[PATCH v13 0/3] KASAN core changes for ppc64 radix KASAN

[PATCH v13 0/3] KASAN core changes for ppc64 radix KASAN

[Daniel Axtens]

Building on the work of Christophe, Aneesh and Balbir, I've ported
KASAN to 64-bit Book3S kernels running on the Radix MMU. I've been
trying this for a while, but we keep having collisions between the
kasan code in the mm tree and the code I want to put in to the ppc
tree.

So this series just contains the kasan core changes that we
need. These can go in via the mm tree. I will then propose the powerpc
changes for a later cycle. (The most recent RFC for the powerpc
changes is in the last series at
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/20210615014705.2234866-1-dja@axtens.net/
)

v13 applies to next-20210611. There should be no noticeable changes to
other platforms.

Changes since v12: respond to Marco's review comments - clean up the
help for ARCH_DISABLE_KASAN_INLINE, and add an arch readiness check to
the new granule poisioning function. Thanks Marco.

Kind regards,
Daniel

Daniel Axtens (3):
  kasan: allow an architecture to disable inline instrumentation
  kasan: allow architectures to provide an outline readiness check
  kasan: define and use MAX_PTRS_PER_* for early shadow tables

 include/linux/kasan.h | 18 +++++++++++++++---
 lib/Kconfig.kasan     | 14 ++++++++++++++
 mm/kasan/common.c     |  4 ++++
 mm/kasan/generic.c    |  3 +++
 mm/kasan/init.c       |  6 +++---
 mm/kasan/kasan.h      |  4 ++++
 mm/kasan/shadow.c     |  8 ++++++++
 7 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

-- 
2.30.2

[PATCH v13 1/3] kasan: allow an architecture to disable inline instrumentation

[Daniel Axtens]

For annoying architectural reasons, it's very difficult to support inline
instrumentation on powerpc64.*

Add a Kconfig flag to allow an arch to disable inline. (It's a bit
annoying to be 'backwards', but I'm not aware of any way to have
an arch force a symbol to be 'n', rather than 'y'.)

We also disable stack instrumentation in this case as it does things that
are functionally equivalent to inline instrumentation, namely adding
code that touches the shadow directly without going through a C helper.

* on ppc64 atm, the shadow lives in virtual memory and isn't accessible in
real mode. However, before we turn on virtual memory, we parse the device
tree to determine which platform and MMU we're running under. That calls
generic DT code, which is instrumented. Inline instrumentation in DT would
unconditionally attempt to touch the shadow region, which we won't have
set up yet, and would crash. We can make outline mode wait for the arch to
be ready, but we can't change what the compiler inserts for inline mode.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
---
 lib/Kconfig.kasan | 14 ++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)

diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.kasan b/lib/Kconfig.kasan
index cffc2ebbf185..cb5e02d09e11 100644
--- a/lib/Kconfig.kasan
+++ b/lib/Kconfig.kasan
@@ -12,6 +12,15 @@ config HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_HW_TAGS
 config HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_VMALLOC
 	bool
 
+config ARCH_DISABLE_KASAN_INLINE
+	bool
+	help
+	  Sometimes an architecture might not be able to support inline
+	  instrumentation but might be able to support outline instrumentation.
+	  This option allows an architecture to prevent inline and stack
+	  instrumentation from being enabled.
+
+
 config CC_HAS_KASAN_GENERIC
 	def_bool $(cc-option, -fsanitize=kernel-address)
 
@@ -130,6 +139,7 @@ config KASAN_OUTLINE
 
 config KASAN_INLINE
 	bool "Inline instrumentation"
+	depends on !ARCH_DISABLE_KASAN_INLINE
 	help
 	  Compiler directly inserts code checking shadow memory before
 	  memory accesses. This is faster than outline (in some workloads
@@ -141,6 +151,7 @@ endchoice
 config KASAN_STACK
 	bool "Enable stack instrumentation (unsafe)" if CC_IS_CLANG && !COMPILE_TEST
 	depends on KASAN_GENERIC || KASAN_SW_TAGS
+	depends on !ARCH_DISABLE_KASAN_INLINE
 	default y if CC_IS_GCC
 	help
 	  The LLVM stack address sanitizer has a know problem that
@@ -154,6 +165,9 @@ config KASAN_STACK
 	  but clang users can still enable it for builds without
 	  CONFIG_COMPILE_TEST.	On gcc it is assumed to always be safe
 	  to use and enabled by default.
+	  If the architecture disables inline instrumentation, this is
+	  also disabled as it adds inline-style instrumentation that
+	  is run unconditionally.
 
