From: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
To: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: "Yongji Xie" <xieyongji@bytedance.com>,
"Stefan Hajnoczi" <stefanha@redhat.com>,
"Stefano Garzarella" <sgarzare@redhat.com>,
"Parav Pandit" <parav@nvidia.com>,
"Christoph Hellwig" <hch@infradead.org>,
"Christian Brauner" <christian.brauner@canonical.com>,
"Randy Dunlap" <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
"Matthew Wilcox" <willy@infradead.org>,
"Al Viro" <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
"Jens Axboe" <axboe@kernel.dk>,
bcrl@kvack.org, "Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Mika Penttilä" <mika.penttila@nextfour.com>,
"Dan Carpenter" <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>,
joro@8bytes.org,
virtualization <virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org>,
netdev <netdev@vger.kernel.org>, kvm <kvm@vger.kernel.org>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org,
linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 00/12] Introduce VDUSE - vDPA Device in Userspace
Date: Tue, 25 May 2021 15:11:25 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CACGkMEsg1X95nmnVsm9x8vML7EUOE195gQrvRdr+3woOEcNBeA@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210525024500-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org>
On Tue, May 25, 2021 at 2:48 PM Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> On Tue, May 25, 2021 at 02:40:57PM +0800, Jason Wang wrote:
> >
> > 在 2021/5/20 下午5:06, Yongji Xie 写道:
> > > On Thu, May 20, 2021 at 2:06 PM Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> wrote:
> > > > On Mon, May 17, 2021 at 05:55:01PM +0800, Xie Yongji wrote:
> > > > > This series introduces a framework, which can be used to implement
> > > > > vDPA Devices in a userspace program. The work consist of two parts:
> > > > > control path forwarding and data path offloading.
> > > > >
> > > > > In the control path, the VDUSE driver will make use of message
> > > > > mechnism to forward the config operation from vdpa bus driver
> > > > > to userspace. Userspace can use read()/write() to receive/reply
> > > > > those control messages.
> > > > >
> > > > > In the data path, the core is mapping dma buffer into VDUSE
> > > > > daemon's address space, which can be implemented in different ways
> > > > > depending on the vdpa bus to which the vDPA device is attached.
> > > > >
> > > > > In virtio-vdpa case, we implements a MMU-based on-chip IOMMU driver with
> > > > > bounce-buffering mechanism to achieve that. And in vhost-vdpa case, the dma
> > > > > buffer is reside in a userspace memory region which can be shared to the
> > > > > VDUSE userspace processs via transferring the shmfd.
> > > > >
> > > > > The details and our user case is shown below:
> > > > >
> > > > > ------------------------ ------------------------- ----------------------------------------------
> > > > > | Container | | QEMU(VM) | | VDUSE daemon |
> > > > > | --------- | | ------------------- | | ------------------------- ---------------- |
> > > > > | |dev/vdx| | | |/dev/vhost-vdpa-x| | | | vDPA device emulation | | block driver | |
> > > > > ------------+----------- -----------+------------ -------------+----------------------+---------
> > > > > | | | |
> > > > > | | | |
> > > > > ------------+---------------------------+----------------------------+----------------------+---------
> > > > > | | block device | | vhost device | | vduse driver | | TCP/IP | |
> > > > > | -------+-------- --------+-------- -------+-------- -----+---- |
> > > > > | | | | | |
> > > > > | ----------+---------- ----------+----------- -------+------- | |
> > > > > | | virtio-blk driver | | vhost-vdpa driver | | vdpa device | | |
> > > > > | ----------+---------- ----------+----------- -------+------- | |
> > > > > | | virtio bus | | | |
> > > > > | --------+----+----------- | | | |
> > > > > | | | | | |
> > > > > | ----------+---------- | | | |
> > > > > | | virtio-blk device | | | | |
> > > > > | ----------+---------- | | | |
> > > > > | | | | | |
> > > > > | -----------+----------- | | | |
> > > > > | | virtio-vdpa driver | | | | |
> > > > > | -----------+----------- | | | |
> > > > > | | | | vdpa bus | |
> > > > > | -----------+----------------------+---------------------------+------------ | |
> > > > > | ---+--- |
> > > > > -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| NIC |------
> > > > > ---+---
> > > > > |
> > > > > ---------+---------
> > > > > | Remote Storages |
> > > > > -------------------
> > > > >
> > > > > We make use of it to implement a block device connecting to
> > > > > our distributed storage, which can be used both in containers and
> > > > > VMs. Thus, we can have an unified technology stack in this two cases.
