_device+0x6d/0xd0
[    4.882010]  device_driver_attach+0x82/0x90
[    4.882233]  ? device_driver_attach+0x90/0x90
[    4.882465]  __driver_attach+0x60/0x100
[    4.882671]  ? device_driver_attach+0x90/0x90
[    4.882903]  bus_for_each_dev+0xe1/0x140
[    4.883114]  ? subsys_dev_iter_exit+0x10/0x10
[    4.883346]  ? klist_node_init+0x61/0x80
[    4.883557]  bus_add_driver+0x254/0x2a0
[    4.883764]  driver_register+0xd3/0x150
[    4.883971]  ? 0xffffffffc0038000
[    4.884149]  do_one_initcall+0x84/0x250
[    4.884355]  ? trace_event_raw_event_initcall_finish+0x150/0x150
[    4.884674]  ? unpoison_range+0xf/0x30
[    4.884875]  ? ____kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0x84/0xa0
[    4.885150]  ? unpoison_range+0xf/0x30
[    4.885352]  ? unpoison_range+0xf/0x30
[    4.885557]  do_init_module+0xf8/0x350
[    4.885760]  load_module+0x3fe6/0x4340
[    4.885960]  ? vm_unmap_ram+0x1d0/0x1d0
[    4.886166]  ? ____kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0x84/0xa0
[    4.886441]  ? module_frob_arch_sections+0x20/0x20
[    4.886697]  ? __do_sys_finit_module+0x108/0x170
[    4.886941]  __do_sys_finit_module+0x108/0x170
[    4.887178]  ? __ia32_sys_init_module+0x40/0x40
[    4.887419]  ? file_open_root+0x200/0x200
[    4.887634]  ? do_sys_open+0x85/0xe0
[    4.887826]  ? filp_open+0x50/0x50
[    4.888009]  ? fpregs_assert_state_consistent+0x4d/0x60
[    4.888287]  ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x2f/0x130
[    4.888547]  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
[    4.888739]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[    4.889010] RIP: 0033:0x7ff62fcf1cf7
[    4.889202] Code: 48 89 57 30 48 8b 04 24 48 89 47 38 e9 1d a0 02 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f71
[    4.890172] RSP: 002b:00007ffe6644ade8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
[    4.890570] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000f2ca70 RCX: 00007ff62fcf1cf7
[    4.890944] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000f2b9e0 RDI: 0000000000000003
[    4.891318] RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
[    4.891691] R10: 00007ff62fd55300 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000f2b9e0
[    4.892064] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000f2bdd0 R15: 0000000000000001
[    4.892439] ==================================================================

Signed-off-by: Tong Zhang <ztong0001@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/atm/eni.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/atm/eni.c b/drivers/atm/eni.c
index 9d16743c4917..2b7786cd548f 100644
--- a/drivers/atm/eni.c
+++ b/drivers/atm/eni.c
@@ -2279,7 +2279,8 @@ static int eni_init_one(struct pci_dev *pci_dev,
 	return rc;
 
 err_eni_release:
-	eni_do_release(dev);
+	dev->phy = NULL;
+	iounmap(ENI_DEV(dev)->ioaddr);
 err_unregister:
 	atm_dev_deregister(dev);
 err_free_consistent:
-- 
2.30.1

[PATCH 4.9 04/53] atm: lanai: dont run lanai_dev_close if not open

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Tong Zhang <ztong0001@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit a2bd45834e83d6c5a04d397bde13d744a4812dfc ]

lanai_dev_open() can fail. When it fail, lanai->base is unmapped and the
pci device is disabled. The caller, lanai_init_one(), then tries to run
atm_dev_deregister(). This will subsequently call lanai_dev_close() and
use the already released MMIO area.

To fix this issue, set the lanai->base to NULL if open fail,
and test the flag in lanai_dev_close().

[    8.324153] lanai: lanai_start() failed, err=19
[    8.324819] lanai(itf 0): shutting down interface
[    8.325211] BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc90000180024
[    8.325781] #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
[    8.326215] #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
[    8.326641] PGD 100000067 P4D 100000067 PUD 100139067 PMD 10013a067 PTE 0
[    8.327206] Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
[    8.327557] CPU: 0 PID: 95 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 5.11.0-rc7-00090-gdcc0b49040c7 #12
[    8.328229] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-48-gd9c812dda519-4
[    8.329145] RIP: 0010:lanai_dev_close+0x4f/0xe5 [lanai]
[    8.329587] Code: 00 48 c7 c7 00 d3 01 c0 e8 49 4e 0a c2 48 8d bd 08 02 00 00 e8 6e 52 14 c1 48 80
[    8.330917] RSP: 0018:ffff8881029ef680 EFLAGS: 00010246
[    8.331196] RAX: 000000000003fffe RBX: ffff888102fb4800 RCX: ffffffffc001a98a
[    8.331572] RDX: ffffc90000180000 RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: ffff888102fb4000
[    8.331948] RBP: ffff888102fb4000 R08: ffffffff8115da8a R09: ffffed102053deaa
[    8.332326] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffffed102053dea9 R12: ffff888102fb48a4
[    8.332701] R13: ffffffffc00123c0 R14: ffff888102fb4b90 R15: ffff888102fb4b88
[    8.333077] FS:  00007f08eb9056a0(0000) GS:ffff88815b400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[    8.333502] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[    8.333806] CR2: ffffc90000180024 CR3: 0000000102a28000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[    8.334182] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[    8.334557] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[    8.334932] Call Trace:
[    8.335066]  atm_dev_deregister+0x161/0x1a0 [atm]
[    8.335324]  lanai_init_one.cold+0x20c/0x96d [lanai]
[    8.335594]  ? lanai_send+0x2a0/0x2a0 [lanai]
[    8.335831]  local_pci_probe+0x6f/0xb0
[    8.336039]  pci_device_probe+0x171/0x240
[    8.336255]  ? pci_device_remove+0xe0/0xe0
[    8.336475]  ? kernfs_create_link+0xb6/0x110
[    8.336704]  ? sysfs_do_create_link_sd.isra.0+0x76/0xe0
[    8.336983]  really_probe+0x161/0x420
[    8.337181]  driver_probe_device+0x6d/0xd0
[    8.337401]  device_driver_attach+0x82/0x90
[    8.337626]  ? device_driver_attach+0x90/0x90
[    8.337859]  __driver_attach+0x60/0x100
[    8.338065]  ? device_driver_attach+0x90/0x90
[    8.338298]  bus_for_each_dev+0xe1/0x140
[    8.338511]  ? subsys_dev_iter_exit+0x10/0x10
[    8.338745]  ? klist_node_init+0x61/0x80
[    8.338956]  bus_add_driver+0x254/0x2a0
[    8.339164]  driver_register+0xd3/0x150
[    8.339370]  ? 0xffffffffc0028000
[    8.339550]  do_one_initcall+0x84/0x250
[    8.339755]  ? trace_event_raw_event_initcall_finish+0x150/0x150
[    8.340076]  ? free_vmap_area_noflush+0x1a5/0x5c0
[    8.340329]  ? unpoison_range+0xf/0x30
[    8.340532]  ? ____kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0x84/0xa0
[    8.340806]  ? unpoison_range+0xf/0x30
[    8.341014]  ? unpoison_range+0xf/0x30
[    8.341217]  do_init_module+0xf8/0x350
[    8.341419]  load_module+0x3fe6/0x4340
[    8.341621]  ? vm_unmap_ram+0x1d0/0x1d0
[    8.341826]  ? ____kasan_kmalloc.constprop.0+0x84/0xa0
[    8.342101]  ? module_frob_arch_sections+0x20/0x20
[    8.342358]  ? __do_sys_finit_module+0x108/0x170
[    8.342604]  __do_sys_finit_module+0x108/0x170
[    8.342841]  ? __ia32_sys_init_module+0x40/0x40
[    8.343083]  ? file_open_root+0x200/0x200
[    8.343298]  ? do_sys_open+0x85/0xe0
[    8.343491]  ? filp_open+0x50/0x50
[    8.343675]  ? exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0xfc/0x130
[    8.343935]  do_syscall_64+0x33/0x40
[    8.344132]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
[    8.344401] RIP: 0033:0x7f08eb887cf7
[    8.344594] Code: 48 89 57 30 48 8b 04 24 48 89 47 38 e9 1d a0 02 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 41
[    8.345565] RSP: 002b:00007ffcd5c98ad8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000139
[    8.345962] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00000000008fea70 RCX: 00007f08eb887cf7
[    8.346336] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000008fd9e0 RDI: 0000000000000003
[    8.346711] RBP: 0000000000000003 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000001
[    8.347085] R10: 00007f08eb8eb300 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000008fd9e0
[    8.347460] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00000000008fddd0 R15: 0000000000000001
[    8.347836] Modules linked in: lanai(+) atm
[    8.348065] CR2: ffffc90000180024
[    8.348244] ---[ end trace 7fdc1c668f2003e5 ]---
[    8.348490] RIP: 0010:lanai_dev_close+0x4f/0xe5 [lanai]
[    8.348772] Code: 00 48 c7 c7 00 d3 01 c0 e8 49 4e 0a c2 48 8d bd 08 02 00 00 e8 6e 52 14 c1 48 80
[    8.349745] RSP: 0018:ffff8881029ef680 EFLAGS: 00010246
[    8.350022] RAX: 000000000003fffe RBX: ffff888102fb4800 RCX: ffffffffc001a98a
[    8.350397] RDX: ffffc90000180000 RSI: 0000000000000246 RDI: ffff888102fb4000
[    8.350772] RBP: ffff888102fb4000 R08: ffffffff8115da8a R09: ffffed102053deaa
[    8.351151] R10: 0000000000000003 R11: ffffed102053dea9 R12: ffff888102fb48a4
[    8.351525] R13: ffffffffc00123c0 R14: ffff888102fb4b90 R15: ffff888102fb4b88
[    8.351918] FS:  00007f08eb9056a0(0000) GS:ffff88815b400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[    8.352343] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[    8.352647] CR2: ffffc90000180024 CR3: 0000000102a28000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[    8.353022] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[    8.353397] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[    8.353958] modprobe (95) used greatest stack depth: 26216 bytes left

Signed-off-by: Tong Zhang <ztong0001@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/atm/lanai.c | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/atm/lanai.c b/drivers/atm/lanai.c
index 445505d9ea07..dec6c68156ee 100644
--- a/drivers/atm/lanai.c
+++ b/drivers/atm/lanai.c
@@ -2240,6 +2240,7 @@ static int lanai_dev_open(struct atm_dev *atmdev)
 	conf1_write(lanai);
 #endif
 	iounmap(lanai->base);
+	lanai->base = NULL;
     error_pci:
 	pci_disable_device(lanai->pci);
     error:
@@ -2252,6 +2253,8 @@ static int lanai_dev_open(struct atm_dev *atmdev)
 static void lanai_dev_close(struct atm_dev *atmdev)
 {
 	struct lanai_dev *lanai = (struct lanai_dev *) atmdev->dev_data;
+	if (lanai->base==NULL)
+		return;
 	printk(KERN_INFO DEV_LABEL "(itf %d): shutting down interface\n",
 	    lanai->number);
 	lanai_timed_poll_stop(lanai);
@@ -2561,7 +2564,7 @@ static int lanai_init_one(struct pci_dev *pci,
 	struct atm_dev *atmdev;
 	int result;
 
-	lanai = kmalloc(sizeof(*lanai), GFP_KERNEL);
+	lanai = kzalloc(sizeof(*lanai), GFP_KERNEL);
 	if (lanai == NULL) {
 		printk(KERN_ERR DEV_LABEL
 		       ": couldn't allocate dev_data structure!\n");
-- 
2.30.1

[PATCH 4.9 05/53] ixgbe: Fix memleak in ixgbe_configure_clsu32

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Dinghao Liu <dinghao.liu@zju.edu.cn>

[ Upstream commit 7a766381634da19fc837619b0a34590498d9d29a ]

When ixgbe_fdir_write_perfect_filter_82599() fails,
input allocated by kzalloc() has not been freed,
which leads to memleak.

Signed-off-by: Dinghao Liu <dinghao.liu@zju.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Paul Menzel <pmenzel@molgen.mpg.de>
Tested-by: Tony Brelinski <tonyx.brelinski@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c | 6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c
index 36d73bf32f4f..8e2aaf774693 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/ixgbe/ixgbe_main.c
@@ -8677,8 +8677,10 @@ static int ixgbe_configure_clsu32(struct ixgbe_adapter *adapter,
 	ixgbe_atr_compute_perfect_hash_82599(&input->filter, mask);
 	err = ixgbe_fdir_write_perfect_filter_82599(hw, &input->filter,
 						    input->sw_idx, queue);
-	if (!err)
-		ixgbe_update_ethtool_fdir_entry(adapter, input, input->sw_idx);
+	if (err)
+		goto err_out_w_lock;
+
+	ixgbe_update_ethtool_fdir_entry(adapter, input, input->sw_idx);
 	spin_unlock(&adapter->fdir_perfect_lock);
 
 	if ((uhtid != 0x800) && (adapter->jump_tables[uhtid]))
-- 
2.30.1

[PATCH 4.9 06/53] net: tehuti: fix error return code in bdx_probe()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 38c26ff3048af50eee3fcd591921357ee5bfd9ee ]

When bdx_read_mac() fails, no error return code of bdx_probe()
is assigned.
To fix this bug, err is assigned with -EFAULT as error return code.

Reported-by: TOTE Robot <oslab@tsinghua.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/tehuti/tehuti.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/tehuti/tehuti.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/tehuti/tehuti.c
index 7108c68f16d3..6ee7f8d2f2d1 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/tehuti/tehuti.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/tehuti/tehuti.c
@@ -2062,6 +2062,7 @@ bdx_probe(struct pci_dev *pdev, const struct pci_device_id *ent)
 		/*bdx_hw_reset(priv); */
 		if (bdx_read_mac(priv)) {
 			pr_err("load MAC address failed\n");
+			err = -EFAULT;
 			goto err_out_iomap;
 		}
 		SET_NETDEV_DEV(ndev, &pdev->dev);
-- 
2.30.1

[PATCH 4.9 07/53] sun/niu: fix wrong RXMAC_BC_FRM_CNT_COUNT count

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Denis Efremov <efremov@linux.com>

[ Upstream commit 155b23e6e53475ca3b8c2a946299b4d4dd6a5a1e ]

RXMAC_BC_FRM_CNT_COUNT added to mp->rx_bcasts twice in a row
in niu_xmac_interrupt(). Remove the second addition.

Signed-off-by: Denis Efremov <efremov@linux.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/sun/niu.c | 2 --
 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/sun/niu.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/sun/niu.c
index fe5b0ac8c631..5bf47279f9c1 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/sun/niu.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/sun/niu.c
@@ -3948,8 +3948,6 @@ static void niu_xmac_interrupt(struct niu *np)
 		mp->rx_mcasts += RXMAC_MC_FRM_CNT_COUNT;
 	if (val & XRXMAC_STATUS_RXBCAST_CNT_EXP)
 		mp->rx_bcasts += RXMAC_BC_FRM_CNT_COUNT;
-	if (val & XRXMAC_STATUS_RXBCAST_CNT_EXP)
-		mp->rx_bcasts += RXMAC_BC_FRM_CNT_COUNT;
 	if (val & XRXMAC_STATUS_RXHIST1_CNT_EXP)
 		mp->rx_hist_cnt1 += RXMAC_HIST_CNT1_COUNT;
 	if (val & XRXMAC_STATUS_RXHIST2_CNT_EXP)
-- 
2.30.1

[PATCH 4.9 08/53] nfs: fix PNFS_FLEXFILE_LAYOUT Kconfig default

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Timo Rothenpieler <timo@rothenpieler.org>

[ Upstream commit a0590473c5e6c4ef17c3132ad08fbad170f72d55 ]

This follows what was done in 8c2fabc6542d9d0f8b16bd1045c2eda59bdcde13.
With the default being m, it's impossible to build the module into the
kernel.

Signed-off-by: Timo Rothenpieler <timo@rothenpieler.org>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/nfs/Kconfig | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/nfs/Kconfig b/fs/nfs/Kconfig
index c3428767332c..55ebf9f4a824 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/Kconfig
+++ b/fs/nfs/Kconfig
@@ -132,7 +132,7 @@ config PNFS_OBJLAYOUT
 config PNFS_FLEXFILE_LAYOUT
 	tristate
 	depends on NFS_V4_1 && NFS_V3
-	default m
+	default NFS_V4
 
 config NFS_V4_1_IMPLEMENTATION_ID_DOMAIN
 	string "NFSv4.1 Implementation ID Domain"
-- 
2.30.1

[PATCH 4.9 09/53] NFS: Correct size calculation for create reply length

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Frank Sorenson <sorenson@redhat.com>

[ Upstream commit ad3dbe35c833c2d4d0bbf3f04c785d32f931e7c9 ]

CREATE requests return a post_op_fh3, rather than nfs_fh3. The
post_op_fh3 includes an extra word to indicate 'handle_follows'.

Without that additional word, create fails when full 64-byte
filehandles are in use.

Add NFS3_post_op_fh_sz, and correct the size calculation for
NFS3_createres_sz.

Signed-off-by: Frank Sorenson <sorenson@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/nfs/nfs3xdr.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs3xdr.c b/fs/nfs/nfs3xdr.c
index 267126d32ec0..4a68837e92ea 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/nfs3xdr.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/nfs3xdr.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
  */
 #define NFS3_fhandle_sz		(1+16)
 #define NFS3_fh_sz		(NFS3_fhandle_sz)	/* shorthand */
+#define NFS3_post_op_fh_sz	(1+NFS3_fh_sz)
 #define NFS3_sattr_sz		(15)
 #define NFS3_filename_sz	(1+(NFS3_MAXNAMLEN>>2))
 #define NFS3_path_sz		(1+(NFS3_MAXPATHLEN>>2))
@@ -70,7 +71,7 @@
 #define NFS3_readlinkres_sz	(1+NFS3_post_op_attr_sz+1)
 #define NFS3_readres_sz		(1+NFS3_post_op_attr_sz+3)
 #define NFS3_writeres_sz	(1+NFS3_wcc_data_sz+4)
-#define NFS3_createres_sz	(1+NFS3_fh_sz+NFS3_post_op_attr_sz+NFS3_wcc_data_sz)
+#define NFS3_createres_sz	(1+NFS3_post_op_fh_sz+NFS3_post_op_attr_sz+NFS3_wcc_data_sz)
 #define NFS3_renameres_sz	(1+(2 * NFS3_wcc_data_sz))
 #define NFS3_linkres_sz		(1+NFS3_post_op_attr_sz+NFS3_wcc_data_sz)
 #define NFS3_readdirres_sz	(1+NFS3_post_op_attr_sz+2)
-- 
2.30.1

[PATCH 4.9 10/53] net: wan: fix error return code of uhdlc_init()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 62765d39553cfd1ad340124fe1e280450e8c89e2 ]

When priv->rx_skbuff or priv->tx_skbuff is NULL, no error return code of
uhdlc_init() is assigned.
To fix this bug, ret is assigned with -ENOMEM in these cases.

Reported-by: TOTE Robot <oslab@tsinghua.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: Jia-Ju Bai <baijiaju1990@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/wan/fsl_ucc_hdlc.c | 8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/wan/fsl_ucc_hdlc.c b/drivers/net/wan/fsl_ucc_hdlc.c
index 87bf05a81db5..fc7d28edee07 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wan/fsl_ucc_hdlc.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wan/fsl_ucc_hdlc.c
@@ -169,13 +169,17 @@ static int uhdlc_init(struct ucc_hdlc_private *priv)
 
 	priv->rx_skbuff = kzalloc(priv->rx_ring_size * sizeof(*priv->rx_skbuff),
 				  GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!priv->rx_skbuff)
+	if (!priv->rx_skbuff) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
 		goto free_ucc_pram;
+	}
 
 	priv->tx_skbuff = kzalloc(priv->tx_ring_size * sizeof(*priv->tx_skbuff),
 				  GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!priv->tx_skbuff)
+	if (!priv->tx_skbuff) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
 		goto free_rx_skbuff;
+	}
 
 	priv->skb_curtx = 0;
 	priv->skb_dirtytx = 0;
-- 
2.30.1

[PATCH 4.9 11/53] atm: uPD98402: fix incorrect allocation

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Tong Zhang <ztong0001@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 3153724fc084d8ef640c611f269ddfb576d1dcb1 ]

dev->dev_data is set in zatm.c, calling zatm_start() will overwrite this
dev->dev_data in uPD98402_start() and a subsequent PRIV(dev)->lock
(i.e dev->phy_data->lock) will result in a null-ptr-dereference.

I believe this is a typo and what it actually want to do is to allocate
phy_data instead of dev_data.

Signed-off-by: Tong Zhang <ztong0001@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/atm/uPD98402.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/atm/uPD98402.c b/drivers/atm/uPD98402.c
index 5120a96b3a89..b2f4e8df1591 100644
--- a/drivers/atm/uPD98402.c
+++ b/drivers/atm/uPD98402.c
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ static void uPD98402_int(struct atm_dev *dev)
 static int uPD98402_start(struct atm_dev *dev)
 {
 	DPRINTK("phy_start\n");
-	if (!(dev->dev_data = kmalloc(sizeof(struct uPD98402_priv),GFP_KERNEL)))
+	if (!(dev->phy_data = kmalloc(sizeof(struct uPD98402_priv),GFP_KERNEL)))
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	spin_lock_init(&PRIV(dev)->lock);
 	memset(&PRIV(dev)->sonet_stats,0,sizeof(struct k_sonet_stats));
-- 
2.30.1

[PATCH 4.9 12/53] atm: idt77252: fix null-ptr-dereference

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Tong Zhang <ztong0001@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 4416e98594dc04590ebc498fc4e530009535c511 ]

this one is similar to the phy_data allocation fix in uPD98402, the
driver allocate the idt77105_priv and store to dev_data but later
dereference using dev->dev_data, which will cause null-ptr-dereference.

fix this issue by changing dev_data to phy_data so that PRIV(dev) can
work correctly.