 config KASAN_SW_TAGS_IDENTIFY
 	bool "Enable memory corruption identification"
-- 
2.30.2

Re: [PATCH v13 1/3] kasan: allow an architecture to disable inline instrumentation

[Marco Elver]

On Wed, 16 Jun 2021 at 10:02, Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> wrote:
>
> For annoying architectural reasons, it's very difficult to support inline
> instrumentation on powerpc64.*
>
> Add a Kconfig flag to allow an arch to disable inline. (It's a bit
> annoying to be 'backwards', but I'm not aware of any way to have
> an arch force a symbol to be 'n', rather than 'y'.)
>
> We also disable stack instrumentation in this case as it does things that
> are functionally equivalent to inline instrumentation, namely adding
> code that touches the shadow directly without going through a C helper.
>
> * on ppc64 atm, the shadow lives in virtual memory and isn't accessible in
> real mode. However, before we turn on virtual memory, we parse the device
> tree to determine which platform and MMU we're running under. That calls
> generic DT code, which is instrumented. Inline instrumentation in DT would
> unconditionally attempt to touch the shadow region, which we won't have
> set up yet, and would crash. We can make outline mode wait for the arch to
> be ready, but we can't change what the compiler inserts for inline mode.
>
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>

Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>

Thank you.

> ---
>  lib/Kconfig.kasan | 14 ++++++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/lib/Kconfig.kasan b/lib/Kconfig.kasan
> index cffc2ebbf185..cb5e02d09e11 100644
> --- a/lib/Kconfig.kasan
> +++ b/lib/Kconfig.kasan
> @@ -12,6 +12,15 @@ config HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_HW_TAGS
>  config HAVE_ARCH_KASAN_VMALLOC
>         bool
>
> +config ARCH_DISABLE_KASAN_INLINE
> +       bool
> +       help
> +         Sometimes an architecture might not be able to support inline
> +         instrumentation but might be able to support outline instrumentation.
> +         This option allows an architecture to prevent inline and stack
> +         instrumentation from being enabled.
> +
> +
>  config CC_HAS_KASAN_GENERIC
>         def_bool $(cc-option, -fsanitize=kernel-address)
>
> @@ -130,6 +139,7 @@ config KASAN_OUTLINE
>
>  config KASAN_INLINE
>         bool "Inline instrumentation"
> +       depends on !ARCH_DISABLE_KASAN_INLINE
>         help
>           Compiler directly inserts code checking shadow memory before
>           memory accesses. This is faster than outline (in some workloads
> @@ -141,6 +151,7 @@ endchoice
>  config KASAN_STACK
>         bool "Enable stack instrumentation (unsafe)" if CC_IS_CLANG && !COMPILE_TEST
>         depends on KASAN_GENERIC || KASAN_SW_TAGS
> +       depends on !ARCH_DISABLE_KASAN_INLINE
>         default y if CC_IS_GCC
>         help
>           The LLVM stack address sanitizer has a know problem that
> @@ -154,6 +165,9 @@ config KASAN_STACK
>           but clang users can still enable it for builds without
>           CONFIG_COMPILE_TEST.  On gcc it is assumed to always be safe
>           to use and enabled by default.
> +         If the architecture disables inline instrumentation, this is
> +         also disabled as it adds inline-style instrumentation that
> +         is run unconditionally.
>
>  config KASAN_SW_TAGS_IDENTIFY
>         bool "Enable memory corruption identification"
> --
> 2.30.2
>
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[PATCH v13 2/3] kasan: allow architectures to provide an outline readiness check

[Daniel Axtens]

Allow architectures to define a kasan_arch_is_ready() hook that bails
out of any function that's about to touch the shadow unless the arch
says that it is ready for the memory to be accessed. This is fairly
uninvasive and should have a negligible performance penalty.

