From: "Stephan Müller" <smueller@chronox.de>
To: Tso Ted <tytso@mit.edu>, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>, Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
"Alexander E. Patrakov" <patrakov@gmail.com>,
"Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com>,
Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>,
Vito Caputo <vcaputo@pengaru.com>,
Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca>,
Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>, Ray Strode <rstrode@redhat.com>,
William Jon McCann <mccann@jhu.edu>,
zhangjs <zachary@baishancloud.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@0pointer.de>,
Peter Matthias <matthias.peter@bsi.bund.de>,
Marcelo Henrique Cerri <marcelo.cerri@canonical.com>,
Neil Horman <nhorman@redhat.com>,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
Julia Lawall <julia.lawall@inria.fr>,
Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>,
Andy Lavr <andy.lavr@gmail.com>,
Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
"Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>,
Petr Tesarik <ptesarik@suse.cz>,
John Haxby <john.haxby@oracle.com>,
Alexander Lobakin <alobakin@mailbox.org>,
Jirka Hladky <jhladky@redhat.com>
Subject: [PATCH v43 03/15] LRNG - sysctls and /proc interface
Date: Sun, 21 Nov 2021 17:40:57 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2386316.XAFRqVoOGU@positron.chronox.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <2036923.9o76ZdvQCi@positron.chronox.de>
The LRNG sysctl interface provides the same controls as the existing
/dev/random implementation. These sysctls behave identically and are
implemented identically. The goal is to allow a possible merge of the
existing /dev/random implementation with this implementation which
implies that this patch tries have a very close similarity. Yet, all
sysctls are documented at [1].
In addition, it provides the file lrng_type which provides details about
the LRNG:
- the name of the DRNG that produces the random numbers for /dev/random,
/dev/urandom, getrandom(2)
- the hash used to produce random numbers from the entropy pool
- the number of secondary DRNG instances
- indicator whether the LRNG operates SP800-90B compliant
- indicator whether a high-resolution timer is identified - only with a
high-resolution timer the interrupt noise source will deliver sufficient
entropy
- indicator whether the LRNG has been minimally seeded (i.e. is the
secondary DRNG seeded with at least 128 bits of entropy)
- indicator whether the LRNG has been fully seeded (i.e. is the
secondary DRNG seeded with at least 256 bits of entropy)
[1] https://www.chronox.de/lrng.html
CC: Torsten Duwe <duwe@lst.de>
CC: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
CC: "Alexander E. Patrakov" <patrakov@gmail.com>
CC: "Ahmed S. Darwish" <darwish.07@gmail.com>
CC: "Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
CC: Willy Tarreau <w@1wt.eu>
CC: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>
CC: Vito Caputo <vcaputo@pengaru.com>
CC: Andreas Dilger <adilger.kernel@dilger.ca>
CC: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
CC: Ray Strode <rstrode@redhat.com>
CC: William Jon McCann <mccann@jhu.edu>
CC: zhangjs <zachary@baishancloud.com>
CC: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
CC: Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>
CC: Lennart Poettering <mzxreary@0pointer.de>
CC: Nicolai Stange <nstange@suse.de>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Lobakin <alobakin@pm.me>
Tested-by: Alexander Lobakin <alobakin@pm.me>
Reviewed-by: Marcelo Henrique Cerri <marcelo.cerri@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Roman Drahtmueller <draht@schaltsekun.de>
Tested-by: Marcelo Henrique Cerri <marcelo.cerri@canonical.com>
Tested-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Jirka Hladky <jhladky@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Jirka Hladky <jhladky@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
---
drivers/char/lrng/Makefile | 1 +
drivers/char/lrng/lrng_interfaces.c | 2 -
drivers/char/lrng/lrng_proc.c | 199 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 200 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 drivers/char/lrng/lrng_proc.c
diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile b/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile
index d321d6d21a44..d7df72a702e4 100644
--- a/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/char/lrng/Makefile
@@ -8,3 +8,4 @@ obj-y += lrng_es_mgr.o lrng_aux.o \
lrng_interfaces.o lrng_es_aux.o
obj-$(CONFIG_LRNG_IRQ) += lrng_es_irq.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SYSCTL) += lrng_proc.o
diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_interfaces.c b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_interfaces.c
index 6316a534bb54..b656aaf0c6cb 100644
--- a/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_interfaces.c
+++ b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_interfaces.c
@@ -38,8 +38,6 @@ static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(lrng_write_wait);
static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(lrng_init_wait);
static struct fasync_struct *fasync;
-struct ctl_table random_table[];
-
/********************************** Helper ***********************************/
/* Is the DRNG seed level too low? */
diff --git a/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_proc.c b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_proc.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b48094c32b95
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/char/lrng/lrng_proc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,199 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 OR BSD-2-Clause
+/*
+ * LRNG proc and sysctl interfaces
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2016 - 2021, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/lrng.h>
+#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/sysctl.h>
+#include <linux/uuid.h>
+
+#include "lrng_internal.h"
+
+/*
+ * This function is used to return both the bootid UUID, and random
+ * UUID. The difference is in whether table->data is NULL; if it is,
+ * then a new UUID is generated and returned to the user.
