* 64fa03de33: BUG:Dentry_still_in_use
@ 2017-05-07 9:21 kernel test robot
2017-05-08 4:44 ` Serge E. Hallyn
0 siblings, 1 reply; 39+ messages in thread
From: kernel test robot @ 2017-05-07 9:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Serge E. Hallyn; +Cc: Eric W. Biederman, LKML, containers, lkp
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 4255 bytes --]
FYI, we noticed the following commit:
commit: 64fa03de33691f5d05c729ef3e026a640a7ff835 ("Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities")
https://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/ebiederm/user-namespace.git for-testing
in testcase: xfstests
with following parameters:
disk: 4HDD
fs: xfs
test: xfs-quick2
test-description: xfstests is a regression test suite for xfs and other files ystems.
test-url: git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/fs/xfs/xfstests-dev.git
on test machine: 4 threads Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-2500K CPU @ 3.30GHz with 6G memory
caused below changes (please refer to attached dmesg/kmsg for entire log/backtrace):
+----------------------------------------------------------------+------------+------------+
| | d66bb1607e | 64fa03de33 |
+----------------------------------------------------------------+------------+------------+
| boot_successes | 19 | 19 |
| boot_failures | 1 | 3 |
| BUG:sleeping_function_called_from_invalid_context_at_mm/slab.h | 1 | |
| BUG:Dentry_still_in_use | 0 | 3 |
| WARNING:at_fs/dcache.c:#umount_check | 0 | 3 |
+----------------------------------------------------------------+------------+------------+
[ 338.836578] BUG: Dentry ffff88017496bd80{i=80000a1,n=testfile} still in use (1) [unmount of xfs sda8]
[ 338.846785] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 338.852260] WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 1937 at fs/dcache.c:1445 umount_check+0x72/0x80
[ 338.861916] Modules linked in: loop binfmt_misc dm_mod rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 dns_resolver netconsole btrfs xor raid6_pq sd_mod sg ata_generic snd_hda_codec_hdmi snd_hda_codec_realtek snd_hda_codec_generic pata_acpi intel_rapl x86_pkg_temp_thermal intel_powerclamp coretemp kvm_intel kvm irqbypass crct10dif_pclmul crc32_pclmul snd_hda_intel crc32c_intel ghash_clmulni_intel snd_hda_codec i915 pcbc snd_hda_core snd_hwdep eeepc_wmi snd_pcm asus_wmi sparse_keymap snd_timer drm_kms_helper rfkill ppdev syscopyarea sysfillrect aesni_intel ata_piix pata_via sysimgblt crypto_simd fb_sys_fops glue_helper cryptd pcspkr libata snd wmi soundcore drm shpchp parport_pc parport tpm_infineon video ip_tables [last unloaded: scsi_debug]
[ 338.931906] CPU: 3 PID: 1937 Comm: umount Not tainted 4.11.0-rc1-00010-g64fa03d #1
[ 338.940587] Hardware name: System manufacturer System Product Name/P8H67-M PRO, BIOS 1002 04/01/2011
[ 338.950953] Call Trace:
[ 338.954641] dump_stack+0x63/0x8a
[ 338.959196] __warn+0xcb/0xf0
[ 338.963400] warn_slowpath_null+0x1d/0x20
[ 338.968650] umount_check+0x72/0x80
[ 338.973383] d_walk+0xcf/0x2f0
[ 338.977671] ? dentry_free+0x80/0x80
[ 338.982483] do_one_tree+0x26/0x40
[ 338.987126] shrink_dcache_for_umount+0x2d/0x90
[ 338.992898] generic_shutdown_super+0x1f/0x100
[ 338.998592] kill_block_super+0x27/0x70
[ 339.003679] deactivate_locked_super+0x43/0x70
[ 339.009371] deactivate_super+0x5a/0x60
[ 339.014441] cleanup_mnt+0x3f/0x90
[ 339.019086] __cleanup_mnt+0x12/0x20
[ 339.023896] task_work_run+0x85/0xc0
[ 339.028708] exit_to_usermode_loop+0xaa/0xb0
[ 339.034219] syscall_return_slowpath+0xaa/0xb0
[ 339.039894] entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xa7/0xa9
[ 339.045734] RIP: 0033:0x7fac7e5cd277
[ 339.050544] RSP: 002b:00007fff4a8e2f68 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a6
[ 339.059366] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 0000000001b44080 RCX: 00007fac7e5cd277
[ 339.067771] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000001b49490
[ 339.076177] RBP: 0000000001b49490 R08: 00626174752f746e R09: 0000000000000020
[ 339.084584] R10: 00000000000006b0 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fac7eacfe44
[ 339.092983] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000001b44260 R15: 00007fff4a8e31f0
[ 339.101413] ---[ end trace aee63d62b93c640d ]---
To reproduce:
git clone https://github.com/01org/lkp-tests.git
cd lkp-tests
bin/lkp install job.yaml # job file is attached in this email
bin/lkp run job.yaml
Thanks,
Kernel Test Robot
[-- Attachment #2: config-4.11.0-rc1-00010-g64fa03d --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 157941 bytes --]
#
# Automatically generated file; DO NOT EDIT.
# Linux/x86_64 4.11.0-rc1 Kernel Configuration
#
CONFIG_64BIT=y
CONFIG_X86_64=y
CONFIG_X86=y
CONFIG_INSTRUCTION_DECODER=y
CONFIG_OUTPUT_FORMAT="elf64-x86-64"
CONFIG_ARCH_DEFCONFIG="arch/x86/configs/x86_64_defconfig"
CONFIG_LOCKDEP_SUPPORT=y
CONFIG_STACKTRACE_SUPPORT=y
CONFIG_MMU=y
CONFIG_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN=28
CONFIG_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MAX=32
CONFIG_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MIN=8
CONFIG_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS_MAX=16
CONFIG_NEED_DMA_MAP_STATE=y
CONFIG_NEED_SG_DMA_LENGTH=y
CONFIG_GENERIC_ISA_DMA=y
CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG=y
CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG_RELATIVE_POINTERS=y
CONFIG_GENERIC_HWEIGHT=y
CONFIG_ARCH_MAY_HAVE_PC_FDC=y
CONFIG_RWSEM_XCHGADD_ALGORITHM=y
CONFIG_GENERIC_CALIBRATE_DELAY=y
CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CPU_RELAX=y
CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CACHE_LINE_SIZE=y
CONFIG_HAVE_SETUP_PER_CPU_AREA=y
CONFIG_NEED_PER_CPU_EMBED_FIRST_CHUNK=y
CONFIG_NEED_PER_CPU_PAGE_FIRST_CHUNK=y
CONFIG_ARCH_HIBERNATION_POSSIBLE=y
CONFIG_ARCH_SUSPEND_POSSIBLE=y
CONFIG_ARCH_WANT_HUGE_PMD_SHARE=y
CONFIG_ARCH_WANT_GENERAL_HUGETLB=y
CONFIG_ZONE_DMA32=y
CONFIG_AUDIT_ARCH=y
CONFIG_ARCH_SUPPORTS_OPTIMIZED_INLINING=y
CONFIG_ARCH_SUPPORTS_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC=y
CONFIG_HAVE_INTEL_TXT=y
CONFIG_X86_64_SMP=y
CONFIG_ARCH_SUPPORTS_UPROBES=y
CONFIG_FIX_EARLYCON_MEM=y
CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS=4
CONFIG_DEFCONFIG_LIST="/lib/modules/$UNAME_RELEASE/.config"
CONFIG_IRQ_WORK=y
CONFIG_BUILDTIME_EXTABLE_SORT=y
CONFIG_THREAD_INFO_IN_TASK=y
#
# General setup
#
CONFIG_INIT_ENV_ARG_LIMIT=32
CONFIG_CROSS_COMPILE=""
# CONFIG_COMPILE_TEST is not set
CONFIG_LOCALVERSION=""
CONFIG_LOCALVERSION_AUTO=y
CONFIG_HAVE_KERNEL_GZIP=y
CONFIG_HAVE_KERNEL_BZIP2=y
CONFIG_HAVE_KERNEL_LZMA=y
CONFIG_HAVE_KERNEL_XZ=y
CONFIG_HAVE_KERNEL_LZO=y
CONFIG_HAVE_KERNEL_LZ4=y
CONFIG_KERNEL_GZIP=y
# CONFIG_KERNEL_BZIP2 is not set
# CONFIG_KERNEL_LZMA is not set
# CONFIG_KERNEL_XZ is not set
# CONFIG_KERNEL_LZO is not set
# CONFIG_KERNEL_LZ4 is not set
CONFIG_DEFAULT_HOSTNAME="(none)"
CONFIG_SWAP=y
CONFIG_SYSVIPC=y
CONFIG_SYSVIPC_SYSCTL=y
CONFIG_POSIX_MQUEUE=y
CONFIG_POSIX_MQUEUE_SYSCTL=y
CONFIG_CROSS_MEMORY_ATTACH=y
CONFIG_FHANDLE=y
CONFIG_USELIB=y
CONFIG_AUDIT=y
CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL=y
CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL=y
CONFIG_AUDIT_WATCH=y
CONFIG_AUDIT_TREE=y
#
# IRQ subsystem
#
CONFIG_GENERIC_IRQ_PROBE=y
CONFIG_GENERIC_IRQ_SHOW=y
CONFIG_GENERIC_PENDING_IRQ=y
CONFIG_IRQ_DOMAIN=y
CONFIG_IRQ_DOMAIN_HIERARCHY=y
CONFIG_GENERIC_MSI_IRQ=y
CONFIG_GENERIC_MSI_IRQ_DOMAIN=y
# CONFIG_IRQ_DOMAIN_DEBUG is not set
CONFIG_IRQ_FORCED_THREADING=y
CONFIG_SPARSE_IRQ=y
CONFIG_CLOCKSOURCE_WATCHDOG=y
CONFIG_ARCH_CLOCKSOURCE_DATA=y
CONFIG_CLOCKSOURCE_VALIDATE_LAST_CYCLE=y
CONFIG_GENERIC_TIME_VSYSCALL=y
CONFIG_GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS=y
CONFIG_GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS_BROADCAST=y
CONFIG_GENERIC_CLOCKEVENTS_MIN_ADJUST=y
CONFIG_GENERIC_CMOS_UPDATE=y
#
# Timers subsystem
#
CONFIG_TICK_ONESHOT=y
CONFIG_NO_HZ_COMMON=y
# CONFIG_HZ_PERIODIC is not set
# CONFIG_NO_HZ_IDLE is not set
CONFIG_NO_HZ_FULL=y
# CONFIG_NO_HZ_FULL_ALL is not set
# CONFIG_NO_HZ_FULL_SYSIDLE is not set
CONFIG_NO_HZ=y
CONFIG_HIGH_RES_TIMERS=y
#
# CPU/Task time and stats accounting
#
CONFIG_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING=y
CONFIG_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING_GEN=y
# CONFIG_IRQ_TIME_ACCOUNTING is not set
CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT=y
CONFIG_BSD_PROCESS_ACCT_V3=y
CONFIG_TASKSTATS=y
CONFIG_TASK_DELAY_ACCT=y
CONFIG_TASK_XACCT=y
CONFIG_TASK_IO_ACCOUNTING=y
#
# RCU Subsystem
#
CONFIG_TREE_RCU=y
# CONFIG_RCU_EXPERT is not set
CONFIG_SRCU=y
CONFIG_TASKS_RCU=y
CONFIG_RCU_STALL_COMMON=y
CONFIG_CONTEXT_TRACKING=y
# CONFIG_CONTEXT_TRACKING_FORCE is not set
# CONFIG_TREE_RCU_TRACE is not set
CONFIG_RCU_NOCB_CPU=y
# CONFIG_RCU_NOCB_CPU_NONE is not set
# CONFIG_RCU_NOCB_CPU_ZERO is not set
CONFIG_RCU_NOCB_CPU_ALL=y
CONFIG_BUILD_BIN2C=y
CONFIG_IKCONFIG=y
CONFIG_IKCONFIG_PROC=y
CONFIG_LOG_BUF_SHIFT=19
CONFIG_LOG_CPU_MAX_BUF_SHIFT=12
CONFIG_PRINTK_SAFE_LOG_BUF_SHIFT=13
CONFIG_HAVE_UNSTABLE_SCHED_CLOCK=y
CONFIG_ARCH_SUPPORTS_NUMA_BALANCING=y
CONFIG_ARCH_WANT_BATCHED_UNMAP_TLB_FLUSH=y
CONFIG_ARCH_SUPPORTS_INT128=y
CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING=y
CONFIG_NUMA_BALANCING_DEFAULT_ENABLED=y
CONFIG_CGROUPS=y
CONFIG_PAGE_COUNTER=y
CONFIG_MEMCG=y
CONFIG_MEMCG_SWAP=y
CONFIG_MEMCG_SWAP_ENABLED=y
CONFIG_BLK_CGROUP=y
# CONFIG_DEBUG_BLK_CGROUP is not set
CONFIG_CGROUP_WRITEBACK=y
CONFIG_CGROUP_SCHED=y
CONFIG_FAIR_GROUP_SCHED=y
CONFIG_CFS_BANDWIDTH=y
CONFIG_RT_GROUP_SCHED=y
# CONFIG_CGROUP_PIDS is not set
# CONFIG_CGROUP_RDMA is not set
CONFIG_CGROUP_FREEZER=y
CONFIG_CGROUP_HUGETLB=y
CONFIG_CPUSETS=y
CONFIG_PROC_PID_CPUSET=y
CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE=y
# CONFIG_CGROUP_CPUACCT is not set
CONFIG_CGROUP_PERF=y
# CONFIG_CGROUP_BPF is not set
# CONFIG_CGROUP_DEBUG is not set
CONFIG_SOCK_CGROUP_DATA=y
CONFIG_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE=y
CONFIG_NAMESPACES=y
CONFIG_UTS_NS=y
CONFIG_IPC_NS=y
CONFIG_USER_NS=y
CONFIG_PID_NS=y
CONFIG_NET_NS=y
CONFIG_SCHED_AUTOGROUP=y
# CONFIG_SYSFS_DEPRECATED is not set
CONFIG_RELAY=y
CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INITRD=y
CONFIG_INITRAMFS_SOURCE=""
CONFIG_RD_GZIP=y
CONFIG_RD_BZIP2=y
CONFIG_RD_LZMA=y
CONFIG_RD_XZ=y
CONFIG_RD_LZO=y
CONFIG_RD_LZ4=y
CONFIG_INITRAMFS_COMPRESSION=".gz"
CONFIG_CC_OPTIMIZE_FOR_PERFORMANCE=y
# CONFIG_CC_OPTIMIZE_FOR_SIZE is not set
CONFIG_SYSCTL=y
CONFIG_ANON_INODES=y
CONFIG_HAVE_UID16=y
CONFIG_SYSCTL_EXCEPTION_TRACE=y
CONFIG_HAVE_PCSPKR_PLATFORM=y
CONFIG_BPF=y
CONFIG_EXPERT=y
CONFIG_UID16=y
CONFIG_MULTIUSER=y
CONFIG_SGETMASK_SYSCALL=y
CONFIG_SYSFS_SYSCALL=y
# CONFIG_SYSCTL_SYSCALL is not set
CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS=y
CONFIG_KALLSYMS=y
CONFIG_KALLSYMS_ALL=y
CONFIG_KALLSYMS_ABSOLUTE_PERCPU=y
CONFIG_KALLSYMS_BASE_RELATIVE=y
CONFIG_PRINTK=y
CONFIG_PRINTK_NMI=y
CONFIG_BUG=y
CONFIG_ELF_CORE=y
CONFIG_PCSPKR_PLATFORM=y
CONFIG_BASE_FULL=y
CONFIG_FUTEX=y
CONFIG_EPOLL=y
CONFIG_SIGNALFD=y
CONFIG_TIMERFD=y
CONFIG_EVENTFD=y
CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL=y
CONFIG_SHMEM=y
CONFIG_AIO=y
CONFIG_ADVISE_SYSCALLS=y
CONFIG_USERFAULTFD=y
CONFIG_PCI_QUIRKS=y
CONFIG_MEMBARRIER=y
CONFIG_EMBEDDED=y
CONFIG_HAVE_PERF_EVENTS=y
# CONFIG_PC104 is not set
#
# Kernel Performance Events And Counters
#
CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS=y
# CONFIG_DEBUG_PERF_USE_VMALLOC is not set
CONFIG_VM_EVENT_COUNTERS=y
CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG=y
# CONFIG_SLUB_MEMCG_SYSFS_ON is not set
# CONFIG_COMPAT_BRK is not set
# CONFIG_SLAB is not set
CONFIG_SLUB=y
# CONFIG_SLOB is not set
# CONFIG_SLAB_FREELIST_RANDOM is not set
CONFIG_SLUB_CPU_PARTIAL=y
# CONFIG_SYSTEM_DATA_VERIFICATION is not set
CONFIG_PROFILING=y
CONFIG_TRACEPOINTS=y
CONFIG_KEXEC_CORE=y
CONFIG_OPROFILE=m
CONFIG_OPROFILE_EVENT_MULTIPLEX=y
CONFIG_HAVE_OPROFILE=y
CONFIG_OPROFILE_NMI_TIMER=y
CONFIG_KPROBES=y
CONFIG_JUMP_LABEL=y
# CONFIG_STATIC_KEYS_SELFTEST is not set
CONFIG_OPTPROBES=y
CONFIG_KPROBES_ON_FTRACE=y
CONFIG_UPROBES=y
# CONFIG_HAVE_64BIT_ALIGNED_ACCESS is not set
CONFIG_HAVE_EFFICIENT_UNALIGNED_ACCESS=y
CONFIG_ARCH_USE_BUILTIN_BSWAP=y
CONFIG_KRETPROBES=y
CONFIG_USER_RETURN_NOTIFIER=y
CONFIG_HAVE_IOREMAP_PROT=y
CONFIG_HAVE_KPROBES=y
CONFIG_HAVE_KRETPROBES=y
CONFIG_HAVE_OPTPROBES=y
CONFIG_HAVE_KPROBES_ON_FTRACE=y
CONFIG_HAVE_NMI=y
CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK=y
CONFIG_HAVE_DMA_CONTIGUOUS=y
CONFIG_GENERIC_SMP_IDLE_THREAD=y
CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY=y
CONFIG_ARCH_WANTS_DYNAMIC_TASK_STRUCT=y
CONFIG_HAVE_REGS_AND_STACK_ACCESS_API=y
CONFIG_HAVE_CLK=y
CONFIG_HAVE_DMA_API_DEBUG=y
CONFIG_HAVE_HW_BREAKPOINT=y
CONFIG_HAVE_MIXED_BREAKPOINTS_REGS=y
CONFIG_HAVE_USER_RETURN_NOTIFIER=y
CONFIG_HAVE_PERF_EVENTS_NMI=y
CONFIG_HAVE_PERF_REGS=y
CONFIG_HAVE_PERF_USER_STACK_DUMP=y
CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_JUMP_LABEL=y
CONFIG_ARCH_HAVE_NMI_SAFE_CMPXCHG=y
CONFIG_HAVE_ALIGNED_STRUCT_PAGE=y
CONFIG_HAVE_CMPXCHG_LOCAL=y
CONFIG_HAVE_CMPXCHG_DOUBLE=y
CONFIG_ARCH_WANT_COMPAT_IPC_PARSE_VERSION=y
CONFIG_ARCH_WANT_OLD_COMPAT_IPC=y
CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER=y
CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER=y
CONFIG_HAVE_GCC_PLUGINS=y
# CONFIG_GCC_PLUGINS is not set
CONFIG_HAVE_CC_STACKPROTECTOR=y
# CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR is not set
CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_NONE=y
# CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_REGULAR is not set
# CONFIG_CC_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG is not set
CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_WITHIN_STACK_FRAMES=y
CONFIG_HAVE_CONTEXT_TRACKING=y
CONFIG_HAVE_VIRT_CPU_ACCOUNTING_GEN=y
CONFIG_HAVE_IRQ_TIME_ACCOUNTING=y
CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE=y
CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_PUD=y
CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_HUGE_VMAP=y
CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SOFT_DIRTY=y
CONFIG_MODULES_USE_ELF_RELA=y
CONFIG_HAVE_IRQ_EXIT_ON_IRQ_STACK=y
CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_ELF_RANDOMIZE=y
CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS=y
CONFIG_HAVE_EXIT_THREAD=y
CONFIG_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS=28
CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS=y
CONFIG_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS=8
CONFIG_HAVE_COPY_THREAD_TLS=y
CONFIG_HAVE_STACK_VALIDATION=y
# CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_HASH is not set
# CONFIG_ISA_BUS_API is not set
CONFIG_OLD_SIGSUSPEND3=y
CONFIG_COMPAT_OLD_SIGACTION=y
# CONFIG_CPU_NO_EFFICIENT_FFS is not set
CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK=y
CONFIG_VMAP_STACK=y
# CONFIG_ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX is not set
# CONFIG_ARCH_OPTIONAL_KERNEL_RWX_DEFAULT is not set
CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX=y
CONFIG_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX=y
CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_STRICT_MODULE_RWX=y
CONFIG_STRICT_MODULE_RWX=y
#
# GCOV-based kernel profiling
#
# CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL is not set
CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_GCOV_PROFILE_ALL=y
# CONFIG_HAVE_GENERIC_DMA_COHERENT is not set
CONFIG_SLABINFO=y
CONFIG_RT_MUTEXES=y
CONFIG_BASE_SMALL=0
CONFIG_MODULES=y
CONFIG_MODULE_FORCE_LOAD=y
CONFIG_MODULE_UNLOAD=y
# CONFIG_MODULE_FORCE_UNLOAD is not set
# CONFIG_MODVERSIONS is not set
# CONFIG_MODULE_SRCVERSION_ALL is not set
# CONFIG_MODULE_SIG is not set
# CONFIG_MODULE_COMPRESS is not set
# CONFIG_TRIM_UNUSED_KSYMS is not set
CONFIG_MODULES_TREE_LOOKUP=y
CONFIG_BLOCK=y
CONFIG_BLK_SCSI_REQUEST=y
CONFIG_BLK_DEV_BSG=y
CONFIG_BLK_DEV_BSGLIB=y
CONFIG_BLK_DEV_INTEGRITY=y
# CONFIG_BLK_DEV_ZONED is not set
CONFIG_BLK_DEV_THROTTLING=y
# CONFIG_BLK_CMDLINE_PARSER is not set
# CONFIG_BLK_WBT is not set
CONFIG_BLK_DEBUG_FS=y
# CONFIG_BLK_SED_OPAL is not set
#
# Partition Types
#
CONFIG_PARTITION_ADVANCED=y
# CONFIG_ACORN_PARTITION is not set
# CONFIG_AIX_PARTITION is not set
CONFIG_OSF_PARTITION=y
CONFIG_AMIGA_PARTITION=y
# CONFIG_ATARI_PARTITION is not set
CONFIG_MAC_PARTITION=y
CONFIG_MSDOS_PARTITION=y
CONFIG_BSD_DISKLABEL=y
CONFIG_MINIX_SUBPARTITION=y
CONFIG_SOLARIS_X86_PARTITION=y
CONFIG_UNIXWARE_DISKLABEL=y
# CONFIG_LDM_PARTITION is not set
CONFIG_SGI_PARTITION=y
# CONFIG_ULTRIX_PARTITION is not set
CONFIG_SUN_PARTITION=y
CONFIG_KARMA_PARTITION=y
CONFIG_EFI_PARTITION=y
# CONFIG_SYSV68_PARTITION is not set
# CONFIG_CMDLINE_PARTITION is not set
CONFIG_BLOCK_COMPAT=y
CONFIG_BLK_MQ_PCI=y
CONFIG_BLK_MQ_VIRTIO=y
#
# IO Schedulers
#
CONFIG_IOSCHED_NOOP=y
CONFIG_IOSCHED_DEADLINE=y
CONFIG_IOSCHED_CFQ=y
CONFIG_CFQ_GROUP_IOSCHED=y
CONFIG_DEFAULT_DEADLINE=y
# CONFIG_DEFAULT_CFQ is not set
# CONFIG_DEFAULT_NOOP is not set
CONFIG_DEFAULT_IOSCHED="deadline"
CONFIG_MQ_IOSCHED_DEADLINE=y
CONFIG_PREEMPT_NOTIFIERS=y
CONFIG_PADATA=y
CONFIG_ASN1=y
CONFIG_INLINE_SPIN_UNLOCK_IRQ=y
CONFIG_INLINE_READ_UNLOCK=y
CONFIG_INLINE_READ_UNLOCK_IRQ=y
CONFIG_INLINE_WRITE_UNLOCK=y
CONFIG_INLINE_WRITE_UNLOCK_IRQ=y
CONFIG_ARCH_SUPPORTS_ATOMIC_RMW=y
CONFIG_MUTEX_SPIN_ON_OWNER=y
CONFIG_RWSEM_SPIN_ON_OWNER=y
CONFIG_LOCK_SPIN_ON_OWNER=y
CONFIG_ARCH_USE_QUEUED_SPINLOCKS=y
CONFIG_QUEUED_SPINLOCKS=y
CONFIG_ARCH_USE_QUEUED_RWLOCKS=y
CONFIG_QUEUED_RWLOCKS=y
CONFIG_FREEZER=y
#
# Processor type and features
#
CONFIG_ZONE_DMA=y
CONFIG_SMP=y
CONFIG_X86_FEATURE_NAMES=y
CONFIG_X86_FAST_FEATURE_TESTS=y
CONFIG_X86_X2APIC=y
CONFIG_X86_MPPARSE=y
# CONFIG_GOLDFISH is not set
CONFIG_INTEL_RDT_A=y
CONFIG_X86_EXTENDED_PLATFORM=y
# CONFIG_X86_NUMACHIP is not set
# CONFIG_X86_VSMP is not set
CONFIG_X86_UV=y
# CONFIG_X86_GOLDFISH is not set
# CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MID is not set
CONFIG_X86_INTEL_LPSS=y
# CONFIG_X86_AMD_PLATFORM_DEVICE is not set
CONFIG_IOSF_MBI=y
# CONFIG_IOSF_MBI_DEBUG is not set
CONFIG_X86_SUPPORTS_MEMORY_FAILURE=y
# CONFIG_SCHED_OMIT_FRAME_POINTER is not set
CONFIG_HYPERVISOR_GUEST=y
CONFIG_PARAVIRT=y
# CONFIG_PARAVIRT_DEBUG is not set
CONFIG_PARAVIRT_SPINLOCKS=y
# CONFIG_QUEUED_LOCK_STAT is not set
CONFIG_XEN=y
CONFIG_XEN_DOM0=y
CONFIG_XEN_PVHVM=y
CONFIG_XEN_512GB=y
CONFIG_XEN_SAVE_RESTORE=y
# CONFIG_XEN_DEBUG_FS is not set
# CONFIG_XEN_PVH is not set
CONFIG_KVM_GUEST=y
# CONFIG_KVM_DEBUG_FS is not set
CONFIG_PARAVIRT_TIME_ACCOUNTING=y
CONFIG_PARAVIRT_CLOCK=y
CONFIG_NO_BOOTMEM=y
# CONFIG_MK8 is not set
# CONFIG_MPSC is not set
# CONFIG_MCORE2 is not set
# CONFIG_MATOM is not set
CONFIG_GENERIC_CPU=y
CONFIG_X86_INTERNODE_CACHE_SHIFT=6
CONFIG_X86_L1_CACHE_SHIFT=6
CONFIG_X86_TSC=y
CONFIG_X86_CMPXCHG64=y
CONFIG_X86_CMOV=y
CONFIG_X86_MINIMUM_CPU_FAMILY=64
CONFIG_X86_DEBUGCTLMSR=y
# CONFIG_PROCESSOR_SELECT is not set
CONFIG_CPU_SUP_INTEL=y
CONFIG_CPU_SUP_AMD=y
CONFIG_CPU_SUP_CENTAUR=y
CONFIG_HPET_TIMER=y
CONFIG_HPET_EMULATE_RTC=y
CONFIG_DMI=y
CONFIG_GART_IOMMU=y
# CONFIG_CALGARY_IOMMU is not set
CONFIG_SWIOTLB=y
CONFIG_IOMMU_HELPER=y
CONFIG_MAXSMP=y
CONFIG_NR_CPUS=8192
CONFIG_SCHED_SMT=y
CONFIG_SCHED_MC=y
CONFIG_SCHED_MC_PRIO=y
# CONFIG_PREEMPT_NONE is not set
CONFIG_PREEMPT_VOLUNTARY=y
# CONFIG_PREEMPT is not set
CONFIG_PREEMPT_COUNT=y
CONFIG_X86_LOCAL_APIC=y
CONFIG_X86_IO_APIC=y
CONFIG_X86_REROUTE_FOR_BROKEN_BOOT_IRQS=y
CONFIG_X86_MCE=y
CONFIG_X86_MCE_INTEL=y
CONFIG_X86_MCE_AMD=y
CONFIG_X86_MCE_THRESHOLD=y
CONFIG_X86_MCE_INJECT=m
CONFIG_X86_THERMAL_VECTOR=y
#
# Performance monitoring
#
CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS_INTEL_UNCORE=y
CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS_INTEL_RAPL=y
CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS_INTEL_CSTATE=y
# CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS_AMD_POWER is not set
# CONFIG_VM86 is not set
CONFIG_X86_16BIT=y
CONFIG_X86_ESPFIX64=y
CONFIG_X86_VSYSCALL_EMULATION=y
CONFIG_I8K=m
CONFIG_MICROCODE=y
CONFIG_MICROCODE_INTEL=y
CONFIG_MICROCODE_AMD=y
CONFIG_MICROCODE_OLD_INTERFACE=y
CONFIG_X86_MSR=y
CONFIG_X86_CPUID=y
CONFIG_ARCH_PHYS_ADDR_T_64BIT=y
CONFIG_ARCH_DMA_ADDR_T_64BIT=y
CONFIG_X86_DIRECT_GBPAGES=y
CONFIG_NUMA=y
CONFIG_AMD_NUMA=y
CONFIG_X86_64_ACPI_NUMA=y
CONFIG_NODES_SPAN_OTHER_NODES=y
# CONFIG_NUMA_EMU is not set
CONFIG_NODES_SHIFT=10
CONFIG_ARCH_SPARSEMEM_ENABLE=y
CONFIG_ARCH_SPARSEMEM_DEFAULT=y
CONFIG_ARCH_SELECT_MEMORY_MODEL=y
CONFIG_ARCH_MEMORY_PROBE=y
CONFIG_ARCH_PROC_KCORE_TEXT=y
CONFIG_ILLEGAL_POINTER_VALUE=0xdead000000000000
CONFIG_SELECT_MEMORY_MODEL=y
CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_MANUAL=y
CONFIG_SPARSEMEM=y
CONFIG_NEED_MULTIPLE_NODES=y
CONFIG_HAVE_MEMORY_PRESENT=y
CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_EXTREME=y
CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP_ENABLE=y
CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_ALLOC_MEM_MAP_TOGETHER=y
CONFIG_SPARSEMEM_VMEMMAP=y
CONFIG_HAVE_MEMBLOCK=y
CONFIG_HAVE_MEMBLOCK_NODE_MAP=y
CONFIG_ARCH_DISCARD_MEMBLOCK=y
CONFIG_MEMORY_ISOLATION=y
CONFIG_MOVABLE_NODE=y
CONFIG_HAVE_BOOTMEM_INFO_NODE=y
CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG=y
CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG_SPARSE=y
# CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTPLUG_DEFAULT_ONLINE is not set
CONFIG_MEMORY_HOTREMOVE=y
CONFIG_SPLIT_PTLOCK_CPUS=4
CONFIG_ARCH_ENABLE_SPLIT_PMD_PTLOCK=y
CONFIG_MEMORY_BALLOON=y
CONFIG_BALLOON_COMPACTION=y
CONFIG_COMPACTION=y
CONFIG_MIGRATION=y
CONFIG_ARCH_ENABLE_HUGEPAGE_MIGRATION=y
CONFIG_PHYS_ADDR_T_64BIT=y
CONFIG_BOUNCE=y
CONFIG_VIRT_TO_BUS=y
CONFIG_MMU_NOTIFIER=y
CONFIG_KSM=y
CONFIG_DEFAULT_MMAP_MIN_ADDR=4096
CONFIG_ARCH_SUPPORTS_MEMORY_FAILURE=y
CONFIG_MEMORY_FAILURE=y
CONFIG_HWPOISON_INJECT=m
CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE=y
CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_ALWAYS=y
# CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE_MADVISE is not set
CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGE_PAGECACHE=y
CONFIG_CLEANCACHE=y
CONFIG_FRONTSWAP=y
CONFIG_CMA=y
# CONFIG_CMA_DEBUG is not set
# CONFIG_CMA_DEBUGFS is not set
CONFIG_CMA_AREAS=7
# CONFIG_MEM_SOFT_DIRTY is not set
CONFIG_ZSWAP=y
CONFIG_ZPOOL=y
CONFIG_ZBUD=y
# CONFIG_Z3FOLD is not set
CONFIG_ZSMALLOC=y
# CONFIG_PGTABLE_MAPPING is not set
# CONFIG_ZSMALLOC_STAT is not set
CONFIG_GENERIC_EARLY_IOREMAP=y
CONFIG_ARCH_SUPPORTS_DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT=y
# CONFIG_DEFERRED_STRUCT_PAGE_INIT is not set
# CONFIG_IDLE_PAGE_TRACKING is not set
CONFIG_ZONE_DEVICE=y
CONFIG_FRAME_VECTOR=y
CONFIG_ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS=y
CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PKEYS=y
CONFIG_X86_PMEM_LEGACY_DEVICE=y
CONFIG_X86_PMEM_LEGACY=m
CONFIG_X86_CHECK_BIOS_CORRUPTION=y
# CONFIG_X86_BOOTPARAM_MEMORY_CORRUPTION_CHECK is not set
CONFIG_X86_RESERVE_LOW=64
CONFIG_MTRR=y
CONFIG_MTRR_SANITIZER=y
CONFIG_MTRR_SANITIZER_ENABLE_DEFAULT=0
CONFIG_MTRR_SANITIZER_SPARE_REG_NR_DEFAULT=1
CONFIG_X86_PAT=y
CONFIG_ARCH_USES_PG_UNCACHED=y
CONFIG_ARCH_RANDOM=y
CONFIG_X86_SMAP=y
# CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MPX is not set
CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS=y
CONFIG_EFI=y
CONFIG_EFI_STUB=y
# CONFIG_EFI_MIXED is not set
CONFIG_SECCOMP=y
# CONFIG_HZ_100 is not set
# CONFIG_HZ_250 is not set
# CONFIG_HZ_300 is not set
CONFIG_HZ_1000=y
CONFIG_HZ=1000
CONFIG_SCHED_HRTICK=y
CONFIG_KEXEC=y
# CONFIG_KEXEC_FILE is not set
CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP=y
CONFIG_KEXEC_JUMP=y
CONFIG_PHYSICAL_START=0x1000000
CONFIG_RELOCATABLE=y
# CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE is not set
CONFIG_PHYSICAL_ALIGN=0x1000000
CONFIG_HOTPLUG_CPU=y
# CONFIG_BOOTPARAM_HOTPLUG_CPU0 is not set
# CONFIG_DEBUG_HOTPLUG_CPU0 is not set
# CONFIG_COMPAT_VDSO is not set
# CONFIG_LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NATIVE is not set
CONFIG_LEGACY_VSYSCALL_EMULATE=y
# CONFIG_LEGACY_VSYSCALL_NONE is not set
# CONFIG_CMDLINE_BOOL is not set
CONFIG_MODIFY_LDT_SYSCALL=y
CONFIG_HAVE_LIVEPATCH=y
# CONFIG_LIVEPATCH is not set
CONFIG_ARCH_ENABLE_MEMORY_HOTPLUG=y
CONFIG_ARCH_ENABLE_MEMORY_HOTREMOVE=y
CONFIG_USE_PERCPU_NUMA_NODE_ID=y
#
# Power management and ACPI options
#
CONFIG_ARCH_HIBERNATION_HEADER=y
CONFIG_SUSPEND=y
CONFIG_SUSPEND_FREEZER=y
# CONFIG_SUSPEND_SKIP_SYNC is not set
CONFIG_HIBERNATE_CALLBACKS=y
CONFIG_HIBERNATION=y
CONFIG_PM_STD_PARTITION=""
