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From: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
To: <kvm@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: <linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>, <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	<linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org>, <x86@kernel.org>,
	<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	<mingo@redhat.com>, <jroedel@suse.de>, <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	<hpa@zytor.com>, <ardb@kernel.org>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	<seanjc@google.com>, <vkuznets@redhat.com>, <jmattson@google.com>,
	<luto@kernel.org>, <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	<slp@redhat.com>, <pgonda@google.com>, <peterz@infradead.org>,
	<srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com>, <rientjes@google.com>,
	<dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>, <tobin@ibm.com>, <bp@alien8.de>,
	<vbabka@suse.cz>, <kirill@shutemov.name>, <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	<tony.luck@intel.com>, <marcorr@google.com>,
	<sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com>,
	<alpergun@google.com>, <jarkko@kernel.org>,
	<ashish.kalra@amd.com>, <nikunj.dadhania@amd.com>,
	<pankaj.gupta@amd.com>, <liam.merwick@oracle.com>,
	<zhi.a.wang@intel.com>, Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH v10 48/50] KVM: SEV: Provide support for SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event
Date: Mon, 16 Oct 2023 08:28:17 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231016132819.1002933-49-michael.roth@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231016132819.1002933-1-michael.roth@amd.com>

From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>

Version 2 of GHCB specification added the support for two SNP Guest
Request Message NAE events. The events allows for an SEV-SNP guest to
make request to the SEV-SNP firmware through hypervisor using the
SNP_GUEST_REQUEST API define in the SEV-SNP firmware specification.

The SNP_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST is similar to SNP_GUEST_REQUEST with the
difference of an additional certificate blob that can be passed through
the SNP_SET_CONFIG ioctl defined in the CCP driver. The CCP driver
provides snp_guest_ext_guest_request() that is used by the KVM to get
both the report and certificate data at once.

Co-developed-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Kardashevskiy <aik@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
[mdr: ensure FW command failures are indicated to guest]
Signed-off-by: Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c       | 176 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h       |   1 +
 drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c |  15 +++
 include/linux/psp-sev.h      |   1 +
 4 files changed, 193 insertions(+)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 602aaf82eef3..d71ec257debb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <linux/misc_cgroup.h>
 #include <linux/processor.h>
 #include <linux/trace_events.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/sev-guest.h>
 
 #include <asm/pkru.h>
 #include <asm/trapnr.h>
@@ -339,6 +340,8 @@ static int sev_guest_init(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 		ret = verify_snp_init_flags(kvm, argp);
 		if (ret)
 			goto e_free;
+
+		mutex_init(&sev->guest_req_lock);
 	}
 
 	ret = sev_platform_init(&argp->error);
@@ -2345,8 +2348,10 @@ static int snp_get_instance_certs(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 
 static void snp_replace_certs(struct kvm_sev_info *sev, struct sev_snp_certs *snp_certs)
 {
+	mutex_lock(&sev->guest_req_lock);
 	sev_snp_certs_put(sev->snp_certs);
 	sev->snp_certs = snp_certs;
+	mutex_unlock(&sev->guest_req_lock);
 }
 