Signed-off-by: Tong Zhang <ztong0001@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/atm/idt77105.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/atm/idt77105.c b/drivers/atm/idt77105.c
index feb023d7eebd..40644670cff2 100644
--- a/drivers/atm/idt77105.c
+++ b/drivers/atm/idt77105.c
@@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ static int idt77105_start(struct atm_dev *dev)
 {
 	unsigned long flags;
 
-	if (!(dev->dev_data = kmalloc(sizeof(struct idt77105_priv),GFP_KERNEL)))
+	if (!(dev->phy_data = kmalloc(sizeof(struct idt77105_priv),GFP_KERNEL)))
 		return -ENOMEM;
 	PRIV(dev)->dev = dev;
 	spin_lock_irqsave(&idt77105_priv_lock, flags);
@@ -338,7 +338,7 @@ static int idt77105_stop(struct atm_dev *dev)
                 else
                     idt77105_all = walk->next;
 	        dev->phy = NULL;
-                dev->dev_data = NULL;
+                dev->phy_data = NULL;
                 kfree(walk);
                 break;
             }
-- 
2.30.1

[PATCH 4.9 13/53] u64_stats,lockdep: Fix u64_stats_init() vs lockdep

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>

[ Upstream commit d5b0e0677bfd5efd17c5bbb00156931f0d41cb85 ]

Jakub reported that:

    static struct net_device *rtl8139_init_board(struct pci_dev *pdev)
    {
	    ...
	    u64_stats_init(&tp->rx_stats.syncp);
	    u64_stats_init(&tp->tx_stats.syncp);
	    ...
    }

results in lockdep getting confused between the RX and TX stats lock.
This is because u64_stats_init() is an inline calling seqcount_init(),
which is a macro using a static variable to generate a lockdep class.

By wrapping that in an inline, we negate the effect of the macro and
fold the static key variable, hence the confusion.

Fix by also making u64_stats_init() a macro for the case where it
matters, leaving the other case an inline for argument validation
etc.

Reported-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Debugged-by: "Ahmed S. Darwish" <a.darwish@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Tested-by: "Erhard F." <erhard_f@mailbox.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/YEXicy6+9MksdLZh@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 include/linux/u64_stats_sync.h | 7 ++++---
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/u64_stats_sync.h b/include/linux/u64_stats_sync.h
index 650f3dd6b800..f604a8fe9d2e 100644
--- a/include/linux/u64_stats_sync.h
+++ b/include/linux/u64_stats_sync.h
@@ -68,12 +68,13 @@ struct u64_stats_sync {
 };
 
 
+#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32 && defined(CONFIG_SMP)
+#define u64_stats_init(syncp)	seqcount_init(&(syncp)->seq)
+#else
 static inline void u64_stats_init(struct u64_stats_sync *syncp)
 {
-#if BITS_PER_LONG == 32 && defined(CONFIG_SMP)
-	seqcount_init(&syncp->seq);
-#endif
 }
+#endif
 
 static inline void u64_stats_update_begin(struct u64_stats_sync *syncp)
 {
-- 
2.30.1

[PATCH 4.9 14/53] nfs: we dont support removing system.nfs4_acl

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>

[ Upstream commit 4f8be1f53bf615102d103c0509ffa9596f65b718 ]

The NFSv4 protocol doesn't have any notion of reomoving an attribute, so
removexattr(path,"system.nfs4_acl") doesn't make sense.

There's no documented return value.  Arguably it could be EOPNOTSUPP but
I'm a little worried an application might take that to mean that we
don't support ACLs or xattrs.  How about EINVAL?

Signed-off-by: J. Bruce Fields <bfields@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
index 0cebe0ca03b2..94130588ebf5 100644
--- a/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
+++ b/fs/nfs/nfs4proc.c
@@ -5144,6 +5144,9 @@ static int __nfs4_proc_set_acl(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, size_t bufl
 	unsigned int npages = DIV_ROUND_UP(buflen, PAGE_SIZE);
 	int ret, i;
 
+	/* You can't remove system.nfs4_acl: */
+	if (buflen == 0)
+		return -EINVAL;
 	if (!nfs4_server_supports_acls(server))
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	if (npages > ARRAY_SIZE(pages))
-- 
2.30.1

[PATCH 4.9 15/53] ia64: fix ia64_syscall_get_set_arguments() for break-based syscalls

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Sergei Trofimovich <slyfox@gentoo.org>

[ Upstream commit 0ceb1ace4a2778e34a5414e5349712ae4dc41d85 ]

In https://bugs.gentoo.org/769614 Dmitry noticed that
`ptrace(PTRACE_GET_SYSCALL_INFO)` does not work for syscalls called via
glibc's syscall() wrapper.

ia64 has two ways to call syscalls from userspace: via `break` and via
`eps` instructions.

The difference is in stack layout:

1. `eps` creates simple stack frame: no locals, in{0..7} == out{0..8}
2. `break` uses userspace stack frame: may be locals (glibc provides
   one), in{0..7} == out{0..8}.

Both work fine in syscall handling cde itself.

But `ptrace(PTRACE_GET_SYSCALL_INFO)` uses unwind mechanism to
re-extract syscall arguments but it does not account for locals.

The change always skips locals registers. It should not change `eps`
path as kernel's handler already enforces locals=0 and fixes `break`.

Tested on v5.10 on rx3600 machine (ia64 9040 CPU).

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210221002554.333076-1-slyfox@gentoo.org
Link: https://bugs.gentoo.org/769614
Signed-off-by: Sergei Trofimovich <slyfox@gentoo.org>
Reported-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c
index 36f660da8124..56007258c014 100644
--- a/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/ia64/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -2144,27 +2144,39 @@ static void syscall_get_set_args_cb(struct unw_frame_info *info, void *data)
 {
 	struct syscall_get_set_args *args = data;
 	struct pt_regs *pt = args->regs;
-	unsigned long *krbs, cfm, ndirty;
+	unsigned long *krbs, cfm, ndirty, nlocals, nouts;
 	int i, count;
 
 	if (unw_unwind_to_user(info) < 0)
 		return;
 
+	/*
+	 * We get here via a few paths:
+	 * - break instruction: cfm is shared with caller.
+	 *   syscall args are in out= regs, locals are non-empty.
+	 * - epsinstruction: cfm is set by br.call
+	 *   locals don't exist.
+	 *
+	 * For both cases argguments are reachable in cfm.sof - cfm.sol.
+	 * CFM: [ ... | sor: 17..14 | sol : 13..7 | sof : 6..0 ]
+	 */
 	cfm = pt->cr_ifs;
+	nlocals = (cfm >> 7) & 0x7f; /* aka sol */
+	nouts = (cfm & 0x7f) - nlocals; /* aka sof - sol */
 	krbs = (unsigned long *)info->task + IA64_RBS_OFFSET/8;
 	ndirty = ia64_rse_num_regs(krbs, krbs + (pt->loadrs >> 19));
 
 	count = 0;
 	if (in_syscall(pt))
-		count = min_t(int, args->n, cfm & 0x7f);
+		count = min_t(int, args->n, nouts);
 
+	/* Iterate over outs. */
 	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
+		int j = ndirty + nlocals + i + args->i;
 		if (args->rw)
-			*ia64_rse_skip_regs(krbs, ndirty + i + args->i) =
-				args->args[i];
+			*ia64_rse_skip_regs(krbs, j) = args->args[i];
 		else
-			args->args[i] = *ia64_rse_skip_regs(krbs,
-				ndirty + i + args->i);
+			args->args[i] = *ia64_rse_skip_regs(krbs, j);
 	}
 
 	if (!args->rw) {
-- 
2.30.1

[PATCH 4.9 16/53] ia64: fix ptrace(PTRACE_SYSCALL_INFO_EXIT) sign

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Sergei Trofimovich <slyfox@gentoo.org>

[ Upstream commit 61bf318eac2c13356f7bd1c6a05421ef504ccc8a ]

In https://bugs.gentoo.org/769614 Dmitry noticed that
`ptrace(PTRACE_GET_SYSCALL_INFO)` does not return error sign properly.

The bug is in mismatch between get/set errors:

static inline long syscall_get_error(struct task_struct *task,
                                     struct pt_regs *regs)
{
        return regs->r10 == -1 ? regs->r8:0;
}

static inline long syscall_get_return_value(struct task_struct *task,
                                            struct pt_regs *regs)
{
        return regs->r8;
}

static inline void syscall_set_return_value(struct task_struct *task,
                                            struct pt_regs *regs,
                                            int error, long val)
{
        if (error) {
                /* error < 0, but ia64 uses > 0 return value */
                regs->r8 = -error;
                regs->r10 = -1;
        } else {
                regs->r8 = val;
                regs->r10 = 0;
        }
}

Tested on v5.10 on rx3600 machine (ia64 9040 CPU).

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210221002554.333076-2-slyfox@gentoo.org
Link: https://bugs.gentoo.org/769614
Signed-off-by: Sergei Trofimovich <slyfox@gentoo.org>
Reported-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org>
Reviewed-by: Dmitry V. Levin <ldv@altlinux.org>
Cc: John Paul Adrian Glaubitz <glaubitz@physik.fu-berlin.de>
Cc: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/ia64/include/asm/syscall.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/ia64/include/asm/syscall.h b/arch/ia64/include/asm/syscall.h
index 1d0b875fec44..ec909eec0b4c 100644
--- a/arch/ia64/include/asm/syscall.h
+++ b/arch/ia64/include/asm/syscall.h
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ static inline void syscall_rollback(struct task_struct *task,
 static inline long syscall_get_error(struct task_struct *task,
 				     struct pt_regs *regs)
 {
-	return regs->r10 == -1 ? regs->r8:0;
+	return regs->r10 == -1 ? -regs->r8:0;
 }
 
 static inline long syscall_get_return_value(struct task_struct *task,
-- 
2.30.1

[PATCH 4.9 17/53] x86/tlb: Flush global mappings when KAISER is disabled

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>

Jim Mattson reported that Debian 9 guests using a 4.9-stable kernel
are exploding during alternatives patching:

  kernel BUG at /build/linux-dqnRSc/linux-4.9.228/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c:709!
  invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP
  Modules linked in:
  CPU: 1 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.9.0-13-amd64 #1 Debian 4.9.228-1
  Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
  Call Trace:
   swap_entry_free
   swap_entry_free
   text_poke_bp
   swap_entry_free
   arch_jump_label_transform
   set_debug_rodata
   __jump_label_update
   static_key_slow_inc
   frontswap_register_ops
   init_zswap
   init_frontswap
   do_one_initcall
   set_debug_rodata
   kernel_init_freeable
   rest_init
   kernel_init
   ret_from_fork

triggering the BUG_ON in text_poke() which verifies whether patched
instruction bytes have actually landed at the destination.

Further debugging showed that the TLB flush before that check is
insufficient because there could be global mappings left in the TLB,
leading to a stale mapping getting used.

I say "global mappings" because the hardware configuration is a new one:
machine is an AMD, which means, KAISER/PTI doesn't need to be enabled
there, which also means there's no user/kernel pagetables split and
therefore the TLB can have global mappings.

And the configuration is new one for a second reason: because that AMD
machine supports PCID and INVPCID, which leads the CPU detection code to
set the synthetic X86_FEATURE_INVPCID_SINGLE flag.

Now, __native_flush_tlb_single() does invalidate global mappings when
X86_FEATURE_INVPCID_SINGLE is *not* set and returns.

When X86_FEATURE_INVPCID_SINGLE is set, however, it invalidates the
requested address from both PCIDs in the KAISER-enabled case. But if
KAISER is not enabled and the machine has global mappings in the TLB,
then those global mappings do not get invalidated, which would lead to
the above mismatch from using a stale TLB entry.

So make sure to flush those global mappings in the KAISER disabled case.

Co-debugged by Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>.

Reported-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Acked-by: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Babu Moger <babu.moger@amd.com>
Tested-by: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CALMp9eRDSW66%2BXvbHVF4ohL7XhThoPoT0BrB0TcS0cgk=dkcBg@mail.gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h | 11 +++++++----
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
index f5ca15622dc9..2bfa4deb8cae 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tlbflush.h
@@ -245,12 +245,15 @@ static inline void __native_flush_tlb_single(unsigned long addr)
 	 * ASID.  But, userspace flushes are probably much more
 	 * important performance-wise.
 	 *
-	 * Make sure to do only a single invpcid when KAISER is
-	 * disabled and we have only a single ASID.
+	 * In the KAISER disabled case, do an INVLPG to make sure
+	 * the mapping is flushed in case it is a global one.
 	 */
-	if (kaiser_enabled)
+	if (kaiser_enabled) {
 		invpcid_flush_one(X86_CR3_PCID_ASID_USER, addr);
-	invpcid_flush_one(X86_CR3_PCID_ASID_KERN, addr);
+		invpcid_flush_one(X86_CR3_PCID_ASID_KERN, addr);
+	} else {
+		asm volatile("invlpg (%0)" ::"r" (addr) : "memory");
+	}
 }
 
 static inline void __flush_tlb_all(void)
-- 
2.30.1

[PATCH 4.9 18/53] squashfs: fix inode lookup sanity checks

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Sean Nyekjaer <sean@geanix.com>

commit c1b2028315c6b15e8d6725e0d5884b15887d3daa upstream.

When mouting a squashfs image created without inode compression it fails
with: "unable to read inode lookup table"

It turns out that the BLOCK_OFFSET is missing when checking the
SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE agaist the actual size.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210226092903.1473545-1-sean@geanix.com
Fixes: eabac19e40c0 ("squashfs: add more sanity checks in inode lookup")
Signed-off-by: Sean Nyekjaer <sean@geanix.com>
Acked-by: Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/squashfs/export.c      |    8 ++++++--
 fs/squashfs/squashfs_fs.h |    1 +
 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/squashfs/export.c
+++ b/fs/squashfs/export.c
@@ -165,14 +165,18 @@ __le64 *squashfs_read_inode_lookup_table
 		start = le64_to_cpu(table[n]);
 		end = le64_to_cpu(table[n + 1]);
 
-		if (start >= end || (end - start) > SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE) {
+		if (start >= end
+		    || (end - start) >
+		    (SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE + SQUASHFS_BLOCK_OFFSET)) {
 			kfree(table);
 			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 		}
 	}
 
 	start = le64_to_cpu(table[indexes - 1]);
-	if (start >= lookup_table_start || (lookup_table_start - start) > SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE) {
+	if (start >= lookup_table_start ||
+	    (lookup_table_start - start) >
+	    (SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE + SQUASHFS_BLOCK_OFFSET)) {
 		kfree(table);
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 	}
--- a/fs/squashfs/squashfs_fs.h
+++ b/fs/squashfs/squashfs_fs.h
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
 
 /* size of metadata (inode and directory) blocks */
 #define SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE		8192
+#define SQUASHFS_BLOCK_OFFSET		2
 
 /* default size of block device I/O */
 #ifdef CONFIG_SQUASHFS_4K_DEVBLK_SIZE

[PATCH 4.9 19/53] squashfs: fix xattr id and id lookup sanity checks

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk>

commit 8b44ca2b634527151af07447a8090a5f3a043321 upstream.

The checks for maximum metadata block size is missing
SQUASHFS_BLOCK_OFFSET (the two byte length count).

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/2069685113.2081245.1614583677427@webmail.123-reg.co.uk
Fixes: f37aa4c7366e23f ("squashfs: add more sanity checks in id lookup")
Signed-off-by: Phillip Lougher <phillip@squashfs.org.uk>
Cc: Sean Nyekjaer <sean@geanix.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 fs/squashfs/id.c       |    6 ++++--
 fs/squashfs/xattr_id.c |    6 ++++--
 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

--- a/fs/squashfs/id.c
+++ b/fs/squashfs/id.c
@@ -110,14 +110,16 @@ __le64 *squashfs_read_id_index_table(str
 		start = le64_to_cpu(table[n]);
 		end = le64_to_cpu(table[n + 1]);
 
-		if (start >= end || (end - start) > SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE) {
+		if (start >= end || (end - start) >
+				(SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE + SQUASHFS_BLOCK_OFFSET)) {
 			kfree(table);
 			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 		}
 	}
 
 	start = le64_to_cpu(table[indexes - 1]);
-	if (start >= id_table_start || (id_table_start - start) > SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE) {
+	if (start >= id_table_start || (id_table_start - start) >
+				(SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE + SQUASHFS_BLOCK_OFFSET)) {
 		kfree(table);
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 	}
--- a/fs/squashfs/xattr_id.c
+++ b/fs/squashfs/xattr_id.c
@@ -122,14 +122,16 @@ __le64 *squashfs_read_xattr_id_table(str
 		start = le64_to_cpu(table[n]);
 		end = le64_to_cpu(table[n + 1]);
 
-		if (start >= end || (end - start) > SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE) {
+		if (start >= end || (end - start) >
+				(SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE + SQUASHFS_BLOCK_OFFSET)) {
 			kfree(table);
 			return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 		}
 	}
 
 	start = le64_to_cpu(table[indexes - 1]);
-	if (start >= table_start || (table_start - start) > SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE) {
+	if (start >= table_start || (table_start - start) >
+				(SQUASHFS_METADATA_SIZE + SQUASHFS_BLOCK_OFFSET)) {
 		kfree(table);
 		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
 	}

[PATCH 4.9 20/53] arm64: dts: ls1043a: mark crypto engine dma coherent

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>

commit 4fb3a074755b7737c4081cffe0ccfa08c2f2d29d upstream.

Crypto engine (CAAM) on LS1043A platform is configured HW-coherent,
mark accordingly the DT node.

Lack of "dma-coherent" property for an IP that is configured HW-coherent
can lead to problems, similar to what has been reported for LS1046A.

Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v4.8+
Fixes: 63dac35b58f4 ("arm64: dts: ls1043a: add crypto node")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/fe6faa24-d8f7-d18f-adfa-44fa0caa1598@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Horia Geantă <horia.geanta@nxp.com>
Acked-by: Li Yang <leoyang.li@nxp.com>
Signed-off-by: Shawn Guo <shawnguo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/arm64/boot/dts/freescale/fsl-ls1043a.dtsi |    1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)

--- a/arch/arm64/boot/dts/freescale/fsl-ls1043a.dtsi
+++ b/arch/arm64/boot/dts/freescale/fsl-ls1043a.dtsi
@@ -177,6 +177,7 @@
 			ranges = <0x0 0x00 0x1700000 0x100000>;
 			reg = <0x00 0x1700000 0x0 0x100000>;
 			interrupts = <0 75 0x4>;
+			dma-coherent;
 
 			sec_jr0: jr@10000 {
 				compatible = "fsl,sec-v5.4-job-ring",

[PATCH 4.9 21/53] bus: omap_l3_noc: mark l3 irqs as IRQF_NO_THREAD

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Grygorii Strashko <grygorii.strashko@ti.com>

[ Upstream commit 7d7275b3e866cf8092bd12553ec53ba26864f7bb ]

The main purpose of l3 IRQs is to catch OCP bus access errors and identify
corresponding code places by showing call stack, so it's important to
handle L3 interconnect errors as fast as possible. On RT these IRQs will
became threaded and will be scheduled much more late from the moment actual
error occurred so showing completely useless information.

Hence, mark l3 IRQs as IRQF_NO_THREAD so they will not be forced threaded
on RT or if force_irqthreads = true.