CONFIG_PM_SLEEP=y
CONFIG_PM_SLEEP_SMP=y
# CONFIG_PM_AUTOSLEEP is not set
# CONFIG_PM_WAKELOCKS is not set
CONFIG_PM=y
CONFIG_PM_DEBUG=y
CONFIG_PM_ADVANCED_DEBUG=y
CONFIG_PM_TEST_SUSPEND=y
CONFIG_PM_SLEEP_DEBUG=y
# CONFIG_DPM_WATCHDOG is not set
# CONFIG_PM_TRACE_RTC is not set
CONFIG_PM_CLK=y
# CONFIG_WQ_POWER_EFFICIENT_DEFAULT is not set
CONFIG_ACPI=y
CONFIG_ACPI_LEGACY_TABLES_LOOKUP=y
CONFIG_ARCH_MIGHT_HAVE_ACPI_PDC=y
CONFIG_ACPI_SYSTEM_POWER_STATES_SUPPORT=y
# CONFIG_ACPI_DEBUGGER is not set
CONFIG_ACPI_SLEEP=y
# CONFIG_ACPI_PROCFS_POWER is not set
CONFIG_ACPI_REV_OVERRIDE_POSSIBLE=y
CONFIG_ACPI_EC_DEBUGFS=m
CONFIG_ACPI_AC=y
CONFIG_ACPI_BATTERY=y
CONFIG_ACPI_BUTTON=y
CONFIG_ACPI_VIDEO=m
CONFIG_ACPI_FAN=y
CONFIG_ACPI_DOCK=y
CONFIG_ACPI_CPU_FREQ_PSS=y
CONFIG_ACPI_PROCESSOR_CSTATE=y
CONFIG_ACPI_PROCESSOR_IDLE=y
CONFIG_ACPI_CPPC_LIB=y
CONFIG_ACPI_PROCESSOR=y
CONFIG_ACPI_IPMI=m
CONFIG_ACPI_HOTPLUG_CPU=y
CONFIG_ACPI_PROCESSOR_AGGREGATOR=m
CONFIG_ACPI_THERMAL=y
CONFIG_ACPI_NUMA=y
# CONFIG_ACPI_CUSTOM_DSDT is not set
CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_ACPI_TABLE_UPGRADE=y
CONFIG_ACPI_TABLE_UPGRADE=y
CONFIG_ACPI_DEBUG=y
CONFIG_ACPI_PCI_SLOT=y
CONFIG_X86_PM_TIMER=y
CONFIG_ACPI_CONTAINER=y
CONFIG_ACPI_HOTPLUG_MEMORY=y
CONFIG_ACPI_HOTPLUG_IOAPIC=y
CONFIG_ACPI_SBS=m
CONFIG_ACPI_HED=y
CONFIG_ACPI_CUSTOM_METHOD=m
CONFIG_ACPI_BGRT=y
# CONFIG_ACPI_REDUCED_HARDWARE_ONLY is not set
CONFIG_ACPI_NFIT=m
# CONFIG_ACPI_NFIT_DEBUG is not set
CONFIG_HAVE_ACPI_APEI=y
CONFIG_HAVE_ACPI_APEI_NMI=y
CONFIG_ACPI_APEI=y
CONFIG_ACPI_APEI_GHES=y
CONFIG_ACPI_APEI_PCIEAER=y
CONFIG_ACPI_APEI_MEMORY_FAILURE=y
CONFIG_ACPI_APEI_EINJ=m
# CONFIG_ACPI_APEI_ERST_DEBUG is not set
# CONFIG_DPTF_POWER is not set
# CONFIG_ACPI_EXTLOG is not set
# CONFIG_PMIC_OPREGION is not set
# CONFIG_ACPI_CONFIGFS is not set
CONFIG_SFI=y
#
# CPU Frequency scaling
#
CONFIG_CPU_FREQ=y
CONFIG_CPU_FREQ_GOV_ATTR_SET=y
CONFIG_CPU_FREQ_GOV_COMMON=y
# CONFIG_CPU_FREQ_STAT is not set
# CONFIG_CPU_FREQ_DEFAULT_GOV_PERFORMANCE is not set
# CONFIG_CPU_FREQ_DEFAULT_GOV_POWERSAVE is not set
# CONFIG_CPU_FREQ_DEFAULT_GOV_USERSPACE is not set
CONFIG_CPU_FREQ_DEFAULT_GOV_ONDEMAND=y
# CONFIG_CPU_FREQ_DEFAULT_GOV_CONSERVATIVE is not set
# CONFIG_CPU_FREQ_DEFAULT_GOV_SCHEDUTIL is not set
CONFIG_CPU_FREQ_GOV_PERFORMANCE=y
CONFIG_CPU_FREQ_GOV_POWERSAVE=y
CONFIG_CPU_FREQ_GOV_USERSPACE=y
CONFIG_CPU_FREQ_GOV_ONDEMAND=y
CONFIG_CPU_FREQ_GOV_CONSERVATIVE=y
# CONFIG_CPU_FREQ_GOV_SCHEDUTIL is not set
#
# CPU frequency scaling drivers
#
CONFIG_X86_INTEL_PSTATE=y
CONFIG_X86_PCC_CPUFREQ=m
CONFIG_X86_ACPI_CPUFREQ=m
CONFIG_X86_ACPI_CPUFREQ_CPB=y
CONFIG_X86_POWERNOW_K8=m
CONFIG_X86_AMD_FREQ_SENSITIVITY=m
# CONFIG_X86_SPEEDSTEP_CENTRINO is not set
CONFIG_X86_P4_CLOCKMOD=m
#
# shared options
#
CONFIG_X86_SPEEDSTEP_LIB=m
#
# CPU Idle
#
CONFIG_CPU_IDLE=y
# CONFIG_CPU_IDLE_GOV_LADDER is not set
CONFIG_CPU_IDLE_GOV_MENU=y
# CONFIG_ARCH_NEEDS_CPU_IDLE_COUPLED is not set
CONFIG_INTEL_IDLE=y
#
# Bus options (PCI etc.)
#
CONFIG_PCI=y
CONFIG_PCI_DIRECT=y
CONFIG_PCI_MMCONFIG=y
CONFIG_PCI_XEN=y
CONFIG_PCI_DOMAINS=y
# CONFIG_PCI_CNB20LE_QUIRK is not set
CONFIG_PCIEPORTBUS=y
CONFIG_HOTPLUG_PCI_PCIE=y
CONFIG_PCIEAER=y
CONFIG_PCIE_ECRC=y
CONFIG_PCIEAER_INJECT=m
CONFIG_PCIEASPM=y
# CONFIG_PCIEASPM_DEBUG is not set
CONFIG_PCIEASPM_DEFAULT=y
# CONFIG_PCIEASPM_POWERSAVE is not set
# CONFIG_PCIEASPM_POWER_SUPERSAVE is not set
# CONFIG_PCIEASPM_PERFORMANCE is not set
CONFIG_PCIE_PME=y
# CONFIG_PCIE_DPC is not set
# CONFIG_PCIE_PTM is not set
CONFIG_PCI_BUS_ADDR_T_64BIT=y
CONFIG_PCI_MSI=y
CONFIG_PCI_MSI_IRQ_DOMAIN=y
# CONFIG_PCI_DEBUG is not set
# CONFIG_PCI_REALLOC_ENABLE_AUTO is not set
CONFIG_PCI_STUB=y
# CONFIG_XEN_PCIDEV_FRONTEND is not set
CONFIG_HT_IRQ=y
CONFIG_PCI_ATS=y
CONFIG_PCI_IOV=y
CONFIG_PCI_PRI=y
CONFIG_PCI_PASID=y
CONFIG_PCI_LABEL=y
# CONFIG_PCI_HYPERV is not set
CONFIG_HOTPLUG_PCI=y
CONFIG_HOTPLUG_PCI_ACPI=y
CONFIG_HOTPLUG_PCI_ACPI_IBM=m
# CONFIG_HOTPLUG_PCI_CPCI is not set
CONFIG_HOTPLUG_PCI_SHPC=m
#
# DesignWare PCI Core Support
#
# CONFIG_PCIE_DW_PLAT is not set
#
# PCI host controller drivers
#
# CONFIG_VMD is not set
# CONFIG_ISA_BUS is not set
CONFIG_ISA_DMA_API=y
CONFIG_AMD_NB=y
CONFIG_PCCARD=y
# CONFIG_PCMCIA is not set
CONFIG_CARDBUS=y
#
# PC-card bridges
#
CONFIG_YENTA=m
CONFIG_YENTA_O2=y
CONFIG_YENTA_RICOH=y
CONFIG_YENTA_TI=y
CONFIG_YENTA_ENE_TUNE=y
CONFIG_YENTA_TOSHIBA=y
# CONFIG_RAPIDIO is not set
# CONFIG_X86_SYSFB is not set
#
# Executable file formats / Emulations
#
CONFIG_BINFMT_ELF=y
CONFIG_COMPAT_BINFMT_ELF=y
CONFIG_ELFCORE=y
CONFIG_CORE_DUMP_DEFAULT_ELF_HEADERS=y
CONFIG_BINFMT_SCRIPT=y
# CONFIG_HAVE_AOUT is not set
CONFIG_BINFMT_MISC=m
CONFIG_COREDUMP=y
CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION=y
# CONFIG_IA32_AOUT is not set
# CONFIG_X86_X32 is not set
CONFIG_COMPAT_32=y
CONFIG_COMPAT=y
CONFIG_COMPAT_FOR_U64_ALIGNMENT=y
CONFIG_SYSVIPC_COMPAT=y
CONFIG_KEYS_COMPAT=y
CONFIG_X86_DEV_DMA_OPS=y
CONFIG_NET=y
CONFIG_COMPAT_NETLINK_MESSAGES=y
CONFIG_NET_INGRESS=y
CONFIG_NET_EGRESS=y
#
# Networking options
#
CONFIG_PACKET=y
CONFIG_PACKET_DIAG=m
CONFIG_UNIX=y
CONFIG_UNIX_DIAG=m
CONFIG_XFRM=y
CONFIG_XFRM_ALGO=y
CONFIG_XFRM_USER=y
CONFIG_XFRM_SUB_POLICY=y
CONFIG_XFRM_MIGRATE=y
CONFIG_XFRM_STATISTICS=y
CONFIG_XFRM_IPCOMP=m
CONFIG_NET_KEY=m
CONFIG_NET_KEY_MIGRATE=y
CONFIG_INET=y
CONFIG_IP_MULTICAST=y
CONFIG_IP_ADVANCED_ROUTER=y
CONFIG_IP_FIB_TRIE_STATS=y
CONFIG_IP_MULTIPLE_TABLES=y
CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_MULTIPATH=y
CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_VERBOSE=y
CONFIG_IP_ROUTE_CLASSID=y
CONFIG_IP_PNP=y
CONFIG_IP_PNP_DHCP=y
# CONFIG_IP_PNP_BOOTP is not set
# CONFIG_IP_PNP_RARP is not set
CONFIG_NET_IPIP=m
CONFIG_NET_IPGRE_DEMUX=m
CONFIG_NET_IP_TUNNEL=m
CONFIG_NET_IPGRE=m
CONFIG_NET_IPGRE_BROADCAST=y
CONFIG_IP_MROUTE=y
CONFIG_IP_MROUTE_MULTIPLE_TABLES=y
CONFIG_IP_PIMSM_V1=y
CONFIG_IP_PIMSM_V2=y
CONFIG_SYN_COOKIES=y
CONFIG_NET_IPVTI=m
CONFIG_NET_UDP_TUNNEL=m
# CONFIG_NET_FOU is not set
# CONFIG_NET_FOU_IP_TUNNELS is not set
CONFIG_INET_AH=m
CONFIG_INET_ESP=m
# CONFIG_INET_ESP_OFFLOAD is not set
CONFIG_INET_IPCOMP=m
CONFIG_INET_XFRM_TUNNEL=m
CONFIG_INET_TUNNEL=m
CONFIG_INET_XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT=m
CONFIG_INET_XFRM_MODE_TUNNEL=m
CONFIG_INET_XFRM_MODE_BEET=m
CONFIG_INET_DIAG=m
CONFIG_INET_TCP_DIAG=m
CONFIG_INET_UDP_DIAG=m
# CONFIG_INET_RAW_DIAG is not set
# CONFIG_INET_DIAG_DESTROY is not set
CONFIG_TCP_CONG_ADVANCED=y
CONFIG_TCP_CONG_BIC=m
CONFIG_TCP_CONG_CUBIC=y
CONFIG_TCP_CONG_WESTWOOD=m
CONFIG_TCP_CONG_HTCP=m
CONFIG_TCP_CONG_HSTCP=m
CONFIG_TCP_CONG_HYBLA=m
CONFIG_TCP_CONG_VEGAS=m
# CONFIG_TCP_CONG_NV is not set
CONFIG_TCP_CONG_SCALABLE=m
CONFIG_TCP_CONG_LP=m
CONFIG_TCP_CONG_VENO=m
CONFIG_TCP_CONG_YEAH=m
CONFIG_TCP_CONG_ILLINOIS=m
# CONFIG_TCP_CONG_DCTCP is not set
# CONFIG_TCP_CONG_CDG is not set
# CONFIG_TCP_CONG_BBR is not set
CONFIG_DEFAULT_CUBIC=y
# CONFIG_DEFAULT_RENO is not set
CONFIG_DEFAULT_TCP_CONG="cubic"
CONFIG_TCP_MD5SIG=y
CONFIG_IPV6=y
CONFIG_IPV6_ROUTER_PREF=y
CONFIG_IPV6_ROUTE_INFO=y
CONFIG_IPV6_OPTIMISTIC_DAD=y
CONFIG_INET6_AH=m
CONFIG_INET6_ESP=m
# CONFIG_INET6_ESP_OFFLOAD is not set
CONFIG_INET6_IPCOMP=m
CONFIG_IPV6_MIP6=m
# CONFIG_IPV6_ILA is not set
CONFIG_INET6_XFRM_TUNNEL=m
CONFIG_INET6_TUNNEL=m
CONFIG_INET6_XFRM_MODE_TRANSPORT=m
CONFIG_INET6_XFRM_MODE_TUNNEL=m
CONFIG_INET6_XFRM_MODE_BEET=m
CONFIG_INET6_XFRM_MODE_ROUTEOPTIMIZATION=m
# CONFIG_IPV6_VTI is not set
CONFIG_IPV6_SIT=m
CONFIG_IPV6_SIT_6RD=y
CONFIG_IPV6_NDISC_NODETYPE=y
CONFIG_IPV6_TUNNEL=m
# CONFIG_IPV6_GRE is not set
# CONFIG_IPV6_FOU is not set
# CONFIG_IPV6_FOU_TUNNEL is not set
CONFIG_IPV6_MULTIPLE_TABLES=y
# CONFIG_IPV6_SUBTREES is not set
CONFIG_IPV6_MROUTE=y
CONFIG_IPV6_MROUTE_MULTIPLE_TABLES=y
CONFIG_IPV6_PIMSM_V2=y
# CONFIG_IPV6_SEG6_LWTUNNEL is not set
# CONFIG_IPV6_SEG6_HMAC is not set
CONFIG_NETLABEL=y
CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK=y
CONFIG_NET_PTP_CLASSIFY=y
CONFIG_NETWORK_PHY_TIMESTAMPING=y
CONFIG_NETFILTER=y
# CONFIG_NETFILTER_DEBUG is not set
CONFIG_NETFILTER_ADVANCED=y
CONFIG_BRIDGE_NETFILTER=m
#
# Core Netfilter Configuration
#
CONFIG_NETFILTER_INGRESS=y
CONFIG_NETFILTER_NETLINK=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_NETLINK_ACCT=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_NETLINK_QUEUE=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_NETLINK_LOG=m
CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK=m
CONFIG_NF_LOG_COMMON=m
# CONFIG_NF_LOG_NETDEV is not set
CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_MARK=y
CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SECMARK=y
CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_ZONES=y
CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_PROCFS=y
CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_EVENTS=y
# CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_TIMEOUT is not set
CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_TIMESTAMP=y
CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_LABELS=y
CONFIG_NF_CT_PROTO_DCCP=y
CONFIG_NF_CT_PROTO_GRE=m
CONFIG_NF_CT_PROTO_SCTP=y
CONFIG_NF_CT_PROTO_UDPLITE=y
CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_AMANDA=m
CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_FTP=m
CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_H323=m
CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_IRC=m
CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_BROADCAST=m
CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_NETBIOS_NS=m
CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SNMP=m
CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_PPTP=m
CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SANE=m
CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_SIP=m
CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_TFTP=m
CONFIG_NF_CT_NETLINK=m
# CONFIG_NF_CT_NETLINK_TIMEOUT is not set
# CONFIG_NETFILTER_NETLINK_GLUE_CT is not set
CONFIG_NF_NAT=m
CONFIG_NF_NAT_NEEDED=y
CONFIG_NF_NAT_PROTO_DCCP=y
CONFIG_NF_NAT_PROTO_UDPLITE=y
CONFIG_NF_NAT_PROTO_SCTP=y
CONFIG_NF_NAT_AMANDA=m
CONFIG_NF_NAT_FTP=m
CONFIG_NF_NAT_IRC=m
CONFIG_NF_NAT_SIP=m
CONFIG_NF_NAT_TFTP=m
CONFIG_NF_NAT_REDIRECT=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_SYNPROXY=m
CONFIG_NF_TABLES=m
# CONFIG_NF_TABLES_INET is not set
# CONFIG_NF_TABLES_NETDEV is not set
CONFIG_NFT_EXTHDR=m
CONFIG_NFT_META=m
# CONFIG_NFT_RT is not set
# CONFIG_NFT_NUMGEN is not set
CONFIG_NFT_CT=m
# CONFIG_NFT_SET_RBTREE is not set
# CONFIG_NFT_SET_HASH is not set
# CONFIG_NFT_SET_BITMAP is not set
CONFIG_NFT_COUNTER=m
CONFIG_NFT_LOG=m
CONFIG_NFT_LIMIT=m
# CONFIG_NFT_MASQ is not set
# CONFIG_NFT_REDIR is not set
CONFIG_NFT_NAT=m
# CONFIG_NFT_OBJREF is not set
# CONFIG_NFT_QUEUE is not set
# CONFIG_NFT_QUOTA is not set
# CONFIG_NFT_REJECT is not set
CONFIG_NFT_COMPAT=m
CONFIG_NFT_HASH=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XTABLES=y
#
# Xtables combined modules
#
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MARK=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_CONNMARK=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_SET=m
#
# Xtables targets
#
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_AUDIT=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_CHECKSUM=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_CLASSIFY=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_CONNMARK=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_CONNSECMARK=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_CT=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_DSCP=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_HL=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_HMARK=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_IDLETIMER=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_LED=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_LOG=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_MARK=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_NAT=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_NETMAP=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_NFLOG=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_NFQUEUE=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_NOTRACK=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_RATEEST=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_REDIRECT=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_TEE=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_TPROXY=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_TRACE=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_SECMARK=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_TCPMSS=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_TARGET_TCPOPTSTRIP=m
#
# Xtables matches
#
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_ADDRTYPE=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_BPF=m
# CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_CGROUP is not set
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_CLUSTER=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_COMMENT=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_CONNBYTES=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_CONNLABEL=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_CONNLIMIT=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_CONNMARK=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_CONNTRACK=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_CPU=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_DCCP=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_DEVGROUP=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_DSCP=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_ECN=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_ESP=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_HASHLIMIT=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_HELPER=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_HL=m
# CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_IPCOMP is not set
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_IPRANGE=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_IPVS=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_L2TP=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_LENGTH=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_LIMIT=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_MAC=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_MARK=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_MULTIPORT=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_NFACCT=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_OSF=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_OWNER=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_POLICY=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_PHYSDEV=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_PKTTYPE=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_QUOTA=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_RATEEST=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_REALM=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_RECENT=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_SCTP=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_STATE=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_STATISTIC=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_STRING=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_TCPMSS=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_TIME=m
CONFIG_NETFILTER_XT_MATCH_U32=m
CONFIG_IP_SET=m
CONFIG_IP_SET_MAX=256
CONFIG_IP_SET_BITMAP_IP=m
CONFIG_IP_SET_BITMAP_IPMAC=m
CONFIG_IP_SET_BITMAP_PORT=m
CONFIG_IP_SET_HASH_IP=m
# CONFIG_IP_SET_HASH_IPMARK is not set
CONFIG_IP_SET_HASH_IPPORT=m
CONFIG_IP_SET_HASH_IPPORTIP=m
CONFIG_IP_SET_HASH_IPPORTNET=m
# CONFIG_IP_SET_HASH_IPMAC is not set
# CONFIG_IP_SET_HASH_MAC is not set
# CONFIG_IP_SET_HASH_NETPORTNET is not set
CONFIG_IP_SET_HASH_NET=m
# CONFIG_IP_SET_HASH_NETNET is not set
CONFIG_IP_SET_HASH_NETPORT=m
CONFIG_IP_SET_HASH_NETIFACE=m
CONFIG_IP_SET_LIST_SET=m
CONFIG_IP_VS=m
CONFIG_IP_VS_IPV6=y
# CONFIG_IP_VS_DEBUG is not set
CONFIG_IP_VS_TAB_BITS=12
#
# IPVS transport protocol load balancing support
#
CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_TCP=y
CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_UDP=y
CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_AH_ESP=y
CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_ESP=y
CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_AH=y
CONFIG_IP_VS_PROTO_SCTP=y
#
# IPVS scheduler
#
CONFIG_IP_VS_RR=m
CONFIG_IP_VS_WRR=m
CONFIG_IP_VS_LC=m
CONFIG_IP_VS_WLC=m
# CONFIG_IP_VS_FO is not set
# CONFIG_IP_VS_OVF is not set
CONFIG_IP_VS_LBLC=m
CONFIG_IP_VS_LBLCR=m
CONFIG_IP_VS_DH=m
CONFIG_IP_VS_SH=m
CONFIG_IP_VS_SED=m
CONFIG_IP_VS_NQ=m
#
# IPVS SH scheduler
#
CONFIG_IP_VS_SH_TAB_BITS=8
#
# IPVS application helper
#
CONFIG_IP_VS_FTP=m
CONFIG_IP_VS_NFCT=y
CONFIG_IP_VS_PE_SIP=m
#
# IP: Netfilter Configuration
#
CONFIG_NF_DEFRAG_IPV4=m
CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_IPV4=m
# CONFIG_NF_SOCKET_IPV4 is not set
CONFIG_NF_TABLES_IPV4=m
CONFIG_NFT_CHAIN_ROUTE_IPV4=m
# CONFIG_NFT_REJECT_IPV4 is not set
# CONFIG_NFT_DUP_IPV4 is not set
# CONFIG_NFT_FIB_IPV4 is not set
# CONFIG_NF_TABLES_ARP is not set
CONFIG_NF_DUP_IPV4=m
# CONFIG_NF_LOG_ARP is not set
CONFIG_NF_LOG_IPV4=m
CONFIG_NF_REJECT_IPV4=m
CONFIG_NF_NAT_IPV4=m
CONFIG_NFT_CHAIN_NAT_IPV4=m
CONFIG_NF_NAT_MASQUERADE_IPV4=m
CONFIG_NF_NAT_SNMP_BASIC=m
CONFIG_NF_NAT_PROTO_GRE=m
CONFIG_NF_NAT_PPTP=m
CONFIG_NF_NAT_H323=m
CONFIG_IP_NF_IPTABLES=m
CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_AH=m
CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_ECN=m
CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_RPFILTER=m
CONFIG_IP_NF_MATCH_TTL=m
CONFIG_IP_NF_FILTER=m
CONFIG_IP_NF_TARGET_REJECT=m
CONFIG_IP_NF_TARGET_SYNPROXY=m
CONFIG_IP_NF_NAT=m
CONFIG_IP_NF_TARGET_MASQUERADE=m
CONFIG_IP_NF_TARGET_NETMAP=m
CONFIG_IP_NF_TARGET_REDIRECT=m
CONFIG_IP_NF_MANGLE=m
CONFIG_IP_NF_TARGET_CLUSTERIP=m
CONFIG_IP_NF_TARGET_ECN=m
CONFIG_IP_NF_TARGET_TTL=m
CONFIG_IP_NF_RAW=m
CONFIG_IP_NF_SECURITY=m
CONFIG_IP_NF_ARPTABLES=m
CONFIG_IP_NF_ARPFILTER=m
CONFIG_IP_NF_ARP_MANGLE=m
#
# IPv6: Netfilter Configuration
#
CONFIG_NF_DEFRAG_IPV6=m
CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_IPV6=m
# CONFIG_NF_SOCKET_IPV6 is not set
CONFIG_NF_TABLES_IPV6=m
CONFIG_NFT_CHAIN_ROUTE_IPV6=m
# CONFIG_NFT_REJECT_IPV6 is not set
# CONFIG_NFT_DUP_IPV6 is not set
# CONFIG_NFT_FIB_IPV6 is not set
CONFIG_NF_DUP_IPV6=m
CONFIG_NF_REJECT_IPV6=m
CONFIG_NF_LOG_IPV6=m
CONFIG_NF_NAT_IPV6=m
CONFIG_NFT_CHAIN_NAT_IPV6=m
# CONFIG_NF_NAT_MASQUERADE_IPV6 is not set
CONFIG_IP6_NF_IPTABLES=m
CONFIG_IP6_NF_MATCH_AH=m
CONFIG_IP6_NF_MATCH_EUI64=m
CONFIG_IP6_NF_MATCH_FRAG=m
CONFIG_IP6_NF_MATCH_OPTS=m
CONFIG_IP6_NF_MATCH_HL=m
CONFIG_IP6_NF_MATCH_IPV6HEADER=m
CONFIG_IP6_NF_MATCH_MH=m
CONFIG_IP6_NF_MATCH_RPFILTER=m
CONFIG_IP6_NF_MATCH_RT=m
CONFIG_IP6_NF_TARGET_HL=m
CONFIG_IP6_NF_FILTER=m
CONFIG_IP6_NF_TARGET_REJECT=m
CONFIG_IP6_NF_TARGET_SYNPROXY=m
CONFIG_IP6_NF_MANGLE=m
CONFIG_IP6_NF_RAW=m
CONFIG_IP6_NF_SECURITY=m
# CONFIG_IP6_NF_NAT is not set
CONFIG_NF_TABLES_BRIDGE=m
# CONFIG_NFT_BRIDGE_META is not set
# CONFIG_NF_LOG_BRIDGE is not set
CONFIG_BRIDGE_NF_EBTABLES=m
CONFIG_BRIDGE_EBT_BROUTE=m
CONFIG_BRIDGE_EBT_T_FILTER=m
CONFIG_BRIDGE_EBT_T_NAT=m
CONFIG_BRIDGE_EBT_802_3=m
CONFIG_BRIDGE_EBT_AMONG=m
CONFIG_BRIDGE_EBT_ARP=m
CONFIG_BRIDGE_EBT_IP=m
CONFIG_BRIDGE_EBT_IP6=m
CONFIG_BRIDGE_EBT_LIMIT=m
CONFIG_BRIDGE_EBT_MARK=m
CONFIG_BRIDGE_EBT_PKTTYPE=m
CONFIG_BRIDGE_EBT_STP=m
CONFIG_BRIDGE_EBT_VLAN=m
CONFIG_BRIDGE_EBT_ARPREPLY=m
CONFIG_BRIDGE_EBT_DNAT=m
CONFIG_BRIDGE_EBT_MARK_T=m
CONFIG_BRIDGE_EBT_REDIRECT=m
CONFIG_BRIDGE_EBT_SNAT=m
CONFIG_BRIDGE_EBT_LOG=m
CONFIG_BRIDGE_EBT_NFLOG=m
CONFIG_IP_DCCP=m
CONFIG_INET_DCCP_DIAG=m
#
# DCCP CCIDs Configuration
#
# CONFIG_IP_DCCP_CCID2_DEBUG is not set
CONFIG_IP_DCCP_CCID3=y
# CONFIG_IP_DCCP_CCID3_DEBUG is not set
CONFIG_IP_DCCP_TFRC_LIB=y
#
# DCCP Kernel Hacking
#
# CONFIG_IP_DCCP_DEBUG is not set
# CONFIG_NET_DCCPPROBE is not set
CONFIG_IP_SCTP=m
CONFIG_NET_SCTPPROBE=m
# CONFIG_SCTP_DBG_OBJCNT is not set
# CONFIG_SCTP_DEFAULT_COOKIE_HMAC_MD5 is not set
CONFIG_SCTP_DEFAULT_COOKIE_HMAC_SHA1=y
# CONFIG_SCTP_DEFAULT_COOKIE_HMAC_NONE is not set
CONFIG_SCTP_COOKIE_HMAC_MD5=y
CONFIG_SCTP_COOKIE_HMAC_SHA1=y
CONFIG_INET_SCTP_DIAG=m
# CONFIG_RDS is not set
CONFIG_TIPC=m
CONFIG_TIPC_MEDIA_UDP=y
CONFIG_ATM=m
CONFIG_ATM_CLIP=m
# CONFIG_ATM_CLIP_NO_ICMP is not set
CONFIG_ATM_LANE=m
# CONFIG_ATM_MPOA is not set
CONFIG_ATM_BR2684=m
# CONFIG_ATM_BR2684_IPFILTER is not set
CONFIG_L2TP=m
CONFIG_L2TP_DEBUGFS=m
CONFIG_L2TP_V3=y
CONFIG_L2TP_IP=m
CONFIG_L2TP_ETH=m
CONFIG_STP=m
CONFIG_GARP=m
CONFIG_MRP=m
CONFIG_BRIDGE=m
CONFIG_BRIDGE_IGMP_SNOOPING=y
CONFIG_BRIDGE_VLAN_FILTERING=y
CONFIG_HAVE_NET_DSA=y
# CONFIG_NET_DSA is not set
CONFIG_VLAN_8021Q=m
CONFIG_VLAN_8021Q_GVRP=y
CONFIG_VLAN_8021Q_MVRP=y
# CONFIG_DECNET is not set
CONFIG_LLC=m
# CONFIG_LLC2 is not set
# CONFIG_IPX is not set
# CONFIG_ATALK is not set
# CONFIG_X25 is not set
# CONFIG_LAPB is not set
# CONFIG_PHONET is not set
# CONFIG_6LOWPAN is not set
CONFIG_IEEE802154=m
# CONFIG_IEEE802154_NL802154_EXPERIMENTAL is not set
CONFIG_IEEE802154_SOCKET=m
CONFIG_MAC802154=m
CONFIG_NET_SCHED=y
#
# Queueing/Scheduling
#
CONFIG_NET_SCH_CBQ=m
CONFIG_NET_SCH_HTB=m
CONFIG_NET_SCH_HFSC=m
CONFIG_NET_SCH_ATM=m
CONFIG_NET_SCH_PRIO=m
CONFIG_NET_SCH_MULTIQ=m
CONFIG_NET_SCH_RED=m
CONFIG_NET_SCH_SFB=m
CONFIG_NET_SCH_SFQ=m
CONFIG_NET_SCH_TEQL=m
CONFIG_NET_SCH_TBF=m
CONFIG_NET_SCH_GRED=m
CONFIG_NET_SCH_DSMARK=m
CONFIG_NET_SCH_NETEM=m
CONFIG_NET_SCH_DRR=m
CONFIG_NET_SCH_MQPRIO=m
CONFIG_NET_SCH_CHOKE=m
CONFIG_NET_SCH_QFQ=m
CONFIG_NET_SCH_CODEL=m
CONFIG_NET_SCH_FQ_CODEL=m
# CONFIG_NET_SCH_FQ is not set
# CONFIG_NET_SCH_HHF is not set
# CONFIG_NET_SCH_PIE is not set
CONFIG_NET_SCH_INGRESS=m
CONFIG_NET_SCH_PLUG=m
#
# Classification
#
CONFIG_NET_CLS=y
CONFIG_NET_CLS_BASIC=m
CONFIG_NET_CLS_TCINDEX=m
CONFIG_NET_CLS_ROUTE4=m
CONFIG_NET_CLS_FW=m
CONFIG_NET_CLS_U32=m
CONFIG_CLS_U32_PERF=y
CONFIG_CLS_U32_MARK=y
CONFIG_NET_CLS_RSVP=m
CONFIG_NET_CLS_RSVP6=m
CONFIG_NET_CLS_FLOW=m
CONFIG_NET_CLS_CGROUP=y
CONFIG_NET_CLS_BPF=m
# CONFIG_NET_CLS_FLOWER is not set
# CONFIG_NET_CLS_MATCHALL is not set
CONFIG_NET_EMATCH=y
CONFIG_NET_EMATCH_STACK=32
CONFIG_NET_EMATCH_CMP=m
CONFIG_NET_EMATCH_NBYTE=m
CONFIG_NET_EMATCH_U32=m
CONFIG_NET_EMATCH_META=m
CONFIG_NET_EMATCH_TEXT=m
CONFIG_NET_EMATCH_IPSET=m
CONFIG_NET_CLS_ACT=y
CONFIG_NET_ACT_POLICE=m
CONFIG_NET_ACT_GACT=m
CONFIG_GACT_PROB=y
CONFIG_NET_ACT_MIRRED=m
# CONFIG_NET_ACT_SAMPLE is not set
CONFIG_NET_ACT_IPT=m
CONFIG_NET_ACT_NAT=m
CONFIG_NET_ACT_PEDIT=m
CONFIG_NET_ACT_SIMP=m
CONFIG_NET_ACT_SKBEDIT=m
CONFIG_NET_ACT_CSUM=m
# CONFIG_NET_ACT_VLAN is not set
# CONFIG_NET_ACT_BPF is not set
# CONFIG_NET_ACT_CONNMARK is not set
# CONFIG_NET_ACT_SKBMOD is not set
# CONFIG_NET_ACT_IFE is not set
# CONFIG_NET_ACT_TUNNEL_KEY is not set
CONFIG_NET_CLS_IND=y
CONFIG_NET_SCH_FIFO=y
CONFIG_DCB=y
CONFIG_DNS_RESOLVER=m
# CONFIG_BATMAN_ADV is not set
CONFIG_OPENVSWITCH=m
CONFIG_OPENVSWITCH_GRE=m
CONFIG_OPENVSWITCH_VXLAN=m
CONFIG_VSOCKETS=m
CONFIG_VMWARE_VMCI_VSOCKETS=m
# CONFIG_VIRTIO_VSOCKETS is not set
CONFIG_NETLINK_DIAG=m
CONFIG_MPLS=y
CONFIG_NET_MPLS_GSO=m
# CONFIG_MPLS_ROUTING is not set
# CONFIG_HSR is not set
# CONFIG_NET_SWITCHDEV is not set
# CONFIG_NET_L3_MASTER_DEV is not set
# CONFIG_NET_NCSI is not set
CONFIG_RPS=y
CONFIG_RFS_ACCEL=y
CONFIG_XPS=y
# CONFIG_CGROUP_NET_PRIO is not set
CONFIG_CGROUP_NET_CLASSID=y
CONFIG_NET_RX_BUSY_POLL=y
CONFIG_BQL=y
CONFIG_BPF_JIT=y
CONFIG_NET_FLOW_LIMIT=y
#
# Network testing
#
CONFIG_NET_PKTGEN=m
# CONFIG_NET_TCPPROBE is not set
CONFIG_NET_DROP_MONITOR=y
# CONFIG_HAMRADIO is not set
# CONFIG_CAN is not set
# CONFIG_IRDA is not set
# CONFIG_BT is not set
# CONFIG_AF_RXRPC is not set
# CONFIG_AF_KCM is not set
# CONFIG_STREAM_PARSER is not set
CONFIG_FIB_RULES=y
CONFIG_WIRELESS=y
CONFIG_WIRELESS_EXT=y
CONFIG_WEXT_CORE=y
CONFIG_WEXT_PROC=y
CONFIG_WEXT_PRIV=y
CONFIG_CFG80211=m
# CONFIG_NL80211_TESTMODE is not set
# CONFIG_CFG80211_DEVELOPER_WARNINGS is not set
# CONFIG_CFG80211_CERTIFICATION_ONUS is not set
CONFIG_CFG80211_DEFAULT_PS=y
# CONFIG_CFG80211_DEBUGFS is not set
# CONFIG_CFG80211_INTERNAL_REGDB is not set
CONFIG_CFG80211_CRDA_SUPPORT=y
CONFIG_CFG80211_WEXT=y
CONFIG_LIB80211=m
# CONFIG_LIB80211_DEBUG is not set
CONFIG_MAC80211=m
CONFIG_MAC80211_HAS_RC=y
CONFIG_MAC80211_RC_MINSTREL=y
CONFIG_MAC80211_RC_MINSTREL_HT=y
# CONFIG_MAC80211_RC_MINSTREL_VHT is not set
CONFIG_MAC80211_RC_DEFAULT_MINSTREL=y
CONFIG_MAC80211_RC_DEFAULT="minstrel_ht"
CONFIG_MAC80211_MESH=y
CONFIG_MAC80211_LEDS=y
# CONFIG_MAC80211_DEBUGFS is not set
# CONFIG_MAC80211_MESSAGE_TRACING is not set
# CONFIG_MAC80211_DEBUG_MENU is not set
CONFIG_MAC80211_STA_HASH_MAX_SIZE=0
# CONFIG_WIMAX is not set
CONFIG_RFKILL=m
CONFIG_RFKILL_LEDS=y
CONFIG_RFKILL_INPUT=y
# CONFIG_RFKILL_GPIO is not set
CONFIG_NET_9P=y
CONFIG_NET_9P_VIRTIO=y
# CONFIG_NET_9P_DEBUG is not set
# CONFIG_CAIF is not set
# CONFIG_CEPH_LIB is not set
# CONFIG_NFC is not set
# CONFIG_PSAMPLE is not set
# CONFIG_NET_IFE is not set
# CONFIG_LWTUNNEL is not set
CONFIG_DST_CACHE=y
CONFIG_GRO_CELLS=y
# CONFIG_NET_DEVLINK is not set
CONFIG_MAY_USE_DEVLINK=y
CONFIG_HAVE_EBPF_JIT=y
#
# Device Drivers
#
#
# Generic Driver Options
#
CONFIG_UEVENT_HELPER=y
CONFIG_UEVENT_HELPER_PATH=""
CONFIG_DEVTMPFS=y
CONFIG_DEVTMPFS_MOUNT=y
CONFIG_STANDALONE=y
CONFIG_PREVENT_FIRMWARE_BUILD=y
CONFIG_FW_LOADER=y
# CONFIG_FIRMWARE_IN_KERNEL is not set
CONFIG_EXTRA_FIRMWARE=""
CONFIG_FW_LOADER_USER_HELPER=y
CONFIG_FW_LOADER_USER_HELPER_FALLBACK=y
CONFIG_ALLOW_DEV_COREDUMP=y
# CONFIG_DEBUG_DRIVER is not set
# CONFIG_DEBUG_DEVRES is not set
# CONFIG_DEBUG_TEST_DRIVER_REMOVE is not set
# CONFIG_TEST_ASYNC_DRIVER_PROBE is not set
CONFIG_SYS_HYPERVISOR=y
# CONFIG_GENERIC_CPU_DEVICES is not set
CONFIG_GENERIC_CPU_AUTOPROBE=y
CONFIG_REGMAP=y
CONFIG_REGMAP_I2C=y
CONFIG_REGMAP_SPI=y
CONFIG_DMA_SHARED_BUFFER=y
# CONFIG_DMA_FENCE_TRACE is not set
CONFIG_DMA_CMA=y
#
# Default contiguous memory area size:
#
CONFIG_CMA_SIZE_MBYTES=200
CONFIG_CMA_SIZE_SEL_MBYTES=y
# CONFIG_CMA_SIZE_SEL_PERCENTAGE is not set
# CONFIG_CMA_SIZE_SEL_MIN is not set
# CONFIG_CMA_SIZE_SEL_MAX is not set
CONFIG_CMA_ALIGNMENT=8
#
# Bus devices
#
CONFIG_CONNECTOR=y
CONFIG_PROC_EVENTS=y
CONFIG_MTD=m
# CONFIG_MTD_TESTS is not set
# CONFIG_MTD_REDBOOT_PARTS is not set
# CONFIG_MTD_CMDLINE_PARTS is not set
# CONFIG_MTD_AR7_PARTS is not set
#
# User Modules And Translation Layers
#
CONFIG_MTD_BLKDEVS=m
CONFIG_MTD_BLOCK=m
# CONFIG_MTD_BLOCK_RO is not set
# CONFIG_FTL is not set
# CONFIG_NFTL is not set
# CONFIG_INFTL is not set
# CONFIG_RFD_FTL is not set
# CONFIG_SSFDC is not set
# CONFIG_SM_FTL is not set
# CONFIG_MTD_OOPS is not set
# CONFIG_MTD_SWAP is not set
# CONFIG_MTD_PARTITIONED_MASTER is not set
#
# RAM/ROM/Flash chip drivers
#
# CONFIG_MTD_CFI is not set
# CONFIG_MTD_JEDECPROBE is not set
CONFIG_MTD_MAP_BANK_WIDTH_1=y
CONFIG_MTD_MAP_BANK_WIDTH_2=y
CONFIG_MTD_MAP_BANK_WIDTH_4=y
# CONFIG_MTD_MAP_BANK_WIDTH_8 is not set
# CONFIG_MTD_MAP_BANK_WIDTH_16 is not set
# CONFIG_MTD_MAP_BANK_WIDTH_32 is not set
CONFIG_MTD_CFI_I1=y
CONFIG_MTD_CFI_I2=y
# CONFIG_MTD_CFI_I4 is not set
# CONFIG_MTD_CFI_I8 is not set
# CONFIG_MTD_RAM is not set
# CONFIG_MTD_ROM is not set
# CONFIG_MTD_ABSENT is not set
#
# Mapping drivers for chip access
#
# CONFIG_MTD_COMPLEX_MAPPINGS is not set
# CONFIG_MTD_INTEL_VR_NOR is not set
# CONFIG_MTD_PLATRAM is not set
#
# Self-contained MTD device drivers
#
# CONFIG_MTD_PMC551 is not set
# CONFIG_MTD_DATAFLASH is not set
# CONFIG_MTD_SST25L is not set
# CONFIG_MTD_SLRAM is not set
# CONFIG_MTD_PHRAM is not set
# CONFIG_MTD_MTDRAM is not set
# CONFIG_MTD_BLOCK2MTD is not set
#
# Disk-On-Chip Device Drivers
#
# CONFIG_MTD_DOCG3 is not set
# CONFIG_MTD_NAND is not set
# CONFIG_MTD_ONENAND is not set
#
# LPDDR & LPDDR2 PCM memory drivers
#
# CONFIG_MTD_LPDDR is not set
# CONFIG_MTD_SPI_NOR is not set
CONFIG_MTD_UBI=m
CONFIG_MTD_UBI_WL_THRESHOLD=4096
CONFIG_MTD_UBI_BEB_LIMIT=20
# CONFIG_MTD_UBI_FASTMAP is not set
# CONFIG_MTD_UBI_GLUEBI is not set
# CONFIG_MTD_UBI_BLOCK is not set
# CONFIG_OF is not set
CONFIG_ARCH_MIGHT_HAVE_PC_PARPORT=y
CONFIG_PARPORT=m
CONFIG_PARPORT_PC=m
CONFIG_PARPORT_SERIAL=m
# CONFIG_PARPORT_PC_FIFO is not set
# CONFIG_PARPORT_PC_SUPERIO is not set
# CONFIG_PARPORT_GSC is not set
# CONFIG_PARPORT_AX88796 is not set
CONFIG_PARPORT_1284=y
CONFIG_PARPORT_NOT_PC=y
CONFIG_PNP=y
# CONFIG_PNP_DEBUG_MESSAGES is not set
#
# Protocols
#
CONFIG_PNPACPI=y
CONFIG_BLK_DEV=y
CONFIG_BLK_DEV_NULL_BLK=m
CONFIG_BLK_DEV_FD=m
# CONFIG_PARIDE is not set
CONFIG_BLK_DEV_PCIESSD_MTIP32XX=m
# CONFIG_ZRAM is not set
# CONFIG_BLK_CPQ_CISS_DA is not set
# CONFIG_BLK_DEV_DAC960 is not set
# CONFIG_BLK_DEV_UMEM is not set
# CONFIG_BLK_DEV_COW_COMMON is not set
CONFIG_BLK_DEV_LOOP=m
CONFIG_BLK_DEV_LOOP_MIN_COUNT=0
# CONFIG_BLK_DEV_CRYPTOLOOP is not set
# CONFIG_BLK_DEV_DRBD is not set
# CONFIG_BLK_DEV_NBD is not set
# CONFIG_BLK_DEV_SKD is not set
CONFIG_BLK_DEV_OSD=m
CONFIG_BLK_DEV_SX8=m
CONFIG_BLK_DEV_RAM=m
CONFIG_BLK_DEV_RAM_COUNT=16
CONFIG_BLK_DEV_RAM_SIZE=16384
# CONFIG_BLK_DEV_RAM_DAX is not set
CONFIG_CDROM_PKTCDVD=m
CONFIG_CDROM_PKTCDVD_BUFFERS=8
# CONFIG_CDROM_PKTCDVD_WCACHE is not set
CONFIG_ATA_OVER_ETH=m
CONFIG_XEN_BLKDEV_FRONTEND=m
# CONFIG_XEN_BLKDEV_BACKEND is not set
CONFIG_VIRTIO_BLK=y
# CONFIG_VIRTIO_BLK_SCSI is not set
# CONFIG_BLK_DEV_HD is not set
# CONFIG_BLK_DEV_RBD is not set
CONFIG_BLK_DEV_RSXX=m
CONFIG_NVME_CORE=m
CONFIG_BLK_DEV_NVME=m
# CONFIG_BLK_DEV_NVME_SCSI is not set
# CONFIG_NVME_FC is not set
# CONFIG_NVME_TARGET is not set
#
# Misc devices
#
CONFIG_SENSORS_LIS3LV02D=m
# CONFIG_AD525X_DPOT is not set
# CONFIG_DUMMY_IRQ is not set
# CONFIG_IBM_ASM is not set
# CONFIG_PHANTOM is not set
CONFIG_SGI_IOC4=m
CONFIG_TIFM_CORE=m
CONFIG_TIFM_7XX1=m
# CONFIG_ICS932S401 is not set
CONFIG_ENCLOSURE_SERVICES=m
CONFIG_SGI_XP=m
CONFIG_HP_ILO=m
CONFIG_SGI_GRU=m
# CONFIG_SGI_GRU_DEBUG is not set
CONFIG_APDS9802ALS=m
CONFIG_ISL29003=m
CONFIG_ISL29020=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_TSL2550=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_BH1770=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_APDS990X=m
# CONFIG_HMC6352 is not set
# CONFIG_DS1682 is not set
# CONFIG_TI_DAC7512 is not set
CONFIG_VMWARE_BALLOON=m
# CONFIG_USB_SWITCH_FSA9480 is not set
# CONFIG_LATTICE_ECP3_CONFIG is not set
# CONFIG_SRAM is not set
# CONFIG_PANEL is not set
# CONFIG_C2PORT is not set
#
# EEPROM support
#
CONFIG_EEPROM_AT24=m
# CONFIG_EEPROM_AT25 is not set
CONFIG_EEPROM_LEGACY=m
CONFIG_EEPROM_MAX6875=m
CONFIG_EEPROM_93CX6=m
# CONFIG_EEPROM_93XX46 is not set
# CONFIG_EEPROM_IDT_89HPESX is not set
CONFIG_CB710_CORE=m
# CONFIG_CB710_DEBUG is not set
CONFIG_CB710_DEBUG_ASSUMPTIONS=y
#
# Texas Instruments shared transport line discipline
#
# CONFIG_TI_ST is not set
CONFIG_SENSORS_LIS3_I2C=m
#
# Altera FPGA firmware download module
#
CONFIG_ALTERA_STAPL=m
CONFIG_INTEL_MEI=y
CONFIG_INTEL_MEI_ME=y
# CONFIG_INTEL_MEI_TXE is not set
CONFIG_VMWARE_VMCI=m
#
# Intel MIC Bus Driver
#
# CONFIG_INTEL_MIC_BUS is not set
#
# SCIF Bus Driver
#
# CONFIG_SCIF_BUS is not set
#
# VOP Bus Driver
#
# CONFIG_VOP_BUS is not set
#
# Intel MIC Host Driver
#
#
# Intel MIC Card Driver
#
#
# SCIF Driver
#
#
# Intel MIC Coprocessor State Management (COSM) Drivers
#
#
# VOP Driver
#
# CONFIG_GENWQE is not set
# CONFIG_ECHO is not set
# CONFIG_CXL_BASE is not set
# CONFIG_CXL_AFU_DRIVER_OPS is not set
CONFIG_HAVE_IDE=y
# CONFIG_IDE is not set
#
# SCSI device support
#
CONFIG_SCSI_MOD=y
CONFIG_RAID_ATTRS=m
CONFIG_SCSI=y
CONFIG_SCSI_DMA=y
CONFIG_SCSI_NETLINK=y
# CONFIG_SCSI_MQ_DEFAULT is not set
CONFIG_SCSI_PROC_FS=y
#
# SCSI support type (disk, tape, CD-ROM)
#
CONFIG_BLK_DEV_SD=m
CONFIG_CHR_DEV_ST=m
CONFIG_CHR_DEV_OSST=m
CONFIG_BLK_DEV_SR=m
CONFIG_BLK_DEV_SR_VENDOR=y
CONFIG_CHR_DEV_SG=m
CONFIG_CHR_DEV_SCH=m
CONFIG_SCSI_ENCLOSURE=m
CONFIG_SCSI_CONSTANTS=y
CONFIG_SCSI_LOGGING=y
CONFIG_SCSI_SCAN_ASYNC=y
#
# SCSI Transports
#
CONFIG_SCSI_SPI_ATTRS=m
CONFIG_SCSI_FC_ATTRS=m
CONFIG_SCSI_ISCSI_ATTRS=m
CONFIG_SCSI_SAS_ATTRS=m
CONFIG_SCSI_SAS_LIBSAS=m
CONFIG_SCSI_SAS_ATA=y
CONFIG_SCSI_SAS_HOST_SMP=y
CONFIG_SCSI_SRP_ATTRS=m
CONFIG_SCSI_LOWLEVEL=y
CONFIG_ISCSI_TCP=m
CONFIG_ISCSI_BOOT_SYSFS=m
CONFIG_SCSI_CXGB3_ISCSI=m
CONFIG_SCSI_CXGB4_ISCSI=m
CONFIG_SCSI_BNX2_ISCSI=m
CONFIG_SCSI_BNX2X_FCOE=m
CONFIG_BE2ISCSI=m
# CONFIG_BLK_DEV_3W_XXXX_RAID is not set
CONFIG_SCSI_HPSA=m
CONFIG_SCSI_3W_9XXX=m
CONFIG_SCSI_3W_SAS=m
# CONFIG_SCSI_ACARD is not set
CONFIG_SCSI_AACRAID=m
# CONFIG_SCSI_AIC7XXX is not set
CONFIG_SCSI_AIC79XX=m
CONFIG_AIC79XX_CMDS_PER_DEVICE=4
CONFIG_AIC79XX_RESET_DELAY_MS=15000
# CONFIG_AIC79XX_DEBUG_ENABLE is not set
CONFIG_AIC79XX_DEBUG_MASK=0
# CONFIG_AIC79XX_REG_PRETTY_PRINT is not set
# CONFIG_SCSI_AIC94XX is not set
CONFIG_SCSI_MVSAS=m
# CONFIG_SCSI_MVSAS_DEBUG is not set
CONFIG_SCSI_MVSAS_TASKLET=y
CONFIG_SCSI_MVUMI=m
# CONFIG_SCSI_DPT_I2O is not set
# CONFIG_SCSI_ADVANSYS is not set
CONFIG_SCSI_ARCMSR=m
# CONFIG_SCSI_ESAS2R is not set
# CONFIG_MEGARAID_NEWGEN is not set
# CONFIG_MEGARAID_LEGACY is not set
CONFIG_MEGARAID_SAS=m
CONFIG_SCSI_MPT3SAS=m
CONFIG_SCSI_MPT2SAS_MAX_SGE=128
CONFIG_SCSI_MPT3SAS_MAX_SGE=128
CONFIG_SCSI_MPT2SAS=m
# CONFIG_SCSI_SMARTPQI is not set
CONFIG_SCSI_UFSHCD=m
CONFIG_SCSI_UFSHCD_PCI=m
# CONFIG_SCSI_UFS_DWC_TC_PCI is not set
# CONFIG_SCSI_UFSHCD_PLATFORM is not set
CONFIG_SCSI_HPTIOP=m
# CONFIG_SCSI_BUSLOGIC is not set
CONFIG_VMWARE_PVSCSI=m
# CONFIG_XEN_SCSI_FRONTEND is not set
CONFIG_HYPERV_STORAGE=m
CONFIG_LIBFC=m
CONFIG_LIBFCOE=m
CONFIG_FCOE=m
CONFIG_FCOE_FNIC=m
# CONFIG_SCSI_SNIC is not set
# CONFIG_SCSI_DMX3191D is not set
# CONFIG_SCSI_EATA is not set
# CONFIG_SCSI_FUTURE_DOMAIN is not set
# CONFIG_SCSI_GDTH is not set
CONFIG_SCSI_ISCI=m
# CONFIG_SCSI_IPS is not set
CONFIG_SCSI_INITIO=m
# CONFIG_SCSI_INIA100 is not set
# CONFIG_SCSI_PPA is not set
# CONFIG_SCSI_IMM is not set
CONFIG_SCSI_STEX=m
# CONFIG_SCSI_SYM53C8XX_2 is not set
CONFIG_SCSI_IPR=m
CONFIG_SCSI_IPR_TRACE=y
CONFIG_SCSI_IPR_DUMP=y
# CONFIG_SCSI_QLOGIC_1280 is not set
CONFIG_SCSI_QLA_FC=m
# CONFIG_TCM_QLA2XXX is not set
CONFIG_SCSI_QLA_ISCSI=m
# CONFIG_SCSI_DC395x is not set
# CONFIG_SCSI_AM53C974 is not set
# CONFIG_SCSI_WD719X is not set
CONFIG_SCSI_DEBUG=m
CONFIG_SCSI_PMCRAID=m
CONFIG_SCSI_PM8001=m
# CONFIG_SCSI_BFA_FC is not set
CONFIG_SCSI_VIRTIO=m
CONFIG_SCSI_CHELSIO_FCOE=m
CONFIG_SCSI_DH=y
CONFIG_SCSI_DH_RDAC=y
CONFIG_SCSI_DH_HP_SW=y
CONFIG_SCSI_DH_EMC=y
CONFIG_SCSI_DH_ALUA=y
CONFIG_SCSI_OSD_INITIATOR=m
CONFIG_SCSI_OSD_ULD=m
CONFIG_SCSI_OSD_DPRINT_SENSE=1
# CONFIG_SCSI_OSD_DEBUG is not set
CONFIG_ATA=m
# CONFIG_ATA_NONSTANDARD is not set
CONFIG_ATA_VERBOSE_ERROR=y
CONFIG_ATA_ACPI=y
# CONFIG_SATA_ZPODD is not set
CONFIG_SATA_PMP=y
#
# Controllers with non-SFF native interface
#
CONFIG_SATA_AHCI=m
CONFIG_SATA_AHCI_PLATFORM=m
# CONFIG_SATA_INIC162X is not set
CONFIG_SATA_ACARD_AHCI=m
CONFIG_SATA_SIL24=m
CONFIG_ATA_SFF=y
#
# SFF controllers with custom DMA interface
#
CONFIG_PDC_ADMA=m
CONFIG_SATA_QSTOR=m
CONFIG_SATA_SX4=m
CONFIG_ATA_BMDMA=y
#
# SATA SFF controllers with BMDMA
#
CONFIG_ATA_PIIX=m
# CONFIG_SATA_DWC is not set
CONFIG_SATA_MV=m
CONFIG_SATA_NV=m
CONFIG_SATA_PROMISE=m
CONFIG_SATA_SIL=m
CONFIG_SATA_SIS=m
CONFIG_SATA_SVW=m
CONFIG_SATA_ULI=m
CONFIG_SATA_VIA=m
CONFIG_SATA_VITESSE=m
#
# PATA SFF controllers with BMDMA
#
CONFIG_PATA_ALI=m
CONFIG_PATA_AMD=m
CONFIG_PATA_ARTOP=m
CONFIG_PATA_ATIIXP=m
CONFIG_PATA_ATP867X=m
CONFIG_PATA_CMD64X=m
# CONFIG_PATA_CYPRESS is not set
# CONFIG_PATA_EFAR is not set
CONFIG_PATA_HPT366=m
CONFIG_PATA_HPT37X=m
CONFIG_PATA_HPT3X2N=m
CONFIG_PATA_HPT3X3=m
# CONFIG_PATA_HPT3X3_DMA is not set
CONFIG_PATA_IT8213=m
CONFIG_PATA_IT821X=m
CONFIG_PATA_JMICRON=m
CONFIG_PATA_MARVELL=m
CONFIG_PATA_NETCELL=m
CONFIG_PATA_NINJA32=m
# CONFIG_PATA_NS87415 is not set
CONFIG_PATA_OLDPIIX=m
# CONFIG_PATA_OPTIDMA is not set
CONFIG_PATA_PDC2027X=m
CONFIG_PATA_PDC_OLD=m
# CONFIG_PATA_RADISYS is not set
CONFIG_PATA_RDC=m
CONFIG_PATA_SCH=m
CONFIG_PATA_SERVERWORKS=m
CONFIG_PATA_SIL680=m
CONFIG_PATA_SIS=m
CONFIG_PATA_TOSHIBA=m
# CONFIG_PATA_TRIFLEX is not set
CONFIG_PATA_VIA=m
# CONFIG_PATA_WINBOND is not set
#
# PIO-only SFF controllers
#
# CONFIG_PATA_CMD640_PCI is not set
# CONFIG_PATA_MPIIX is not set
# CONFIG_PATA_NS87410 is not set
# CONFIG_PATA_OPTI is not set
# CONFIG_PATA_PLATFORM is not set
# CONFIG_PATA_RZ1000 is not set
#
# Generic fallback / legacy drivers
#
CONFIG_PATA_ACPI=m
CONFIG_ATA_GENERIC=m
# CONFIG_PATA_LEGACY is not set
CONFIG_MD=y
CONFIG_BLK_DEV_MD=y
CONFIG_MD_AUTODETECT=y
CONFIG_MD_LINEAR=m
CONFIG_MD_RAID0=m
CONFIG_MD_RAID1=m
CONFIG_MD_RAID10=m
CONFIG_MD_RAID456=m
CONFIG_MD_MULTIPATH=m
CONFIG_MD_FAULTY=m
# CONFIG_MD_CLUSTER is not set
# CONFIG_BCACHE is not set
CONFIG_BLK_DEV_DM_BUILTIN=y
CONFIG_BLK_DEV_DM=m
# CONFIG_DM_MQ_DEFAULT is not set
CONFIG_DM_DEBUG=y
CONFIG_DM_BUFIO=m
# CONFIG_DM_DEBUG_BLOCK_MANAGER_LOCKING is not set
CONFIG_DM_BIO_PRISON=m
CONFIG_DM_PERSISTENT_DATA=m
CONFIG_DM_CRYPT=m
CONFIG_DM_SNAPSHOT=m
CONFIG_DM_THIN_PROVISIONING=m
CONFIG_DM_CACHE=m
CONFIG_DM_CACHE_SMQ=m
CONFIG_DM_CACHE_CLEANER=m
# CONFIG_DM_ERA is not set
CONFIG_DM_MIRROR=m
CONFIG_DM_LOG_USERSPACE=m
CONFIG_DM_RAID=m
CONFIG_DM_ZERO=m
CONFIG_DM_MULTIPATH=m
CONFIG_DM_MULTIPATH_QL=m
CONFIG_DM_MULTIPATH_ST=m
CONFIG_DM_DELAY=m
CONFIG_DM_UEVENT=y
CONFIG_DM_FLAKEY=m
CONFIG_DM_VERITY=m
# CONFIG_DM_VERITY_FEC is not set
CONFIG_DM_SWITCH=m
# CONFIG_DM_LOG_WRITES is not set
CONFIG_TARGET_CORE=m
CONFIG_TCM_IBLOCK=m
CONFIG_TCM_FILEIO=m
CONFIG_TCM_PSCSI=m
# CONFIG_TCM_USER2 is not set
CONFIG_LOOPBACK_TARGET=m
CONFIG_TCM_FC=m
CONFIG_ISCSI_TARGET=m
# CONFIG_ISCSI_TARGET_CXGB4 is not set
# CONFIG_SBP_TARGET is not set
CONFIG_FUSION=y
CONFIG_FUSION_SPI=m
# CONFIG_FUSION_FC is not set
CONFIG_FUSION_SAS=m
CONFIG_FUSION_MAX_SGE=128
CONFIG_FUSION_CTL=m
CONFIG_FUSION_LOGGING=y
#
# IEEE 1394 (FireWire) support
#
CONFIG_FIREWIRE=m
CONFIG_FIREWIRE_OHCI=m
CONFIG_FIREWIRE_SBP2=m
CONFIG_FIREWIRE_NET=m
# CONFIG_FIREWIRE_NOSY is not set
CONFIG_MACINTOSH_DRIVERS=y
CONFIG_MAC_EMUMOUSEBTN=y
CONFIG_NETDEVICES=y
CONFIG_MII=y
CONFIG_NET_CORE=y
CONFIG_BONDING=m
CONFIG_DUMMY=m
# CONFIG_EQUALIZER is not set
CONFIG_NET_FC=y
CONFIG_IFB=m
CONFIG_NET_TEAM=m
CONFIG_NET_TEAM_MODE_BROADCAST=m
CONFIG_NET_TEAM_MODE_ROUNDROBIN=m
CONFIG_NET_TEAM_MODE_RANDOM=m
CONFIG_NET_TEAM_MODE_ACTIVEBACKUP=m
CONFIG_NET_TEAM_MODE_LOADBALANCE=m
CONFIG_MACVLAN=m
CONFIG_MACVTAP=m
CONFIG_VXLAN=m
# CONFIG_GENEVE is not set
# CONFIG_GTP is not set
# CONFIG_MACSEC is not set
CONFIG_NETCONSOLE=m
CONFIG_NETCONSOLE_DYNAMIC=y
CONFIG_NETPOLL=y
CONFIG_NET_POLL_CONTROLLER=y
CONFIG_TUN=m
CONFIG_TAP=m
# CONFIG_TUN_VNET_CROSS_LE is not set
CONFIG_VETH=m
CONFIG_VIRTIO_NET=y
CONFIG_NLMON=m
# CONFIG_ARCNET is not set
# CONFIG_ATM_DRIVERS is not set
#
# CAIF transport drivers
#
#
# Distributed Switch Architecture drivers
#
CONFIG_ETHERNET=y
CONFIG_MDIO=y
# CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_3COM is not set
# CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_ADAPTEC is not set
CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_AGERE=y
# CONFIG_ET131X is not set
CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_ALACRITECH=y
# CONFIG_SLICOSS is not set
# CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_ALTEON is not set
# CONFIG_ALTERA_TSE is not set
CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_AMAZON=y
# CONFIG_ENA_ETHERNET is not set
# CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_AMD is not set
CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_AQUANTIA=y
# CONFIG_AQTION is not set
CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_ARC=y
CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_ATHEROS=y
CONFIG_ATL2=m
CONFIG_ATL1=m
CONFIG_ATL1E=m
CONFIG_ATL1C=m
CONFIG_ALX=m
# CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_AURORA is not set
CONFIG_NET_CADENCE=y
# CONFIG_MACB is not set
CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_BROADCOM=y
CONFIG_B44=m
CONFIG_B44_PCI_AUTOSELECT=y
CONFIG_B44_PCICORE_AUTOSELECT=y
CONFIG_B44_PCI=y
# CONFIG_BCMGENET is not set
CONFIG_BNX2=m
CONFIG_CNIC=m
CONFIG_TIGON3=y
# CONFIG_BNX2X is not set
# CONFIG_BNXT is not set
CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_BROCADE=y
CONFIG_BNA=m
CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_CAVIUM=y
# CONFIG_THUNDER_NIC_PF is not set
# CONFIG_THUNDER_NIC_VF is not set
# CONFIG_THUNDER_NIC_BGX is not set
# CONFIG_THUNDER_NIC_RGX is not set
# CONFIG_LIQUIDIO is not set
# CONFIG_LIQUIDIO_VF is not set
CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_CHELSIO=y
# CONFIG_CHELSIO_T1 is not set
CONFIG_CHELSIO_T3=m
CONFIG_CHELSIO_T4=m
# CONFIG_CHELSIO_T4_DCB is not set
CONFIG_CHELSIO_T4VF=m
CONFIG_CHELSIO_LIB=m
CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_CISCO=y
CONFIG_ENIC=m
# CONFIG_CX_ECAT is not set
CONFIG_DNET=m
CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_DEC=y
CONFIG_NET_TULIP=y
CONFIG_DE2104X=m
CONFIG_DE2104X_DSL=0
CONFIG_TULIP=y
# CONFIG_TULIP_MWI is not set
CONFIG_TULIP_MMIO=y
# CONFIG_TULIP_NAPI is not set
CONFIG_DE4X5=m
CONFIG_WINBOND_840=m
CONFIG_DM9102=m
CONFIG_ULI526X=m
CONFIG_PCMCIA_XIRCOM=m
# CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_DLINK is not set
CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_EMULEX=y
CONFIG_BE2NET=m
CONFIG_BE2NET_HWMON=y
CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_EZCHIP=y
# CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_EXAR is not set
# CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_HP is not set
CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_INTEL=y
# CONFIG_E100 is not set
CONFIG_E1000=y
CONFIG_E1000E=y
CONFIG_E1000E_HWTS=y
CONFIG_IGB=y
CONFIG_IGB_HWMON=y
CONFIG_IGBVF=m
CONFIG_IXGB=m
CONFIG_IXGBE=y
CONFIG_IXGBE_HWMON=y
CONFIG_IXGBE_DCB=y
CONFIG_IXGBEVF=m
CONFIG_I40E=m
# CONFIG_I40E_DCB is not set
# CONFIG_I40E_FCOE is not set
# CONFIG_I40EVF is not set
# CONFIG_FM10K is not set
# CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_I825XX is not set
CONFIG_JME=m
CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_MARVELL=y
CONFIG_MVMDIO=m
CONFIG_SKGE=m
CONFIG_SKGE_DEBUG=y
CONFIG_SKGE_GENESIS=y
CONFIG_SKY2=m
CONFIG_SKY2_DEBUG=y
CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_MELLANOX=y
CONFIG_MLX4_EN=m
CONFIG_MLX4_EN_DCB=y
CONFIG_MLX4_CORE=m
CONFIG_MLX4_DEBUG=y
# CONFIG_MLX5_CORE is not set
# CONFIG_MLXSW_CORE is not set
# CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_MICREL is not set
CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_MICROCHIP=y
# CONFIG_ENC28J60 is not set
# CONFIG_ENCX24J600 is not set
CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_MYRI=y
CONFIG_MYRI10GE=m
# CONFIG_FEALNX is not set
# CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_NATSEMI is not set
CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_NETRONOME=y
# CONFIG_NFP is not set
# CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_NVIDIA is not set
CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_OKI=y
CONFIG_ETHOC=m
CONFIG_NET_PACKET_ENGINE=y
# CONFIG_HAMACHI is not set
CONFIG_YELLOWFIN=m
CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_QLOGIC=y
CONFIG_QLA3XXX=m
CONFIG_QLCNIC=m
CONFIG_QLCNIC_SRIOV=y
CONFIG_QLCNIC_DCB=y
CONFIG_QLCNIC_HWMON=y
CONFIG_QLGE=m
CONFIG_NETXEN_NIC=m
# CONFIG_QED is not set
CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_QUALCOMM=y
# CONFIG_QCOM_EMAC is not set
CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_REALTEK=y
# CONFIG_ATP is not set
CONFIG_8139CP=y
CONFIG_8139TOO=y
CONFIG_8139TOO_PIO=y
# CONFIG_8139TOO_TUNE_TWISTER is not set
CONFIG_8139TOO_8129=y
# CONFIG_8139_OLD_RX_RESET is not set
CONFIG_R8169=y
CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_RENESAS=y
# CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_RDC is not set
CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_ROCKER=y
CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_SAMSUNG=y
# CONFIG_SXGBE_ETH is not set
# CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_SEEQ is not set
# CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_SILAN is not set
# CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_SIS is not set
CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_SOLARFLARE=y
CONFIG_SFC=m
CONFIG_SFC_MTD=y
