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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	"Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>,
	Patrick Colp <patrick.colp@oracle.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Subject: [PATCH 5.16 02/37] x86/speculation: Add eIBRS + Retpoline options
Date: Wed,  9 Mar 2022 17:00:03 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220309155859.160089022@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220309155859.086952723@linuxfoundation.org>

From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>

commit 1e19da8522c81bf46b335f84137165741e0d82b7 upstream.

Thanks to the chaps at VUsec it is now clear that eIBRS is not
sufficient, therefore allow enabling of retpolines along with eIBRS.

Add spectre_v2=eibrs, spectre_v2=eibrs,lfence and
spectre_v2=eibrs,retpoline options to explicitly pick your preferred
means of mitigation.

Since there's new mitigations there's also user visible changes in
/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2 to reflect these
new mitigations.

  [ bp: Massage commit message, trim error messages,
    do more precise eIBRS mode checking. ]

Co-developed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Patrick Colp <patrick.colp@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h |    4 -
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c           |  133 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
 2 files changed, 99 insertions(+), 38 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -190,7 +190,9 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation {
 	SPECTRE_V2_NONE,
 	SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE,
 	SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE,
-	SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED,
+	SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS,
+	SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE,
+	SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE,
 };
 
 /* The indirect branch speculation control variants */
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -665,6 +665,9 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd {
 	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE,
 	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC,
 	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE,
+	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS,
+	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE,
+	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE,
 };
 
 enum spectre_v2_user_cmd {
@@ -737,6 +740,13 @@ spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(enum spect
 	return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO;
 }
 
+static inline bool spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode)
+{
+	return (mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS ||
+		mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE ||
+		mode == SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE);
+}
+
 static void __init
 spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd v2_cmd)
 {
@@ -804,7 +814,7 @@ spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(enum s
 	 */
 	if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_STIBP) ||
 	    !smt_possible ||
-	    spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED)
+	    spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
 		return;
 
 	/*
@@ -826,7 +836,9 @@ static const char * const spectre_v2_str
 	[SPECTRE_V2_NONE]			= "Vulnerable",
 	[SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE]			= "Mitigation: Retpolines",
 	[SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE]			= "Mitigation: LFENCE",
-	[SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED]		= "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS",
+	[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS]			= "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS",
+	[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE]		= "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + LFENCE",
+	[SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE]		= "Mitigation: Enhanced IBRS + Retpolines",
 };
 
 static const struct {
@@ -840,6 +852,9 @@ static const struct {
 	{ "retpoline,amd",	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE,  false },
 	{ "retpoline,lfence",	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE,  false },
 	{ "retpoline,generic",	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC, false },
+	{ "eibrs",		SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS,		  false },
+	{ "eibrs,lfence",	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE,	  false },
+	{ "eibrs,retpoline",	SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE,	  false },
 	{ "auto",		SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO,		  false },
 };
 
@@ -877,15 +892,29 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __
 
 	if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE ||
 	     cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE ||
-	     cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC) &&
+	     cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC ||
+	     cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE ||
+	     cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE) &&
 	    !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) {
-		pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n", mitigation_options[i].option);
+		pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n",
+		       mitigation_options[i].option);
+		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+	}
+
+	if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS ||
+	     cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE ||
+	     cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE) &&
+	    !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED)) {
+		pr_err("%s selected but CPU doesn't have eIBRS. Switching to AUTO select\n",
+		       mitigation_options[i].option);
 		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
 	}
 
-	if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE) &&
+	if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE ||
+	     cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE) &&
 	    !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)) {
-		pr_err("%s selected, but CPU doesn't have a serializing LFENCE. Switching to AUTO select\n", mitigation_options[i].option);
+		pr_err("%s selected, but CPU doesn't have a serializing LFENCE. Switching to AUTO select\n",
+		       mitigation_options[i].option);
 		return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
 	}
 
@@ -894,6 +923,25 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __
 	return cmd;
 }
 
+static enum spectre_v2_mitigation __init spectre_v2_select_retpoline(void)
+{
+	if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) {
+		pr_err("Kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!");
+		return SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
+	}
+
+	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD ||
+	    boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) {
+		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)) {
+			pr_err("LFENCE not serializing, switching to generic retpoline\n");
+			return SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE;
+		}
+		return SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE;
+	}
+
+	return SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE;
+}
+
 static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
 {
 	enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline();
@@ -914,49 +962,60 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mit
 	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE:
 	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO:
 		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED)) {
-			mode = SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED;
-			/* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */
-			x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
-			wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
-			goto specv2_set_mode;
+			mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS;
+			break;
 		}
-		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
-			goto retpoline_auto;
+
+		mode = spectre_v2_select_retpoline();
 		break;
+
 	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_LFENCE:
-		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
-			goto retpoline_lfence;
+		mode = SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE;
 		break;
+
 	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC:
-		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
-			goto retpoline_generic;
+		mode = SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE;
 		break;
+
 	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE:
-		if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
-			goto retpoline_auto;
+		mode = spectre_v2_select_retpoline();
+		break;
+
+	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS:
+		mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS;
+		break;
+
+	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE:
+		mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE;
+		break;
+
+	case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE:
+		mode = SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE;
 		break;
 	}
-	pr_err("Spectre mitigation: kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!");
-	return;
 