+ *
+ * If the user accesses this via the proc interface, the UUID will be
+ * returned as an ASCII string in the standard UUID format; if via the
+ * sysctl system call, as 16 bytes of binary data.
+ */
+static int lrng_proc_do_uuid(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+ void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct ctl_table fake_table;
+ unsigned char buf[64], tmp_uuid[16], *uuid;
+
+ uuid = table->data;
+ if (!uuid) {
+ uuid = tmp_uuid;
+ generate_random_uuid(uuid);
+ } else {
+ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(bootid_spinlock);
+
+ spin_lock(&bootid_spinlock);
+ if (!uuid[8])
+ generate_random_uuid(uuid);
+ spin_unlock(&bootid_spinlock);
+ }
+
+ sprintf(buf, "%pU", uuid);
+
+ fake_table.data = buf;
+ fake_table.maxlen = sizeof(buf);
+
+ return proc_dostring(&fake_table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+}
+
+static int lrng_proc_do_entropy(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+ void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct ctl_table fake_table;
+ int entropy_count;
+
+ entropy_count = lrng_avail_entropy();
+
+ fake_table.data = &entropy_count;
+ fake_table.maxlen = sizeof(entropy_count);
+
+ return proc_dointvec(&fake_table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+}
+
+static int lrng_proc_do_poolsize(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
+ void *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct ctl_table fake_table;
+ int entropy_count;
+
+ /* LRNG can at most retain entropy in per-CPU pools and aux pool */
+ entropy_count = lrng_get_digestsize() + lrng_pcpu_avail_pool_size();
+
+ fake_table.data = &entropy_count;
+ fake_table.maxlen = sizeof(entropy_count);
+
+ return proc_dointvec(&fake_table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos);
+}
+
+static int lrng_min_write_thresh;
+static int lrng_max_write_thresh = (LRNG_WRITE_WAKEUP_ENTROPY << 3);
+static char lrng_sysctl_bootid[16];
+static int lrng_drng_reseed_max_min;
+
+void lrng_proc_update_max_write_thresh(u32 new_digestsize)
+{
+ lrng_max_write_thresh = (int)new_digestsize;
+ mb();
+}
+
+struct ctl_table random_table[] = {
+ {
+ .procname = "poolsize",
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .mode = 0444,
+ .proc_handler = lrng_proc_do_poolsize,
+ },
+ {
+ .procname = "entropy_avail",
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .mode = 0444,
+ .proc_handler = lrng_proc_do_entropy,
+ },
+ {
+ .procname = "write_wakeup_threshold",
+ .data = &lrng_write_wakeup_bits,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax,
+ .extra1 = &lrng_min_write_thresh,
+ .extra2 = &lrng_max_write_thresh,
+ },
+ {
+ .procname = "boot_id",
+ .data = &lrng_sysctl_bootid,
+ .maxlen = 16,
+ .mode = 0444,
+ .proc_handler = lrng_proc_do_uuid,
+ },
+ {
+ .procname = "uuid",
+ .maxlen = 16,
+ .mode = 0444,
+ .proc_handler = lrng_proc_do_uuid,
+ },
+ {
+ .procname = "urandom_min_reseed_secs",
+ .data = &lrng_drng_reseed_max_time,
+ .maxlen = sizeof(int),
+ .mode = 0644,
+ .proc_handler = proc_dointvec,
+ .extra1 = &lrng_drng_reseed_max_min,
+ },
+ { }
+};
+
+/* Number of online DRNGs */
+static u32 numa_drngs = 1;
+
+void lrng_pool_inc_numa_node(void)
+{
+ numa_drngs++;
+}
+
+static int lrng_proc_type_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
+{
+ struct lrng_drng *lrng_drng_init = lrng_drng_init_instance();
+ unsigned long flags = 0;
+ unsigned char buf[250], irq[200], aux[100], cpu[90], jent[45];
+
+ lrng_drng_lock(lrng_drng_init, &flags);
+ snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
+ "DRNG name: %s\n"
+ "LRNG security strength in bits: %d\n"
+ "number of DRNG instances: %u\n"
+ "Standards compliance: %s\n"
+ "Entropy Sources: %s%s%sAuxiliary\n"
+ "LRNG minimally seeded: %s\n"
+ "LRNG fully seeded: %s\n",
+ lrng_drng_init->crypto_cb->lrng_drng_name(),
+ lrng_security_strength(),
+ numa_drngs,
+ lrng_sp80090c_compliant() ? "SP800-90C " : "",
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_LRNG_IRQ) ? "IRQ " : "",
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_LRNG_JENT) ? "JitterRNG " : "",
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_LRNG_CPU) ? "CPU " : "",
+ lrng_state_min_seeded() ? "true" : "false",
+ lrng_state_fully_seeded() ? "true" : "false");
+
+ lrng_aux_es_state(aux, sizeof(aux));
+
+ irq[0] = '\0';
+ lrng_irq_es_state(irq, sizeof(irq));
+
+ jent[0] = '\0';
+ lrng_jent_es_state(jent, sizeof(jent));
+
+ cpu[0] = '\0';
+ lrng_arch_es_state(cpu, sizeof(cpu));
+
+ lrng_drng_unlock(lrng_drng_init, &flags);
+
+ seq_write(m, buf, strlen(buf));
+ seq_write(m, aux, strlen(aux));
+ seq_write(m, irq, strlen(irq));
+ seq_write(m, jent, strlen(jent));
+ seq_write(m, cpu, strlen(cpu));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init lrng_proc_type_init(void)
+{
+ proc_create_single("lrng_type", 0444, NULL, &lrng_proc_type_show);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+module_init(lrng_proc_type_init);
--
2.31.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-11-21 16:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 101+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-11-21 16:39 [PATCH v43 00/15] /dev/random - a new approach Stephan Müller
2021-11-21 16:40 ` [PATCH v43 01/15] Linux Random Number Generator Stephan Müller
2021-11-21 17:23 ` Joe Perches
2021-11-21 22:42 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2021-11-22 5:34 ` Stephan Mueller
2021-11-22 6:02 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-22 6:42 ` Stephan Mueller
2021-11-22 6:55 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-22 15:09 ` Simo Sorce
2021-11-22 21:06 ` Jeffrey Walton
2021-11-23 5:38 ` Stephan Mueller
2021-11-26 15:42 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-22 16:56 ` John Haxby
2021-11-26 15:40 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-22 14:59 ` Simo Sorce
2021-11-26 15:44 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-26 16:15 ` Stephan Mueller
2021-11-26 16:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-29 15:31 ` Stephan Mueller
2021-11-29 16:25 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-29 16:50 ` Stephan Mueller
2021-11-30 12:24 ` Jeffrey Walton
2021-11-30 14:04 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-30 14:31 ` Simo Sorce
2021-11-30 15:45 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-30 17:05 ` Willy Tarreau
2021-11-30 17:08 ` Simo Sorce
2021-11-30 18:15 ` Eric Biggers
2021-11-30 18:39 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2021-11-30 19:41 ` Simo Sorce
2021-12-01 16:02 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2021-12-01 17:19 ` Simo Sorce
2021-12-01 17:55 ` Boris Krasnovskiy
2021-12-01 18:05 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-12-01 18:24 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2021-12-02 0:24 ` Jeffrey Walton
2021-12-02 7:12 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-12-02 15:50 ` John Haxby
2021-12-01 18:29 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
[not found] ` <BY5PR14MB3416DF44172D8F47D0B078A986689@BY5PR14MB3416.namprd14.prod.outlook.com>