Fixes: 0ee7261c9212 ("drivers: bus: Move the OMAP interconnect driver to drivers/bus/")
Signed-off-by: Grygorii Strashko <grygorii.strashko@ti.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/bus/omap_l3_noc.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/bus/omap_l3_noc.c b/drivers/bus/omap_l3_noc.c
index 5012e3ad1225..624f74d03a83 100644
--- a/drivers/bus/omap_l3_noc.c
+++ b/drivers/bus/omap_l3_noc.c
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ static int omap_l3_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	 */
 	l3->debug_irq = platform_get_irq(pdev, 0);
 	ret = devm_request_irq(l3->dev, l3->debug_irq, l3_interrupt_handler,
-			       0x0, "l3-dbg-irq", l3);
+			       IRQF_NO_THREAD, "l3-dbg-irq", l3);
 	if (ret) {
 		dev_err(l3->dev, "request_irq failed for %d\n",
 			l3->debug_irq);
@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ static int omap_l3_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 
 	l3->app_irq = platform_get_irq(pdev, 1);
 	ret = devm_request_irq(l3->dev, l3->app_irq, l3_interrupt_handler,
-			       0x0, "l3-app-irq", l3);
+			       IRQF_NO_THREAD, "l3-app-irq", l3);
 	if (ret)
 		dev_err(l3->dev, "request_irq failed for %d\n", l3->app_irq);
 
-- 
2.30.1

[PATCH 4.9 22/53] macvlan: macvlan_count_rx() needs to be aware of preemption

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

[ Upstream commit dd4fa1dae9f4847cc1fd78ca468ad69e16e5db3e ]

macvlan_count_rx() can be called from process context, it is thus
necessary to disable preemption before calling u64_stats_update_begin()

syzbot was able to spot this on 32bit arch:

WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 4632 at include/linux/seqlock.h:271 __seqprop_assert include/linux/seqlock.h:271 [inline]
WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 4632 at include/linux/seqlock.h:271 __seqprop_assert.constprop.0+0xf0/0x11c include/linux/seqlock.h:269
Modules linked in:
Kernel panic - not syncing: panic_on_warn set ...
CPU: 1 PID: 4632 Comm: kworker/1:3 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc2-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: ARM-Versatile Express
Workqueue: events macvlan_process_broadcast
Backtrace:
[<82740468>] (dump_backtrace) from [<827406dc>] (show_stack+0x18/0x1c arch/arm/kernel/traps.c:252)
 r7:00000080 r6:60000093 r5:00000000 r4:8422a3c4
[<827406c4>] (show_stack) from [<82751b58>] (__dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline])
[<827406c4>] (show_stack) from [<82751b58>] (dump_stack+0xb8/0xe8 lib/dump_stack.c:120)
[<82751aa0>] (dump_stack) from [<82741270>] (panic+0x130/0x378 kernel/panic.c:231)
 r7:830209b4 r6:84069ea4 r5:00000000 r4:844350d0
[<82741140>] (panic) from [<80244924>] (__warn+0xb0/0x164 kernel/panic.c:605)
 r3:8404ec8c r2:00000000 r1:00000000 r0:830209b4
 r7:0000010f
[<80244874>] (__warn) from [<82741520>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0x68/0xd4 kernel/panic.c:628)
 r7:81363f70 r6:0000010f r5:83018e50 r4:00000000
[<827414bc>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<81363f70>] (__seqprop_assert include/linux/seqlock.h:271 [inline])
[<827414bc>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<81363f70>] (__seqprop_assert.constprop.0+0xf0/0x11c include/linux/seqlock.h:269)
 r8:5a109000 r7:0000000f r6:a568dac0 r5:89802300 r4:00000001
[<81363e80>] (__seqprop_assert.constprop.0) from [<81364af0>] (u64_stats_update_begin include/linux/u64_stats_sync.h:128 [inline])
[<81363e80>] (__seqprop_assert.constprop.0) from [<81364af0>] (macvlan_count_rx include/linux/if_macvlan.h:47 [inline])
[<81363e80>] (__seqprop_assert.constprop.0) from [<81364af0>] (macvlan_broadcast+0x154/0x26c drivers/net/macvlan.c:291)
 r5:89802300 r4:8a927740
[<8136499c>] (macvlan_broadcast) from [<81365020>] (macvlan_process_broadcast+0x258/0x2d0 drivers/net/macvlan.c:317)
 r10:81364f78 r9:8a86d000 r8:8a9c7e7c r7:8413aa5c r6:00000000 r5:00000000
 r4:89802840
[<81364dc8>] (macvlan_process_broadcast) from [<802696a4>] (process_one_work+0x2d4/0x998 kernel/workqueue.c:2275)
 r10:00000008 r9:8404ec98 r8:84367a02 r7:ddfe6400 r6:ddfe2d40 r5:898dac80
 r4:8a86d43c
[<802693d0>] (process_one_work) from [<80269dcc>] (worker_thread+0x64/0x54c kernel/workqueue.c:2421)
 r10:00000008 r9:8a9c6000 r8:84006d00 r7:ddfe2d78 r6:898dac94 r5:ddfe2d40
 r4:898dac80
[<80269d68>] (worker_thread) from [<80271f40>] (kthread+0x184/0x1a4 kernel/kthread.c:292)
 r10:85247e64 r9:898dac80 r8:80269d68 r7:00000000 r6:8a9c6000 r5:89a2ee40
 r4:8a97bd00
[<80271dbc>] (kthread) from [<80200114>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x20 arch/arm/kernel/entry-common.S:158)
Exception stack(0x8a9c7fb0 to 0x8a9c7ff8)

Fixes: 412ca1550cbe ("macvlan: Move broadcasts into a work queue")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Acked-by: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 include/linux/if_macvlan.h | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/if_macvlan.h b/include/linux/if_macvlan.h
index a4ccc3122f93..cfcbc49f4ddf 100644
--- a/include/linux/if_macvlan.h
+++ b/include/linux/if_macvlan.h
@@ -70,13 +70,14 @@ static inline void macvlan_count_rx(const struct macvlan_dev *vlan,
 	if (likely(success)) {
 		struct vlan_pcpu_stats *pcpu_stats;
 
-		pcpu_stats = this_cpu_ptr(vlan->pcpu_stats);
+		pcpu_stats = get_cpu_ptr(vlan->pcpu_stats);
 		u64_stats_update_begin(&pcpu_stats->syncp);
 		pcpu_stats->rx_packets++;
 		pcpu_stats->rx_bytes += len;
 		if (multicast)
 			pcpu_stats->rx_multicast++;
 		u64_stats_update_end(&pcpu_stats->syncp);
+		put_cpu_ptr(vlan->pcpu_stats);
 	} else {
 		this_cpu_inc(vlan->pcpu_stats->rx_errors);
 	}
-- 
2.30.1

[PATCH 4.9 23/53] net: dsa: bcm_sf2: Qualify phydev->dev_flags based on port

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 47142ed6c34d544ae9f0463e58d482289cbe0d46 ]

Similar to commit 92696286f3bb37ba50e4bd8d1beb24afb759a799 ("net:
bcmgenet: Set phydev->dev_flags only for internal PHYs") we need to
qualify the phydev->dev_flags based on whether the port is connected to
an internal or external PHY otherwise we risk having a flags collision
with a completely different interpretation depending on the driver.

Fixes: aa9aef77c761 ("net: dsa: bcm_sf2: communicate integrated PHY revision to PHY driver")
Signed-off-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/dsa/bcm_sf2.c | 6 ++++--
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/dsa/bcm_sf2.c b/drivers/net/dsa/bcm_sf2.c
index 0c69d5858558..40b3adf7ad99 100644
--- a/drivers/net/dsa/bcm_sf2.c
+++ b/drivers/net/dsa/bcm_sf2.c
@@ -588,8 +588,10 @@ static u32 bcm_sf2_sw_get_phy_flags(struct dsa_switch *ds, int port)
 	 * in bits 15:8 and the patch level in bits 7:0 which is exactly what
 	 * the REG_PHY_REVISION register layout is.
 	 */
-
-	return priv->hw_params.gphy_rev;
+	if (priv->int_phy_mask & BIT(port))
+		return priv->hw_params.gphy_rev;
+	else
+		return 0;
 }
 
 static void bcm_sf2_sw_adjust_link(struct dsa_switch *ds, int port,
-- 
2.30.1

[PATCH 4.9 24/53] e1000e: add rtnl_lock() to e1000_reset_task

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Vitaly Lifshits <vitaly.lifshits@intel.com>

[ Upstream commit 21f857f0321d0d0ea9b1a758bd55dc63d1cb2437 ]

A possible race condition was found in e1000_reset_task,
after discovering a similar issue in igb driver via
commit 024a8168b749 ("igb: reinit_locked() should be called
with rtnl_lock").

Added rtnl_lock() and rtnl_unlock() to avoid this.

Fixes: bc7f75fa9788 ("[E1000E]: New pci-express e1000 driver (currently for ICH9 devices only)")
Suggested-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Vitaly Lifshits <vitaly.lifshits@intel.com>
Tested-by: Dvora Fuxbrumer <dvorax.fuxbrumer@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/netdev.c | 6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/netdev.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/netdev.c
index 3c01bc43889a..46323019aa63 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/netdev.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/netdev.c
@@ -5920,15 +5920,19 @@ static void e1000_reset_task(struct work_struct *work)
 	struct e1000_adapter *adapter;
 	adapter = container_of(work, struct e1000_adapter, reset_task);
 
+	rtnl_lock();
 	/* don't run the task if already down */
-	if (test_bit(__E1000_DOWN, &adapter->state))
+	if (test_bit(__E1000_DOWN, &adapter->state)) {
+		rtnl_unlock();
 		return;
+	}
 
 	if (!(adapter->flags & FLAG_RESTART_NOW)) {
 		e1000e_dump(adapter);
 		e_err("Reset adapter unexpectedly\n");
 	}
 	e1000e_reinit_locked(adapter);
+	rtnl_unlock();
 }
 
 /**
-- 
2.30.1

[PATCH 4.9 25/53] e1000e: Fix error handling in e1000_set_d0_lplu_state_82571

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Dinghao Liu <dinghao.liu@zju.edu.cn>

[ Upstream commit b52912b8293f2c496f42583e65599aee606a0c18 ]

There is one e1e_wphy() call in e1000_set_d0_lplu_state_82571
that we have caught its return value but lack further handling.
Check and terminate the execution flow just like other e1e_wphy()
in this function.

Fixes: bc7f75fa9788 ("[E1000E]: New pci-express e1000 driver (currently for ICH9 devices only)")
Signed-off-by: Dinghao Liu <dinghao.liu@zju.edu.cn>
Acked-by: Sasha Neftin <sasha.neftin@intel.com>
Tested-by: Dvora Fuxbrumer <dvorax.fuxbrumer@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Tony Nguyen <anthony.l.nguyen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/82571.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/82571.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/82571.c
index 6b03c8553e59..65deaf8f3004 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/82571.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000e/82571.c
@@ -917,6 +917,8 @@ static s32 e1000_set_d0_lplu_state_82571(struct e1000_hw *hw, bool active)
 	} else {
 		data &= ~IGP02E1000_PM_D0_LPLU;
 		ret_val = e1e_wphy(hw, IGP02E1000_PHY_POWER_MGMT, data);
+		if (ret_val)
+			return ret_val;
 		/* LPLU and SmartSpeed are mutually exclusive.  LPLU is used
 		 * during Dx states where the power conservation is most
 		 * important.  During driver activity we should enable
-- 
2.30.1

[PATCH 4.9 26/53] net/qlcnic: Fix a use after free in qlcnic_83xx_get_minidump_template

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Lv Yunlong <lyl2019@mail.ustc.edu.cn>

[ Upstream commit db74623a3850db99cb9692fda9e836a56b74198d ]

In qlcnic_83xx_get_minidump_template, fw_dump->tmpl_hdr was freed by
vfree(). But unfortunately, it is used when extended is true.

Fixes: 7061b2bdd620e ("qlogic: Deletion of unnecessary checks before two function calls")
Signed-off-by: Lv Yunlong <lyl2019@mail.ustc.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qlcnic/qlcnic_minidump.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qlcnic/qlcnic_minidump.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qlcnic/qlcnic_minidump.c
index 5174e0bd75d1..625336264a44 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qlcnic/qlcnic_minidump.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/qlcnic/qlcnic_minidump.c
@@ -1426,6 +1426,7 @@ void qlcnic_83xx_get_minidump_template(struct qlcnic_adapter *adapter)
 
 	if (fw_dump->tmpl_hdr == NULL || current_version > prev_version) {
 		vfree(fw_dump->tmpl_hdr);
+		fw_dump->tmpl_hdr = NULL;
 
 		if (qlcnic_83xx_md_check_extended_dump_capability(adapter))
 			extended = !qlcnic_83xx_extend_md_capab(adapter);
@@ -1444,6 +1445,8 @@ void qlcnic_83xx_get_minidump_template(struct qlcnic_adapter *adapter)
 			struct qlcnic_83xx_dump_template_hdr *hdr;
 
 			hdr = fw_dump->tmpl_hdr;
+			if (!hdr)
+				return;
 			hdr->drv_cap_mask = 0x1f;
 			fw_dump->cap_mask = 0x1f;
 			dev_info(&pdev->dev,
-- 
2.30.1

[PATCH 4.9 27/53] can: c_can_pci: c_can_pci_remove(): fix use-after-free

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Tong Zhang <ztong0001@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 0429d6d89f97ebff4f17f13f5b5069c66bde8138 ]

There is a UAF in c_can_pci_remove(). dev is released by
free_c_can_dev() and is used by pci_iounmap(pdev, priv->base) later.
To fix this issue, save the mmio address before releasing dev.

Fixes: 5b92da0443c2 ("c_can_pci: generic module for C_CAN/D_CAN on PCI")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210301024512.539039-1-ztong0001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Tong Zhang <ztong0001@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/can/c_can/c_can_pci.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/can/c_can/c_can_pci.c b/drivers/net/can/c_can/c_can_pci.c
index d065c0e2d18e..f3e0b2124a37 100644
--- a/drivers/net/can/c_can/c_can_pci.c
+++ b/drivers/net/can/c_can/c_can_pci.c
@@ -239,12 +239,13 @@ static void c_can_pci_remove(struct pci_dev *pdev)
 {
 	struct net_device *dev = pci_get_drvdata(pdev);
 	struct c_can_priv *priv = netdev_priv(dev);
+	void __iomem *addr = priv->base;
 
 	unregister_c_can_dev(dev);
 
 	free_c_can_dev(dev);
 
-	pci_iounmap(pdev, priv->base);
+	pci_iounmap(pdev, addr);
 	pci_disable_msi(pdev);
 	pci_clear_master(pdev);
 	pci_release_regions(pdev);
-- 
2.30.1

[PATCH 4.9 28/53] can: c_can: move runtime PM enable/disable to c_can_platform

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Tong Zhang <ztong0001@gmail.com>

[ Upstream commit 6e2fe01dd6f98da6cae8b07cd5cfa67abc70d97d ]

Currently doing modprobe c_can_pci will make the kernel complain:

    Unbalanced pm_runtime_enable!

this is caused by pm_runtime_enable() called before pm is initialized.

This fix is similar to 227619c3ff7c, move those pm_enable/disable code
to c_can_platform.

Fixes: 4cdd34b26826 ("can: c_can: Add runtime PM support to Bosch C_CAN/D_CAN controller")
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/r/20210302025542.987600-1-ztong0001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Tong Zhang <ztong0001@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Uwe Kleine-König <u.kleine-koenig@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/can/c_can/c_can.c          | 24 +-----------------------
 drivers/net/can/c_can/c_can_platform.c |  6 +++++-
 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/can/c_can/c_can.c b/drivers/net/can/c_can/c_can.c
index 4ead5a18b794..c41ab2cb272e 100644
--- a/drivers/net/can/c_can/c_can.c
+++ b/drivers/net/can/c_can/c_can.c
@@ -212,18 +212,6 @@ static const struct can_bittiming_const c_can_bittiming_const = {
 	.brp_inc = 1,
 };
 
-static inline void c_can_pm_runtime_enable(const struct c_can_priv *priv)
-{
-	if (priv->device)
-		pm_runtime_enable(priv->device);
-}
-
-static inline void c_can_pm_runtime_disable(const struct c_can_priv *priv)
-{
-	if (priv->device)
-		pm_runtime_disable(priv->device);
-}
-
 static inline void c_can_pm_runtime_get_sync(const struct c_can_priv *priv)
 {
 	if (priv->device)
@@ -1318,7 +1306,6 @@ static const struct net_device_ops c_can_netdev_ops = {
 
 int register_c_can_dev(struct net_device *dev)
 {
-	struct c_can_priv *priv = netdev_priv(dev);
 	int err;
 
 	/* Deactivate pins to prevent DRA7 DCAN IP from being
@@ -1328,28 +1315,19 @@ int register_c_can_dev(struct net_device *dev)
 	 */
 	pinctrl_pm_select_sleep_state(dev->dev.parent);
 
-	c_can_pm_runtime_enable(priv);
-
 	dev->flags |= IFF_ECHO;	/* we support local echo */
 	dev->netdev_ops = &c_can_netdev_ops;
 
 	err = register_candev(dev);
-	if (err)
-		c_can_pm_runtime_disable(priv);
-	else
+	if (!err)
 		devm_can_led_init(dev);
-
 	return err;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(register_c_can_dev);
 
 void unregister_c_can_dev(struct net_device *dev)
 {
-	struct c_can_priv *priv = netdev_priv(dev);
-
 	unregister_candev(dev);
-
-	c_can_pm_runtime_disable(priv);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(unregister_c_can_dev);
 
diff --git a/drivers/net/can/c_can/c_can_platform.c b/drivers/net/can/c_can/c_can_platform.c
index 717530eac70c..c6a03f565e3f 100644
--- a/drivers/net/can/c_can/c_can_platform.c
+++ b/drivers/net/can/c_can/c_can_platform.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
 #include <linux/list.h>
 #include <linux/io.h>
 #include <linux/platform_device.h>
+#include <linux/pm_runtime.h>
 #include <linux/clk.h>
 #include <linux/of.h>
 #include <linux/of_device.h>
@@ -385,6 +386,7 @@ static int c_can_plat_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	platform_set_drvdata(pdev, dev);
 	SET_NETDEV_DEV(dev, &pdev->dev);
 
+	pm_runtime_enable(priv->device);
 	ret = register_c_can_dev(dev);
 	if (ret) {
 		dev_err(&pdev->dev, "registering %s failed (err=%d)\n",
@@ -397,6 +399,7 @@ static int c_can_plat_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 	return 0;
 
 exit_free_device:
+	pm_runtime_disable(priv->device);
 	free_c_can_dev(dev);
 exit:
 	dev_err(&pdev->dev, "probe failed\n");
@@ -407,9 +410,10 @@ exit:
 static int c_can_plat_remove(struct platform_device *pdev)
 {
 	struct net_device *dev = platform_get_drvdata(pdev);
+	struct c_can_priv *priv = netdev_priv(dev);
 
 	unregister_c_can_dev(dev);
-
+	pm_runtime_disable(priv->device);
 	free_c_can_dev(dev);
 
 	return 0;
-- 
2.30.1

[PATCH 4.9 29/53] can: m_can: m_can_do_rx_poll(): fix extraneous msg loss warning

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Torin Cooper-Bennun <torin@maxiluxsystems.com>

[ Upstream commit c0e399f3baf42279f48991554240af8c457535d1 ]

Message loss from RX FIFO 0 is already handled in
m_can_handle_lost_msg(), with netdev output included.

Removing this warning also improves driver performance under heavy
load, where m_can_do_rx_poll() may be called many times before this
interrupt is cleared, causing this message to be output many
times (thanks Mariusz Madej for this report).

Fixes: e0d1f4816f2a ("can: m_can: add Bosch M_CAN controller support")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210303103151.3760532-1-torin@maxiluxsystems.com
Reported-by: Mariusz Madej <mariusz.madej@xtrack.com>
Signed-off-by: Torin Cooper-Bennun <torin@maxiluxsystems.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/can/m_can/m_can.c | 3 ---
 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/can/m_can/m_can.c b/drivers/net/can/m_can/m_can.c
index 0bd7e7164796..197c27d8f584 100644
--- a/drivers/net/can/m_can/m_can.c
+++ b/drivers/net/can/m_can/m_can.c
@@ -428,9 +428,6 @@ static int m_can_do_rx_poll(struct net_device *dev, int quota)
 	}
 
 	while ((rxfs & RXFS_FFL_MASK) && (quota > 0)) {
-		if (rxfs & RXFS_RFL)
-			netdev_warn(dev, "Rx FIFO 0 Message Lost\n");
-
 		m_can_read_fifo(dev, rxfs);
 
 		quota--;
-- 
2.30.1

[PATCH 4.9 30/53] mac80211: fix rate mask reset

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>

[ Upstream commit 1944015fe9c1d9fa5e9eb7ffbbb5ef8954d6753b ]

Coverity reported the strange "if (~...)" condition that's
always true. It suggested that ! was intended instead of ~,
but upon further analysis I'm convinced that what really was
intended was a comparison to 0xff/0xffff (in HT/VHT cases
respectively), since this indicates that all of the rates
are enabled.

Change the comparison accordingly.

I'm guessing this never really mattered because a reset to
not having a rate mask is basically equivalent to having a
mask that enables all rates.

Reported-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Fixes: 2ffbe6d33366 ("mac80211: fix and optimize MCS mask handling")
Fixes: b119ad6e726c ("mac80211: add rate mask logic for vht rates")
Reviewed-by: Colin Ian King <colin.king@canonical.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210212112213.36b38078f569.I8546a20c80bc1669058eb453e213630b846e107b@changeid
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 net/mac80211/cfg.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/mac80211/cfg.c b/net/mac80211/cfg.c
index 1a13715b9a59..f37fbc71fc1d 100644
--- a/net/mac80211/cfg.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/cfg.c
@@ -2681,14 +2681,14 @@ static int ieee80211_set_bitrate_mask(struct wiphy *wiphy,
 			continue;
 
 		for (j = 0; j < IEEE80211_HT_MCS_MASK_LEN; j++) {
-			if (~sdata->rc_rateidx_mcs_mask[i][j]) {
+			if (sdata->rc_rateidx_mcs_mask[i][j] != 0xff) {
 				sdata->rc_has_mcs_mask[i] = true;
 				break;
 			}
 		}
 
 		for (j = 0; j < NL80211_VHT_NSS_MAX; j++) {
-			if (~sdata->rc_rateidx_vht_mcs_mask[i][j]) {
+			if (sdata->rc_rateidx_vht_mcs_mask[i][j] != 0xffff) {
 				sdata->rc_has_vht_mcs_mask[i] = true;
 				break;
 			}
-- 
2.30.1

[PATCH 4.9 31/53] net: cdc-phonet: fix data-interface release on probe failure

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>

[ Upstream commit c79a707072fe3fea0e3c92edee6ca85c1e53c29f ]

Set the disconnected flag before releasing the data interface in case
netdev registration fails to avoid having the disconnect callback try to
deregister the never registered netdev (and trigger a WARN_ON()).

Fixes: 87cf65601e17 ("USB host CDC Phonet network interface driver")
Signed-off-by: Johan Hovold <johan@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/net/usb/cdc-phonet.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/net/usb/cdc-phonet.c b/drivers/net/usb/cdc-phonet.c
index ff2270ead2e6..84e0e7f78029 100644
--- a/drivers/net/usb/cdc-phonet.c
+++ b/drivers/net/usb/cdc-phonet.c
@@ -406,6 +406,8 @@ static int usbpn_probe(struct usb_interface *intf, const struct usb_device_id *i
 
 	err = register_netdev(dev);
 	if (err) {
+		/* Set disconnected flag so that disconnect() returns early. */
+		pnd->disconnected = 1;
 		usb_driver_release_interface(&usbpn_driver, data_intf);
 		goto out;
 	}
-- 
2.30.1

[PATCH 4.9 32/53] RDMA/cxgb4: Fix adapter LE hash errors while destroying ipv6 listening server

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Potnuri Bharat Teja <bharat@chelsio.com>

[ Upstream commit 3408be145a5d6418ff955fe5badde652be90e700 ]

Not setting the ipv6 bit while destroying ipv6 listening servers may
result in potential fatal adapter errors due to lookup engine memory hash
errors. Therefore always set ipv6 field while destroying ipv6 listening
servers.