CONFIG_SFC_MCDI_MON=y
CONFIG_SFC_SRIOV=y
CONFIG_SFC_MCDI_LOGGING=y
# CONFIG_SFC_FALCON is not set
CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_SMSC=y
CONFIG_EPIC100=m
# CONFIG_SMSC911X is not set
CONFIG_SMSC9420=m
# CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_STMICRO is not set
# CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_SUN is not set
# CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_TEHUTI is not set
# CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_TI is not set
# CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_VIA is not set
# CONFIG_NET_VENDOR_WIZNET is not set
# CONFIG_FDDI is not set
# CONFIG_HIPPI is not set
# CONFIG_NET_SB1000 is not set
CONFIG_PHYLIB=y
CONFIG_SWPHY=y
# CONFIG_LED_TRIGGER_PHY is not set
#
# MDIO bus device drivers
#
# CONFIG_MDIO_BCM_UNIMAC is not set
CONFIG_MDIO_BITBANG=m
# CONFIG_MDIO_GPIO is not set
# CONFIG_MDIO_OCTEON is not set
# CONFIG_MDIO_THUNDER is not set
#
# MII PHY device drivers
#
CONFIG_AMD_PHY=m
# CONFIG_AQUANTIA_PHY is not set
CONFIG_AT803X_PHY=m
# CONFIG_BCM7XXX_PHY is not set
CONFIG_BCM87XX_PHY=m
CONFIG_BCM_NET_PHYLIB=m
CONFIG_BROADCOM_PHY=m
CONFIG_CICADA_PHY=m
CONFIG_DAVICOM_PHY=m
# CONFIG_DP83848_PHY is not set
# CONFIG_DP83867_PHY is not set
CONFIG_FIXED_PHY=y
CONFIG_ICPLUS_PHY=m
# CONFIG_INTEL_XWAY_PHY is not set
CONFIG_LSI_ET1011C_PHY=m
CONFIG_LXT_PHY=m
CONFIG_MARVELL_PHY=m
CONFIG_MICREL_PHY=m
# CONFIG_MICROCHIP_PHY is not set
# CONFIG_MICROSEMI_PHY is not set
CONFIG_NATIONAL_PHY=m
CONFIG_QSEMI_PHY=m
CONFIG_REALTEK_PHY=m
CONFIG_SMSC_PHY=m
CONFIG_STE10XP=m
# CONFIG_TERANETICS_PHY is not set
CONFIG_VITESSE_PHY=m
# CONFIG_XILINX_GMII2RGMII is not set
# CONFIG_MICREL_KS8995MA is not set
# CONFIG_PLIP is not set
CONFIG_PPP=m
CONFIG_PPP_BSDCOMP=m
CONFIG_PPP_DEFLATE=m
CONFIG_PPP_FILTER=y
CONFIG_PPP_MPPE=m
CONFIG_PPP_MULTILINK=y
CONFIG_PPPOATM=m
CONFIG_PPPOE=m
CONFIG_PPTP=m
CONFIG_PPPOL2TP=m
CONFIG_PPP_ASYNC=m
CONFIG_PPP_SYNC_TTY=m
CONFIG_SLIP=m
CONFIG_SLHC=m
CONFIG_SLIP_COMPRESSED=y
CONFIG_SLIP_SMART=y
# CONFIG_SLIP_MODE_SLIP6 is not set
CONFIG_USB_NET_DRIVERS=y
CONFIG_USB_CATC=y
CONFIG_USB_KAWETH=y
CONFIG_USB_PEGASUS=y
CONFIG_USB_RTL8150=y
CONFIG_USB_RTL8152=m
# CONFIG_USB_LAN78XX is not set
CONFIG_USB_USBNET=y
CONFIG_USB_NET_AX8817X=y
CONFIG_USB_NET_AX88179_178A=m
CONFIG_USB_NET_CDCETHER=y
CONFIG_USB_NET_CDC_EEM=y
CONFIG_USB_NET_CDC_NCM=m
# CONFIG_USB_NET_HUAWEI_CDC_NCM is not set
CONFIG_USB_NET_CDC_MBIM=m
CONFIG_USB_NET_DM9601=y
# CONFIG_USB_NET_SR9700 is not set
# CONFIG_USB_NET_SR9800 is not set
CONFIG_USB_NET_SMSC75XX=y
CONFIG_USB_NET_SMSC95XX=y
CONFIG_USB_NET_GL620A=y
CONFIG_USB_NET_NET1080=y
CONFIG_USB_NET_PLUSB=y
CONFIG_USB_NET_MCS7830=y
CONFIG_USB_NET_RNDIS_HOST=y
CONFIG_USB_NET_CDC_SUBSET_ENABLE=y
CONFIG_USB_NET_CDC_SUBSET=y
CONFIG_USB_ALI_M5632=y
CONFIG_USB_AN2720=y
CONFIG_USB_BELKIN=y
CONFIG_USB_ARMLINUX=y
CONFIG_USB_EPSON2888=y
CONFIG_USB_KC2190=y
CONFIG_USB_NET_ZAURUS=y
CONFIG_USB_NET_CX82310_ETH=m
CONFIG_USB_NET_KALMIA=m
CONFIG_USB_NET_QMI_WWAN=m
CONFIG_USB_HSO=m
CONFIG_USB_NET_INT51X1=y
CONFIG_USB_IPHETH=y
CONFIG_USB_SIERRA_NET=y
CONFIG_USB_VL600=m
# CONFIG_USB_NET_CH9200 is not set
CONFIG_WLAN=y
# CONFIG_WIRELESS_WDS is not set
CONFIG_WLAN_VENDOR_ADMTEK=y
# CONFIG_ADM8211 is not set
CONFIG_WLAN_VENDOR_ATH=y
# CONFIG_ATH_DEBUG is not set
# CONFIG_ATH5K is not set
# CONFIG_ATH5K_PCI is not set
# CONFIG_ATH9K is not set
# CONFIG_ATH9K_HTC is not set
# CONFIG_CARL9170 is not set
# CONFIG_ATH6KL is not set
# CONFIG_AR5523 is not set
# CONFIG_WIL6210 is not set
# CONFIG_ATH10K is not set
# CONFIG_WCN36XX is not set
CONFIG_WLAN_VENDOR_ATMEL=y
# CONFIG_ATMEL is not set
# CONFIG_AT76C50X_USB is not set
CONFIG_WLAN_VENDOR_BROADCOM=y
# CONFIG_B43 is not set
# CONFIG_B43LEGACY is not set
# CONFIG_BRCMSMAC is not set
# CONFIG_BRCMFMAC is not set
CONFIG_WLAN_VENDOR_CISCO=y
# CONFIG_AIRO is not set
CONFIG_WLAN_VENDOR_INTEL=y
# CONFIG_IPW2100 is not set
# CONFIG_IPW2200 is not set
# CONFIG_IWL4965 is not set
# CONFIG_IWL3945 is not set
# CONFIG_IWLWIFI is not set
CONFIG_WLAN_VENDOR_INTERSIL=y
# CONFIG_HOSTAP is not set
# CONFIG_HERMES is not set
# CONFIG_P54_COMMON is not set
# CONFIG_PRISM54 is not set
CONFIG_WLAN_VENDOR_MARVELL=y
# CONFIG_LIBERTAS is not set
# CONFIG_LIBERTAS_THINFIRM is not set
# CONFIG_MWIFIEX is not set
# CONFIG_MWL8K is not set
CONFIG_WLAN_VENDOR_MEDIATEK=y
# CONFIG_MT7601U is not set
CONFIG_WLAN_VENDOR_RALINK=y
# CONFIG_RT2X00 is not set
CONFIG_WLAN_VENDOR_REALTEK=y
# CONFIG_RTL8180 is not set
# CONFIG_RTL8187 is not set
CONFIG_RTL_CARDS=m
# CONFIG_RTL8192CE is not set
# CONFIG_RTL8192SE is not set
# CONFIG_RTL8192DE is not set
# CONFIG_RTL8723AE is not set
# CONFIG_RTL8723BE is not set
# CONFIG_RTL8188EE is not set
# CONFIG_RTL8192EE is not set
# CONFIG_RTL8821AE is not set
# CONFIG_RTL8192CU is not set
# CONFIG_RTL8XXXU is not set
CONFIG_WLAN_VENDOR_RSI=y
# CONFIG_RSI_91X is not set
CONFIG_WLAN_VENDOR_ST=y
# CONFIG_CW1200 is not set
CONFIG_WLAN_VENDOR_TI=y
# CONFIG_WL1251 is not set
# CONFIG_WL12XX is not set
# CONFIG_WL18XX is not set
# CONFIG_WLCORE is not set
CONFIG_WLAN_VENDOR_ZYDAS=y
# CONFIG_USB_ZD1201 is not set
# CONFIG_ZD1211RW is not set
CONFIG_MAC80211_HWSIM=m
# CONFIG_USB_NET_RNDIS_WLAN is not set
#
# Enable WiMAX (Networking options) to see the WiMAX drivers
#
CONFIG_WAN=y
# CONFIG_LANMEDIA is not set
CONFIG_HDLC=m
CONFIG_HDLC_RAW=m
# CONFIG_HDLC_RAW_ETH is not set
CONFIG_HDLC_CISCO=m
CONFIG_HDLC_FR=m
CONFIG_HDLC_PPP=m
#
# X.25/LAPB support is disabled
#
# CONFIG_PCI200SYN is not set
# CONFIG_WANXL is not set
# CONFIG_PC300TOO is not set
# CONFIG_FARSYNC is not set
# CONFIG_DSCC4 is not set
CONFIG_DLCI=m
CONFIG_DLCI_MAX=8
# CONFIG_SBNI is not set
CONFIG_IEEE802154_DRIVERS=m
CONFIG_IEEE802154_FAKELB=m
# CONFIG_IEEE802154_AT86RF230 is not set
# CONFIG_IEEE802154_MRF24J40 is not set
# CONFIG_IEEE802154_CC2520 is not set
# CONFIG_IEEE802154_ATUSB is not set
# CONFIG_IEEE802154_ADF7242 is not set
CONFIG_XEN_NETDEV_FRONTEND=m
# CONFIG_XEN_NETDEV_BACKEND is not set
CONFIG_VMXNET3=m
# CONFIG_FUJITSU_ES is not set
CONFIG_HYPERV_NET=m
CONFIG_ISDN=y
CONFIG_ISDN_I4L=m
CONFIG_ISDN_PPP=y
CONFIG_ISDN_PPP_VJ=y
CONFIG_ISDN_MPP=y
CONFIG_IPPP_FILTER=y
# CONFIG_ISDN_PPP_BSDCOMP is not set
CONFIG_ISDN_AUDIO=y
CONFIG_ISDN_TTY_FAX=y
#
# ISDN feature submodules
#
CONFIG_ISDN_DIVERSION=m
#
# ISDN4Linux hardware drivers
#
#
# Passive cards
#
# CONFIG_ISDN_DRV_HISAX is not set
CONFIG_ISDN_CAPI=m
# CONFIG_CAPI_TRACE is not set
CONFIG_ISDN_CAPI_CAPI20=m
CONFIG_ISDN_CAPI_MIDDLEWARE=y
CONFIG_ISDN_CAPI_CAPIDRV=m
# CONFIG_ISDN_CAPI_CAPIDRV_VERBOSE is not set
#
# CAPI hardware drivers
#
CONFIG_CAPI_AVM=y
CONFIG_ISDN_DRV_AVMB1_B1PCI=m
CONFIG_ISDN_DRV_AVMB1_B1PCIV4=y
CONFIG_ISDN_DRV_AVMB1_T1PCI=m
CONFIG_ISDN_DRV_AVMB1_C4=m
# CONFIG_CAPI_EICON is not set
CONFIG_ISDN_DRV_GIGASET=m
CONFIG_GIGASET_CAPI=y
# CONFIG_GIGASET_I4L is not set
# CONFIG_GIGASET_DUMMYLL is not set
CONFIG_GIGASET_BASE=m
CONFIG_GIGASET_M105=m
CONFIG_GIGASET_M101=m
# CONFIG_GIGASET_DEBUG is not set
CONFIG_HYSDN=m
CONFIG_HYSDN_CAPI=y
CONFIG_MISDN=m
CONFIG_MISDN_DSP=m
CONFIG_MISDN_L1OIP=m
#
# mISDN hardware drivers
#
CONFIG_MISDN_HFCPCI=m
CONFIG_MISDN_HFCMULTI=m
CONFIG_MISDN_HFCUSB=m
CONFIG_MISDN_AVMFRITZ=m
CONFIG_MISDN_SPEEDFAX=m
CONFIG_MISDN_INFINEON=m
CONFIG_MISDN_W6692=m
CONFIG_MISDN_NETJET=m
CONFIG_MISDN_IPAC=m
CONFIG_MISDN_ISAR=m
CONFIG_ISDN_HDLC=m
# CONFIG_NVM is not set
#
# Input device support
#
CONFIG_INPUT=y
CONFIG_INPUT_LEDS=y
CONFIG_INPUT_FF_MEMLESS=m
CONFIG_INPUT_POLLDEV=m
CONFIG_INPUT_SPARSEKMAP=m
# CONFIG_INPUT_MATRIXKMAP is not set
#
# Userland interfaces
#
CONFIG_INPUT_MOUSEDEV=y
# CONFIG_INPUT_MOUSEDEV_PSAUX is not set
CONFIG_INPUT_MOUSEDEV_SCREEN_X=1024
CONFIG_INPUT_MOUSEDEV_SCREEN_Y=768
# CONFIG_INPUT_JOYDEV is not set
CONFIG_INPUT_EVDEV=y
# CONFIG_INPUT_EVBUG is not set
#
# Input Device Drivers
#
CONFIG_INPUT_KEYBOARD=y
# CONFIG_KEYBOARD_ADP5588 is not set
# CONFIG_KEYBOARD_ADP5589 is not set
CONFIG_KEYBOARD_ATKBD=y
# CONFIG_KEYBOARD_QT1070 is not set
# CONFIG_KEYBOARD_QT2160 is not set
# CONFIG_KEYBOARD_LKKBD is not set
# CONFIG_KEYBOARD_GPIO is not set
# CONFIG_KEYBOARD_GPIO_POLLED is not set
# CONFIG_KEYBOARD_TCA6416 is not set
# CONFIG_KEYBOARD_TCA8418 is not set
# CONFIG_KEYBOARD_MATRIX is not set
# CONFIG_KEYBOARD_LM8323 is not set
# CONFIG_KEYBOARD_LM8333 is not set
# CONFIG_KEYBOARD_MAX7359 is not set
# CONFIG_KEYBOARD_MCS is not set
# CONFIG_KEYBOARD_MPR121 is not set
# CONFIG_KEYBOARD_NEWTON is not set
# CONFIG_KEYBOARD_OPENCORES is not set
# CONFIG_KEYBOARD_SAMSUNG is not set
# CONFIG_KEYBOARD_STOWAWAY is not set
# CONFIG_KEYBOARD_SUNKBD is not set
# CONFIG_KEYBOARD_TM2_TOUCHKEY is not set
# CONFIG_KEYBOARD_XTKBD is not set
CONFIG_INPUT_MOUSE=y
CONFIG_MOUSE_PS2=y
CONFIG_MOUSE_PS2_ALPS=y
CONFIG_MOUSE_PS2_BYD=y
CONFIG_MOUSE_PS2_LOGIPS2PP=y
CONFIG_MOUSE_PS2_SYNAPTICS=y
CONFIG_MOUSE_PS2_CYPRESS=y
CONFIG_MOUSE_PS2_LIFEBOOK=y
CONFIG_MOUSE_PS2_TRACKPOINT=y
CONFIG_MOUSE_PS2_ELANTECH=y
CONFIG_MOUSE_PS2_SENTELIC=y
# CONFIG_MOUSE_PS2_TOUCHKIT is not set
CONFIG_MOUSE_PS2_FOCALTECH=y
# CONFIG_MOUSE_PS2_VMMOUSE is not set
CONFIG_MOUSE_SERIAL=m
CONFIG_MOUSE_APPLETOUCH=m
CONFIG_MOUSE_BCM5974=m
CONFIG_MOUSE_CYAPA=m
# CONFIG_MOUSE_ELAN_I2C is not set
CONFIG_MOUSE_VSXXXAA=m
# CONFIG_MOUSE_GPIO is not set
CONFIG_MOUSE_SYNAPTICS_I2C=m
CONFIG_MOUSE_SYNAPTICS_USB=m
# CONFIG_INPUT_JOYSTICK is not set
CONFIG_INPUT_TABLET=y
CONFIG_TABLET_USB_ACECAD=m
CONFIG_TABLET_USB_AIPTEK=m
CONFIG_TABLET_USB_GTCO=m
# CONFIG_TABLET_USB_HANWANG is not set
CONFIG_TABLET_USB_KBTAB=m
# CONFIG_TABLET_USB_PEGASUS is not set
# CONFIG_TABLET_SERIAL_WACOM4 is not set
CONFIG_INPUT_TOUCHSCREEN=y
CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_PROPERTIES=y
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_ADS7846 is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_AD7877 is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_AD7879 is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_ATMEL_MXT is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_AUO_PIXCIR is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_BU21013 is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_CY8CTMG110 is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_CYTTSP_CORE is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_CYTTSP4_CORE is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_DYNAPRO is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_HAMPSHIRE is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_EETI is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_EGALAX_SERIAL is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_FUJITSU is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_GOODIX is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_ILI210X is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_GUNZE is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_EKTF2127 is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_ELAN is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_ELO is not set
CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_WACOM_W8001=m
CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_WACOM_I2C=m
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_MAX11801 is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_MCS5000 is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_MMS114 is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_MELFAS_MIP4 is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_MTOUCH is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_INEXIO is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_MK712 is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_PENMOUNT is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_EDT_FT5X06 is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_TOUCHRIGHT is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_TOUCHWIN is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_PIXCIR is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_WDT87XX_I2C is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_WM97XX is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_USB_COMPOSITE is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_TOUCHIT213 is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_TSC_SERIO is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_TSC2004 is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_TSC2005 is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_TSC2007 is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_RM_TS is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_SILEAD is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_SIS_I2C is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_ST1232 is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_SUR40 is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_SURFACE3_SPI is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_SX8654 is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_TPS6507X is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_ZET6223 is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_ZFORCE is not set
# CONFIG_TOUCHSCREEN_ROHM_BU21023 is not set
CONFIG_INPUT_MISC=y
# CONFIG_INPUT_AD714X is not set
# CONFIG_INPUT_BMA150 is not set
# CONFIG_INPUT_E3X0_BUTTON is not set
CONFIG_INPUT_PCSPKR=m
# CONFIG_INPUT_MMA8450 is not set
CONFIG_INPUT_APANEL=m
# CONFIG_INPUT_GP2A is not set
# CONFIG_INPUT_GPIO_BEEPER is not set
# CONFIG_INPUT_GPIO_TILT_POLLED is not set
# CONFIG_INPUT_GPIO_DECODER is not set
CONFIG_INPUT_ATLAS_BTNS=m
CONFIG_INPUT_ATI_REMOTE2=m
CONFIG_INPUT_KEYSPAN_REMOTE=m
# CONFIG_INPUT_KXTJ9 is not set
CONFIG_INPUT_POWERMATE=m
CONFIG_INPUT_YEALINK=m
CONFIG_INPUT_CM109=m
CONFIG_INPUT_UINPUT=m
# CONFIG_INPUT_PCF8574 is not set
# CONFIG_INPUT_PWM_BEEPER is not set
# CONFIG_INPUT_GPIO_ROTARY_ENCODER is not set
# CONFIG_INPUT_ADXL34X is not set
# CONFIG_INPUT_IMS_PCU is not set
# CONFIG_INPUT_CMA3000 is not set
CONFIG_INPUT_XEN_KBDDEV_FRONTEND=m
# CONFIG_INPUT_IDEAPAD_SLIDEBAR is not set
# CONFIG_INPUT_DRV260X_HAPTICS is not set
# CONFIG_INPUT_DRV2665_HAPTICS is not set
# CONFIG_INPUT_DRV2667_HAPTICS is not set
# CONFIG_RMI4_CORE is not set
#
# Hardware I/O ports
#
CONFIG_SERIO=y
CONFIG_ARCH_MIGHT_HAVE_PC_SERIO=y
CONFIG_SERIO_I8042=y
CONFIG_SERIO_SERPORT=y
# CONFIG_SERIO_CT82C710 is not set
# CONFIG_SERIO_PARKBD is not set
# CONFIG_SERIO_PCIPS2 is not set
CONFIG_SERIO_LIBPS2=y
CONFIG_SERIO_RAW=m
CONFIG_SERIO_ALTERA_PS2=m
# CONFIG_SERIO_PS2MULT is not set
CONFIG_SERIO_ARC_PS2=m
CONFIG_HYPERV_KEYBOARD=m
# CONFIG_USERIO is not set
# CONFIG_GAMEPORT is not set
#
# Character devices
#
CONFIG_TTY=y
CONFIG_VT=y
CONFIG_CONSOLE_TRANSLATIONS=y
CONFIG_VT_CONSOLE=y
CONFIG_VT_CONSOLE_SLEEP=y
CONFIG_HW_CONSOLE=y
CONFIG_VT_HW_CONSOLE_BINDING=y
CONFIG_UNIX98_PTYS=y
# CONFIG_LEGACY_PTYS is not set
CONFIG_SERIAL_NONSTANDARD=y
# CONFIG_ROCKETPORT is not set
CONFIG_CYCLADES=m
# CONFIG_CYZ_INTR is not set
CONFIG_MOXA_INTELLIO=m
CONFIG_MOXA_SMARTIO=m
CONFIG_SYNCLINK=m
CONFIG_SYNCLINKMP=m
CONFIG_SYNCLINK_GT=m
CONFIG_NOZOMI=m
# CONFIG_ISI is not set
CONFIG_N_HDLC=m
CONFIG_N_GSM=m
# CONFIG_TRACE_SINK is not set
CONFIG_DEVMEM=y
# CONFIG_DEVKMEM is not set
#
# Serial drivers
#
CONFIG_SERIAL_EARLYCON=y
CONFIG_SERIAL_8250=y
# CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_DEPRECATED_OPTIONS is not set
CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_PNP=y
# CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_FINTEK is not set
CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_CONSOLE=y
CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_DMA=y
CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_PCI=y
CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_EXAR=y
CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_NR_UARTS=32
CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_RUNTIME_UARTS=4
CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_EXTENDED=y
CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_MANY_PORTS=y
CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_SHARE_IRQ=y
# CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_DETECT_IRQ is not set
CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_RSA=y
# CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_FSL is not set
CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_DW=y
# CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_RT288X is not set
CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_LPSS=y
CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_MID=y
# CONFIG_SERIAL_8250_MOXA is not set
#
# Non-8250 serial port support
#
# CONFIG_SERIAL_MAX3100 is not set
# CONFIG_SERIAL_MAX310X is not set
# CONFIG_SERIAL_UARTLITE is not set
CONFIG_SERIAL_CORE=y
CONFIG_SERIAL_CORE_CONSOLE=y
CONFIG_SERIAL_JSM=m
# CONFIG_SERIAL_SCCNXP is not set
# CONFIG_SERIAL_SC16IS7XX is not set
# CONFIG_SERIAL_ALTERA_JTAGUART is not set
# CONFIG_SERIAL_ALTERA_UART is not set
# CONFIG_SERIAL_IFX6X60 is not set
CONFIG_SERIAL_ARC=m
CONFIG_SERIAL_ARC_NR_PORTS=1
# CONFIG_SERIAL_RP2 is not set
# CONFIG_SERIAL_FSL_LPUART is not set
# CONFIG_SERIAL_DEV_BUS is not set
# CONFIG_TTY_PRINTK is not set
CONFIG_PRINTER=m
# CONFIG_LP_CONSOLE is not set
CONFIG_PPDEV=m
CONFIG_HVC_DRIVER=y
CONFIG_HVC_IRQ=y
CONFIG_HVC_XEN=y
CONFIG_HVC_XEN_FRONTEND=y
CONFIG_VIRTIO_CONSOLE=y
CONFIG_IPMI_HANDLER=m
# CONFIG_IPMI_PANIC_EVENT is not set
CONFIG_IPMI_DEVICE_INTERFACE=m
CONFIG_IPMI_SI=m
# CONFIG_IPMI_SSIF is not set
CONFIG_IPMI_WATCHDOG=m
CONFIG_IPMI_POWEROFF=m
CONFIG_HW_RANDOM=y
CONFIG_HW_RANDOM_TIMERIOMEM=m
CONFIG_HW_RANDOM_INTEL=m
CONFIG_HW_RANDOM_AMD=m
CONFIG_HW_RANDOM_VIA=m
CONFIG_HW_RANDOM_VIRTIO=y
CONFIG_HW_RANDOM_TPM=m
CONFIG_NVRAM=y
# CONFIG_R3964 is not set
# CONFIG_APPLICOM is not set
# CONFIG_MWAVE is not set
CONFIG_RAW_DRIVER=y
CONFIG_MAX_RAW_DEVS=8192
CONFIG_HPET=y
CONFIG_HPET_MMAP=y
# CONFIG_HPET_MMAP_DEFAULT is not set
CONFIG_HANGCHECK_TIMER=m
CONFIG_UV_MMTIMER=m
CONFIG_TCG_TPM=y
CONFIG_TCG_TIS_CORE=y
CONFIG_TCG_TIS=y
# CONFIG_TCG_TIS_SPI is not set
# CONFIG_TCG_TIS_I2C_ATMEL is not set
# CONFIG_TCG_TIS_I2C_INFINEON is not set
# CONFIG_TCG_TIS_I2C_NUVOTON is not set
CONFIG_TCG_NSC=m
CONFIG_TCG_ATMEL=m
CONFIG_TCG_INFINEON=m
# CONFIG_TCG_XEN is not set
# CONFIG_TCG_CRB is not set
# CONFIG_TCG_VTPM_PROXY is not set
# CONFIG_TCG_TIS_ST33ZP24_I2C is not set
# CONFIG_TCG_TIS_ST33ZP24_SPI is not set
CONFIG_TELCLOCK=m
CONFIG_DEVPORT=y
# CONFIG_XILLYBUS is not set
#
# I2C support
#
CONFIG_I2C=y
CONFIG_ACPI_I2C_OPREGION=y
CONFIG_I2C_BOARDINFO=y
CONFIG_I2C_COMPAT=y
CONFIG_I2C_CHARDEV=m
CONFIG_I2C_MUX=m
#
# Multiplexer I2C Chip support
#
# CONFIG_I2C_MUX_GPIO is not set
# CONFIG_I2C_MUX_PCA9541 is not set
# CONFIG_I2C_MUX_PCA954x is not set
# CONFIG_I2C_MUX_PINCTRL is not set
# CONFIG_I2C_MUX_REG is not set
# CONFIG_I2C_MUX_MLXCPLD is not set
CONFIG_I2C_HELPER_AUTO=y
CONFIG_I2C_SMBUS=y
CONFIG_I2C_ALGOBIT=y
CONFIG_I2C_ALGOPCA=m
#
# I2C Hardware Bus support
#
#
# PC SMBus host controller drivers
#
# CONFIG_I2C_ALI1535 is not set
# CONFIG_I2C_ALI1563 is not set
# CONFIG_I2C_ALI15X3 is not set
CONFIG_I2C_AMD756=m
CONFIG_I2C_AMD756_S4882=m
CONFIG_I2C_AMD8111=m
CONFIG_I2C_I801=y
CONFIG_I2C_ISCH=m
CONFIG_I2C_ISMT=m
CONFIG_I2C_PIIX4=m
CONFIG_I2C_NFORCE2=m
CONFIG_I2C_NFORCE2_S4985=m
# CONFIG_I2C_SIS5595 is not set
# CONFIG_I2C_SIS630 is not set
CONFIG_I2C_SIS96X=m
CONFIG_I2C_VIA=m
CONFIG_I2C_VIAPRO=m
#
# ACPI drivers
#
CONFIG_I2C_SCMI=m
#
# I2C system bus drivers (mostly embedded / system-on-chip)
#
# CONFIG_I2C_CBUS_GPIO is not set
CONFIG_I2C_DESIGNWARE_CORE=m
CONFIG_I2C_DESIGNWARE_PLATFORM=m
CONFIG_I2C_DESIGNWARE_PCI=m
# CONFIG_I2C_DESIGNWARE_BAYTRAIL is not set
# CONFIG_I2C_EMEV2 is not set
# CONFIG_I2C_GPIO is not set
# CONFIG_I2C_OCORES is not set
CONFIG_I2C_PCA_PLATFORM=m
# CONFIG_I2C_PXA_PCI is not set
CONFIG_I2C_SIMTEC=m
# CONFIG_I2C_XILINX is not set
#
# External I2C/SMBus adapter drivers
#
CONFIG_I2C_DIOLAN_U2C=m
CONFIG_I2C_PARPORT=m
CONFIG_I2C_PARPORT_LIGHT=m
# CONFIG_I2C_ROBOTFUZZ_OSIF is not set
# CONFIG_I2C_TAOS_EVM is not set
CONFIG_I2C_TINY_USB=m
CONFIG_I2C_VIPERBOARD=m
#
# Other I2C/SMBus bus drivers
#
# CONFIG_I2C_MLXCPLD is not set
CONFIG_I2C_STUB=m
# CONFIG_I2C_SLAVE is not set
# CONFIG_I2C_DEBUG_CORE is not set
# CONFIG_I2C_DEBUG_ALGO is not set
# CONFIG_I2C_DEBUG_BUS is not set
CONFIG_SPI=y
# CONFIG_SPI_DEBUG is not set
CONFIG_SPI_MASTER=y
#
# SPI Master Controller Drivers
#
# CONFIG_SPI_ALTERA is not set
# CONFIG_SPI_AXI_SPI_ENGINE is not set
# CONFIG_SPI_BITBANG is not set
# CONFIG_SPI_BUTTERFLY is not set
# CONFIG_SPI_CADENCE is not set
CONFIG_SPI_DESIGNWARE=m
# CONFIG_SPI_DW_PCI is not set
# CONFIG_SPI_DW_MMIO is not set
# CONFIG_SPI_GPIO is not set
# CONFIG_SPI_LM70_LLP is not set
# CONFIG_SPI_OC_TINY is not set
CONFIG_SPI_PXA2XX=m
CONFIG_SPI_PXA2XX_PCI=m
# CONFIG_SPI_ROCKCHIP is not set
# CONFIG_SPI_SC18IS602 is not set
# CONFIG_SPI_XCOMM is not set
# CONFIG_SPI_XILINX is not set
# CONFIG_SPI_ZYNQMP_GQSPI is not set
#
# SPI Protocol Masters
#
# CONFIG_SPI_SPIDEV is not set
# CONFIG_SPI_LOOPBACK_TEST is not set
# CONFIG_SPI_TLE62X0 is not set
# CONFIG_SPMI is not set
# CONFIG_HSI is not set
#
# PPS support
#
CONFIG_PPS=y
# CONFIG_PPS_DEBUG is not set
#
# PPS clients support
#
# CONFIG_PPS_CLIENT_KTIMER is not set
CONFIG_PPS_CLIENT_LDISC=m
CONFIG_PPS_CLIENT_PARPORT=m
CONFIG_PPS_CLIENT_GPIO=m
#
# PPS generators support
#
#
# PTP clock support
#
CONFIG_PTP_1588_CLOCK=y
CONFIG_DP83640_PHY=m
CONFIG_PTP_1588_CLOCK_KVM=y
CONFIG_PINCTRL=y
#
# Pin controllers
#
CONFIG_PINMUX=y
CONFIG_PINCONF=y
CONFIG_GENERIC_PINCONF=y
# CONFIG_DEBUG_PINCTRL is not set
# CONFIG_PINCTRL_AMD is not set
# CONFIG_PINCTRL_SX150X is not set
CONFIG_PINCTRL_BAYTRAIL=y
# CONFIG_PINCTRL_CHERRYVIEW is not set
# CONFIG_PINCTRL_BROXTON is not set
# CONFIG_PINCTRL_GEMINILAKE is not set
# CONFIG_PINCTRL_SUNRISEPOINT is not set
CONFIG_GPIOLIB=y
CONFIG_GPIO_ACPI=y
CONFIG_GPIOLIB_IRQCHIP=y
# CONFIG_DEBUG_GPIO is not set
CONFIG_GPIO_SYSFS=y
#
# Memory mapped GPIO drivers
#
# CONFIG_GPIO_AMDPT is not set
# CONFIG_GPIO_DWAPB is not set
# CONFIG_GPIO_EXAR is not set
# CONFIG_GPIO_GENERIC_PLATFORM is not set
# CONFIG_GPIO_ICH is not set
CONFIG_GPIO_LYNXPOINT=m
CONFIG_GPIO_MOCKUP=y
# CONFIG_GPIO_VX855 is not set
#
# Port-mapped I/O GPIO drivers
#
# CONFIG_GPIO_F7188X is not set
# CONFIG_GPIO_IT87 is not set
# CONFIG_GPIO_SCH is not set
# CONFIG_GPIO_SCH311X is not set
#
# I2C GPIO expanders
#
# CONFIG_GPIO_ADP5588 is not set
# CONFIG_GPIO_MAX7300 is not set
# CONFIG_GPIO_MAX732X is not set
# CONFIG_GPIO_PCA953X is not set
# CONFIG_GPIO_PCF857X is not set
# CONFIG_GPIO_SX150X is not set
# CONFIG_GPIO_TPIC2810 is not set
#
# MFD GPIO expanders
#
#
# PCI GPIO expanders
#
# CONFIG_GPIO_AMD8111 is not set
# CONFIG_GPIO_ML_IOH is not set
# CONFIG_GPIO_PCI_IDIO_16 is not set
# CONFIG_GPIO_RDC321X is not set
#
# SPI GPIO expanders
#
# CONFIG_GPIO_MAX7301 is not set
# CONFIG_GPIO_MC33880 is not set
# CONFIG_GPIO_PISOSR is not set
#
# SPI or I2C GPIO expanders
#
#
# USB GPIO expanders
#
# CONFIG_GPIO_VIPERBOARD is not set
# CONFIG_W1 is not set
# CONFIG_POWER_AVS is not set
CONFIG_POWER_RESET=y
# CONFIG_POWER_RESET_RESTART is not set
CONFIG_POWER_SUPPLY=y
# CONFIG_POWER_SUPPLY_DEBUG is not set
# CONFIG_PDA_POWER is not set
# CONFIG_TEST_POWER is not set
# CONFIG_BATTERY_DS2780 is not set
# CONFIG_BATTERY_DS2781 is not set
# CONFIG_BATTERY_DS2782 is not set
# CONFIG_BATTERY_SBS is not set
# CONFIG_CHARGER_SBS is not set
# CONFIG_BATTERY_BQ27XXX is not set
# CONFIG_BATTERY_MAX17040 is not set
# CONFIG_BATTERY_MAX17042 is not set
# CONFIG_CHARGER_ISP1704 is not set
# CONFIG_CHARGER_MAX8903 is not set
# CONFIG_CHARGER_LP8727 is not set
# CONFIG_CHARGER_GPIO is not set
# CONFIG_CHARGER_BQ2415X is not set
# CONFIG_CHARGER_BQ24190 is not set
# CONFIG_CHARGER_BQ24257 is not set
# CONFIG_CHARGER_BQ24735 is not set
# CONFIG_CHARGER_BQ25890 is not set
CONFIG_CHARGER_SMB347=m
# CONFIG_BATTERY_GAUGE_LTC2941 is not set
# CONFIG_CHARGER_RT9455 is not set
CONFIG_HWMON=y
CONFIG_HWMON_VID=m
# CONFIG_HWMON_DEBUG_CHIP is not set
#
# Native drivers
#
CONFIG_SENSORS_ABITUGURU=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_ABITUGURU3=m
# CONFIG_SENSORS_AD7314 is not set
CONFIG_SENSORS_AD7414=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_AD7418=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_ADM1021=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_ADM1025=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_ADM1026=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_ADM1029=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_ADM1031=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_ADM9240=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_ADT7X10=m
# CONFIG_SENSORS_ADT7310 is not set
CONFIG_SENSORS_ADT7410=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_ADT7411=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_ADT7462=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_ADT7470=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_ADT7475=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_ASC7621=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_K8TEMP=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_K10TEMP=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_FAM15H_POWER=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_APPLESMC=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_ASB100=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_ATXP1=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_DS620=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_DS1621=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_DELL_SMM=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_I5K_AMB=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_F71805F=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_F71882FG=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_F75375S=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_FSCHMD=m
# CONFIG_SENSORS_FTSTEUTATES is not set
CONFIG_SENSORS_GL518SM=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_GL520SM=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_G760A=m
# CONFIG_SENSORS_G762 is not set
# CONFIG_SENSORS_GPIO_FAN is not set
# CONFIG_SENSORS_HIH6130 is not set
CONFIG_SENSORS_IBMAEM=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_IBMPEX=m
# CONFIG_SENSORS_I5500 is not set
CONFIG_SENSORS_CORETEMP=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_IT87=m
# CONFIG_SENSORS_JC42 is not set
# CONFIG_SENSORS_POWR1220 is not set
CONFIG_SENSORS_LINEAGE=m
# CONFIG_SENSORS_LTC2945 is not set
# CONFIG_SENSORS_LTC2990 is not set
CONFIG_SENSORS_LTC4151=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_LTC4215=m
# CONFIG_SENSORS_LTC4222 is not set
CONFIG_SENSORS_LTC4245=m
# CONFIG_SENSORS_LTC4260 is not set
CONFIG_SENSORS_LTC4261=m
# CONFIG_SENSORS_MAX1111 is not set
CONFIG_SENSORS_MAX16065=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_MAX1619=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_MAX1668=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_MAX197=m
# CONFIG_SENSORS_MAX31722 is not set
CONFIG_SENSORS_MAX6639=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_MAX6642=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_MAX6650=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_MAX6697=m
# CONFIG_SENSORS_MAX31790 is not set
CONFIG_SENSORS_MCP3021=m
# CONFIG_SENSORS_TC654 is not set
# CONFIG_SENSORS_ADCXX is not set
CONFIG_SENSORS_LM63=m
# CONFIG_SENSORS_LM70 is not set
CONFIG_SENSORS_LM73=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_LM75=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_LM77=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_LM78=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_LM80=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_LM83=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_LM85=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_LM87=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_LM90=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_LM92=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_LM93=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_LM95234=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_LM95241=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_LM95245=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_PC87360=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_PC87427=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_NTC_THERMISTOR=m
# CONFIG_SENSORS_NCT6683 is not set
CONFIG_SENSORS_NCT6775=m
# CONFIG_SENSORS_NCT7802 is not set
# CONFIG_SENSORS_NCT7904 is not set
CONFIG_SENSORS_PCF8591=m
CONFIG_PMBUS=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_PMBUS=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_ADM1275=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_LM25066=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_LTC2978=m
# CONFIG_SENSORS_LTC3815 is not set
CONFIG_SENSORS_MAX16064=m
# CONFIG_SENSORS_MAX20751 is not set
CONFIG_SENSORS_MAX34440=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_MAX8688=m
# CONFIG_SENSORS_TPS40422 is not set
CONFIG_SENSORS_UCD9000=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_UCD9200=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_ZL6100=m
# CONFIG_SENSORS_SHT15 is not set
CONFIG_SENSORS_SHT21=m
# CONFIG_SENSORS_SHT3x is not set
# CONFIG_SENSORS_SHTC1 is not set
CONFIG_SENSORS_SIS5595=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_DME1737=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_EMC1403=m
# CONFIG_SENSORS_EMC2103 is not set
CONFIG_SENSORS_EMC6W201=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_SMSC47M1=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_SMSC47M192=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_SMSC47B397=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_SCH56XX_COMMON=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_SCH5627=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_SCH5636=m
# CONFIG_SENSORS_STTS751 is not set
# CONFIG_SENSORS_SMM665 is not set
# CONFIG_SENSORS_ADC128D818 is not set
CONFIG_SENSORS_ADS1015=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_ADS7828=m
# CONFIG_SENSORS_ADS7871 is not set
CONFIG_SENSORS_AMC6821=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_INA209=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_INA2XX=m
# CONFIG_SENSORS_INA3221 is not set
# CONFIG_SENSORS_TC74 is not set
CONFIG_SENSORS_THMC50=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_TMP102=m
# CONFIG_SENSORS_TMP103 is not set
# CONFIG_SENSORS_TMP108 is not set
CONFIG_SENSORS_TMP401=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_TMP421=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_VIA_CPUTEMP=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_VIA686A=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_VT1211=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_VT8231=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_W83781D=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_W83791D=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_W83792D=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_W83793=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_W83795=m
# CONFIG_SENSORS_W83795_FANCTRL is not set
CONFIG_SENSORS_W83L785TS=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_W83L786NG=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_W83627HF=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_W83627EHF=m
# CONFIG_SENSORS_XGENE is not set
#
# ACPI drivers
#
CONFIG_SENSORS_ACPI_POWER=m
CONFIG_SENSORS_ATK0110=m
CONFIG_THERMAL=y
CONFIG_THERMAL_HWMON=y
CONFIG_THERMAL_WRITABLE_TRIPS=y
CONFIG_THERMAL_DEFAULT_GOV_STEP_WISE=y
# CONFIG_THERMAL_DEFAULT_GOV_FAIR_SHARE is not set
# CONFIG_THERMAL_DEFAULT_GOV_USER_SPACE is not set
# CONFIG_THERMAL_DEFAULT_GOV_POWER_ALLOCATOR is not set
CONFIG_THERMAL_GOV_FAIR_SHARE=y
CONFIG_THERMAL_GOV_STEP_WISE=y
CONFIG_THERMAL_GOV_BANG_BANG=y
CONFIG_THERMAL_GOV_USER_SPACE=y
# CONFIG_THERMAL_GOV_POWER_ALLOCATOR is not set
# CONFIG_THERMAL_EMULATION is not set
CONFIG_INTEL_POWERCLAMP=m
CONFIG_X86_PKG_TEMP_THERMAL=m
# CONFIG_INTEL_SOC_DTS_THERMAL is not set
#
# ACPI INT340X thermal drivers
#
# CONFIG_INT340X_THERMAL is not set
CONFIG_INTEL_PCH_THERMAL=m
CONFIG_WATCHDOG=y
CONFIG_WATCHDOG_CORE=y
# CONFIG_WATCHDOG_NOWAYOUT is not set
# CONFIG_WATCHDOG_SYSFS is not set
#
# Watchdog Device Drivers
#
CONFIG_SOFT_WATCHDOG=m
# CONFIG_WDAT_WDT is not set
# CONFIG_XILINX_WATCHDOG is not set
# CONFIG_ZIIRAVE_WATCHDOG is not set
# CONFIG_CADENCE_WATCHDOG is not set
# CONFIG_DW_WATCHDOG is not set
# CONFIG_MAX63XX_WATCHDOG is not set
# CONFIG_ACQUIRE_WDT is not set
# CONFIG_ADVANTECH_WDT is not set
CONFIG_ALIM1535_WDT=m
CONFIG_ALIM7101_WDT=m
CONFIG_F71808E_WDT=m
CONFIG_SP5100_TCO=m
CONFIG_SBC_FITPC2_WATCHDOG=m
# CONFIG_EUROTECH_WDT is not set
CONFIG_IB700_WDT=m
CONFIG_IBMASR=m
# CONFIG_WAFER_WDT is not set
CONFIG_I6300ESB_WDT=y
CONFIG_IE6XX_WDT=m
CONFIG_ITCO_WDT=y
CONFIG_ITCO_VENDOR_SUPPORT=y
CONFIG_IT8712F_WDT=m
CONFIG_IT87_WDT=m
CONFIG_HP_WATCHDOG=m
CONFIG_HPWDT_NMI_DECODING=y
# CONFIG_SC1200_WDT is not set
# CONFIG_PC87413_WDT is not set
CONFIG_NV_TCO=m
# CONFIG_60XX_WDT is not set
# CONFIG_CPU5_WDT is not set
CONFIG_SMSC_SCH311X_WDT=m
# CONFIG_SMSC37B787_WDT is not set
CONFIG_VIA_WDT=m
CONFIG_W83627HF_WDT=m
CONFIG_W83877F_WDT=m
CONFIG_W83977F_WDT=m
CONFIG_MACHZ_WDT=m
# CONFIG_SBC_EPX_C3_WATCHDOG is not set
# CONFIG_INTEL_MEI_WDT is not set
# CONFIG_NI903X_WDT is not set
# CONFIG_NIC7018_WDT is not set
# CONFIG_MEN_A21_WDT is not set
CONFIG_XEN_WDT=m
#
# PCI-based Watchdog Cards
#
CONFIG_PCIPCWATCHDOG=m
CONFIG_WDTPCI=m
#
# USB-based Watchdog Cards
#
CONFIG_USBPCWATCHDOG=m
#
# Watchdog Pretimeout Governors
#
# CONFIG_WATCHDOG_PRETIMEOUT_GOV is not set
CONFIG_SSB_POSSIBLE=y
#
# Sonics Silicon Backplane
#
CONFIG_SSB=m
CONFIG_SSB_SPROM=y
CONFIG_SSB_PCIHOST_POSSIBLE=y
CONFIG_SSB_PCIHOST=y
# CONFIG_SSB_B43_PCI_BRIDGE is not set
CONFIG_SSB_SDIOHOST_POSSIBLE=y
CONFIG_SSB_SDIOHOST=y
# CONFIG_SSB_SILENT is not set
# CONFIG_SSB_DEBUG is not set
CONFIG_SSB_DRIVER_PCICORE_POSSIBLE=y
CONFIG_SSB_DRIVER_PCICORE=y
# CONFIG_SSB_DRIVER_GPIO is not set
CONFIG_BCMA_POSSIBLE=y
#
# Broadcom specific AMBA
#
CONFIG_BCMA=m
CONFIG_BCMA_HOST_PCI_POSSIBLE=y
CONFIG_BCMA_HOST_PCI=y
# CONFIG_BCMA_HOST_SOC is not set
CONFIG_BCMA_DRIVER_PCI=y
CONFIG_BCMA_DRIVER_GMAC_CMN=y
# CONFIG_BCMA_DRIVER_GPIO is not set
# CONFIG_BCMA_DEBUG is not set
#
# Multifunction device drivers
#
CONFIG_MFD_CORE=y
# CONFIG_MFD_AS3711 is not set
# CONFIG_PMIC_ADP5520 is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_AAT2870_CORE is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_BCM590XX is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_AXP20X_I2C is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_CROS_EC is not set
# CONFIG_PMIC_DA903X is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_DA9052_SPI is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_DA9052_I2C is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_DA9055 is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_DA9062 is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_DA9063 is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_DA9150 is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_DLN2 is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_MC13XXX_SPI is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_MC13XXX_I2C is not set
# CONFIG_HTC_PASIC3 is not set
# CONFIG_HTC_I2CPLD is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_INTEL_QUARK_I2C_GPIO is not set
CONFIG_LPC_ICH=y
CONFIG_LPC_SCH=m
# CONFIG_INTEL_SOC_PMIC is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_INTEL_LPSS_ACPI is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_INTEL_LPSS_PCI is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_JANZ_CMODIO is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_KEMPLD is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_88PM800 is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_88PM805 is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_88PM860X is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_MAX14577 is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_MAX77693 is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_MAX77843 is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_MAX8907 is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_MAX8925 is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_MAX8997 is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_MAX8998 is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_MT6397 is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_MENF21BMC is not set
# CONFIG_EZX_PCAP is not set
CONFIG_MFD_VIPERBOARD=m
# CONFIG_MFD_RETU is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_PCF50633 is not set
# CONFIG_UCB1400_CORE is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_RDC321X is not set
CONFIG_MFD_RTSX_PCI=m
# CONFIG_MFD_RT5033 is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_RTSX_USB is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_RC5T583 is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_SEC_CORE is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_SI476X_CORE is not set
CONFIG_MFD_SM501=m
# CONFIG_MFD_SM501_GPIO is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_SKY81452 is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_SMSC is not set
# CONFIG_ABX500_CORE is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_SYSCON is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_TI_AM335X_TSCADC is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_LP3943 is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_LP8788 is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_PALMAS is not set
# CONFIG_TPS6105X is not set
# CONFIG_TPS65010 is not set
# CONFIG_TPS6507X is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_TPS65086 is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_TPS65090 is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_TPS65217 is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_TI_LP873X is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_TPS65218 is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_TPS6586X is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_TPS65910 is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_TPS65912_I2C is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_TPS65912_SPI is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_TPS80031 is not set
# CONFIG_TWL4030_CORE is not set
# CONFIG_TWL6040_CORE is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_WL1273_CORE is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_LM3533 is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_TMIO is not set
CONFIG_MFD_VX855=m
# CONFIG_MFD_ARIZONA_I2C is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_ARIZONA_SPI is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_WM8400 is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_WM831X_I2C is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_WM831X_SPI is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_WM8350_I2C is not set
# CONFIG_MFD_WM8994 is not set
# CONFIG_REGULATOR is not set
CONFIG_MEDIA_SUPPORT=m
#
# Multimedia core support
#
CONFIG_MEDIA_CAMERA_SUPPORT=y
CONFIG_MEDIA_ANALOG_TV_SUPPORT=y
CONFIG_MEDIA_DIGITAL_TV_SUPPORT=y
CONFIG_MEDIA_RADIO_SUPPORT=y
# CONFIG_MEDIA_SDR_SUPPORT is not set
CONFIG_MEDIA_RC_SUPPORT=y
# CONFIG_MEDIA_CEC_SUPPORT is not set
# CONFIG_MEDIA_CONTROLLER is not set
CONFIG_VIDEO_DEV=m
CONFIG_VIDEO_V4L2=m
# CONFIG_VIDEO_ADV_DEBUG is not set
# CONFIG_VIDEO_FIXED_MINOR_RANGES is not set
CONFIG_VIDEO_TUNER=m
CONFIG_VIDEOBUF_GEN=m
CONFIG_VIDEOBUF_DMA_SG=m
CONFIG_VIDEOBUF_VMALLOC=m
CONFIG_VIDEOBUF_DVB=m
CONFIG_VIDEOBUF2_CORE=m
CONFIG_VIDEOBUF2_MEMOPS=m
CONFIG_VIDEOBUF2_VMALLOC=m
CONFIG_VIDEOBUF2_DMA_SG=m
CONFIG_VIDEOBUF2_DVB=m
CONFIG_DVB_CORE=m
CONFIG_DVB_NET=y
CONFIG_TTPCI_EEPROM=m
CONFIG_DVB_MAX_ADAPTERS=8
CONFIG_DVB_DYNAMIC_MINORS=y
# CONFIG_DVB_DEMUX_SECTION_LOSS_LOG is not set
#
# Media drivers
#
CONFIG_RC_CORE=m
CONFIG_RC_MAP=m
CONFIG_RC_DECODERS=y
CONFIG_LIRC=m
CONFIG_IR_LIRC_CODEC=m
CONFIG_IR_NEC_DECODER=m
CONFIG_IR_RC5_DECODER=m
CONFIG_IR_RC6_DECODER=m
CONFIG_IR_JVC_DECODER=m
CONFIG_IR_SONY_DECODER=m
CONFIG_IR_SANYO_DECODER=m
CONFIG_IR_SHARP_DECODER=m
CONFIG_IR_MCE_KBD_DECODER=m
CONFIG_IR_XMP_DECODER=m
CONFIG_RC_DEVICES=y
CONFIG_RC_ATI_REMOTE=m
CONFIG_IR_ENE=m
# CONFIG_IR_HIX5HD2 is not set
CONFIG_IR_IMON=m
CONFIG_IR_MCEUSB=m
CONFIG_IR_ITE_CIR=m
CONFIG_IR_FINTEK=m
CONFIG_IR_NUVOTON=m
CONFIG_IR_REDRAT3=m
# CONFIG_IR_SPI is not set
CONFIG_IR_STREAMZAP=m
CONFIG_IR_WINBOND_CIR=m
# CONFIG_IR_IGORPLUGUSB is not set
CONFIG_IR_IGUANA=m
CONFIG_IR_TTUSBIR=m
# CONFIG_RC_LOOPBACK is not set
CONFIG_IR_GPIO_CIR=m
# CONFIG_IR_SERIAL is not set
CONFIG_MEDIA_USB_SUPPORT=y
#
# Webcam devices
#
CONFIG_USB_VIDEO_CLASS=m
CONFIG_USB_VIDEO_CLASS_INPUT_EVDEV=y
CONFIG_USB_GSPCA=m
CONFIG_USB_M5602=m
CONFIG_USB_STV06XX=m
CONFIG_USB_GL860=m
CONFIG_USB_GSPCA_BENQ=m
CONFIG_USB_GSPCA_CONEX=m
CONFIG_USB_GSPCA_CPIA1=m
# CONFIG_USB_GSPCA_DTCS033 is not set
CONFIG_USB_GSPCA_ETOMS=m
CONFIG_USB_GSPCA_FINEPIX=m
CONFIG_USB_GSPCA_JEILINJ=m
CONFIG_USB_GSPCA_JL2005BCD=m
# CONFIG_USB_GSPCA_KINECT is not set
CONFIG_USB_GSPCA_KONICA=m
CONFIG_USB_GSPCA_MARS=m
CONFIG_USB_GSPCA_MR97310A=m
CONFIG_USB_GSPCA_NW80X=m
CONFIG_USB_GSPCA_OV519=m
CONFIG_USB_GSPCA_OV534=m
CONFIG_USB_GSPCA_OV534_9=m
CONFIG_USB_GSPCA_PAC207=m
CONFIG_USB_GSPCA_PAC7302=m
CONFIG_USB_GSPCA_PAC7311=m
CONFIG_USB_GSPCA_SE401=m
CONFIG_USB_GSPCA_SN9C2028=m
CONFIG_USB_GSPCA_SN9C20X=m
CONFIG_USB_GSPCA_SONIXB=m
CONFIG_USB_GSPCA_SONIXJ=m
CONFIG_USB_GSPCA_SPCA500=m
CONFIG_USB_GSPCA_SPCA501=m
CONFIG_USB_GSPCA_SPCA505=m
CONFIG_USB_GSPCA_SPCA506=m
CONFIG_USB_GSPCA_SPCA508=m
CONFIG_USB_GSPCA_SPCA561=m
CONFIG_USB_GSPCA_SPCA1528=m
CONFIG_USB_GSPCA_SQ905=m
CONFIG_USB_GSPCA_SQ905C=m
CONFIG_USB_GSPCA_SQ930X=m
CONFIG_USB_GSPCA_STK014=m
# CONFIG_USB_GSPCA_STK1135 is not set
CONFIG_USB_GSPCA_STV0680=m
CONFIG_USB_GSPCA_SUNPLUS=m
CONFIG_USB_GSPCA_T613=m
CONFIG_USB_GSPCA_TOPRO=m
# CONFIG_USB_GSPCA_TOUPTEK is not set
CONFIG_USB_GSPCA_TV8532=m
CONFIG_USB_GSPCA_VC032X=m
CONFIG_USB_GSPCA_VICAM=m
CONFIG_USB_GSPCA_XIRLINK_CIT=m
CONFIG_USB_GSPCA_ZC3XX=m
CONFIG_USB_PWC=m
# CONFIG_USB_PWC_DEBUG is not set
CONFIG_USB_PWC_INPUT_EVDEV=y
# CONFIG_VIDEO_CPIA2 is not set
CONFIG_USB_ZR364XX=m
CONFIG_USB_STKWEBCAM=m
CONFIG_USB_S2255=m
# CONFIG_VIDEO_USBTV is not set
#
# Analog TV USB devices
#
CONFIG_VIDEO_PVRUSB2=m
CONFIG_VIDEO_PVRUSB2_SYSFS=y
CONFIG_VIDEO_PVRUSB2_DVB=y
# CONFIG_VIDEO_PVRUSB2_DEBUGIFC is not set
CONFIG_VIDEO_HDPVR=m
CONFIG_VIDEO_USBVISION=m
# CONFIG_VIDEO_STK1160_COMMON is not set
# CONFIG_VIDEO_GO7007 is not set
#
# Analog/digital TV USB devices
#
CONFIG_VIDEO_AU0828=m
CONFIG_VIDEO_AU0828_V4L2=y
# CONFIG_VIDEO_AU0828_RC is not set
CONFIG_VIDEO_CX231XX=m
CONFIG_VIDEO_CX231XX_RC=y
CONFIG_VIDEO_CX231XX_ALSA=m
CONFIG_VIDEO_CX231XX_DVB=m
CONFIG_VIDEO_TM6000=m
CONFIG_VIDEO_TM6000_ALSA=m
CONFIG_VIDEO_TM6000_DVB=m
#
# Digital TV USB devices
#
CONFIG_DVB_USB=m
# CONFIG_DVB_USB_DEBUG is not set
CONFIG_DVB_USB_DIB3000MC=m
CONFIG_DVB_USB_A800=m
CONFIG_DVB_USB_DIBUSB_MB=m
# CONFIG_DVB_USB_DIBUSB_MB_FAULTY is not set
CONFIG_DVB_USB_DIBUSB_MC=m
CONFIG_DVB_USB_DIB0700=m
CONFIG_DVB_USB_UMT_010=m
CONFIG_DVB_USB_CXUSB=m
CONFIG_DVB_USB_M920X=m
CONFIG_DVB_USB_DIGITV=m
CONFIG_DVB_USB_VP7045=m
CONFIG_DVB_USB_VP702X=m
CONFIG_DVB_USB_GP8PSK=m
CONFIG_DVB_USB_NOVA_T_USB2=m
CONFIG_DVB_USB_TTUSB2=m
CONFIG_DVB_USB_DTT200U=m
CONFIG_DVB_USB_OPERA1=m
CONFIG_DVB_USB_AF9005=m
CONFIG_DVB_USB_AF9005_REMOTE=m
CONFIG_DVB_USB_PCTV452E=m
CONFIG_DVB_USB_DW2102=m
CONFIG_DVB_USB_CINERGY_T2=m
CONFIG_DVB_USB_DTV5100=m
CONFIG_DVB_USB_FRIIO=m
CONFIG_DVB_USB_AZ6027=m
CONFIG_DVB_USB_TECHNISAT_USB2=m
CONFIG_DVB_USB_V2=m
CONFIG_DVB_USB_AF9015=m
CONFIG_DVB_USB_AF9035=m
CONFIG_DVB_USB_ANYSEE=m
CONFIG_DVB_USB_AU6610=m
CONFIG_DVB_USB_AZ6007=m
CONFIG_DVB_USB_CE6230=m
CONFIG_DVB_USB_EC168=m
CONFIG_DVB_USB_GL861=m
CONFIG_DVB_USB_LME2510=m
CONFIG_DVB_USB_MXL111SF=m
CONFIG_DVB_USB_RTL28XXU=m
# CONFIG_DVB_USB_DVBSKY is not set
# CONFIG_DVB_USB_ZD1301 is not set
CONFIG_DVB_TTUSB_BUDGET=m
CONFIG_DVB_TTUSB_DEC=m
CONFIG_SMS_USB_DRV=m
CONFIG_DVB_B2C2_FLEXCOP_USB=m
# CONFIG_DVB_B2C2_FLEXCOP_USB_DEBUG is not set
# CONFIG_DVB_AS102 is not set
#
# Webcam, TV (analog/digital) USB devices
#
CONFIG_VIDEO_EM28XX=m