 static int snp_set_instance_certs(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
@@ -3218,6 +3223,8 @@ static int sev_es_validate_vmgexit(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 	case SVM_VMGEXIT_HV_FEATURES:
 	case SVM_VMGEXIT_PSC:
 	case SVM_VMGEXIT_TERM_REQUEST:
+	case SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST:
+	case SVM_VMGEXIT_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST:
 		break;
 	default:
 		reason = GHCB_ERR_INVALID_EVENT;
@@ -3627,6 +3634,163 @@ static int sev_snp_ap_creation(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static unsigned long snp_setup_guest_buf(struct vcpu_svm *svm,
+					 struct sev_data_snp_guest_request *data,
+					 gpa_t req_gpa, gpa_t resp_gpa)
+{
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
+	struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
+	kvm_pfn_t req_pfn, resp_pfn;
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev;
+
+	sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+
+	if (!IS_ALIGNED(req_gpa, PAGE_SIZE) || !IS_ALIGNED(resp_gpa, PAGE_SIZE))
+		return SEV_RET_INVALID_PARAM;
+
+	req_pfn = gfn_to_pfn(kvm, gpa_to_gfn(req_gpa));
+	if (is_error_noslot_pfn(req_pfn))
+		return SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
+
+	resp_pfn = gfn_to_pfn(kvm, gpa_to_gfn(resp_gpa));
+	if (is_error_noslot_pfn(resp_pfn))
+		return SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
+
+	if (rmp_make_private(resp_pfn, 0, PG_LEVEL_4K, 0, true))
+		return SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
+
+	data->gctx_paddr = __psp_pa(sev->snp_context);
+	data->req_paddr = __sme_set(req_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT);
+	data->res_paddr = __sme_set(resp_pfn << PAGE_SHIFT);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void snp_cleanup_guest_buf(struct sev_data_snp_guest_request *data, unsigned long *rc)
+{
+	u64 pfn = __sme_clr(data->res_paddr) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = snp_page_reclaim(pfn);
+	if (ret)
+		*rc = SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
+
+	ret = rmp_make_shared(pfn, PG_LEVEL_4K);
+	if (ret)
+		*rc = SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
+}
+
+static void snp_handle_guest_request(struct vcpu_svm *svm, gpa_t req_gpa, gpa_t resp_gpa)
+{
+	struct sev_data_snp_guest_request data = {0};
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
+	struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev;
+	unsigned long rc;
+	int err;
+
+	if (!sev_snp_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
+		rc = SEV_RET_INVALID_GUEST;
+		goto e_fail;
+	}
+
+	sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+
+	mutex_lock(&sev->guest_req_lock);
+
+	rc = snp_setup_guest_buf(svm, &data, req_gpa, resp_gpa);
+	if (rc)
+		goto unlock;
+
+	rc = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SNP_GUEST_REQUEST, &data, &err);
+	if (rc)
+		/* Ensure an error value is returned to guest. */
+		rc = err ? err : SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
+
+	snp_cleanup_guest_buf(&data, &rc);
+
+unlock:
+	mutex_unlock(&sev->guest_req_lock);
+
+e_fail:
+	ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(svm->sev_es.ghcb, rc);
+}
+
+static void snp_handle_ext_guest_request(struct vcpu_svm *svm, gpa_t req_gpa, gpa_t resp_gpa)
+{
+	struct sev_data_snp_guest_request req = {0};
+	struct sev_snp_certs *snp_certs = NULL;
+	struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = &svm->vcpu;
+	struct kvm *kvm = vcpu->kvm;
+	unsigned long data_npages;
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev;
+	unsigned long exitcode = 0;
+	u64 data_gpa;
+	int err, rc;
+
+	if (!sev_snp_guest(vcpu->kvm)) {
+		rc = SEV_RET_INVALID_GUEST;
+		goto e_fail;
+	}
+
+	sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+
+	data_gpa = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX];
+	data_npages = vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX];
+
+	if (!IS_ALIGNED(data_gpa, PAGE_SIZE)) {
+		exitcode = SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
+		goto e_fail;
+	}
+
+	mutex_lock(&sev->guest_req_lock);
+
+	rc = snp_setup_guest_buf(svm, &req, req_gpa, resp_gpa);
+	if (rc)
+		goto unlock;
+
+	/*
+	 * If a VMM-specific certificate blob hasn't been provided, grab the
+	 * host-wide one.
+	 */
+	snp_certs = sev_snp_certs_get(sev->snp_certs);
+	if (!snp_certs)
+		snp_certs = sev_snp_global_certs_get();
+
+	/*
+	 * If there is a host-wide or VMM-specific certificate blob available,
+	 * make sure the guest has allocated enough space to store it.
+	 * Otherwise, inform the guest how much space is needed.
+	 */
+	if (snp_certs && (data_npages << PAGE_SHIFT) < snp_certs->len) {
+		vcpu->arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX] = snp_certs->len >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+		exitcode = SNP_GUEST_VMM_ERR(SNP_GUEST_VMM_ERR_INVALID_LEN);
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+
+	rc = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SNP_GUEST_REQUEST, &req, &err);
+	if (rc) {
+		/* pass the firmware error code */
+		exitcode = err;
+		goto cleanup;
+	}
+
+	/* Copy the certificate blob in the guest memory */
+	if (snp_certs &&
+	    kvm_write_guest(kvm, data_gpa, snp_certs->data, snp_certs->len))
+		exitcode = SEV_RET_INVALID_ADDRESS;
+
+cleanup:
+	sev_snp_certs_put(snp_certs);
+	snp_cleanup_guest_buf(&req, &exitcode);
+
+unlock:
+	mutex_unlock(&sev->guest_req_lock);
+
+e_fail:
+	ghcb_set_sw_exit_info_2(svm->sev_es.ghcb, exitcode);
+}
+
 static int sev_handle_vmgexit_msr_protocol(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
 {
 	struct vmcb_control_area *control = &svm->vmcb->control;
@@ -3894,6 +4058,18 @@ int sev_handle_vmgexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 		vcpu->run->system_event.ndata = 1;
 		vcpu->run->system_event.data[0] = control->ghcb_gpa;
 		break;
+	case SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST:
+		snp_handle_guest_request(svm, control->exit_info_1, control->exit_info_2);
+
+		ret = 1;
+		break;
+	case SVM_VMGEXIT_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST:
+		snp_handle_ext_guest_request(svm,
+					     control->exit_info_1,
+					     control->exit_info_2);
+
+		ret = 1;
+		break;
 	case SVM_VMGEXIT_UNSUPPORTED_EVENT:
 		vcpu_unimpl(vcpu,
 			    "vmgexit: unsupported event - exit_info_1=%#llx, exit_info_2=%#llx\n",
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
index bdf792ba06e1..3673a6e4e22e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ struct kvm_sev_info {
 	void *snp_context;      /* SNP guest context page */
 	u64 sev_features;	/* Features set at VMSA creation */
 	struct sev_snp_certs *snp_certs;
+	struct mutex guest_req_lock; /* Lock for guest request handling */
 };
 