Fixes: 830662f6f032 ("RDMA/cxgb4: Add support for active and passive open connection with IPv6 address")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210324190453.8171-1-bharat@chelsio.com
Signed-off-by: Potnuri Bharat Teja <bharat@chelsio.com>
Reviewed-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/cm.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/cm.c b/drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/cm.c
index a60e1c1b4b5e..8bd062635399 100644
--- a/drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/cm.c
+++ b/drivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/cm.c
@@ -3472,13 +3472,13 @@ int c4iw_destroy_listen(struct iw_cm_id *cm_id)
 	    ep->com.local_addr.ss_family == AF_INET) {
 		err = cxgb4_remove_server_filter(
 			ep->com.dev->rdev.lldi.ports[0], ep->stid,
-			ep->com.dev->rdev.lldi.rxq_ids[0], 0);
+			ep->com.dev->rdev.lldi.rxq_ids[0], false);
 	} else {
 		struct sockaddr_in6 *sin6;
 		c4iw_init_wr_wait(&ep->com.wr_wait);
 		err = cxgb4_remove_server(
 				ep->com.dev->rdev.lldi.ports[0], ep->stid,
-				ep->com.dev->rdev.lldi.rxq_ids[0], 0);
+				ep->com.dev->rdev.lldi.rxq_ids[0], true);
 		if (err)
 			goto done;
 		err = c4iw_wait_for_reply(&ep->com.dev->rdev, &ep->com.wr_wait,
-- 
2.30.1

[PATCH 4.9 33/53] ACPI: scan: Rearrange memory allocation in acpi_device_add()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>

[ Upstream commit c1013ff7a5472db637c56bb6237f8343398c03a7 ]

The upfront allocation of new_bus_id is done to avoid allocating
memory under acpi_device_lock, but it doesn't really help,
because (1) it leads to many unnecessary memory allocations for
_ADR devices, (2) kstrdup_const() is run under that lock anyway and
(3) it complicates the code.

Rearrange acpi_device_add() to allocate memory for a new struct
acpi_device_bus_id instance only when necessary, eliminate a redundant
local variable from it and reduce the number of labels in there.

No intentional functional impact.

Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/acpi/scan.c | 57 +++++++++++++++++++++------------------------
 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/acpi/scan.c b/drivers/acpi/scan.c
index 5aa4a01f698f..c1066487c06b 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/scan.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/scan.c
@@ -622,12 +622,23 @@ void acpi_bus_put_acpi_device(struct acpi_device *adev)
 	put_device(&adev->dev);
 }
 
+static struct acpi_device_bus_id *acpi_device_bus_id_match(const char *dev_id)
+{
+	struct acpi_device_bus_id *acpi_device_bus_id;
+
+	/* Find suitable bus_id and instance number in acpi_bus_id_list. */
+	list_for_each_entry(acpi_device_bus_id, &acpi_bus_id_list, node) {
+		if (!strcmp(acpi_device_bus_id->bus_id, dev_id))
+			return acpi_device_bus_id;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+}
+
 int acpi_device_add(struct acpi_device *device,
 		    void (*release)(struct device *))
 {
+	struct acpi_device_bus_id *acpi_device_bus_id;
 	int result;
-	struct acpi_device_bus_id *acpi_device_bus_id, *new_bus_id;
-	int found = 0;
 
 	if (device->handle) {
 		acpi_status status;
@@ -653,38 +664,26 @@ int acpi_device_add(struct acpi_device *device,
 	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&device->del_list);
 	mutex_init(&device->physical_node_lock);
 
-	new_bus_id = kzalloc(sizeof(struct acpi_device_bus_id), GFP_KERNEL);
-	if (!new_bus_id) {
-		pr_err(PREFIX "Memory allocation error\n");
-		result = -ENOMEM;
-		goto err_detach;
-	}
-
 	mutex_lock(&acpi_device_lock);
-	/*
-	 * Find suitable bus_id and instance number in acpi_bus_id_list
-	 * If failed, create one and link it into acpi_bus_id_list
-	 */
-	list_for_each_entry(acpi_device_bus_id, &acpi_bus_id_list, node) {
-		if (!strcmp(acpi_device_bus_id->bus_id,
-			    acpi_device_hid(device))) {
-			acpi_device_bus_id->instance_no++;
-			found = 1;
-			kfree(new_bus_id);
-			break;
+
+	acpi_device_bus_id = acpi_device_bus_id_match(acpi_device_hid(device));
+	if (acpi_device_bus_id) {
+		acpi_device_bus_id->instance_no++;
+	} else {
+		acpi_device_bus_id = kzalloc(sizeof(*acpi_device_bus_id),
+					     GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!acpi_device_bus_id) {
+			result = -ENOMEM;
+			goto err_unlock;
 		}
-	}
-	if (!found) {
-		acpi_device_bus_id = new_bus_id;
 		acpi_device_bus_id->bus_id =
 			kstrdup_const(acpi_device_hid(device), GFP_KERNEL);
 		if (!acpi_device_bus_id->bus_id) {
-			pr_err(PREFIX "Memory allocation error for bus id\n");
+			kfree(acpi_device_bus_id);
 			result = -ENOMEM;
-			goto err_free_new_bus_id;
+			goto err_unlock;
 		}
 
-		acpi_device_bus_id->instance_no = 0;
 		list_add_tail(&acpi_device_bus_id->node, &acpi_bus_id_list);
 	}
 	dev_set_name(&device->dev, "%s:%02x", acpi_device_bus_id->bus_id, acpi_device_bus_id->instance_no);
@@ -719,13 +718,9 @@ int acpi_device_add(struct acpi_device *device,
 		list_del(&device->node);
 	list_del(&device->wakeup_list);
 
- err_free_new_bus_id:
-	if (!found)
-		kfree(new_bus_id);
-
+ err_unlock:
 	mutex_unlock(&acpi_device_lock);
 
- err_detach:
 	acpi_detach_data(device->handle, acpi_scan_drop_device);
 	return result;
 }
-- 
2.30.1

[PATCH 4.9 34/53] ACPI: scan: Use unique number for instance_no

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>

[ Upstream commit eb50aaf960e3bedfef79063411ffd670da94b84b ]

The decrementation of acpi_device_bus_id->instance_no
in acpi_device_del() is incorrect, because it may cause
a duplicate instance number to be allocated next time
a device with the same acpi_device_bus_id is added.

Replace above mentioned approach by using IDA framework.

While at it, define the instance range to be [0, 4096).

Fixes: e49bd2dd5a50 ("ACPI: use PNPID:instance_no as bus_id of ACPI device")
Fixes: ca9dc8d42b30 ("ACPI / scan: Fix acpi_bus_id_list bookkeeping")
Signed-off-by: Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>
Cc: 4.10+ <stable@vger.kernel.org> # 4.10+
Signed-off-by: Rafael J. Wysocki <rafael.j.wysocki@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/acpi/internal.h |  6 +++++-
 drivers/acpi/scan.c     | 33 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 include/acpi/acpi_bus.h |  1 +
 3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/acpi/internal.h b/drivers/acpi/internal.h
index eae0b278d517..56c429ea6aaf 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/internal.h
+++ b/drivers/acpi/internal.h
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@
 #ifndef _ACPI_INTERNAL_H_
 #define _ACPI_INTERNAL_H_
 
+#include <linux/idr.h>
+
 #define PREFIX "ACPI: "
 
 int early_acpi_osi_init(void);
@@ -97,9 +99,11 @@ void acpi_scan_table_handler(u32 event, void *table, void *context);
 
 extern struct list_head acpi_bus_id_list;
 
+#define ACPI_MAX_DEVICE_INSTANCES	4096
+
 struct acpi_device_bus_id {
 	const char *bus_id;
-	unsigned int instance_no;
+	struct ida instance_ida;
 	struct list_head node;
 };
 
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/scan.c b/drivers/acpi/scan.c
index c1066487c06b..d749fe20fbfc 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/scan.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/scan.c
@@ -481,9 +481,8 @@ static void acpi_device_del(struct acpi_device *device)
 	list_for_each_entry(acpi_device_bus_id, &acpi_bus_id_list, node)
 		if (!strcmp(acpi_device_bus_id->bus_id,
 			    acpi_device_hid(device))) {
-			if (acpi_device_bus_id->instance_no > 0)
-				acpi_device_bus_id->instance_no--;
-			else {
+			ida_simple_remove(&acpi_device_bus_id->instance_ida, device->pnp.instance_no);
+			if (ida_is_empty(&acpi_device_bus_id->instance_ida)) {
 				list_del(&acpi_device_bus_id->node);
 				kfree_const(acpi_device_bus_id->bus_id);
 				kfree(acpi_device_bus_id);
@@ -634,6 +633,21 @@ static struct acpi_device_bus_id *acpi_device_bus_id_match(const char *dev_id)
 	return NULL;
 }
 
+static int acpi_device_set_name(struct acpi_device *device,
+				struct acpi_device_bus_id *acpi_device_bus_id)
+{
+	struct ida *instance_ida = &acpi_device_bus_id->instance_ida;
+	int result;
+
+	result = ida_simple_get(instance_ida, 0, ACPI_MAX_DEVICE_INSTANCES, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (result < 0)
+		return result;
+
+	device->pnp.instance_no = result;
+	dev_set_name(&device->dev, "%s:%02x", acpi_device_bus_id->bus_id, result);
+	return 0;
+}
+
 int acpi_device_add(struct acpi_device *device,
 		    void (*release)(struct device *))
 {
@@ -668,7 +682,9 @@ int acpi_device_add(struct acpi_device *device,
 
 	acpi_device_bus_id = acpi_device_bus_id_match(acpi_device_hid(device));
 	if (acpi_device_bus_id) {
-		acpi_device_bus_id->instance_no++;
+		result = acpi_device_set_name(device, acpi_device_bus_id);
+		if (result)
+			goto err_unlock;
 	} else {
 		acpi_device_bus_id = kzalloc(sizeof(*acpi_device_bus_id),
 					     GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -684,9 +700,16 @@ int acpi_device_add(struct acpi_device *device,
 			goto err_unlock;
 		}
 
+		ida_init(&acpi_device_bus_id->instance_ida);
+
+		result = acpi_device_set_name(device, acpi_device_bus_id);
+		if (result) {
+			kfree(acpi_device_bus_id);
+			goto err_unlock;
+		}
+
 		list_add_tail(&acpi_device_bus_id->node, &acpi_bus_id_list);
 	}
-	dev_set_name(&device->dev, "%s:%02x", acpi_device_bus_id->bus_id, acpi_device_bus_id->instance_no);
 
 	if (device->parent)
 		list_add_tail(&device->node, &device->parent->children);
diff --git a/include/acpi/acpi_bus.h b/include/acpi/acpi_bus.h
index c1a524de67c5..53b2a1f320f9 100644
--- a/include/acpi/acpi_bus.h
+++ b/include/acpi/acpi_bus.h
@@ -241,6 +241,7 @@ struct acpi_pnp_type {
 
 struct acpi_device_pnp {
 	acpi_bus_id bus_id;		/* Object name */
+	int instance_no;		/* Instance number of this object */
 	struct acpi_pnp_type type;	/* ID type */
 	acpi_bus_address bus_address;	/* _ADR */
 	char *unique_id;		/* _UID */
-- 
2.30.1

[PATCH 4.9 35/53] perf auxtrace: Fix auxtrace queue conflict

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>

[ Upstream commit b410ed2a8572d41c68bd9208555610e4b07d0703 ]

The only requirement of an auxtrace queue is that the buffers are in
time order.  That is achieved by making separate queues for separate
perf buffer or AUX area buffer mmaps.

That generally means a separate queue per cpu for per-cpu contexts, and
a separate queue per thread for per-task contexts.

When buffers are added to a queue, perf checks that the buffer cpu and
thread id (tid) match the queue cpu and thread id.

However, generally, that need not be true, and perf will queue buffers
correctly anyway, so the check is not needed.

In addition, the check gets erroneously hit when using sample mode to
trace multiple threads.

Consequently, fix that case by removing the check.

Fixes: e502789302a6 ("perf auxtrace: Add helpers for queuing AUX area tracing data")
Reported-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210308151143.18338-1-adrian.hunter@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 tools/perf/util/auxtrace.c | 4 ----
 1 file changed, 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/tools/perf/util/auxtrace.c b/tools/perf/util/auxtrace.c
index b87221efdf7e..51fdec9273d7 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/auxtrace.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/auxtrace.c
@@ -248,10 +248,6 @@ static int auxtrace_queues__add_buffer(struct auxtrace_queues *queues,
 		queue->set = true;
 		queue->tid = buffer->tid;
 		queue->cpu = buffer->cpu;
-	} else if (buffer->cpu != queue->cpu || buffer->tid != queue->tid) {
-		pr_err("auxtrace queue conflict: cpu %d, tid %d vs cpu %d, tid %d\n",
-		       queue->cpu, queue->tid, buffer->cpu, buffer->tid);
-		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
 	buffer->buffer_nr = queues->next_buffer_nr++;
-- 
2.30.1

[PATCH 4.9 36/53] idr: add ida_is_empty

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Matthew Wilcox <willy@linux.intel.com>

[ Upstream commit 99c494077e2d4282a17120a772eecc00ec3004cc ]

Two of the USB Gadgets were poking around in the internals of struct ida
in order to determine if it is empty.  Add the appropriate abstraction.

Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1480369871-5271-63-git-send-email-mawilcox@linuxonhyperv.com
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox <willy@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Konstantin Khlebnikov <koct9i@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ross Zwisler <ross.zwisler@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Felipe Balbi <balbi@kernel.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Michal Nazarewicz <mina86@mina86.com>
Cc: Matthew Wilcox <mawilcox@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_hid.c     | 6 +++---
 drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_printer.c | 6 +++---
 include/linux/idr.h                     | 5 +++++
 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_hid.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_hid.c
index 8e83649f77ce..42e5677d932d 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_hid.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_hid.c
@@ -932,7 +932,7 @@ static void hidg_free_inst(struct usb_function_instance *f)
 	mutex_lock(&hidg_ida_lock);
 
 	hidg_put_minor(opts->minor);
-	if (idr_is_empty(&hidg_ida.idr))
+	if (ida_is_empty(&hidg_ida))
 		ghid_cleanup();
 
 	mutex_unlock(&hidg_ida_lock);
@@ -958,7 +958,7 @@ static struct usb_function_instance *hidg_alloc_inst(void)
 
 	mutex_lock(&hidg_ida_lock);
 
-	if (idr_is_empty(&hidg_ida.idr)) {
+	if (ida_is_empty(&hidg_ida)) {
 		status = ghid_setup(NULL, HIDG_MINORS);
 		if (status)  {
 			ret = ERR_PTR(status);
@@ -971,7 +971,7 @@ static struct usb_function_instance *hidg_alloc_inst(void)
 	if (opts->minor < 0) {
 		ret = ERR_PTR(opts->minor);
 		kfree(opts);
-		if (idr_is_empty(&hidg_ida.idr))
+		if (ida_is_empty(&hidg_ida))
 			ghid_cleanup();
 		goto unlock;
 	}
diff --git a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_printer.c b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_printer.c
index b962f24b500b..b3d036d06553 100644
--- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_printer.c
+++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_printer.c
@@ -1276,7 +1276,7 @@ static void gprinter_free_inst(struct usb_function_instance *f)
 	mutex_lock(&printer_ida_lock);
 
 	gprinter_put_minor(opts->minor);
-	if (idr_is_empty(&printer_ida.idr))
+	if (ida_is_empty(&printer_ida))
 		gprinter_cleanup();
 
 	mutex_unlock(&printer_ida_lock);
@@ -1300,7 +1300,7 @@ static struct usb_function_instance *gprinter_alloc_inst(void)
 
 	mutex_lock(&printer_ida_lock);
 
-	if (idr_is_empty(&printer_ida.idr)) {
+	if (ida_is_empty(&printer_ida)) {
 		status = gprinter_setup(PRINTER_MINORS);
 		if (status) {
 			ret = ERR_PTR(status);
@@ -1313,7 +1313,7 @@ static struct usb_function_instance *gprinter_alloc_inst(void)
 	if (opts->minor < 0) {
 		ret = ERR_PTR(opts->minor);
 		kfree(opts);
-		if (idr_is_empty(&printer_ida.idr))
+		if (ida_is_empty(&printer_ida))
 			gprinter_cleanup();
 		goto unlock;
 	}
diff --git a/include/linux/idr.h b/include/linux/idr.h
index 083d61e92706..3639a28188c9 100644
--- a/include/linux/idr.h
+++ b/include/linux/idr.h
@@ -195,6 +195,11 @@ static inline int ida_get_new(struct ida *ida, int *p_id)
 	return ida_get_new_above(ida, 0, p_id);
 }
 
+static inline bool ida_is_empty(struct ida *ida)
+{
+	return idr_is_empty(&ida->idr);
+}
+
 void __init idr_init_cache(void);
 
 #endif /* __IDR_H__ */
-- 
2.30.1

[PATCH 4.9 37/53] futex: Use smp_store_release() in mark_wake_futex()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>

commit 1b367ece0d7e696cab1c8501bab282cc6a538b3f upstream.

Since the futex_q can dissapear the instruction after assigning NULL,
this really should be a RELEASE barrier. That stops loads from hitting
dead memory too.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: juri.lelli@arm.com
Cc: bigeasy@linutronix.de
Cc: xlpang@redhat.com
Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org
Cc: mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com
Cc: jdesfossez@efficios.com
Cc: dvhart@infradead.org
Cc: bristot@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170322104151.604296452@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/futex.c |    3 +--
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/futex.c
+++ b/kernel/futex.c
@@ -1565,8 +1565,7 @@ static void mark_wake_futex(struct wake_
 	 * memory barrier is required here to prevent the following
 	 * store to lock_ptr from getting ahead of the plist_del.
 	 */
-	smp_wmb();
-	q->lock_ptr = NULL;
+	smp_store_release(&q->lock_ptr, NULL);
 }
 
 /*

[PATCH 4.9 38/53] futex,rt_mutex: Introduce rt_mutex_init_waiter()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>

commit 50809358dd7199aa7ce232f6877dd09ec30ef374 upstream.

Since there's already two copies of this code, introduce a helper now
before adding a third one.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: juri.lelli@arm.com
Cc: bigeasy@linutronix.de
Cc: xlpang@redhat.com
Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org
Cc: mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com
Cc: jdesfossez@efficios.com
Cc: dvhart@infradead.org
Cc: bristot@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170322104151.950039479@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
[bwh: Backported to 4.9: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/futex.c                  |    5 +----
 kernel/locking/rtmutex.c        |   12 +++++++++---
 kernel/locking/rtmutex_common.h |    1 +
 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/futex.c
+++ b/kernel/futex.c
@@ -3234,10 +3234,7 @@ static int futex_wait_requeue_pi(u32 __u
 	 * The waiter is allocated on our stack, manipulated by the requeue
 	 * code while we sleep on uaddr.
 	 */
-	debug_rt_mutex_init_waiter(&rt_waiter);
-	RB_CLEAR_NODE(&rt_waiter.pi_tree_entry);
-	RB_CLEAR_NODE(&rt_waiter.tree_entry);
-	rt_waiter.task = NULL;
+	rt_mutex_init_waiter(&rt_waiter);
 
 	ret = get_futex_key(uaddr2, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &key2, VERIFY_WRITE);
 	if (unlikely(ret != 0))
--- a/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c
+++ b/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c
@@ -1176,6 +1176,14 @@ void rt_mutex_adjust_pi(struct task_stru
 				   next_lock, NULL, task);
 }
 
+void rt_mutex_init_waiter(struct rt_mutex_waiter *waiter)
+{
+	debug_rt_mutex_init_waiter(waiter);
+	RB_CLEAR_NODE(&waiter->pi_tree_entry);
+	RB_CLEAR_NODE(&waiter->tree_entry);
+	waiter->task = NULL;
+}
+
 /**
  * __rt_mutex_slowlock() - Perform the wait-wake-try-to-take loop
  * @lock:		 the rt_mutex to take
@@ -1258,9 +1266,7 @@ rt_mutex_slowlock(struct rt_mutex *lock,
 	unsigned long flags;
 	int ret = 0;
 
-	debug_rt_mutex_init_waiter(&waiter);
-	RB_CLEAR_NODE(&waiter.pi_tree_entry);
-	RB_CLEAR_NODE(&waiter.tree_entry);
+	rt_mutex_init_waiter(&waiter);
 
 	/*
 	 * Technically we could use raw_spin_[un]lock_irq() here, but this can
--- a/kernel/locking/rtmutex_common.h
+++ b/kernel/locking/rtmutex_common.h
@@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ extern struct task_struct *rt_mutex_next
 extern void rt_mutex_init_proxy_locked(struct rt_mutex *lock,
 				       struct task_struct *proxy_owner);
 extern void rt_mutex_proxy_unlock(struct rt_mutex *lock);
+extern void rt_mutex_init_waiter(struct rt_mutex_waiter *waiter);
 extern int rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(struct rt_mutex *lock,
 				     struct rt_mutex_waiter *waiter,
 				     struct task_struct *task);

[PATCH 4.9 39/53] futex: Rework futex_lock_pi() to use rt_mutex_*_proxy_lock()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>

commit cfafcd117da0216520568c195cb2f6cd1980c4bb upstream.

By changing futex_lock_pi() to use rt_mutex_*_proxy_lock() all wait_list
modifications are done under both hb->lock and wait_lock.