> > > > >
> > > > > To test it with null-blk:
> > > > >
> > > > > $ qemu-storage-daemon \
> > > > > --chardev socket,id=charmonitor,path=/tmp/qmp.sock,server,nowait \
> > > > > --monitor chardev=charmonitor \
> > > > > --blockdev driver=host_device,cache.direct=on,aio=native,filename=/dev/nullb0,node-name=disk0 \
> > > > > --export type=vduse-blk,id=test,node-name=disk0,writable=on,name=vduse-null,num-queues=16,queue-size=128
> > > > >
> > > > > The qemu-storage-daemon can be found at https://github.com/bytedance/qemu/tree/vduse
> > > > >
> > > > > To make the userspace VDUSE processes such as qemu-storage-daemon able to
> > > > > run unprivileged. We did some works on virtio driver to avoid trusting
> > > > > device, including:
> > > > >
> > > > > - validating the device status:
> > > > >
> > > > > * https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210517093428.670-1-xieyongji@bytedance.com/
> > > > >
> > > > > - validating the used length:
> > > > >
> > > > > * https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210517090836.533-1-xieyongji@bytedance.com/
> > > > >
> > > > > - validating the device config:
> > > > >
> > > > > * patch 4 ("virtio-blk: Add validation for block size in config space")
> > > > >
> > > > > - validating the device response:
> > > > >
> > > > > * patch 5 ("virtio_scsi: Add validation for residual bytes from response")
> > > > >
> > > > > Since I'm not sure if I missing something during auditing, especially on some
> > > > > virtio device drivers that I'm not familiar with, now we only support emualting
> > > > > a few vDPA devices by default, including: virtio-net device, virtio-blk device,
> > > > > virtio-scsi device and virtio-fs device. This limitation can help to reduce
> > > > > security risks.
> > > > I suspect there are a lot of assumptions even with these 4.
> > > > Just what are the security assumptions and guarantees here?
> >
> >
> > Note that VDUSE is not the only device that may suffer from this, here're
> > two others:
> >
> > 1) Encrypted VM
>
> Encrypted VMs are generally understood not to be fully
> protected from attacks by a malicious hypervisor. For example
> a DoS by a hypervisor is currently trivial.
Right, but I mainly meant the emulated virtio-net device in the case
of an encrypted VM. We should not leak information to the
device/hypervisor.
>
> > 2) Smart NICs
>
> More or less the same thing.
In my opinion, this is more similar to VDUSE. Without an encrypted VM,
we trust the hypervisor but not the device so DOS from a device should
be eliminated.
Thanks
>
>
> >
> > > The attack surface from a virtio device is limited with IOMMU enabled.
> > > It should be able to avoid security risk if we can validate all data
> > > such as config space and used length from device in device driver.
> > >
> > > > E.g. it seems pretty clear that exposing a malformed FS
> > > > to a random kernel config can cause untold mischief.
> > > >
> > > > Things like virtnet_send_command are also an easy way for
> > > > the device to DOS the kernel.
> >
> >
> > I think the virtnet_send_command() needs to use interrupt instead of
> > polling.
> >
> > Thanks
> >
> >
> > > > And before you try to add
> > > > an arbitrary timeout there - please don't,
> > > > the fix is moving things that must be guaranteed into kernel
> > > > and making things that are not guaranteed asynchronous.
> > > > Right now there are some things that happen with locks taken,
> > > > where if we don't wait for device we lose the ability to report failures
> > > > to userspace. E.g. all kind of netlink things are like this.
> > > > One can think of a bunch of ways to address this, this
> > > > needs to be discussed with the relevant subsystem maintainers.
> > > >
> > > >
> > > > If I were you I would start with one type of device, and as simple one
> > > > as possible.
> > > >
> > > Make sense to me. The virtio-blk device might be a good start. We
> > > already have some existing interface like NBD to do similar things.
> > >
> > > >
> > > > > When a sysadmin trusts the userspace process enough, it can relax
> > > > > the limitation with a 'allow_unsafe_device_emulation' module parameter.
