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From: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
To: David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com>,
	Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@google.com>
Cc: syzbot+72473edc9bf4eb1c6556@syzkaller.appspotmail.com,
	Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>,
	Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>,
	"open list:HID CORE LAYER" <linux-input@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: BUG: GPF in non-whitelisted uaccess (non-canonical address?)
Date: Wed, 14 Nov 2018 08:52:46 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CACT4Y+b8801QqLe4axBct-cZ2a-jr2S2=MSRhg7rV20bPvUHxQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CANq1E4T6+bacZ9iGREtWiyM8eUkAQoxhgFM6rPrzNRkzAcnfJg@mail.gmail.com>

On Wed, Nov 14, 2018 at 4:20 AM, David Herrmann <dh.herrmann@gmail.com> wrote:
> Hey
>
> On Wed, Nov 14, 2018 at 1:25 AM syzbot
> <syzbot+72473edc9bf4eb1c6556@syzkaller.appspotmail.com> wrote:
>> syzbot has found a reproducer for the following crash on:
>>
>> HEAD commit:    ccda4af0f4b9 Linux 4.20-rc2
>> git tree:       upstream
>> console output: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/log.txt?x=13b4e77b400000
>> kernel config:  https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/.config?x=4a0a89f12ca9b0f5
>> dashboard link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=72473edc9bf4eb1c6556
>> compiler:       gcc (GCC) 8.0.1 20180413 (experimental)
>> syz repro:      https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.syz?x=1646a225400000
>> C reproducer:   https://syzkaller.appspot.com/x/repro.c?x=108a6533400000
>>
>> IMPORTANT: if you fix the bug, please add the following tag to the commit:
>> Reported-by: syzbot+72473edc9bf4eb1c6556@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
>>
> [...]
>> BUG: GPF in non-whitelisted uaccess (non-canonical address?)
>
> This uses sendpage(2) to feed data from a file into a uhid chardev.
> The default behavior of the kernel is to create a temporary pipe, then
> splice from the file into the pipe, and then splice again from the
> pipe into uhid.
>
> The kernel provides default implementations for splicing between files
> and any other file. The default implementation of `.splice_write()`
> uses kmap() to map the page from the pipe and then uses the
> __kernel_write() (which uses .f_op->write()) to push the data into the
> target file. The problem is, __kernel_write() sets the address-space
> to KERNEL_DS `set_fs(get_ds())`, thus granting the UHID request access
> to kernel memory.
>
> I see several ways to fix that, the most simple solution is to simply
> prevent splice/sendpage on uhid (by setting f_op.splice_write to a
> dummy). Alternatively, we can implement a proper splice helper that
> takes the page directly, rather than through the __kernel_write()
> default implementation.

also +dtor for uhid

  reply	other threads:[~2018-11-14 16:53 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-11-11 18:26 BUG: GPF in non-whitelisted uaccess (non-canonical address?) syzbot
2018-11-14  0:25 ` syzbot
2018-11-14 12:20   ` David Herrmann
2018-11-14 16:52     ` Dmitry Vyukov [this message]
2018-11-14 17:14       ` Eric Biggers
2018-11-14 18:02         ` [PATCH] HID: uhid: prevent uhid_char_write() under KERNEL_DS Eric Biggers
2018-11-14 18:14           ` Dmitry Torokhov
2018-11-14 18:18           ` Jann Horn
2018-11-14 21:54             ` Eric Biggers
2018-11-14 21:55             ` [PATCH v2] HID: uhid: forbid UHID_CREATE under KERNEL_DS or elevated privileges Eric Biggers
2018-11-14 22:04               ` Jann Horn
2018-11-14 22:28                 ` Dmitry Torokhov
2018-11-14 22:37                   ` Jann Horn
2018-11-14 22:46                     ` Dmitry Torokhov
2018-11-15  0:39                       ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-14 23:00                   ` Eric Biggers
2018-11-14 23:20                     ` Dmitry Torokhov
2018-11-15  8:14                       ` Benjamin Tissoires
2018-11-15 12:06                         ` David Herrmann
2018-11-15 14:50                           ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-15 12:09               ` David Herrmann
2018-11-15 14:49                 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-19 12:52               ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-19 13:21                 ` David Herrmann
2018-11-19 13:26                   ` Jiri Kosina

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