This closes the obvious interleave pattern between futex_lock_pi() and
futex_unlock_pi(), but not entirely so. See below:

Before:

futex_lock_pi()			futex_unlock_pi()
  unlock hb->lock

				  lock hb->lock
				  unlock hb->lock

				  lock rt_mutex->wait_lock
				  unlock rt_mutex_wait_lock
				    -EAGAIN

  lock rt_mutex->wait_lock
  list_add
  unlock rt_mutex->wait_lock

  schedule()

  lock rt_mutex->wait_lock
  list_del
  unlock rt_mutex->wait_lock

				  <idem>
				    -EAGAIN

  lock hb->lock

After:

futex_lock_pi()			futex_unlock_pi()

  lock hb->lock
  lock rt_mutex->wait_lock
  list_add
  unlock rt_mutex->wait_lock
  unlock hb->lock

  schedule()
				  lock hb->lock
				  unlock hb->lock
  lock hb->lock
  lock rt_mutex->wait_lock
  list_del
  unlock rt_mutex->wait_lock

				  lock rt_mutex->wait_lock
				  unlock rt_mutex_wait_lock
				    -EAGAIN

  unlock hb->lock

It does however solve the earlier starvation/live-lock scenario which got
introduced with the -EAGAIN since unlike the before scenario; where the
-EAGAIN happens while futex_unlock_pi() doesn't hold any locks; in the
after scenario it happens while futex_unlock_pi() actually holds a lock,
and then it is serialized on that lock.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: juri.lelli@arm.com
Cc: bigeasy@linutronix.de
Cc: xlpang@redhat.com
Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org
Cc: mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com
Cc: jdesfossez@efficios.com
Cc: dvhart@infradead.org
Cc: bristot@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170322104152.062785528@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
[bwh: Backported to 4.9: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/futex.c                  |   77 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
 kernel/locking/rtmutex.c        |   26 +++----------
 kernel/locking/rtmutex_common.h |    1 
 3 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/futex.c
+++ b/kernel/futex.c
@@ -2333,20 +2333,7 @@ queue_unlock(struct futex_hash_bucket *h
 	hb_waiters_dec(hb);
 }
 
-/**
- * queue_me() - Enqueue the futex_q on the futex_hash_bucket
- * @q:	The futex_q to enqueue
- * @hb:	The destination hash bucket
- *
- * The hb->lock must be held by the caller, and is released here. A call to
- * queue_me() is typically paired with exactly one call to unqueue_me().  The
- * exceptions involve the PI related operations, which may use unqueue_me_pi()
- * or nothing if the unqueue is done as part of the wake process and the unqueue
- * state is implicit in the state of woken task (see futex_wait_requeue_pi() for
- * an example).
- */
-static inline void queue_me(struct futex_q *q, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb)
-	__releases(&hb->lock)
+static inline void __queue_me(struct futex_q *q, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb)
 {
 	int prio;
 
@@ -2363,6 +2350,24 @@ static inline void queue_me(struct futex
 	plist_node_init(&q->list, prio);
 	plist_add(&q->list, &hb->chain);
 	q->task = current;
+}
+
+/**
+ * queue_me() - Enqueue the futex_q on the futex_hash_bucket
+ * @q:	The futex_q to enqueue
+ * @hb:	The destination hash bucket
+ *
+ * The hb->lock must be held by the caller, and is released here. A call to
+ * queue_me() is typically paired with exactly one call to unqueue_me().  The
+ * exceptions involve the PI related operations, which may use unqueue_me_pi()
+ * or nothing if the unqueue is done as part of the wake process and the unqueue
+ * state is implicit in the state of woken task (see futex_wait_requeue_pi() for
+ * an example).
+ */
+static inline void queue_me(struct futex_q *q, struct futex_hash_bucket *hb)
+	__releases(&hb->lock)
+{
+	__queue_me(q, hb);
 	spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
 }
 
@@ -2868,6 +2873,7 @@ static int futex_lock_pi(u32 __user *uad
 {
 	struct hrtimer_sleeper timeout, *to = NULL;
 	struct task_struct *exiting = NULL;
+	struct rt_mutex_waiter rt_waiter;
 	struct futex_hash_bucket *hb;
 	struct futex_q q = futex_q_init;
 	int res, ret;
@@ -2928,25 +2934,52 @@ retry_private:
 		}
 	}
 
+	WARN_ON(!q.pi_state);
+
 	/*
 	 * Only actually queue now that the atomic ops are done:
 	 */
-	queue_me(&q, hb);
+	__queue_me(&q, hb);
 
-	WARN_ON(!q.pi_state);
-	/*
-	 * Block on the PI mutex:
-	 */
-	if (!trylock) {
-		ret = rt_mutex_timed_futex_lock(&q.pi_state->pi_mutex, to);
-	} else {
+	if (trylock) {
 		ret = rt_mutex_futex_trylock(&q.pi_state->pi_mutex);
 		/* Fixup the trylock return value: */
 		ret = ret ? 0 : -EWOULDBLOCK;
+		goto no_block;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * We must add ourselves to the rt_mutex waitlist while holding hb->lock
+	 * such that the hb and rt_mutex wait lists match.
+	 */
+	rt_mutex_init_waiter(&rt_waiter);
+	ret = rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(&q.pi_state->pi_mutex, &rt_waiter, current);
+	if (ret) {
+		if (ret == 1)
+			ret = 0;
+
+		goto no_block;
+	}
+
+	spin_unlock(q.lock_ptr);
+
+	if (unlikely(to))
+		hrtimer_start_expires(&to->timer, HRTIMER_MODE_ABS);
+
+	ret = rt_mutex_wait_proxy_lock(&q.pi_state->pi_mutex, to, &rt_waiter);
+
 	spin_lock(q.lock_ptr);
 	/*
+	 * If we failed to acquire the lock (signal/timeout), we must
+	 * first acquire the hb->lock before removing the lock from the
+	 * rt_mutex waitqueue, such that we can keep the hb and rt_mutex
+	 * wait lists consistent.
+	 */
+	if (ret && !rt_mutex_cleanup_proxy_lock(&q.pi_state->pi_mutex, &rt_waiter))
+		ret = 0;
+
+no_block:
+	/*
 	 * Fixup the pi_state owner and possibly acquire the lock if we
 	 * haven't already.
 	 */
--- a/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c
+++ b/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c
@@ -1523,19 +1523,6 @@ int __sched rt_mutex_lock_interruptible(
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(rt_mutex_lock_interruptible);
 
 /*
- * Futex variant with full deadlock detection.
- * Futex variants must not use the fast-path, see __rt_mutex_futex_unlock().
- */
-int __sched rt_mutex_timed_futex_lock(struct rt_mutex *lock,
-			      struct hrtimer_sleeper *timeout)
-{
-	might_sleep();
-
-	return rt_mutex_slowlock(lock, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE,
-				 timeout, RT_MUTEX_FULL_CHAINWALK);
-}
-
-/*
  * Futex variant, must not use fastpath.
  */
 int __sched rt_mutex_futex_trylock(struct rt_mutex *lock)
@@ -1808,12 +1795,6 @@ int rt_mutex_wait_proxy_lock(struct rt_m
 	/* sleep on the mutex */
 	ret = __rt_mutex_slowlock(lock, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE, to, waiter);
 
-	/*
-	 * try_to_take_rt_mutex() sets the waiter bit unconditionally. We might
-	 * have to fix that up.
-	 */
-	fixup_rt_mutex_waiters(lock);
-
 	raw_spin_unlock_irq(&lock->wait_lock);
 
 	return ret;
@@ -1853,6 +1834,13 @@ bool rt_mutex_cleanup_proxy_lock(struct
 		fixup_rt_mutex_waiters(lock);
 		cleanup = true;
 	}
+
+	/*
+	 * try_to_take_rt_mutex() sets the waiter bit unconditionally. We might
+	 * have to fix that up.
+	 */
+	fixup_rt_mutex_waiters(lock);
+
 	raw_spin_unlock_irq(&lock->wait_lock);
 
 	return cleanup;
--- a/kernel/locking/rtmutex_common.h
+++ b/kernel/locking/rtmutex_common.h
@@ -112,7 +112,6 @@ extern int rt_mutex_wait_proxy_lock(stru
 			       struct rt_mutex_waiter *waiter);
 extern bool rt_mutex_cleanup_proxy_lock(struct rt_mutex *lock,
 				 struct rt_mutex_waiter *waiter);
-extern int rt_mutex_timed_futex_lock(struct rt_mutex *l, struct hrtimer_sleeper *to);
 extern int rt_mutex_futex_trylock(struct rt_mutex *l);
 extern int __rt_mutex_futex_trylock(struct rt_mutex *l);
 

[PATCH 4.9 40/53] futex: Drop hb->lock before enqueueing on the rtmutex

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>

commit 56222b212e8edb1cf51f5dd73ff645809b082b40 upstream.

When PREEMPT_RT_FULL does the spinlock -> rt_mutex substitution the PI
chain code will (falsely) report a deadlock and BUG.

The problem is that it hold hb->lock (now an rt_mutex) while doing
task_blocks_on_rt_mutex on the futex's pi_state::rtmutex. This, when
interleaved just right with futex_unlock_pi() leads it to believe to see an
AB-BA deadlock.

  Task1 (holds rt_mutex,	Task2 (does FUTEX_LOCK_PI)
         does FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI)

				lock hb->lock
				lock rt_mutex (as per start_proxy)
  lock hb->lock

Which is a trivial AB-BA.

It is not an actual deadlock, because it won't be holding hb->lock by the
time it actually blocks on the rt_mutex, but the chainwalk code doesn't
know that and it would be a nightmare to handle this gracefully.

To avoid this problem, do the same as in futex_unlock_pi() and drop
hb->lock after acquiring wait_lock. This still fully serializes against
futex_unlock_pi(), since adding to the wait_list does the very same lock
dance, and removing it holds both locks.

Aside of solving the RT problem this makes the lock and unlock mechanism
symetric and reduces the hb->lock held time.

Reported-and-tested-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Suggested-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: juri.lelli@arm.com
Cc: xlpang@redhat.com
Cc: rostedt@goodmis.org
Cc: mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com
Cc: jdesfossez@efficios.com
Cc: dvhart@infradead.org
Cc: bristot@redhat.com
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170322104152.161341537@infradead.org
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/futex.c                  |   30 +++++++++++++++++-------
 kernel/locking/rtmutex.c        |   49 ++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
 kernel/locking/rtmutex_common.h |    3 ++
 3 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/futex.c
+++ b/kernel/futex.c
@@ -2948,20 +2948,33 @@ retry_private:
 		goto no_block;
 	}
 
+	rt_mutex_init_waiter(&rt_waiter);
+
 	/*
-	 * We must add ourselves to the rt_mutex waitlist while holding hb->lock
-	 * such that the hb and rt_mutex wait lists match.
+	 * On PREEMPT_RT_FULL, when hb->lock becomes an rt_mutex, we must not
+	 * hold it while doing rt_mutex_start_proxy(), because then it will
+	 * include hb->lock in the blocking chain, even through we'll not in
+	 * fact hold it while blocking. This will lead it to report -EDEADLK
+	 * and BUG when futex_unlock_pi() interleaves with this.
+	 *
+	 * Therefore acquire wait_lock while holding hb->lock, but drop the
+	 * latter before calling rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(). This still fully
+	 * serializes against futex_unlock_pi() as that does the exact same
+	 * lock handoff sequence.
 	 */
-	rt_mutex_init_waiter(&rt_waiter);
-	ret = rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(&q.pi_state->pi_mutex, &rt_waiter, current);
+	raw_spin_lock_irq(&q.pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
+	spin_unlock(q.lock_ptr);
+	ret = __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(&q.pi_state->pi_mutex, &rt_waiter, current);
+	raw_spin_unlock_irq(&q.pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
+
 	if (ret) {
 		if (ret == 1)
 			ret = 0;
 
+		spin_lock(q.lock_ptr);
 		goto no_block;
 	}
 
-	spin_unlock(q.lock_ptr);
 
 	if (unlikely(to))
 		hrtimer_start_expires(&to->timer, HRTIMER_MODE_ABS);
@@ -2974,6 +2987,9 @@ retry_private:
 	 * first acquire the hb->lock before removing the lock from the
 	 * rt_mutex waitqueue, such that we can keep the hb and rt_mutex
 	 * wait lists consistent.
+	 *
+	 * In particular; it is important that futex_unlock_pi() can not
+	 * observe this inconsistency.
 	 */
 	if (ret && !rt_mutex_cleanup_proxy_lock(&q.pi_state->pi_mutex, &rt_waiter))
 		ret = 0;
@@ -3071,10 +3087,6 @@ retry:
 
 		get_pi_state(pi_state);
 		/*
-		 * Since modifying the wait_list is done while holding both
-		 * hb->lock and wait_lock, holding either is sufficient to
-		 * observe it.
-		 *
 		 * By taking wait_lock while still holding hb->lock, we ensure
 		 * there is no point where we hold neither; and therefore
 		 * wake_futex_pi() must observe a state consistent with what we
--- a/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c
+++ b/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c
@@ -1695,31 +1695,14 @@ void rt_mutex_proxy_unlock(struct rt_mut
 	rt_mutex_set_owner(lock, NULL);
 }
 
-/**
- * rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock() - Start lock acquisition for another task
- * @lock:		the rt_mutex to take
- * @waiter:		the pre-initialized rt_mutex_waiter
- * @task:		the task to prepare
- *
- * Returns:
- *  0 - task blocked on lock
- *  1 - acquired the lock for task, caller should wake it up
- * <0 - error
- *
- * Special API call for FUTEX_REQUEUE_PI support.
- */
-int rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(struct rt_mutex *lock,
+int __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(struct rt_mutex *lock,
 			      struct rt_mutex_waiter *waiter,
 			      struct task_struct *task)
 {
 	int ret;
 
-	raw_spin_lock_irq(&lock->wait_lock);
-
-	if (try_to_take_rt_mutex(lock, task, NULL)) {
-		raw_spin_unlock_irq(&lock->wait_lock);
+	if (try_to_take_rt_mutex(lock, task, NULL))
 		return 1;
-	}
 
 	/* We enforce deadlock detection for futexes */
 	ret = task_blocks_on_rt_mutex(lock, waiter, task,
@@ -1738,12 +1721,36 @@ int rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(struct rt_
 	if (unlikely(ret))
 		remove_waiter(lock, waiter);
 
-	raw_spin_unlock_irq(&lock->wait_lock);
-
 	debug_rt_mutex_print_deadlock(waiter);
 
 	return ret;
 }
+
+/**
+ * rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock() - Start lock acquisition for another task
+ * @lock:		the rt_mutex to take
+ * @waiter:		the pre-initialized rt_mutex_waiter
+ * @task:		the task to prepare
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *  0 - task blocked on lock
+ *  1 - acquired the lock for task, caller should wake it up
+ * <0 - error
+ *
+ * Special API call for FUTEX_REQUEUE_PI support.
+ */
+int rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(struct rt_mutex *lock,
+			      struct rt_mutex_waiter *waiter,
+			      struct task_struct *task)
+{
+	int ret;
+
+	raw_spin_lock_irq(&lock->wait_lock);
+	ret = __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(lock, waiter, task);
+	raw_spin_unlock_irq(&lock->wait_lock);
+
+	return ret;
+}
 
 /**
  * rt_mutex_next_owner - return the next owner of the lock
--- a/kernel/locking/rtmutex_common.h
+++ b/kernel/locking/rtmutex_common.h
@@ -104,6 +104,9 @@ extern void rt_mutex_init_proxy_locked(s
 				       struct task_struct *proxy_owner);
 extern void rt_mutex_proxy_unlock(struct rt_mutex *lock);
 extern void rt_mutex_init_waiter(struct rt_mutex_waiter *waiter);
+extern int __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(struct rt_mutex *lock,
+				     struct rt_mutex_waiter *waiter,
+				     struct task_struct *task);
 extern int rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(struct rt_mutex *lock,
 				     struct rt_mutex_waiter *waiter,
 				     struct task_struct *task);

[PATCH 4.9 41/53] futex: Avoid freeing an active timer

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

commit 97181f9bd57405b879403763284537e27d46963d upstream.

Alexander reported a hrtimer debug_object splat:

  ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object type: hrtimer hint: hrtimer_wakeup (kernel/time/hrtimer.c:1423)

  debug_object_free (lib/debugobjects.c:603)
  destroy_hrtimer_on_stack (kernel/time/hrtimer.c:427)
  futex_lock_pi (kernel/futex.c:2740)
  do_futex (kernel/futex.c:3399)
  SyS_futex (kernel/futex.c:3447 kernel/futex.c:3415)
  do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:284)
  entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:249)

Which was caused by commit:

  cfafcd117da0 ("futex: Rework futex_lock_pi() to use rt_mutex_*_proxy_lock()")

... losing the hrtimer_cancel() in the shuffle. Where previously the
hrtimer_cancel() was done by rt_mutex_slowlock() we now need to do it
manually.

Reported-by: Alexander Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Fixes: cfafcd117da0 ("futex: Rework futex_lock_pi() to use rt_mutex_*_proxy_lock()")
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.20.1704101802370.2906@nanos
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/futex.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/kernel/futex.c
+++ b/kernel/futex.c
@@ -3018,8 +3018,10 @@ out_unlock_put_key:
 out_put_key:
 	put_futex_key(&q.key);
 out:
-	if (to)
+	if (to) {
+		hrtimer_cancel(&to->timer);
 		destroy_hrtimer_on_stack(&to->timer);
+	}
 	return ret != -EINTR ? ret : -ERESTARTNOINTR;
 
 uaddr_faulted:

[PATCH 4.9 42/53] futex,rt_mutex: Fix rt_mutex_cleanup_proxy_lock()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>

commit 04dc1b2fff4e96cb4142227fbdc63c8871ad4ed9 upstream.

Markus reported that the glibc/nptl/tst-robustpi8 test was failing after
commit:

  cfafcd117da0 ("futex: Rework futex_lock_pi() to use rt_mutex_*_proxy_lock()")

The following trace shows the problem:

 ld-linux-x86-64-2161  [019] ....   410.760971: SyS_futex: 00007ffbeb76b028: 80000875  op=FUTEX_LOCK_PI
 ld-linux-x86-64-2161  [019] ...1   410.760972: lock_pi_update_atomic: 00007ffbeb76b028: curval=80000875 uval=80000875 newval=80000875 ret=0
 ld-linux-x86-64-2165  [011] ....   410.760978: SyS_futex: 00007ffbeb76b028: 80000875  op=FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI
 ld-linux-x86-64-2165  [011] d..1   410.760979: do_futex: 00007ffbeb76b028: curval=80000875 uval=80000875 newval=80000871 ret=0
 ld-linux-x86-64-2165  [011] ....   410.760980: SyS_futex: 00007ffbeb76b028: 80000871 ret=0000
 ld-linux-x86-64-2161  [019] ....   410.760980: SyS_futex: 00007ffbeb76b028: 80000871 ret=ETIMEDOUT

Task 2165 does an UNLOCK_PI, assigning the lock to the waiter task 2161
which then returns with -ETIMEDOUT. That wrecks the lock state, because now
the owner isn't aware it acquired the lock and removes the pending robust
list entry.

If 2161 is killed, the robust list will not clear out this futex and the
subsequent acquire on this futex will then (correctly) result in -ESRCH
which is unexpected by glibc, triggers an internal assertion and dies.

Task 2161			Task 2165

rt_mutex_wait_proxy_lock()
   timeout();
   /* T2161 is still queued in  the waiter list */
   return -ETIMEDOUT;

				futex_unlock_pi()
				spin_lock(hb->lock);
				rtmutex_unlock()
				  remove_rtmutex_waiter(T2161);
				   mark_lock_available();
				/* Make the next waiter owner of the user space side */
				futex_uval = 2161;
				spin_unlock(hb->lock);
spin_lock(hb->lock);
rt_mutex_cleanup_proxy_lock()
  if (rtmutex_owner() !== current)
     ...
     return FAIL;
....
return -ETIMEOUT;

This means that rt_mutex_cleanup_proxy_lock() needs to call
try_to_take_rt_mutex() so it can take over the rtmutex correctly which was
assigned by the waker. If the rtmutex is owned by some other task then this
call is harmless and just confirmes that the waiter is not able to acquire
it.

While there, fix what looks like a merge error which resulted in
rt_mutex_cleanup_proxy_lock() having two calls to
fixup_rt_mutex_waiters() and rt_mutex_wait_proxy_lock() not having any.
Both should have one, since both potentially touch the waiter list.

Fixes: 38d589f2fd08 ("futex,rt_mutex: Restructure rt_mutex_finish_proxy_lock()")
Reported-by: Markus Trippelsdorf <markus@trippelsdorf.de>
Bug-Spotted-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
Cc: Darren Hart <dvhart@infradead.org>
Cc: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: Markus Trippelsdorf <markus@trippelsdorf.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20170519154850.mlomgdsd26drq5j6@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/locking/rtmutex.c |   24 ++++++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c
+++ b/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c
@@ -1796,12 +1796,14 @@ int rt_mutex_wait_proxy_lock(struct rt_m
 	int ret;
 
 	raw_spin_lock_irq(&lock->wait_lock);
-
-	set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
-
 	/* sleep on the mutex */
+	set_current_state(TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE);
 	ret = __rt_mutex_slowlock(lock, TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE, to, waiter);
-
+	/*
+	 * try_to_take_rt_mutex() sets the waiter bit unconditionally. We might
+	 * have to fix that up.
+	 */
+	fixup_rt_mutex_waiters(lock);
 	raw_spin_unlock_irq(&lock->wait_lock);
 
 	return ret;
@@ -1833,15 +1835,25 @@ bool rt_mutex_cleanup_proxy_lock(struct
 
 	raw_spin_lock_irq(&lock->wait_lock);
 	/*
+	 * Do an unconditional try-lock, this deals with the lock stealing
+	 * state where __rt_mutex_futex_unlock() -> mark_wakeup_next_waiter()
+	 * sets a NULL owner.
+	 *
+	 * We're not interested in the return value, because the subsequent
+	 * test on rt_mutex_owner() will infer that. If the trylock succeeded,
+	 * we will own the lock and it will have removed the waiter. If we
+	 * failed the trylock, we're still not owner and we need to remove
+	 * ourselves.
+	 */
+	try_to_take_rt_mutex(lock, current, waiter);
+	/*
 	 * Unless we're the owner; we're still enqueued on the wait_list.
 	 * So check if we became owner, if not, take us off the wait_list.
 	 */
 	if (rt_mutex_owner(lock) != current) {
 		remove_waiter(lock, waiter);
-		fixup_rt_mutex_waiters(lock);
 		cleanup = true;
 	}
-
 	/*
 	 * try_to_take_rt_mutex() sets the waiter bit unconditionally. We might
 	 * have to fix that up.

