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From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com>
Cc: tony.luck@intel.com, ak@linux.intel.com,
	chang.seok.bae@intel.com, x86@kernel.org,
	Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, luto@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v10 00/18] Enable FSGSBASE instructions
Date: Sun, 10 May 2020 12:15:34 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87h7wo3xkp.fsf@nanos.tec.linutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <d7111932-6ba5-1484-4347-210d9e80316f@oracle.com>

Vegard Nossum <vegard.nossum@oracle.com> writes:
> On 5/10/20 10:09 AM, Vegard Nossum wrote:
>
> I spoke a few minutes too soon. Just hit this, if anybody wants to have
> a look:
>
> [ 6402.786418] ------------[ cut here ]------------
> [ 6402.787769] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 13802 at arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:811 
> do_debug+0x16c/0x210

> [ 6402.820353] Call Trace:
> [ 6402.821043]  <#DB>
> [ 6402.821622]  debug+0x37/0x70
> [ 6402.822449] RIP: 0010:arch_stack_walk_user+0x79/0x110

That's a cute way to trigger that WARN_ON in the #DB handler.

> [ 6402.816468] DR0: 0000000000000001 DR1: 0000000040006070 DR2: 00007ffff7ffd000
> [ 6402.818406] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000003b3062a

#DB recursion

  [ 6402.832288] RDX: 0000000040006073 

27:	48 8b 1a      mov    (%rdx),%rbx

Breakpoint on user space stack, #DB triggers and the low level ASM
irqflags tracepoint has stacktrace enabled which unwinds into the user
stack and triggers #DB again.

Bah. I know why I want to ban all that tracing muck from low level entry code.

> It might not be related to the patch set, mind.

It's unrelated.

Thanks,

        tglx

  reply	other threads:[~2020-05-10 10:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-04-23 23:21 Sasha Levin
2020-04-23 23:21 ` [PATCH v10 01/18] x86/ptrace: Prevent ptrace from clearing the FS/GS selector Sasha Levin
2020-04-25 22:46   ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-04-23 23:21 ` [PATCH v10 02/18] selftests/x86/fsgsbase: Test GS selector on ptracer-induced GS base write Sasha Levin
2020-04-23 23:21 ` [PATCH v10 03/18] x86/cpu: Add 'unsafe_fsgsbase' to enable CR4.FSGSBASE Sasha Levin
2020-04-23 23:21 ` [PATCH v10 04/18] x86/entry/64: Clean up paranoid exit Sasha Levin
2020-04-23 23:21 ` [PATCH v10 05/18] x86/entry/64: Switch CR3 before SWAPGS in paranoid entry Sasha Levin
2020-04-23 23:21 ` [PATCH v10 06/18] x86/entry/64: Introduce the FIND_PERCPU_BASE macro Sasha Levin
2020-04-23 23:21 ` [PATCH v10 07/18] x86/entry/64: Handle FSGSBASE enabled paranoid entry/exit Sasha Levin
2020-04-23 23:21 ` [PATCH v10 08/18] x86/entry/64: Document GSBASE handling in the paranoid path Sasha Levin
2020-04-23 23:21 ` [PATCH v10 09/18] x86/fsgsbase/64: Add intrinsics for FSGSBASE instructions Sasha Levin
2020-04-23 23:21 ` [PATCH v10 10/18] x86/fsgsbase/64: Enable FSGSBASE instructions in helper functions Sasha Levin
2020-04-23 23:22 ` [PATCH v10 11/18] x86/fsgsbase/64: Use FSGSBASE in switch_to() if available Sasha Levin
2020-04-23 23:22 ` [PATCH v10 12/18] x86/fsgsbase/64: move save_fsgs to header file Sasha Levin
2020-04-23 23:22 ` [PATCH v10 13/18] x86/fsgsbase/64: Use FSGSBASE instructions on thread copy and ptrace Sasha Levin
2020-04-23 23:22 ` [PATCH v10 14/18] x86/speculation/swapgs: Check FSGSBASE in enabling SWAPGS mitigation Sasha Levin
2020-04-23 23:22 ` [PATCH v10 15/18] selftests/x86/fsgsbase: Test ptracer-induced GS base write with FSGSBASE Sasha Levin
2020-04-23 23:22 ` [PATCH v10 16/18] x86/fsgsbase/64: Enable FSGSBASE on 64bit by default and add a chicken bit Sasha Levin
2020-04-23 23:22 ` [PATCH v10 17/18] x86/elf: Enumerate kernel FSGSBASE capability in AT_HWCAP2 Sasha Levin
2020-04-23 23:22 ` [PATCH v10 18/18] Documentation/x86/64: Add documentation for GS/FS addressing mode Sasha Levin
2020-05-10  8:09 ` [PATCH v10 00/18] Enable FSGSBASE instructions Vegard Nossum
2020-05-10  8:29   ` Vegard Nossum
2020-05-10 10:15     ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
2020-05-10 14:17       ` Sasha Levin
2020-05-11  0:48     ` Andi Kleen
2020-05-11  0:50       ` Andi Kleen
2020-05-11  5:03         ` Sasha Levin

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