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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: Guenter Roeck <linux@roeck-us.net>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org,
	torvalds@linux-foundation.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
	shuah@kernel.org, patches@kernelci.org,
	lkft-triage@lists.linaro.org, pavel@denx.de,
	jonathanh@nvidia.com, f.fainelli@gmail.com,
	sudipm.mukherjee@gmail.com, slade@sladewatkins.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5.16 00/37] 5.16.14-rc1 review
Date: Wed, 9 Mar 2022 21:01:48 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YikHrEtQ5dFz9paK@kroah.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <37efd441-7fe4-1aa4-a41b-19d30b652c5c@roeck-us.net>

On Wed, Mar 09, 2022 at 11:05:15AM -0800, Guenter Roeck wrote:
> On 3/9/22 08:00, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > This is the start of the stable review cycle for the 5.16.14 release.
> > There are 37 patches in this series, all will be posted as a response
> > to this one.  If anyone has any issues with these being applied, please
> > let me know.
> > 
> > Responses should be made by Fri, 11 Mar 2022 15:58:48 +0000.
> > Anything received after that time might be too late.
> > 
> 
> Almost all arm builds, all branches from 4.9.y to 5.16.y:
> 
> Error log:
> arch/arm/common/secure_cntvoff.S: Assembler messages:
> arch/arm/common/secure_cntvoff.S:24: Error: co-processor register expected -- `mcr p15,0,r0,c7,r5,4'
> arch/arm/common/secure_cntvoff.S:27: Error: co-processor register expected -- `mcr p15,0,r0,c7,r5,4'
> arch/arm/common/secure_cntvoff.S:29: Error: co-processor register expected -- `mcr p15,0,r0,c7,r5,4'
> 
> bisect log:
> 
> # bad: [3416254dac79ea26e08dffde371ab1fd3130223c] Linux 5.16.14-rc1
> # good: [6273c309621c9dd61c9c3f6d63f5d56ee2d89c73] Linux 5.16.13
> git bisect start 'HEAD' 'v5.16.13'
> # bad: [4403d69931dbc17659845d2d710602bbe35b4398] KVM: arm64: Allow indirect vectors to be used without SPECTRE_V3A
> git bisect bad 4403d69931dbc17659845d2d710602bbe35b4398
> # good: [6f0cf3a1eb8b46a5d652a395ba25a59c32a86692] ARM: report Spectre v2 status through sysfs
> git bisect good 6f0cf3a1eb8b46a5d652a395ba25a59c32a86692
> # bad: [87e96a363eb4a62b65bb974a46d518a87153cd1c] arm64: add ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1 sys register
> git bisect bad 87e96a363eb4a62b65bb974a46d518a87153cd1c
> # good: [654f0a73f042662a36155a0cafa30db846ccb5a9] ARM: use LOADADDR() to get load address of sections
> git bisect good 654f0a73f042662a36155a0cafa30db846ccb5a9
> # bad: [91bdae56c40ee6de675fba6ac283311c92c437ce] ARM: include unprivileged BPF status in Spectre V2 reporting
> git bisect bad 91bdae56c40ee6de675fba6ac283311c92c437ce
> # bad: [95ff4cb3b696a581d6166f0d754771bf9af5e27b] ARM: Spectre-BHB workaround
> git bisect bad 95ff4cb3b696a581d6166f0d754771bf9af5e27b
> # first bad commit: [95ff4cb3b696a581d6166f0d754771bf9af5e27b] ARM: Spectre-BHB workaround
> 
> Guenter

Wow these are all broken, have I mentioned I hate working on patches in
embargos?

I'll look at these in the morning, it's odd that Linus's tree isn't
showing these same issue, but I might have messed up the arm backports
somehow.  I did test them on using the multi_v7_defconfig configuration
and they built for me locally with gcc.  I'll try to see what is
different here...

thanks,

greg k-h

  reply	other threads:[~2022-03-10  9:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 49+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-03-09 16:00 [PATCH 5.16 00/37] 5.16.14-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 01/37] x86/speculation: Rename RETPOLINE_AMD to RETPOLINE_LFENCE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 02/37] x86/speculation: Add eIBRS + Retpoline options Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 03/37] Documentation/hw-vuln: Update spectre doc Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 04/37] x86/speculation: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 05/37] x86/speculation: Use generic retpoline by default on AMD Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 06/37] x86/speculation: Update link to AMD speculation whitepaper Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 07/37] x86/speculation: Warn about Spectre v2 LFENCE mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 08/37] x86/speculation: Warn about eIBRS + LFENCE + Unprivileged eBPF + SMT Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 09/37] ARM: report Spectre v2 status through sysfs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 10/37] ARM: early traps initialisation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 11/37] ARM: use LOADADDR() to get load address of sections Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 12/37] ARM: Spectre-BHB workaround Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 13/37] ARM: include unprivileged BPF status in Spectre V2 reporting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 14/37] arm64: add ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1 sys register Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 15/37] arm64: cpufeature: add HWCAP for FEAT_AFP Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 16/37] arm64: cpufeature: add HWCAP for FEAT_RPRES Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 17/37] arm64: entry.S: Add ventry overflow sanity checks Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 18/37] arm64: spectre: Rename spectre_v4_patch_fw_mitigation_conduit Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 19/37] KVM: arm64: Allow indirect vectors to be used without SPECTRE_V3A Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 20/37] arm64: entry: Make the trampoline cleanup optional Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 21/37] arm64: entry: Free up another register on kptis tramp_exit path Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 22/37] arm64: entry: Move the trampoline data page before the text page Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 23/37] arm64: entry: Allow tramp_alias to access symbols after the 4K boundary Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 24/37] arm64: entry: Dont assume tramp_vectors is the start of the vectors Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 25/37] arm64: entry: Move trampoline macros out of ifdefd section Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 26/37] arm64: entry: Make the kpti trampolines kpti sequence optional Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 27/37] arm64: entry: Allow the trampoline text to occupy multiple pages Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 28/37] arm64: entry: Add non-kpti __bp_harden_el1_vectors for mitigations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 29/37] arm64: entry: Add vectors that have the bhb mitigation sequences Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-10 23:27   ` Pavel Machek
2022-03-11  8:15     ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-11  8:39       ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 30/37] arm64: entry: Add macro for reading symbol addresses from the trampoline Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 31/37] arm64: Add percpu vectors for EL1 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 32/37] arm64: proton-pack: Report Spectre-BHB vulnerabilities as part of Spectre-v2 Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 33/37] arm64: Mitigate spectre style branch history side channels Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 34/37] KVM: arm64: Allow SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3 to be discovered and migrated Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 35/37] arm64: Use the clearbhb instruction in mitigations Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 36/37] arm64: proton-pack: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.16 37/37] ARM: fix build error when BPF_SYSCALL is disabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 19:05 ` [PATCH 5.16 00/37] 5.16.14-rc1 review Guenter Roeck
2022-03-09 20:01   ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2022-03-09 21:17     ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 20:23 ` Shuah Khan
2022-03-09 21:17 ` Daniel Díaz
2022-03-09 21:19   ` Daniel Díaz
2022-03-09 21:49 ` Fox Chen
2022-03-10 10:50 ` Bagas Sanjaya

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