-retpoline_auto:
-	if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD ||
-	    boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) {
-	retpoline_lfence:
-		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)) {
-			pr_err("Spectre mitigation: LFENCE not serializing, switching to generic retpoline\n");
-			goto retpoline_generic;
-		}
-		mode = SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE;
+	if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode)) {
+		/* Force it so VMEXIT will restore correctly */
+		x86_spec_ctrl_base |= SPEC_CTRL_IBRS;
+		wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, x86_spec_ctrl_base);
+	}
+
+	switch (mode) {
+	case SPECTRE_V2_NONE:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS:
+		break;
+
+	case SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE:
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE);
+		fallthrough;
+
+	case SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE:
+	case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE:
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
-	} else {
-	retpoline_generic:
-		mode = SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE;
-		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
+		break;
 	}
 
-specv2_set_mode:
 	spectre_v2_enabled = mode;
 	pr_info("%s\n", spectre_v2_strings[mode]);
 
@@ -982,7 +1041,7 @@ specv2_set_mode:
 	 * the CPU supports Enhanced IBRS, kernel might un-intentionally not
 	 * enable IBRS around firmware calls.
 	 */
-	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && mode != SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED) {
+	if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBRS) && !spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(mode)) {
 		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_FW);
 		pr_info("Enabling Restricted Speculation for firmware calls\n");
 	}
@@ -1691,7 +1750,7 @@ static ssize_t tsx_async_abort_show_stat
 
 static char *stibp_state(void)
 {
-	if (spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_IBRS_ENHANCED)
+	if (spectre_v2_in_eibrs_mode(spectre_v2_enabled))
 		return "";
 
 	switch (spectre_v2_user_stibp) {



  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-03-09 16:22 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 49+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-03-09 16:00 [PATCH 5.16 00/37] 5.16.14-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 01/37] x86/speculation: Rename RETPOLINE_AMD to RETPOLINE_LFENCE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 03/37] Documentation/hw-vuln: Update spectre doc Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 04/37] x86/speculation: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 05/37] x86/speculation: Use generic retpoline by default on AMD Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 06/37] x86/speculation: Update link to AMD speculation whitepaper Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 07/37] x86/speculation: Warn about Spectre v2 LFENCE mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 08/37] x86/speculation: Warn about eIBRS + LFENCE + Unprivileged eBPF + SMT Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 09/37] ARM: report Spectre v2 status through sysfs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 10/37] ARM: early traps initialisation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 11/37] ARM: use LOADADDR() to get load address of sections Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 12/37] ARM: Spectre-BHB workaround Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 13/37] ARM: include unprivileged BPF status in Spectre V2 reporting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 14/37] arm64: add ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1 sys register Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 15/37] arm64: cpufeature: add HWCAP for FEAT_AFP Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 16/37] arm64: cpufeature: add HWCAP for FEAT_RPRES Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 17/37] arm64: entry.S: Add ventry overflow sanity checks Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 18/37] arm64: spectre: Rename spectre_v4_patch_fw_mitigation_conduit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 19/37] KVM: arm64: Allow indirect vectors to be used without SPECTRE_V3A Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 20/37] arm64: entry: Make the trampoline cleanup optional Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 21/37] arm64: entry: Free up another register on kptis tramp_exit path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 22/37] arm64: entry: Move the trampoline data page before the text page Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 23/37] arm64: entry: Allow tramp_alias to access symbols after the 4K boundary Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 24/37] arm64: entry: Dont assume tramp_vectors is the start of the vectors Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 25/37] arm64: entry: Move trampoline macros out of ifdefd section Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 26/37] arm64: entry: Make the kpti trampolines kpti sequence optional Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 27/37] arm64: entry: Allow the trampoline text to occupy multiple pages Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 28/37] arm64: entry: Add non-kpti __bp_harden_el1_vectors for mitigations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 29/37] arm64: entry: Add vectors that have the bhb mitigation sequences Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 23:27   ` Pavel Machek
2022-03-11  8:15     ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-11  8:39       ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 30/37] arm64: entry: Add macro for reading symbol addresses from the trampoline Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 31/37] arm64: Add percpu vectors for EL1 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 32/37] arm64: proton-pack: Report Spectre-BHB vulnerabilities as part of Spectre-v2 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 33/37] arm64: Mitigate spectre style branch history side channels Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 34/37] KVM: arm64: Allow SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3 to be discovered and migrated Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 35/37] arm64: Use the clearbhb instruction in mitigations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 36/37] arm64: proton-pack: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 37/37] ARM: fix build error when BPF_SYSCALL is disabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 19:05 ` [PATCH 5.16 00/37] 5.16.14-rc1 review Guenter Roeck
2022-03-09 20:01   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 21:17     ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 20:23 ` Shuah Khan
2022-03-09 21:17 ` Daniel Díaz
2022-03-09 21:19   ` Daniel Díaz
2022-03-09 21:49 ` Fox Chen
2022-03-10 10:50 ` Bagas Sanjaya

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