From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
To: Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>
Cc: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux Containers <containers@lists.linux-foundation.org>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
"Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>,
Tyler Hicks <tyhicks@canonical.com>,
Akihiro Suda <suda.akihiro@lab.ntt.co.jp>
Subject: Re: [RFC 1/3] seccomp: add a return code to trap to userspace
Date: Sun, 4 Feb 2018 17:36:33 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CALCETrWgu5n+SMqrsZQ7MVYPtzs8otuc7hpA5uPH+JNtFrMBkQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180204104946.25559-2-tycho@tycho.ws>
On Sun, Feb 4, 2018 at 10:49 AM, Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws> wrote:
> This patch introduces a means for syscalls matched in seccomp to notify
> some other task that a particular filter has been triggered.
Neat!
>
> The motivation for this is primarily for use with containers. For example,
> if a container does an init_module(), we obviously don't want to load this
> untrusted code, which may be compiled for the wrong version of the kernel
> anyway. Instead, we could parse the module image, figure out which module
> the container is trying to load and load it on the host.
>
> As another example, containers cannot mknod(), since this checks
> capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN). However, harmless devices like /dev/null or
> /dev/zero should be ok for containers to mknod, but we'd like to avoid hard
> coding some whitelist in the kernel. Another example is mount(), which has
> many security restrictions for good reason, but configuration or runtime
> knowledge could potentially be used to relax these restrictions.
>
> This patch adds functionality that is already possible via at least two
> other means that I know about, both of which involve ptrace(): first, one
> could ptrace attach, and then iterate through syscalls via PTRACE_SYSCALL.
> Unfortunately this is slow, so a faster version would be to install a
> filter that does SECCOMP_RET_TRACE, which triggers a PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP.
> Since ptrace allows only one tracer, if the container runtime is that
> tracer, users inside the container (or outside) trying to debug it will not
> be able to use ptrace, which is annoying. It also means that older
> distributions based on Upstart cannot boot inside containers using ptrace,
> since upstart itself uses ptrace to start services.
>
> The actual implementation of this is fairly small, although getting the
> synchronization right was/is slightly complex. Also worth noting that there
> is one race still present:
>
> 1. a task does a SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF
> 2. the userspace handler reads this notification
> 3. the task dies
> 4. a new task with the same pid starts
> 5. this new task does a SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF, gets the same cookie id
> that the previous one did
> 6. the userspace handler writes a response
I'm slightly confused. I thought the id was never reused for a given
struct seccomp_filter. (Also, shouldn't the id be u64, not u32?)
On very quick reading, I have a question. What happens if a process
has two seccomp_filters attached, one of them returns
SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF, and the *other* one has a listener?
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-02-04 17:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-02-04 10:49 [RFC 0/3] seccomp trap to userspace Tycho Andersen
2018-02-04 10:49 ` [RFC 1/3] seccomp: add a return code to " Tycho Andersen
2018-02-04 17:36 ` Andy Lutomirski [this message]
2018-02-04 20:01 ` Tycho Andersen
2018-02-04 20:33 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-05 8:47 ` Tycho Andersen
2018-02-13 21:09 ` Kees Cook
2018-02-14 15:29 ` Tycho Andersen
2018-02-14 17:19 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-14 17:23 ` Tycho Andersen
2018-02-15 14:48 ` Christian Brauner
2018-02-27 0:49 ` Kees Cook
2018-02-27 3:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-02-04 10:49 ` [RFC 2/3] seccomp: hoist out filter resolving logic Tycho Andersen
2018-02-13 21:29 ` Kees Cook
2018-02-14 15:33 ` Tycho Andersen
2018-02-04 10:49 ` [RFC 3/3] seccomp: add a way to get a listener fd from ptrace Tycho Andersen
2018-02-13 21:32 ` Kees Cook
2018-02-14 15:33 ` Tycho Andersen
2018-03-15 16:09 ` [RFC 0/3] seccomp trap to userspace Christian Brauner
2018-03-15 16:56 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-03-15 17:05 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2018-03-15 17:11 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-03-15 17:25 ` Christian Brauner
2018-03-15 17:30 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-03-15 17:35 ` Tycho Andersen
2018-03-16 0:46 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-03-16 14:47 ` Christian Brauner
2018-03-16 16:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-03-16 16:40 ` Christian Brauner
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