[PATCH 4.9 43/53] futex: Handle early deadlock return correctly

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>

commit 1a1fb985f2e2b85ec0d3dc2e519ee48389ec2434 upstream.

commit 56222b212e8e ("futex: Drop hb->lock before enqueueing on the
rtmutex") changed the locking rules in the futex code so that the hash
bucket lock is not longer held while the waiter is enqueued into the
rtmutex wait list. This made the lock and the unlock path symmetric, but
unfortunately the possible early exit from __rt_mutex_proxy_start() due to
a detected deadlock was not updated accordingly. That allows a concurrent
unlocker to observe inconsitent state which triggers the warning in the
unlock path.

futex_lock_pi()                         futex_unlock_pi()
  lock(hb->lock)
  queue(hb_waiter)				lock(hb->lock)
  lock(rtmutex->wait_lock)
  unlock(hb->lock)
                                        // acquired hb->lock
                                        hb_waiter = futex_top_waiter()
                                        lock(rtmutex->wait_lock)
  __rt_mutex_proxy_start()
     ---> fail
          remove(rtmutex_waiter);
     ---> returns -EDEADLOCK
  unlock(rtmutex->wait_lock)
                                        // acquired wait_lock
                                        wake_futex_pi()
                                        rt_mutex_next_owner()
					  --> returns NULL
                                          --> WARN

  lock(hb->lock)
  unqueue(hb_waiter)

The problem is caused by the remove(rtmutex_waiter) in the failure case of
__rt_mutex_proxy_start() as this lets the unlocker observe a waiter in the
hash bucket but no waiter on the rtmutex, i.e. inconsistent state.

The original commit handles this correctly for the other early return cases
(timeout, signal) by delaying the removal of the rtmutex waiter until the
returning task reacquired the hash bucket lock.

Treat the failure case of __rt_mutex_proxy_start() in the same way and let
the existing cleanup code handle the eventual handover of the rtmutex
gracefully. The regular rt_mutex_proxy_start() gains the rtmutex waiter
removal for the failure case, so that the other callsites are still
operating correctly.

Add proper comments to the code so all these details are fully documented.

Thanks to Peter for helping with the analysis and writing the really
valuable code comments.

Fixes: 56222b212e8e ("futex: Drop hb->lock before enqueueing on the rtmutex")
Reported-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Co-developed-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Cc: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Stefan Liebler <stli@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: Sebastian Sewior <bigeasy@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/alpine.DEB.2.21.1901292311410.1950@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/futex.c           |   28 ++++++++++++++++++----------
 kernel/locking/rtmutex.c |   37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 2 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/futex.c
+++ b/kernel/futex.c
@@ -2958,35 +2958,39 @@ retry_private:
 	 * and BUG when futex_unlock_pi() interleaves with this.
 	 *
 	 * Therefore acquire wait_lock while holding hb->lock, but drop the
-	 * latter before calling rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(). This still fully
-	 * serializes against futex_unlock_pi() as that does the exact same
-	 * lock handoff sequence.
+	 * latter before calling __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(). This
+	 * interleaves with futex_unlock_pi() -- which does a similar lock
+	 * handoff -- such that the latter can observe the futex_q::pi_state
+	 * before __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock() is done.
 	 */
 	raw_spin_lock_irq(&q.pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
 	spin_unlock(q.lock_ptr);
+	/*
+	 * __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock() unconditionally enqueues the @rt_waiter
+	 * such that futex_unlock_pi() is guaranteed to observe the waiter when
+	 * it sees the futex_q::pi_state.
+	 */
 	ret = __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(&q.pi_state->pi_mutex, &rt_waiter, current);
 	raw_spin_unlock_irq(&q.pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
 
 	if (ret) {
 		if (ret == 1)
 			ret = 0;
-
-		spin_lock(q.lock_ptr);
-		goto no_block;
+		goto cleanup;
 	}
 
-
 	if (unlikely(to))
 		hrtimer_start_expires(&to->timer, HRTIMER_MODE_ABS);
 
 	ret = rt_mutex_wait_proxy_lock(&q.pi_state->pi_mutex, to, &rt_waiter);
 
+cleanup:
 	spin_lock(q.lock_ptr);
 	/*
-	 * If we failed to acquire the lock (signal/timeout), we must
+	 * If we failed to acquire the lock (deadlock/signal/timeout), we must
 	 * first acquire the hb->lock before removing the lock from the
-	 * rt_mutex waitqueue, such that we can keep the hb and rt_mutex
-	 * wait lists consistent.
+	 * rt_mutex waitqueue, such that we can keep the hb and rt_mutex wait
+	 * lists consistent.
 	 *
 	 * In particular; it is important that futex_unlock_pi() can not
 	 * observe this inconsistency.
@@ -3093,6 +3097,10 @@ retry:
 		 * there is no point where we hold neither; and therefore
 		 * wake_futex_pi() must observe a state consistent with what we
 		 * observed.
+		 *
+		 * In particular; this forces __rt_mutex_start_proxy() to
+		 * complete such that we're guaranteed to observe the
+		 * rt_waiter. Also see the WARN in wake_futex_pi().
 		 */
 		raw_spin_lock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
 		spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
--- a/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c
+++ b/kernel/locking/rtmutex.c
@@ -1695,12 +1695,33 @@ void rt_mutex_proxy_unlock(struct rt_mut
 	rt_mutex_set_owner(lock, NULL);
 }
 
+/**
+ * __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock() - Start lock acquisition for another task
+ * @lock:		the rt_mutex to take
+ * @waiter:		the pre-initialized rt_mutex_waiter
+ * @task:		the task to prepare
+ *
+ * Starts the rt_mutex acquire; it enqueues the @waiter and does deadlock
+ * detection. It does not wait, see rt_mutex_wait_proxy_lock() for that.
+ *
+ * NOTE: does _NOT_ remove the @waiter on failure; must either call
+ * rt_mutex_wait_proxy_lock() or rt_mutex_cleanup_proxy_lock() after this.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ *  0 - task blocked on lock
+ *  1 - acquired the lock for task, caller should wake it up
+ * <0 - error
+ *
+ * Special API call for PI-futex support.
+ */
 int __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(struct rt_mutex *lock,
 			      struct rt_mutex_waiter *waiter,
 			      struct task_struct *task)
 {
 	int ret;
 
+	lockdep_assert_held(&lock->wait_lock);
+
 	if (try_to_take_rt_mutex(lock, task, NULL))
 		return 1;
 
@@ -1718,9 +1739,6 @@ int __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(struct r
 		ret = 0;
 	}
 
-	if (unlikely(ret))
-		remove_waiter(lock, waiter);
-
 	debug_rt_mutex_print_deadlock(waiter);
 
 	return ret;
@@ -1732,12 +1750,18 @@ int __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(struct r
  * @waiter:		the pre-initialized rt_mutex_waiter
  * @task:		the task to prepare
  *
+ * Starts the rt_mutex acquire; it enqueues the @waiter and does deadlock
+ * detection. It does not wait, see rt_mutex_wait_proxy_lock() for that.
+ *
+ * NOTE: unlike __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock this _DOES_ remove the @waiter
+ * on failure.
+ *
  * Returns:
  *  0 - task blocked on lock
  *  1 - acquired the lock for task, caller should wake it up
  * <0 - error
  *
- * Special API call for FUTEX_REQUEUE_PI support.
+ * Special API call for PI-futex support.
  */
 int rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(struct rt_mutex *lock,
 			      struct rt_mutex_waiter *waiter,
@@ -1747,6 +1771,8 @@ int rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(struct rt_
 
 	raw_spin_lock_irq(&lock->wait_lock);
 	ret = __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock(lock, waiter, task);
+	if (unlikely(ret))
+		remove_waiter(lock, waiter);
 	raw_spin_unlock_irq(&lock->wait_lock);
 
 	return ret;
@@ -1814,7 +1840,8 @@ int rt_mutex_wait_proxy_lock(struct rt_m
  * @lock:		the rt_mutex we were woken on
  * @waiter:		the pre-initialized rt_mutex_waiter
  *
- * Attempt to clean up after a failed rt_mutex_wait_proxy_lock().
+ * Attempt to clean up after a failed __rt_mutex_start_proxy_lock() or
+ * rt_mutex_wait_proxy_lock().
  *
  * Unless we acquired the lock; we're still enqueued on the wait-list and can
  * in fact still be granted ownership until we're removed. Therefore we can

[PATCH 4.9 44/53] futex: Fix (possible) missed wakeup

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>

commit b061c38bef43406df8e73c5be06cbfacad5ee6ad upstream.

We must not rely on wake_q_add() to delay the wakeup; in particular
commit:

  1d0dcb3ad9d3 ("futex: Implement lockless wakeups")

moved wake_q_add() before smp_store_release(&q->lock_ptr, NULL), which
could result in futex_wait() waking before observing ->lock_ptr ==
NULL and going back to sleep again.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Fixes: 1d0dcb3ad9d3 ("futex: Implement lockless wakeups")
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/futex.c |   13 ++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/futex.c
+++ b/kernel/futex.c
@@ -1553,11 +1553,7 @@ static void mark_wake_futex(struct wake_
 	if (WARN(q->pi_state || q->rt_waiter, "refusing to wake PI futex\n"))
 		return;
 
-	/*
-	 * Queue the task for later wakeup for after we've released
-	 * the hb->lock. wake_q_add() grabs reference to p.
-	 */
-	wake_q_add(wake_q, p);
+	get_task_struct(p);
 	__unqueue_futex(q);
 	/*
 	 * The waiting task can free the futex_q as soon as
@@ -1566,6 +1562,13 @@ static void mark_wake_futex(struct wake_
 	 * store to lock_ptr from getting ahead of the plist_del.
 	 */
 	smp_store_release(&q->lock_ptr, NULL);
+
+	/*
+	 * Queue the task for later wakeup for after we've released
+	 * the hb->lock. wake_q_add() grabs reference to p.
+	 */
+	wake_q_add(wake_q, p);
+	put_task_struct(p);
 }
 
 /*

[PATCH 4.9 45/53] locking/futex: Allow low-level atomic operations to return -EAGAIN

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>

commit 6b4f4bc9cb22875f97023984a625386f0c7cc1c0 upstream.

Some futex() operations, including FUTEX_WAKE_OP, require the kernel to
perform an atomic read-modify-write of the futex word via the userspace
mapping. These operations are implemented by each architecture in
arch_futex_atomic_op_inuser() and futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic(), which
are called in atomic context with the relevant hash bucket locks held.

Although these routines may return -EFAULT in response to a page fault
generated when accessing userspace, they are expected to succeed (i.e.
return 0) in all other cases. This poses a problem for architectures
that do not provide bounded forward progress guarantees or fairness of
contended atomic operations and can lead to starvation in some cases.

In these problematic scenarios, we must return back to the core futex
code so that we can drop the hash bucket locks and reschedule if
necessary, much like we do in the case of a page fault.

Allow architectures to return -EAGAIN from their implementations of
arch_futex_atomic_op_inuser() and futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic(), which
will cause the core futex code to reschedule if necessary and return
back to the architecture code later on.

Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
[bwh: Backported to 4.9: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/futex.c |  185 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
 1 file changed, 115 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/futex.c
+++ b/kernel/futex.c
@@ -1407,13 +1407,15 @@ static int lookup_pi_state(u32 __user *u
 
 static int lock_pi_update_atomic(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval, u32 newval)
 {
+	int err;
 	u32 uninitialized_var(curval);
 
 	if (unlikely(should_fail_futex(true)))
 		return -EFAULT;
 
-	if (unlikely(cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr, uval, newval)))
-		return -EFAULT;
+	err = cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr, uval, newval);
+	if (unlikely(err))
+		return err;
 
 	/* If user space value changed, let the caller retry */
 	return curval != uval ? -EAGAIN : 0;
@@ -1606,10 +1608,8 @@ static int wake_futex_pi(u32 __user *uad
 	if (unlikely(should_fail_futex(true)))
 		ret = -EFAULT;
 
-	if (cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr, uval, newval)) {
-		ret = -EFAULT;
-
-	} else if (curval != uval) {
+	ret = cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr, uval, newval);
+	if (!ret && (curval != uval)) {
 		/*
 		 * If a unconditional UNLOCK_PI operation (user space did not
 		 * try the TID->0 transition) raced with a waiter setting the
@@ -1795,32 +1795,32 @@ retry_private:
 	double_lock_hb(hb1, hb2);
 	op_ret = futex_atomic_op_inuser(op, uaddr2);
 	if (unlikely(op_ret < 0)) {
-
 		double_unlock_hb(hb1, hb2);
 
-#ifndef CONFIG_MMU
-		/*
-		 * we don't get EFAULT from MMU faults if we don't have an MMU,
-		 * but we might get them from range checking
-		 */
-		ret = op_ret;
-		goto out_put_keys;
-#endif
-
-		if (unlikely(op_ret != -EFAULT)) {
+		if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MMU) ||
+		    unlikely(op_ret != -EFAULT && op_ret != -EAGAIN)) {
+			/*
+			 * we don't get EFAULT from MMU faults if we don't have
+			 * an MMU, but we might get them from range checking
+			 */
 			ret = op_ret;
 			goto out_put_keys;
 		}
 
-		ret = fault_in_user_writeable(uaddr2);
-		if (ret)
-			goto out_put_keys;
+		if (op_ret == -EFAULT) {
+			ret = fault_in_user_writeable(uaddr2);
+			if (ret)
+				goto out_put_keys;
+		}
 
-		if (!(flags & FLAGS_SHARED))
+		if (!(flags & FLAGS_SHARED)) {
+			cond_resched();
 			goto retry_private;
+		}
 
 		put_futex_key(&key2);
 		put_futex_key(&key1);
+		cond_resched();
 		goto retry;
 	}
 
@@ -2516,14 +2516,17 @@ retry:
 	if (!pi_state->owner)
 		newtid |= FUTEX_OWNER_DIED;
 
-	if (get_futex_value_locked(&uval, uaddr))
-		goto handle_fault;
+	err = get_futex_value_locked(&uval, uaddr);
+	if (err)
+		goto handle_err;
 
 	for (;;) {
 		newval = (uval & FUTEX_OWNER_DIED) | newtid;
 
-		if (cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr, uval, newval))
-			goto handle_fault;
+		err = cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr, uval, newval);
+		if (err)
+			goto handle_err;
+
 		if (curval == uval)
 			break;
 		uval = curval;
@@ -2538,23 +2541,36 @@ retry:
 	return argowner == current;
 
 	/*
-	 * To handle the page fault we need to drop the locks here. That gives
-	 * the other task (either the highest priority waiter itself or the
-	 * task which stole the rtmutex) the chance to try the fixup of the
-	 * pi_state. So once we are back from handling the fault we need to
-	 * check the pi_state after reacquiring the locks and before trying to
-	 * do another fixup. When the fixup has been done already we simply
-	 * return.
+	 * In order to reschedule or handle a page fault, we need to drop the
+	 * locks here. In the case of a fault, this gives the other task
+	 * (either the highest priority waiter itself or the task which stole
+	 * the rtmutex) the chance to try the fixup of the pi_state. So once we
+	 * are back from handling the fault we need to check the pi_state after
+	 * reacquiring the locks and before trying to do another fixup. When
+	 * the fixup has been done already we simply return.
 	 *
 	 * Note: we hold both hb->lock and pi_mutex->wait_lock. We can safely
 	 * drop hb->lock since the caller owns the hb -> futex_q relation.
 	 * Dropping the pi_mutex->wait_lock requires the state revalidate.
 	 */
-handle_fault:
+handle_err:
 	raw_spin_unlock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
 	spin_unlock(q->lock_ptr);
 
-	err = fault_in_user_writeable(uaddr);
+	switch (err) {
+	case -EFAULT:
+		err = fault_in_user_writeable(uaddr);
+		break;
+
+	case -EAGAIN:
+		cond_resched();
+		err = 0;
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+		break;
+	}
 
 	spin_lock(q->lock_ptr);
 	raw_spin_lock_irq(&pi_state->pi_mutex.wait_lock);
@@ -3128,10 +3144,8 @@ retry:
 		 * A unconditional UNLOCK_PI op raced against a waiter
 		 * setting the FUTEX_WAITERS bit. Try again.
 		 */
-		if (ret == -EAGAIN) {
-			put_futex_key(&key);
-			goto retry;
-		}
+		if (ret == -EAGAIN)
+			goto pi_retry;
 		/*
 		 * wake_futex_pi has detected invalid state. Tell user
 		 * space.
@@ -3146,9 +3160,19 @@ retry:
 	 * preserve the WAITERS bit not the OWNER_DIED one. We are the
 	 * owner.
 	 */
-	if (cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr, uval, 0)) {
+	if ((ret = cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr, uval, 0))) {
 		spin_unlock(&hb->lock);
-		goto pi_faulted;
+		switch (ret) {
+		case -EFAULT:
+			goto pi_faulted;
+
+		case -EAGAIN:
+			goto pi_retry;
+
+		default:
+			WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+			goto out_putkey;
+		}
 	}
 
 	/*
@@ -3162,6 +3186,11 @@ out_putkey:
 	put_futex_key(&key);
 	return ret;
 
+pi_retry:
+	put_futex_key(&key);
+	cond_resched();
+	goto retry;
+
 pi_faulted:
 	put_futex_key(&key);
 
@@ -3504,6 +3533,7 @@ err_unlock:
 static int handle_futex_death(u32 __user *uaddr, struct task_struct *curr, int pi)
 {
 	u32 uval, uninitialized_var(nval), mval;
+	int err;
 
 	/* Futex address must be 32bit aligned */
 	if ((((unsigned long)uaddr) % sizeof(*uaddr)) != 0)
@@ -3513,42 +3543,57 @@ retry:
 	if (get_user(uval, uaddr))
 		return -1;
 
-	if ((uval & FUTEX_TID_MASK) == task_pid_vnr(curr)) {
-		/*
-		 * Ok, this dying thread is truly holding a futex
-		 * of interest. Set the OWNER_DIED bit atomically
-		 * via cmpxchg, and if the value had FUTEX_WAITERS
-		 * set, wake up a waiter (if any). (We have to do a
-		 * futex_wake() even if OWNER_DIED is already set -
-		 * to handle the rare but possible case of recursive
-		 * thread-death.) The rest of the cleanup is done in
-		 * userspace.
-		 */
-		mval = (uval & FUTEX_WAITERS) | FUTEX_OWNER_DIED;
-		/*
-		 * We are not holding a lock here, but we want to have
-		 * the pagefault_disable/enable() protection because
-		 * we want to handle the fault gracefully. If the
-		 * access fails we try to fault in the futex with R/W
-		 * verification via get_user_pages. get_user() above
-		 * does not guarantee R/W access. If that fails we
-		 * give up and leave the futex locked.
-		 */
-		if (cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&nval, uaddr, uval, mval)) {
+	if ((uval & FUTEX_TID_MASK) != task_pid_vnr(curr))
+		return 0;
+
+	/*
+	 * Ok, this dying thread is truly holding a futex
+	 * of interest. Set the OWNER_DIED bit atomically
+	 * via cmpxchg, and if the value had FUTEX_WAITERS
+	 * set, wake up a waiter (if any). (We have to do a
+	 * futex_wake() even if OWNER_DIED is already set -
+	 * to handle the rare but possible case of recursive
+	 * thread-death.) The rest of the cleanup is done in
+	 * userspace.
+	 */
+	mval = (uval & FUTEX_WAITERS) | FUTEX_OWNER_DIED;
+
+	/*
+	 * We are not holding a lock here, but we want to have
+	 * the pagefault_disable/enable() protection because
+	 * we want to handle the fault gracefully. If the
+	 * access fails we try to fault in the futex with R/W
+	 * verification via get_user_pages. get_user() above
+	 * does not guarantee R/W access. If that fails we
+	 * give up and leave the futex locked.
+	 */
+	if ((err = cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&nval, uaddr, uval, mval))) {
+		switch (err) {
+		case -EFAULT:
 			if (fault_in_user_writeable(uaddr))
 				return -1;
 			goto retry;
-		}
-		if (nval != uval)
+
+		case -EAGAIN:
+			cond_resched();
 			goto retry;
 
-		/*
-		 * Wake robust non-PI futexes here. The wakeup of
-		 * PI futexes happens in exit_pi_state():
-		 */
-		if (!pi && (uval & FUTEX_WAITERS))
-			futex_wake(uaddr, 1, 1, FUTEX_BITSET_MATCH_ANY);
+		default:
+			WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+			return err;
+		}
 	}
+
+	if (nval != uval)
+		goto retry;
+
+	/*
+	 * Wake robust non-PI futexes here. The wakeup of
+	 * PI futexes happens in exit_pi_state():
+	 */
+	if (!pi && (uval & FUTEX_WAITERS))
+		futex_wake(uaddr, 1, 1, FUTEX_BITSET_MATCH_ANY);
+
 	return 0;
 }
 

[PATCH 4.9 46/53] arm64: futex: Bound number of LDXR/STXR loops in FUTEX_WAKE_OP

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>

commit 03110a5cb2161690ae5ac04994d47ed0cd6cef75 upstream.

