From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
To: Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@google.com>
Cc: jannh@google.com, ebiggers@kernel.org,
dh.herrmann@googlemail.com, Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>,
Benjamin Tissoires <benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com>,
"open list:HID CORE LAYER" <linux-input@vger.kernel.org>,
lkml <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com,
Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>,
syzbot+72473edc9bf4eb1c6556@syzkaller.appspotmail.com,
stable@vger.kernel.org, luto@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] HID: uhid: forbid UHID_CREATE under KERNEL_DS or elevated privileges
Date: Wed, 14 Nov 2018 16:39:41 -0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <D1DFB962-DAC7-4CD6-A627-4A69062EDDE5@amacapital.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAE_wzQ91=FQ1HYYvbOi5R5VSXjJibLwYWsAPFtvUemPa9+Turg@mail.gmail.com>
> On Nov 14, 2018, at 2:46 PM, Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@google.com> wrote:
>
>> On Wed, Nov 14, 2018 at 2:38 PM Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> wrote:
>>
>>> On Wed, Nov 14, 2018 at 11:29 PM Dmitry Torokhov <dtor@google.com> wrote:
>>>> On Wed, Nov 14, 2018 at 2:05 PM Jann Horn <jannh@google.com> wrote:
>>>>> On Wed, Nov 14, 2018 at 10:55 PM Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> wrote:
>>>>> When a UHID_CREATE command is written to the uhid char device, a
>>>>> copy_from_user() is done from a user pointer embedded in the command.
>>>>> When the address limit is KERNEL_DS, e.g. as is the case during
>>>>> sys_sendfile(), this can read from kernel memory. Alternatively,
>>>>> information can be leaked from a setuid binary that is tricked to write
>>>>> to the file descriptor. Therefore, forbid UHID_CREATE in these cases.
>>>>>
>>>>> No other commands in uhid_char_write() are affected by this bug and
>>>>> UHID_CREATE is marked as "obsolete", so apply the restriction to
>>>>> UHID_CREATE only rather than to uhid_char_write() entirely.
>> [...]
>>>>> diff --git a/drivers/hid/uhid.c b/drivers/hid/uhid.c
>> [...]
>>>>> @@ -722,6 +723,17 @@ static ssize_t uhid_char_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
>>>>>
>>>>> switch (uhid->input_buf.type) {
>>>>> case UHID_CREATE:
>>>>> + /*
>>>>> + * 'struct uhid_create_req' contains a __user pointer which is
>>>>> + * copied from, so it's unsafe to allow this with elevated
>>>>> + * privileges (e.g. from a setuid binary) or via kernel_write().
>>>>> + */
>>>
>>> uhid is a privileged interface so we would go from root to less
>>> privileged (if at all). If non-privileged process can open uhid it can
>>> construct virtual keyboard and inject whatever keystrokes it wants.
>>>
>>> Also, instead of disallowing access, can we ensure that we switch back
>>> to USER_DS before trying to load data from the user pointer?
>>
>> Does that even make sense? You are using some deprecated legacy
>> interface; you interact with it by splicing a request from something
>> like a file or a pipe into the uhid device; but the request you're
>> splicing through contains a pointer into userspace memory? Do you know
>> of anyone who is actually doing that? If not, anyone who does want to
>> do this for some reason in the future can just go use UHID_CREATE2
>> instead.
>
> I do not know if anyone is still using UHID_CREATE with sendpage and
> neither do you really. It is all about not breaking userspace without
> good reason and here ensuring that we switch to USER_DS and then back
> to whatever it was does not seem too hard.
It’s about not breaking userspace *except as needed for security fixes*. User pointers in a write() payload is a big no-no.
Also, that f_cred hack is only barely enough. This isn’t just about attacking suid things — this bug allows poking at the address space of an unsuspecting process. So, if a privileged program opens a uhid fd and is then tricked into writing untrusted data to the same fd (which is supposed to be safe), then we have a problem. Fortunately, identically privileged programs usually still don’t share a cred pointer unless they came from the right place.
The real right fix is to remove UHID_CREATE outright. This is terminally broken.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-11-15 0:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 25+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-11-11 18:26 BUG: GPF in non-whitelisted uaccess (non-canonical address?) syzbot
2018-11-14 0:25 ` syzbot
2018-11-14 12:20 ` David Herrmann
2018-11-14 16:52 ` Dmitry Vyukov
2018-11-14 17:14 ` Eric Biggers
2018-11-14 18:02 ` [PATCH] HID: uhid: prevent uhid_char_write() under KERNEL_DS Eric Biggers
2018-11-14 18:14 ` Dmitry Torokhov
2018-11-14 18:18 ` Jann Horn
2018-11-14 21:54 ` Eric Biggers
2018-11-14 21:55 ` [PATCH v2] HID: uhid: forbid UHID_CREATE under KERNEL_DS or elevated privileges Eric Biggers
2018-11-14 22:04 ` Jann Horn
2018-11-14 22:28 ` Dmitry Torokhov
2018-11-14 22:37 ` Jann Horn
2018-11-14 22:46 ` Dmitry Torokhov
2018-11-15 0:39 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2018-11-14 23:00 ` Eric Biggers
2018-11-14 23:20 ` Dmitry Torokhov
2018-11-15 8:14 ` Benjamin Tissoires
2018-11-15 12:06 ` David Herrmann
2018-11-15 14:50 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-15 12:09 ` David Herrmann
2018-11-15 14:49 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-11-19 12:52 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-11-19 13:21 ` David Herrmann
2018-11-19 13:26 ` Jiri Kosina
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=D1DFB962-DAC7-4CD6-A627-4A69062EDDE5@amacapital.net \
--to=luto@amacapital.net \
--cc=benjamin.tissoires@redhat.com \
--cc=dh.herrmann@googlemail.com \
--cc=dtor@google.com \
--cc=dvyukov@google.com \
--cc=ebiggers@kernel.org \
--cc=jannh@google.com \
--cc=jikos@kernel.org \
--cc=linux-input@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=luto@kernel.org \
--cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=syzbot+72473edc9bf4eb1c6556@syzkaller.appspotmail.com \
--cc=syzkaller-bugs@googlegroups.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).