# CONFIG_VIDEO_EM28XX_V4L2 is not set
CONFIG_VIDEO_EM28XX_ALSA=m
CONFIG_VIDEO_EM28XX_DVB=m
CONFIG_VIDEO_EM28XX_RC=m
CONFIG_MEDIA_PCI_SUPPORT=y
#
# Media capture support
#
# CONFIG_VIDEO_MEYE is not set
# CONFIG_VIDEO_SOLO6X10 is not set
# CONFIG_VIDEO_TW5864 is not set
# CONFIG_VIDEO_TW68 is not set
# CONFIG_VIDEO_TW686X is not set
# CONFIG_VIDEO_ZORAN is not set
#
# Media capture/analog TV support
#
CONFIG_VIDEO_IVTV=m
# CONFIG_VIDEO_IVTV_DEPRECATED_IOCTLS is not set
# CONFIG_VIDEO_IVTV_ALSA is not set
CONFIG_VIDEO_FB_IVTV=m
# CONFIG_VIDEO_HEXIUM_GEMINI is not set
# CONFIG_VIDEO_HEXIUM_ORION is not set
# CONFIG_VIDEO_MXB is not set
# CONFIG_VIDEO_DT3155 is not set
#
# Media capture/analog/hybrid TV support
#
CONFIG_VIDEO_CX18=m
CONFIG_VIDEO_CX18_ALSA=m
CONFIG_VIDEO_CX23885=m
CONFIG_MEDIA_ALTERA_CI=m
# CONFIG_VIDEO_CX25821 is not set
CONFIG_VIDEO_CX88=m
CONFIG_VIDEO_CX88_ALSA=m
CONFIG_VIDEO_CX88_BLACKBIRD=m
CONFIG_VIDEO_CX88_DVB=m
CONFIG_VIDEO_CX88_ENABLE_VP3054=y
CONFIG_VIDEO_CX88_VP3054=m
CONFIG_VIDEO_CX88_MPEG=m
CONFIG_VIDEO_BT848=m
CONFIG_DVB_BT8XX=m
CONFIG_VIDEO_SAA7134=m
CONFIG_VIDEO_SAA7134_ALSA=m
CONFIG_VIDEO_SAA7134_RC=y
CONFIG_VIDEO_SAA7134_DVB=m
CONFIG_VIDEO_SAA7164=m
#
# Media digital TV PCI Adapters
#
CONFIG_DVB_AV7110_IR=y
CONFIG_DVB_AV7110=m
CONFIG_DVB_AV7110_OSD=y
CONFIG_DVB_BUDGET_CORE=m
CONFIG_DVB_BUDGET=m
CONFIG_DVB_BUDGET_CI=m
CONFIG_DVB_BUDGET_AV=m
CONFIG_DVB_BUDGET_PATCH=m
CONFIG_DVB_B2C2_FLEXCOP_PCI=m
# CONFIG_DVB_B2C2_FLEXCOP_PCI_DEBUG is not set
CONFIG_DVB_PLUTO2=m
CONFIG_DVB_DM1105=m
CONFIG_DVB_PT1=m
# CONFIG_DVB_PT3 is not set
CONFIG_MANTIS_CORE=m
CONFIG_DVB_MANTIS=m
CONFIG_DVB_HOPPER=m
CONFIG_DVB_NGENE=m
CONFIG_DVB_DDBRIDGE=m
# CONFIG_DVB_SMIPCIE is not set
# CONFIG_DVB_NETUP_UNIDVB is not set
# CONFIG_V4L_PLATFORM_DRIVERS is not set
# CONFIG_V4L_MEM2MEM_DRIVERS is not set
# CONFIG_V4L_TEST_DRIVERS is not set
# CONFIG_DVB_PLATFORM_DRIVERS is not set
#
# Supported MMC/SDIO adapters
#
CONFIG_SMS_SDIO_DRV=m
CONFIG_RADIO_ADAPTERS=y
CONFIG_RADIO_TEA575X=m
# CONFIG_RADIO_SI470X is not set
# CONFIG_RADIO_SI4713 is not set
# CONFIG_USB_MR800 is not set
# CONFIG_USB_DSBR is not set
# CONFIG_RADIO_MAXIRADIO is not set
# CONFIG_RADIO_SHARK is not set
# CONFIG_RADIO_SHARK2 is not set
# CONFIG_USB_KEENE is not set
# CONFIG_USB_RAREMONO is not set
# CONFIG_USB_MA901 is not set
# CONFIG_RADIO_TEA5764 is not set
# CONFIG_RADIO_SAA7706H is not set
# CONFIG_RADIO_TEF6862 is not set
# CONFIG_RADIO_WL1273 is not set
#
# Texas Instruments WL128x FM driver (ST based)
#
#
# Supported FireWire (IEEE 1394) Adapters
#
CONFIG_DVB_FIREDTV=m
CONFIG_DVB_FIREDTV_INPUT=y
CONFIG_MEDIA_COMMON_OPTIONS=y
#
# common driver options
#
CONFIG_VIDEO_CX2341X=m
CONFIG_VIDEO_TVEEPROM=m
CONFIG_CYPRESS_FIRMWARE=m
CONFIG_DVB_B2C2_FLEXCOP=m
CONFIG_VIDEO_SAA7146=m
CONFIG_VIDEO_SAA7146_VV=m
CONFIG_SMS_SIANO_MDTV=m
CONFIG_SMS_SIANO_RC=y
# CONFIG_SMS_SIANO_DEBUGFS is not set
#
# Media ancillary drivers (tuners, sensors, i2c, spi, frontends)
#
CONFIG_MEDIA_SUBDRV_AUTOSELECT=y
CONFIG_MEDIA_ATTACH=y
CONFIG_VIDEO_IR_I2C=m
#
# Audio decoders, processors and mixers
#
CONFIG_VIDEO_TVAUDIO=m
CONFIG_VIDEO_TDA7432=m
CONFIG_VIDEO_MSP3400=m
CONFIG_VIDEO_CS3308=m
CONFIG_VIDEO_CS5345=m
CONFIG_VIDEO_CS53L32A=m
CONFIG_VIDEO_WM8775=m
CONFIG_VIDEO_WM8739=m
CONFIG_VIDEO_VP27SMPX=m
#
# RDS decoders
#
CONFIG_VIDEO_SAA6588=m
#
# Video decoders
#
CONFIG_VIDEO_SAA711X=m
#
# Video and audio decoders
#
CONFIG_VIDEO_SAA717X=m
CONFIG_VIDEO_CX25840=m
#
# Video encoders
#
CONFIG_VIDEO_SAA7127=m
#
# Camera sensor devices
#
#
# Flash devices
#
#
# Video improvement chips
#
CONFIG_VIDEO_UPD64031A=m
CONFIG_VIDEO_UPD64083=m
#
# Audio/Video compression chips
#
CONFIG_VIDEO_SAA6752HS=m
#
# Miscellaneous helper chips
#
CONFIG_VIDEO_M52790=m
#
# Sensors used on soc_camera driver
#
CONFIG_MEDIA_TUNER=m
CONFIG_MEDIA_TUNER_SIMPLE=m
CONFIG_MEDIA_TUNER_TDA8290=m
CONFIG_MEDIA_TUNER_TDA827X=m
CONFIG_MEDIA_TUNER_TDA18271=m
CONFIG_MEDIA_TUNER_TDA9887=m
CONFIG_MEDIA_TUNER_TEA5761=m
CONFIG_MEDIA_TUNER_TEA5767=m
CONFIG_MEDIA_TUNER_MT20XX=m
CONFIG_MEDIA_TUNER_MT2060=m
CONFIG_MEDIA_TUNER_MT2063=m
CONFIG_MEDIA_TUNER_MT2266=m
CONFIG_MEDIA_TUNER_MT2131=m
CONFIG_MEDIA_TUNER_QT1010=m
CONFIG_MEDIA_TUNER_XC2028=m
CONFIG_MEDIA_TUNER_XC5000=m
CONFIG_MEDIA_TUNER_XC4000=m
CONFIG_MEDIA_TUNER_MXL5005S=m
CONFIG_MEDIA_TUNER_MXL5007T=m
CONFIG_MEDIA_TUNER_MC44S803=m
CONFIG_MEDIA_TUNER_MAX2165=m
CONFIG_MEDIA_TUNER_TDA18218=m
CONFIG_MEDIA_TUNER_FC0011=m
CONFIG_MEDIA_TUNER_FC0012=m
CONFIG_MEDIA_TUNER_FC0013=m
CONFIG_MEDIA_TUNER_TDA18212=m
CONFIG_MEDIA_TUNER_E4000=m
CONFIG_MEDIA_TUNER_FC2580=m
CONFIG_MEDIA_TUNER_M88RS6000T=m
CONFIG_MEDIA_TUNER_TUA9001=m
CONFIG_MEDIA_TUNER_SI2157=m
CONFIG_MEDIA_TUNER_IT913X=m
CONFIG_MEDIA_TUNER_R820T=m
CONFIG_MEDIA_TUNER_QM1D1C0042=m
#
# Multistandard (satellite) frontends
#
CONFIG_DVB_STB0899=m
CONFIG_DVB_STB6100=m
CONFIG_DVB_STV090x=m
CONFIG_DVB_STV6110x=m
CONFIG_DVB_M88DS3103=m
#
# Multistandard (cable + terrestrial) frontends
#
CONFIG_DVB_DRXK=m
CONFIG_DVB_TDA18271C2DD=m
CONFIG_DVB_SI2165=m
CONFIG_DVB_MN88472=m
CONFIG_DVB_MN88473=m
#
# DVB-S (satellite) frontends
#
CONFIG_DVB_CX24110=m
CONFIG_DVB_CX24123=m
CONFIG_DVB_MT312=m
CONFIG_DVB_ZL10036=m
CONFIG_DVB_ZL10039=m
CONFIG_DVB_S5H1420=m
CONFIG_DVB_STV0288=m
CONFIG_DVB_STB6000=m
CONFIG_DVB_STV0299=m
CONFIG_DVB_STV6110=m
CONFIG_DVB_STV0900=m
CONFIG_DVB_TDA8083=m
CONFIG_DVB_TDA10086=m
CONFIG_DVB_TDA8261=m
CONFIG_DVB_VES1X93=m
CONFIG_DVB_TUNER_ITD1000=m
CONFIG_DVB_TUNER_CX24113=m
CONFIG_DVB_TDA826X=m
CONFIG_DVB_TUA6100=m
CONFIG_DVB_CX24116=m
CONFIG_DVB_CX24117=m
CONFIG_DVB_CX24120=m
CONFIG_DVB_SI21XX=m
CONFIG_DVB_TS2020=m
CONFIG_DVB_DS3000=m
CONFIG_DVB_MB86A16=m
CONFIG_DVB_TDA10071=m
#
# DVB-T (terrestrial) frontends
#
CONFIG_DVB_SP8870=m
CONFIG_DVB_SP887X=m
CONFIG_DVB_CX22700=m
CONFIG_DVB_CX22702=m
CONFIG_DVB_DRXD=m
CONFIG_DVB_L64781=m
CONFIG_DVB_TDA1004X=m
CONFIG_DVB_NXT6000=m
CONFIG_DVB_MT352=m
CONFIG_DVB_ZL10353=m
CONFIG_DVB_DIB3000MB=m
CONFIG_DVB_DIB3000MC=m
CONFIG_DVB_DIB7000M=m
CONFIG_DVB_DIB7000P=m
CONFIG_DVB_TDA10048=m
CONFIG_DVB_AF9013=m
CONFIG_DVB_EC100=m
CONFIG_DVB_STV0367=m
CONFIG_DVB_CXD2820R=m
CONFIG_DVB_RTL2830=m
CONFIG_DVB_RTL2832=m
CONFIG_DVB_SI2168=m
# CONFIG_DVB_AS102_FE is not set
CONFIG_DVB_GP8PSK_FE=m
#
# DVB-C (cable) frontends
#
CONFIG_DVB_VES1820=m
CONFIG_DVB_TDA10021=m
CONFIG_DVB_TDA10023=m
CONFIG_DVB_STV0297=m
#
# ATSC (North American/Korean Terrestrial/Cable DTV) frontends
#
CONFIG_DVB_NXT200X=m
CONFIG_DVB_OR51211=m
CONFIG_DVB_OR51132=m
CONFIG_DVB_BCM3510=m
CONFIG_DVB_LGDT330X=m
CONFIG_DVB_LGDT3305=m
CONFIG_DVB_LGDT3306A=m
CONFIG_DVB_LG2160=m
CONFIG_DVB_S5H1409=m
CONFIG_DVB_AU8522=m
CONFIG_DVB_AU8522_DTV=m
CONFIG_DVB_AU8522_V4L=m
CONFIG_DVB_S5H1411=m
#
# ISDB-T (terrestrial) frontends
#
CONFIG_DVB_S921=m
CONFIG_DVB_DIB8000=m
CONFIG_DVB_MB86A20S=m
#
# ISDB-S (satellite) & ISDB-T (terrestrial) frontends
#
CONFIG_DVB_TC90522=m
#
# Digital terrestrial only tuners/PLL
#
CONFIG_DVB_PLL=m
CONFIG_DVB_TUNER_DIB0070=m
CONFIG_DVB_TUNER_DIB0090=m
#
# SEC control devices for DVB-S
#
CONFIG_DVB_DRX39XYJ=m
CONFIG_DVB_LNBP21=m
CONFIG_DVB_LNBP22=m
CONFIG_DVB_ISL6405=m
CONFIG_DVB_ISL6421=m
CONFIG_DVB_ISL6423=m
CONFIG_DVB_A8293=m
CONFIG_DVB_LGS8GXX=m
CONFIG_DVB_ATBM8830=m
CONFIG_DVB_TDA665x=m
CONFIG_DVB_IX2505V=m
CONFIG_DVB_M88RS2000=m
CONFIG_DVB_AF9033=m
#
# Tools to develop new frontends
#
# CONFIG_DVB_DUMMY_FE is not set
#
# Graphics support
#
CONFIG_AGP=y
CONFIG_AGP_AMD64=y
CONFIG_AGP_INTEL=y
CONFIG_AGP_SIS=y
CONFIG_AGP_VIA=y
CONFIG_INTEL_GTT=y
CONFIG_VGA_ARB=y
CONFIG_VGA_ARB_MAX_GPUS=64
CONFIG_VGA_SWITCHEROO=y
CONFIG_DRM=m
CONFIG_DRM_MIPI_DSI=y
# CONFIG_DRM_DP_AUX_CHARDEV is not set
# CONFIG_DRM_DEBUG_MM_SELFTEST is not set
CONFIG_DRM_KMS_HELPER=m
CONFIG_DRM_KMS_FB_HELPER=y
CONFIG_DRM_FBDEV_EMULATION=y
CONFIG_DRM_LOAD_EDID_FIRMWARE=y
CONFIG_DRM_TTM=m
#
# I2C encoder or helper chips
#
CONFIG_DRM_I2C_CH7006=m
CONFIG_DRM_I2C_SIL164=m
CONFIG_DRM_I2C_NXP_TDA998X=m
# CONFIG_DRM_RADEON is not set
# CONFIG_DRM_AMDGPU is not set
#
# ACP (Audio CoProcessor) Configuration
#
# CONFIG_DRM_NOUVEAU is not set
CONFIG_DRM_I915=m
# CONFIG_DRM_I915_ALPHA_SUPPORT is not set
CONFIG_DRM_I915_CAPTURE_ERROR=y
CONFIG_DRM_I915_COMPRESS_ERROR=y
CONFIG_DRM_I915_USERPTR=y
# CONFIG_DRM_I915_GVT is not set
#
# drm/i915 Debugging
#
# CONFIG_DRM_I915_WERROR is not set
# CONFIG_DRM_I915_DEBUG is not set
# CONFIG_DRM_I915_SW_FENCE_DEBUG_OBJECTS is not set
# CONFIG_DRM_VGEM is not set
CONFIG_DRM_VMWGFX=m
CONFIG_DRM_VMWGFX_FBCON=y
CONFIG_DRM_GMA500=m
CONFIG_DRM_GMA600=y
CONFIG_DRM_GMA3600=y
CONFIG_DRM_UDL=m
CONFIG_DRM_AST=m
CONFIG_DRM_MGAG200=m
CONFIG_DRM_CIRRUS_QEMU=m
CONFIG_DRM_QXL=m
# CONFIG_DRM_BOCHS is not set
# CONFIG_DRM_VIRTIO_GPU is not set
CONFIG_DRM_PANEL=y
#
# Display Panels
#
CONFIG_DRM_BRIDGE=y
#
# Display Interface Bridges
#
# CONFIG_DRM_ANALOGIX_ANX78XX is not set
# CONFIG_DRM_HISI_HIBMC is not set
# CONFIG_DRM_TINYDRM is not set
# CONFIG_DRM_LEGACY is not set
# CONFIG_DRM_LIB_RANDOM is not set
#
# Frame buffer Devices
#
CONFIG_FB=y
# CONFIG_FIRMWARE_EDID is not set
CONFIG_FB_CMDLINE=y
CONFIG_FB_NOTIFY=y
# CONFIG_FB_DDC is not set
CONFIG_FB_BOOT_VESA_SUPPORT=y
CONFIG_FB_CFB_FILLRECT=y
CONFIG_FB_CFB_COPYAREA=y
CONFIG_FB_CFB_IMAGEBLIT=y
# CONFIG_FB_CFB_REV_PIXELS_IN_BYTE is not set
CONFIG_FB_SYS_FILLRECT=m
CONFIG_FB_SYS_COPYAREA=m
CONFIG_FB_SYS_IMAGEBLIT=m
# CONFIG_FB_PROVIDE_GET_FB_UNMAPPED_AREA is not set
# CONFIG_FB_FOREIGN_ENDIAN is not set
CONFIG_FB_SYS_FOPS=m
CONFIG_FB_DEFERRED_IO=y
# CONFIG_FB_SVGALIB is not set
# CONFIG_FB_MACMODES is not set
# CONFIG_FB_BACKLIGHT is not set
# CONFIG_FB_MODE_HELPERS is not set
CONFIG_FB_TILEBLITTING=y
#
# Frame buffer hardware drivers
#
# CONFIG_FB_CIRRUS is not set
# CONFIG_FB_PM2 is not set
# CONFIG_FB_CYBER2000 is not set
# CONFIG_FB_ARC is not set
# CONFIG_FB_ASILIANT is not set
# CONFIG_FB_IMSTT is not set
# CONFIG_FB_VGA16 is not set
# CONFIG_FB_UVESA is not set
CONFIG_FB_VESA=y
CONFIG_FB_EFI=y
# CONFIG_FB_N411 is not set
# CONFIG_FB_HGA is not set
# CONFIG_FB_OPENCORES is not set
# CONFIG_FB_S1D13XXX is not set
# CONFIG_FB_NVIDIA is not set
# CONFIG_FB_RIVA is not set
# CONFIG_FB_I740 is not set
# CONFIG_FB_LE80578 is not set
# CONFIG_FB_INTEL is not set
# CONFIG_FB_MATROX is not set
# CONFIG_FB_RADEON is not set
# CONFIG_FB_ATY128 is not set
# CONFIG_FB_ATY is not set
# CONFIG_FB_S3 is not set
# CONFIG_FB_SAVAGE is not set
# CONFIG_FB_SIS is not set
# CONFIG_FB_VIA is not set
# CONFIG_FB_NEOMAGIC is not set
# CONFIG_FB_KYRO is not set
# CONFIG_FB_3DFX is not set
# CONFIG_FB_VOODOO1 is not set
# CONFIG_FB_VT8623 is not set
# CONFIG_FB_TRIDENT is not set
# CONFIG_FB_ARK is not set
# CONFIG_FB_PM3 is not set
# CONFIG_FB_CARMINE is not set
# CONFIG_FB_SM501 is not set
# CONFIG_FB_SMSCUFX is not set
# CONFIG_FB_UDL is not set
# CONFIG_FB_IBM_GXT4500 is not set
# CONFIG_FB_VIRTUAL is not set
# CONFIG_XEN_FBDEV_FRONTEND is not set
# CONFIG_FB_METRONOME is not set
# CONFIG_FB_MB862XX is not set
# CONFIG_FB_BROADSHEET is not set
# CONFIG_FB_AUO_K190X is not set
CONFIG_FB_HYPERV=m
# CONFIG_FB_SIMPLE is not set
# CONFIG_FB_SM712 is not set
CONFIG_BACKLIGHT_LCD_SUPPORT=y
CONFIG_LCD_CLASS_DEVICE=m
# CONFIG_LCD_L4F00242T03 is not set
# CONFIG_LCD_LMS283GF05 is not set
# CONFIG_LCD_LTV350QV is not set
# CONFIG_LCD_ILI922X is not set
# CONFIG_LCD_ILI9320 is not set
# CONFIG_LCD_TDO24M is not set
# CONFIG_LCD_VGG2432A4 is not set
CONFIG_LCD_PLATFORM=m
# CONFIG_LCD_S6E63M0 is not set
# CONFIG_LCD_LD9040 is not set
# CONFIG_LCD_AMS369FG06 is not set
# CONFIG_LCD_LMS501KF03 is not set
# CONFIG_LCD_HX8357 is not set
CONFIG_BACKLIGHT_CLASS_DEVICE=y
# CONFIG_BACKLIGHT_GENERIC is not set
# CONFIG_BACKLIGHT_PWM is not set
CONFIG_BACKLIGHT_APPLE=m
# CONFIG_BACKLIGHT_PM8941_WLED is not set
# CONFIG_BACKLIGHT_SAHARA is not set
# CONFIG_BACKLIGHT_ADP8860 is not set
# CONFIG_BACKLIGHT_ADP8870 is not set
# CONFIG_BACKLIGHT_LM3630A is not set
# CONFIG_BACKLIGHT_LM3639 is not set
# CONFIG_BACKLIGHT_LP855X is not set
# CONFIG_BACKLIGHT_GPIO is not set
# CONFIG_BACKLIGHT_LV5207LP is not set
# CONFIG_BACKLIGHT_BD6107 is not set
# CONFIG_VGASTATE is not set
CONFIG_HDMI=y
#
# Console display driver support
#
CONFIG_VGA_CONSOLE=y
CONFIG_VGACON_SOFT_SCROLLBACK=y
CONFIG_VGACON_SOFT_SCROLLBACK_SIZE=64
# CONFIG_VGACON_SOFT_SCROLLBACK_PERSISTENT_ENABLE_BY_DEFAULT is not set
CONFIG_DUMMY_CONSOLE=y
CONFIG_DUMMY_CONSOLE_COLUMNS=80
CONFIG_DUMMY_CONSOLE_ROWS=25
CONFIG_FRAMEBUFFER_CONSOLE=y
CONFIG_FRAMEBUFFER_CONSOLE_DETECT_PRIMARY=y
CONFIG_FRAMEBUFFER_CONSOLE_ROTATION=y
CONFIG_LOGO=y
# CONFIG_LOGO_LINUX_MONO is not set
# CONFIG_LOGO_LINUX_VGA16 is not set
CONFIG_LOGO_LINUX_CLUT224=y
CONFIG_SOUND=m
CONFIG_SOUND_OSS_CORE=y
CONFIG_SOUND_OSS_CORE_PRECLAIM=y
CONFIG_SND=m
CONFIG_SND_TIMER=m
CONFIG_SND_PCM=m
CONFIG_SND_HWDEP=m
CONFIG_SND_RAWMIDI=m
CONFIG_SND_JACK=y
CONFIG_SND_JACK_INPUT_DEV=y
CONFIG_SND_SEQUENCER=m
CONFIG_SND_SEQ_DUMMY=m
CONFIG_SND_OSSEMUL=y
# CONFIG_SND_MIXER_OSS is not set
# CONFIG_SND_PCM_OSS is not set
CONFIG_SND_PCM_TIMER=y
CONFIG_SND_SEQUENCER_OSS=y
CONFIG_SND_HRTIMER=m
CONFIG_SND_SEQ_HRTIMER_DEFAULT=y
CONFIG_SND_DYNAMIC_MINORS=y
CONFIG_SND_MAX_CARDS=32
# CONFIG_SND_SUPPORT_OLD_API is not set
CONFIG_SND_PROC_FS=y
CONFIG_SND_VERBOSE_PROCFS=y
# CONFIG_SND_VERBOSE_PRINTK is not set
# CONFIG_SND_DEBUG is not set
CONFIG_SND_VMASTER=y
CONFIG_SND_DMA_SGBUF=y
CONFIG_SND_RAWMIDI_SEQ=m
CONFIG_SND_OPL3_LIB_SEQ=m
# CONFIG_SND_OPL4_LIB_SEQ is not set
# CONFIG_SND_SBAWE_SEQ is not set
CONFIG_SND_EMU10K1_SEQ=m
CONFIG_SND_MPU401_UART=m
CONFIG_SND_OPL3_LIB=m
CONFIG_SND_VX_LIB=m
CONFIG_SND_AC97_CODEC=m
CONFIG_SND_DRIVERS=y
CONFIG_SND_PCSP=m
CONFIG_SND_DUMMY=m
CONFIG_SND_ALOOP=m
CONFIG_SND_VIRMIDI=m
CONFIG_SND_MTPAV=m
# CONFIG_SND_MTS64 is not set
# CONFIG_SND_SERIAL_U16550 is not set
CONFIG_SND_MPU401=m
# CONFIG_SND_PORTMAN2X4 is not set
CONFIG_SND_AC97_POWER_SAVE=y
CONFIG_SND_AC97_POWER_SAVE_DEFAULT=5
CONFIG_SND_PCI=y
CONFIG_SND_AD1889=m
# CONFIG_SND_ALS300 is not set
# CONFIG_SND_ALS4000 is not set
CONFIG_SND_ALI5451=m
CONFIG_SND_ASIHPI=m
CONFIG_SND_ATIIXP=m
CONFIG_SND_ATIIXP_MODEM=m
CONFIG_SND_AU8810=m
CONFIG_SND_AU8820=m
CONFIG_SND_AU8830=m
# CONFIG_SND_AW2 is not set
# CONFIG_SND_AZT3328 is not set
CONFIG_SND_BT87X=m
# CONFIG_SND_BT87X_OVERCLOCK is not set
CONFIG_SND_CA0106=m
CONFIG_SND_CMIPCI=m
CONFIG_SND_OXYGEN_LIB=m
CONFIG_SND_OXYGEN=m
# CONFIG_SND_CS4281 is not set
CONFIG_SND_CS46XX=m
CONFIG_SND_CS46XX_NEW_DSP=y
CONFIG_SND_CTXFI=m
CONFIG_SND_DARLA20=m
CONFIG_SND_GINA20=m
CONFIG_SND_LAYLA20=m
CONFIG_SND_DARLA24=m
CONFIG_SND_GINA24=m
CONFIG_SND_LAYLA24=m
CONFIG_SND_MONA=m
CONFIG_SND_MIA=m
CONFIG_SND_ECHO3G=m
CONFIG_SND_INDIGO=m
CONFIG_SND_INDIGOIO=m
CONFIG_SND_INDIGODJ=m
CONFIG_SND_INDIGOIOX=m
CONFIG_SND_INDIGODJX=m
CONFIG_SND_EMU10K1=m
CONFIG_SND_EMU10K1X=m
CONFIG_SND_ENS1370=m
CONFIG_SND_ENS1371=m
# CONFIG_SND_ES1938 is not set
CONFIG_SND_ES1968=m
CONFIG_SND_ES1968_INPUT=y
CONFIG_SND_ES1968_RADIO=y
# CONFIG_SND_FM801 is not set
CONFIG_SND_HDSP=m
CONFIG_SND_HDSPM=m
CONFIG_SND_ICE1712=m
CONFIG_SND_ICE1724=m
CONFIG_SND_INTEL8X0=m
CONFIG_SND_INTEL8X0M=m
CONFIG_SND_KORG1212=m
CONFIG_SND_LOLA=m
CONFIG_SND_LX6464ES=m
CONFIG_SND_MAESTRO3=m
CONFIG_SND_MAESTRO3_INPUT=y
CONFIG_SND_MIXART=m
# CONFIG_SND_NM256 is not set
CONFIG_SND_PCXHR=m
# CONFIG_SND_RIPTIDE is not set
CONFIG_SND_RME32=m
CONFIG_SND_RME96=m
CONFIG_SND_RME9652=m
# CONFIG_SND_SONICVIBES is not set
CONFIG_SND_TRIDENT=m
CONFIG_SND_VIA82XX=m
CONFIG_SND_VIA82XX_MODEM=m
CONFIG_SND_VIRTUOSO=m
CONFIG_SND_VX222=m
# CONFIG_SND_YMFPCI is not set
#
# HD-Audio
#
CONFIG_SND_HDA=m
CONFIG_SND_HDA_INTEL=m
CONFIG_SND_HDA_HWDEP=y
# CONFIG_SND_HDA_RECONFIG is not set
CONFIG_SND_HDA_INPUT_BEEP=y
CONFIG_SND_HDA_INPUT_BEEP_MODE=0
# CONFIG_SND_HDA_PATCH_LOADER is not set
CONFIG_SND_HDA_CODEC_REALTEK=m
CONFIG_SND_HDA_CODEC_ANALOG=m
CONFIG_SND_HDA_CODEC_SIGMATEL=m
CONFIG_SND_HDA_CODEC_VIA=m
CONFIG_SND_HDA_CODEC_HDMI=m
CONFIG_SND_HDA_CODEC_CIRRUS=m
CONFIG_SND_HDA_CODEC_CONEXANT=m
CONFIG_SND_HDA_CODEC_CA0110=m
CONFIG_SND_HDA_CODEC_CA0132=m
CONFIG_SND_HDA_CODEC_CA0132_DSP=y
CONFIG_SND_HDA_CODEC_CMEDIA=m
CONFIG_SND_HDA_CODEC_SI3054=m
CONFIG_SND_HDA_GENERIC=m
CONFIG_SND_HDA_POWER_SAVE_DEFAULT=0
CONFIG_SND_HDA_CORE=m
CONFIG_SND_HDA_DSP_LOADER=y
CONFIG_SND_HDA_I915=y
CONFIG_SND_HDA_PREALLOC_SIZE=512
CONFIG_SND_SPI=y
CONFIG_SND_USB=y
CONFIG_SND_USB_AUDIO=m
CONFIG_SND_USB_UA101=m
CONFIG_SND_USB_USX2Y=m
CONFIG_SND_USB_CAIAQ=m
CONFIG_SND_USB_CAIAQ_INPUT=y
CONFIG_SND_USB_US122L=m
CONFIG_SND_USB_6FIRE=m
# CONFIG_SND_USB_HIFACE is not set
# CONFIG_SND_BCD2000 is not set
# CONFIG_SND_USB_POD is not set
# CONFIG_SND_USB_PODHD is not set
# CONFIG_SND_USB_TONEPORT is not set
# CONFIG_SND_USB_VARIAX is not set
CONFIG_SND_FIREWIRE=y
CONFIG_SND_FIREWIRE_LIB=m
# CONFIG_SND_DICE is not set
# CONFIG_SND_OXFW is not set
CONFIG_SND_ISIGHT=m
# CONFIG_SND_FIREWORKS is not set
# CONFIG_SND_BEBOB is not set
# CONFIG_SND_FIREWIRE_DIGI00X is not set
# CONFIG_SND_FIREWIRE_TASCAM is not set
# CONFIG_SND_SOC is not set
# CONFIG_SND_X86 is not set
# CONFIG_SOUND_PRIME is not set
CONFIG_AC97_BUS=m
#
# HID support
#
CONFIG_HID=y
CONFIG_HID_BATTERY_STRENGTH=y
CONFIG_HIDRAW=y
CONFIG_UHID=m
CONFIG_HID_GENERIC=y
#
# Special HID drivers
#
CONFIG_HID_A4TECH=y
CONFIG_HID_ACRUX=m
# CONFIG_HID_ACRUX_FF is not set
CONFIG_HID_APPLE=y
CONFIG_HID_APPLEIR=m
# CONFIG_HID_ASUS is not set
CONFIG_HID_AUREAL=m
CONFIG_HID_BELKIN=y
# CONFIG_HID_BETOP_FF is not set
CONFIG_HID_CHERRY=y
CONFIG_HID_CHICONY=y
# CONFIG_HID_CORSAIR is not set
CONFIG_HID_PRODIKEYS=m
# CONFIG_HID_CMEDIA is not set
# CONFIG_HID_CP2112 is not set
CONFIG_HID_CYPRESS=y
CONFIG_HID_DRAGONRISE=m
# CONFIG_DRAGONRISE_FF is not set
# CONFIG_HID_EMS_FF is not set
CONFIG_HID_ELECOM=m
# CONFIG_HID_ELO is not set
CONFIG_HID_EZKEY=y
# CONFIG_HID_GEMBIRD is not set
# CONFIG_HID_GFRM is not set
CONFIG_HID_HOLTEK=m
# CONFIG_HOLTEK_FF is not set
# CONFIG_HID_GT683R is not set
CONFIG_HID_KEYTOUCH=m
CONFIG_HID_KYE=m
CONFIG_HID_UCLOGIC=m
CONFIG_HID_WALTOP=m
CONFIG_HID_GYRATION=m
CONFIG_HID_ICADE=m
CONFIG_HID_TWINHAN=m
CONFIG_HID_KENSINGTON=y
CONFIG_HID_LCPOWER=m
CONFIG_HID_LED=m
# CONFIG_HID_LENOVO is not set
CONFIG_HID_LOGITECH=y
CONFIG_HID_LOGITECH_DJ=m
CONFIG_HID_LOGITECH_HIDPP=m
# CONFIG_LOGITECH_FF is not set
# CONFIG_LOGIRUMBLEPAD2_FF is not set
# CONFIG_LOGIG940_FF is not set
# CONFIG_LOGIWHEELS_FF is not set
CONFIG_HID_MAGICMOUSE=y
# CONFIG_HID_MAYFLASH is not set
CONFIG_HID_MICROSOFT=y
CONFIG_HID_MONTEREY=y
CONFIG_HID_MULTITOUCH=m
CONFIG_HID_NTRIG=y
CONFIG_HID_ORTEK=m
CONFIG_HID_PANTHERLORD=m
# CONFIG_PANTHERLORD_FF is not set
# CONFIG_HID_PENMOUNT is not set
CONFIG_HID_PETALYNX=m
CONFIG_HID_PICOLCD=m
CONFIG_HID_PICOLCD_FB=y
CONFIG_HID_PICOLCD_BACKLIGHT=y
CONFIG_HID_PICOLCD_LCD=y
CONFIG_HID_PICOLCD_LEDS=y
CONFIG_HID_PICOLCD_CIR=y
CONFIG_HID_PLANTRONICS=y
CONFIG_HID_PRIMAX=m
CONFIG_HID_ROCCAT=m
CONFIG_HID_SAITEK=m
CONFIG_HID_SAMSUNG=m
CONFIG_HID_SONY=m
# CONFIG_SONY_FF is not set
CONFIG_HID_SPEEDLINK=m
CONFIG_HID_STEELSERIES=m
CONFIG_HID_SUNPLUS=m
# CONFIG_HID_RMI is not set
CONFIG_HID_GREENASIA=m
# CONFIG_GREENASIA_FF is not set
CONFIG_HID_HYPERV_MOUSE=m
CONFIG_HID_SMARTJOYPLUS=m
# CONFIG_SMARTJOYPLUS_FF is not set
CONFIG_HID_TIVO=m
CONFIG_HID_TOPSEED=m
CONFIG_HID_THINGM=m
CONFIG_HID_THRUSTMASTER=m
# CONFIG_THRUSTMASTER_FF is not set
# CONFIG_HID_UDRAW_PS3 is not set
CONFIG_HID_WACOM=m
CONFIG_HID_WIIMOTE=m
# CONFIG_HID_XINMO is not set
CONFIG_HID_ZEROPLUS=m
# CONFIG_ZEROPLUS_FF is not set
CONFIG_HID_ZYDACRON=m
# CONFIG_HID_SENSOR_HUB is not set
# CONFIG_HID_ALPS is not set
#
# USB HID support
#
CONFIG_USB_HID=y
CONFIG_HID_PID=y
CONFIG_USB_HIDDEV=y
#
# I2C HID support
#
CONFIG_I2C_HID=m
#
# Intel ISH HID support
#
# CONFIG_INTEL_ISH_HID is not set
CONFIG_USB_OHCI_LITTLE_ENDIAN=y
CONFIG_USB_SUPPORT=y
CONFIG_USB_COMMON=y
CONFIG_USB_ARCH_HAS_HCD=y
CONFIG_USB=y
CONFIG_USB_ANNOUNCE_NEW_DEVICES=y
#
# Miscellaneous USB options
#
CONFIG_USB_DEFAULT_PERSIST=y
# CONFIG_USB_DYNAMIC_MINORS is not set
# CONFIG_USB_OTG is not set
# CONFIG_USB_OTG_WHITELIST is not set
# CONFIG_USB_OTG_BLACKLIST_HUB is not set
# CONFIG_USB_LEDS_TRIGGER_USBPORT is not set
CONFIG_USB_MON=y
CONFIG_USB_WUSB=m
CONFIG_USB_WUSB_CBAF=m
# CONFIG_USB_WUSB_CBAF_DEBUG is not set
#
# USB Host Controller Drivers
#
# CONFIG_USB_C67X00_HCD is not set
CONFIG_USB_XHCI_HCD=y
CONFIG_USB_XHCI_PCI=y
CONFIG_USB_XHCI_PLATFORM=y
CONFIG_USB_EHCI_HCD=y
CONFIG_USB_EHCI_ROOT_HUB_TT=y
CONFIG_USB_EHCI_TT_NEWSCHED=y
CONFIG_USB_EHCI_PCI=y
# CONFIG_USB_EHCI_HCD_PLATFORM is not set
# CONFIG_USB_OXU210HP_HCD is not set
# CONFIG_USB_ISP116X_HCD is not set
# CONFIG_USB_ISP1362_HCD is not set
# CONFIG_USB_FOTG210_HCD is not set
# CONFIG_USB_MAX3421_HCD is not set
CONFIG_USB_OHCI_HCD=y
CONFIG_USB_OHCI_HCD_PCI=y
# CONFIG_USB_OHCI_HCD_PLATFORM is not set
CONFIG_USB_UHCI_HCD=y
# CONFIG_USB_U132_HCD is not set
# CONFIG_USB_SL811_HCD is not set
# CONFIG_USB_R8A66597_HCD is not set
# CONFIG_USB_WHCI_HCD is not set
CONFIG_USB_HWA_HCD=m
# CONFIG_USB_HCD_BCMA is not set
# CONFIG_USB_HCD_SSB is not set
# CONFIG_USB_HCD_TEST_MODE is not set
#
# USB Device Class drivers
#
CONFIG_USB_ACM=m
CONFIG_USB_PRINTER=m
CONFIG_USB_WDM=m
CONFIG_USB_TMC=m
#
# NOTE: USB_STORAGE depends on SCSI but BLK_DEV_SD may
#
#
# also be needed; see USB_STORAGE Help for more info
#
CONFIG_USB_STORAGE=m
# CONFIG_USB_STORAGE_DEBUG is not set
CONFIG_USB_STORAGE_REALTEK=m
CONFIG_REALTEK_AUTOPM=y
CONFIG_USB_STORAGE_DATAFAB=m
CONFIG_USB_STORAGE_FREECOM=m
CONFIG_USB_STORAGE_ISD200=m
CONFIG_USB_STORAGE_USBAT=m
CONFIG_USB_STORAGE_SDDR09=m
CONFIG_USB_STORAGE_SDDR55=m
CONFIG_USB_STORAGE_JUMPSHOT=m
CONFIG_USB_STORAGE_ALAUDA=m
CONFIG_USB_STORAGE_ONETOUCH=m
CONFIG_USB_STORAGE_KARMA=m
CONFIG_USB_STORAGE_CYPRESS_ATACB=m
CONFIG_USB_STORAGE_ENE_UB6250=m
CONFIG_USB_UAS=m
#
# USB Imaging devices
#
CONFIG_USB_MDC800=m
CONFIG_USB_MICROTEK=m
# CONFIG_USBIP_CORE is not set
# CONFIG_USB_MUSB_HDRC is not set
CONFIG_USB_DWC3=y
# CONFIG_USB_DWC3_HOST is not set
CONFIG_USB_DWC3_GADGET=y
# CONFIG_USB_DWC3_DUAL_ROLE is not set
#
# Platform Glue Driver Support
#
CONFIG_USB_DWC3_PCI=y
# CONFIG_USB_DWC2 is not set
# CONFIG_USB_CHIPIDEA is not set
# CONFIG_USB_ISP1760 is not set
#
# USB port drivers
#
CONFIG_USB_USS720=m
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL=y
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_CONSOLE=y
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_GENERIC=y
# CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_SIMPLE is not set
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_AIRCABLE=m
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_ARK3116=m
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_BELKIN=m
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_CH341=m
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_WHITEHEAT=m
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_DIGI_ACCELEPORT=m
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_CP210X=m
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_CYPRESS_M8=m
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_EMPEG=m
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_FTDI_SIO=m
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_VISOR=m
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_IPAQ=m
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_IR=m
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_EDGEPORT=m
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_EDGEPORT_TI=m
# CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_F81232 is not set
# CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_F8153X is not set
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_GARMIN=m
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_IPW=m
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_IUU=m
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_KEYSPAN_PDA=m
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_KEYSPAN=m
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_KLSI=m
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_KOBIL_SCT=m
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_MCT_U232=m
# CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_METRO is not set
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_MOS7720=m
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_MOS7715_PARPORT=y
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_MOS7840=m
# CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_MXUPORT is not set
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_NAVMAN=m
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_PL2303=m
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_OTI6858=m
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_QCAUX=m
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_QUALCOMM=m
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_SPCP8X5=m
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_SAFE=m
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_SAFE_PADDED=y
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_SIERRAWIRELESS=m
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_SYMBOL=m
# CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_TI is not set
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_CYBERJACK=m
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_XIRCOM=m
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_WWAN=m
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_OPTION=m
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_OMNINET=m
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_OPTICON=m
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_XSENS_MT=m
# CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_WISHBONE is not set
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_SSU100=m
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_QT2=m
# CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_UPD78F0730 is not set
CONFIG_USB_SERIAL_DEBUG=m
#
# USB Miscellaneous drivers
#
CONFIG_USB_EMI62=m
CONFIG_USB_EMI26=m
CONFIG_USB_ADUTUX=m
CONFIG_USB_SEVSEG=m
# CONFIG_USB_RIO500 is not set
CONFIG_USB_LEGOTOWER=m
CONFIG_USB_LCD=m
# CONFIG_USB_CYPRESS_CY7C63 is not set
# CONFIG_USB_CYTHERM is not set
CONFIG_USB_IDMOUSE=m
CONFIG_USB_FTDI_ELAN=m
CONFIG_USB_APPLEDISPLAY=m
CONFIG_USB_SISUSBVGA=m
CONFIG_USB_SISUSBVGA_CON=y
CONFIG_USB_LD=m
# CONFIG_USB_TRANCEVIBRATOR is not set
CONFIG_USB_IOWARRIOR=m
# CONFIG_USB_TEST is not set
# CONFIG_USB_EHSET_TEST_FIXTURE is not set
CONFIG_USB_ISIGHTFW=m
# CONFIG_USB_YUREX is not set
CONFIG_USB_EZUSB_FX2=m
# CONFIG_USB_HUB_USB251XB is not set
CONFIG_USB_HSIC_USB3503=m
# CONFIG_USB_HSIC_USB4604 is not set
# CONFIG_USB_LINK_LAYER_TEST is not set
# CONFIG_USB_CHAOSKEY is not set
# CONFIG_UCSI is not set
CONFIG_USB_ATM=m
CONFIG_USB_SPEEDTOUCH=m
CONFIG_USB_CXACRU=m
CONFIG_USB_UEAGLEATM=m
CONFIG_USB_XUSBATM=m
#
# USB Physical Layer drivers
#
CONFIG_USB_PHY=y
CONFIG_NOP_USB_XCEIV=y
# CONFIG_USB_GPIO_VBUS is not set
# CONFIG_USB_ISP1301 is not set
CONFIG_USB_GADGET=y
# CONFIG_USB_GADGET_DEBUG is not set
# CONFIG_USB_GADGET_DEBUG_FILES is not set
# CONFIG_USB_GADGET_DEBUG_FS is not set
CONFIG_USB_GADGET_VBUS_DRAW=2
CONFIG_USB_GADGET_STORAGE_NUM_BUFFERS=2
#
# USB Peripheral Controller
#
# CONFIG_USB_FOTG210_UDC is not set
# CONFIG_USB_GR_UDC is not set
# CONFIG_USB_R8A66597 is not set
# CONFIG_USB_PXA27X is not set
# CONFIG_USB_MV_UDC is not set
# CONFIG_USB_MV_U3D is not set
# CONFIG_USB_M66592 is not set
# CONFIG_USB_BDC_UDC is not set
# CONFIG_USB_AMD5536UDC is not set
# CONFIG_USB_NET2272 is not set
# CONFIG_USB_NET2280 is not set
# CONFIG_USB_GOKU is not set
# CONFIG_USB_EG20T is not set
# CONFIG_USB_DUMMY_HCD is not set
CONFIG_USB_LIBCOMPOSITE=m
CONFIG_USB_F_MASS_STORAGE=m
# CONFIG_USB_CONFIGFS is not set
# CONFIG_USB_ZERO is not set
# CONFIG_USB_AUDIO is not set
# CONFIG_USB_ETH is not set
# CONFIG_USB_G_NCM is not set
# CONFIG_USB_GADGETFS is not set
# CONFIG_USB_FUNCTIONFS is not set
CONFIG_USB_MASS_STORAGE=m
# CONFIG_USB_GADGET_TARGET is not set
# CONFIG_USB_G_SERIAL is not set
# CONFIG_USB_MIDI_GADGET is not set
# CONFIG_USB_G_PRINTER is not set
# CONFIG_USB_CDC_COMPOSITE is not set
# CONFIG_USB_G_ACM_MS is not set
# CONFIG_USB_G_MULTI is not set
# CONFIG_USB_G_HID is not set
# CONFIG_USB_G_DBGP is not set
# CONFIG_USB_G_WEBCAM is not set
# CONFIG_USB_LED_TRIG is not set
# CONFIG_USB_ULPI_BUS is not set
CONFIG_UWB=m
CONFIG_UWB_HWA=m
CONFIG_UWB_WHCI=m
CONFIG_UWB_I1480U=m
CONFIG_MMC=m
# CONFIG_MMC_DEBUG is not set
CONFIG_MMC_BLOCK=m
CONFIG_MMC_BLOCK_MINORS=8
CONFIG_MMC_BLOCK_BOUNCE=y
CONFIG_SDIO_UART=m
# CONFIG_MMC_TEST is not set
#
# MMC/SD/SDIO Host Controller Drivers
#
CONFIG_MMC_SDHCI=m
CONFIG_MMC_SDHCI_PCI=m
CONFIG_MMC_RICOH_MMC=y
CONFIG_MMC_SDHCI_ACPI=m
CONFIG_MMC_SDHCI_PLTFM=m
# CONFIG_MMC_WBSD is not set
CONFIG_MMC_TIFM_SD=m
# CONFIG_MMC_SPI is not set
CONFIG_MMC_CB710=m
CONFIG_MMC_VIA_SDMMC=m
CONFIG_MMC_VUB300=m
CONFIG_MMC_USHC=m
# CONFIG_MMC_USDHI6ROL0 is not set
CONFIG_MMC_REALTEK_PCI=m
# CONFIG_MMC_TOSHIBA_PCI is not set
# CONFIG_MMC_MTK is not set
CONFIG_MEMSTICK=m
# CONFIG_MEMSTICK_DEBUG is not set
#
# MemoryStick drivers
#
# CONFIG_MEMSTICK_UNSAFE_RESUME is not set
CONFIG_MSPRO_BLOCK=m
# CONFIG_MS_BLOCK is not set
#
# MemoryStick Host Controller Drivers
#
CONFIG_MEMSTICK_TIFM_MS=m
CONFIG_MEMSTICK_JMICRON_38X=m
CONFIG_MEMSTICK_R592=m
CONFIG_MEMSTICK_REALTEK_PCI=m
CONFIG_NEW_LEDS=y
CONFIG_LEDS_CLASS=y
# CONFIG_LEDS_CLASS_FLASH is not set
# CONFIG_LEDS_BRIGHTNESS_HW_CHANGED is not set
#
# LED drivers
#
CONFIG_LEDS_LM3530=m
# CONFIG_LEDS_LM3642 is not set
# CONFIG_LEDS_PCA9532 is not set
# CONFIG_LEDS_GPIO is not set
CONFIG_LEDS_LP3944=m
# CONFIG_LEDS_LP3952 is not set
CONFIG_LEDS_LP55XX_COMMON=m
CONFIG_LEDS_LP5521=m
CONFIG_LEDS_LP5523=m
CONFIG_LEDS_LP5562=m
# CONFIG_LEDS_LP8501 is not set
# CONFIG_LEDS_LP8860 is not set
CONFIG_LEDS_CLEVO_MAIL=m
# CONFIG_LEDS_PCA955X is not set
# CONFIG_LEDS_PCA963X is not set
# CONFIG_LEDS_DAC124S085 is not set
# CONFIG_LEDS_PWM is not set
# CONFIG_LEDS_BD2802 is not set
CONFIG_LEDS_INTEL_SS4200=m
# CONFIG_LEDS_LT3593 is not set
# CONFIG_LEDS_TCA6507 is not set
# CONFIG_LEDS_TLC591XX is not set
# CONFIG_LEDS_LM355x is not set
#
# LED driver for blink(1) USB RGB LED is under Special HID drivers (HID_THINGM)
#
CONFIG_LEDS_BLINKM=m
# CONFIG_LEDS_MLXCPLD is not set
# CONFIG_LEDS_USER is not set
# CONFIG_LEDS_NIC78BX is not set
#
# LED Triggers
#
CONFIG_LEDS_TRIGGERS=y
CONFIG_LEDS_TRIGGER_TIMER=m
CONFIG_LEDS_TRIGGER_ONESHOT=m
# CONFIG_LEDS_TRIGGER_DISK is not set
# CONFIG_LEDS_TRIGGER_MTD is not set
CONFIG_LEDS_TRIGGER_HEARTBEAT=m
CONFIG_LEDS_TRIGGER_BACKLIGHT=m
# CONFIG_LEDS_TRIGGER_CPU is not set
# CONFIG_LEDS_TRIGGER_GPIO is not set
CONFIG_LEDS_TRIGGER_DEFAULT_ON=m
#
# iptables trigger is under Netfilter config (LED target)
#
CONFIG_LEDS_TRIGGER_TRANSIENT=m
CONFIG_LEDS_TRIGGER_CAMERA=m
# CONFIG_LEDS_TRIGGER_PANIC is not set
# CONFIG_ACCESSIBILITY is not set
# CONFIG_INFINIBAND is not set
CONFIG_EDAC_ATOMIC_SCRUB=y
CONFIG_EDAC_SUPPORT=y
CONFIG_EDAC=y
CONFIG_EDAC_LEGACY_SYSFS=y
# CONFIG_EDAC_DEBUG is not set
CONFIG_EDAC_DECODE_MCE=m
CONFIG_EDAC_MM_EDAC=m
CONFIG_EDAC_AMD64=m
# CONFIG_EDAC_AMD64_ERROR_INJECTION is not set
CONFIG_EDAC_E752X=m
CONFIG_EDAC_I82975X=m
CONFIG_EDAC_I3000=m
CONFIG_EDAC_I3200=m
# CONFIG_EDAC_IE31200 is not set
CONFIG_EDAC_X38=m
CONFIG_EDAC_I5400=m
CONFIG_EDAC_I7CORE=m
CONFIG_EDAC_I5000=m
CONFIG_EDAC_I5100=m
CONFIG_EDAC_I7300=m
CONFIG_EDAC_SBRIDGE=m
# CONFIG_EDAC_SKX is not set
CONFIG_RTC_LIB=y
CONFIG_RTC_MC146818_LIB=y
CONFIG_RTC_CLASS=y
CONFIG_RTC_HCTOSYS=y
CONFIG_RTC_HCTOSYS_DEVICE="rtc0"
# CONFIG_RTC_SYSTOHC is not set
# CONFIG_RTC_DEBUG is not set
#
# RTC interfaces
#
CONFIG_RTC_INTF_SYSFS=y
CONFIG_RTC_INTF_PROC=y
CONFIG_RTC_INTF_DEV=y
# CONFIG_RTC_INTF_DEV_UIE_EMUL is not set
# CONFIG_RTC_DRV_TEST is not set
#
# I2C RTC drivers
#
# CONFIG_RTC_DRV_ABB5ZES3 is not set
# CONFIG_RTC_DRV_ABX80X is not set
CONFIG_RTC_DRV_DS1307=m
CONFIG_RTC_DRV_DS1307_HWMON=y
# CONFIG_RTC_DRV_DS1307_CENTURY is not set
CONFIG_RTC_DRV_DS1374=m
# CONFIG_RTC_DRV_DS1374_WDT is not set
CONFIG_RTC_DRV_DS1672=m
CONFIG_RTC_DRV_MAX6900=m
CONFIG_RTC_DRV_RS5C372=m
CONFIG_RTC_DRV_ISL1208=m
CONFIG_RTC_DRV_ISL12022=m
CONFIG_RTC_DRV_X1205=m
CONFIG_RTC_DRV_PCF8523=m
# CONFIG_RTC_DRV_PCF85063 is not set
CONFIG_RTC_DRV_PCF8563=m
CONFIG_RTC_DRV_PCF8583=m
CONFIG_RTC_DRV_M41T80=m
CONFIG_RTC_DRV_M41T80_WDT=y
CONFIG_RTC_DRV_BQ32K=m
# CONFIG_RTC_DRV_S35390A is not set
CONFIG_RTC_DRV_FM3130=m
# CONFIG_RTC_DRV_RX8010 is not set
CONFIG_RTC_DRV_RX8581=m
CONFIG_RTC_DRV_RX8025=m
CONFIG_RTC_DRV_EM3027=m
# CONFIG_RTC_DRV_RV8803 is not set
#
# SPI RTC drivers
#
# CONFIG_RTC_DRV_M41T93 is not set
# CONFIG_RTC_DRV_M41T94 is not set
# CONFIG_RTC_DRV_DS1302 is not set
# CONFIG_RTC_DRV_DS1305 is not set
# CONFIG_RTC_DRV_DS1343 is not set
# CONFIG_RTC_DRV_DS1347 is not set
# CONFIG_RTC_DRV_DS1390 is not set
# CONFIG_RTC_DRV_MAX6916 is not set
# CONFIG_RTC_DRV_R9701 is not set
# CONFIG_RTC_DRV_RX4581 is not set
# CONFIG_RTC_DRV_RX6110 is not set
# CONFIG_RTC_DRV_RS5C348 is not set
# CONFIG_RTC_DRV_MAX6902 is not set
# CONFIG_RTC_DRV_PCF2123 is not set
# CONFIG_RTC_DRV_MCP795 is not set
CONFIG_RTC_I2C_AND_SPI=y
#
# SPI and I2C RTC drivers
#
CONFIG_RTC_DRV_DS3232=m
# CONFIG_RTC_DRV_PCF2127 is not set
CONFIG_RTC_DRV_RV3029C2=m
CONFIG_RTC_DRV_RV3029_HWMON=y
#
# Platform RTC drivers
#
CONFIG_RTC_DRV_CMOS=y
CONFIG_RTC_DRV_DS1286=m
CONFIG_RTC_DRV_DS1511=m
CONFIG_RTC_DRV_DS1553=m
# CONFIG_RTC_DRV_DS1685_FAMILY is not set
CONFIG_RTC_DRV_DS1742=m
CONFIG_RTC_DRV_DS2404=m
CONFIG_RTC_DRV_STK17TA8=m
# CONFIG_RTC_DRV_M48T86 is not set
CONFIG_RTC_DRV_M48T35=m
CONFIG_RTC_DRV_M48T59=m
CONFIG_RTC_DRV_MSM6242=m
CONFIG_RTC_DRV_BQ4802=m
CONFIG_RTC_DRV_RP5C01=m
CONFIG_RTC_DRV_V3020=m
#
# on-CPU RTC drivers
#
#
# HID Sensor RTC drivers
#
# CONFIG_RTC_DRV_HID_SENSOR_TIME is not set
CONFIG_DMADEVICES=y
# CONFIG_DMADEVICES_DEBUG is not set
#
# DMA Devices
#
CONFIG_DMA_ENGINE=y
CONFIG_DMA_VIRTUAL_CHANNELS=y
CONFIG_DMA_ACPI=y
# CONFIG_INTEL_IDMA64 is not set
# CONFIG_INTEL_IOATDMA is not set
# CONFIG_QCOM_HIDMA_MGMT is not set
# CONFIG_QCOM_HIDMA is not set
CONFIG_DW_DMAC_CORE=y
CONFIG_DW_DMAC=m
CONFIG_DW_DMAC_PCI=y
CONFIG_HSU_DMA=y
#
# DMA Clients
#
CONFIG_ASYNC_TX_DMA=y
CONFIG_DMATEST=m
#
# DMABUF options
#
CONFIG_SYNC_FILE=y
CONFIG_SW_SYNC=y
CONFIG_AUXDISPLAY=y
CONFIG_KS0108=m
CONFIG_KS0108_PORT=0x378
CONFIG_KS0108_DELAY=2
CONFIG_CFAG12864B=m
CONFIG_CFAG12864B_RATE=20
# CONFIG_IMG_ASCII_LCD is not set
CONFIG_UIO=m
CONFIG_UIO_CIF=m
CONFIG_UIO_PDRV_GENIRQ=m
# CONFIG_UIO_DMEM_GENIRQ is not set
CONFIG_UIO_AEC=m
CONFIG_UIO_SERCOS3=m
CONFIG_UIO_PCI_GENERIC=m
# CONFIG_UIO_NETX is not set
# CONFIG_UIO_PRUSS is not set
# CONFIG_UIO_MF624 is not set
# CONFIG_UIO_HV_GENERIC is not set
CONFIG_VFIO_IOMMU_TYPE1=m
CONFIG_VFIO_VIRQFD=m
CONFIG_VFIO=m
# CONFIG_VFIO_NOIOMMU is not set
CONFIG_VFIO_PCI=m
# CONFIG_VFIO_PCI_VGA is not set
CONFIG_VFIO_PCI_MMAP=y
CONFIG_VFIO_PCI_INTX=y
CONFIG_VFIO_PCI_IGD=y
# CONFIG_VFIO_MDEV is not set
CONFIG_IRQ_BYPASS_MANAGER=m
# CONFIG_VIRT_DRIVERS is not set
CONFIG_VIRTIO=y
#
# Virtio drivers
#
CONFIG_VIRTIO_PCI=y
CONFIG_VIRTIO_PCI_LEGACY=y
CONFIG_VIRTIO_BALLOON=y
# CONFIG_VIRTIO_INPUT is not set
# CONFIG_VIRTIO_MMIO is not set
#
# Microsoft Hyper-V guest support
#
CONFIG_HYPERV=m
CONFIG_HYPERV_UTILS=m
CONFIG_HYPERV_BALLOON=m
#
# Xen driver support
#
CONFIG_XEN_BALLOON=y
# CONFIG_XEN_SELFBALLOONING is not set
# CONFIG_XEN_BALLOON_MEMORY_HOTPLUG is not set
CONFIG_XEN_SCRUB_PAGES=y
CONFIG_XEN_DEV_EVTCHN=m
CONFIG_XEN_BACKEND=y
CONFIG_XENFS=m
CONFIG_XEN_COMPAT_XENFS=y
CONFIG_XEN_SYS_HYPERVISOR=y
CONFIG_XEN_XENBUS_FRONTEND=y
# CONFIG_XEN_GNTDEV is not set
# CONFIG_XEN_GRANT_DEV_ALLOC is not set
CONFIG_SWIOTLB_XEN=y
CONFIG_XEN_TMEM=m
CONFIG_XEN_PCIDEV_BACKEND=m
# CONFIG_XEN_SCSI_BACKEND is not set
CONFIG_XEN_PRIVCMD=m
CONFIG_XEN_ACPI_PROCESSOR=m
# CONFIG_XEN_MCE_LOG is not set
CONFIG_XEN_HAVE_PVMMU=y
CONFIG_XEN_EFI=y
CONFIG_XEN_AUTO_XLATE=y
CONFIG_XEN_ACPI=y
CONFIG_XEN_SYMS=y
CONFIG_XEN_HAVE_VPMU=y
CONFIG_STAGING=y
# CONFIG_PRISM2_USB is not set
# CONFIG_COMEDI is not set
# CONFIG_RTL8192U is not set
CONFIG_RTLLIB=m
CONFIG_RTLLIB_CRYPTO_CCMP=m
CONFIG_RTLLIB_CRYPTO_TKIP=m
CONFIG_RTLLIB_CRYPTO_WEP=m
CONFIG_RTL8192E=m
CONFIG_R8712U=m
# CONFIG_R8188EU is not set
# CONFIG_RTS5208 is not set
# CONFIG_VT6655 is not set
# CONFIG_VT6656 is not set
# CONFIG_FB_SM750 is not set
# CONFIG_FB_XGI is not set
#
# Speakup console speech
#
# CONFIG_SPEAKUP is not set
# CONFIG_STAGING_MEDIA is not set
#
# Android
#
# CONFIG_LTE_GDM724X is not set
CONFIG_FIREWIRE_SERIAL=m
CONFIG_FWTTY_MAX_TOTAL_PORTS=64
CONFIG_FWTTY_MAX_CARD_PORTS=32
# CONFIG_LNET is not set
# CONFIG_DGNC is not set
# CONFIG_GS_FPGABOOT is not set
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_SKEIN is not set
# CONFIG_UNISYSSPAR is not set
# CONFIG_FB_TFT is not set
# CONFIG_WILC1000_SDIO is not set
# CONFIG_WILC1000_SPI is not set
# CONFIG_MOST is not set
# CONFIG_KS7010 is not set
# CONFIG_GREYBUS is not set
CONFIG_X86_PLATFORM_DEVICES=y
CONFIG_ACER_WMI=m
CONFIG_ACERHDF=m
# CONFIG_ALIENWARE_WMI is not set
CONFIG_ASUS_LAPTOP=m
# CONFIG_DELL_LAPTOP is not set
# CONFIG_DELL_WMI is not set
CONFIG_DELL_WMI_AIO=m
# CONFIG_DELL_SMO8800 is not set
# CONFIG_DELL_RBTN is not set
CONFIG_FUJITSU_LAPTOP=m
# CONFIG_FUJITSU_LAPTOP_DEBUG is not set
CONFIG_FUJITSU_TABLET=m
CONFIG_AMILO_RFKILL=m
CONFIG_HP_ACCEL=m
# CONFIG_HP_WIRELESS is not set
CONFIG_HP_WMI=m
CONFIG_MSI_LAPTOP=m
CONFIG_PANASONIC_LAPTOP=m
CONFIG_COMPAL_LAPTOP=m
CONFIG_SONY_LAPTOP=m
CONFIG_SONYPI_COMPAT=y
CONFIG_IDEAPAD_LAPTOP=m
# CONFIG_SURFACE3_WMI is not set
CONFIG_THINKPAD_ACPI=m
CONFIG_THINKPAD_ACPI_ALSA_SUPPORT=y
# CONFIG_THINKPAD_ACPI_DEBUGFACILITIES is not set
# CONFIG_THINKPAD_ACPI_DEBUG is not set
# CONFIG_THINKPAD_ACPI_UNSAFE_LEDS is not set
CONFIG_THINKPAD_ACPI_VIDEO=y
CONFIG_THINKPAD_ACPI_HOTKEY_POLL=y
CONFIG_SENSORS_HDAPS=m
# CONFIG_INTEL_MENLOW is not set
CONFIG_EEEPC_LAPTOP=m
CONFIG_ASUS_WMI=m
CONFIG_ASUS_NB_WMI=m
CONFIG_EEEPC_WMI=m
# CONFIG_ASUS_WIRELESS is not set
CONFIG_ACPI_WMI=m
CONFIG_MSI_WMI=m
CONFIG_TOPSTAR_LAPTOP=m
CONFIG_TOSHIBA_BT_RFKILL=m
# CONFIG_TOSHIBA_HAPS is not set
# CONFIG_TOSHIBA_WMI is not set
CONFIG_ACPI_CMPC=m
# CONFIG_INTEL_HID_EVENT is not set
# CONFIG_INTEL_VBTN is not set
CONFIG_INTEL_IPS=m
# CONFIG_INTEL_PMC_CORE is not set
# CONFIG_IBM_RTL is not set
CONFIG_SAMSUNG_LAPTOP=m
CONFIG_MXM_WMI=m
CONFIG_INTEL_OAKTRAIL=m
CONFIG_SAMSUNG_Q10=m
CONFIG_APPLE_GMUX=m
# CONFIG_INTEL_RST is not set
# CONFIG_INTEL_SMARTCONNECT is not set
CONFIG_PVPANIC=y
# CONFIG_INTEL_PMC_IPC is not set
# CONFIG_SURFACE_PRO3_BUTTON is not set
# CONFIG_INTEL_PUNIT_IPC is not set
# CONFIG_MLX_PLATFORM is not set
# CONFIG_MLX_CPLD_PLATFORM is not set
# CONFIG_INTEL_TURBO_MAX_3 is not set
# CONFIG_SILEAD_DMI is not set
CONFIG_PMC_ATOM=y
# CONFIG_CHROME_PLATFORMS is not set
CONFIG_CLKDEV_LOOKUP=y
CONFIG_HAVE_CLK_PREPARE=y
CONFIG_COMMON_CLK=y
#
# Common Clock Framework
#
# CONFIG_COMMON_CLK_SI5351 is not set
# CONFIG_COMMON_CLK_CDCE706 is not set
# CONFIG_COMMON_CLK_CS2000_CP is not set
# CONFIG_COMMON_CLK_NXP is not set
# CONFIG_COMMON_CLK_PWM is not set
# CONFIG_COMMON_CLK_PXA is not set
# CONFIG_COMMON_CLK_PIC32 is not set
#
# Hardware Spinlock drivers
#
#
# Clock Source drivers
#
CONFIG_CLKEVT_I8253=y
CONFIG_I8253_LOCK=y
CONFIG_CLKBLD_I8253=y
# CONFIG_ATMEL_PIT is not set
# CONFIG_SH_TIMER_CMT is not set
# CONFIG_SH_TIMER_MTU2 is not set
# CONFIG_SH_TIMER_TMU is not set
# CONFIG_EM_TIMER_STI is not set
CONFIG_MAILBOX=y
CONFIG_PCC=y
# CONFIG_ALTERA_MBOX is not set
CONFIG_IOMMU_API=y
CONFIG_IOMMU_SUPPORT=y
#
# Generic IOMMU Pagetable Support
#
CONFIG_IOMMU_IOVA=y
CONFIG_AMD_IOMMU=y
CONFIG_AMD_IOMMU_V2=m
CONFIG_DMAR_TABLE=y
CONFIG_INTEL_IOMMU=y
# CONFIG_INTEL_IOMMU_SVM is not set
# CONFIG_INTEL_IOMMU_DEFAULT_ON is not set
CONFIG_INTEL_IOMMU_FLOPPY_WA=y
CONFIG_IRQ_REMAP=y
#
# Remoteproc drivers
#
# CONFIG_REMOTEPROC is not set
#
# Rpmsg drivers
#
#
# SOC (System On Chip) specific Drivers
#
#
# Broadcom SoC drivers
#
# CONFIG_SUNXI_SRAM is not set
# CONFIG_SOC_TI is not set
# CONFIG_SOC_ZTE is not set
CONFIG_PM_DEVFREQ=y
#
# DEVFREQ Governors
#
CONFIG_DEVFREQ_GOV_SIMPLE_ONDEMAND=m
# CONFIG_DEVFREQ_GOV_PERFORMANCE is not set
# CONFIG_DEVFREQ_GOV_POWERSAVE is not set
# CONFIG_DEVFREQ_GOV_USERSPACE is not set
# CONFIG_DEVFREQ_GOV_PASSIVE is not set
#
# DEVFREQ Drivers
#
# CONFIG_PM_DEVFREQ_EVENT is not set
# CONFIG_EXTCON is not set
# CONFIG_MEMORY is not set
# CONFIG_IIO is not set
CONFIG_NTB=m
# CONFIG_NTB_AMD is not set
# CONFIG_NTB_INTEL is not set
# CONFIG_NTB_PINGPONG is not set
# CONFIG_NTB_TOOL is not set
# CONFIG_NTB_PERF is not set
# CONFIG_NTB_TRANSPORT is not set
# CONFIG_VME_BUS is not set
CONFIG_PWM=y
CONFIG_PWM_SYSFS=y
# CONFIG_PWM_LPSS_PCI is not set
# CONFIG_PWM_LPSS_PLATFORM is not set
# CONFIG_PWM_PCA9685 is not set
CONFIG_ARM_GIC_MAX_NR=1
# CONFIG_IPACK_BUS is not set
# CONFIG_RESET_CONTROLLER is not set
# CONFIG_FMC is not set
#
# PHY Subsystem
#
CONFIG_GENERIC_PHY=y
# CONFIG_PHY_PXA_28NM_HSIC is not set
# CONFIG_PHY_PXA_28NM_USB2 is not set
# CONFIG_BCM_KONA_USB2_PHY is not set
CONFIG_POWERCAP=y
CONFIG_INTEL_RAPL=m
# CONFIG_MCB is not set
#
# Performance monitor support
#
CONFIG_RAS=y
# CONFIG_MCE_AMD_INJ is not set
# CONFIG_THUNDERBOLT is not set
#
# Android
#
# CONFIG_ANDROID is not set
CONFIG_LIBNVDIMM=m
CONFIG_BLK_DEV_PMEM=m
CONFIG_ND_BLK=m
CONFIG_ND_CLAIM=y
CONFIG_ND_BTT=m
CONFIG_BTT=y
CONFIG_ND_PFN=m
CONFIG_NVDIMM_PFN=y
CONFIG_NVDIMM_DAX=y
CONFIG_DEV_DAX=m
CONFIG_DEV_DAX_PMEM=m
CONFIG_NR_DEV_DAX=32768
CONFIG_NVMEM=m
# CONFIG_STM is not set
# CONFIG_INTEL_TH is not set
#
# FPGA Configuration Support
#
# CONFIG_FPGA is not set
#
# FSI support
#
# CONFIG_FSI is not set
#
# Firmware Drivers
#
CONFIG_EDD=m
# CONFIG_EDD_OFF is not set
CONFIG_FIRMWARE_MEMMAP=y
CONFIG_DELL_RBU=m
CONFIG_DCDBAS=m
CONFIG_DMIID=y
CONFIG_DMI_SYSFS=y
CONFIG_DMI_SCAN_MACHINE_NON_EFI_FALLBACK=y
CONFIG_ISCSI_IBFT_FIND=y
CONFIG_ISCSI_IBFT=m
# CONFIG_FW_CFG_SYSFS is not set
# CONFIG_GOOGLE_FIRMWARE is not set
#
# EFI (Extensible Firmware Interface) Support
#
CONFIG_EFI_VARS=y
CONFIG_EFI_ESRT=y
CONFIG_EFI_VARS_PSTORE=y
CONFIG_EFI_VARS_PSTORE_DEFAULT_DISABLE=y
CONFIG_EFI_RUNTIME_MAP=y
# CONFIG_EFI_FAKE_MEMMAP is not set
CONFIG_EFI_RUNTIME_WRAPPERS=y
# CONFIG_EFI_BOOTLOADER_CONTROL is not set
# CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_LOADER is not set
# CONFIG_EFI_TEST is not set
# CONFIG_APPLE_PROPERTIES is not set
CONFIG_UEFI_CPER=y
# CONFIG_EFI_DEV_PATH_PARSER is not set
#
# Tegra firmware driver
#
#
# File systems
#
CONFIG_DCACHE_WORD_ACCESS=y
CONFIG_FS_IOMAP=y
# CONFIG_EXT2_FS is not set
# CONFIG_EXT3_FS is not set
CONFIG_EXT4_FS=y
CONFIG_EXT4_USE_FOR_EXT2=y
CONFIG_EXT4_FS_POSIX_ACL=y
CONFIG_EXT4_FS_SECURITY=y
# CONFIG_EXT4_ENCRYPTION is not set
# CONFIG_EXT4_DEBUG is not set
CONFIG_JBD2=y
# CONFIG_JBD2_DEBUG is not set
CONFIG_FS_MBCACHE=y
# CONFIG_REISERFS_FS is not set
# CONFIG_JFS_FS is not set
CONFIG_XFS_FS=y
CONFIG_XFS_QUOTA=y
CONFIG_XFS_POSIX_ACL=y
# CONFIG_XFS_RT is not set
# CONFIG_XFS_WARN is not set
# CONFIG_XFS_DEBUG is not set
CONFIG_GFS2_FS=m
CONFIG_GFS2_FS_LOCKING_DLM=y
CONFIG_OCFS2_FS=m
CONFIG_OCFS2_FS_O2CB=m
CONFIG_OCFS2_FS_USERSPACE_CLUSTER=m
CONFIG_OCFS2_FS_STATS=y
CONFIG_OCFS2_DEBUG_MASKLOG=y
# CONFIG_OCFS2_DEBUG_FS is not set
CONFIG_BTRFS_FS=m
CONFIG_BTRFS_FS_POSIX_ACL=y
# CONFIG_BTRFS_FS_CHECK_INTEGRITY is not set
# CONFIG_BTRFS_FS_RUN_SANITY_TESTS is not set
# CONFIG_BTRFS_DEBUG is not set
# CONFIG_BTRFS_ASSERT is not set
# CONFIG_NILFS2_FS is not set
CONFIG_F2FS_FS=m
CONFIG_F2FS_STAT_FS=y
CONFIG_F2FS_FS_XATTR=y
CONFIG_F2FS_FS_POSIX_ACL=y
# CONFIG_F2FS_FS_SECURITY is not set
# CONFIG_F2FS_CHECK_FS is not set
# CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTION is not set
# CONFIG_F2FS_IO_TRACE is not set
# CONFIG_F2FS_FAULT_INJECTION is not set
CONFIG_FS_DAX=y
CONFIG_FS_DAX_PMD=y
CONFIG_FS_POSIX_ACL=y
CONFIG_EXPORTFS=y
# CONFIG_EXPORTFS_BLOCK_OPS is not set
CONFIG_FILE_LOCKING=y
CONFIG_MANDATORY_FILE_LOCKING=y
# CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION is not set
CONFIG_FSNOTIFY=y
CONFIG_DNOTIFY=y
CONFIG_INOTIFY_USER=y
CONFIG_FANOTIFY=y
CONFIG_FANOTIFY_ACCESS_PERMISSIONS=y
CONFIG_QUOTA=y
CONFIG_QUOTA_NETLINK_INTERFACE=y
CONFIG_PRINT_QUOTA_WARNING=y
# CONFIG_QUOTA_DEBUG is not set
CONFIG_QUOTA_TREE=y
# CONFIG_QFMT_V1 is not set
CONFIG_QFMT_V2=y
CONFIG_QUOTACTL=y
CONFIG_QUOTACTL_COMPAT=y
CONFIG_AUTOFS4_FS=y
CONFIG_FUSE_FS=m
CONFIG_CUSE=m
CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS=m
# CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS_REDIRECT_DIR is not set
#
# Caches
#
CONFIG_FSCACHE=m
CONFIG_FSCACHE_STATS=y
# CONFIG_FSCACHE_HISTOGRAM is not set
# CONFIG_FSCACHE_DEBUG is not set
# CONFIG_FSCACHE_OBJECT_LIST is not set
CONFIG_CACHEFILES=m
# CONFIG_CACHEFILES_DEBUG is not set
# CONFIG_CACHEFILES_HISTOGRAM is not set
#
# CD-ROM/DVD Filesystems
#
CONFIG_ISO9660_FS=m
CONFIG_JOLIET=y
CONFIG_ZISOFS=y
CONFIG_UDF_FS=m
CONFIG_UDF_NLS=y
#
# DOS/FAT/NT Filesystems
#
CONFIG_FAT_FS=m
CONFIG_MSDOS_FS=m
CONFIG_VFAT_FS=m
CONFIG_FAT_DEFAULT_CODEPAGE=437
CONFIG_FAT_DEFAULT_IOCHARSET="ascii"
# CONFIG_FAT_DEFAULT_UTF8 is not set
# CONFIG_NTFS_FS is not set
#
# Pseudo filesystems
#
CONFIG_PROC_FS=y
CONFIG_PROC_KCORE=y
CONFIG_PROC_VMCORE=y
CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL=y
CONFIG_PROC_PAGE_MONITOR=y
CONFIG_PROC_CHILDREN=y
CONFIG_KERNFS=y
CONFIG_SYSFS=y
CONFIG_TMPFS=y
CONFIG_TMPFS_POSIX_ACL=y
CONFIG_TMPFS_XATTR=y
CONFIG_HUGETLBFS=y
CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE=y
CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_GIGANTIC_PAGE=y
CONFIG_CONFIGFS_FS=y
CONFIG_EFIVAR_FS=y
CONFIG_MISC_FILESYSTEMS=y
# CONFIG_ORANGEFS_FS is not set
# CONFIG_ADFS_FS is not set
# CONFIG_AFFS_FS is not set
# CONFIG_ECRYPT_FS is not set
# CONFIG_HFS_FS is not set
# CONFIG_HFSPLUS_FS is not set
# CONFIG_BEFS_FS is not set
# CONFIG_BFS_FS is not set
# CONFIG_EFS_FS is not set
# CONFIG_JFFS2_FS is not set
# CONFIG_UBIFS_FS is not set
CONFIG_CRAMFS=m
CONFIG_SQUASHFS=m
CONFIG_SQUASHFS_FILE_CACHE=y
# CONFIG_SQUASHFS_FILE_DIRECT is not set
CONFIG_SQUASHFS_DECOMP_SINGLE=y
# CONFIG_SQUASHFS_DECOMP_MULTI is not set
# CONFIG_SQUASHFS_DECOMP_MULTI_PERCPU is not set
CONFIG_SQUASHFS_XATTR=y
CONFIG_SQUASHFS_ZLIB=y
# CONFIG_SQUASHFS_LZ4 is not set
CONFIG_SQUASHFS_LZO=y
CONFIG_SQUASHFS_XZ=y
# CONFIG_SQUASHFS_4K_DEVBLK_SIZE is not set
# CONFIG_SQUASHFS_EMBEDDED is not set
CONFIG_SQUASHFS_FRAGMENT_CACHE_SIZE=3
# CONFIG_VXFS_FS is not set
# CONFIG_MINIX_FS is not set
# CONFIG_OMFS_FS is not set
# CONFIG_HPFS_FS is not set
# CONFIG_QNX4FS_FS is not set
# CONFIG_QNX6FS_FS is not set
# CONFIG_ROMFS_FS is not set
CONFIG_PSTORE=y
CONFIG_PSTORE_ZLIB_COMPRESS=y
# CONFIG_PSTORE_LZO_COMPRESS is not set
# CONFIG_PSTORE_LZ4_COMPRESS is not set
CONFIG_PSTORE_CONSOLE=y
CONFIG_PSTORE_PMSG=y
# CONFIG_PSTORE_FTRACE is not set
CONFIG_PSTORE_RAM=m
# CONFIG_SYSV_FS is not set
# CONFIG_UFS_FS is not set
# CONFIG_EXOFS_FS is not set
CONFIG_ORE=m
CONFIG_NETWORK_FILESYSTEMS=y
CONFIG_NFS_FS=y
# CONFIG_NFS_V2 is not set
CONFIG_NFS_V3=y
CONFIG_NFS_V3_ACL=y
CONFIG_NFS_V4=m
# CONFIG_NFS_SWAP is not set
CONFIG_NFS_V4_1=y
CONFIG_NFS_V4_2=y
CONFIG_PNFS_FILE_LAYOUT=m
CONFIG_PNFS_BLOCK=m
CONFIG_PNFS_OBJLAYOUT=m
CONFIG_PNFS_FLEXFILE_LAYOUT=m
CONFIG_NFS_V4_1_IMPLEMENTATION_ID_DOMAIN="kernel.org"
# CONFIG_NFS_V4_1_MIGRATION is not set
CONFIG_NFS_V4_SECURITY_LABEL=y
CONFIG_ROOT_NFS=y
# CONFIG_NFS_USE_LEGACY_DNS is not set
CONFIG_NFS_USE_KERNEL_DNS=y
CONFIG_NFS_DEBUG=y
CONFIG_NFSD=m
CONFIG_NFSD_V2_ACL=y
CONFIG_NFSD_V3=y
CONFIG_NFSD_V3_ACL=y
CONFIG_NFSD_V4=y
# CONFIG_NFSD_BLOCKLAYOUT is not set
# CONFIG_NFSD_SCSILAYOUT is not set
# CONFIG_NFSD_FLEXFILELAYOUT is not set
CONFIG_NFSD_V4_SECURITY_LABEL=y
# CONFIG_NFSD_FAULT_INJECTION is not set
CONFIG_GRACE_PERIOD=y
CONFIG_LOCKD=y
CONFIG_LOCKD_V4=y
CONFIG_NFS_ACL_SUPPORT=y
CONFIG_NFS_COMMON=y
CONFIG_SUNRPC=y
CONFIG_SUNRPC_GSS=m
CONFIG_SUNRPC_BACKCHANNEL=y
CONFIG_RPCSEC_GSS_KRB5=m
CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG=y
# CONFIG_CEPH_FS is not set
CONFIG_CIFS=m
CONFIG_CIFS_STATS=y
# CONFIG_CIFS_STATS2 is not set
CONFIG_CIFS_WEAK_PW_HASH=y
CONFIG_CIFS_UPCALL=y
CONFIG_CIFS_XATTR=y
CONFIG_CIFS_POSIX=y
CONFIG_CIFS_ACL=y
CONFIG_CIFS_DEBUG=y
# CONFIG_CIFS_DEBUG2 is not set
CONFIG_CIFS_DFS_UPCALL=y
CONFIG_CIFS_SMB2=y
# CONFIG_CIFS_SMB311 is not set
# CONFIG_CIFS_FSCACHE is not set
# CONFIG_NCP_FS is not set
# CONFIG_CODA_FS is not set
# CONFIG_AFS_FS is not set
CONFIG_9P_FS=y
CONFIG_9P_FS_POSIX_ACL=y
# CONFIG_9P_FS_SECURITY is not set
CONFIG_NLS=y
CONFIG_NLS_DEFAULT="utf8"
CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_437=y
CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_737=m
CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_775=m
CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_850=m
CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_852=m
CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_855=m
CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_857=m
CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_860=m
CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_861=m
CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_862=m
CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_863=m
CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_864=m
CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_865=m
CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_866=m
CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_869=m
CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_936=m
CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_950=m
CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_932=m
CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_949=m
CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_874=m
CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_8=m
CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_1250=m
CONFIG_NLS_CODEPAGE_1251=m
CONFIG_NLS_ASCII=y
CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_1=m
CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_2=m
CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_3=m
CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_4=m
CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_5=m
CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_6=m
CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_7=m
CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_9=m
CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_13=m
CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_14=m
CONFIG_NLS_ISO8859_15=m
CONFIG_NLS_KOI8_R=m
CONFIG_NLS_KOI8_U=m
CONFIG_NLS_MAC_ROMAN=m
CONFIG_NLS_MAC_CELTIC=m
CONFIG_NLS_MAC_CENTEURO=m
CONFIG_NLS_MAC_CROATIAN=m
CONFIG_NLS_MAC_CYRILLIC=m
CONFIG_NLS_MAC_GAELIC=m
CONFIG_NLS_MAC_GREEK=m
CONFIG_NLS_MAC_ICELAND=m
CONFIG_NLS_MAC_INUIT=m
CONFIG_NLS_MAC_ROMANIAN=m
CONFIG_NLS_MAC_TURKISH=m
CONFIG_NLS_UTF8=m
CONFIG_DLM=m
CONFIG_DLM_DEBUG=y
#
# Kernel hacking
#
CONFIG_TRACE_IRQFLAGS_SUPPORT=y
#
# printk and dmesg options
#
CONFIG_PRINTK_TIME=y
CONFIG_CONSOLE_LOGLEVEL_DEFAULT=7
CONFIG_MESSAGE_LOGLEVEL_DEFAULT=4
CONFIG_BOOT_PRINTK_DELAY=y
CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG=y
#
# Compile-time checks and compiler options
#
# CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO is not set
# CONFIG_ENABLE_WARN_DEPRECATED is not set
CONFIG_ENABLE_MUST_CHECK=y
CONFIG_FRAME_WARN=2048
CONFIG_STRIP_ASM_SYMS=y
# CONFIG_READABLE_ASM is not set
# CONFIG_UNUSED_SYMBOLS is not set
# CONFIG_PAGE_OWNER is not set
CONFIG_DEBUG_FS=y
CONFIG_HEADERS_CHECK=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_SECTION_MISMATCH=y
CONFIG_SECTION_MISMATCH_WARN_ONLY=y
CONFIG_ARCH_WANT_FRAME_POINTERS=y
CONFIG_FRAME_POINTER=y
# CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION is not set
# CONFIG_DEBUG_FORCE_WEAK_PER_CPU is not set
CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ=y
CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ_DEFAULT_ENABLE=0x1
CONFIG_MAGIC_SYSRQ_SERIAL=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y
#
# Memory Debugging
#
# CONFIG_PAGE_EXTENSION is not set
# CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGEALLOC is not set
# CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING is not set
# CONFIG_DEBUG_PAGE_REF is not set
CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA_TEST=y
# CONFIG_DEBUG_OBJECTS is not set
# CONFIG_SLUB_DEBUG_ON is not set
# CONFIG_SLUB_STATS is not set
CONFIG_HAVE_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK=y
# CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK is not set
# CONFIG_DEBUG_STACK_USAGE is not set
# CONFIG_DEBUG_VM is not set
CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_DEBUG_VIRTUAL=y
# CONFIG_DEBUG_VIRTUAL is not set
CONFIG_DEBUG_MEMORY_INIT=y
CONFIG_MEMORY_NOTIFIER_ERROR_INJECT=m
# CONFIG_DEBUG_PER_CPU_MAPS is not set
CONFIG_HAVE_DEBUG_STACKOVERFLOW=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_STACKOVERFLOW=y
CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_KMEMCHECK=y
CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_KASAN=y
# CONFIG_KASAN is not set
CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_KCOV=y
# CONFIG_KCOV is not set
CONFIG_DEBUG_SHIRQ=y
#
# Debug Lockups and Hangs
#
CONFIG_LOCKUP_DETECTOR=y
CONFIG_HARDLOCKUP_DETECTOR=y
CONFIG_BOOTPARAM_HARDLOCKUP_PANIC=y
CONFIG_BOOTPARAM_HARDLOCKUP_PANIC_VALUE=1
# CONFIG_BOOTPARAM_SOFTLOCKUP_PANIC is not set
CONFIG_BOOTPARAM_SOFTLOCKUP_PANIC_VALUE=0
# CONFIG_DETECT_HUNG_TASK is not set
# CONFIG_WQ_WATCHDOG is not set
CONFIG_PANIC_ON_OOPS=y
CONFIG_PANIC_ON_OOPS_VALUE=1
CONFIG_PANIC_TIMEOUT=0
CONFIG_SCHED_DEBUG=y
CONFIG_SCHED_INFO=y
CONFIG_SCHEDSTATS=y
# CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK is not set
# CONFIG_DEBUG_TIMEKEEPING is not set
#
# Lock Debugging (spinlocks, mutexes, etc...)
#
# CONFIG_DEBUG_RT_MUTEXES is not set
# CONFIG_DEBUG_SPINLOCK is not set
# CONFIG_DEBUG_MUTEXES is not set
# CONFIG_DEBUG_WW_MUTEX_SLOWPATH is not set
# CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCK_ALLOC is not set
# CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING is not set
# CONFIG_LOCK_STAT is not set
CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP=y
# CONFIG_DEBUG_LOCKING_API_SELFTESTS is not set
CONFIG_LOCK_TORTURE_TEST=m
# CONFIG_WW_MUTEX_SELFTEST is not set
CONFIG_STACKTRACE=y
# CONFIG_DEBUG_KOBJECT is not set
CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE=y
CONFIG_DEBUG_LIST=y
# CONFIG_DEBUG_PI_LIST is not set
# CONFIG_DEBUG_SG is not set
# CONFIG_DEBUG_NOTIFIERS is not set
# CONFIG_DEBUG_CREDENTIALS is not set
#
# RCU Debugging
#
# CONFIG_PROVE_RCU is not set
CONFIG_SPARSE_RCU_POINTER=y
CONFIG_TORTURE_TEST=m
# CONFIG_RCU_PERF_TEST is not set
CONFIG_RCU_TORTURE_TEST=m
# CONFIG_RCU_TORTURE_TEST_SLOW_PREINIT is not set
# CONFIG_RCU_TORTURE_TEST_SLOW_INIT is not set
# CONFIG_RCU_TORTURE_TEST_SLOW_CLEANUP is not set
CONFIG_RCU_CPU_STALL_TIMEOUT=60
# CONFIG_RCU_TRACE is not set
# CONFIG_RCU_EQS_DEBUG is not set
# CONFIG_DEBUG_WQ_FORCE_RR_CPU is not set
# CONFIG_DEBUG_BLOCK_EXT_DEVT is not set
# CONFIG_CPU_HOTPLUG_STATE_CONTROL is not set
CONFIG_NOTIFIER_ERROR_INJECTION=m
CONFIG_PM_NOTIFIER_ERROR_INJECT=m
# CONFIG_NETDEV_NOTIFIER_ERROR_INJECT is not set
# CONFIG_FAULT_INJECTION is not set
CONFIG_LATENCYTOP=y
CONFIG_USER_STACKTRACE_SUPPORT=y
CONFIG_NOP_TRACER=y
CONFIG_HAVE_FUNCTION_TRACER=y
CONFIG_HAVE_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER=y
CONFIG_HAVE_DYNAMIC_FTRACE=y
CONFIG_HAVE_DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS=y
CONFIG_HAVE_FTRACE_MCOUNT_RECORD=y
CONFIG_HAVE_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINTS=y
CONFIG_HAVE_FENTRY=y
CONFIG_HAVE_C_RECORDMCOUNT=y
CONFIG_TRACER_MAX_TRACE=y
CONFIG_TRACE_CLOCK=y
CONFIG_RING_BUFFER=y
CONFIG_EVENT_TRACING=y
CONFIG_CONTEXT_SWITCH_TRACER=y
CONFIG_RING_BUFFER_ALLOW_SWAP=y
CONFIG_TRACING=y
CONFIG_GENERIC_TRACER=y
CONFIG_TRACING_SUPPORT=y
CONFIG_FTRACE=y
CONFIG_FUNCTION_TRACER=y
CONFIG_FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER=y
# CONFIG_IRQSOFF_TRACER is not set
CONFIG_SCHED_TRACER=y
# CONFIG_HWLAT_TRACER is not set
CONFIG_FTRACE_SYSCALLS=y
CONFIG_TRACER_SNAPSHOT=y
# CONFIG_TRACER_SNAPSHOT_PER_CPU_SWAP is not set
CONFIG_BRANCH_PROFILE_NONE=y
# CONFIG_PROFILE_ANNOTATED_BRANCHES is not set
# CONFIG_PROFILE_ALL_BRANCHES is not set
CONFIG_STACK_TRACER=y
CONFIG_BLK_DEV_IO_TRACE=y
CONFIG_KPROBE_EVENT=y
CONFIG_UPROBE_EVENT=y
CONFIG_BPF_EVENTS=y
CONFIG_PROBE_EVENTS=y
CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE=y
CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS=y
CONFIG_FUNCTION_PROFILER=y
CONFIG_FTRACE_MCOUNT_RECORD=y
# CONFIG_FTRACE_STARTUP_TEST is not set
# CONFIG_MMIOTRACE is not set
CONFIG_TRACING_MAP=y
CONFIG_HIST_TRIGGERS=y
# CONFIG_TRACEPOINT_BENCHMARK is not set
CONFIG_RING_BUFFER_BENCHMARK=m
# CONFIG_RING_BUFFER_STARTUP_TEST is not set
# CONFIG_TRACE_ENUM_MAP_FILE is not set
CONFIG_TRACING_EVENTS_GPIO=y
#
# Runtime Testing
#
CONFIG_LKDTM=m
# CONFIG_TEST_LIST_SORT is not set
# CONFIG_TEST_SORT is not set
# CONFIG_KPROBES_SANITY_TEST is not set
# CONFIG_BACKTRACE_SELF_TEST is not set
CONFIG_RBTREE_TEST=m
CONFIG_INTERVAL_TREE_TEST=m
CONFIG_PERCPU_TEST=m
CONFIG_ATOMIC64_SELFTEST=y
CONFIG_ASYNC_RAID6_TEST=m
# CONFIG_TEST_HEXDUMP is not set
# CONFIG_TEST_STRING_HELPERS is not set
CONFIG_TEST_KSTRTOX=m
CONFIG_TEST_PRINTF=m
CONFIG_TEST_BITMAP=m
# CONFIG_TEST_UUID is not set
# CONFIG_TEST_RHASHTABLE is not set
# CONFIG_TEST_HASH is not set
CONFIG_PROVIDE_OHCI1394_DMA_INIT=y
# CONFIG_DMA_API_DEBUG is not set
CONFIG_TEST_LKM=m
CONFIG_TEST_USER_COPY=m
CONFIG_TEST_BPF=m
CONFIG_TEST_FIRMWARE=m
CONFIG_TEST_UDELAY=m
# CONFIG_MEMTEST is not set
CONFIG_TEST_STATIC_KEYS=m
# CONFIG_BUG_ON_DATA_CORRUPTION is not set
# CONFIG_SAMPLES is not set
CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_KGDB=y
# CONFIG_KGDB is not set
CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_UBSAN_SANITIZE_ALL=y
# CONFIG_ARCH_WANTS_UBSAN_NO_NULL is not set
# CONFIG_UBSAN is not set
CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_DEVMEM_IS_ALLOWED=y
CONFIG_STRICT_DEVMEM=y
# CONFIG_IO_STRICT_DEVMEM is not set
CONFIG_X86_VERBOSE_BOOTUP=y
CONFIG_EARLY_PRINTK=y
CONFIG_EARLY_PRINTK_DBGP=y
# CONFIG_EARLY_PRINTK_EFI is not set
# CONFIG_X86_PTDUMP_CORE is not set
# CONFIG_X86_PTDUMP is not set
# CONFIG_EFI_PGT_DUMP is not set
# CONFIG_DEBUG_WX is not set
CONFIG_DOUBLEFAULT=y
# CONFIG_DEBUG_TLBFLUSH is not set
# CONFIG_IOMMU_DEBUG is not set
# CONFIG_IOMMU_STRESS is not set
CONFIG_HAVE_MMIOTRACE_SUPPORT=y
CONFIG_X86_DECODER_SELFTEST=y
CONFIG_IO_DELAY_TYPE_0X80=0
CONFIG_IO_DELAY_TYPE_0XED=1
CONFIG_IO_DELAY_TYPE_UDELAY=2
CONFIG_IO_DELAY_TYPE_NONE=3
CONFIG_IO_DELAY_0X80=y
# CONFIG_IO_DELAY_0XED is not set
# CONFIG_IO_DELAY_UDELAY is not set
# CONFIG_IO_DELAY_NONE is not set
CONFIG_DEFAULT_IO_DELAY_TYPE=0
CONFIG_DEBUG_BOOT_PARAMS=y
# CONFIG_CPA_DEBUG is not set
CONFIG_OPTIMIZE_INLINING=y
# CONFIG_DEBUG_ENTRY is not set
# CONFIG_DEBUG_NMI_SELFTEST is not set
CONFIG_X86_DEBUG_FPU=y
# CONFIG_PUNIT_ATOM_DEBUG is not set
#
# Security options
#
CONFIG_KEYS=y
CONFIG_PERSISTENT_KEYRINGS=y
CONFIG_BIG_KEYS=y
CONFIG_TRUSTED_KEYS=y
CONFIG_ENCRYPTED_KEYS=y
# CONFIG_KEY_DH_OPERATIONS is not set
# CONFIG_SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT is not set
CONFIG_SECURITY=y
CONFIG_SECURITYFS=y
CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK=y
CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM=y
# CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH is not set
CONFIG_INTEL_TXT=y
CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR=65535
CONFIG_HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR=y
CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY=y
# CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY is not set
# CONFIG_STATIC_USERMODEHELPER is not set
CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX=y
CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM=y
CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE=1
CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE=y
CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP=y
CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_AVC_STATS=y
CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_CHECKREQPROT_VALUE=1
# CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK is not set
# CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO is not set
# CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR is not set
# CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN is not set
# CONFIG_SECURITY_YAMA is not set
CONFIG_INTEGRITY=y
CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE=y
CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS=y
CONFIG_INTEGRITY_TRUSTED_KEYRING=y
CONFIG_INTEGRITY_AUDIT=y
CONFIG_IMA=y
CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX=10
CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES=y
# CONFIG_IMA_TEMPLATE is not set
CONFIG_IMA_NG_TEMPLATE=y
# CONFIG_IMA_SIG_TEMPLATE is not set
CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_TEMPLATE="ima-ng"
CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA1=y
# CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA256 is not set
# CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_SHA512 is not set
# CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH_WP512 is not set
CONFIG_IMA_DEFAULT_HASH="sha1"
# CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY is not set
# CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY is not set
CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE=y
CONFIG_IMA_TRUSTED_KEYRING=y
# CONFIG_IMA_BLACKLIST_KEYRING is not set
# CONFIG_IMA_LOAD_X509 is not set
CONFIG_EVM=y
CONFIG_EVM_ATTR_FSUUID=y
# CONFIG_EVM_LOAD_X509 is not set
CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX=y
# CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC is not set
CONFIG_DEFAULT_SECURITY="selinux"
CONFIG_XOR_BLOCKS=m
CONFIG_ASYNC_CORE=m
CONFIG_ASYNC_MEMCPY=m
CONFIG_ASYNC_XOR=m
CONFIG_ASYNC_PQ=m
CONFIG_ASYNC_RAID6_RECOV=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO=y
#
# Crypto core or helper
#
CONFIG_CRYPTO_ALGAPI=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_ALGAPI2=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_AEAD=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_AEAD2=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLKCIPHER2=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH2=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_RNG=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_RNG2=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_RNG_DEFAULT=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_AKCIPHER2=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_AKCIPHER=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_KPP2=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_ACOMP2=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_RSA=y
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH is not set
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECDH is not set
CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER2=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_MANAGER_DISABLE_TESTS=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_GF128MUL=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_NULL=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_NULL2=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_PCRYPT=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_WORKQUEUE=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRYPTD=m
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_MCRYPTD is not set
CONFIG_CRYPTO_AUTHENC=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_TEST=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_ABLK_HELPER=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_SIMD=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_GLUE_HELPER_X86=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_ENGINE=m
#
# Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data
#
CONFIG_CRYPTO_CCM=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_GCM=m
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_CHACHA20POLY1305 is not set
CONFIG_CRYPTO_SEQIV=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECHAINIV=m
#
# Block modes
#
CONFIG_CRYPTO_CBC=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_CTR=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_CTS=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_ECB=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_LRW=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_PCBC=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_XTS=m
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_KEYWRAP is not set
#
# Hash modes
#
CONFIG_CRYPTO_CMAC=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_HMAC=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_XCBC=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_VMAC=m
#
# Digest
#
CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRC32C=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRC32C_INTEL=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRC32=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRC32_PCLMUL=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRCT10DIF=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_CRCT10DIF_PCLMUL=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_GHASH=m
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_POLY1305 is not set
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_POLY1305_X86_64 is not set
CONFIG_CRYPTO_MD4=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_MD5=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_MICHAEL_MIC=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_RMD128=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_RMD160=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_RMD256=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_RMD320=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA1=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA1_SSSE3=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256_SSSE3=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512_SSSE3=m
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA1_MB is not set
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256_MB is not set
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512_MB is not set
CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA256=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA512=m
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_SHA3 is not set
CONFIG_CRYPTO_TGR192=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_WP512=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_GHASH_CLMUL_NI_INTEL=m
#
# Ciphers
#
CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES=y
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES_TI is not set
CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES_X86_64=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_AES_NI_INTEL=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_ANUBIS=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARC4=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLOWFISH=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLOWFISH_COMMON=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_BLOWFISH_X86_64=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_CAMELLIA=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_CAMELLIA_X86_64=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_CAMELLIA_AESNI_AVX_X86_64=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_CAMELLIA_AESNI_AVX2_X86_64=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_CAST_COMMON=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_CAST5=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_CAST5_AVX_X86_64=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_CAST6=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_CAST6_AVX_X86_64=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DES=m
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_DES3_EDE_X86_64 is not set
CONFIG_CRYPTO_FCRYPT=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_KHAZAD=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_SALSA20=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_SALSA20_X86_64=m
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_CHACHA20 is not set
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_CHACHA20_X86_64 is not set
CONFIG_CRYPTO_SEED=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_SERPENT=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_SERPENT_SSE2_X86_64=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_SERPENT_AVX_X86_64=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_SERPENT_AVX2_X86_64=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_TEA=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_TWOFISH=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_TWOFISH_COMMON=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_TWOFISH_X86_64=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_TWOFISH_X86_64_3WAY=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_TWOFISH_AVX_X86_64=m
#
# Compression
#
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEFLATE=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_LZO=y
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_842 is not set
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_LZ4 is not set
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_LZ4HC is not set
#
# Random Number Generation
#
CONFIG_CRYPTO_ANSI_CPRNG=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_MENU=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HMAC=y
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_HASH is not set
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG_CTR is not set
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DRBG=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_JITTERENTROPY=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_HASH=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_SKCIPHER=y
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_RNG is not set
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_USER_API_AEAD is not set
CONFIG_CRYPTO_HASH_INFO=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_HW=y
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_PADLOCK=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_PADLOCK_AES=m
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_PADLOCK_SHA=m
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_FSL_CAAM_CRYPTO_API_DESC is not set
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_CCP is not set
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_QAT_DH895xCC is not set
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_QAT_C3XXX is not set
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_QAT_C62X is not set
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_QAT_DH895xCCVF is not set
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_QAT_C3XXXVF is not set
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_QAT_C62XVF is not set
# CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_CHELSIO is not set
CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_VIRTIO=m
CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_KEY_TYPE=y
CONFIG_ASYMMETRIC_PUBLIC_KEY_SUBTYPE=y
CONFIG_X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER=y
# CONFIG_PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER is not set
#
# Certificates for signature checking
#
CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYRING=y
CONFIG_SYSTEM_TRUSTED_KEYS=""
# CONFIG_SYSTEM_EXTRA_CERTIFICATE is not set
# CONFIG_SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING is not set
CONFIG_HAVE_KVM=y
CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_IRQCHIP=y
CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_IRQFD=y
CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_IRQ_ROUTING=y
CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_EVENTFD=y
CONFIG_KVM_MMIO=y
CONFIG_KVM_ASYNC_PF=y
CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_MSI=y
CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_CPU_RELAX_INTERCEPT=y
CONFIG_KVM_VFIO=y
CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_DIRTYLOG_READ_PROTECT=y
CONFIG_KVM_COMPAT=y
CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_IRQ_BYPASS=y
CONFIG_VIRTUALIZATION=y
CONFIG_KVM=m
CONFIG_KVM_INTEL=m
CONFIG_KVM_AMD=m
CONFIG_KVM_MMU_AUDIT=y
# CONFIG_KVM_DEVICE_ASSIGNMENT is not set
CONFIG_VHOST_NET=m
# CONFIG_VHOST_SCSI is not set
# CONFIG_VHOST_VSOCK is not set
CONFIG_VHOST=m
# CONFIG_VHOST_CROSS_ENDIAN_LEGACY is not set
CONFIG_BINARY_PRINTF=y
#
# Library routines
#
CONFIG_RAID6_PQ=m
CONFIG_BITREVERSE=y
# CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_BITREVERSE is not set
CONFIG_RATIONAL=y
CONFIG_GENERIC_STRNCPY_FROM_USER=y
CONFIG_GENERIC_STRNLEN_USER=y
CONFIG_GENERIC_NET_UTILS=y
CONFIG_GENERIC_FIND_FIRST_BIT=y
CONFIG_GENERIC_PCI_IOMAP=y
CONFIG_GENERIC_IOMAP=y
CONFIG_GENERIC_IO=y
CONFIG_ARCH_USE_CMPXCHG_LOCKREF=y
CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_FAST_MULTIPLIER=y
CONFIG_CRC_CCITT=y
CONFIG_CRC16=y
CONFIG_CRC_T10DIF=y
CONFIG_CRC_ITU_T=m
CONFIG_CRC32=y
# CONFIG_CRC32_SELFTEST is not set
CONFIG_CRC32_SLICEBY8=y
# CONFIG_CRC32_SLICEBY4 is not set
# CONFIG_CRC32_SARWATE is not set
# CONFIG_CRC32_BIT is not set
# CONFIG_CRC7 is not set
CONFIG_LIBCRC32C=y
CONFIG_CRC8=m
# CONFIG_AUDIT_ARCH_COMPAT_GENERIC is not set
# CONFIG_RANDOM32_SELFTEST is not set
CONFIG_ZLIB_INFLATE=y
CONFIG_ZLIB_DEFLATE=y
CONFIG_LZO_COMPRESS=y
CONFIG_LZO_DECOMPRESS=y
CONFIG_LZ4_DECOMPRESS=y
CONFIG_XZ_DEC=y
CONFIG_XZ_DEC_X86=y
CONFIG_XZ_DEC_POWERPC=y
CONFIG_XZ_DEC_IA64=y
CONFIG_XZ_DEC_ARM=y
CONFIG_XZ_DEC_ARMTHUMB=y
CONFIG_XZ_DEC_SPARC=y
CONFIG_XZ_DEC_BCJ=y
# CONFIG_XZ_DEC_TEST is not set
CONFIG_DECOMPRESS_GZIP=y
CONFIG_DECOMPRESS_BZIP2=y
CONFIG_DECOMPRESS_LZMA=y
CONFIG_DECOMPRESS_XZ=y
CONFIG_DECOMPRESS_LZO=y
CONFIG_DECOMPRESS_LZ4=y
CONFIG_GENERIC_ALLOCATOR=y
CONFIG_REED_SOLOMON=m
CONFIG_REED_SOLOMON_ENC8=y
CONFIG_REED_SOLOMON_DEC8=y
CONFIG_TEXTSEARCH=y
CONFIG_TEXTSEARCH_KMP=m
CONFIG_TEXTSEARCH_BM=m
CONFIG_TEXTSEARCH_FSM=m
CONFIG_INTERVAL_TREE=y
CONFIG_RADIX_TREE_MULTIORDER=y
CONFIG_ASSOCIATIVE_ARRAY=y
CONFIG_HAS_IOMEM=y
CONFIG_HAS_IOPORT_MAP=y
CONFIG_HAS_DMA=y
# CONFIG_DMA_NOOP_OPS is not set
# CONFIG_DMA_VIRT_OPS is not set
CONFIG_CHECK_SIGNATURE=y
CONFIG_CPUMASK_OFFSTACK=y
CONFIG_CPU_RMAP=y
CONFIG_DQL=y
CONFIG_GLOB=y
# CONFIG_GLOB_SELFTEST is not set
CONFIG_NLATTR=y
CONFIG_CLZ_TAB=y
CONFIG_CORDIC=m
# CONFIG_DDR is not set
CONFIG_IRQ_POLL=y
CONFIG_MPILIB=y
CONFIG_SIGNATURE=y
CONFIG_OID_REGISTRY=y
CONFIG_UCS2_STRING=y
CONFIG_FONT_SUPPORT=y
# CONFIG_FONTS is not set
CONFIG_FONT_8x8=y
CONFIG_FONT_8x16=y
# CONFIG_SG_SPLIT is not set
CONFIG_SG_POOL=y
CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_SG_CHAIN=y
CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_PMEM_API=y
CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_MMIO_FLUSH=y
CONFIG_SBITMAP=y
[-- Attachment #3: job-script --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 5204 bytes --]
#!/bin/sh
export_top_env()
{
export suite='xfstests'
export testcase='xfstests'
export category='functional'
export job_origin='/lkp/lkp/.src-20170430-234940/allot/cyclic:linux-devel:devel-hourly/snb-drag/xfstests-xfs.yaml'
export queue='bisect'
export testbox='snb-drag'
export tbox_group='snb-drag'
export submit_id='590e27ea0b9a935caf13eb48'
export job_file='/lkp/scheduled/snb-drag/xfstests-4HDD-xfs-xfs-quick2-debian-x86_64-2016-08-31.cgz-64fa03de33691f5d05c729ef3e026a640a7ff835-20170507-23727-1yji9tz-0.yaml'
export id='60c22a35862e60e9599f34969b215714157697c0'
export model='Sandy Bridge'
export nr_node=1
export nr_cpu=4
export memory='6G'
export hdd_partitions='/dev/disk/by-id/ata-WDC_WD20EZRX-00D8PB0_WD-WCC4M6XASAKV-part5 /dev/disk/by-id/ata-WDC_WD20EZRX-00D8PB0_WD-WCC4M6XASAKV-part6 /dev/disk/by-id/ata-WDC_WD20EZRX-00D8PB0_WD-WCC4M6XASAKV-part7 /dev/disk/by-id/ata-WDC_WD20EZRX-00D8PB0_WD-WCC4M6XASAKV-part8 /dev/disk/by-id/ata-WDC_WD20EZRX-00D8PB0_WD-WCC4M6XASAKV-part9 /dev/disk/by-id/ata-WDC_WD20EZRX-00D8PB0_WD-WCC4M6XASAKV-part10'
export swap_partitions=
export rootfs_partition='/dev/disk/by-id/ata-WDC_WD20EZRX-00D8PB0_WD-WCC4M6XASAKV-part2'
export netconsole_port=6648
export brand='Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-2500K CPU @ 3.30GHz'
export need_kconfig='CONFIG_BLK_DEV_SD
CONFIG_SCSI
CONFIG_BLOCK=y
CONFIG_SATA_AHCI
CONFIG_SATA_AHCI_PLATFORM
CONFIG_ATA
CONFIG_PCI=y
CONFIG_XFS_FS'
export commit='64fa03de33691f5d05c729ef3e026a640a7ff835'
export run_on_local_disk=true
export kconfig='x86_64-rhel-7.2'
export compiler='gcc-6'
export rootfs='debian-x86_64-2016-08-31.cgz'
export enqueue_time='2017-05-07 03:45:46 +0800'
export _id='590e27ea0b9a935caf13eb48'
export _rt='/result/xfstests/4HDD-xfs-xfs-quick2/snb-drag/debian-x86_64-2016-08-31.cgz/x86_64-rhel-7.2/gcc-6/64fa03de33691f5d05c729ef3e026a640a7ff835'
export user='lkp'
export head_commit='d246ca8c98b5a19308378b4a27fb7d2c167509da'
export base_commit='5a7ad1146caa895ad718a534399e38bd2ba721b7'
export branch='linux-devel/devel-hourly-2017050108'
export result_root='/result/xfstests/4HDD-xfs-xfs-quick2/snb-drag/debian-x86_64-2016-08-31.cgz/x86_64-rhel-7.2/gcc-6/64fa03de33691f5d05c729ef3e026a640a7ff835/0'
export LKP_SERVER='inn'
export max_uptime=3600
export initrd='/osimage/debian/debian-x86_64-2016-08-31.cgz'
export bootloader_append='root=/dev/ram0
user=lkp
job=/lkp/scheduled/snb-drag/xfstests-4HDD-xfs-xfs-quick2-debian-x86_64-2016-08-31.cgz-64fa03de33691f5d05c729ef3e026a640a7ff835-20170507-23727-1yji9tz-0.yaml
ARCH=x86_64
kconfig=x86_64-rhel-7.2
branch=linux-devel/devel-hourly-2017050108
commit=64fa03de33691f5d05c729ef3e026a640a7ff835
BOOT_IMAGE=/pkg/linux/x86_64-rhel-7.2/gcc-6/64fa03de33691f5d05c729ef3e026a640a7ff835/vmlinuz-4.11.0-rc1-00010-g64fa03d
max_uptime=3600
RESULT_ROOT=/result/xfstests/4HDD-xfs-xfs-quick2/snb-drag/debian-x86_64-2016-08-31.cgz/x86_64-rhel-7.2/gcc-6/64fa03de33691f5d05c729ef3e026a640a7ff835/0
LKP_SERVER=inn
debug
apic=debug
sysrq_always_enabled
rcupdate.rcu_cpu_stall_timeout=100
net.ifnames=0
printk.devkmsg=on
panic=-1
softlockup_panic=1
nmi_watchdog=panic
oops=panic
load_ramdisk=2
prompt_ramdisk=0
drbd.minor_count=8
systemd.log_level=err
ignore_loglevel
earlyprintk=ttyS0,115200
console=ttyS0,115200
console=tty0
vga=normal
rw'
export lkp_initrd='/lkp/lkp/lkp-x86_64.cgz'
export modules_initrd='/pkg/linux/x86_64-rhel-7.2/gcc-6/64fa03de33691f5d05c729ef3e026a640a7ff835/modules.cgz'
export bm_initrd='/osimage/deps/debian-x86_64-2016-08-31.cgz/lkp_2017-05-01.cgz,/osimage/deps/debian-x86_64-2016-08-31.cgz/rsync-rootfs_2016-11-15.cgz,/osimage/deps/debian-x86_64-2016-08-31.cgz/run-ipconfig_2016-11-15.cgz,/osimage/deps/debian-x86_64-2016-08-31.cgz/fs_2016-11-15.cgz,/osimage/deps/debian-x86_64-2016-08-31.cgz/xfstests_2017-02-15.cgz,/osimage/pkg/debian-x86_64-2016-08-31.cgz/xfstests-x86_64_2017-04-17.cgz,/osimage/deps/debian-x86_64-2016-08-31.cgz/hw_2016-11-15.cgz'
export site='inn'
export LKP_CGI_PORT=80
export LKP_CIFS_PORT=139
export kernel='/pkg/linux/x86_64-rhel-7.2/gcc-6/64fa03de33691f5d05c729ef3e026a640a7ff835/vmlinuz-4.11.0-rc1-00010-g64fa03d'
export dequeue_time='2017-05-07 03:55:38 +0800'
export job_initrd='/lkp/scheduled/snb-drag/xfstests-4HDD-xfs-xfs-quick2-debian-x86_64-2016-08-31.cgz-64fa03de33691f5d05c729ef3e026a640a7ff835-20170507-23727-1yji9tz-0.cgz'
[ -n "$LKP_SRC" ] ||
export LKP_SRC=/lkp/${user:-lkp}/src
}
run_job()
{
echo $$ > $TMP/run-job.pid
. $LKP_SRC/lib/http.sh
. $LKP_SRC/lib/job.sh
. $LKP_SRC/lib/env.sh
export_top_env
run_setup nr_hdd=4 $LKP_SRC/setup/disk
run_setup fs='xfs' $LKP_SRC/setup/fs
run_monitor $LKP_SRC/monitors/wrapper kmsg
run_monitor $LKP_SRC/monitors/wrapper heartbeat
run_monitor $LKP_SRC/monitors/wrapper oom-killer
run_monitor $LKP_SRC/monitors/plain/watchdog
run_monitor $LKP_SRC/monitors/wrapper nfs-hang
run_test test='xfs-quick2' $LKP_SRC/tests/wrapper xfstests
}
extract_stats()
{
$LKP_SRC/stats/wrapper xfstests
$LKP_SRC/stats/wrapper kmsg
$LKP_SRC/stats/wrapper time xfstests.time
$LKP_SRC/stats/wrapper time
$LKP_SRC/stats/wrapper dmesg
$LKP_SRC/stats/wrapper kmsg
$LKP_SRC/stats/wrapper stderr
$LKP_SRC/stats/wrapper last_state
}
"$@"
[-- Attachment #4: dmesg.xz --]
[-- Type: application/octet-stream, Size: 27164 bytes --]
[-- Attachment #5: xfstests --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 2020 bytes --]
2017-05-07 03:57:37 export TEST_DIR=/fs/sda5
2017-05-07 03:57:37 export TEST_DEV=/dev/sda5
2017-05-07 03:57:37 export FSTYP=xfs
2017-05-07 03:57:37 export SCRATCH_MNT=/fs/scratch
2017-05-07 03:57:37 mkdir /fs/scratch -p
2017-05-07 03:57:37 export SCRATCH_DEV=/dev/sda8
2017-05-07 03:57:37 export SCRATCH_LOGDEV=/dev/sda6
2017-05-07 03:57:37 ./check xfs/014 xfs/112 xfs/116 xfs/119 xfs/121 xfs/123 xfs/124 xfs/125 xfs/126 xfs/164 xfs/165 xfs/166 xfs/170 xfs/174 xfs/181 xfs/183 xfs/188 xfs/190 xfs/194 xfs/195 xfs/199 xfs/201 xfs/202 xfs/203 xfs/205 xfs/206 xfs/216 xfs/220 xfs/222 xfs/238 xfs/242 xfs/252 xfs/253 xfs/261 xfs/266 xfs/278 xfs/279 xfs/281 xfs/282 xfs/290 xfs/292 xfs/295 xfs/296 xfs/299 xfs/301 xfs/302 xfs/303 xfs/304
FSTYP -- xfs (non-debug)
PLATFORM -- Linux/x86_64 snb-drag 4.11.0-rc1-00010-g64fa03d
MKFS_OPTIONS -- -f -bsize=4096 /dev/sda8
MOUNT_OPTIONS -- /dev/sda8 /fs/scratch
xfs/014 12s
xfs/112 7s
xfs/116 2s
xfs/119 5s
xfs/121 7s
xfs/123 4s
xfs/124 4s
xfs/125 6s
xfs/126 5s
xfs/164 1s
xfs/165 1s
xfs/166 1s
xfs/170 7s
xfs/174 7s
xfs/181 14s
xfs/183 3s
xfs/188 9s
xfs/190 2s
xfs/194 2s
xfs/195 0s
xfs/199 2s
xfs/201 2s
xfs/202 0s
xfs/203 2s
xfs/205 2s
xfs/206 0s
xfs/216 7s
xfs/220 3s
xfs/222 0s
xfs/238 2s
xfs/242 1s
xfs/252 2s
xfs/253 7s
xfs/261 1s
xfs/266 16s
xfs/278 2s
xfs/279 6s
xfs/281 14s
xfs/282 16s
xfs/290 0s
xfs/292 2s
xfs/295 7s
xfs/296 14s
_check_dmesg: something found in dmesg (see /lkp/benchmarks/xfstests/results//xfs/296.dmesg)
xfs/299 13s
xfs/301 16s
xfs/302 14s
xfs/303 0s
xfs/304 4s
Ran: xfs/014 xfs/112 xfs/116 xfs/119 xfs/121 xfs/123 xfs/124 xfs/125 xfs/126 xfs/164 xfs/165 xfs/166 xfs/170 xfs/174 xfs/181 xfs/183 xfs/188 xfs/190 xfs/194 xfs/195 xfs/199 xfs/201 xfs/202 xfs/203 xfs/205 xfs/206 xfs/216 xfs/220 xfs/222 xfs/238 xfs/242 xfs/252 xfs/253 xfs/261 xfs/266 xfs/278 xfs/279 xfs/281 xfs/282 xfs/290 xfs/292 xfs/295 xfs/296 xfs/299 xfs/301 xfs/302 xfs/303 xfs/304
Failures: xfs/296
Failed 1 of 48 tests
[-- Attachment #6: job.yaml --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 4343 bytes --]
---
#! jobs/xfstests-xfs.yaml
suite: xfstests
testcase: xfstests
category: functional
disk: 4HDD
fs: xfs
xfstests:
test: xfs-quick2
job_origin: "/lkp/lkp/.src-20170430-234940/allot/cyclic:linux-devel:devel-hourly/snb-drag/xfstests-xfs.yaml"
#! queue options
queue: bisect
testbox: snb-drag
tbox_group: snb-drag
submit_id: 590e27ea0b9a935caf13eb48
job_file: "/lkp/scheduled/snb-drag/xfstests-4HDD-xfs-xfs-quick2-debian-x86_64-2016-08-31.cgz-64fa03de33691f5d05c729ef3e026a640a7ff835-20170507-23727-1yji9tz-0.yaml"
id: 60c22a35862e60e9599f34969b215714157697c0
#! hosts/snb-drag
model: Sandy Bridge
nr_node: 1
nr_cpu: 4
memory: 6G
hdd_partitions: "/dev/disk/by-id/ata-WDC_WD20EZRX-00D8PB0_WD-WCC4M6XASAKV-part5 /dev/disk/by-id/ata-WDC_WD20EZRX-00D8PB0_WD-WCC4M6XASAKV-part6
/dev/disk/by-id/ata-WDC_WD20EZRX-00D8PB0_WD-WCC4M6XASAKV-part7 /dev/disk/by-id/ata-WDC_WD20EZRX-00D8PB0_WD-WCC4M6XASAKV-part8
/dev/disk/by-id/ata-WDC_WD20EZRX-00D8PB0_WD-WCC4M6XASAKV-part9 /dev/disk/by-id/ata-WDC_WD20EZRX-00D8PB0_WD-WCC4M6XASAKV-part10"
swap_partitions:
rootfs_partition: "/dev/disk/by-id/ata-WDC_WD20EZRX-00D8PB0_WD-WCC4M6XASAKV-part2"
netconsole_port: 6648
brand: Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-2500K CPU @ 3.30GHz
#! include/category/functional
kmsg:
heartbeat:
#! include/disk/nr_hdd
need_kconfig:
- CONFIG_BLK_DEV_SD
- CONFIG_SCSI
- CONFIG_BLOCK=y
- CONFIG_SATA_AHCI
- CONFIG_SATA_AHCI_PLATFORM
- CONFIG_ATA
- CONFIG_PCI=y
- CONFIG_XFS_FS
#! include/queue/cyclic
commit: 64fa03de33691f5d05c729ef3e026a640a7ff835
#! include/testbox/snb-drag
run_on_local_disk: true
#! include/fs/OTHERS
#! default params
kconfig: x86_64-rhel-7.2
compiler: gcc-6
rootfs: debian-x86_64-2016-08-31.cgz
enqueue_time: 2017-05-07 03:45:46.084245460 +08:00
_id: 590e27ea0b9a935caf13eb48
_rt: "/result/xfstests/4HDD-xfs-xfs-quick2/snb-drag/debian-x86_64-2016-08-31.cgz/x86_64-rhel-7.2/gcc-6/64fa03de33691f5d05c729ef3e026a640a7ff835"
#! schedule options
user: lkp
head_commit: d246ca8c98b5a19308378b4a27fb7d2c167509da
base_commit: 5a7ad1146caa895ad718a534399e38bd2ba721b7
branch: linux-devel/devel-hourly-2017050108
result_root: "/result/xfstests/4HDD-xfs-xfs-quick2/snb-drag/debian-x86_64-2016-08-31.cgz/x86_64-rhel-7.2/gcc-6/64fa03de33691f5d05c729ef3e026a640a7ff835/0"
LKP_SERVER: inn
max_uptime: 3600
initrd: "/osimage/debian/debian-x86_64-2016-08-31.cgz"
bootloader_append:
- root=/dev/ram0
- user=lkp
- job=/lkp/scheduled/snb-drag/xfstests-4HDD-xfs-xfs-quick2-debian-x86_64-2016-08-31.cgz-64fa03de33691f5d05c729ef3e026a640a7ff835-20170507-23727-1yji9tz-0.yaml
- ARCH=x86_64
- kconfig=x86_64-rhel-7.2
- branch=linux-devel/devel-hourly-2017050108
- commit=64fa03de33691f5d05c729ef3e026a640a7ff835
- BOOT_IMAGE=/pkg/linux/x86_64-rhel-7.2/gcc-6/64fa03de33691f5d05c729ef3e026a640a7ff835/vmlinuz-4.11.0-rc1-00010-g64fa03d
- max_uptime=3600
- RESULT_ROOT=/result/xfstests/4HDD-xfs-xfs-quick2/snb-drag/debian-x86_64-2016-08-31.cgz/x86_64-rhel-7.2/gcc-6/64fa03de33691f5d05c729ef3e026a640a7ff835/0
- LKP_SERVER=inn
- debug
- apic=debug
- sysrq_always_enabled
- rcupdate.rcu_cpu_stall_timeout=100
- net.ifnames=0
- printk.devkmsg=on
- panic=-1
- softlockup_panic=1
- nmi_watchdog=panic
- oops=panic
- load_ramdisk=2
- prompt_ramdisk=0
- drbd.minor_count=8
- systemd.log_level=err
- ignore_loglevel
- earlyprintk=ttyS0,115200
- console=ttyS0,115200
- console=tty0
- vga=normal
- rw
lkp_initrd: "/lkp/lkp/lkp-x86_64.cgz"
modules_initrd: "/pkg/linux/x86_64-rhel-7.2/gcc-6/64fa03de33691f5d05c729ef3e026a640a7ff835/modules.cgz"
bm_initrd: "/osimage/deps/debian-x86_64-2016-08-31.cgz/lkp_2017-05-01.cgz,/osimage/deps/debian-x86_64-2016-08-31.cgz/rsync-rootfs_2016-11-15.cgz,/osimage/deps/debian-x86_64-2016-08-31.cgz/run-ipconfig_2016-11-15.cgz,/osimage/deps/debian-x86_64-2016-08-31.cgz/fs_2016-11-15.cgz,/osimage/deps/debian-x86_64-2016-08-31.cgz/xfstests_2017-02-15.cgz,/osimage/pkg/debian-x86_64-2016-08-31.cgz/xfstests-x86_64_2017-04-17.cgz,/osimage/deps/debian-x86_64-2016-08-31.cgz/hw_2016-11-15.cgz"
site: inn
#! /lkp/lkp/.src-20170505-175852/include/site/inn
LKP_CGI_PORT: 80
LKP_CIFS_PORT: 139
oom-killer:
watchdog:
nfs-hang:
#! runtime status
#! user overrides
kernel: "/pkg/linux/x86_64-rhel-7.2/gcc-6/64fa03de33691f5d05c729ef3e026a640a7ff835/vmlinuz-4.11.0-rc1-00010-g64fa03d"
dequeue_time: 2017-05-07 03:55:38.112732227 +08:00
job_state: failed
loadavg: '0.64'
[-- Attachment #7: reproduce --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 1076 bytes --]
dmsetup remove_all
wipefs -a --force /dev/sda5
wipefs -a --force /dev/sda6
wipefs -a --force /dev/sda7
wipefs -a --force /dev/sda8
mkfs -t xfs /dev/sda5
mkfs -t xfs /dev/sda7
mkfs -t xfs /dev/sda8
mkfs -t xfs /dev/sda6
mkdir -p /fs/sda5
mount -t xfs -o nobarrier,inode64 /dev/sda5 /fs/sda5
mkdir -p /fs/sda6
mount -t xfs -o nobarrier,inode64 /dev/sda6 /fs/sda6
mkdir -p /fs/sda7
mount -t xfs -o nobarrier,inode64 /dev/sda7 /fs/sda7
mkdir -p /fs/sda8
mount -t xfs -o nobarrier,inode64 /dev/sda8 /fs/sda8
export TEST_DIR=/fs/sda5
export TEST_DEV=/dev/sda5
export FSTYP=xfs
export SCRATCH_MNT=/fs/scratch
mkdir /fs/scratch -p
export SCRATCH_DEV=/dev/sda8
export SCRATCH_LOGDEV=/dev/sda6
./check xfs/014 xfs/112 xfs/116 xfs/119 xfs/121 xfs/123 xfs/124 xfs/125 xfs/126 xfs/164 xfs/165 xfs/166 xfs/170 xfs/174 xfs/181 xfs/183 xfs/188 xfs/190 xfs/194 xfs/195 xfs/199 xfs/201 xfs/202 xfs/203 xfs/205 xfs/206 xfs/216 xfs/220 xfs/222 xfs/238 xfs/242 xfs/252 xfs/253 xfs/261 xfs/266 xfs/278 xfs/279 xfs/281 xfs/282 xfs/290 xfs/292 xfs/295 xfs/296 xfs/299 xfs/301 xfs/302 xfs/303 xfs/304
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 39+ messages in thread
* Re: 64fa03de33: BUG:Dentry_still_in_use
2017-05-07 9:21 64fa03de33: BUG:Dentry_still_in_use kernel test robot
@ 2017-05-08 4:44 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-05-08 11:47 ` Masami Ichikawa
0 siblings, 1 reply; 39+ messages in thread
From: Serge E. Hallyn @ 2017-05-08 4:44 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Eric W. Biederman; +Cc: kernel test robot, LKML, containers, lkp
>From 6a3fb632f67f8425c6e76c65dad8115f1550d2a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Date: Sun, 7 May 2017 23:40:42 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 1/1] cap_inode_getsecurity: don't pin dentry (fold up)
This should fix the "Dentry_still_in_use" reported by the kernel
test robot.