> > > > That's not a great security interface. It's a global module specific knob
> > > > that just allows any userspace to emulate anything at all.
> > > > Coming up with a reasonable interface isn't going to be easy.
> > > > For now maybe just have people patch their kernels if they want to
> > > > move fast and break things.
> > > >
> > > OK. A reasonable interface can be added if we need it in the future.
> > >
> > > Thanks,
> > > Yongji
>
prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-05-25 7:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 51+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-05-17 9:55 [PATCH v7 00/12] Introduce VDUSE - vDPA Device in Userspace Xie Yongji
2021-05-17 9:55 ` [PATCH v7 01/12] iova: Export alloc_iova_fast() Xie Yongji
2021-05-26 2:36 ` Jason Wang
2021-05-26 2:43 ` Yongji Xie
2021-05-17 9:55 ` [PATCH v7 02/12] file: Export receive_fd() to modules Xie Yongji
2021-05-20 6:18 ` Al Viro
2021-05-20 6:32 ` Yongji Xie
2021-05-17 9:55 ` [PATCH v7 03/12] eventfd: Increase the recursion depth of eventfd_signal() Xie Yongji
2021-05-17 9:55 ` [PATCH v7 04/12] virtio-blk: Add validation for block size in config space Xie Yongji
2021-05-19 13:39 ` Yongji Xie
2021-05-19 14:42 ` Dan Carpenter
2021-05-20 5:25 ` Yongji Xie
2021-05-20 5:43 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-05-20 7:08 ` Yongji Xie
2021-05-17 9:55 ` [PATCH v7 05/12] virtio_scsi: Add validation for residual bytes from response Xie Yongji
2021-05-26 2:41 ` Jason Wang
2021-05-17 9:55 ` [PATCH v7 06/12] vhost-iotlb: Add an opaque pointer for vhost IOTLB Xie Yongji
2021-05-17 9:55 ` [PATCH v7 07/12] vdpa: Add an opaque pointer for vdpa_config_ops.dma_map() Xie Yongji
2021-05-17 9:55 ` [PATCH v7 08/12] vdpa: factor out vhost_vdpa_pa_map() and vhost_vdpa_pa_unmap() Xie Yongji
2021-05-17 9:55 ` [PATCH v7 09/12] vdpa: Support transferring virtual addressing during DMA mapping Xie Yongji
2021-05-17 9:55 ` [PATCH v7 10/12] vduse: Implement an MMU-based IOMMU driver Xie Yongji
2021-05-17 9:55 ` [PATCH v7 11/12] vduse: Introduce VDUSE - vDPA Device in Userspace Xie Yongji
2021-05-20 6:28 ` Al Viro
2021-05-20 7:03 ` Yongji Xie
2021-05-27 4:12 ` Jason Wang
2021-05-27 4:57 ` Yongji Xie
2021-05-27 5:00 ` Jason Wang
2021-05-27 5:08 ` Yongji Xie
2021-05-27 5:40 ` Jason Wang
2021-05-27 7:34 ` Yongji Xie
2021-05-27 8:41 ` Jason Wang
2021-05-27 8:43 ` Jason Wang
2021-05-27 10:14 ` Yongji Xie
2021-05-28 1:33 ` Jason Wang
2021-05-28 3:54 ` Yongji Xie
2021-05-28 6:38 ` Jason Wang
2021-05-27 13:17 ` Yongji Xie
2021-05-28 2:31 ` Jason Wang
2021-05-31 4:27 ` Yongji Xie
2021-05-31 4:38 ` Jason Wang
2021-05-31 6:24 ` Yongji Xie
2021-05-31 4:56 ` Greg KH
2021-05-31 6:19 ` Yongji Xie
2021-05-31 6:32 ` Greg KH
2021-05-31 7:13 ` Yongji Xie
2021-05-17 9:55 ` [PATCH v7 12/12] Documentation: Add documentation for VDUSE Xie Yongji
2021-05-20 6:06 ` [PATCH v7 00/12] Introduce VDUSE - vDPA Device in Userspace Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-05-20 9:06 ` Yongji Xie
2021-05-25 6:40 ` Jason Wang
2021-05-25 6:48 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2021-05-25 7:11 ` Jason Wang [this message]
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