2021-12-01 18:05 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-12-10 1:43 ` Marcelo Henrique Cerri
2021-12-10 6:46 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-12-10 9:30 ` Marcelo Henrique Cerri
2021-12-10 9:48 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-12-10 17:02 ` Simo Sorce
2021-12-11 7:06 ` Willy Tarreau
2021-12-11 8:09 ` Stephan Müller
2021-12-11 8:57 ` Willy Tarreau
2022-01-10 13:23 ` Marcelo Henrique Cerri
2022-01-10 14:11 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-01-10 14:29 ` Theodore Ts'o
2022-01-10 14:38 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-01-10 17:38 ` Theodore Ts'o
2022-01-10 18:29 ` Eric Biggers
2022-01-10 18:44 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-01-10 19:41 ` Simo Sorce
2022-01-10 20:05 ` Eric Biggers
2022-01-10 19:49 ` Theodore Ts'o
2022-01-10 22:19 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-01-11 1:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-01-11 3:10 ` Theodore Ts'o
2022-01-11 4:04 ` Willy Tarreau
2022-01-11 4:13 ` Matthew Garrett
2022-01-11 10:01 ` Alexander E. Patrakov
[not found] ` <CAN_LGv0CTDi9k=t=TGHvaHZz5YVT+OUEBaRXjP=Xv=kousHY1w@mail.gmail.com>
2022-01-11 17:10 ` Matthew Garrett
2022-01-11 13:16 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-01-11 16:08 ` Theodore Ts'o
2022-01-11 13:06 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-01-11 15:10 ` Andy Lutomirski
2022-01-10 21:38 ` Jason A. Donenfeld
2022-01-10 15:07 ` Marcelo Henrique Cerri
2021-11-30 15:13 ` Jeffrey Walton
2021-11-30 15:39 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-30 7:32 ` Sandy Harris
2021-11-30 7:55 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-11-30 8:56 ` Stephan Mueller
2021-11-30 9:12 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-12-04 9:53 ` Sandy Harris
2021-11-22 10:33 ` kernel test robot
2021-11-22 11:47 ` Stephan Mueller
2021-11-25 5:25 ` [kbuild-all] " Chen, Rong A
2021-11-30 2:55 ` Sandy Harris
2021-11-30 6:06 ` Stephan Müller
2021-11-21 16:40 ` [PATCH v43 02/15] LRNG - IRQ entropy source Stephan Müller
2021-11-21 16:40 ` Stephan Müller [this message]
2021-11-21 16:41 ` [PATCH v43 04/15] LRNG - allocate one DRNG instance per NUMA node Stephan Müller
2021-11-21 16:42 ` [PATCH v43 05/15] LRNG - CPU entropy source Stephan Müller
2021-11-22 7:09 ` kernel test robot
2021-11-22 11:48 ` Stephan Mueller
2021-11-21 16:42 ` [PATCH v43 06/15] LRNG - add switchable DRNG support Stephan Müller
2021-11-21 16:43 ` [PATCH v43 07/15] LRNG - add common generic hash support Stephan Müller
2021-11-21 16:43 ` [PATCH v43 08/15] crypto: DRBG - externalize DRBG functions for LRNG Stephan Müller
2021-11-21 16:44 ` [PATCH v43 09/15] LRNG - add SP800-90A DRBG extension Stephan Müller
2021-11-21 16:45 ` [PATCH v43 10/15] LRNG - add kernel crypto API PRNG extension Stephan Müller
2021-11-21 16:45 ` [PATCH v43 11/15] crypto: move Jitter RNG header include dir Stephan Müller
2021-11-21 16:46 ` [PATCH v43 12/15] LRNG - add Jitter RNG fast noise source Stephan Müller
2021-11-21 16:46 ` [PATCH v43 13/15] LRNG - add SP800-90B compliant health tests Stephan Müller
2021-11-21 16:47 ` [PATCH v43 14/15] LRNG - add interface for gathering of raw entropy Stephan Müller
2021-11-21 16:47 ` [PATCH v43 15/15] LRNG - add power-on and runtime self-tests Stephan Müller
2021-12-11 15:45 ` [PATCH v43 00/15] /dev/random - a new approach Thomas Schoebel-Theuer
2021-12-11 16:04 ` Willy Tarreau
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