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
---
security/commoncap.c | 27 +++++++++++++++------------
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index a1a2935..c970b71 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -406,21 +406,21 @@ int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer,
&tmpbuf, size, GFP_NOFS);
if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
+ goto out;
fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns;
cap = (struct vfs_cap_data *) tmpbuf;
if (is_v2header(ret, cap->magic_etc)) {
/* If this is sizeof(vfs_cap_data) then we're ok with the
* on-disk value, so return that. */
- if (alloc)
+ if (alloc) {
*buffer = tmpbuf;
- else
- kfree(tmpbuf);
- return ret;
+ tmpbuf = NULL;
+ }
+ goto out;
} else if (!is_v3header(ret, cap->magic_etc)) {
- kfree(tmpbuf);
- return -EINVAL;
+ ret = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
}
nscap = (struct vfs_ns_cap_data *) tmpbuf;
@@ -434,14 +434,14 @@ int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer,
if (alloc) {
*buffer = tmpbuf;
nscap->rootid = cpu_to_le32(mappedroot);
- } else
- kfree(tmpbuf);
- return size;
+ tmpbuf = NULL;
+ }
+ goto out;
}
if (!rootid_owns_currentns(kroot)) {
- kfree(tmpbuf);
- return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ goto out;
}
/* This comes from a parent namespace. Return as a v2 capability */
@@ -459,6 +459,9 @@ int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer,
cap->magic_etc = cpu_to_le32(magic);
}
}
+
+out:
+ dput(dentry);
kfree(tmpbuf);
return size;
}
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 39+ messages in thread
* Re: 64fa03de33: BUG:Dentry_still_in_use
2017-05-08 4:44 ` Serge E. Hallyn
@ 2017-05-08 11:47 ` Masami Ichikawa
2017-05-08 15:49 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-05-08 18:11 ` [PATCH v4] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities Serge E. Hallyn
0 siblings, 2 replies; 39+ messages in thread
From: Masami Ichikawa @ 2017-05-08 11:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Serge E. Hallyn; +Cc: Eric W. Biederman, containers, lkp, xiaolong.ye, LKML
On Mon, May 8, 2017 at 1:44 PM, Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> wrote:
> From 6a3fb632f67f8425c6e76c65dad8115f1550d2a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> From: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> Date: Sun, 7 May 2017 23:40:42 -0500
> Subject: [PATCH 1/1] cap_inode_getsecurity: don't pin dentry (fold up)
>
> This should fix the "Dentry_still_in_use" reported by the kernel
> test robot.
>
> Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> ---
> security/commoncap.c | 27 +++++++++++++++------------
> 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index a1a2935..c970b71 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -406,21 +406,21 @@ int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer,
> &tmpbuf, size, GFP_NOFS);
>
> if (ret < 0)
> - return ret;
> + goto out;
>
> fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns;
> cap = (struct vfs_cap_data *) tmpbuf;
> if (is_v2header(ret, cap->magic_etc)) {
> /* If this is sizeof(vfs_cap_data) then we're ok with the
> * on-disk value, so return that. */
> - if (alloc)
> + if (alloc) {
> *buffer = tmpbuf;
> - else
> - kfree(tmpbuf);
> - return ret;
> + tmpbuf = NULL;
> + }
> + goto out;
> } else if (!is_v3header(ret, cap->magic_etc)) {
> - kfree(tmpbuf);
> - return -EINVAL;
> + ret = -EINVAL;
> + goto out;
> }
>
> nscap = (struct vfs_ns_cap_data *) tmpbuf;
> @@ -434,14 +434,14 @@ int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer,
> if (alloc) {
> *buffer = tmpbuf;
> nscap->rootid = cpu_to_le32(mappedroot);
> - } else
> - kfree(tmpbuf);
> - return size;
> + tmpbuf = NULL;
> + }
> + goto out;
> }
>
> if (!rootid_owns_currentns(kroot)) {
> - kfree(tmpbuf);
> - return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> + ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
> + goto out;
> }
>
> /* This comes from a parent namespace. Return as a v2 capability */
> @@ -459,6 +459,9 @@ int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer,
> cap->magic_etc = cpu_to_le32(magic);
> }
> }
> +
> +out:
> + dput(dentry);
> kfree(tmpbuf);
> return size;
If ret is set to some error code, e.g. -EINVAL, then jump to out
label, this function should return error code, doesn't it?
> }
> --
> 2.7.4
>
> _______________________________________________
> Containers mailing list
> Containers@lists.linux-foundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers
--
/**
* Masami Ichikawa
* email: masami256@gmail.com
*/
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 39+ messages in thread
* Re: 64fa03de33: BUG:Dentry_still_in_use
2017-05-08 11:47 ` Masami Ichikawa
@ 2017-05-08 15:49 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-05-08 18:11 ` [PATCH v4] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities Serge E. Hallyn
1 sibling, 0 replies; 39+ messages in thread
From: Serge E. Hallyn @ 2017-05-08 15:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Masami Ichikawa
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn, Eric W. Biederman, containers, lkp, xiaolong.ye, LKML
Quoting Masami Ichikawa (masami256@gmail.com):
> On Mon, May 8, 2017 at 1:44 PM, Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> wrote:
> > From 6a3fb632f67f8425c6e76c65dad8115f1550d2a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
> > From: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> > Date: Sun, 7 May 2017 23:40:42 -0500
> > Subject: [PATCH 1/1] cap_inode_getsecurity: don't pin dentry (fold up)
> >
> > This should fix the "Dentry_still_in_use" reported by the kernel
> > test robot.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> > ---
> > security/commoncap.c | 27 +++++++++++++++------------
> > 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> > index a1a2935..c970b71 100644
> > --- a/security/commoncap.c
> > +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> > @@ -406,21 +406,21 @@ int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer,
> > &tmpbuf, size, GFP_NOFS);
> >
> > if (ret < 0)
> > - return ret;
> > + goto out;
> >
> > fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns;
> > cap = (struct vfs_cap_data *) tmpbuf;
> > if (is_v2header(ret, cap->magic_etc)) {
> > /* If this is sizeof(vfs_cap_data) then we're ok with the
> > * on-disk value, so return that. */
> > - if (alloc)
> > + if (alloc) {
> > *buffer = tmpbuf;
> > - else
> > - kfree(tmpbuf);
> > - return ret;
> > + tmpbuf = NULL;
> > + }
> > + goto out;
> > } else if (!is_v3header(ret, cap->magic_etc)) {
> > - kfree(tmpbuf);
> > - return -EINVAL;
> > + ret = -EINVAL;
> > + goto out;
> > }
> >
> > nscap = (struct vfs_ns_cap_data *) tmpbuf;
> > @@ -434,14 +434,14 @@ int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer,
> > if (alloc) {
> > *buffer = tmpbuf;
> > nscap->rootid = cpu_to_le32(mappedroot);
> > - } else
> > - kfree(tmpbuf);
> > - return size;
> > + tmpbuf = NULL;
> > + }
> > + goto out;
> > }
> >
> > if (!rootid_owns_currentns(kroot)) {
> > - kfree(tmpbuf);
> > - return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> > + ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
> > + goto out;
> > }
> >
> > /* This comes from a parent namespace. Return as a v2 capability */
> > @@ -459,6 +459,9 @@ int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer,
> > cap->magic_etc = cpu_to_le32(magic);
> > }
> > }
> > +
> > +out:
> > + dput(dentry);
> > kfree(tmpbuf);
> > return size;
>
> If ret is set to some error code, e.g. -EINVAL, then jump to out
> label, this function should return error code, doesn't it?
D'oh, yes.
Sorry, I'd wanted to ack the fact that there was a real bug before I went to bed.
I'll send a proper patch tonight.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 39+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v4] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities
2017-05-08 11:47 ` Masami Ichikawa
2017-05-08 15:49 ` Serge E. Hallyn
@ 2017-05-08 18:11 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-05-09 16:55 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-06-13 15:47 ` Stefan Berger
1 sibling, 2 replies; 39+ messages in thread
From: Serge E. Hallyn @ 2017-05-08 18:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Eric W. Biederman; +Cc: Masami Ichikawa, containers, lkp, xiaolong.ye, LKML
Root in a non-initial user ns cannot be trusted to write a traditional
security.capability xattr. If it were allowed to do so, then any
unprivileged user on the host could map his own uid to root in a private
namespace, write the xattr, and execute the file with privilege on the
host.
However supporting file capabilities in a user namespace is very
desirable. Not doing so means that any programs designed to run with
limited privilege must continue to support other methods of gaining and
dropping privilege. For instance a program installer must detect
whether file capabilities can be assigned, and assign them if so but set
setuid-root otherwise. The program in turn must know how to drop
partial capabilities, and do so only if setuid-root.
This patch introduces v3 of the security.capability xattr. It builds a
vfs_ns_cap_data struct by appending a uid_t rootid to struct
vfs_cap_data. This is the absolute uid_t (that is, the uid_t in user
namespace which mounted the filesystem, usually init_user_ns) of the
root id in whose namespaces the file capabilities may take effect.
When a task asks to write a v2 security.capability xattr, if it is
privileged with respect to the userns which mounted the filesystem, then
nothing should change. Otherwise, the kernel will transparently rewrite
the xattr as a v3 with the appropriate rootid. This is done during the
execution of setxattr() to catch user-space-initiated capability writes.
Subsequently, any task executing the file which has the noted kuid as
its root uid, or which is in a descendent user_ns of such a user_ns,
will run the file with capabilities.
Similarly when asking to read file capabilities, a v3 capability will
be presented as v2 if it applies to the caller's namespace.
If a task writes a v3 security.capability, then it can provide a uid for
the xattr so long as the uid is valid in its own user namespace, and it
is privileged with CAP_SETFCAP over its namespace. The kernel will
translate that rootid to an absolute uid, and write that to disk. After
this, a task in the writer's namespace will not be able to use those
capabilities (unless rootid was 0), but a task in a namespace where the
given uid is root will.
Only a single security.capability xattr may exist at a time for a given
file. A task may overwrite an existing xattr so long as it is
privileged over the inode. Note this is a departure from previous
semantics, which required privilege to remove a security.capability
xattr. This check can be re-added if deemed useful.
This allows a simple setxattr to work, allows tar/untar to work, and
allows us to tar in one namespace and untar in another while preserving
the capability, without risking leaking privilege into a parent
namespace.
Example using tar:
$ cp /bin/sleep sleepx
$ mkdir b1 b2
$ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100000:1 -m b:1:$(id -u):1 -- chown 0:0 b1
$ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100001:1 -m b:1:$(id -u):1 -- chown 0:0 b2
$ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100000:1000 -- tar --xattrs-include=security.capability --xattrs -cf b1/sleepx.tar sleepx
$ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100001:1000 -- tar --xattrs-include=security.capability --xattrs -C b2 -xf b1/sleepx.tar
$ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100001:1000 -- getcap b2/sleepx
b2/sleepx = cap_sys_admin+ep
# /opt/ltp/testcases/bin/getv3xattr b2/sleepx
v3 xattr, rootid is 100001
A patch to linux-test-project adding a new set of tests for this
functionality is in the nsfscaps branch at github.com/hallyn/ltp
Changelog:
Nov 02 2016: fix invalid check at refuse_fcap_overwrite()
Nov 07 2016: convert rootid from and to fs user_ns
(From ebiederm: mar 28 2017)
commoncap.c: fix typos - s/v4/v3
get_vfs_caps_from_disk: clarify the fs_ns root access check
nsfscaps: change the code split for cap_inode_setxattr()
Apr 09 2017:
don't return v3 cap for caps owned by current root.
return a v2 cap for a true v2 cap in non-init ns
Apr 18 2017:
. Change the flow of fscap writing to support s_user_ns writing.
. Remove refuse_fcap_overwrite(). The value of the previous
xattr doesn't matter.
Apr 24 2017:
. incorporate Eric's incremental diff
. move cap_convert_nscap to setxattr and simplify its usage
May 8, 2017:
. fix leaking dentry refcount in cap_inode_getsecurity
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
---
fs/xattr.c | 6 +
include/linux/capability.h | 2 +
include/linux/security.h | 2 +
include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 22 +++-
security/commoncap.c | 270 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
5 files changed, 280 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c
index 7e3317c..0a9dea4 100644
--- a/fs/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/xattr.c
@@ -444,6 +444,12 @@ setxattr(struct dentry *d, const char __user *name, const void __user *value,
if ((strcmp(kname, XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS) == 0) ||
(strcmp(kname, XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT) == 0))
posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user(kvalue, size);
+ else if (strcmp(kname, XATTR_NAME_CAPS) == 0) {
+ error = cap_convert_nscap(d, &kvalue, size);
+ if (error < 0)
+ goto out;
+ size = error;
+ }
}
error = vfs_setxattr(d, kname, kvalue, size, flags);
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index 6ffb67e..b52e278 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -248,4 +248,6 @@ extern bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns);
/* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);
+extern int cap_convert_nscap(struct dentry *dentry, void **ivalue, size_t size);
+
#endif /* !_LINUX_CAPABILITY_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 96899fa..bd49cc1 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -86,6 +86,8 @@ extern int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
extern int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
extern int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
extern int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
+extern int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
+ void **buffer, bool alloc);
extern int cap_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr);
extern int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags);
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
index 49bc062..fd4f87d 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
@@ -60,9 +60,13 @@ typedef struct __user_cap_data_struct {
#define VFS_CAP_U32_2 2
#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2 (sizeof(__le32)*(1 + 2*VFS_CAP_U32_2))
-#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2
-#define VFS_CAP_U32 VFS_CAP_U32_2
-#define VFS_CAP_REVISION VFS_CAP_REVISION_2
+#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_3 0x03000000
+#define VFS_CAP_U32_3 2
+#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ_3 (sizeof(__le32)*(2 + 2*VFS_CAP_U32_3))
+
+#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ XATTR_CAPS_SZ_3
+#define VFS_CAP_U32 VFS_CAP_U32_3
+#define VFS_CAP_REVISION VFS_CAP_REVISION_3
struct vfs_cap_data {
__le32 magic_etc; /* Little endian */
@@ -72,6 +76,18 @@ struct vfs_cap_data {
} data[VFS_CAP_U32];
};
+/*
+ * same as vfs_cap_data but with a rootid at the end
+ */
+struct vfs_ns_cap_data {
+ __le32 magic_etc;
+ struct {
+ __le32 permitted; /* Little endian */
+ __le32 inheritable; /* Little endian */
+ } data[VFS_CAP_U32];
+ __le32 rootid;
+};
+
#ifndef __KERNEL__
/*
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index 78b3783..c28d126 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -332,6 +332,209 @@ int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
return error;
}
+static bool rootid_owns_currentns(kuid_t kroot)
+{
+ struct user_namespace *ns;
+
+ if (!uid_valid(kroot))
+ return false;
+
+ for (ns = current_user_ns(); ; ns = ns->parent) {
+ if (from_kuid(ns, kroot) == 0)
+ return true;
+ if (ns == &init_user_ns)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+static __u32 sansflags(__u32 m)
+{
+ return m & ~VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE;
+}
+
+static bool is_v2header(size_t size, __le32 magic)
+{
+ __u32 m = le32_to_cpu(magic);
+ if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2)
+ return false;
+ return sansflags(m) == VFS_CAP_REVISION_2;
+}
+
+static bool is_v3header(size_t size, __le32 magic)
+{
+ __u32 m = le32_to_cpu(magic);
+
+ if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_3)
+ return false;
+ return sansflags(m) == VFS_CAP_REVISION_3;
+}
+
+/*
+ * getsecurity: We are called for security.* before any attempt to read the
+ * xattr from the inode itself.
+ *
+ * This gives us a chance to read the on-disk value and convert it. If we
+ * return -EOPNOTSUPP, then vfs_getxattr() will call the i_op handler.
+ *
+ * Note we are not called by vfs_getxattr_alloc(), but that is only called
+ * by the integrity subsystem, which really wants the unconverted values -
+ * so that's good.
+ */
+int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer,
+ bool alloc)
+{
+ int size, ret;
+ kuid_t kroot;
+ uid_t root, mappedroot;
+ char *tmpbuf = NULL;
+ struct vfs_cap_data *cap;
+ struct vfs_ns_cap_data *nscap;
+ struct dentry *dentry;
+ struct user_namespace *fs_ns;
+
+ if (strcmp(name, "capability") != 0)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
+ if (!dentry)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ size = sizeof(struct vfs_ns_cap_data);
+ ret = (int) vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS,
+ &tmpbuf, size, GFP_NOFS);
+ dput(dentry);
+
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns;
+ cap = (struct vfs_cap_data *) tmpbuf;
+ if (is_v2header((size_t) ret, cap->magic_etc)) {
+ /* If this is sizeof(vfs_cap_data) then we're ok with the
+ * on-disk value, so return that. */
+ if (alloc)
+ *buffer = tmpbuf;
+ else
+ kfree(tmpbuf);
+ return ret;
+ } else if (!is_v3header((size_t) ret, cap->magic_etc)) {
+ kfree(tmpbuf);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ nscap = (struct vfs_ns_cap_data *) tmpbuf;
+ root = le32_to_cpu(nscap->rootid);
+ kroot = make_kuid(fs_ns, root);
+
+ /* If the root kuid maps to a valid uid in current ns, then return
+ * this as a nscap. */
+ mappedroot = from_kuid(current_user_ns(), kroot);
+ if (mappedroot != (uid_t)-1 && mappedroot != (uid_t)0) {
+ if (alloc) {
+ *buffer = tmpbuf;
+ nscap->rootid = cpu_to_le32(mappedroot);
+ } else
+ kfree(tmpbuf);
+ return size;
+ }
+
+ if (!rootid_owns_currentns(kroot)) {
+ kfree(tmpbuf);
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ }
+
+ /* This comes from a parent namespace. Return as a v2 capability */
+ size = sizeof(struct vfs_cap_data);
+ if (alloc) {
+ *buffer = kmalloc(size, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (*buffer) {
+ struct vfs_cap_data *cap = *buffer;
+ __le32 nsmagic, magic;
+ magic = VFS_CAP_REVISION_2;
+ nsmagic = le32_to_cpu(nscap->magic_etc);
+ if (nsmagic & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE)
+ magic |= VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE;
+ memcpy(&cap->data, &nscap->data, sizeof(__le32) * 2 * VFS_CAP_U32);
+ cap->magic_etc = cpu_to_le32(magic);
+ }
+ }
+ kfree(tmpbuf);
+ return size;
+}
+
+static kuid_t rootid_from_xattr(const void *value, size_t size,
+ struct user_namespace *task_ns)
+{
+ const struct vfs_ns_cap_data *nscap = value;
+ uid_t rootid = 0;
+
+ if (size == XATTR_CAPS_SZ_3)
+ rootid = le32_to_cpu(nscap->rootid);
+
+ return make_kuid(task_ns, rootid);
+}
+
+static bool validheader(size_t size, __le32 magic)
+{
+ return is_v2header(size, magic) || is_v3header(size, magic);
+}
+
+/*
+ * User requested a write of security.capability. If needed, update the
+ * xattr to change from v2 to v3, or to fixup the v3 rootid.
+ *
+ * If all is ok, we return the new size, on error return < 0.
+ */
+int cap_convert_nscap(struct dentry *dentry, void **ivalue, size_t size)
+{
+ struct vfs_ns_cap_data *nscap;
+ uid_t nsrootid;
+ const struct vfs_cap_data *cap = *ivalue;
+ __u32 magic, nsmagic;
+ struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+ struct user_namespace *task_ns = current_user_ns(),
+ *fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns;
+ kuid_t rootid;
+ size_t newsize;
+
+ if (!*ivalue)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (!validheader(size, cap->magic_etc))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_SETFCAP))
+ return -EPERM;
+ if (size == XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2)
+ if (ns_capable(inode->i_sb->s_user_ns, CAP_SETFCAP))
+ /* user is privileged, just write the v2 */
+ return size;
+
+ rootid = rootid_from_xattr(*ivalue, size, task_ns);
+ if (!uid_valid(rootid))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ nsrootid = from_kuid(fs_ns, rootid);
+ if (nsrootid == -1)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ newsize = sizeof(struct vfs_ns_cap_data);
+ nscap = kmalloc(newsize, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!nscap)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ nscap->rootid = cpu_to_le32(nsrootid);
+ nsmagic = VFS_CAP_REVISION_3;
+ magic = le32_to_cpu(cap->magic_etc);
+ if (magic & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE)
+ nsmagic |= VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE;
+ nscap->magic_etc = cpu_to_le32(nsmagic);
+ memcpy(&nscap->data, &cap->data, sizeof(__le32) * 2 * VFS_CAP_U32);
+
+ kvfree(*ivalue);
+ *ivalue = nscap;
+ return newsize;
+}
+
/*
* Calculate the new process capability sets from the capability sets attached
* to a file.
@@ -385,7 +588,10 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data
__u32 magic_etc;
unsigned tocopy, i;
int size;
- struct vfs_cap_data caps;
+ struct vfs_ns_cap_data data, *nscaps = &data;
+ struct vfs_cap_data *caps = (struct vfs_cap_data *) &data;
+ kuid_t rootkuid;
+ struct user_namespace *fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns;
memset(cpu_caps, 0, sizeof(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data));
@@ -393,18 +599,20 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data
return -ENODATA;
size = __vfs_getxattr((struct dentry *)dentry, inode,
- XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &caps, XATTR_CAPS_SZ);
+ XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &data, XATTR_CAPS_SZ);
if (size == -ENODATA || size == -EOPNOTSUPP)
/* no data, that's ok */
return -ENODATA;
+
if (size < 0)
return size;
if (size < sizeof(magic_etc))
return -EINVAL;
- cpu_caps->magic_etc = magic_etc = le32_to_cpu(caps.magic_etc);
+ cpu_caps->magic_etc = magic_etc = le32_to_cpu(caps->magic_etc);
+ rootkuid = make_kuid(fs_ns, 0);
switch (magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) {
case VFS_CAP_REVISION_1:
if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_1)
@@ -416,15 +624,27 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data
return -EINVAL;
tocopy = VFS_CAP_U32_2;
break;
+ case VFS_CAP_REVISION_3:
+ if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_3)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ tocopy = VFS_CAP_U32_3;
+ rootkuid = make_kuid(fs_ns, le32_to_cpu(nscaps->rootid));
+ break;
+
default:
return -EINVAL;
}
+ /* Limit the caps to the mounter of the filesystem
+ * or the more limited uid specified in the xattr.
+ */
+ if (!rootid_owns_currentns(rootkuid))
+ return -ENODATA;
CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
if (i >= tocopy)
break;
- cpu_caps->permitted.cap[i] = le32_to_cpu(caps.data[i].permitted);
- cpu_caps->inheritable.cap[i] = le32_to_cpu(caps.data[i].inheritable);
+ cpu_caps->permitted.cap[i] = le32_to_cpu(caps->data[i].permitted);
+ cpu_caps->inheritable.cap[i] = le32_to_cpu(caps->data[i].inheritable);
}
cpu_caps->permitted.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK;
@@ -462,8 +682,8 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_c
rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps);
if (rc < 0) {
if (rc == -EINVAL)
- printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: get_vfs_caps_from_disk returned %d for %s\n",
- __func__, rc, bprm->filename);
+ printk(KERN_NOTICE "Invalid argument reading file caps for %s\n",
+ bprm->filename);
else if (rc == -ENODATA)
rc = 0;
goto out;
@@ -660,15 +880,19 @@ int cap_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
{
- if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
- if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
- return -EPERM;
+ /* Ignore non-security xattrs */
+ if (strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
+ sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) != 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * For XATTR_NAME_CAPS the check will be done in
+ * cap_convert_nscap(), called by setxattr()
+ */
+ if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS) == 0)
return 0;
- }
- if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
- sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) &&
- !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return 0;
}
@@ -686,15 +910,22 @@ int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
*/
int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
{
- if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
- if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
+ /* Ignore non-security xattrs */
+ if (strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
+ sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) != 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS) == 0) {
+ /* security.capability gets namespaced */
+ struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+ if (!inode)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_SETFCAP))
return -EPERM;
return 0;
}
- if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
- sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) &&
- !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
return 0;
}
@@ -1082,6 +1313,7 @@ struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, cap_bprm_secureexec),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_need_killpriv, cap_inode_need_killpriv),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_killpriv, cap_inode_killpriv),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, cap_inode_getsecurity),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, cap_mmap_addr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, cap_mmap_file),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, cap_task_fix_setuid),
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 39+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities
2017-05-08 18:11 ` [PATCH v4] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities Serge E. Hallyn
@ 2017-05-09 16:55 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-05-09 20:37 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-13 15:47 ` Stefan Berger
1 sibling, 1 reply; 39+ messages in thread
From: Eric W. Biederman @ 2017-05-09 16:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Serge E. Hallyn; +Cc: Masami Ichikawa, containers, lkp, xiaolong.ye, LKML
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> writes:
> Changelog:
[snip]
> May 8, 2017:
> . fix leaking dentry refcount in cap_inode_getsecurity
>
[snip]
> +/*
> + * getsecurity: We are called for security.* before any attempt to read the
> + * xattr from the inode itself.
> + *
> + * This gives us a chance to read the on-disk value and convert it. If we
> + * return -EOPNOTSUPP, then vfs_getxattr() will call the i_op handler.
> + *
> + * Note we are not called by vfs_getxattr_alloc(), but that is only called
> + * by the integrity subsystem, which really wants the unconverted values -
> + * so that's good.
> + */
> +int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer,
> + bool alloc)
> +{
> + int size, ret;
> + kuid_t kroot;
> + uid_t root, mappedroot;
> + char *tmpbuf = NULL;
> + struct vfs_cap_data *cap;
> + struct vfs_ns_cap_data *nscap;
> + struct dentry *dentry;
> + struct user_namespace *fs_ns;
> +
> + if (strcmp(name, "capability") != 0)
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +
> + dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
> + if (!dentry)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + size = sizeof(struct vfs_ns_cap_data);
> + ret = (int) vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS,
> + &tmpbuf, size, GFP_NOFS);
> + dput(dentry);
This looks like a good fix but ouch! That interface is wrong.
The dentry is needed because vfs_getxattr_alloc does:
error = handler->get(handler, dentry, inode, name, NULL, 0);
Which is has no business taking a dentry as xattrs are inode concepts.
I have no issue with your patch but it looks like that handler issue
is going to need to be fixed with xattrs.
Eric
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 39+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities
2017-05-09 16:55 ` Eric W. Biederman
@ 2017-05-09 20:37 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-05-09 22:27 ` Eric W. Biederman
0 siblings, 1 reply; 39+ messages in thread
From: Serge E. Hallyn @ 2017-05-09 20:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Eric W. Biederman
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn, Masami Ichikawa, containers, lkp, xiaolong.ye, LKML
Quoting Eric W. Biederman (ebiederm@xmission.com):
> "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> writes:
> > Changelog:
> [snip]
> > May 8, 2017:
> > . fix leaking dentry refcount in cap_inode_getsecurity
> >
> [snip]
> > +/*
> > + * getsecurity: We are called for security.* before any attempt to read the
> > + * xattr from the inode itself.
> > + *
> > + * This gives us a chance to read the on-disk value and convert it. If we
> > + * return -EOPNOTSUPP, then vfs_getxattr() will call the i_op handler.
> > + *
> > + * Note we are not called by vfs_getxattr_alloc(), but that is only called
> > + * by the integrity subsystem, which really wants the unconverted values -
> > + * so that's good.
> > + */
> > +int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer,
> > + bool alloc)
> > +{
> > + int size, ret;
> > + kuid_t kroot;
> > + uid_t root, mappedroot;
> > + char *tmpbuf = NULL;
> > + struct vfs_cap_data *cap;
> > + struct vfs_ns_cap_data *nscap;
> > + struct dentry *dentry;
> > + struct user_namespace *fs_ns;
> > +
> > + if (strcmp(name, "capability") != 0)
> > + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> > +
> > + dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
> > + if (!dentry)
> > + return -EINVAL;
> > +
> > + size = sizeof(struct vfs_ns_cap_data);
> > + ret = (int) vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS,
> > + &tmpbuf, size, GFP_NOFS);
> > + dput(dentry);
>
> This looks like a good fix but ouch! That interface is wrong.
>
> The dentry is needed because vfs_getxattr_alloc does:
> error = handler->get(handler, dentry, inode, name, NULL, 0);
>
> Which is has no business taking a dentry as xattrs are inode concepts.
>
> I have no issue with your patch but it looks like that handler issue
> is going to need to be fixed with xattrs.
True, it's a bit clunky.
Any reason not to just have the current vfs_getxattr_alloc() become a
lightweight wrapper calling inode_getxattr_alloc(dentry->d_inode)?
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 39+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities
2017-05-09 20:37 ` Serge E. Hallyn
@ 2017-05-09 22:27 ` Eric W. Biederman
0 siblings, 0 replies; 39+ messages in thread
From: Eric W. Biederman @ 2017-05-09 22:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Serge E. Hallyn; +Cc: Masami Ichikawa, containers, lkp, xiaolong.ye, LKML
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> writes:
> Quoting Eric W. Biederman (ebiederm@xmission.com):
>> "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> writes:
>> > Changelog:
>> [snip]
>> > May 8, 2017:
>> > . fix leaking dentry refcount in cap_inode_getsecurity
>> >
>> [snip]
>> > +/*
>> > + * getsecurity: We are called for security.* before any attempt to read the
>> > + * xattr from the inode itself.
>> > + *
>> > + * This gives us a chance to read the on-disk value and convert it. If we
>> > + * return -EOPNOTSUPP, then vfs_getxattr() will call the i_op handler.
>> > + *
>> > + * Note we are not called by vfs_getxattr_alloc(), but that is only called
>> > + * by the integrity subsystem, which really wants the unconverted values -
>> > + * so that's good.
>> > + */
>> > +int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer,
>> > + bool alloc)
>> > +{
>> > + int size, ret;
>> > + kuid_t kroot;
>> > + uid_t root, mappedroot;
>> > + char *tmpbuf = NULL;
>> > + struct vfs_cap_data *cap;
>> > + struct vfs_ns_cap_data *nscap;
>> > + struct dentry *dentry;
>> > + struct user_namespace *fs_ns;
>> > +
>> > + if (strcmp(name, "capability") != 0)
>> > + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>> > +
>> > + dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
>> > + if (!dentry)
>> > + return -EINVAL;
>> > +
>> > + size = sizeof(struct vfs_ns_cap_data);
>> > + ret = (int) vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS,
>> > + &tmpbuf, size, GFP_NOFS);
>> > + dput(dentry);
>>
>> This looks like a good fix but ouch! That interface is wrong.
>>
>> The dentry is needed because vfs_getxattr_alloc does:
>> error = handler->get(handler, dentry, inode, name, NULL, 0);
>>
>> Which is has no business taking a dentry as xattrs are inode concepts.
>>
>> I have no issue with your patch but it looks like that handler issue
>> is going to need to be fixed with xattrs.
>
> True, it's a bit clunky.
>
> Any reason not to just have the current vfs_getxattr_alloc() become a
> lightweight wrapper calling inode_getxattr_alloc(dentry->d_inode)?
My deep issue is that handler is functions like posix_acl_xattr_get.
And all of those functions that vfs_getxattr_alloc calls should not
take a dentry.
So I feel like I have just spotted the tip of an iceberg that needs
sorting out.
Eric
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 39+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities
2017-05-08 18:11 ` [PATCH v4] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities Serge E. Hallyn
2017-05-09 16:55 ` Eric W. Biederman
@ 2017-06-13 15:47 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-13 17:14 ` Tycho Andersen
` (2 more replies)
1 sibling, 3 replies; 39+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2017-06-13 15:47 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Serge E. Hallyn, Eric W. Biederman
Cc: Masami Ichikawa, containers, lkp, xiaolong.ye, LKML, Mimi Zohar
On 05/08/2017 02:11 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> Root in a non-initial user ns cannot be trusted to write a traditional
> security.capability xattr. If it were allowed to do so, then any
> unprivileged user on the host could map his own uid to root in a private
> namespace, write the xattr, and execute the file with privilege on the
> host.
>
> However supporting file capabilities in a user namespace is very
> desirable. Not doing so means that any programs designed to run with
> limited privilege must continue to support other methods of gaining and
> dropping privilege. For instance a program installer must detect
> whether file capabilities can be assigned, and assign them if so but set
> setuid-root otherwise. The program in turn must know how to drop
> partial capabilities, and do so only if setuid-root.
Hi Serge,
I have been looking at patch below primarily to learn how we could
apply a similar technique to security.ima and security.evm for a
namespaced IMA. From the paragraphs above I thought that you solved the
problem of a shared filesystem where one now can write different
security.capability xattrs by effectively supporting for example
security.capability[uid=1000] and security.capability[uid=2000] written
into the filesystem. Each would then become visible as
security.capability if the userns mapping is set appropriately. However,
this doesn't seem to be how it is implemented. There seems to be only a
single such entry with uid appended to it and, if it was a shared
filesystem, the first one to set this attribute blocks everyone else
from writing the xattr. Is that how it works? Would that work
differently with an overlay filesystem ? I think a similar model could
also work for IMA, but maybe you have some thoughts. The only thing I
would be concerned about is blocking the parent container's root user
from setting an xattr.
Regards,
Stefan
>
> This patch introduces v3 of the security.capability xattr. It builds a
> vfs_ns_cap_data struct by appending a uid_t rootid to struct
> vfs_cap_data. This is the absolute uid_t (that is, the uid_t in user
> namespace which mounted the filesystem, usually init_user_ns) of the
> root id in whose namespaces the file capabilities may take effect.
>
> When a task asks to write a v2 security.capability xattr, if it is
> privileged with respect to the userns which mounted the filesystem, then
> nothing should change. Otherwise, the kernel will transparently rewrite
> the xattr as a v3 with the appropriate rootid. This is done during the
> execution of setxattr() to catch user-space-initiated capability writes.
> Subsequently, any task executing the file which has the noted kuid as
> its root uid, or which is in a descendent user_ns of such a user_ns,
> will run the file with capabilities.
>
> Similarly when asking to read file capabilities, a v3 capability will
> be presented as v2 if it applies to the caller's namespace.
>
> If a task writes a v3 security.capability, then it can provide a uid for
> the xattr so long as the uid is valid in its own user namespace, and it
> is privileged with CAP_SETFCAP over its namespace. The kernel will
> translate that rootid to an absolute uid, and write that to disk. After
> this, a task in the writer's namespace will not be able to use those
> capabilities (unless rootid was 0), but a task in a namespace where the
> given uid is root will.
>
> Only a single security.capability xattr may exist at a time for a given
> file. A task may overwrite an existing xattr so long as it is
> privileged over the inode. Note this is a departure from previous
> semantics, which required privilege to remove a security.capability
> xattr. This check can be re-added if deemed useful.
>
> This allows a simple setxattr to work, allows tar/untar to work, and
> allows us to tar in one namespace and untar in another while preserving
> the capability, without risking leaking privilege into a parent
> namespace.
>
> Example using tar:
>
> $ cp /bin/sleep sleepx
> $ mkdir b1 b2
> $ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100000:1 -m b:1:$(id -u):1 -- chown 0:0 b1
> $ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100001:1 -m b:1:$(id -u):1 -- chown 0:0 b2
> $ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100000:1000 -- tar --xattrs-include=security.capability --xattrs -cf b1/sleepx.tar sleepx
> $ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100001:1000 -- tar --xattrs-include=security.capability --xattrs -C b2 -xf b1/sleepx.tar
> $ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100001:1000 -- getcap b2/sleepx
> b2/sleepx = cap_sys_admin+ep
> # /opt/ltp/testcases/bin/getv3xattr b2/sleepx
> v3 xattr, rootid is 100001
>
> A patch to linux-test-project adding a new set of tests for this
> functionality is in the nsfscaps branch at github.com/hallyn/ltp
>
> Changelog:
> Nov 02 2016: fix invalid check at refuse_fcap_overwrite()
> Nov 07 2016: convert rootid from and to fs user_ns
> (From ebiederm: mar 28 2017)
> commoncap.c: fix typos - s/v4/v3
> get_vfs_caps_from_disk: clarify the fs_ns root access check
> nsfscaps: change the code split for cap_inode_setxattr()
> Apr 09 2017:
> don't return v3 cap for caps owned by current root.
> return a v2 cap for a true v2 cap in non-init ns
> Apr 18 2017:
> . Change the flow of fscap writing to support s_user_ns writing.
> . Remove refuse_fcap_overwrite(). The value of the previous
> xattr doesn't matter.
> Apr 24 2017:
> . incorporate Eric's incremental diff
> . move cap_convert_nscap to setxattr and simplify its usage
> May 8, 2017:
> . fix leaking dentry refcount in cap_inode_getsecurity
>
> Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> ---
> fs/xattr.c | 6 +
> include/linux/capability.h | 2 +
> include/linux/security.h | 2 +
> include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 22 +++-
> security/commoncap.c | 270 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
> 5 files changed, 280 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c
> index 7e3317c..0a9dea4 100644
> --- a/fs/xattr.c
> +++ b/fs/xattr.c
> @@ -444,6 +444,12 @@ setxattr(struct dentry *d, const char __user *name, const void __user *value,
> if ((strcmp(kname, XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS) == 0) ||
> (strcmp(kname, XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT) == 0))
> posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user(kvalue, size);
> + else if (strcmp(kname, XATTR_NAME_CAPS) == 0) {
> + error = cap_convert_nscap(d, &kvalue, size);
> + if (error < 0)
> + goto out;
> + size = error;
> + }
> }
>
> error = vfs_setxattr(d, kname, kvalue, size, flags);
> diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
> index 6ffb67e..b52e278 100644
> --- a/include/linux/capability.h
> +++ b/include/linux/capability.h
> @@ -248,4 +248,6 @@ extern bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns);
> /* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
> extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);
>
> +extern int cap_convert_nscap(struct dentry *dentry, void **ivalue, size_t size);
> +
> #endif /* !_LINUX_CAPABILITY_H */
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> index 96899fa..bd49cc1 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -86,6 +86,8 @@ extern int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
> extern int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
> extern int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
> extern int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
> +extern int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
> + void **buffer, bool alloc);
> extern int cap_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr);
> extern int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
> unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags);
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
> index 49bc062..fd4f87d 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
> @@ -60,9 +60,13 @@ typedef struct __user_cap_data_struct {
> #define VFS_CAP_U32_2 2
> #define XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2 (sizeof(__le32)*(1 + 2*VFS_CAP_U32_2))
>
> -#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2
> -#define VFS_CAP_U32 VFS_CAP_U32_2
> -#define VFS_CAP_REVISION VFS_CAP_REVISION_2
> +#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_3 0x03000000
> +#define VFS_CAP_U32_3 2
> +#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ_3 (sizeof(__le32)*(2 + 2*VFS_CAP_U32_3))
> +
> +#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ XATTR_CAPS_SZ_3
> +#define VFS_CAP_U32 VFS_CAP_U32_3
> +#define VFS_CAP_REVISION VFS_CAP_REVISION_3
>
> struct vfs_cap_data {
> __le32 magic_etc; /* Little endian */
> @@ -72,6 +76,18 @@ struct vfs_cap_data {
> } data[VFS_CAP_U32];
> };
>
> +/*
> + * same as vfs_cap_data but with a rootid at the end
> + */
> +struct vfs_ns_cap_data {
> + __le32 magic_etc;
> + struct {
> + __le32 permitted; /* Little endian */
> + __le32 inheritable; /* Little endian */
> + } data[VFS_CAP_U32];
> + __le32 rootid;
> +};
> +
> #ifndef __KERNEL__
>
> /*
> diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> index 78b3783..c28d126 100644
> --- a/security/commoncap.c
> +++ b/security/commoncap.c
> @@ -332,6 +332,209 @@ int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
> return error;
> }
>
> +static bool rootid_owns_currentns(kuid_t kroot)
> +{
> + struct user_namespace *ns;
> +
> + if (!uid_valid(kroot))
> + return false;
> +
> + for (ns = current_user_ns(); ; ns = ns->parent) {
> + if (from_kuid(ns, kroot) == 0)
> + return true;
> + if (ns == &init_user_ns)
> + break;
> + }
> +
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> +static __u32 sansflags(__u32 m)
> +{
> + return m & ~VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE;
> +}
> +
> +static bool is_v2header(size_t size, __le32 magic)
> +{
> + __u32 m = le32_to_cpu(magic);
> + if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2)
> + return false;
> + return sansflags(m) == VFS_CAP_REVISION_2;
> +}
> +
> +static bool is_v3header(size_t size, __le32 magic)
> +{
> + __u32 m = le32_to_cpu(magic);
> +
> + if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_3)
> + return false;
> + return sansflags(m) == VFS_CAP_REVISION_3;
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * getsecurity: We are called for security.* before any attempt to read the
> + * xattr from the inode itself.
> + *
> + * This gives us a chance to read the on-disk value and convert it. If we
> + * return -EOPNOTSUPP, then vfs_getxattr() will call the i_op handler.
> + *
> + * Note we are not called by vfs_getxattr_alloc(), but that is only called
> + * by the integrity subsystem, which really wants the unconverted values -
> + * so that's good.
> + */
> +int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer,
> + bool alloc)
> +{
> + int size, ret;
> + kuid_t kroot;
> + uid_t root, mappedroot;
> + char *tmpbuf = NULL;
> + struct vfs_cap_data *cap;
> + struct vfs_ns_cap_data *nscap;
> + struct dentry *dentry;
> + struct user_namespace *fs_ns;
> +
> + if (strcmp(name, "capability") != 0)
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> +
> + dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
> + if (!dentry)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + size = sizeof(struct vfs_ns_cap_data);
> + ret = (int) vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS,
> + &tmpbuf, size, GFP_NOFS);
> + dput(dentry);
> +
> + if (ret < 0)
> + return ret;
> +
> + fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns;
> + cap = (struct vfs_cap_data *) tmpbuf;
> + if (is_v2header((size_t) ret, cap->magic_etc)) {
> + /* If this is sizeof(vfs_cap_data) then we're ok with the
> + * on-disk value, so return that. */
> + if (alloc)
> + *buffer = tmpbuf;
> + else
> + kfree(tmpbuf);
> + return ret;
> + } else if (!is_v3header((size_t) ret, cap->magic_etc)) {
> + kfree(tmpbuf);
> + return -EINVAL;
> + }
> +
> + nscap = (struct vfs_ns_cap_data *) tmpbuf;
> + root = le32_to_cpu(nscap->rootid);
> + kroot = make_kuid(fs_ns, root);
> +
> + /* If the root kuid maps to a valid uid in current ns, then return
> + * this as a nscap. */
> + mappedroot = from_kuid(current_user_ns(), kroot);
> + if (mappedroot != (uid_t)-1 && mappedroot != (uid_t)0) {
> + if (alloc) {
> + *buffer = tmpbuf;
> + nscap->rootid = cpu_to_le32(mappedroot);
> + } else
> + kfree(tmpbuf);
> + return size;
> + }
> +
> + if (!rootid_owns_currentns(kroot)) {
> + kfree(tmpbuf);
> + return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> + }
> +
> + /* This comes from a parent namespace. Return as a v2 capability */
> + size = sizeof(struct vfs_cap_data);
> + if (alloc) {
> + *buffer = kmalloc(size, GFP_ATOMIC);
> + if (*buffer) {
> + struct vfs_cap_data *cap = *buffer;
> + __le32 nsmagic, magic;
> + magic = VFS_CAP_REVISION_2;
> + nsmagic = le32_to_cpu(nscap->magic_etc);
> + if (nsmagic & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE)
> + magic |= VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE;
> + memcpy(&cap->data, &nscap->data, sizeof(__le32) * 2 * VFS_CAP_U32);
> + cap->magic_etc = cpu_to_le32(magic);
> + }
> + }
> + kfree(tmpbuf);
> + return size;
> +}
> +
> +static kuid_t rootid_from_xattr(const void *value, size_t size,
> + struct user_namespace *task_ns)
> +{
> + const struct vfs_ns_cap_data *nscap = value;
> + uid_t rootid = 0;
> +
> + if (size == XATTR_CAPS_SZ_3)
> + rootid = le32_to_cpu(nscap->rootid);
> +
> + return make_kuid(task_ns, rootid);
> +}
> +
> +static bool validheader(size_t size, __le32 magic)
> +{
> + return is_v2header(size, magic) || is_v3header(size, magic);
> +}
> +
> +/*
> + * User requested a write of security.capability. If needed, update the
> + * xattr to change from v2 to v3, or to fixup the v3 rootid.
> + *
> + * If all is ok, we return the new size, on error return < 0.
> + */
> +int cap_convert_nscap(struct dentry *dentry, void **ivalue, size_t size)
> +{
> + struct vfs_ns_cap_data *nscap;
> + uid_t nsrootid;
> + const struct vfs_cap_data *cap = *ivalue;
> + __u32 magic, nsmagic;
> + struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
> + struct user_namespace *task_ns = current_user_ns(),
> + *fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns;
> + kuid_t rootid;
> + size_t newsize;
> +
> + if (!*ivalue)
> + return -EINVAL;
> + if (!validheader(size, cap->magic_etc))
> + return -EINVAL;
> + if (!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_SETFCAP))
> + return -EPERM;
> + if (size == XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2)
> + if (ns_capable(inode->i_sb->s_user_ns, CAP_SETFCAP))
> + /* user is privileged, just write the v2 */
> + return size;
> +
> + rootid = rootid_from_xattr(*ivalue, size, task_ns);
> + if (!uid_valid(rootid))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + nsrootid = from_kuid(fs_ns, rootid);
> + if (nsrootid == -1)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + newsize = sizeof(struct vfs_ns_cap_data);
> + nscap = kmalloc(newsize, GFP_ATOMIC);
> + if (!nscap)
> + return -ENOMEM;
> + nscap->rootid = cpu_to_le32(nsrootid);
> + nsmagic = VFS_CAP_REVISION_3;
> + magic = le32_to_cpu(cap->magic_etc);
> + if (magic & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE)
> + nsmagic |= VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE;
> + nscap->magic_etc = cpu_to_le32(nsmagic);
> + memcpy(&nscap->data, &cap->data, sizeof(__le32) * 2 * VFS_CAP_U32);
> +
> + kvfree(*ivalue);
> + *ivalue = nscap;
> + return newsize;
> +}
> +
> /*
> * Calculate the new process capability sets from the capability sets attached
> * to a file.
> @@ -385,7 +588,10 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data
> __u32 magic_etc;
> unsigned tocopy, i;
> int size;
> - struct vfs_cap_data caps;
> + struct vfs_ns_cap_data data, *nscaps = &data;
> + struct vfs_cap_data *caps = (struct vfs_cap_data *) &data;
> + kuid_t rootkuid;
> + struct user_namespace *fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns;
>
> memset(cpu_caps, 0, sizeof(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data));
>
> @@ -393,18 +599,20 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data
> return -ENODATA;
>
> size = __vfs_getxattr((struct dentry *)dentry, inode,
> - XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &caps, XATTR_CAPS_SZ);
> + XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &data, XATTR_CAPS_SZ);
> if (size == -ENODATA || size == -EOPNOTSUPP)
> /* no data, that's ok */
> return -ENODATA;
> +
> if (size < 0)
> return size;
>
> if (size < sizeof(magic_etc))
> return -EINVAL;
>
> - cpu_caps->magic_etc = magic_etc = le32_to_cpu(caps.magic_etc);
> + cpu_caps->magic_etc = magic_etc = le32_to_cpu(caps->magic_etc);
>
> + rootkuid = make_kuid(fs_ns, 0);
> switch (magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) {
> case VFS_CAP_REVISION_1:
> if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_1)
> @@ -416,15 +624,27 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data
> return -EINVAL;
> tocopy = VFS_CAP_U32_2;
> break;
> + case VFS_CAP_REVISION_3:
> + if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_3)
> + return -EINVAL;
> + tocopy = VFS_CAP_U32_3;
> + rootkuid = make_kuid(fs_ns, le32_to_cpu(nscaps->rootid));
> + break;
> +
> default:
> return -EINVAL;
> }
> + /* Limit the caps to the mounter of the filesystem
> + * or the more limited uid specified in the xattr.
> + */
> + if (!rootid_owns_currentns(rootkuid))
> + return -ENODATA;
>
> CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
> if (i >= tocopy)
> break;
> - cpu_caps->permitted.cap[i] = le32_to_cpu(caps.data[i].permitted);
> - cpu_caps->inheritable.cap[i] = le32_to_cpu(caps.data[i].inheritable);
> + cpu_caps->permitted.cap[i] = le32_to_cpu(caps->data[i].permitted);
> + cpu_caps->inheritable.cap[i] = le32_to_cpu(caps->data[i].inheritable);
> }
>
> cpu_caps->permitted.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK;
> @@ -462,8 +682,8 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_c
> rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps);
> if (rc < 0) {
> if (rc == -EINVAL)
> - printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: get_vfs_caps_from_disk returned %d for %s\n",
> - __func__, rc, bprm->filename);
> + printk(KERN_NOTICE "Invalid argument reading file caps for %s\n",
> + bprm->filename);
> else if (rc == -ENODATA)
> rc = 0;
> goto out;
> @@ -660,15 +880,19 @@ int cap_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
> const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
> {
> - if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
> - if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
> - return -EPERM;
> + /* Ignore non-security xattrs */
> + if (strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
> + sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) != 0)
> + return 0;
> +
> + /*
> + * For XATTR_NAME_CAPS the check will be done in
> + * cap_convert_nscap(), called by setxattr()
> + */
> + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS) == 0)
> return 0;
> - }
>
> - if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
> - sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) &&
> - !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> return -EPERM;
> return 0;
> }
> @@ -686,15 +910,22 @@ int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
> */
> int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
> {
> - if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
> - if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
> + /* Ignore non-security xattrs */
> + if (strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
> + sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) != 0)
> + return 0;
> +
> + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS) == 0) {
> + /* security.capability gets namespaced */
> + struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
> + if (!inode)
> + return -EINVAL;
> + if (!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_SETFCAP))
> return -EPERM;
> return 0;
> }
>
> - if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
> - sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) &&
> - !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> return -EPERM;
> return 0;
> }
> @@ -1082,6 +1313,7 @@ struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, cap_bprm_secureexec),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_need_killpriv, cap_inode_need_killpriv),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_killpriv, cap_inode_killpriv),
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, cap_inode_getsecurity),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, cap_mmap_addr),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, cap_mmap_file),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, cap_task_fix_setuid),
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 39+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities
2017-06-13 15:47 ` Stefan Berger
@ 2017-06-13 17:14 ` Tycho Andersen
2017-06-13 17:42 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-13 17:45 ` James Bottomley
2017-06-13 17:18 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-13 23:42 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2 siblings, 2 replies; 39+ messages in thread
From: Tycho Andersen @ 2017-06-13 17:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stefan Berger
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn, Eric W. Biederman, lkp, containers, xiaolong.ye,
LKML, Mimi Zohar
Hi Stefan,
On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 11:47:26AM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
> On 05/08/2017 02:11 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > Root in a non-initial user ns cannot be trusted to write a traditional
> > security.capability xattr. If it were allowed to do so, then any
> > unprivileged user on the host could map his own uid to root in a private
> > namespace, write the xattr, and execute the file with privilege on the
> > host.
> >
> > However supporting file capabilities in a user namespace is very
> > desirable. Not doing so means that any programs designed to run with
> > limited privilege must continue to support other methods of gaining and
> > dropping privilege. For instance a program installer must detect
> > whether file capabilities can be assigned, and assign them if so but set
> > setuid-root otherwise. The program in turn must know how to drop
> > partial capabilities, and do so only if setuid-root.
>
> Hi Serge,
>
>
> I have been looking at patch below primarily to learn how we could apply a
> similar technique to security.ima and security.evm for a namespaced IMA.
> From the paragraphs above I thought that you solved the problem of a shared
> filesystem where one now can write different security.capability xattrs by
> effectively supporting for example security.capability[uid=1000] and
> security.capability[uid=2000] written into the filesystem. Each would then
> become visible as security.capability if the userns mapping is set
> appropriately.
One disadvantage of this approach is that whoever is setting up the
container would need to go touch the security.ima attribute for each
file in the contianer, which would slow down container creation time.
For capabilities this makes sense, because you might want the file to
have different capabilities in different namespaces, but for IMA,
since the file hash will be the same in every namespace, it would be
nice to use a design that avoids touching each file on new ns
creation.
Cheers,
Tycho
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 39+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities
2017-06-13 15:47 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-13 17:14 ` Tycho Andersen
@ 2017-06-13 17:18 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-13 18:12 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-13 23:42 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2 siblings, 1 reply; 39+ messages in thread
From: Serge E. Hallyn @ 2017-06-13 17:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stefan Berger
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn, Eric W. Biederman, Masami Ichikawa, containers,
lkp, xiaolong.ye, LKML, Mimi Zohar
Quoting Stefan Berger (stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com):
> On 05/08/2017 02:11 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> >Root in a non-initial user ns cannot be trusted to write a traditional
> >security.capability xattr. If it were allowed to do so, then any
> >unprivileged user on the host could map his own uid to root in a private
> >namespace, write the xattr, and execute the file with privilege on the
> >host.
> >
> >However supporting file capabilities in a user namespace is very
> >desirable. Not doing so means that any programs designed to run with
> >limited privilege must continue to support other methods of gaining and
> >dropping privilege. For instance a program installer must detect
> >whether file capabilities can be assigned, and assign them if so but set
> >setuid-root otherwise. The program in turn must know how to drop
> >partial capabilities, and do so only if setuid-root.
>
> Hi Serge,
>
>
> I have been looking at patch below primarily to learn how we could
> apply a similar technique to security.ima and security.evm for a
> namespaced IMA. From the paragraphs above I thought that you solved
> the problem of a shared filesystem where one now can write different
> security.capability xattrs by effectively supporting for example
> security.capability[uid=1000] and security.capability[uid=2000]
> written into the filesystem. Each would then become visible as
> security.capability if the userns mapping is set appropriately.
> However, this doesn't seem to be how it is implemented. There seems
> to be only a single such entry with uid appended to it and, if it
> was a shared filesystem, the first one to set this attribute blocks
> everyone else from writing the xattr. Is that how it works? Would
Yes, that's how this works here. I'd considered allowing multiple
entries, but I didn't feel that was needed for this case. In a previous
implementation (which is probably in the lkml archives somewhere) I
supported variable length xattr so that multiple containers could
each write a value tagged with their own userns.rootid. Instead,
in the final version, if root in any parent container writes an
xattr, it will take effect in child user namespaces. Which is
sensible - the parent presumbly laid out the filesystem to create
the child container.
> that work differently with an overlay filesystem ? I think a similar
Certainly an overlay filesystem should be an easy case as the container
can have its own copy of the inode with its own xattr. Btrfs/zfs
would be nicer as the whole file wouldn't need to be copied.
> model could also work for IMA, but maybe you have some thoughts. The
> only thing I would be concerned about is blocking the parent
> container's root user from setting an xattr.
So if you have container c1 creating child container c2 on host h1,
then if c1 creates an xattr, can c2 not use that? And if h1 writes it,
can c1 and c2 use it?
If they can't, then I guess for IMA multiple xattrs would need to be
supported.
-serge
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 39+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities
2017-06-13 17:14 ` Tycho Andersen
@ 2017-06-13 17:42 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-13 20:51 ` Tycho Andersen
2017-06-13 17:45 ` James Bottomley
1 sibling, 1 reply; 39+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2017-06-13 17:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tycho Andersen
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn, Eric W. Biederman, lkp, containers, xiaolong.ye,
LKML, Mimi Zohar
On 06/13/2017 01:14 PM, Tycho Andersen wrote:
> Hi Stefan,
>
> On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 11:47:26AM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
>> On 05/08/2017 02:11 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>>> Root in a non-initial user ns cannot be trusted to write a traditional
>>> security.capability xattr. If it were allowed to do so, then any
>>> unprivileged user on the host could map his own uid to root in a private
>>> namespace, write the xattr, and execute the file with privilege on the
>>> host.
>>>
>>> However supporting file capabilities in a user namespace is very
>>> desirable. Not doing so means that any programs designed to run with
>>> limited privilege must continue to support other methods of gaining and
>>> dropping privilege. For instance a program installer must detect
>>> whether file capabilities can be assigned, and assign them if so but set
>>> setuid-root otherwise. The program in turn must know how to drop
>>> partial capabilities, and do so only if setuid-root.
>> Hi Serge,
>>
>>
>> I have been looking at patch below primarily to learn how we could apply a
>> similar technique to security.ima and security.evm for a namespaced IMA.