 struct kvm_svm {
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
index 4807ddd6ec52..f9c75c561c4e 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c
@@ -2109,6 +2109,21 @@ void sev_snp_certs_put(struct sev_snp_certs *certs)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_snp_certs_put);
 
+struct sev_snp_certs *sev_snp_global_certs_get(void)
+{
+	struct sev_device *sev;
+
+	if (!psp_master || !psp_master->sev_data)
+		return NULL;
+
+	sev = psp_master->sev_data;
+	if (!sev->snp_initialized)
+		return NULL;
+
+	return sev_snp_certs_get(sev->snp_certs);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sev_snp_global_certs_get);
+
 static void sev_exit(struct kref *ref)
 {
 	misc_deregister(&misc_dev->misc);
diff --git a/include/linux/psp-sev.h b/include/linux/psp-sev.h
index 722e26d28d2f..3b294ccbbec9 100644
--- a/include/linux/psp-sev.h
+++ b/include/linux/psp-sev.h
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ struct sev_snp_certs {
 struct sev_snp_certs *sev_snp_certs_new(void *data, u32 len);
 struct sev_snp_certs *sev_snp_certs_get(struct sev_snp_certs *certs);
 void sev_snp_certs_put(struct sev_snp_certs *certs);
+struct sev_snp_certs *sev_snp_global_certs_get(void);
 