Our futex implementation makes use of LDXR/STXR loops to perform atomic
updates to user memory from atomic context. This can lead to latency
problems if we end up spinning around the LL/SC sequence at the expense
of doing something useful.

Rework our futex atomic operations so that we return -EAGAIN if we fail
to update the futex word after 128 attempts. The core futex code will
reschedule if necessary and we'll try again later.

Fixes: 6170a97460db ("arm64: Atomic operations")
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
[bwh: Backported to 4.9: adjust context]
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/arm64/include/asm/futex.h |   59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/futex.h
+++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/futex.h
@@ -26,7 +26,12 @@
 #include <asm/errno.h>
 #include <asm/sysreg.h>
 
+#define FUTEX_MAX_LOOPS	128 /* What's the largest number you can think of? */
+
 #define __futex_atomic_op(insn, ret, oldval, uaddr, tmp, oparg)		\
+do {									\
+	unsigned int loops = FUTEX_MAX_LOOPS;				\
+									\
 	asm volatile(							\
 	ALTERNATIVE("nop", SET_PSTATE_PAN(0), ARM64_HAS_PAN,		\
 		    CONFIG_ARM64_PAN)					\
@@ -34,21 +39,26 @@
 "1:	ldxr	%w1, %2\n"						\
 	insn "\n"							\
 "2:	stlxr	%w0, %w3, %2\n"						\
-"	cbnz	%w0, 1b\n"						\
-"	dmb	ish\n"							\
+"	cbz	%w0, 3f\n"						\
+"	sub	%w4, %w4, %w0\n"					\
+"	cbnz	%w4, 1b\n"						\
+"	mov	%w0, %w7\n"						\
 "3:\n"									\
+"	dmb	ish\n"							\
 "	.pushsection .fixup,\"ax\"\n"					\
 "	.align	2\n"							\
-"4:	mov	%w0, %w5\n"						\
+"4:	mov	%w0, %w6\n"						\
 "	b	3b\n"							\
 "	.popsection\n"							\
 	_ASM_EXTABLE(1b, 4b)						\
 	_ASM_EXTABLE(2b, 4b)						\
 	ALTERNATIVE("nop", SET_PSTATE_PAN(1), ARM64_HAS_PAN,		\
 		    CONFIG_ARM64_PAN)					\
-	: "=&r" (ret), "=&r" (oldval), "+Q" (*uaddr), "=&r" (tmp)	\
-	: "r" (oparg), "Ir" (-EFAULT)					\
-	: "memory")
+	: "=&r" (ret), "=&r" (oldval), "+Q" (*uaddr), "=&r" (tmp),	\
+	  "+r" (loops)							\
+	: "r" (oparg), "Ir" (-EFAULT), "Ir" (-EAGAIN)			\
+	: "memory");							\
+} while (0)
 
 static inline int
 arch_futex_atomic_op_inuser(int op, int oparg, int *oval, u32 __user *uaddr)
@@ -59,23 +69,23 @@ arch_futex_atomic_op_inuser(int op, int
 
 	switch (op) {
 	case FUTEX_OP_SET:
-		__futex_atomic_op("mov	%w3, %w4",
+		__futex_atomic_op("mov	%w3, %w5",
 				  ret, oldval, uaddr, tmp, oparg);
 		break;
 	case FUTEX_OP_ADD:
-		__futex_atomic_op("add	%w3, %w1, %w4",
+		__futex_atomic_op("add	%w3, %w1, %w5",
 				  ret, oldval, uaddr, tmp, oparg);
 		break;
 	case FUTEX_OP_OR:
-		__futex_atomic_op("orr	%w3, %w1, %w4",
+		__futex_atomic_op("orr	%w3, %w1, %w5",
 				  ret, oldval, uaddr, tmp, oparg);
 		break;
 	case FUTEX_OP_ANDN:
-		__futex_atomic_op("and	%w3, %w1, %w4",
+		__futex_atomic_op("and	%w3, %w1, %w5",
 				  ret, oldval, uaddr, tmp, ~oparg);
 		break;
 	case FUTEX_OP_XOR:
-		__futex_atomic_op("eor	%w3, %w1, %w4",
+		__futex_atomic_op("eor	%w3, %w1, %w5",
 				  ret, oldval, uaddr, tmp, oparg);
 		break;
 	default:
@@ -95,6 +105,7 @@ futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic(u32 *uval,
 			      u32 oldval, u32 newval)
 {
 	int ret = 0;
+	unsigned int loops = FUTEX_MAX_LOOPS;
 	u32 val, tmp;
 	u32 __user *uaddr;
 
@@ -106,21 +117,25 @@ futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic(u32 *uval,
 ALTERNATIVE("nop", SET_PSTATE_PAN(0), ARM64_HAS_PAN, CONFIG_ARM64_PAN)
 "	prfm	pstl1strm, %2\n"
 "1:	ldxr	%w1, %2\n"
-"	sub	%w3, %w1, %w4\n"
-"	cbnz	%w3, 3f\n"
-"2:	stlxr	%w3, %w5, %2\n"
-"	cbnz	%w3, 1b\n"
-"	dmb	ish\n"
+"	sub	%w3, %w1, %w5\n"
+"	cbnz	%w3, 4f\n"
+"2:	stlxr	%w3, %w6, %2\n"
+"	cbz	%w3, 3f\n"
+"	sub	%w4, %w4, %w3\n"
+"	cbnz	%w4, 1b\n"
+"	mov	%w0, %w8\n"
 "3:\n"
+"	dmb	ish\n"
+"4:\n"
 "	.pushsection .fixup,\"ax\"\n"
-"4:	mov	%w0, %w6\n"
-"	b	3b\n"
+"5:	mov	%w0, %w7\n"
+"	b	4b\n"
 "	.popsection\n"
-	_ASM_EXTABLE(1b, 4b)
-	_ASM_EXTABLE(2b, 4b)
+	_ASM_EXTABLE(1b, 5b)
+	_ASM_EXTABLE(2b, 5b)
 ALTERNATIVE("nop", SET_PSTATE_PAN(1), ARM64_HAS_PAN, CONFIG_ARM64_PAN)
-	: "+r" (ret), "=&r" (val), "+Q" (*uaddr), "=&r" (tmp)
-	: "r" (oldval), "r" (newval), "Ir" (-EFAULT)
+	: "+r" (ret), "=&r" (val), "+Q" (*uaddr), "=&r" (tmp), "+r" (loops)
+	: "r" (oldval), "r" (newval), "Ir" (-EFAULT), "Ir" (-EAGAIN)
 	: "memory");
 
 	*uval = val;

[PATCH 4.9 47/53] futex: Prevent robust futex exit race

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Yang Tao <yang.tao172@zte.com.cn>

commit ca16d5bee59807bf04deaab0a8eccecd5061528c upstream.

Robust futexes utilize the robust_list mechanism to allow the kernel to
release futexes which are held when a task exits. The exit can be voluntary
or caused by a signal or fault. This prevents that waiters block forever.

The futex operations in user space store a pointer to the futex they are
either locking or unlocking in the op_pending member of the per task robust
list.

After a lock operation has succeeded the futex is queued in the robust list
linked list and the op_pending pointer is cleared.

After an unlock operation has succeeded the futex is removed from the
robust list linked list and the op_pending pointer is cleared.

The robust list exit code checks for the pending operation and any futex
which is queued in the linked list. It carefully checks whether the futex
value is the TID of the exiting task. If so, it sets the OWNER_DIED bit and
tries to wake up a potential waiter.

This is race free for the lock operation but unlock has two race scenarios
where waiters might not be woken up. These issues can be observed with
regular robust pthread mutexes. PI aware pthread mutexes are not affected.

(1) Unlocking task is killed after unlocking the futex value in user space
    before being able to wake a waiter.

        pthread_mutex_unlock()
                |
                V
        atomic_exchange_rel (&mutex->__data.__lock, 0)
                        <------------------------killed
            lll_futex_wake ()                   |
                                                |
                                                |(__lock = 0)
                                                |(enter kernel)
                                                |
                                                V
                                            do_exit()
                                            exit_mm()
                                          mm_release()
                                        exit_robust_list()
                                        handle_futex_death()
                                                |
                                                |(__lock = 0)
                                                |(uval = 0)
                                                |
                                                V
        if ((uval & FUTEX_TID_MASK) != task_pid_vnr(curr))
                return 0;

    The sanity check which ensures that the user space futex is owned by
    the exiting task prevents the wakeup of waiters which in consequence
    block infinitely.

(2) Waiting task is killed after a wakeup and before it can acquire the
    futex in user space.

        OWNER                         WAITER
				futex_wait()
   pthread_mutex_unlock()               |
                |                       |
                |(__lock = 0)           |
                |                       |
                V                       |
         futex_wake() ------------>  wakeup()
                                        |
                                        |(return to userspace)
                                        |(__lock = 0)
                                        |
                                        V
                        oldval = mutex->__data.__lock
                                          <-----------------killed
    atomic_compare_and_exchange_val_acq (&mutex->__data.__lock,  |
                        id | assume_other_futex_waiters, 0)      |
                                                                 |
                                                                 |
                                                   (enter kernel)|
                                                                 |
                                                                 V
                                                         do_exit()
                                                        |
                                                        |
                                                        V
                                        handle_futex_death()
                                        |
                                        |(__lock = 0)
                                        |(uval = 0)
                                        |
                                        V
        if ((uval & FUTEX_TID_MASK) != task_pid_vnr(curr))
                return 0;

    The sanity check which ensures that the user space futex is owned
    by the exiting task prevents the wakeup of waiters, which seems to
    be correct as the exiting task does not own the futex value, but
    the consequence is that other waiters wont be woken up and block
    infinitely.

In both scenarios the following conditions are true:

   - task->robust_list->list_op_pending != NULL
   - user space futex value == 0
   - Regular futex (not PI)

If these conditions are met then it is reasonably safe to wake up a
potential waiter in order to prevent the above problems.

As this might be a false positive it can cause spurious wakeups, but the
waiter side has to handle other types of unrelated wakeups, e.g. signals
gracefully anyway. So such a spurious wakeup will not affect the
correctness of these operations.

This workaround must not touch the user space futex value and cannot set
the OWNER_DIED bit because the lock value is 0, i.e. uncontended. Setting
OWNER_DIED in this case would result in inconsistent state and subsequently
in malfunction of the owner died handling in user space.

The rest of the user space state is still consistent as no other task can
observe the list_op_pending entry in the exiting tasks robust list.

The eventually woken up waiter will observe the uncontended lock value and
take it over.

[ tglx: Massaged changelog and comment. Made the return explicit and not
  	depend on the subsequent check and added constants to hand into
  	handle_futex_death() instead of plain numbers. Fixed a few coding
	style issues. ]

Fixes: 0771dfefc9e5 ("[PATCH] lightweight robust futexes: core")
Signed-off-by: Yang Tao <yang.tao172@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Yi Wang <wang.yi59@zte.com.cn>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/1573010582-35297-1-git-send-email-wang.yi59@zte.com.cn
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20191106224555.943191378@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/futex.c |   58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 51 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/futex.c
+++ b/kernel/futex.c
@@ -3526,11 +3526,16 @@ err_unlock:
 	return ret;
 }
 
+/* Constants for the pending_op argument of handle_futex_death */
+#define HANDLE_DEATH_PENDING	true
+#define HANDLE_DEATH_LIST	false
+
 /*
  * Process a futex-list entry, check whether it's owned by the
  * dying task, and do notification if so:
  */
-static int handle_futex_death(u32 __user *uaddr, struct task_struct *curr, int pi)
+static int handle_futex_death(u32 __user *uaddr, struct task_struct *curr,
+			      bool pi, bool pending_op)
 {
 	u32 uval, uninitialized_var(nval), mval;
 	int err;
@@ -3543,6 +3548,42 @@ retry:
 	if (get_user(uval, uaddr))
 		return -1;
 
+	/*
+	 * Special case for regular (non PI) futexes. The unlock path in
+	 * user space has two race scenarios:
+	 *
+	 * 1. The unlock path releases the user space futex value and
+	 *    before it can execute the futex() syscall to wake up
+	 *    waiters it is killed.
+	 *
+	 * 2. A woken up waiter is killed before it can acquire the
+	 *    futex in user space.
+	 *
+	 * In both cases the TID validation below prevents a wakeup of
+	 * potential waiters which can cause these waiters to block
+	 * forever.
+	 *
+	 * In both cases the following conditions are met:
+	 *
+	 *	1) task->robust_list->list_op_pending != NULL
+	 *	   @pending_op == true
+	 *	2) User space futex value == 0
+	 *	3) Regular futex: @pi == false
+	 *
+	 * If these conditions are met, it is safe to attempt waking up a
+	 * potential waiter without touching the user space futex value and
+	 * trying to set the OWNER_DIED bit. The user space futex value is
+	 * uncontended and the rest of the user space mutex state is
+	 * consistent, so a woken waiter will just take over the
+	 * uncontended futex. Setting the OWNER_DIED bit would create
+	 * inconsistent state and malfunction of the user space owner died
+	 * handling.
+	 */
+	if (pending_op && !pi && !uval) {
+		futex_wake(uaddr, 1, 1, FUTEX_BITSET_MATCH_ANY);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
 	if ((uval & FUTEX_TID_MASK) != task_pid_vnr(curr))
 		return 0;
 
@@ -3662,10 +3703,11 @@ static void exit_robust_list(struct task
 		 * A pending lock might already be on the list, so
 		 * don't process it twice:
 		 */
-		if (entry != pending)
+		if (entry != pending) {
 			if (handle_futex_death((void __user *)entry + futex_offset,
-						curr, pi))
+						curr, pi, HANDLE_DEATH_LIST))
 				return;
+		}
 		if (rc)
 			return;
 		entry = next_entry;
@@ -3679,9 +3721,10 @@ static void exit_robust_list(struct task
 		cond_resched();
 	}
 
-	if (pending)
+	if (pending) {
 		handle_futex_death((void __user *)pending + futex_offset,
-				   curr, pip);
+				   curr, pip, HANDLE_DEATH_PENDING);
+	}
 }
 
 static void futex_cleanup(struct task_struct *tsk)
@@ -3964,7 +4007,8 @@ void compat_exit_robust_list(struct task
 		if (entry != pending) {
 			void __user *uaddr = futex_uaddr(entry, futex_offset);
 
-			if (handle_futex_death(uaddr, curr, pi))
+			if (handle_futex_death(uaddr, curr, pi,
+					       HANDLE_DEATH_LIST))
 				return;
 		}
 		if (rc)
@@ -3983,7 +4027,7 @@ void compat_exit_robust_list(struct task
 	if (pending) {
 		void __user *uaddr = futex_uaddr(pending, futex_offset);
 
-		handle_futex_death(uaddr, curr, pip);
+		handle_futex_death(uaddr, curr, pip, HANDLE_DEATH_PENDING);
 	}
 }
 

[PATCH 4.9 48/53] futex: Fix incorrect should_fail_futex() handling

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Mateusz Nosek <mateusznosek0@gmail.com>

commit 921c7ebd1337d1a46783d7e15a850e12aed2eaa0 upstream.

If should_futex_fail() returns true in futex_wake_pi(), then the 'ret'
variable is set to -EFAULT and then immediately overwritten. So the failure
injection is non-functional.

Fix it by actually leaving the function and returning -EFAULT.

The Fixes tag is kinda blury because the initial commit which introduced
failure injection was already sloppy, but the below mentioned commit broke
it completely.

[ tglx: Massaged changelog ]

Fixes: 6b4f4bc9cb22 ("locking/futex: Allow low-level atomic operations to return -EAGAIN")
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Nosek <mateusznosek0@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200927000858.24219-1-mateusznosek0@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/futex.c |    4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/kernel/futex.c
+++ b/kernel/futex.c
@@ -1605,8 +1605,10 @@ static int wake_futex_pi(u32 __user *uad
 	 */
 	newval = FUTEX_WAITERS | task_pid_vnr(new_owner);
 
-	if (unlikely(should_fail_futex(true)))
+	if (unlikely(should_fail_futex(true))) {
 		ret = -EFAULT;
+		goto out_unlock;
+	}
 
 	ret = cmpxchg_futex_value_locked(&curval, uaddr, uval, newval);
 	if (!ret && (curval != uval)) {

[PATCH 4.9 49/53] futex: Handle transient "ownerless" rtmutex state correctly

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>

commit 9f5d1c336a10c0d24e83e40b4c1b9539f7dba627 upstream.

Gratian managed to trigger the BUG_ON(!newowner) in fixup_pi_state_owner().
This is one possible chain of events leading to this:

Task Prio       Operation
T1   120	lock(F)
T2   120	lock(F)   -> blocks (top waiter)
T3   50 (RT)	lock(F)   -> boosts T1 and blocks (new top waiter)
XX   		timeout/  -> wakes T2
		signal
T1   50		unlock(F) -> wakes T3 (rtmutex->owner == NULL, waiter bit is set)
T2   120	cleanup   -> try_to_take_mutex() fails because T3 is the top waiter
     			     and the lower priority T2 cannot steal the lock.
     			  -> fixup_pi_state_owner() sees newowner == NULL -> BUG_ON()

The comment states that this is invalid and rt_mutex_real_owner() must
return a non NULL owner when the trylock failed, but in case of a queued
and woken up waiter rt_mutex_real_owner() == NULL is a valid transient
state. The higher priority waiter has simply not yet managed to take over
the rtmutex.

The BUG_ON() is therefore wrong and this is just another retry condition in
fixup_pi_state_owner().

Drop the locks, so that T3 can make progress, and then try the fixup again.

Gratian provided a great analysis, traces and a reproducer. The analysis is
to the point, but it confused the hell out of that tglx dude who had to
page in all the futex horrors again. Condensed version is above.

[ tglx: Wrote comment and changelog ]

Fixes: c1e2f0eaf015 ("futex: Avoid violating the 10th rule of futex")
Reported-by: Gratian Crisan <gratian.crisan@ni.com>
Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <efault@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87a6w6x7bb.fsf@ni.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/87sg9pkvf7.fsf@nanos.tec.linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 kernel/futex.c |   16 ++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

--- a/kernel/futex.c
+++ b/kernel/futex.c
@@ -2497,10 +2497,22 @@ retry:
 		}
 
 		/*
-		 * Since we just failed the trylock; there must be an owner.
+		 * The trylock just failed, so either there is an owner or
+		 * there is a higher priority waiter than this one.
 		 */
 		newowner = rt_mutex_owner(&pi_state->pi_mutex);
-		BUG_ON(!newowner);
+		/*
+		 * If the higher priority waiter has not yet taken over the
+		 * rtmutex then newowner is NULL. We can't return here with
+		 * that state because it's inconsistent vs. the user space
+		 * state. So drop the locks and try again. It's a valid
+		 * situation and not any different from the other retry
+		 * conditions.
+		 */
+		if (unlikely(!newowner)) {
+			err = -EAGAIN;
+			goto handle_err;
+		}
 	} else {
 		WARN_ON_ONCE(argowner != current);
 		if (oldowner == current) {

[PATCH 4.9 50/53] can: dev: Move device back to init netns on owning netns delete

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>

commit 3a5ca857079ea022e0b1b17fc154f7ad7dbc150f upstream.

When a non-initial netns is destroyed, the usual policy is to delete
all virtual network interfaces contained, but move physical interfaces
back to the initial netns. This keeps the physical interface visible
on the system.

CAN devices are somewhat special, as they define rtnl_link_ops even
if they are physical devices. If a CAN interface is moved into a
non-initial netns, destroying that netns lets the interface vanish
instead of moving it back to the initial netns. default_device_exit()
skips CAN interfaces due to having rtnl_link_ops set. Reproducer:

  ip netns add foo
  ip link set can0 netns foo
  ip netns delete foo

WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 84 at net/core/dev.c:11030 ops_exit_list+0x38/0x60
CPU: 1 PID: 84 Comm: kworker/u4:2 Not tainted 5.10.19 #1
Workqueue: netns cleanup_net
[<c010e700>] (unwind_backtrace) from [<c010a1d8>] (show_stack+0x10/0x14)
[<c010a1d8>] (show_stack) from [<c086dc10>] (dump_stack+0x94/0xa8)
[<c086dc10>] (dump_stack) from [<c086b938>] (__warn+0xb8/0x114)
[<c086b938>] (__warn) from [<c086ba10>] (warn_slowpath_fmt+0x7c/0xac)
[<c086ba10>] (warn_slowpath_fmt) from [<c0629f20>] (ops_exit_list+0x38/0x60)
[<c0629f20>] (ops_exit_list) from [<c062a5c4>] (cleanup_net+0x230/0x380)
[<c062a5c4>] (cleanup_net) from [<c0142c20>] (process_one_work+0x1d8/0x438)
[<c0142c20>] (process_one_work) from [<c0142ee4>] (worker_thread+0x64/0x5a8)
[<c0142ee4>] (worker_thread) from [<c0148a98>] (kthread+0x148/0x14c)
[<c0148a98>] (kthread) from [<c0100148>] (ret_from_fork+0x14/0x2c)

To properly restore physical CAN devices to the initial netns on owning
netns exit, introduce a flag on rtnl_link_ops that can be set by drivers.
For CAN devices setting this flag, default_device_exit() considers them
non-virtual, applying the usual namespace move.

The issue was introduced in the commit mentioned below, as at that time
CAN devices did not have a dellink() operation.