>> From the paragraphs above I thought that you solved the problem of a shared
>> filesystem where one now can write different security.capability xattrs by
>> effectively supporting for example security.capability[uid=1000] and
>> security.capability[uid=2000] written into the filesystem. Each would then
>> become visible as security.capability if the userns mapping is set
>> appropriately.
> One disadvantage of this approach is that whoever is setting up the
> container would need to go touch the security.ima attribute for each
> file in the contianer, which would slow down container creation time.
> For capabilities this makes sense, because you might want the file to
> have different capabilities in different namespaces, but for IMA,
> since the file hash will be the same in every namespace, it would be
> nice to use a design that avoids touching each file on new ns
> creation.
Actually IMA in appraisal mode also supports signatures in the extended
attributes. Depending on which (public) keys you put on the IMA keyring
for a namespaced IMA, you may need a different signature on a file to be
able to access it (execute it for example). For this to work containers
would have to be able to ship with security.ima xattrs embedded in them
and users should be able to apply signatures on files on a running
container (or while building it). I worked on a prototype for namespaces
IMA before where one of the issues was the CAP_SYS_ADMIN gate that
disallows setting of security.ima when dropped. So some form of
exception would have to be granted to be allowed to set security.ima
from inside a container while CAP_SYS_ADMIN isn't there. And of course
we need to protect the host's filesystem from an attack where the user
just modifies the security.ima signature associated with a file.
Stefan
> Cheers,
>
> Tycho
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 39+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities
2017-06-13 17:14 ` Tycho Andersen
2017-06-13 17:42 ` Stefan Berger
@ 2017-06-13 17:45 ` James Bottomley
2017-06-13 20:46 ` Tycho Andersen
1 sibling, 1 reply; 39+ messages in thread
From: James Bottomley @ 2017-06-13 17:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tycho Andersen, Stefan Berger
Cc: Mimi Zohar, containers, LKML, xiaolong.ye, Eric W. Biederman, lkp
On Tue, 2017-06-13 at 11:14 -0600, Tycho Andersen via Containers wrote:
> Hi Stefan,
>
> On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 11:47:26AM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
> > On 05/08/2017 02:11 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > > Root in a non-initial user ns cannot be trusted to write a
> > > traditional security.capability xattr. If it were allowed to do
> > > so, then any unprivileged user on the host could map his own uid
> > > to root in a private namespace, write the xattr, and execute the
> > > file with privilege on the host.
> > >
> > > However supporting file capabilities in a user namespace is very
> > > desirable. Not doing so means that any programs designed to run
> > > with limited privilege must continue to support other methods of
> > > gaining and dropping privilege. For instance a program installer
> > > must detect whether file capabilities can be assigned, and assign
> > > them if so but set setuid-root otherwise. The program in turn
> > > must know how to drop partial capabilities, and do so only if
> > > setuid-root.
> >
> > Hi Serge,
> >
> >
> > I have been looking at patch below primarily to learn how we
> > could apply a similar technique to security.ima and security.evm
> > for a namespaced IMA. From the paragraphs above I thought that you
> > solved the problem of a shared filesystem where one now can write
> > different security.capability xattrs by effectively supporting for
> > example security.capability[uid=1000] and
> > security.capability[uid=2000] written into the filesystem. Each
> > would then become visible as security.capability if the userns
> > mapping is set appropriately.
>
> One disadvantage of this approach is that whoever is setting up the
> container would need to go touch the security.ima attribute for each
> file in the contianer, which would slow down container creation time.
> For capabilities this makes sense, because you might want the file to
> have different capabilities in different namespaces, but for IMA,
> since the file hash will be the same in every namespace,
Actually, this isn't necessarily true: IMA may have the hash, you're
right, but I suspect in most container use cases it will have the
signature. It's definitely a use case that the container will be using
a different keyring from the host, so different signatures are surely
possible for the same underlying image file.
One might imagine doing the above via overlays, because the new
signature should override the old.
James
> it would be nice to use a design that avoids touching each file on
> new ns creation.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 39+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities
2017-06-13 17:18 ` Serge E. Hallyn
@ 2017-06-13 18:12 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-13 23:55 ` Serge E. Hallyn
0 siblings, 1 reply; 39+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2017-06-13 18:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Serge E. Hallyn
Cc: Eric W. Biederman, Masami Ichikawa, containers, lkp, xiaolong.ye,
LKML, Mimi Zohar
On 06/13/2017 01:18 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> Quoting Stefan Berger (stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com):
>> On 05/08/2017 02:11 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>>> Root in a non-initial user ns cannot be trusted to write a traditional
>>> security.capability xattr. If it were allowed to do so, then any
>>> unprivileged user on the host could map his own uid to root in a private
>>> namespace, write the xattr, and execute the file with privilege on the
>>> host.
>>>
>>> However supporting file capabilities in a user namespace is very
>>> desirable. Not doing so means that any programs designed to run with
>>> limited privilege must continue to support other methods of gaining and
>>> dropping privilege. For instance a program installer must detect
>>> whether file capabilities can be assigned, and assign them if so but set
>>> setuid-root otherwise. The program in turn must know how to drop
>>> partial capabilities, and do so only if setuid-root.
>> Hi Serge,
>>
>>
>> I have been looking at patch below primarily to learn how we could
>> apply a similar technique to security.ima and security.evm for a
>> namespaced IMA. From the paragraphs above I thought that you solved
>> the problem of a shared filesystem where one now can write different
>> security.capability xattrs by effectively supporting for example
>> security.capability[uid=1000] and security.capability[uid=2000]
>> written into the filesystem. Each would then become visible as
>> security.capability if the userns mapping is set appropriately.
>> However, this doesn't seem to be how it is implemented. There seems
>> to be only a single such entry with uid appended to it and, if it
>> was a shared filesystem, the first one to set this attribute blocks
>> everyone else from writing the xattr. Is that how it works? Would
> Yes, that's how this works here. I'd considered allowing multiple
> entries, but I didn't feel that was needed for this case. In a previous
> implementation (which is probably in the lkml archives somewhere) I
> supported variable length xattr so that multiple containers could
> each write a value tagged with their own userns.rootid. Instead,
> in the final version, if root in any parent container writes an
> xattr, it will take effect in child user namespaces. Which is
> sensible - the parent presumbly laid out the filesystem to create
> the child container.
>
>> that work differently with an overlay filesystem ? I think a similar
> Certainly an overlay filesystem should be an easy case as the container
> can have its own copy of the inode with its own xattr. Btrfs/zfs
> would be nicer as the whole file wouldn't need to be copied.
>
>> model could also work for IMA, but maybe you have some thoughts. The
>> only thing I would be concerned about is blocking the parent
>> container's root user from setting an xattr.
> So if you have container c1 creating child container c2 on host h1,
> then if c1 creates an xattr, can c2 not use that? And if h1 writes it,
> can c1 and c2 use it?
In the case of IMA appraisal the extended attribute security.ima would
be a signature. For c1 and c2 to use that file they would all have to
have the same key on their (isolated IMA namespace ) keyring. I think
this type of setup could be arranged.
Following your attack description in the introduction I would say that
we would want to prevent malicious modification of a security.ima
extended attribute:
"Root in a non-initial user ns cannot be trusted to write a traditional security.ima xattr. If it were allowed to do so, then any unprivileged user on the host could map his own uid to root in a private namespace, write the signature in the security.ima xattr, and prevent the file from being accessible on the host."
>
> If they can't, then I guess for IMA multiple xattrs would need to be
> supported.
I am not sure about that. I suppose any extended attribute modifications
would have to be designed for the case where a shared filesystem is used
that also shares the extended attributes, not assuming an overlay
filesystem that automatically isolates the extend attributes. With the
shared filesystem I'd like to prevent any type of setting of extended
attributes by a child container or more generally anyone mounting it as
a '2nd consumer', which would make it a shared filesystem. Only the
process that mounts a filesystem as the '1st consumer' would be able to
set the extended attributes. I am assuming that using an overlay fs
would always make you the '1st consumer' -- I would hope that these
conditions could be detected. And probably the process should also write
along its host uid as part of writing out the xattr. If all extended
attributes were to support this model, maybe the 'uid' could be
associated with the 'name' of the xattr rather than its 'value' (not
sure whether that's possible).
Stefan
>
> -serge
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 39+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities
2017-06-13 17:45 ` James Bottomley
@ 2017-06-13 20:46 ` Tycho Andersen
2017-06-13 20:49 ` Stefan Berger
0 siblings, 1 reply; 39+ messages in thread
From: Tycho Andersen @ 2017-06-13 20:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: James Bottomley
Cc: Stefan Berger, Mimi Zohar, containers, LKML, xiaolong.ye,
Eric W. Biederman, lkp
On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 10:45:02AM -0700, James Bottomley wrote:
> On Tue, 2017-06-13 at 11:14 -0600, Tycho Andersen via Containers wrote:
> > Hi Stefan,
> >
> > On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 11:47:26AM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
> > > On 05/08/2017 02:11 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > > > Root in a non-initial user ns cannot be trusted to write a
> > > > traditional security.capability xattr. If it were allowed to do
> > > > so, then any unprivileged user on the host could map his own uid
> > > > to root in a private namespace, write the xattr, and execute the
> > > > file with privilege on the host.
> > > >
> > > > However supporting file capabilities in a user namespace is very
> > > > desirable. Not doing so means that any programs designed to run
> > > > with limited privilege must continue to support other methods of
> > > > gaining and dropping privilege. For instance a program installer
> > > > must detect whether file capabilities can be assigned, and assign
> > > > them if so but set setuid-root otherwise. The program in turn
> > > > must know how to drop partial capabilities, and do so only if
> > > > setuid-root.
> > >
> > > Hi Serge,
> > >
> > >
> > > I have been looking at patch below primarily to learn how we
> > > could apply a similar technique to security.ima and security.evm
> > > for a namespaced IMA. From the paragraphs above I thought that you
> > > solved the problem of a shared filesystem where one now can write
> > > different security.capability xattrs by effectively supporting for
> > > example security.capability[uid=1000] and
> > > security.capability[uid=2000] written into the filesystem. Each
> > > would then become visible as security.capability if the userns
> > > mapping is set appropriately.
> >
> > One disadvantage of this approach is that whoever is setting up the
> > container would need to go touch the security.ima attribute for each
> > file in the contianer, which would slow down container creation time.
> > For capabilities this makes sense, because you might want the file to
> > have different capabilities in different namespaces, but for IMA,
> > since the file hash will be the same in every namespace,
>
> Actually, this isn't necessarily true: IMA may have the hash, you're
> right, but I suspect in most container use cases it will have the
> signature. It's definitely a use case that the container will be using
> a different keyring from the host, so different signatures are surely
> possible for the same underlying image file.
>
> One might imagine doing the above via overlays, because the new
> signature should override the old.
Yes, good point, thanks. Assuming the container and the host are using
the same keyring, we could design it in such a way that the container
engine doesn't need to touch every file on creation, which would be
very nice.
Tycho
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 39+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities
2017-06-13 20:46 ` Tycho Andersen
@ 2017-06-13 20:49 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-13 20:53 ` Tycho Andersen
0 siblings, 1 reply; 39+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2017-06-13 20:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tycho Andersen, James Bottomley
Cc: Mimi Zohar, containers, LKML, xiaolong.ye, Eric W. Biederman, lkp
On 06/13/2017 04:46 PM, Tycho Andersen wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 10:45:02AM -0700, James Bottomley wrote:
>> On Tue, 2017-06-13 at 11:14 -0600, Tycho Andersen via Containers wrote:
>>> Hi Stefan,
>>>
>>> On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 11:47:26AM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
>>>> On 05/08/2017 02:11 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>>>>> Root in a non-initial user ns cannot be trusted to write a
>>>>> traditional security.capability xattr. If it were allowed to do
>>>>> so, then any unprivileged user on the host could map his own uid
>>>>> to root in a private namespace, write the xattr, and execute the
>>>>> file with privilege on the host.
>>>>>
>>>>> However supporting file capabilities in a user namespace is very
>>>>> desirable. Not doing so means that any programs designed to run
>>>>> with limited privilege must continue to support other methods of
>>>>> gaining and dropping privilege. For instance a program installer
>>>>> must detect whether file capabilities can be assigned, and assign
>>>>> them if so but set setuid-root otherwise. The program in turn
>>>>> must know how to drop partial capabilities, and do so only if
>>>>> setuid-root.
>>>> Hi Serge,
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I have been looking at patch below primarily to learn how we
>>>> could apply a similar technique to security.ima and security.evm
>>>> for a namespaced IMA. From the paragraphs above I thought that you
>>>> solved the problem of a shared filesystem where one now can write
>>>> different security.capability xattrs by effectively supporting for
>>>> example security.capability[uid=1000] and
>>>> security.capability[uid=2000] written into the filesystem. Each
>>>> would then become visible as security.capability if the userns
>>>> mapping is set appropriately.
>>> One disadvantage of this approach is that whoever is setting up the
>>> container would need to go touch the security.ima attribute for each
>>> file in the contianer, which would slow down container creation time.
>>> For capabilities this makes sense, because you might want the file to
>>> have different capabilities in different namespaces, but for IMA,
>>> since the file hash will be the same in every namespace,
>> Actually, this isn't necessarily true: IMA may have the hash, you're
>> right, but I suspect in most container use cases it will have the
>> signature. It's definitely a use case that the container will be using
>> a different keyring from the host, so different signatures are surely
>> possible for the same underlying image file.
>>
>> One might imagine doing the above via overlays, because the new
>> signature should override the old.
> Yes, good point, thanks. Assuming the container and the host are using
> the same keyring, we could design it in such a way that the container
> engine doesn't need to touch every file on creation, which would be
> very nice.
I don't think this will be the general case. The host may be Ubuntu, the
guest could be Fedora and you'll have different keys. I don't think you
would want the container keys on the host keyring.
Stefan
>
> Tycho
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 39+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities
2017-06-13 17:42 ` Stefan Berger
@ 2017-06-13 20:51 ` Tycho Andersen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 39+ messages in thread
From: Tycho Andersen @ 2017-06-13 20:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stefan Berger
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn, Eric W. Biederman, lkp, containers, xiaolong.ye,
LKML, Mimi Zohar
On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 01:42:24PM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
> On 06/13/2017 01:14 PM, Tycho Andersen wrote:
> > Hi Stefan,
> >
> > On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 11:47:26AM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
> > > On 05/08/2017 02:11 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > > > Root in a non-initial user ns cannot be trusted to write a traditional
> > > > security.capability xattr. If it were allowed to do so, then any
> > > > unprivileged user on the host could map his own uid to root in a private
> > > > namespace, write the xattr, and execute the file with privilege on the
> > > > host.
> > > >
> > > > However supporting file capabilities in a user namespace is very
> > > > desirable. Not doing so means that any programs designed to run with
> > > > limited privilege must continue to support other methods of gaining and
> > > > dropping privilege. For instance a program installer must detect
> > > > whether file capabilities can be assigned, and assign them if so but set
> > > > setuid-root otherwise. The program in turn must know how to drop
> > > > partial capabilities, and do so only if setuid-root.
> > > Hi Serge,
> > >
> > >
> > > I have been looking at patch below primarily to learn how we could apply a
> > > similar technique to security.ima and security.evm for a namespaced IMA.
> > > From the paragraphs above I thought that you solved the problem of a shared
> > > filesystem where one now can write different security.capability xattrs by
> > > effectively supporting for example security.capability[uid=1000] and
> > > security.capability[uid=2000] written into the filesystem. Each would then
> > > become visible as security.capability if the userns mapping is set
> > > appropriately.
> > One disadvantage of this approach is that whoever is setting up the
> > container would need to go touch the security.ima attribute for each
> > file in the contianer, which would slow down container creation time.
> > For capabilities this makes sense, because you might want the file to
> > have different capabilities in different namespaces, but for IMA,
> > since the file hash will be the same in every namespace, it would be
> > nice to use a design that avoids touching each file on new ns
> > creation.
>
> Actually IMA in appraisal mode also supports signatures in the extended
> attributes. Depending on which (public) keys you put on the IMA keyring for
> a namespaced IMA, you may need a different signature on a file to be able to
> access it (execute it for example). For this to work containers would have
> to be able to ship with security.ima xattrs embedded in them and users
> should be able to apply signatures on files on a running container (or while
> building it).
Yes, we will definitely support shipping images with the security.ima
xattrs set when namespaced support is available in the kernel.
> I worked on a prototype for namespaces IMA before where one of
> the issues was the CAP_SYS_ADMIN gate that disallows setting of security.ima
> when dropped. So some form of exception would have to be granted to be
> allowed to set security.ima from inside a container while CAP_SYS_ADMIN
> isn't there. And of course we need to protect the host's filesystem from an
> attack where the user just modifies the security.ima signature associated
> with a file.
At least initially, I think it would be fine to require
capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN); right now the container engine is the one
responsible for setting up the container's rootfs (via downloading an
image and extracting it), and these typically run as root.
Eventually it would be great to relax this, because
"unprivileged/rootless" containers are a thing people are interested
in, but as a first cut I'm not sure it's necessary.
Cheers, and thanks for looking at this!
Tycho
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 39+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities
2017-06-13 20:49 ` Stefan Berger
@ 2017-06-13 20:53 ` Tycho Andersen
2017-06-13 20:58 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-13 20:59 ` Mimi Zohar
0 siblings, 2 replies; 39+ messages in thread
From: Tycho Andersen @ 2017-06-13 20:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stefan Berger
Cc: James Bottomley, Mimi Zohar, containers, LKML, xiaolong.ye,
Eric W. Biederman, lkp
On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 04:49:03PM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
> On 06/13/2017 04:46 PM, Tycho Andersen wrote:
> > On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 10:45:02AM -0700, James Bottomley wrote:
> > > On Tue, 2017-06-13 at 11:14 -0600, Tycho Andersen via Containers wrote:
> > > > Hi Stefan,
> > > >
> > > > On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 11:47:26AM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
> > > > > On 05/08/2017 02:11 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > > > > > Root in a non-initial user ns cannot be trusted to write a
> > > > > > traditional security.capability xattr. If it were allowed to do
> > > > > > so, then any unprivileged user on the host could map his own uid
> > > > > > to root in a private namespace, write the xattr, and execute the
> > > > > > file with privilege on the host.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > However supporting file capabilities in a user namespace is very
> > > > > > desirable. Not doing so means that any programs designed to run
> > > > > > with limited privilege must continue to support other methods of
> > > > > > gaining and dropping privilege. For instance a program installer
> > > > > > must detect whether file capabilities can be assigned, and assign
> > > > > > them if so but set setuid-root otherwise. The program in turn
> > > > > > must know how to drop partial capabilities, and do so only if
> > > > > > setuid-root.
> > > > > Hi Serge,
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > I have been looking at patch below primarily to learn how we
> > > > > could apply a similar technique to security.ima and security.evm
> > > > > for a namespaced IMA. From the paragraphs above I thought that you
> > > > > solved the problem of a shared filesystem where one now can write
> > > > > different security.capability xattrs by effectively supporting for
> > > > > example security.capability[uid=1000] and
> > > > > security.capability[uid=2000] written into the filesystem. Each
> > > > > would then become visible as security.capability if the userns
> > > > > mapping is set appropriately.
> > > > One disadvantage of this approach is that whoever is setting up the
> > > > container would need to go touch the security.ima attribute for each
> > > > file in the contianer, which would slow down container creation time.
> > > > For capabilities this makes sense, because you might want the file to
> > > > have different capabilities in different namespaces, but for IMA,
> > > > since the file hash will be the same in every namespace,
> > > Actually, this isn't necessarily true: IMA may have the hash, you're
> > > right, but I suspect in most container use cases it will have the
> > > signature. It's definitely a use case that the container will be using
> > > a different keyring from the host, so different signatures are surely
> > > possible for the same underlying image file.
> > >
> > > One might imagine doing the above via overlays, because the new
> > > signature should override the old.
> > Yes, good point, thanks. Assuming the container and the host are using
> > the same keyring, we could design it in such a way that the container
> > engine doesn't need to touch every file on creation, which would be
> > very nice.
>
> I don't think this will be the general case. The host may be Ubuntu, the
> guest could be Fedora and you'll have different keys. I don't think you
> would want the container keys on the host keyring.
I guess it depends: if your entire infrastructure needs to be signed
by your ops team, it would (presumably) all be the same ops key. If
you're running off the shelf stuff from the distros or from a vendor,
probably not, I agree.
Cheers,
Tycho
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 39+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities
2017-06-13 20:53 ` Tycho Andersen
@ 2017-06-13 20:58 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-13 20:59 ` Mimi Zohar
1 sibling, 0 replies; 39+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2017-06-13 20:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tycho Andersen
Cc: James Bottomley, Mimi Zohar, containers, LKML, xiaolong.ye,
Eric W. Biederman, lkp
On 06/13/2017 04:53 PM, Tycho Andersen wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 04:49:03PM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
>> On 06/13/2017 04:46 PM, Tycho Andersen wrote:
>>> On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 10:45:02AM -0700, James Bottomley wrote:
>>>> On Tue, 2017-06-13 at 11:14 -0600, Tycho Andersen via Containers wrote:
>>>>> Hi Stefan,
>>>>>
>>>>> On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 11:47:26AM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
>>>>>> On 05/08/2017 02:11 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>>>>>>> Root in a non-initial user ns cannot be trusted to write a
>>>>>>> traditional security.capability xattr. If it were allowed to do
>>>>>>> so, then any unprivileged user on the host could map his own uid
>>>>>>> to root in a private namespace, write the xattr, and execute the
>>>>>>> file with privilege on the host.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> However supporting file capabilities in a user namespace is very
>>>>>>> desirable. Not doing so means that any programs designed to run
>>>>>>> with limited privilege must continue to support other methods of
>>>>>>> gaining and dropping privilege. For instance a program installer
>>>>>>> must detect whether file capabilities can be assigned, and assign
>>>>>>> them if so but set setuid-root otherwise. The program in turn
>>>>>>> must know how to drop partial capabilities, and do so only if
>>>>>>> setuid-root.
>>>>>> Hi Serge,
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I have been looking at patch below primarily to learn how we
>>>>>> could apply a similar technique to security.ima and security.evm
>>>>>> for a namespaced IMA. From the paragraphs above I thought that you
>>>>>> solved the problem of a shared filesystem where one now can write
>>>>>> different security.capability xattrs by effectively supporting for
>>>>>> example security.capability[uid=1000] and
>>>>>> security.capability[uid=2000] written into the filesystem. Each
>>>>>> would then become visible as security.capability if the userns
>>>>>> mapping is set appropriately.
>>>>> One disadvantage of this approach is that whoever is setting up the
>>>>> container would need to go touch the security.ima attribute for each
>>>>> file in the contianer, which would slow down container creation time.
>>>>> For capabilities this makes sense, because you might want the file to
>>>>> have different capabilities in different namespaces, but for IMA,
>>>>> since the file hash will be the same in every namespace,
>>>> Actually, this isn't necessarily true: IMA may have the hash, you're
>>>> right, but I suspect in most container use cases it will have the
>>>> signature. It's definitely a use case that the container will be using
>>>> a different keyring from the host, so different signatures are surely
>>>> possible for the same underlying image file.
>>>>
>>>> One might imagine doing the above via overlays, because the new
>>>> signature should override the old.
>>> Yes, good point, thanks. Assuming the container and the host are using
>>> the same keyring, we could design it in such a way that the container
>>> engine doesn't need to touch every file on creation, which would be
>>> very nice.
>> I don't think this will be the general case. The host may be Ubuntu, the
>> guest could be Fedora and you'll have different keys. I don't think you
>> would want the container keys on the host keyring.
> I guess it depends: if your entire infrastructure needs to be signed
> by your ops team, it would (presumably) all be the same ops key. If
> you're running off the shelf stuff from the distros or from a vendor,
> probably not, I agree.
I think this will largely depend on how IMA works with namespaces. In
the prototype I mention we had each container have its own _ima keyring
and the public keys were inside the container at the typical location
(for physical machines) and the mgmt. stack (docker) basically emulating
what the initramfs scripts are doing, which is loading all keys from
/etc/keys/ima into that keyring.
Stefan
> Cheers,
>
> Tycho
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 39+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities
2017-06-13 20:53 ` Tycho Andersen
2017-06-13 20:58 ` Stefan Berger
@ 2017-06-13 20:59 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-06-13 21:09 ` Tycho Andersen
1 sibling, 1 reply; 39+ messages in thread
From: Mimi Zohar @ 2017-06-13 20:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tycho Andersen, Stefan Berger
Cc: James Bottomley, containers, LKML, xiaolong.ye, Eric W. Biederman, lkp
On Tue, 2017-06-13 at 14:53 -0600, Tycho Andersen wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 04:49:03PM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
> > On 06/13/2017 04:46 PM, Tycho Andersen wrote:
> > > On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 10:45:02AM -0700, James Bottomley wrote:
> > > > On Tue, 2017-06-13 at 11:14 -0600, Tycho Andersen via Containers wrote:
> > > > > Hi Stefan,
> > > > >
> > > > > On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 11:47:26AM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
> > > > > > On 05/08/2017 02:11 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > > > > > > Root in a non-initial user ns cannot be trusted to write a
> > > > > > > traditional security.capability xattr. If it were allowed to do
> > > > > > > so, then any unprivileged user on the host could map his own uid
> > > > > > > to root in a private namespace, write the xattr, and execute the
> > > > > > > file with privilege on the host.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > However supporting file capabilities in a user namespace is very
> > > > > > > desirable. Not doing so means that any programs designed to run
> > > > > > > with limited privilege must continue to support other methods of
> > > > > > > gaining and dropping privilege. For instance a program installer
> > > > > > > must detect whether file capabilities can be assigned, and assign
> > > > > > > them if so but set setuid-root otherwise. The program in turn
> > > > > > > must know how to drop partial capabilities, and do so only if
> > > > > > > setuid-root.
> > > > > > Hi Serge,
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I have been looking at patch below primarily to learn how we
> > > > > > could apply a similar technique to security.ima and security.evm
> > > > > > for a namespaced IMA. From the paragraphs above I thought that you
> > > > > > solved the problem of a shared filesystem where one now can write
> > > > > > different security.capability xattrs by effectively supporting for
> > > > > > example security.capability[uid=1000] and
> > > > > > security.capability[uid=2000] written into the filesystem. Each
> > > > > > would then become visible as security.capability if the userns
> > > > > > mapping is set appropriately.
> > > > > One disadvantage of this approach is that whoever is setting up the
> > > > > container would need to go touch the security.ima attribute for each
> > > > > file in the contianer, which would slow down container creation time.
> > > > > For capabilities this makes sense, because you might want the file to
> > > > > have different capabilities in different namespaces, but for IMA,
> > > > > since the file hash will be the same in every namespace,
> > > > Actually, this isn't necessarily true: IMA may have the hash, you're
> > > > right, but I suspect in most container use cases it will have the
> > > > signature. It's definitely a use case that the container will be using
> > > > a different keyring from the host, so different signatures are surely
> > > > possible for the same underlying image file.
> > > >
> > > > One might imagine doing the above via overlays, because the new
> > > > signature should override the old.
> > > Yes, good point, thanks. Assuming the container and the host are using
> > > the same keyring, we could design it in such a way that the container
> > > engine doesn't need to touch every file on creation, which would be
> > > very nice.
> >
> > I don't think this will be the general case. The host may be Ubuntu, the
> > guest could be Fedora and you'll have different keys. I don't think you
> > would want the container keys on the host keyring.
>
> I guess it depends: if your entire infrastructure needs to be signed
> by your ops team, it would (presumably) all be the same ops key. If
> you're running off the shelf stuff from the distros or from a vendor,
> probably not, I agree.
Assuming you want to support container specific executables, you would
want them specifically signed by a key not on the system IMA keyring.
Mimi
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 39+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities
2017-06-13 20:59 ` Mimi Zohar
@ 2017-06-13 21:09 ` Tycho Andersen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 39+ messages in thread
From: Tycho Andersen @ 2017-06-13 21:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mimi Zohar
Cc: Stefan Berger, James Bottomley, containers, LKML, xiaolong.ye,
Eric W. Biederman, lkp
On Tue, Jun 13, 2017 at 04:59:30PM -0400, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> Assuming you want to support container specific executables, you would
> want them specifically signed by a key not on the system IMA keyring.
Yes, this is a good point.
Cheers,
Tycho
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 39+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities
2017-06-13 15:47 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-13 17:14 ` Tycho Andersen
2017-06-13 17:18 ` Serge E. Hallyn
@ 2017-06-13 23:42 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-13 23:50 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2 siblings, 1 reply; 39+ messages in thread
From: Serge E. Hallyn @ 2017-06-13 23:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stefan Berger
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn, Eric W. Biederman, Masami Ichikawa, containers,
lkp, xiaolong.ye, LKML, Mimi Zohar
Quoting Stefan Berger (stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com):
> On 05/08/2017 02:11 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> >Root in a non-initial user ns cannot be trusted to write a traditional
> >security.capability xattr. If it were allowed to do so, then any
> >unprivileged user on the host could map his own uid to root in a private
> >namespace, write the xattr, and execute the file with privilege on the
> >host.
> >
> >However supporting file capabilities in a user namespace is very
> >desirable. Not doing so means that any programs designed to run with
> >limited privilege must continue to support other methods of gaining and
> >dropping privilege. For instance a program installer must detect
> >whether file capabilities can be assigned, and assign them if so but set
> >setuid-root otherwise. The program in turn must know how to drop
> >partial capabilities, and do so only if setuid-root.
>
> Hi Serge,
>
>
> I have been looking at patch below primarily to learn how we could
> apply a similar technique to security.ima and security.evm for a
> namespaced IMA. From the paragraphs above I thought that you solved
> the problem of a shared filesystem where one now can write different
> security.capability xattrs by effectively supporting for example
> security.capability[uid=1000] and security.capability[uid=2000]
Interesting idea. Worth considering.
> written into the filesystem. Each would then become visible as
> security.capability if the userns mapping is set appropriately.
> However, this doesn't seem to be how it is implemented. There seems
Indeed, when I was considering supporting multiple simulatenous
xattrs, I did it as something like:
struct vfs_ns_cap_data {
struct {
__le32 permitted;
__le32 inheritable;
} data[VFS_CAP_U32];
__le32 rootid;
};
struct vfs_ns_cap {
__le32 magic_etc;
__le32 n_entries;
struct ns_cap_data data[0];
}; // followed by n_entries of struct ns_cap_data
You're instead suggesting encoding the rootuid in the name,
which is interesting.
> to be only a single such entry with uid appended to it and, if it
> was a shared filesystem, the first one to set this attribute blocks
> everyone else from writing the xattr. Is that how it works? Would
Approximately - indeed there is only a single xattr. But it can be
overwritten, so long as the writer has CAP_SETFCAP over the user_ns
which mounted the filesystem.
> that work differently with an overlay filesystem ? I think a similar
> model could also work for IMA, but maybe you have some thoughts. The
> only thing I would be concerned about is blocking the parent
> container's root user from setting an xattr.
>
> Regards,
> Stefan
>
>
> >
> >This patch introduces v3 of the security.capability xattr. It builds a
> >vfs_ns_cap_data struct by appending a uid_t rootid to struct
> >vfs_cap_data. This is the absolute uid_t (that is, the uid_t in user
> >namespace which mounted the filesystem, usually init_user_ns) of the
> >root id in whose namespaces the file capabilities may take effect.
> >
> >When a task asks to write a v2 security.capability xattr, if it is
> >privileged with respect to the userns which mounted the filesystem, then
> >nothing should change. Otherwise, the kernel will transparently rewrite
> >the xattr as a v3 with the appropriate rootid. This is done during the
> >execution of setxattr() to catch user-space-initiated capability writes.
> >Subsequently, any task executing the file which has the noted kuid as
> >its root uid, or which is in a descendent user_ns of such a user_ns,
> >will run the file with capabilities.
> >
> >Similarly when asking to read file capabilities, a v3 capability will
> >be presented as v2 if it applies to the caller's namespace.
> >
> >If a task writes a v3 security.capability, then it can provide a uid for
> >the xattr so long as the uid is valid in its own user namespace, and it
> >is privileged with CAP_SETFCAP over its namespace. The kernel will
> >translate that rootid to an absolute uid, and write that to disk. After
> >this, a task in the writer's namespace will not be able to use those
> >capabilities (unless rootid was 0), but a task in a namespace where the
> >given uid is root will.
> >
> >Only a single security.capability xattr may exist at a time for a given
> >file. A task may overwrite an existing xattr so long as it is
> >privileged over the inode. Note this is a departure from previous
> >semantics, which required privilege to remove a security.capability
> >xattr. This check can be re-added if deemed useful.
> >
> >This allows a simple setxattr to work, allows tar/untar to work, and
> >allows us to tar in one namespace and untar in another while preserving
> >the capability, without risking leaking privilege into a parent
> >namespace.
> >
> >Example using tar:
> >
> > $ cp /bin/sleep sleepx
> > $ mkdir b1 b2
> > $ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100000:1 -m b:1:$(id -u):1 -- chown 0:0 b1
> > $ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100001:1 -m b:1:$(id -u):1 -- chown 0:0 b2
> > $ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100000:1000 -- tar --xattrs-include=security.capability --xattrs -cf b1/sleepx.tar sleepx
> > $ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100001:1000 -- tar --xattrs-include=security.capability --xattrs -C b2 -xf b1/sleepx.tar
> > $ lxc-usernsexec -m b:0:100001:1000 -- getcap b2/sleepx
> > b2/sleepx = cap_sys_admin+ep
> > # /opt/ltp/testcases/bin/getv3xattr b2/sleepx
> > v3 xattr, rootid is 100001
> >
> >A patch to linux-test-project adding a new set of tests for this
> >functionality is in the nsfscaps branch at github.com/hallyn/ltp
> >
> >Changelog:
> > Nov 02 2016: fix invalid check at refuse_fcap_overwrite()
> > Nov 07 2016: convert rootid from and to fs user_ns
> > (From ebiederm: mar 28 2017)
> > commoncap.c: fix typos - s/v4/v3
> > get_vfs_caps_from_disk: clarify the fs_ns root access check
> > nsfscaps: change the code split for cap_inode_setxattr()
> > Apr 09 2017:
> > don't return v3 cap for caps owned by current root.
> > return a v2 cap for a true v2 cap in non-init ns
> > Apr 18 2017:
> > . Change the flow of fscap writing to support s_user_ns writing.
> > . Remove refuse_fcap_overwrite(). The value of the previous
> > xattr doesn't matter.
> > Apr 24 2017:
> > . incorporate Eric's incremental diff
> > . move cap_convert_nscap to setxattr and simplify its usage
> > May 8, 2017:
> > . fix leaking dentry refcount in cap_inode_getsecurity
> >
> >Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
> >---
> > fs/xattr.c | 6 +
> > include/linux/capability.h | 2 +
> > include/linux/security.h | 2 +
> > include/uapi/linux/capability.h | 22 +++-
> > security/commoncap.c | 270 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
> > 5 files changed, 280 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
> >
> >diff --git a/fs/xattr.c b/fs/xattr.c
> >index 7e3317c..0a9dea4 100644
> >--- a/fs/xattr.c
> >+++ b/fs/xattr.c
> >@@ -444,6 +444,12 @@ setxattr(struct dentry *d, const char __user *name, const void __user *value,
> > if ((strcmp(kname, XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_ACCESS) == 0) ||
> > (strcmp(kname, XATTR_NAME_POSIX_ACL_DEFAULT) == 0))
> > posix_acl_fix_xattr_from_user(kvalue, size);
> >+ else if (strcmp(kname, XATTR_NAME_CAPS) == 0) {
> >+ error = cap_convert_nscap(d, &kvalue, size);
> >+ if (error < 0)
> >+ goto out;
> >+ size = error;
> >+ }
> > }
> >
> > error = vfs_setxattr(d, kname, kvalue, size, flags);
> >diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
> >index 6ffb67e..b52e278 100644
> >--- a/include/linux/capability.h
> >+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
> >@@ -248,4 +248,6 @@ extern bool ptracer_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, struct user_namespace *ns);
> > /* audit system wants to get cap info from files as well */
> > extern int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *cpu_caps);
> >
> >+extern int cap_convert_nscap(struct dentry *dentry, void **ivalue, size_t size);
> >+
> > #endif /* !_LINUX_CAPABILITY_H */
> >diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
> >index 96899fa..bd49cc1 100644
> >--- a/include/linux/security.h
> >+++ b/include/linux/security.h
> >@@ -86,6 +86,8 @@ extern int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
> > extern int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name);
> > extern int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
> > extern int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry);
> >+extern int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
> >+ void **buffer, bool alloc);
> > extern int cap_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr);
> > extern int cap_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
> > unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags);
> >diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
> >index 49bc062..fd4f87d 100644
> >--- a/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
> >+++ b/include/uapi/linux/capability.h
> >@@ -60,9 +60,13 @@ typedef struct __user_cap_data_struct {
> > #define VFS_CAP_U32_2 2
> > #define XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2 (sizeof(__le32)*(1 + 2*VFS_CAP_U32_2))
> >
> >-#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2
> >-#define VFS_CAP_U32 VFS_CAP_U32_2
> >-#define VFS_CAP_REVISION VFS_CAP_REVISION_2
> >+#define VFS_CAP_REVISION_3 0x03000000
> >+#define VFS_CAP_U32_3 2
> >+#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ_3 (sizeof(__le32)*(2 + 2*VFS_CAP_U32_3))
> >+
> >+#define XATTR_CAPS_SZ XATTR_CAPS_SZ_3
> >+#define VFS_CAP_U32 VFS_CAP_U32_3
> >+#define VFS_CAP_REVISION VFS_CAP_REVISION_3
> >
> > struct vfs_cap_data {
> > __le32 magic_etc; /* Little endian */
> >@@ -72,6 +76,18 @@ struct vfs_cap_data {
> > } data[VFS_CAP_U32];
> > };
> >
> >+/*
> >+ * same as vfs_cap_data but with a rootid at the end
> >+ */
> >+struct vfs_ns_cap_data {
> >+ __le32 magic_etc;
> >+ struct {
> >+ __le32 permitted; /* Little endian */
> >+ __le32 inheritable; /* Little endian */
> >+ } data[VFS_CAP_U32];
> >+ __le32 rootid;
> >+};
> >+
> > #ifndef __KERNEL__
> >
> > /*
> >diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
> >index 78b3783..c28d126 100644
> >--- a/security/commoncap.c
> >+++ b/security/commoncap.c
> >@@ -332,6 +332,209 @@ int cap_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
> > return error;
> > }
> >
> >+static bool rootid_owns_currentns(kuid_t kroot)
> >+{
> >+ struct user_namespace *ns;
> >+
> >+ if (!uid_valid(kroot))
> >+ return false;
> >+
> >+ for (ns = current_user_ns(); ; ns = ns->parent) {
> >+ if (from_kuid(ns, kroot) == 0)
> >+ return true;
> >+ if (ns == &init_user_ns)
> >+ break;
> >+ }
> >+
> >+ return false;
> >+}
> >+
> >+static __u32 sansflags(__u32 m)
> >+{
> >+ return m & ~VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE;
> >+}
> >+
> >+static bool is_v2header(size_t size, __le32 magic)
> >+{
> >+ __u32 m = le32_to_cpu(magic);
> >+ if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2)
> >+ return false;
> >+ return sansflags(m) == VFS_CAP_REVISION_2;
> >+}
> >+
> >+static bool is_v3header(size_t size, __le32 magic)
> >+{
> >+ __u32 m = le32_to_cpu(magic);
> >+
> >+ if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_3)
> >+ return false;
> >+ return sansflags(m) == VFS_CAP_REVISION_3;
> >+}
> >+
> >+/*
> >+ * getsecurity: We are called for security.* before any attempt to read the
> >+ * xattr from the inode itself.
> >+ *
> >+ * This gives us a chance to read the on-disk value and convert it. If we
> >+ * return -EOPNOTSUPP, then vfs_getxattr() will call the i_op handler.
> >+ *
> >+ * Note we are not called by vfs_getxattr_alloc(), but that is only called
> >+ * by the integrity subsystem, which really wants the unconverted values -
> >+ * so that's good.
> >+ */
> >+int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer,
> >+ bool alloc)
> >+{
> >+ int size, ret;
> >+ kuid_t kroot;
> >+ uid_t root, mappedroot;
> >+ char *tmpbuf = NULL;
> >+ struct vfs_cap_data *cap;
> >+ struct vfs_ns_cap_data *nscap;
> >+ struct dentry *dentry;
> >+ struct user_namespace *fs_ns;
> >+
> >+ if (strcmp(name, "capability") != 0)
> >+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> >+
> >+ dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
> >+ if (!dentry)
> >+ return -EINVAL;
> >+
> >+ size = sizeof(struct vfs_ns_cap_data);
> >+ ret = (int) vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_CAPS,
> >+ &tmpbuf, size, GFP_NOFS);
> >+ dput(dentry);
> >+
> >+ if (ret < 0)
> >+ return ret;
> >+
> >+ fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns;
> >+ cap = (struct vfs_cap_data *) tmpbuf;
> >+ if (is_v2header((size_t) ret, cap->magic_etc)) {
> >+ /* If this is sizeof(vfs_cap_data) then we're ok with the
> >+ * on-disk value, so return that. */
> >+ if (alloc)
> >+ *buffer = tmpbuf;
> >+ else
> >+ kfree(tmpbuf);
> >+ return ret;
> >+ } else if (!is_v3header((size_t) ret, cap->magic_etc)) {
> >+ kfree(tmpbuf);
> >+ return -EINVAL;
> >+ }
> >+
> >+ nscap = (struct vfs_ns_cap_data *) tmpbuf;
> >+ root = le32_to_cpu(nscap->rootid);
> >+ kroot = make_kuid(fs_ns, root);
> >+
> >+ /* If the root kuid maps to a valid uid in current ns, then return
> >+ * this as a nscap. */
> >+ mappedroot = from_kuid(current_user_ns(), kroot);
> >+ if (mappedroot != (uid_t)-1 && mappedroot != (uid_t)0) {
> >+ if (alloc) {
> >+ *buffer = tmpbuf;
> >+ nscap->rootid = cpu_to_le32(mappedroot);
> >+ } else
> >+ kfree(tmpbuf);
> >+ return size;
> >+ }
> >+
> >+ if (!rootid_owns_currentns(kroot)) {
> >+ kfree(tmpbuf);
> >+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> >+ }
> >+
> >+ /* This comes from a parent namespace. Return as a v2 capability */
> >+ size = sizeof(struct vfs_cap_data);
> >+ if (alloc) {
> >+ *buffer = kmalloc(size, GFP_ATOMIC);
> >+ if (*buffer) {
> >+ struct vfs_cap_data *cap = *buffer;
> >+ __le32 nsmagic, magic;
> >+ magic = VFS_CAP_REVISION_2;
> >+ nsmagic = le32_to_cpu(nscap->magic_etc);
> >+ if (nsmagic & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE)
> >+ magic |= VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE;
> >+ memcpy(&cap->data, &nscap->data, sizeof(__le32) * 2 * VFS_CAP_U32);
> >+ cap->magic_etc = cpu_to_le32(magic);
> >+ }
> >+ }
> >+ kfree(tmpbuf);
> >+ return size;
> >+}
> >+
> >+static kuid_t rootid_from_xattr(const void *value, size_t size,
> >+ struct user_namespace *task_ns)
> >+{
> >+ const struct vfs_ns_cap_data *nscap = value;
> >+ uid_t rootid = 0;
> >+
> >+ if (size == XATTR_CAPS_SZ_3)
> >+ rootid = le32_to_cpu(nscap->rootid);
> >+
> >+ return make_kuid(task_ns, rootid);
> >+}
> >+
> >+static bool validheader(size_t size, __le32 magic)
> >+{
> >+ return is_v2header(size, magic) || is_v3header(size, magic);
> >+}
> >+
> >+/*
> >+ * User requested a write of security.capability. If needed, update the
> >+ * xattr to change from v2 to v3, or to fixup the v3 rootid.
> >+ *
> >+ * If all is ok, we return the new size, on error return < 0.
> >+ */
> >+int cap_convert_nscap(struct dentry *dentry, void **ivalue, size_t size)
> >+{
> >+ struct vfs_ns_cap_data *nscap;
> >+ uid_t nsrootid;
> >+ const struct vfs_cap_data *cap = *ivalue;
> >+ __u32 magic, nsmagic;
> >+ struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
> >+ struct user_namespace *task_ns = current_user_ns(),
> >+ *fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns;
> >+ kuid_t rootid;
> >+ size_t newsize;
> >+
> >+ if (!*ivalue)
> >+ return -EINVAL;
> >+ if (!validheader(size, cap->magic_etc))
> >+ return -EINVAL;
> >+ if (!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_SETFCAP))
> >+ return -EPERM;
> >+ if (size == XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2)
> >+ if (ns_capable(inode->i_sb->s_user_ns, CAP_SETFCAP))
> >+ /* user is privileged, just write the v2 */
> >+ return size;
> >+
> >+ rootid = rootid_from_xattr(*ivalue, size, task_ns);
> >+ if (!uid_valid(rootid))
> >+ return -EINVAL;
> >+
> >+ nsrootid = from_kuid(fs_ns, rootid);
> >+ if (nsrootid == -1)
> >+ return -EINVAL;
> >+
> >+ newsize = sizeof(struct vfs_ns_cap_data);
> >+ nscap = kmalloc(newsize, GFP_ATOMIC);
> >+ if (!nscap)
> >+ return -ENOMEM;
> >+ nscap->rootid = cpu_to_le32(nsrootid);
> >+ nsmagic = VFS_CAP_REVISION_3;
> >+ magic = le32_to_cpu(cap->magic_etc);
> >+ if (magic & VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE)
> >+ nsmagic |= VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE;
> >+ nscap->magic_etc = cpu_to_le32(nsmagic);
> >+ memcpy(&nscap->data, &cap->data, sizeof(__le32) * 2 * VFS_CAP_U32);
> >+
> >+ kvfree(*ivalue);
> >+ *ivalue = nscap;
> >+ return newsize;
> >+}
> >+
> > /*
> > * Calculate the new process capability sets from the capability sets attached
> > * to a file.
> >@@ -385,7 +588,10 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data
> > __u32 magic_etc;
> > unsigned tocopy, i;
> > int size;
> >- struct vfs_cap_data caps;
> >+ struct vfs_ns_cap_data data, *nscaps = &data;
> >+ struct vfs_cap_data *caps = (struct vfs_cap_data *) &data;
> >+ kuid_t rootkuid;
> >+ struct user_namespace *fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns;
> >
> > memset(cpu_caps, 0, sizeof(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data));
> >
> >@@ -393,18 +599,20 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data
> > return -ENODATA;
> >
> > size = __vfs_getxattr((struct dentry *)dentry, inode,
> >- XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &caps, XATTR_CAPS_SZ);
> >+ XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &data, XATTR_CAPS_SZ);
> > if (size == -ENODATA || size == -EOPNOTSUPP)
> > /* no data, that's ok */
> > return -ENODATA;
> >+
> > if (size < 0)
> > return size;
> >
> > if (size < sizeof(magic_etc))
> > return -EINVAL;
> >
> >- cpu_caps->magic_etc = magic_etc = le32_to_cpu(caps.magic_etc);
> >+ cpu_caps->magic_etc = magic_etc = le32_to_cpu(caps->magic_etc);
> >
> >+ rootkuid = make_kuid(fs_ns, 0);
> > switch (magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) {
> > case VFS_CAP_REVISION_1:
> > if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_1)
> >@@ -416,15 +624,27 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data
> > return -EINVAL;
> > tocopy = VFS_CAP_U32_2;
> > break;
> >+ case VFS_CAP_REVISION_3:
> >+ if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_3)
> >+ return -EINVAL;
> >+ tocopy = VFS_CAP_U32_3;
> >+ rootkuid = make_kuid(fs_ns, le32_to_cpu(nscaps->rootid));
> >+ break;
> >+
> > default:
> > return -EINVAL;
> > }
> >+ /* Limit the caps to the mounter of the filesystem
> >+ * or the more limited uid specified in the xattr.
> >+ */
> >+ if (!rootid_owns_currentns(rootkuid))
> >+ return -ENODATA;
> >
> > CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) {
> > if (i >= tocopy)
> > break;
> >- cpu_caps->permitted.cap[i] = le32_to_cpu(caps.data[i].permitted);
> >- cpu_caps->inheritable.cap[i] = le32_to_cpu(caps.data[i].inheritable);
> >+ cpu_caps->permitted.cap[i] = le32_to_cpu(caps->data[i].permitted);
> >+ cpu_caps->inheritable.cap[i] = le32_to_cpu(caps->data[i].inheritable);
> > }
> >
> > cpu_caps->permitted.cap[CAP_LAST_U32] &= CAP_LAST_U32_VALID_MASK;
> >@@ -462,8 +682,8 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_c
> > rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps);
> > if (rc < 0) {
> > if (rc == -EINVAL)
> >- printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: get_vfs_caps_from_disk returned %d for %s\n",
> >- __func__, rc, bprm->filename);
> >+ printk(KERN_NOTICE "Invalid argument reading file caps for %s\n",
> >+ bprm->filename);
> > else if (rc == -ENODATA)
> > rc = 0;
> > goto out;
> >@@ -660,15 +880,19 @@ int cap_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
> > int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
> > const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
> > {
> >- if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
> >- if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
> >- return -EPERM;
> >+ /* Ignore non-security xattrs */
> >+ if (strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
> >+ sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) != 0)
> >+ return 0;
> >+
> >+ /*
> >+ * For XATTR_NAME_CAPS the check will be done in
> >+ * cap_convert_nscap(), called by setxattr()
> >+ */
> >+ if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS) == 0)
> > return 0;
> >- }
> >
> >- if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
> >- sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) &&
> >- !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> >+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> > return -EPERM;
> > return 0;
> > }
> >@@ -686,15 +910,22 @@ int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
> > */
> > int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
> > {
> >- if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
> >- if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
> >+ /* Ignore non-security xattrs */
> >+ if (strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
> >+ sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) != 0)
> >+ return 0;
> >+
> >+ if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS) == 0) {
> >+ /* security.capability gets namespaced */
> >+ struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
> >+ if (!inode)
> >+ return -EINVAL;
> >+ if (!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_SETFCAP))
> > return -EPERM;
> > return 0;
> > }
> >
> >- if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
> >- sizeof(XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX) - 1) &&
> >- !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> >+ if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
> > return -EPERM;
> > return 0;
> > }
> >@@ -1082,6 +1313,7 @@ struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] = {
> > LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, cap_bprm_secureexec),
> > LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_need_killpriv, cap_inode_need_killpriv),
> > LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_killpriv, cap_inode_killpriv),
> >+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, cap_inode_getsecurity),
> > LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, cap_mmap_addr),
> > LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, cap_mmap_file),
> > LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_fix_setuid, cap_task_fix_setuid),
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 39+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities
2017-06-13 23:42 ` Serge E. Hallyn
@ 2017-06-13 23:50 ` Serge E. Hallyn
0 siblings, 0 replies; 39+ messages in thread
From: Serge E. Hallyn @ 2017-06-13 23:50 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Serge E. Hallyn
Cc: Stefan Berger, Eric W. Biederman, Masami Ichikawa, containers,
lkp, xiaolong.ye, LKML, Mimi Zohar
Quoting Serge E. Hallyn (serge@hallyn.com):
> Quoting Stefan Berger (stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com):
> > On 05/08/2017 02:11 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > >Root in a non-initial user ns cannot be trusted to write a traditional
> > >security.capability xattr. If it were allowed to do so, then any
> > >unprivileged user on the host could map his own uid to root in a private
> > >namespace, write the xattr, and execute the file with privilege on the
> > >host.
> > >
> > >However supporting file capabilities in a user namespace is very
> > >desirable. Not doing so means that any programs designed to run with
> > >limited privilege must continue to support other methods of gaining and
> > >dropping privilege. For instance a program installer must detect
> > >whether file capabilities can be assigned, and assign them if so but set
> > >setuid-root otherwise. The program in turn must know how to drop
> > >partial capabilities, and do so only if setuid-root.
> >
> > Hi Serge,
> >
> >
> > I have been looking at patch below primarily to learn how we could
> > apply a similar technique to security.ima and security.evm for a
> > namespaced IMA. From the paragraphs above I thought that you solved
> > the problem of a shared filesystem where one now can write different
> > security.capability xattrs by effectively supporting for example
> > security.capability[uid=1000] and security.capability[uid=2000]
>
> Interesting idea. Worth considering.
>
> > written into the filesystem. Each would then become visible as
> > security.capability if the userns mapping is set appropriately.
> > However, this doesn't seem to be how it is implemented. There seems
>
> Indeed, when I was considering supporting multiple simulatenous
> xattrs, I did it as something like:
>
> struct vfs_ns_cap_data {
> struct {
> __le32 permitted;
> __le32 inheritable;
> } data[VFS_CAP_U32];
> __le32 rootid;
> };
>
> struct vfs_ns_cap {
> __le32 magic_etc;
> __le32 n_entries;
> struct ns_cap_data data[0];
> }; // followed by n_entries of struct ns_cap_data
>
> You're instead suggesting encoding the rootuid in the name,
> which is interesting.
>
> > to be only a single such entry with uid appended to it and, if it
> > was a shared filesystem, the first one to set this attribute blocks
> > everyone else from writing the xattr. Is that how it works? Would
>
> Approximately - indeed there is only a single xattr. But it can be
> overwritten, so long as the writer has CAP_SETFCAP over the user_ns
> which mounted the filesystem.
Hang on. I've mis-spoken. That's the requirement for writing a
v2 xattr. To write a v3 xattr you only need to be privileged
(with CAP_SETFCAP) against the inode.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 39+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities
2017-06-13 18:12 ` Stefan Berger
@ 2017-06-13 23:55 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-14 12:27 ` Stefan Berger
0 siblings, 1 reply; 39+ messages in thread
From: Serge E. Hallyn @ 2017-06-13 23:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stefan Berger
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn, Eric W. Biederman, Masami Ichikawa, containers,
lkp, xiaolong.ye, LKML, Mimi Zohar
Quoting Stefan Berger (stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com):
> On 06/13/2017 01:18 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> >Quoting Stefan Berger (stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com):
> >>On 05/08/2017 02:11 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> >>>Root in a non-initial user ns cannot be trusted to write a traditional
> >>>security.capability xattr. If it were allowed to do so, then any
> >>>unprivileged user on the host could map his own uid to root in a private
> >>>namespace, write the xattr, and execute the file with privilege on the
> >>>host.
> >>>
> >>>However supporting file capabilities in a user namespace is very
> >>>desirable. Not doing so means that any programs designed to run with
> >>>limited privilege must continue to support other methods of gaining and
> >>>dropping privilege. For instance a program installer must detect
> >>>whether file capabilities can be assigned, and assign them if so but set
> >>>setuid-root otherwise. The program in turn must know how to drop
> >>>partial capabilities, and do so only if setuid-root.
> >>Hi Serge,
> >>
> >>
> >> I have been looking at patch below primarily to learn how we could
> >>apply a similar technique to security.ima and security.evm for a
> >>namespaced IMA. From the paragraphs above I thought that you solved
> >>the problem of a shared filesystem where one now can write different
> >>security.capability xattrs by effectively supporting for example
> >>security.capability[uid=1000] and security.capability[uid=2000]
> >>written into the filesystem. Each would then become visible as
> >>security.capability if the userns mapping is set appropriately.
> >>However, this doesn't seem to be how it is implemented. There seems
> >>to be only a single such entry with uid appended to it and, if it
> >>was a shared filesystem, the first one to set this attribute blocks
> >>everyone else from writing the xattr. Is that how it works? Would
> >Yes, that's how this works here. I'd considered allowing multiple
> >entries, but I didn't feel that was needed for this case. In a previous
> >implementation (which is probably in the lkml archives somewhere) I
> >supported variable length xattr so that multiple containers could
> >each write a value tagged with their own userns.rootid. Instead,
> >in the final version, if root in any parent container writes an
> >xattr, it will take effect in child user namespaces. Which is
> >sensible - the parent presumbly laid out the filesystem to create
> >the child container.
> >
> >>that work differently with an overlay filesystem ? I think a similar
> >Certainly an overlay filesystem should be an easy case as the container
> >can have its own copy of the inode with its own xattr. Btrfs/zfs
> >would be nicer as the whole file wouldn't need to be copied.
> >
> >>model could also work for IMA, but maybe you have some thoughts. The
> >>only thing I would be concerned about is blocking the parent
> >>container's root user from setting an xattr.
> >So if you have container c1 creating child container c2 on host h1,
> >then if c1 creates an xattr, can c2 not use that? And if h1 writes it,
> >can c1 and c2 use it?
>
> In the case of IMA appraisal the extended attribute security.ima
> would be a signature. For c1 and c2 to use that file they would all
> have to have the same key on their (isolated IMA namespace )
> keyring. I think this type of setup could be arranged.
Ok. If it's too much of a restriction then certainly we can make
it more flexible. I don't think we want to support too many versions
of magic in this code, so if there's a chance we'll want to make it
more flexible later, then perhaps we should discuss the other options
in more detail now.
> Following your attack description in the introduction I would say
> that we would want to prevent malicious modification of a
> security.ima extended attribute:
>
> "Root in a non-initial user ns cannot be trusted to write a traditional security.ima xattr. If it were allowed to do so, then any unprivileged user on the host could map his own uid to root in a private namespace, write the signature in the security.ima xattr, and prevent the file from being accessible on the host."
Of course.
The way this is handled with nsfscaps is not by just forbidding the
write, but by only respecting the xattr if the rootid which was
written in the xattr (which is translated and enforced by the kernel
at write time) is root in the caller's user_ns or a parent thereof.
I think that would suffice for ima as well?
> >If they can't, then I guess for IMA multiple xattrs would need to be
> >supported.
>
> I am not sure about that. I suppose any extended attribute
> modifications would have to be designed for the case where a shared
> filesystem is used that also shares the extended attributes, not
> assuming an overlay filesystem that automatically isolates the
> extend attributes. With the shared filesystem I'd like to prevent
> any type of setting of extended attributes by a child container or
> more generally anyone mounting it as a '2nd consumer', which would
> make it a shared filesystem. Only the process that mounts a
> filesystem as the '1st consumer' would be able to set the extended
> attributes.