 /**
  * SEV platform state
-- 
2.25.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-10-16 13:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 158+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-10-16 13:27 [PATCH v10 00/50] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Hypervisor Support Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 01/50] KVM: SVM: INTERCEPT_RDTSCP is never intercepted anyway Michael Roth
2023-10-16 15:12   ` Greg KH
2023-10-16 15:14     ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-10-16 15:21       ` Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 02/50] KVM: SVM: Fix TSC_AUX virtualization setup Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 03/50] KVM: SEV: Do not intercept accesses to MSR_IA32_XSS for SEV-ES guests Michael Roth
2023-12-13 12:50   ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-13 17:30     ` Sean Christopherson
2023-12-13 17:40       ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 04/50] x86/cpufeatures: Add SEV-SNP CPU feature Michael Roth
2023-12-13 12:51   ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-13 13:13     ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-13 13:31       ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-13 13:36         ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-13 13:40           ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-13 13:49             ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-13 14:18               ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-13 15:41                 ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-13 17:35                   ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-13 18:53                     ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 05/50] x86/speculation: Do not enable Automatic IBRS if SEV SNP is enabled Michael Roth
2023-10-25 17:33   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-27 21:50   ` Dave Hansen
2023-12-13 12:52   ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 06/50] x86/sev: Add the host SEV-SNP initialization support Michael Roth
2023-10-25 18:19   ` Tom Lendacky
2023-11-07 16:31   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-11-07 18:32     ` Tom Lendacky
2023-11-07 19:13       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-11-08  8:21       ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-11-08 15:19         ` Tom Lendacky
2023-11-07 19:00     ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-11-07 19:19       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-11-07 20:27         ` Borislav Petkov
2023-11-07 21:21           ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-11-07 21:27             ` Borislav Petkov
2023-11-07 22:08               ` Borislav Petkov
2023-11-07 22:33                 ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-11-08  6:14                   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-11-08  9:11                     ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-11-08 19:53                     ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-12-08 17:09       ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-12-08 23:21         ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-12-20  7:07     ` Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 07/50] x86/sev: Add RMP entry lookup helpers Michael Roth
2023-11-14 14:24   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-19  3:31     ` Michael Roth
2024-01-09 22:07       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 08/50] x86/fault: Add helper for dumping RMP entries Michael Roth
2023-11-15 16:08   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-19  6:08     ` Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 09/50] x86/traps: Define RMP violation #PF error code Michael Roth
2023-10-16 14:14   ` Dave Hansen
2023-10-16 14:55     ` Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 10/50] x86/fault: Report RMP page faults for kernel addresses Michael Roth
2023-11-21 15:23   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 11/50] x86/sev: Add helper functions for RMPUPDATE and PSMASH instruction Michael Roth
2023-11-21 16:21   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-19 16:20     ` Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 12/50] x86/sev: Invalidate pages from the direct map when adding them to the RMP table Michael Roth
2023-11-24 14:20   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 13/50] crypto: ccp: Define the SEV-SNP commands Michael Roth
2023-11-24 14:36   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 14/50] crypto: ccp: Add support to initialize the AMD-SP for SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2023-11-27  9:59   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-11-30  2:13     ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-12-06 17:08       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-06 20:35         ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-12-09 16:20           ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-11 21:11             ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-12-12  6:52               ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 15/50] crypto: ccp: Provide API to issue SEV and SNP commands Michael Roth
2023-12-06 20:21   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 16/50] x86/sev: Introduce snp leaked pages list Michael Roth
2023-12-06 20:42   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-08 20:54     ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-12-07 16:20   ` Vlastimil Babka
2023-12-08 22:10     ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-12-11 13:08       ` Vlastimil Babka
2023-12-12 23:26         ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 17/50] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy TMR allocation when SNP is enabled Michael Roth
2023-12-08 13:05   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-19 23:46     ` Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 18/50] crypto: ccp: Handle the legacy SEV command " Michael Roth