Fixes: e008b5fc8dc7 ("net: Simplfy default_device_exit and improve batching.")
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210302122423.872326-1-martin@strongswan.org
Signed-off-by: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org>
Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde <mkl@pengutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 drivers/net/can/dev.c   |    1 +
 include/net/rtnetlink.h |    2 ++
 net/core/dev.c          |    2 +-
 3 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

--- a/drivers/net/can/dev.c
+++ b/drivers/net/can/dev.c
@@ -1084,6 +1084,7 @@ static void can_dellink(struct net_devic
 
 static struct rtnl_link_ops can_link_ops __read_mostly = {
 	.kind		= "can",
+	.netns_refund	= true,
 	.maxtype	= IFLA_CAN_MAX,
 	.policy		= can_policy,
 	.setup		= can_setup,
--- a/include/net/rtnetlink.h
+++ b/include/net/rtnetlink.h
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ static inline int rtnl_msg_family(const
  *
  *	@list: Used internally
  *	@kind: Identifier
+ *	@netns_refund: Physical device, move to init_net on netns exit
  *	@maxtype: Highest device specific netlink attribute number
  *	@policy: Netlink policy for device specific attribute validation
  *	@validate: Optional validation function for netlink/changelink parameters
@@ -84,6 +85,7 @@ struct rtnl_link_ops {
 	unsigned int		(*get_num_tx_queues)(void);
 	unsigned int		(*get_num_rx_queues)(void);
 
+	bool			netns_refund;
 	int			slave_maxtype;
 	const struct nla_policy	*slave_policy;
 	int			(*slave_validate)(struct nlattr *tb[],
--- a/net/core/dev.c
+++ b/net/core/dev.c
@@ -8300,7 +8300,7 @@ static void __net_exit default_device_ex
 			continue;
 
 		/* Leave virtual devices for the generic cleanup */
-		if (dev->rtnl_link_ops)
+		if (dev->rtnl_link_ops && !dev->rtnl_link_ops->netns_refund)
 			continue;
 
 		/* Push remaining network devices to init_net */

[PATCH 4.9 51/53] net: sched: validate stab values

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

commit e323d865b36134e8c5c82c834df89109a5c60dab upstream.

iproute2 package is well behaved, but malicious user space can
provide illegal shift values and trigger UBSAN reports.

Add stab parameter to red_check_params() to validate user input.

syzbot reported:

UBSAN: shift-out-of-bounds in ./include/net/red.h:312:18
shift exponent 111 is too large for 64-bit type 'long unsigned int'
CPU: 1 PID: 14662 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.12.0-rc2-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x141/0x1d7 lib/dump_stack.c:120
 ubsan_epilogue+0xb/0x5a lib/ubsan.c:148
 __ubsan_handle_shift_out_of_bounds.cold+0xb1/0x181 lib/ubsan.c:327
 red_calc_qavg_from_idle_time include/net/red.h:312 [inline]
 red_calc_qavg include/net/red.h:353 [inline]
 choke_enqueue.cold+0x18/0x3dd net/sched/sch_choke.c:221
 __dev_xmit_skb net/core/dev.c:3837 [inline]
 __dev_queue_xmit+0x1943/0x2e00 net/core/dev.c:4150
 neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:499 [inline]
 neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:508 [inline]
 ip6_finish_output2+0x911/0x1700 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:117
 __ip6_finish_output net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:182 [inline]
 __ip6_finish_output+0x4c1/0xe10 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:161
 ip6_finish_output+0x35/0x200 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:192
 NF_HOOK_COND include/linux/netfilter.h:290 [inline]
 ip6_output+0x1e4/0x530 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:215
 dst_output include/net/dst.h:448 [inline]
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:301 [inline]
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:295 [inline]
 ip6_xmit+0x127e/0x1eb0 net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:320
 inet6_csk_xmit+0x358/0x630 net/ipv6/inet6_connection_sock.c:135
 dccp_transmit_skb+0x973/0x12c0 net/dccp/output.c:138
 dccp_send_reset+0x21b/0x2b0 net/dccp/output.c:535
 dccp_finish_passive_close net/dccp/proto.c:123 [inline]
 dccp_finish_passive_close+0xed/0x140 net/dccp/proto.c:118
 dccp_terminate_connection net/dccp/proto.c:958 [inline]
 dccp_close+0xb3c/0xe60 net/dccp/proto.c:1028
 inet_release+0x12e/0x280 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:431
 inet6_release+0x4c/0x70 net/ipv6/af_inet6.c:478
 __sock_release+0xcd/0x280 net/socket.c:599
 sock_close+0x18/0x20 net/socket.c:1258
 __fput+0x288/0x920 fs/file_table.c:280
 task_work_run+0xdd/0x1a0 kernel/task_work.c:140
 tracehook_notify_resume include/linux/tracehook.h:189 [inline]

Fixes: 8afa10cbe281 ("net_sched: red: Avoid illegal values")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 include/net/red.h     |   10 +++++++++-
 net/sched/sch_choke.c |    7 ++++---
 net/sched/sch_gred.c  |    2 +-
 net/sched/sch_red.c   |    7 +++++--
 net/sched/sch_sfq.c   |    2 +-
 5 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

--- a/include/net/red.h
+++ b/include/net/red.h
@@ -167,7 +167,8 @@ static inline void red_set_vars(struct r
 	v->qcount	= -1;
 }
 
-static inline bool red_check_params(u32 qth_min, u32 qth_max, u8 Wlog, u8 Scell_log)
+static inline bool red_check_params(u32 qth_min, u32 qth_max, u8 Wlog,
+				    u8 Scell_log, u8 *stab)
 {
 	if (fls(qth_min) + Wlog > 32)
 		return false;
@@ -177,6 +178,13 @@ static inline bool red_check_params(u32
 		return false;
 	if (qth_max < qth_min)
 		return false;
+	if (stab) {
+		int i;
+
+		for (i = 0; i < RED_STAB_SIZE; i++)
+			if (stab[i] >= 32)
+				return false;
+	}
 	return true;
 }
 
--- a/net/sched/sch_choke.c
+++ b/net/sched/sch_choke.c
@@ -409,6 +409,7 @@ static int choke_change(struct Qdisc *sc
 	struct sk_buff **old = NULL;
 	unsigned int mask;
 	u32 max_P;
+	u8 *stab;
 
 	if (opt == NULL)
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -424,8 +425,8 @@ static int choke_change(struct Qdisc *sc
 	max_P = tb[TCA_CHOKE_MAX_P] ? nla_get_u32(tb[TCA_CHOKE_MAX_P]) : 0;
 
 	ctl = nla_data(tb[TCA_CHOKE_PARMS]);
-
-	if (!red_check_params(ctl->qth_min, ctl->qth_max, ctl->Wlog, ctl->Scell_log))
+	stab = nla_data(tb[TCA_CHOKE_STAB]);
+	if (!red_check_params(ctl->qth_min, ctl->qth_max, ctl->Wlog, ctl->Scell_log, stab))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (ctl->limit > CHOKE_MAX_QUEUE)
@@ -478,7 +479,7 @@ static int choke_change(struct Qdisc *sc
 
 	red_set_parms(&q->parms, ctl->qth_min, ctl->qth_max, ctl->Wlog,
 		      ctl->Plog, ctl->Scell_log,
-		      nla_data(tb[TCA_CHOKE_STAB]),
+		      stab,
 		      max_P);
 	red_set_vars(&q->vars);
 
--- a/net/sched/sch_gred.c
+++ b/net/sched/sch_gred.c
@@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ static inline int gred_change_vq(struct
 	struct gred_sched *table = qdisc_priv(sch);
 	struct gred_sched_data *q = table->tab[dp];
 
-	if (!red_check_params(ctl->qth_min, ctl->qth_max, ctl->Wlog, ctl->Scell_log))
+	if (!red_check_params(ctl->qth_min, ctl->qth_max, ctl->Wlog, ctl->Scell_log, stab))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (!q) {
--- a/net/sched/sch_red.c
+++ b/net/sched/sch_red.c
@@ -169,6 +169,7 @@ static int red_change(struct Qdisc *sch,
 	struct Qdisc *child = NULL;
 	int err;
 	u32 max_P;
+	u8 *stab;
 
 	if (opt == NULL)
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -184,7 +185,9 @@ static int red_change(struct Qdisc *sch,
 	max_P = tb[TCA_RED_MAX_P] ? nla_get_u32(tb[TCA_RED_MAX_P]) : 0;
 
 	ctl = nla_data(tb[TCA_RED_PARMS]);
-	if (!red_check_params(ctl->qth_min, ctl->qth_max, ctl->Wlog, ctl->Scell_log))
+	stab = nla_data(tb[TCA_RED_STAB]);
+	if (!red_check_params(ctl->qth_min, ctl->qth_max, ctl->Wlog,
+			      ctl->Scell_log, stab))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
 	if (ctl->limit > 0) {
@@ -206,7 +209,7 @@ static int red_change(struct Qdisc *sch,
 	red_set_parms(&q->parms,
 		      ctl->qth_min, ctl->qth_max, ctl->Wlog,
 		      ctl->Plog, ctl->Scell_log,
-		      nla_data(tb[TCA_RED_STAB]),
+		      stab,
 		      max_P);
 	red_set_vars(&q->vars);
 
--- a/net/sched/sch_sfq.c
+++ b/net/sched/sch_sfq.c
@@ -645,7 +645,7 @@ static int sfq_change(struct Qdisc *sch,
 	}
 
 	if (ctl_v1 && !red_check_params(ctl_v1->qth_min, ctl_v1->qth_max,
-					ctl_v1->Wlog, ctl_v1->Scell_log))
+					ctl_v1->Wlog, ctl_v1->Scell_log, NULL))
 		return -EINVAL;
 	if (ctl_v1 && ctl_v1->qth_min) {
 		p = kmalloc(sizeof(*p), GFP_KERNEL);

[PATCH 4.9 52/53] net: qrtr: fix a kernel-infoleak in qrtr_recvmsg()

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

commit 50535249f624d0072cd885bcdce4e4b6fb770160 upstream.

struct sockaddr_qrtr has a 2-byte hole, and qrtr_recvmsg() currently
does not clear it before copying kernel data to user space.

It might be too late to name the hole since sockaddr_qrtr structure is uapi.

BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in kmsan_copy_to_user+0x9c/0xb0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:249
CPU: 0 PID: 29705 Comm: syz-executor.3 Not tainted 5.11.0-rc7-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x21c/0x280 lib/dump_stack.c:120
 kmsan_report+0xfb/0x1e0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_report.c:118
 kmsan_internal_check_memory+0x202/0x520 mm/kmsan/kmsan.c:402
 kmsan_copy_to_user+0x9c/0xb0 mm/kmsan/kmsan_hooks.c:249
 instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:121 [inline]
 _copy_to_user+0x1ac/0x270 lib/usercopy.c:33
 copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:209 [inline]
 move_addr_to_user+0x3a2/0x640 net/socket.c:237
 ____sys_recvmsg+0x696/0xd50 net/socket.c:2575
 ___sys_recvmsg net/socket.c:2610 [inline]
 do_recvmmsg+0xa97/0x22d0 net/socket.c:2710
 __sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2789 [inline]
 __do_sys_recvmmsg net/socket.c:2812 [inline]
 __se_sys_recvmmsg+0x24a/0x410 net/socket.c:2805
 __x64_sys_recvmmsg+0x62/0x80 net/socket.c:2805
 do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x140 arch/x86/entry/common.c:48
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
RIP: 0033:0x465f69
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 bc ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f43659d6188 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000012b
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 000000000056bf60 RCX: 0000000000465f69
RDX: 0000000000000008 RSI: 0000000020003e40 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00000000004bfa8f R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000010060 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 000000000056bf60
R13: 0000000000a9fb1f R14: 00007f43659d6300 R15: 0000000000022000

Local variable ----addr@____sys_recvmsg created at:
 ____sys_recvmsg+0x168/0xd50 net/socket.c:2550
 ____sys_recvmsg+0x168/0xd50 net/socket.c:2550

Bytes 2-3 of 12 are uninitialized
Memory access of size 12 starts at ffff88817c627b40
Data copied to user address 0000000020000140

Fixes: bdabad3e363d ("net: Add Qualcomm IPC router")
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Courtney Cavin <courtney.cavin@sonymobile.com>
Reported-by: syzbot <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/qrtr/qrtr.c |    5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

--- a/net/qrtr/qrtr.c
+++ b/net/qrtr/qrtr.c
@@ -728,6 +728,11 @@ static int qrtr_recvmsg(struct socket *s
 	rc = copied;
 
 	if (addr) {
+		/* There is an anonymous 2-byte hole after sq_family,
+		 * make sure to clear it.
+		 */
+		memset(addr, 0, sizeof(*addr));
+
 		addr->sq_family = AF_QIPCRTR;
 		addr->sq_node = le32_to_cpu(phdr->src_node_id);
 		addr->sq_port = le32_to_cpu(phdr->src_port_id);

[PATCH 4.9 53/53] mac80211: fix double free in ibss_leave

[Greg Kroah-Hartman]

From: Markus Theil <markus.theil@tu-ilmenau.de>

commit 3bd801b14e0c5d29eeddc7336558beb3344efaa3 upstream.

Clear beacon ie pointer and ie length after free
in order to prevent double free.

==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: double-free or invalid-free \
in ieee80211_ibss_leave+0x83/0xe0 net/mac80211/ibss.c:1876

CPU: 0 PID: 8472 Comm: syz-executor100 Not tainted 5.11.0-rc6-syzkaller #0
Call Trace:
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:79 [inline]
 dump_stack+0x107/0x163 lib/dump_stack.c:120
 print_address_description.constprop.0.cold+0x5b/0x2c6 mm/kasan/report.c:230
 kasan_report_invalid_free+0x51/0x80 mm/kasan/report.c:355
 ____kasan_slab_free+0xcc/0xe0 mm/kasan/common.c:341
 kasan_slab_free include/linux/kasan.h:192 [inline]
 __cache_free mm/slab.c:3424 [inline]
 kfree+0xed/0x270 mm/slab.c:3760
 ieee80211_ibss_leave+0x83/0xe0 net/mac80211/ibss.c:1876
 rdev_leave_ibss net/wireless/rdev-ops.h:545 [inline]
 __cfg80211_leave_ibss+0x19a/0x4c0 net/wireless/ibss.c:212
 __cfg80211_leave+0x327/0x430 net/wireless/core.c:1172
 cfg80211_leave net/wireless/core.c:1221 [inline]
 cfg80211_netdev_notifier_call+0x9e8/0x12c0 net/wireless/core.c:1335
 notifier_call_chain+0xb5/0x200 kernel/notifier.c:83
 call_netdevice_notifiers_info+0xb5/0x130 net/core/dev.c:2040
 call_netdevice_notifiers_extack net/core/dev.c:2052 [inline]
 call_netdevice_notifiers net/core/dev.c:2066 [inline]
 __dev_close_many+0xee/0x2e0 net/core/dev.c:1586
 __dev_close net/core/dev.c:1624 [inline]
 __dev_change_flags+0x2cb/0x730 net/core/dev.c:8476
 dev_change_flags+0x8a/0x160 net/core/dev.c:8549
 dev_ifsioc+0x210/0xa70 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:265
 dev_ioctl+0x1b1/0xc40 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:511
 sock_do_ioctl+0x148/0x2d0 net/socket.c:1060
 sock_ioctl+0x477/0x6a0 net/socket.c:1177
 vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:48 [inline]
 __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:753 [inline]
 __se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:739 [inline]
 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x193/0x200 fs/ioctl.c:739
 do_syscall_64+0x2d/0x70 arch/x86/entry/common.c:46
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9

Reported-by: syzbot+93976391bf299d425f44@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Markus Theil <markus.theil@tu-ilmenau.de>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210213133653.367130-1-markus.theil@tu-ilmenau.de
Signed-off-by: Johannes Berg <johannes.berg@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 net/mac80211/ibss.c |    2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)

--- a/net/mac80211/ibss.c
+++ b/net/mac80211/ibss.c
@@ -1862,6 +1862,8 @@ int ieee80211_ibss_leave(struct ieee8021
 
 	/* remove beacon */
 	kfree(sdata->u.ibss.ie);
+	sdata->u.ibss.ie = NULL;
+	sdata->u.ibss.ie_len = 0;
 
 	/* on the next join, re-program HT parameters */
 	memset(&ifibss->ht_capa, 0, sizeof(ifibss->ht_capa));

Re: [PATCH 4.9 00/53] 4.9.264-rc1 review

[Florian Fainelli]

On 3/29/21 12:57 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.264 release.
> There are 53 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
> 
> Responses should be made by Wed, 31 Mar 2021 07:55:56 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
> 
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> 	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.264-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> 	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
> 
> thanks,
> 
> greg k-h
> 
>
On ARCH_BRCMSTB using 32-bit and 64-bit ARM kernels:

Tested-by: Florian Fainelli <f.fainelli@gmail.com>

and thanks to Ben's latest back ports, no longer seeing the do_futex
warning that I was seeing, thanks a lot Ben!
-- 
Florian

Re: [PATCH 4.9 00/53] 4.9.264-rc1 review

[Guenter Roeck]

On Mon, Mar 29, 2021 at 09:57:35AM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.264 release.
> There are 53 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
> 
> Responses should be made by Wed, 31 Mar 2021 07:55:56 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
> 

Build results:
	total: 163 pass: 163 fail: 0
Qemu test results:
	total: 381 pass: 381 fail: 0

Tested-by: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>

Guenter

Re: [PATCH 4.9 00/53] 4.9.264-rc1 review

[Shuah Khan]

On 3/29/21 1:57 AM, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.264 release.
> There are 53 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
> 
> Responses should be made by Wed, 31 Mar 2021 07:55:56 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
> 
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
> 	https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.264-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
> 	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
> 
> thanks,
> 
> greg k-h
> 

Compiled and booted on my test system. No dmesg regressions.

Tested-by: Shuah Khan <skhan@linuxfoundation.org>

thanks,
-- Shuah

Re: [PATCH 4.9 00/53] 4.9.264-rc1 review

[Naresh Kamboju]

On Mon, 29 Mar 2021 at 13:33, Greg Kroah-Hartman
<gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
>
> This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 4.9.264 release.
> There are 53 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> let me know.
>
> Responses should be made by Wed, 31 Mar 2021 07:55:56 +0000.
> Anything received after that time might be too late.
>
> The whole patch series can be found in one patch at:
>         https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v4.x/stable-review/patch-4.9.264-rc1.gz
> or in the git tree and branch at:
>         git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git linux-4.9.y
> and the diffstat can be found below.
>
> thanks,
>
> greg k-h

Results from Linaro’s test farm.
No regressions on arm64, arm, x86_64, and i386.

Tested-by: Linux Kernel Functional Testing <lkft@linaro.org>

Summary
------------------------------------------------------------------------

kernel: 4.9.264-rc1
git repo: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux-stable-rc.git
git branch: linux-4.9.y
git commit: 3c2295cc6be320f7598a3ae9da3abc98230bd931
git describe: v4.9.263-54-g3c2295cc6be3
Test details: https://qa-reports.linaro.org/lkft/linux-stable-rc-linux-4.9.y/build/v4.9.263-54-g3c2295cc6be3

No regressions (compared to build v4.9.263)

No fixes (compared to build v4.9.263)

Ran 49047 total tests in the following environments and test suites.

Environments
--------------
- arm
- arm64
- dragonboard-410c - arm64
- hi6220-hikey - arm64
- i386
- juno-64k_page_size
- juno-r2 - arm64
- juno-r2-compat
- juno-r2-kasan
- mips
- qemu-arm-debug
- qemu-arm64-debug
- qemu-arm64-kasan
- qemu-i386-debug
- qemu-x86_64-debug
- qemu-x86_64-kasan
- qemu_arm
- qemu_arm64
- qemu_arm64-compat
- qemu_i386
- qemu_x86_64
- qemu_x86_64-compat
- sparc
- x15 - arm
- x86_64
- x86-kasan
- x86_64

Test Suites
-----------
* build
* linux-log-parser
* igt-gpu-tools
* install-android-platform-tools-r2600
* kselftest-android
* kselftest-bpf
* kselftest-capabilities
* kselftest-cgroup
* kselftest-clone3
* kselftest-core
* kselftest-cpu-hotplug
* kselftest-cpufreq
* kselftest-efivarfs
* kselftest-filesystems
* kselftest-firmware
* kselftest-fpu
* kselftest-futex
* kselftest-gpio
* kselftest-intel_pstate
* kselftest-ipc
* kselftest-ir
* kselftest-kcmp
* kselftest-kvm
* kselftest-livepatch
* kselftest-lkdtm
* kselftest-ptrace
* kselftest-rseq
* kselftest-rtc
* kselftest-seccomp
* kselftest-sigaltstack
* kselftest-size
* kselftest-splice
* kselftest-static_keys
* kselftest-sysctl
* kvm-unit-tests
* libhugetlbfs
* ltp-commands-tests
* ltp-containers-tests
* ltp-controllers-tests
* ltp-cve-tests
* ltp-dio-tests
* ltp-fcntl-locktests-tests
* ltp-filecaps-tests
* ltp-fs-tests
* ltp-fs_bind-tests
* ltp-fs_perms_simple-tests
* ltp-fsx-tests
* ltp-hugetlb-tests
* ltp-io-tests
* ltp-ipc-tests
* ltp-math-tests
* ltp-mm-tests
* ltp-nptl-tests
* ltp-pty-tests
* ltp-sched-tests
* ltp-securebits-tests
* ltp-syscalls-tests
* ltp-tracing-tests
* v4l2-compliance
* fwts
* kselftest-lib
* kselftest-membarrier
* kselftest-timens
* kselftest-timers
* kselftest-tmpfs
* kselftest-tpm2
* kselftest-user
* kselftest-zram
* ltp-cap_bounds-tests
* ltp-cpuhotplug-tests
* ltp-crypto-tests
* network-basic-tests
* perf
* kselftest-kexec
* kselftest-sync
* kselftest-vm
* kselftest-x86
* ltp-open-posix-tests
* ssuite

-- 
Linaro LKFT
https://lkft.linaro.org