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From: "Albert Cahalan" <acahalan@gmail.com>
To: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: "William Lee Irwin III" <wli@holomorphy.com>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: JIT emulator needs
Date: Wed, 20 Jun 2007 23:21:49 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <787b0d920706202021t567b2fefu869a03ef76f245da@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <46797747.9020904@zytor.com>

On 6/20/07, H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> wrote:
> Albert Cahalan wrote:
> > Putting this into the security policy was an error born of
> > lazyness to begin with. Abuse of the security mechanism
> > was easier than hacking the toolchain, ELF loader, etc.
> >
> > Either a binary needs self-modification, or it doesn't. This is
> > determined by the author of the code. If you don't trust an
> > executable that needs this ability, then you simply can not
> > run it in a useful way.
>
> That's fine.  That's a policy decision.  That's what a security policy
> *is*.  The owner of the system has decided, by security policy, that
> that is not allowed.  Bypassing that is not acceptable.

Fixing a bug should be acceptable.

Look, let's back up a bit here. At a high level, what exactly do
you imagine that this behavior was intended for? I suggest you
list some examples of the attacks that are blocked.

Can you come up with a reasonable argument that the current behavior
is the least painful restriction required to block those attacks?
Does the current behavior block any attack that the proposed behavior
would not? (list the attacks please)

  reply	other threads:[~2007-06-21  3:21 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 28+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2007-06-08  6:35 JIT emulator needs Albert Cahalan
2007-06-08  7:09 ` Eric Dumazet
2007-06-09  4:12   ` Albert Cahalan
2007-06-08 11:10 ` Alan Cox
2007-06-08 16:35   ` Nicholas Miell
2007-06-09  5:17   ` Albert Cahalan
2007-06-09 20:00 ` H. Peter Anvin
2007-06-19 15:08 ` William Lee Irwin III
2007-06-20  3:16   ` Albert Cahalan
2007-06-20 16:01     ` William Lee Irwin III
2007-06-20 16:37       ` H. Peter Anvin
2007-06-20 17:54         ` William Lee Irwin III
2007-06-20 18:23           ` H. Peter Anvin
2007-06-20 18:25         ` Albert Cahalan
2007-06-20 18:51           ` H. Peter Anvin
2007-06-21  3:21             ` Albert Cahalan [this message]
2007-06-21  3:32               ` H. Peter Anvin
2007-06-21  7:38                 ` Albert Cahalan
2007-06-20 18:43       ` Albert Cahalan
2007-06-23  3:52   ` Kyle Moffett
2007-06-24  4:14     ` William Lee Irwin III
2007-06-21 17:44 ` Arjan van de Ven
2007-06-22  5:56   ` Albert Cahalan
2007-06-22 13:43     ` Arjan van de Ven
2007-06-22 14:32       ` Albert Cahalan
2007-06-22 14:42         ` Arjan van de Ven
2007-06-23  2:30           ` Albert Cahalan
     [not found] <8tGiE-2Hv-1@gated-at.bofh.it>
     [not found] ` <8xNvm-2Tw-29@gated-at.bofh.it>
     [not found]   ` <8xYTM-3So-13@gated-at.bofh.it>
2007-06-21 11:08     ` Bodo Eggert

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