Right, again that's currently the case in the nscaps patch.
> I am assuming that using an overlay fs would always make
> you the '1st consumer' -- I would hope that these conditions could
> be detected. And probably the process should also write along its
> host uid as part of writing out the xattr.
I think that's what the rootid in the nscaps xattr is.
> If all extended
> attributes were to support this model, maybe the 'uid' could be
> associated with the 'name' of the xattr rather than its 'value' (not
> sure whether that's possible).
Right, I missed that in your original email when I saw it this morning.
It's not what my patch does, but it's an interesting idea. Do you have
a patch to that effect? We might even be able to generalize that to
namespace any security.* xattrs. Wouldn't be automatically enabled
for anything but ima and capabilities, but we could make the infrastructure
generic and re-usable.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 39+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities
2017-06-13 23:55 ` Serge E. Hallyn
@ 2017-06-14 12:27 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-15 3:05 ` Serge E. Hallyn
0 siblings, 1 reply; 39+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2017-06-14 12:27 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Serge E. Hallyn
Cc: Eric W. Biederman, Masami Ichikawa, containers, lkp, xiaolong.ye,
LKML, Mimi Zohar
On 06/13/2017 07:55 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> Quoting Stefan Berger (stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com):
>> On 06/13/2017 01:18 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>>> Quoting Stefan Berger (stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com):
>>>> On 05/08/2017 02:11 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>>>>> Root in a non-initial user ns cannot be trusted to write a traditional
>>>>> security.capability xattr. If it were allowed to do so, then any
>>>>> unprivileged user on the host could map his own uid to root in a private
>>>>> namespace, write the xattr, and execute the file with privilege on the
>>>>> host.
>>>>>
>>>>> However supporting file capabilities in a user namespace is very
>>>>> desirable. Not doing so means that any programs designed to run with
>>>>> limited privilege must continue to support other methods of gaining and
>>>>> dropping privilege. For instance a program installer must detect
>>>>> whether file capabilities can be assigned, and assign them if so but set
>>>>> setuid-root otherwise. The program in turn must know how to drop
>>>>> partial capabilities, and do so only if setuid-root.
>>>> Hi Serge,
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I have been looking at patch below primarily to learn how we could
>>>> apply a similar technique to security.ima and security.evm for a
>>>> namespaced IMA. From the paragraphs above I thought that you solved
>>>> the problem of a shared filesystem where one now can write different
>>>> security.capability xattrs by effectively supporting for example
>>>> security.capability[uid=1000] and security.capability[uid=2000]
>>>> written into the filesystem. Each would then become visible as
>>>> security.capability if the userns mapping is set appropriately.
>>>> However, this doesn't seem to be how it is implemented. There seems
>>>> to be only a single such entry with uid appended to it and, if it
>>>> was a shared filesystem, the first one to set this attribute blocks
>>>> everyone else from writing the xattr. Is that how it works? Would
>>> Yes, that's how this works here. I'd considered allowing multiple
>>> entries, but I didn't feel that was needed for this case. In a previous
>>> implementation (which is probably in the lkml archives somewhere) I
>>> supported variable length xattr so that multiple containers could
>>> each write a value tagged with their own userns.rootid. Instead,
>>> in the final version, if root in any parent container writes an
>>> xattr, it will take effect in child user namespaces. Which is
>>> sensible - the parent presumbly laid out the filesystem to create
>>> the child container.
>>>
>>>> that work differently with an overlay filesystem ? I think a similar
>>> Certainly an overlay filesystem should be an easy case as the container
>>> can have its own copy of the inode with its own xattr. Btrfs/zfs
>>> would be nicer as the whole file wouldn't need to be copied.
>>>
>>>> model could also work for IMA, but maybe you have some thoughts. The
>>>> only thing I would be concerned about is blocking the parent
>>>> container's root user from setting an xattr.
>>> So if you have container c1 creating child container c2 on host h1,
>>> then if c1 creates an xattr, can c2 not use that? And if h1 writes it,
>>> can c1 and c2 use it?
>> In the case of IMA appraisal the extended attribute security.ima
>> would be a signature. For c1 and c2 to use that file they would all
>> have to have the same key on their (isolated IMA namespace )
>> keyring. I think this type of setup could be arranged.
> Ok. If it's too much of a restriction then certainly we can make
> it more flexible. I don't think we want to support too many versions
> of magic in this code, so if there's a chance we'll want to make it
> more flexible later, then perhaps we should discuss the other options
> in more detail now.
>
>> Following your attack description in the introduction I would say
>> that we would want to prevent malicious modification of a
>> security.ima extended attribute:
>>
>> "Root in a non-initial user ns cannot be trusted to write a traditional security.ima xattr. If it were allowed to do so, then any unprivileged user on the host could map his own uid to root in a private namespace, write the signature in the security.ima xattr, and prevent the file from being accessible on the host."
> Of course.
>
> The way this is handled with nsfscaps is not by just forbidding the
> write, but by only respecting the xattr if the rootid which was
> written in the xattr (which is translated and enforced by the kernel
> at write time) is root in the caller's user_ns or a parent thereof.
>
> I think that would suffice for ima as well?
>
>>> If they can't, then I guess for IMA multiple xattrs would need to be
>>> supported.
>> I am not sure about that. I suppose any extended attribute
>> modifications would have to be designed for the case where a shared
>> filesystem is used that also shares the extended attributes, not
>> assuming an overlay filesystem that automatically isolates the
>> extend attributes. With the shared filesystem I'd like to prevent
>> any type of setting of extended attributes by a child container or
>> more generally anyone mounting it as a '2nd consumer', which would
>> make it a shared filesystem. Only the process that mounts a
>> filesystem as the '1st consumer' would be able to set the extended
>> attributes.
> Right, again that's currently the case in the nscaps patch.
>
>> I am assuming that using an overlay fs would always make
>> you the '1st consumer' -- I would hope that these conditions could
>> be detected. And probably the process should also write along its
>> host uid as part of writing out the xattr.
> I think that's what the rootid in the nscaps xattr is.
>
>> If all extended
>> attributes were to support this model, maybe the 'uid' could be
>> associated with the 'name' of the xattr rather than its 'value' (not
>> sure whether that's possible).
> Right, I missed that in your original email when I saw it this morning.
> It's not what my patch does, but it's an interesting idea. Do you have
> a patch to that effect? We might even be able to generalize that to
No, I don't have a patch. It may not be possible to implement it. The
xattr_handler's take the name of the xattr as input to get(). So one
could try to encode the mapped uid in the name. However, that could lead
to problems with stale xattrs in a shared filesystem over time unless
one could limit the number of xattrs with the same prefix, e.g.,
security.capability*. So I doubt that it would work. Otherwise it would
be good if the value was wrapped in a data structure use by all xattrs,
but that doesn't seem to be the case, either. So I guess we have to go
into each type of value structure and add a uid field there.
> namespace any security.* xattrs. Wouldn't be automatically enabled
> for anything but ima and capabilities, but we could make the infrastructure
> generic and re-usable.
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 39+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities
2017-06-14 12:27 ` Stefan Berger
@ 2017-06-15 3:05 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-16 9:02 ` Christian Brauner
` (2 more replies)
0 siblings, 3 replies; 39+ messages in thread
From: Serge E. Hallyn @ 2017-06-15 3:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stefan Berger
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn, Eric W. Biederman, Masami Ichikawa, containers,
lkp, xiaolong.ye, LKML, Mimi Zohar
On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 08:27:40AM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
> On 06/13/2017 07:55 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> >Quoting Stefan Berger (stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com):
> >> If all extended
> >>attributes were to support this model, maybe the 'uid' could be
> >>associated with the 'name' of the xattr rather than its 'value' (not
> >>sure whether that's possible).
> >Right, I missed that in your original email when I saw it this morning.
> >It's not what my patch does, but it's an interesting idea. Do you have
> >a patch to that effect? We might even be able to generalize that to
>
> No, I don't have a patch. It may not be possible to implement it.
> The xattr_handler's take the name of the xattr as input to get().
That may be ok though. Assume the host created a container with
100000 as the uid for root, which created a container with 130000 as
uid for root. If root in the nested container tries to read the
xattr, the kernel can check for security.foo[130000] first, then
security.foo[100000], then security.foo. Or, it can do a listxattr
and look for those. Am I overlooking one?
> So one could try to encode the mapped uid in the name. However, that
I thought that's exactly what you were suggesting in your original
email? "security.capability[uid=2000]"
> could lead to problems with stale xattrs in a shared filesystem over
> time unless one could limit the number of xattrs with the same
> prefix, e.g., security.capability*. So I doubt that it would work.
Hm. Yeah. But really how many setups are there like that? I.e. if
you launch a regular docker or lxd container, the image doesn't do a
bind mount of a shared image, it layers something above it or does a
copy. What setups do you know of where multiple containers in different
user namespaces mount the same filesystem shared and writeable?
> Otherwise it would be good if the value was wrapped in a data
> structure use by all xattrs, but that doesn't seem to be the case,
> either. So I guess we have to go into each type of value structure
> and add a uid field there.
>
> >namespace any security.* xattrs. Wouldn't be automatically enabled
> >for anything but ima and capabilities, but we could make the infrastructure
> >generic and re-usable.
> >
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 39+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities
2017-06-15 3:05 ` Serge E. Hallyn
@ 2017-06-16 9:02 ` Christian Brauner
2017-06-16 22:24 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-17 20:56 ` Stefan Berger
2 siblings, 0 replies; 39+ messages in thread
From: Christian Brauner @ 2017-06-16 9:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Serge E. Hallyn, Stefan Berger
Cc: containers, xiaolong.ye, Mimi Zohar, LKML, lkp, Eric W. Biederman
> "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> hat am 15. Juni 2017 um 05:05 geschrieben:
>
>
> On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 08:27:40AM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
> > On 06/13/2017 07:55 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > >Quoting Stefan Berger (stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com):
> > >> If all extended
> > >>attributes were to support this model, maybe the 'uid' could be
> > >>associated with the 'name' of the xattr rather than its 'value' (not
> > >>sure whether that's possible).
> > >Right, I missed that in your original email when I saw it this morning.
> > >It's not what my patch does, but it's an interesting idea. Do you have
> > >a patch to that effect? We might even be able to generalize that to
> >
> > No, I don't have a patch. It may not be possible to implement it.
> > The xattr_handler's take the name of the xattr as input to get().
>
> That may be ok though. Assume the host created a container with
> 100000 as the uid for root, which created a container with 130000 as
> uid for root. If root in the nested container tries to read the
> xattr, the kernel can check for security.foo[130000] first, then
> security.foo[100000], then security.foo. Or, it can do a listxattr
> and look for those. Am I overlooking one?
>
> > So one could try to encode the mapped uid in the name. However, that
>
> I thought that's exactly what you were suggesting in your original
> email? "security.capability[uid=2000]"
>
> > could lead to problems with stale xattrs in a shared filesystem over
> > time unless one could limit the number of xattrs with the same
> > prefix, e.g., security.capability*. So I doubt that it would work.
>
> Hm. Yeah. But really how many setups are there like that? I.e. if
> you launch a regular docker or lxd container, the image doesn't do a
> bind mount of a shared image, it layers something above it or does a
> copy. What setups do you know of where multiple containers in different
> user namespaces mount the same filesystem shared and writeable?
Iiuc, this should also be something that will be addressed by a viable shifts
solution so it's probably not worth worrying about it here. I was going to
point out that there are plans of sharing filesystems between containers
in different user namespaces. However, without shifts this really will only
work nicely if the container's setup identical id mappings in which case you
won't have to worry about stale xattrs.
>
> > Otherwise it would be good if the value was wrapped in a data
> > structure use by all xattrs, but that doesn't seem to be the case,
> > either. So I guess we have to go into each type of value structure
> > and add a uid field there.
> >
> > >namespace any security.* xattrs. Wouldn't be automatically enabled
> > >for anything but ima and capabilities, but we could make the infrastructure
> > >generic and re-usable.
> > >
> _______________________________________________
> Containers mailing list
> Containers@lists.linux-foundation.org
> https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 39+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities
2017-06-15 3:05 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-16 9:02 ` Christian Brauner
@ 2017-06-16 22:24 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-17 20:56 ` Stefan Berger
2 siblings, 0 replies; 39+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2017-06-16 22:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Serge E. Hallyn
Cc: Eric W. Biederman, Masami Ichikawa, containers, lkp, xiaolong.ye,
LKML, Mimi Zohar
On 06/14/2017 11:05 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 08:27:40AM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
>> On 06/13/2017 07:55 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>>> Quoting Stefan Berger (stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com):
>>>> If all extended
>>>> attributes were to support this model, maybe the 'uid' could be
>>>> associated with the 'name' of the xattr rather than its 'value' (not
>>>> sure whether that's possible).
>>> Right, I missed that in your original email when I saw it this morning.
>>> It's not what my patch does, but it's an interesting idea. Do you have
>>> a patch to that effect? We might even be able to generalize that to
>> No, I don't have a patch. It may not be possible to implement it.
>> The xattr_handler's take the name of the xattr as input to get().
> That may be ok though. Assume the host created a container with
> 100000 as the uid for root, which created a container with 130000 as
> uid for root. If root in the nested container tries to read the
> xattr, the kernel can check for security.foo[130000] first, then
> security.foo[100000], then security.foo. Or, it can do a listxattr
> and look for those. Am I overlooking one?
So that sounds like a child would 'inherit' the value of an xattr from
the closest parent if it doesn't have one itself. I guess it would
depend on the xattr whether that should apply? And removing an xattr
becomes difficult then if the parent container's xattr always shines
through...
>
>> So one could try to encode the mapped uid in the name. However, that
> I thought that's exactly what you were suggesting in your original
> email? "security.capability[uid=2000]"
>
>> could lead to problems with stale xattrs in a shared filesystem over
>> time unless one could limit the number of xattrs with the same
>> prefix, e.g., security.capability*. So I doubt that it would work.
> Hm. Yeah. But really how many setups are there like that? I.e. if
> you launch a regular docker or lxd container, the image doesn't do a
> bind mount of a shared image, it layers something above it or does a
> copy. What setups do you know of where multiple containers in different
> user namespaces mount the same filesystem shared and writeable?
So you think it's a good idea? I am not sure when I would get to it,
though...
Stefan
>
>> Otherwise it would be good if the value was wrapped in a data
>> structure use by all xattrs, but that doesn't seem to be the case,
>> either. So I guess we have to go into each type of value structure
>> and add a uid field there.
>>
>>> namespace any security.* xattrs. Wouldn't be automatically enabled
>>> for anything but ima and capabilities, but we could make the infrastructure
>>> generic and re-usable.
>>>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 39+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities
2017-06-15 3:05 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-16 9:02 ` Christian Brauner
2017-06-16 22:24 ` Stefan Berger
@ 2017-06-17 20:56 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-18 22:14 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2 siblings, 1 reply; 39+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2017-06-17 20:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Serge E. Hallyn
Cc: Eric W. Biederman, Masami Ichikawa, containers, lkp, xiaolong.ye,
LKML, Mimi Zohar
On 06/14/2017 11:05 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 08:27:40AM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
>> On 06/13/2017 07:55 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>>> Quoting Stefan Berger (stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com):
>>>> If all extended
>>>> attributes were to support this model, maybe the 'uid' could be
>>>> associated with the 'name' of the xattr rather than its 'value' (not
>>>> sure whether that's possible).
>>> Right, I missed that in your original email when I saw it this morning.
>>> It's not what my patch does, but it's an interesting idea. Do you have
>>> a patch to that effect? We might even be able to generalize that to
>> No, I don't have a patch. It may not be possible to implement it.
>> The xattr_handler's take the name of the xattr as input to get().
> That may be ok though. Assume the host created a container with
> 100000 as the uid for root, which created a container with 130000 as
> uid for root. If root in the nested container tries to read the
> xattr, the kernel can check for security.foo[130000] first, then
> security.foo[100000], then security.foo. Or, it can do a listxattr
> and look for those. Am I overlooking one?
>
>> So one could try to encode the mapped uid in the name. However, that
> I thought that's exactly what you were suggesting in your original
> email? "security.capability[uid=2000]"
>
>> could lead to problems with stale xattrs in a shared filesystem over
>> time unless one could limit the number of xattrs with the same
>> prefix, e.g., security.capability*. So I doubt that it would work.
> Hm. Yeah. But really how many setups are there like that? I.e. if
> you launch a regular docker or lxd container, the image doesn't do a
> bind mount of a shared image, it layers something above it or does a
> copy. What setups do you know of where multiple containers in different
> user namespaces mount the same filesystem shared and writeable?
I think I have something now that accomodates userns access to
security.capability:
https://github.com/stefanberger/linux/commits/xattr_for_userns
Encoding of uid is in the attribute name now as follows:
security.foo@uid=<uid>
1) The 'plain' security.capability is only r/w accessible from the host
(init_user_ns).
2) When userns reads/writes 'security.capability' it will read/write
security.capability@uid=<uid> instead, with uid being the uid of root ,
e.g. 1000.
3) When listing xattrs for userns the host's security.capability is
filtered out to avoid read failures iof 'security.capability' if
security.capability@uid=<uid> is read but not there. (see 1) and 2))
4) security.capability* may all be read from anywhere
5) security.capability@uid=<uid> may be read or written directly from a
userns if <uid> matches the uid of root (current_uid())
6) security.capability@* are 'reserved' and may be read but not written
to unless 5) applies.
Similat, from the text of one of the functions in the code:
+ * In a user namespace we prevent read/write accesses to the _host's_
+ * security.foo to protect these extended attributes.
+ *
+ * Reading: Reading security.foo from a user namespace will read
+ * security.foo@uid=<uid> instead. Reading security.foo@uid=<uid> directly
+ * also works. In general, all security.foo*, except for security.foo
of the
+ * host, can be read from a user namespace.
+ *
+ * Writing: Writing security.foo from a user namespace will write
+ * security.foo@uid=<uid> instead. Writing security.foo@uid=<uid> directly
+ * also work.s No other security.foo* attributes, including the
security.foo
+ * offthe host, can be written to. All security.foo@* are 'reserved'.
+ *
+ * Removing: The same rules for writing apply to removing of extended
+ * attributes from a user namespace.
Stefan
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 39+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities
2017-06-17 20:56 ` Stefan Berger
@ 2017-06-18 22:14 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-19 1:13 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-19 21:34 ` Eric W. Biederman
0 siblings, 2 replies; 39+ messages in thread
From: Serge E. Hallyn @ 2017-06-18 22:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stefan Berger
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn, Eric W. Biederman, Masami Ichikawa, containers,
lkp, xiaolong.ye, LKML, Mimi Zohar
Quoting Stefan Berger (stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com):
> On 06/14/2017 11:05 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> >On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 08:27:40AM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
> >>On 06/13/2017 07:55 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> >>>Quoting Stefan Berger (stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com):
> >>>> If all extended
> >>>>attributes were to support this model, maybe the 'uid' could be
> >>>>associated with the 'name' of the xattr rather than its 'value' (not
> >>>>sure whether that's possible).
> >>>Right, I missed that in your original email when I saw it this morning.
> >>>It's not what my patch does, but it's an interesting idea. Do you have
> >>>a patch to that effect? We might even be able to generalize that to
> >>No, I don't have a patch. It may not be possible to implement it.
> >>The xattr_handler's take the name of the xattr as input to get().
> >That may be ok though. Assume the host created a container with
> >100000 as the uid for root, which created a container with 130000 as
> >uid for root. If root in the nested container tries to read the
> >xattr, the kernel can check for security.foo[130000] first, then
> >security.foo[100000], then security.foo. Or, it can do a listxattr
> >and look for those. Am I overlooking one?
> >
> >>So one could try to encode the mapped uid in the name. However, that
> >I thought that's exactly what you were suggesting in your original
> >email? "security.capability[uid=2000]"
> >
> >>could lead to problems with stale xattrs in a shared filesystem over
> >>time unless one could limit the number of xattrs with the same
> >>prefix, e.g., security.capability*. So I doubt that it would work.
> >Hm. Yeah. But really how many setups are there like that? I.e. if
> >you launch a regular docker or lxd container, the image doesn't do a
> >bind mount of a shared image, it layers something above it or does a
> >copy. What setups do you know of where multiple containers in different
> >user namespaces mount the same filesystem shared and writeable?
>
> I think I have something now that accomodates userns access to
> security.capability:
>
> https://github.com/stefanberger/linux/commits/xattr_for_userns
Thanks!
> Encoding of uid is in the attribute name now as follows:
> security.foo@uid=<uid>
>
> 1) The 'plain' security.capability is only r/w accessible from the
> host (init_user_ns).
> 2) When userns reads/writes 'security.capability' it will read/write
> security.capability@uid=<uid> instead, with uid being the uid of
> root , e.g. 1000.
> 3) When listing xattrs for userns the host's security.capability is
> filtered out to avoid read failures iof 'security.capability' if
> security.capability@uid=<uid> is read but not there. (see 1) and 2))
> 4) security.capability* may all be read from anywhere
> 5) security.capability@uid=<uid> may be read or written directly
> from a userns if <uid> matches the uid of root (current_uid())
This looks very close to what we want. One exception - we do want
to support root in a user namespace being able to write
security.capability@uid=<x> where <x> is a valid uid mapped in its
namespace. In that case the name should be rewritten to be
security.capability@uid=<y> where y is the unmapped kuid.val.
Eric,
so far my patch hasn't yet hit Linus' tree. Given that, would you
mind taking a look and seeing what you think of this approach? If
we may decide to go this route, we probably should stop my patch
from hitting Linus' tree before we have to continue supporting it.
Stefan,
so do you think the general framework could be re-used by IMA? If
we can move the capability-specific code in fs/xattr.c into
an LSM hook in a way that IMA can also use, then this is a definite
win.
-serge
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 39+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities
2017-06-18 22:14 ` Serge E. Hallyn
@ 2017-06-19 1:13 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-19 13:05 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-20 6:23 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-19 21:34 ` Eric W. Biederman
1 sibling, 2 replies; 39+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2017-06-19 1:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Serge E. Hallyn
Cc: Eric W. Biederman, Masami Ichikawa, containers, lkp, xiaolong.ye,
LKML, Mimi Zohar
On 06/18/2017 06:14 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> Quoting Stefan Berger (stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com):
>> On 06/14/2017 11:05 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>>> On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 08:27:40AM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
>>>> On 06/13/2017 07:55 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>>>>> Quoting Stefan Berger (stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com):
>>>>>> If all extended
>>>>>> attributes were to support this model, maybe the 'uid' could be
>>>>>> associated with the 'name' of the xattr rather than its 'value' (not
>>>>>> sure whether that's possible).
>>>>> Right, I missed that in your original email when I saw it this morning.
>>>>> It's not what my patch does, but it's an interesting idea. Do you have
>>>>> a patch to that effect? We might even be able to generalize that to
>>>> No, I don't have a patch. It may not be possible to implement it.
>>>> The xattr_handler's take the name of the xattr as input to get().
>>> That may be ok though. Assume the host created a container with
>>> 100000 as the uid for root, which created a container with 130000 as
>>> uid for root. If root in the nested container tries to read the
>>> xattr, the kernel can check for security.foo[130000] first, then
>>> security.foo[100000], then security.foo. Or, it can do a listxattr
>>> and look for those. Am I overlooking one?
>>>
>>>> So one could try to encode the mapped uid in the name. However, that
>>> I thought that's exactly what you were suggesting in your original
>>> email? "security.capability[uid=2000]"
>>>
>>>> could lead to problems with stale xattrs in a shared filesystem over
>>>> time unless one could limit the number of xattrs with the same
>>>> prefix, e.g., security.capability*. So I doubt that it would work.
>>> Hm. Yeah. But really how many setups are there like that? I.e. if
>>> you launch a regular docker or lxd container, the image doesn't do a
>>> bind mount of a shared image, it layers something above it or does a
>>> copy. What setups do you know of where multiple containers in different
>>> user namespaces mount the same filesystem shared and writeable?
>> I think I have something now that accomodates userns access to
>> security.capability:
>>
>> https://github.com/stefanberger/linux/commits/xattr_for_userns
> Thanks!
>
>> Encoding of uid is in the attribute name now as follows:
>> security.foo@uid=<uid>
>>
>> 1) The 'plain' security.capability is only r/w accessible from the
>> host (init_user_ns).
>> 2) When userns reads/writes 'security.capability' it will read/write
>> security.capability@uid=<uid> instead, with uid being the uid of
>> root , e.g. 1000.
>> 3) When listing xattrs for userns the host's security.capability is
>> filtered out to avoid read failures iof 'security.capability' if
>> security.capability@uid=<uid> is read but not there. (see 1) and 2))
>> 4) security.capability* may all be read from anywhere
>> 5) security.capability@uid=<uid> may be read or written directly
>> from a userns if <uid> matches the uid of root (current_uid())
> This looks very close to what we want. One exception - we do want
> to support root in a user namespace being able to write
> security.capability@uid=<x> where <x> is a valid uid mapped in its
> namespace. In that case the name should be rewritten to be
> security.capability@uid=<y> where y is the unmapped kuid.val.
I'll try to write a patch on top of the existing one.
Can you adapt your test cases. I haven't tried them, but having them
would be important.
>
> Eric,
>
> so far my patch hasn't yet hit Linus' tree. Given that, would you
> mind taking a look and seeing what you think of this approach? If
> we may decide to go this route, we probably should stop my patch
> from hitting Linus' tree before we have to continue supporting it.
>
> Stefan,
>
> so do you think the general framework could be re-used by IMA? If
> we can move the capability-specific code in fs/xattr.c into
> an LSM hook in a way that IMA can also use, then this is a definite
> win.
I am fairly sure that this would be easily possible and some of the if
statements with string comparisons would likely only have to be extended
with another comparison.
Regards,
Stefan
>
> -serge
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 39+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities
2017-06-19 1:13 ` Stefan Berger
@ 2017-06-19 13:05 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-20 6:23 ` Serge E. Hallyn
1 sibling, 0 replies; 39+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2017-06-19 13:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Serge E. Hallyn
Cc: Eric W. Biederman, Masami Ichikawa, containers, lkp, xiaolong.ye,
LKML, Mimi Zohar
On 06/18/2017 09:13 PM, Stefan Berger wrote:
> On 06/18/2017 06:14 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>> Quoting Stefan Berger (stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com):
>>> On 06/14/2017 11:05 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>>>> On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 08:27:40AM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
>>>>> On 06/13/2017 07:55 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>>>>>> Quoting Stefan Berger (stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com):
>>>>>>> If all extended
>>>>>>> attributes were to support this model, maybe the 'uid' could be
>>>>>>> associated with the 'name' of the xattr rather than its 'value'
>>>>>>> (not
>>>>>>> sure whether that's possible).
>>>>>> Right, I missed that in your original email when I saw it this
>>>>>> morning.
>>>>>> It's not what my patch does, but it's an interesting idea. Do
>>>>>> you have
>>>>>> a patch to that effect? We might even be able to generalize that to
>>>>> No, I don't have a patch. It may not be possible to implement it.
>>>>> The xattr_handler's take the name of the xattr as input to get().
>>>> That may be ok though. Assume the host created a container with
>>>> 100000 as the uid for root, which created a container with 130000 as
>>>> uid for root. If root in the nested container tries to read the
>>>> xattr, the kernel can check for security.foo[130000] first, then
>>>> security.foo[100000], then security.foo. Or, it can do a listxattr
>>>> and look for those. Am I overlooking one?
>>>>
>>>>> So one could try to encode the mapped uid in the name. However, that
>>>> I thought that's exactly what you were suggesting in your original
>>>> email? "security.capability[uid=2000]"
>>>>
>>>>> could lead to problems with stale xattrs in a shared filesystem over
>>>>> time unless one could limit the number of xattrs with the same
>>>>> prefix, e.g., security.capability*. So I doubt that it would work.
>>>> Hm. Yeah. But really how many setups are there like that? I.e. if
>>>> you launch a regular docker or lxd container, the image doesn't do a
>>>> bind mount of a shared image, it layers something above it or does a
>>>> copy. What setups do you know of where multiple containers in
>>>> different
>>>> user namespaces mount the same filesystem shared and writeable?
>>> I think I have something now that accomodates userns access to
>>> security.capability:
>>>
>>> https://github.com/stefanberger/linux/commits/xattr_for_userns
>> Thanks!
>>
>>> Encoding of uid is in the attribute name now as follows:
>>> security.foo@uid=<uid>
>>>
>>> 1) The 'plain' security.capability is only r/w accessible from the
>>> host (init_user_ns).
>>> 2) When userns reads/writes 'security.capability' it will read/write
>>> security.capability@uid=<uid> instead, with uid being the uid of
>>> root , e.g. 1000.
>>> 3) When listing xattrs for userns the host's security.capability is
>>> filtered out to avoid read failures iof 'security.capability' if
>>> security.capability@uid=<uid> is read but not there. (see 1) and 2))
>>> 4) security.capability* may all be read from anywhere
>>> 5) security.capability@uid=<uid> may be read or written directly
>>> from a userns if <uid> matches the uid of root (current_uid())
>> This looks very close to what we want. One exception - we do want
>> to support root in a user namespace being able to write
>> security.capability@uid=<x> where <x> is a valid uid mapped in its
>> namespace. In that case the name should be rewritten to be
>> security.capability@uid=<y> where y is the unmapped kuid.val.
>
> I'll try to write a patch on top of the existing one.
Did that now in a 2nd patch (that also fixes a few problems of the 1st).
In a user ns mapped to 1000 root can write security.capability@uid=123,
which then ends up writing to security.capability@uid=1123. The reading
also works with @uid=123. When listing xattrs only those get shown that
actually have valid mappings.
https://github.com/stefanberger/linux/commits/xattr_for_userns
Stefan
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 39+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities
2017-06-18 22:14 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-19 1:13 ` Stefan Berger
@ 2017-06-19 21:34 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-06-20 5:42 ` Amir Goldstein
1 sibling, 1 reply; 39+ messages in thread
From: Eric W. Biederman @ 2017-06-19 21:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Serge E. Hallyn
Cc: Stefan Berger, Masami Ichikawa, containers, lkp, xiaolong.ye,
LKML, Mimi Zohar
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> writes:
> Quoting Stefan Berger (stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com):
>> On 06/14/2017 11:05 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>> >On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 08:27:40AM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
>> >>On 06/13/2017 07:55 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>> >>>Quoting Stefan Berger (stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com):
>> >>>> If all extended
>> >>>>attributes were to support this model, maybe the 'uid' could be
>> >>>>associated with the 'name' of the xattr rather than its 'value' (not
>> >>>>sure whether that's possible).
>> >>>Right, I missed that in your original email when I saw it this morning.
>> >>>It's not what my patch does, but it's an interesting idea. Do you have
>> >>>a patch to that effect? We might even be able to generalize that to
>> >>No, I don't have a patch. It may not be possible to implement it.
>> >>The xattr_handler's take the name of the xattr as input to get().
>> >That may be ok though. Assume the host created a container with
>> >100000 as the uid for root, which created a container with 130000 as
>> >uid for root. If root in the nested container tries to read the
>> >xattr, the kernel can check for security.foo[130000] first, then
>> >security.foo[100000], then security.foo. Or, it can do a listxattr
>> >and look for those. Am I overlooking one?
>> >
>> >>So one could try to encode the mapped uid in the name. However, that
>> >I thought that's exactly what you were suggesting in your original
>> >email? "security.capability[uid=2000]"
>> >
>> >>could lead to problems with stale xattrs in a shared filesystem over
>> >>time unless one could limit the number of xattrs with the same
>> >>prefix, e.g., security.capability*. So I doubt that it would work.
>> >Hm. Yeah. But really how many setups are there like that? I.e. if
>> >you launch a regular docker or lxd container, the image doesn't do a
>> >bind mount of a shared image, it layers something above it or does a
>> >copy. What setups do you know of where multiple containers in different
>> >user namespaces mount the same filesystem shared and writeable?
>>
>> I think I have something now that accomodates userns access to
>> security.capability:
>>
>> https://github.com/stefanberger/linux/commits/xattr_for_userns
>
> Thanks!
>
>> Encoding of uid is in the attribute name now as follows:
>> security.foo@uid=<uid>
>>
>> 1) The 'plain' security.capability is only r/w accessible from the
>> host (init_user_ns).
>> 2) When userns reads/writes 'security.capability' it will read/write
>> security.capability@uid=<uid> instead, with uid being the uid of
>> root , e.g. 1000.
>> 3) When listing xattrs for userns the host's security.capability is
>> filtered out to avoid read failures iof 'security.capability' if
>> security.capability@uid=<uid> is read but not there. (see 1) and 2))
>> 4) security.capability* may all be read from anywhere
>> 5) security.capability@uid=<uid> may be read or written directly
>> from a userns if <uid> matches the uid of root (current_uid())
>
> This looks very close to what we want. One exception - we do want
> to support root in a user namespace being able to write
> security.capability@uid=<x> where <x> is a valid uid mapped in its
> namespace. In that case the name should be rewritten to be
> security.capability@uid=<y> where y is the unmapped kuid.val.
>
> Eric,
>
> so far my patch hasn't yet hit Linus' tree. Given that, would you
> mind taking a look and seeing what you think of this approach? If
> we may decide to go this route, we probably should stop my patch
> from hitting Linus' tree before we have to continue supporting it.
Agreed. I will take a look. I also want to see how all of this works
in the context of stackable filesystems. As that is the one case that
looked like it could be a problem case in your current patchset.
Eric
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 39+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities
2017-06-19 21:34 ` Eric W. Biederman
@ 2017-06-20 5:42 ` Amir Goldstein
2017-06-20 12:19 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-20 19:57 ` Vivek Goyal
0 siblings, 2 replies; 39+ messages in thread
From: Amir Goldstein @ 2017-06-20 5:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Eric W. Biederman
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn, Stefan Berger, Mimi Zohar, Linux Containers,
LKML, xiaolong.ye, lkp, Vivek Goyal, Miklos Szeredi
On Tue, Jun 20, 2017 at 12:34 AM, Eric W. Biederman
<ebiederm@xmission.com> wrote:
> "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> writes:
>
>> Quoting Stefan Berger (stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com):
>>> On 06/14/2017 11:05 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>>> >On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 08:27:40AM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
>>> >>On 06/13/2017 07:55 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>>> >>>Quoting Stefan Berger (stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com):
>>> >>>> If all extended
>>> >>>>attributes were to support this model, maybe the 'uid' could be
>>> >>>>associated with the 'name' of the xattr rather than its 'value' (not
>>> >>>>sure whether that's possible).
>>> >>>Right, I missed that in your original email when I saw it this morning.
>>> >>>It's not what my patch does, but it's an interesting idea. Do you have
>>> >>>a patch to that effect? We might even be able to generalize that to
>>> >>No, I don't have a patch. It may not be possible to implement it.
>>> >>The xattr_handler's take the name of the xattr as input to get().
>>> >That may be ok though. Assume the host created a container with
>>> >100000 as the uid for root, which created a container with 130000 as
>>> >uid for root. If root in the nested container tries to read the
>>> >xattr, the kernel can check for security.foo[130000] first, then
>>> >security.foo[100000], then security.foo. Or, it can do a listxattr
>>> >and look for those. Am I overlooking one?
>>> >
>>> >>So one could try to encode the mapped uid in the name. However, that
>>> >I thought that's exactly what you were suggesting in your original
>>> >email? "security.capability[uid=2000]"
>>> >
>>> >>could lead to problems with stale xattrs in a shared filesystem over
>>> >>time unless one could limit the number of xattrs with the same
>>> >>prefix, e.g., security.capability*. So I doubt that it would work.
>>> >Hm. Yeah. But really how many setups are there like that? I.e. if
>>> >you launch a regular docker or lxd container, the image doesn't do a
>>> >bind mount of a shared image, it layers something above it or does a
>>> >copy. What setups do you know of where multiple containers in different
>>> >user namespaces mount the same filesystem shared and writeable?
>>>
>>> I think I have something now that accomodates userns access to
>>> security.capability:
>>>
>>> https://github.com/stefanberger/linux/commits/xattr_for_userns
>>
>> Thanks!
>>
>>> Encoding of uid is in the attribute name now as follows:
>>> security.foo@uid=<uid>
>>>
>>> 1) The 'plain' security.capability is only r/w accessible from the
>>> host (init_user_ns).
>>> 2) When userns reads/writes 'security.capability' it will read/write
>>> security.capability@uid=<uid> instead, with uid being the uid of
>>> root , e.g. 1000.
>>> 3) When listing xattrs for userns the host's security.capability is
>>> filtered out to avoid read failures iof 'security.capability' if
>>> security.capability@uid=<uid> is read but not there. (see 1) and 2))
>>> 4) security.capability* may all be read from anywhere
>>> 5) security.capability@uid=<uid> may be read or written directly
>>> from a userns if <uid> matches the uid of root (current_uid())
>>
>> This looks very close to what we want. One exception - we do want
>> to support root in a user namespace being able to write
>> security.capability@uid=<x> where <x> is a valid uid mapped in its
>> namespace. In that case the name should be rewritten to be
>> security.capability@uid=<y> where y is the unmapped kuid.val.
>>
>> Eric,
>>
>> so far my patch hasn't yet hit Linus' tree. Given that, would you
>> mind taking a look and seeing what you think of this approach? If
>> we may decide to go this route, we probably should stop my patch
>> from hitting Linus' tree before we have to continue supporting it.
>
> Agreed. I will take a look. I also want to see how all of this works
> in the context of stackable filesystems. As that is the one case that
> looked like it could be a problem case in your current patchset.
>
Apropos stackable filesystems [cc some overlayfs folks], is there any
way that parts of this work could be generalized towards ns aware
trusted@uid.* xattr?
With overlayfs, files are written to underlying fs with mounter's
credentials. How this affects v3 security capabilities and how exactly
security xattrs are handled in overtlayfs I'm not sure. Vivek?
But, if we had an infrastructure to store trusted@<rootid> xattr, then
unprivileged overlayfs mount would become a very reachable goal.
Much closer goal then loop mounting...
Amir.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 39+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities
2017-06-19 1:13 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-19 13:05 ` Stefan Berger
@ 2017-06-20 6:23 ` Serge E. Hallyn
1 sibling, 0 replies; 39+ messages in thread
From: Serge E. Hallyn @ 2017-06-20 6:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stefan Berger
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn, Eric W. Biederman, Masami Ichikawa, containers,
lkp, xiaolong.ye, LKML, Mimi Zohar
On Sun, Jun 18, 2017 at 09:13:28PM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
> Can you adapt your test cases. I haven't tried them, but having
> them would be important.
branch nsfscaps of github.com/hallyn/ltp now has a patch on top
which makes it work with your capabilities. Tests are passing.
thanks,
-serge
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 39+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities
2017-06-20 5:42 ` Amir Goldstein
@ 2017-06-20 12:19 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-20 17:33 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-20 19:57 ` Vivek Goyal
1 sibling, 1 reply; 39+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2017-06-20 12:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Amir Goldstein, Eric W. Biederman
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn, Mimi Zohar, Linux Containers, LKML, xiaolong.ye,
lkp, Vivek Goyal, Miklos Szeredi
On 06/20/2017 01:42 AM, Amir Goldstein wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 20, 2017 at 12:34 AM, Eric W. Biederman
> <ebiederm@xmission.com> wrote:
>> "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> writes:
>>
>>> Quoting Stefan Berger (stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com):
>>>> On 06/14/2017 11:05 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>>>>> On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 08:27:40AM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
>>>>>> On 06/13/2017 07:55 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>>>>>>> Quoting Stefan Berger (stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com):
>>>>>>>> If all extended
>>>>>>>> attributes were to support this model, maybe the 'uid' could be
>>>>>>>> associated with the 'name' of the xattr rather than its 'value' (not
>>>>>>>> sure whether that's possible).
>>>>>>> Right, I missed that in your original email when I saw it this morning.
>>>>>>> It's not what my patch does, but it's an interesting idea. Do you have
>>>>>>> a patch to that effect? We might even be able to generalize that to
>>>>>> No, I don't have a patch. It may not be possible to implement it.
>>>>>> The xattr_handler's take the name of the xattr as input to get().
>>>>> That may be ok though. Assume the host created a container with
>>>>> 100000 as the uid for root, which created a container with 130000 as
>>>>> uid for root. If root in the nested container tries to read the
>>>>> xattr, the kernel can check for security.foo[130000] first, then
>>>>> security.foo[100000], then security.foo. Or, it can do a listxattr
>>>>> and look for those. Am I overlooking one?
>>>>>
>>>>>> So one could try to encode the mapped uid in the name. However, that
>>>>> I thought that's exactly what you were suggesting in your original
>>>>> email? "security.capability[uid=2000]"
>>>>>
>>>>>> could lead to problems with stale xattrs in a shared filesystem over
>>>>>> time unless one could limit the number of xattrs with the same
>>>>>> prefix, e.g., security.capability*. So I doubt that it would work.
>>>>> Hm. Yeah. But really how many setups are there like that? I.e. if
>>>>> you launch a regular docker or lxd container, the image doesn't do a
>>>>> bind mount of a shared image, it layers something above it or does a
>>>>> copy. What setups do you know of where multiple containers in different
>>>>> user namespaces mount the same filesystem shared and writeable?
>>>> I think I have something now that accomodates userns access to
>>>> security.capability:
>>>>
>>>> https://github.com/stefanberger/linux/commits/xattr_for_userns
>>> Thanks!
>>>
>>>> Encoding of uid is in the attribute name now as follows:
>>>> security.foo@uid=<uid>
>>>>
>>>> 1) The 'plain' security.capability is only r/w accessible from the
>>>> host (init_user_ns).
>>>> 2) When userns reads/writes 'security.capability' it will read/write
>>>> security.capability@uid=<uid> instead, with uid being the uid of
>>>> root , e.g. 1000.
>>>> 3) When listing xattrs for userns the host's security.capability is
>>>> filtered out to avoid read failures iof 'security.capability' if
>>>> security.capability@uid=<uid> is read but not there. (see 1) and 2))
>>>> 4) security.capability* may all be read from anywhere
>>>> 5) security.capability@uid=<uid> may be read or written directly
>>>> from a userns if <uid> matches the uid of root (current_uid())
>>> This looks very close to what we want. One exception - we do want
>>> to support root in a user namespace being able to write
>>> security.capability@uid=<x> where <x> is a valid uid mapped in its
>>> namespace. In that case the name should be rewritten to be
>>> security.capability@uid=<y> where y is the unmapped kuid.val.
>>>
>>> Eric,
>>>
>>> so far my patch hasn't yet hit Linus' tree. Given that, would you
>>> mind taking a look and seeing what you think of this approach? If
>>> we may decide to go this route, we probably should stop my patch
>>> from hitting Linus' tree before we have to continue supporting it.
>> Agreed. I will take a look. I also want to see how all of this works
>> in the context of stackable filesystems. As that is the one case that
>> looked like it could be a problem case in your current patchset.
>>
> Apropos stackable filesystems [cc some overlayfs folks], is there any
> way that parts of this work could be generalized towards ns aware
> trusted@uid.* xattr?
I am at least removing all string comparison with xattr names from the
core code and move the enabled xattr names into a list. For the
security.* extended attribute names we would enumerated the enabled ones
in that list, only security.capability for now. I am not sure how the
trusted.* space works.
Stefan
>
> With overlayfs, files are written to underlying fs with mounter's
> credentials. How this affects v3 security capabilities and how exactly
> security xattrs are handled in overtlayfs I'm not sure. Vivek?
>
> But, if we had an infrastructure to store trusted@<rootid> xattr, then
> unprivileged overlayfs mount would become a very reachable goal.
> Much closer goal then loop mounting...
>
> Amir.
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 39+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities
2017-06-20 12:19 ` Stefan Berger
@ 2017-06-20 17:33 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-20 19:56 ` Amir Goldstein
0 siblings, 1 reply; 39+ messages in thread
From: Stefan Berger @ 2017-06-20 17:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Amir Goldstein, Eric W. Biederman
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn, Mimi Zohar, Linux Containers, LKML, xiaolong.ye,
lkp, Vivek Goyal, Miklos Szeredi
On 06/20/2017 08:19 AM, Stefan Berger wrote:
> On 06/20/2017 01:42 AM, Amir Goldstein wrote:
>> On Tue, Jun 20, 2017 at 12:34 AM, Eric W. Biederman
>> <ebiederm@xmission.com> wrote:
>>> "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> writes:
>>>
>>>> Quoting Stefan Berger (stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com):
>>>>> On 06/14/2017 11:05 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>>>>>> On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 08:27:40AM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
>>>>>>> On 06/13/2017 07:55 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>>>>>>>> Quoting Stefan Berger (stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com):
>>>>>>>>> If all extended
>>>>>>>>> attributes were to support this model, maybe the 'uid' could be
>>>>>>>>> associated with the 'name' of the xattr rather than its
>>>>>>>>> 'value' (not
>>>>>>>>> sure whether that's possible).
>>>>>>>> Right, I missed that in your original email when I saw it this
>>>>>>>> morning.
>>>>>>>> It's not what my patch does, but it's an interesting idea. Do
>>>>>>>> you have
>>>>>>>> a patch to that effect? We might even be able to generalize
>>>>>>>> that to
>>>>>>> No, I don't have a patch. It may not be possible to implement it.
>>>>>>> The xattr_handler's take the name of the xattr as input to get().
>>>>>> That may be ok though. Assume the host created a container with
>>>>>> 100000 as the uid for root, which created a container with 130000 as
>>>>>> uid for root. If root in the nested container tries to read the
>>>>>> xattr, the kernel can check for security.foo[130000] first, then
>>>>>> security.foo[100000], then security.foo. Or, it can do a listxattr
>>>>>> and look for those. Am I overlooking one?
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> So one could try to encode the mapped uid in the name. However,
>>>>>>> that
>>>>>> I thought that's exactly what you were suggesting in your original
>>>>>> email? "security.capability[uid=2000]"
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> could lead to problems with stale xattrs in a shared filesystem
>>>>>>> over
>>>>>>> time unless one could limit the number of xattrs with the same
>>>>>>> prefix, e.g., security.capability*. So I doubt that it would work.
>>>>>> Hm. Yeah. But really how many setups are there like that? I.e. if
>>>>>> you launch a regular docker or lxd container, the image doesn't do a
>>>>>> bind mount of a shared image, it layers something above it or does a
>>>>>> copy. What setups do you know of where multiple containers in
>>>>>> different
>>>>>> user namespaces mount the same filesystem shared and writeable?
>>>>> I think I have something now that accomodates userns access to
>>>>> security.capability:
>>>>>
>>>>> https://github.com/stefanberger/linux/commits/xattr_for_userns
>>>> Thanks!
>>>>
>>>>> Encoding of uid is in the attribute name now as follows:
>>>>> security.foo@uid=<uid>
>>>>>
>>>>> 1) The 'plain' security.capability is only r/w accessible from the
>>>>> host (init_user_ns).
>>>>> 2) When userns reads/writes 'security.capability' it will read/write
>>>>> security.capability@uid=<uid> instead, with uid being the uid of
>>>>> root , e.g. 1000.
>>>>> 3) When listing xattrs for userns the host's security.capability is
>>>>> filtered out to avoid read failures iof 'security.capability' if
>>>>> security.capability@uid=<uid> is read but not there. (see 1) and 2))
>>>>> 4) security.capability* may all be read from anywhere
>>>>> 5) security.capability@uid=<uid> may be read or written directly
>>>>> from a userns if <uid> matches the uid of root (current_uid())
>>>> This looks very close to what we want. One exception - we do want
>>>> to support root in a user namespace being able to write
>>>> security.capability@uid=<x> where <x> is a valid uid mapped in its
>>>> namespace. In that case the name should be rewritten to be
>>>> security.capability@uid=<y> where y is the unmapped kuid.val.
>>>>
>>>> Eric,
>>>>
>>>> so far my patch hasn't yet hit Linus' tree. Given that, would you
>>>> mind taking a look and seeing what you think of this approach? If
>>>> we may decide to go this route, we probably should stop my patch
>>>> from hitting Linus' tree before we have to continue supporting it.
>>> Agreed. I will take a look. I also want to see how all of this works
>>> in the context of stackable filesystems. As that is the one case that
>>> looked like it could be a problem case in your current patchset.
>>>
>> Apropos stackable filesystems [cc some overlayfs folks], is there any
>> way that parts of this work could be generalized towards ns aware
>> trusted@uid.* xattr?
>
> I am at least removing all string comparison with xattr names from the
> core code and move the enabled xattr names into a list. For the
> security.* extended attribute names we would enumerated the enabled
> ones in that list, only security.capability for now. I am not sure how
> the trusted.* space works.
I extended 'the infrastructure' now to support prefix matching for
trusted.* and probably others as well. It's fairly easy to do that but
would not write the code like that for exact string matching to support
security.capability. The patch lets me write trusted.foo@uid=100 from
within the userns if uid=100 exists, rejects it otherwise. It may be
written out as trusted.foo@uid=1100 for root mapping to uid 1000. I can
list this entry on the host. For some reason trusted.* is not listed at
all inside the userns. So something else needs to be enabled as well.
For now it looks like this:
https://github.com/stefanberger/linux/commit/8ae131e731c9e1def92a2100697632ea35e007d0
Regards,
Stefan
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 39+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities
2017-06-20 17:33 ` Stefan Berger
@ 2017-06-20 19:56 ` Amir Goldstein
0 siblings, 0 replies; 39+ messages in thread
From: Amir Goldstein @ 2017-06-20 19:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Stefan Berger
Cc: Eric W. Biederman, Serge E. Hallyn, Mimi Zohar, Linux Containers,
LKML, xiaolong.ye, lkp, Vivek Goyal, Miklos Szeredi
On Tue, Jun 20, 2017 at 8:33 PM, Stefan Berger
<stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com> wrote:
> On 06/20/2017 08:19 AM, Stefan Berger wrote:
>>
>> On 06/20/2017 01:42 AM, Amir Goldstein wrote:
>>>>
>>> Apropos stackable filesystems [cc some overlayfs folks], is there any
>>> way that parts of this work could be generalized towards ns aware
>>> trusted@uid.* xattr?
>>
>>
>> I am at least removing all string comparison with xattr names from the
>> core code and move the enabled xattr names into a list. For the security.*
>> extended attribute names we would enumerated the enabled ones in that list,
>> only security.capability for now. I am not sure how the trusted.* space
>> works.
>
>
> I extended 'the infrastructure' now to support prefix matching for trusted.*
> and probably others as well. It's fairly easy to do that but would not write
> the code like that for exact string matching to support security.capability.
> The patch lets me write trusted.foo@uid=100 from within the userns if
> uid=100 exists, rejects it otherwise. It may be written out as
> trusted.foo@uid=1100 for root mapping to uid 1000. I can list this entry on
> the host. For some reason trusted.* is not listed at all inside the userns.
> So something else needs to be enabled as well. For now it looks like this:
>
>
> https://github.com/stefanberger/linux/commit/8ae131e731c9e1def92a2100697632ea35e007d0
>
That looks useful!
I hope someone who knows his way around trusted xattr can say what's missing.
Thanks,
Amir.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 39+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v4] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities
2017-06-20 5:42 ` Amir Goldstein
2017-06-20 12:19 ` Stefan Berger
@ 2017-06-20 19:57 ` Vivek Goyal
1 sibling, 0 replies; 39+ messages in thread
From: Vivek Goyal @ 2017-06-20 19:57 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Amir Goldstein
Cc: Eric W. Biederman, Serge E. Hallyn, Stefan Berger, Mimi Zohar,
Linux Containers, LKML, xiaolong.ye, lkp, Miklos Szeredi
On Tue, Jun 20, 2017 at 08:42:45AM +0300, Amir Goldstein wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 20, 2017 at 12:34 AM, Eric W. Biederman
> <ebiederm@xmission.com> wrote:
> > "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> writes:
> >
> >> Quoting Stefan Berger (stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com):
> >>> On 06/14/2017 11:05 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> >>> >On Wed, Jun 14, 2017 at 08:27:40AM -0400, Stefan Berger wrote:
> >>> >>On 06/13/2017 07:55 PM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> >>> >>>Quoting Stefan Berger (stefanb@linux.vnet.ibm.com):
> >>> >>>> If all extended
> >>> >>>>attributes were to support this model, maybe the 'uid' could be
> >>> >>>>associated with the 'name' of the xattr rather than its 'value' (not
> >>> >>>>sure whether that's possible).
> >>> >>>Right, I missed that in your original email when I saw it this morning.
> >>> >>>It's not what my patch does, but it's an interesting idea. Do you have
> >>> >>>a patch to that effect? We might even be able to generalize that to
> >>> >>No, I don't have a patch. It may not be possible to implement it.
> >>> >>The xattr_handler's take the name of the xattr as input to get().
> >>> >That may be ok though. Assume the host created a container with
> >>> >100000 as the uid for root, which created a container with 130000 as
> >>> >uid for root. If root in the nested container tries to read the
> >>> >xattr, the kernel can check for security.foo[130000] first, then
> >>> >security.foo[100000], then security.foo. Or, it can do a listxattr
> >>> >and look for those. Am I overlooking one?
> >>> >
> >>> >>So one could try to encode the mapped uid in the name. However, that
> >>> >I thought that's exactly what you were suggesting in your original
> >>> >email? "security.capability[uid=2000]"
> >>> >
> >>> >>could lead to problems with stale xattrs in a shared filesystem over
> >>> >>time unless one could limit the number of xattrs with the same
> >>> >>prefix, e.g., security.capability*. So I doubt that it would work.
> >>> >Hm. Yeah. But really how many setups are there like that? I.e. if
> >>> >you launch a regular docker or lxd container, the image doesn't do a
> >>> >bind mount of a shared image, it layers something above it or does a
> >>> >copy. What setups do you know of where multiple containers in different
> >>> >user namespaces mount the same filesystem shared and writeable?
> >>>
> >>> I think I have something now that accomodates userns access to
> >>> security.capability:
> >>>
> >>> https://github.com/stefanberger/linux/commits/xattr_for_userns
> >>
> >> Thanks!
> >>
> >>> Encoding of uid is in the attribute name now as follows:
> >>> security.foo@uid=<uid>
> >>>
> >>> 1) The 'plain' security.capability is only r/w accessible from the
> >>> host (init_user_ns).
> >>> 2) When userns reads/writes 'security.capability' it will read/write
> >>> security.capability@uid=<uid> instead, with uid being the uid of
> >>> root , e.g. 1000.
> >>> 3) When listing xattrs for userns the host's security.capability is
> >>> filtered out to avoid read failures iof 'security.capability' if
> >>> security.capability@uid=<uid> is read but not there. (see 1) and 2))
> >>> 4) security.capability* may all be read from anywhere
> >>> 5) security.capability@uid=<uid> may be read or written directly
> >>> from a userns if <uid> matches the uid of root (current_uid())
> >>
> >> This looks very close to what we want. One exception - we do want
> >> to support root in a user namespace being able to write
> >> security.capability@uid=<x> where <x> is a valid uid mapped in its
> >> namespace. In that case the name should be rewritten to be
> >> security.capability@uid=<y> where y is the unmapped kuid.val.
> >>
> >> Eric,
> >>
> >> so far my patch hasn't yet hit Linus' tree. Given that, would you
> >> mind taking a look and seeing what you think of this approach? If
> >> we may decide to go this route, we probably should stop my patch
> >> from hitting Linus' tree before we have to continue supporting it.
> >
> > Agreed. I will take a look. I also want to see how all of this works
> > in the context of stackable filesystems. As that is the one case that
> > looked like it could be a problem case in your current patchset.
> >
>
> Apropos stackable filesystems [cc some overlayfs folks], is there any
> way that parts of this work could be generalized towards ns aware
> trusted@uid.* xattr?
>
> With overlayfs, files are written to underlying fs with mounter's
> credentials.
We do switch to mounter's credential for privileged operations but
for a newly created file final selinux label is created as if task
created that file.
>How this affects v3 security capabilities and how exactly
> security xattrs are handled in overtlayfs I'm not sure. Vivek?
Given we switch to mounter's creds for operations on underlying
filesystem (setxattr, getxattr), I thought that it probably
will call xattr_userns_name() in nested manner. Once using tasks's
creds and second time using mounter's creds. So that probably
should have made it security.foo@uid@uid. I tried patches quickly
but setcap/getcap inside containers work. So may be it is
due to the fact that mounting was done from init_user_ns and
following line of code will avoid adding @uid in that case.
+ /* no name changes for init_user_ns or uid == 0 */
+ if (current_user_ns() == &init_user_ns || uid.val == 0)
+ goto out_copy;
+
I have not looked deeper. Still curious how getxattr() path works
when we switch to mounter's creds. In that case underlying file
system will get the impression that mounter task is trying to
do getxattr() in security.capability set by container task. I
am assuming we allow that?
I need to spend more time understanding this.
Vivek
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 39+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2017-06-20 19:57 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 39+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2017-05-07 9:21 64fa03de33: BUG:Dentry_still_in_use kernel test robot
2017-05-08 4:44 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-05-08 11:47 ` Masami Ichikawa
2017-05-08 15:49 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-05-08 18:11 ` [PATCH v4] Introduce v3 namespaced file capabilities Serge E. Hallyn
2017-05-09 16:55 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-05-09 20:37 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-05-09 22:27 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-06-13 15:47 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-13 17:14 ` Tycho Andersen
2017-06-13 17:42 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-13 20:51 ` Tycho Andersen
2017-06-13 17:45 ` James Bottomley
2017-06-13 20:46 ` Tycho Andersen
2017-06-13 20:49 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-13 20:53 ` Tycho Andersen
2017-06-13 20:58 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-13 20:59 ` Mimi Zohar
2017-06-13 21:09 ` Tycho Andersen
2017-06-13 17:18 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-13 18:12 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-13 23:55 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-14 12:27 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-15 3:05 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-16 9:02 ` Christian Brauner
2017-06-16 22:24 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-17 20:56 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-18 22:14 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-19 1:13 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-19 13:05 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-20 6:23 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-19 21:34 ` Eric W. Biederman
2017-06-20 5:42 ` Amir Goldstein
2017-06-20 12:19 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-20 17:33 ` Stefan Berger
2017-06-20 19:56 ` Amir Goldstein
2017-06-20 19:57 ` Vivek Goyal
2017-06-13 23:42 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2017-06-13 23:50 ` Serge E. Hallyn
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