2023-12-09 15:36   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-29 21:38     ` Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 19/50] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_PLATFORM_STATUS command Michael Roth
2023-12-12 16:45   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 20/50] KVM: SEV: Select CONFIG_KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM when CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV=y Michael Roth
2023-12-13 12:54   ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-29 21:41     ` Michael Roth
2023-12-18 10:13   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-12-29 21:40     ` Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 21/50] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle AP reset MSR protocol Michael Roth
2023-12-12 17:02   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 22/50] KVM: SEV: Add GHCB handling for Hypervisor Feature Support requests Michael Roth
2023-12-18 10:23   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 23/50] KVM: SEV: Make AVIC backing, VMSA and VMCB memory allocation SNP safe Michael Roth
2023-12-11 13:24   ` Vlastimil Babka
2023-12-12  0:00     ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-12-13 13:31   ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-13 18:45   ` Paolo Bonzini
2023-12-18 14:57   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 24/50] KVM: SEV: Add initial SEV-SNP support Michael Roth
2023-12-18 17:43   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 25/50] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SNP_INIT command Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 26/50] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_START command Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 27/50] KVM: Add HVA range operator Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 28/50] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_UPDATE command Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 29/50] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH command Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:27 ` [PATCH v10 30/50] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle GHCB GPA register VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 31/50] KVM: SEV: Add KVM_EXIT_VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 32/50] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle MSR based Page State Change VMGEXIT Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 33/50] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle " Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 34/50] KVM: x86: Export the kvm_zap_gfn_range() for the SNP use Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 35/50] KVM: SEV: Add support to handle RMP nested page faults Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 36/50] KVM: SEV: Use a VMSA physical address variable for populating VMCB Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 37/50] KVM: SEV: Support SEV-SNP AP Creation NAE event Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 38/50] KVM: SEV: Add support for GHCB-based termination requests Michael Roth
2023-10-19 12:20   ` Liam Merwick
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 39/50] KVM: SEV: Implement gmem hook for initializing private pages Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 40/50] KVM: SEV: Implement gmem hook for invalidating " Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 41/50] KVM: x86: Add gmem hook for determining max NPT mapping level Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 42/50] KVM: SEV: Avoid WBINVD for HVA-based MMU notifications for SNP Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 43/50] KVM: SVM: Add module parameter to enable the SEV-SNP Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 44/50] iommu/amd: Add IOMMU_SNP_SHUTDOWN support Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 45/50] iommu/amd: Report all cases inhibiting SNP enablement Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 46/50] crypto: ccp: Add the SNP_{SET,GET}_EXT_CONFIG command Michael Roth
2023-10-16 23:11   ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 47/50] x86/sev: Add KVM commands for per-instance certs Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` Michael Roth [this message]
2023-10-16 23:18   ` [PATCH v10 48/50] KVM: SEV: Provide support for SNP_GUEST_REQUEST NAE event Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-10-17 16:27     ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-18  2:28       ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-10-18 13:48         ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-18 20:27           ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-10-18 20:38             ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-18 21:27               ` Kalra, Ashish
2023-10-18 21:43                 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-19  2:48           ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-10-19 14:57             ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-19 23:55               ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-10-20  0:13                 ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-20  0:43                   ` Alexey Kardashevskiy
2023-10-20 15:13                     ` Sean Christopherson
2023-10-20 18:37             ` Tom Lendacky
2023-11-10 22:07           ` Michael Roth
2023-11-10 22:47             ` Sean Christopherson
2023-11-16  5:31               ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-12-05  0:30                 ` Dan Williams
2023-12-05  0:48                   ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-12-05 20:06                     ` Dan Williams
2023-12-05 22:04                       ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-12-05 23:11                         ` Dan Williams
2023-12-06  0:43                           ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 49/50] crypto: ccp: Add debug support for decrypting pages Michael Roth
2023-10-16 13:28 ` [PATCH v10 50/50] crypto: ccp: Add panic notifier for SEV/SNP firmware shutdown on kdump Michael Roth

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