This will only work in outline mode, so an arch must specify
ARCH_DISABLE_KASAN_INLINE if it requires this.

Cc: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Suggested-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>

--

I discuss the justfication for this later in the series. Also,
both previous RFCs for ppc64 - by 2 different people - have
needed this trick! See:
 - https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/592820/ # ppc64 hash series
 - https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/795211/      # ppc radix series
---
 mm/kasan/common.c  | 4 ++++
 mm/kasan/generic.c | 3 +++
 mm/kasan/kasan.h   | 4 ++++
 mm/kasan/shadow.c  | 8 ++++++++
 4 files changed, 19 insertions(+)

diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
index 10177cc26d06..0ad615f3801d 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/common.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
@@ -331,6 +331,10 @@ static inline bool ____kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
 	u8 tag;
 	void *tagged_object;
 
+	/* Bail if the arch isn't ready */
+	if (!kasan_arch_is_ready())
+		return false;
+
 	tag = get_tag(object);
 	tagged_object = object;
 	object = kasan_reset_tag(object);
diff --git a/mm/kasan/generic.c b/mm/kasan/generic.c
index 53cbf28859b5..c3f5ba7a294a 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/generic.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/generic.c
@@ -163,6 +163,9 @@ static __always_inline bool check_region_inline(unsigned long addr,
 						size_t size, bool write,
 						unsigned long ret_ip)
 {
+	if (!kasan_arch_is_ready())
+		return true;
+
 	if (unlikely(size == 0))
 		return true;
 
diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.h b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
index 8f450bc28045..19323a3d5975 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/kasan.h
+++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
@@ -449,6 +449,10 @@ static inline void kasan_poison_last_granule(const void *address, size_t size) {
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC */
 
+#ifndef kasan_arch_is_ready
+static inline bool kasan_arch_is_ready(void)	{ return true; }
+#endif
+
 /*
  * Exported functions for interfaces called from assembly or from generated
  * code. Declarations here to avoid warning about missing declarations.
diff --git a/mm/kasan/shadow.c b/mm/kasan/shadow.c
index 082ee5b6d9a1..3c7f7efe6f68 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/shadow.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/shadow.c
@@ -73,6 +73,10 @@ void kasan_poison(const void *addr, size_t size, u8 value, bool init)
 {
 	void *shadow_start, *shadow_end;
 
+	/* Don't touch the shadow memory if arch isn't ready */
+	if (!kasan_arch_is_ready())
+		return;
+
 	/*
 	 * Perform shadow offset calculation based on untagged address, as
 	 * some of the callers (e.g. kasan_poison_object_data) pass tagged
@@ -99,6 +103,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_poison);
 #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC
 void kasan_poison_last_granule(const void *addr, size_t size)
 {
+	/* Don't touch the shadow memory if arch isn't ready */
+	if (!kasan_arch_is_ready())
+		return;
+
 	if (size & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK) {
 		u8 *shadow = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr + size);
 		*shadow = size & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK;
-- 
2.30.2

Re: [PATCH v13 2/3] kasan: allow architectures to provide an outline readiness check

[Marco Elver]

On Wed, 16 Jun 2021 at 10:02, Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> wrote:
> Allow architectures to define a kasan_arch_is_ready() hook that bails
> out of any function that's about to touch the shadow unless the arch
> says that it is ready for the memory to be accessed. This is fairly
> uninvasive and should have a negligible performance penalty.
>
> This will only work in outline mode, so an arch must specify
> ARCH_DISABLE_KASAN_INLINE if it requires this.
>
> Cc: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
> Cc: Aneesh Kumar K.V <aneesh.kumar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> Suggested-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
> Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>

Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com>

but also check if an assertion that this is only used with
KASAN_GENERIC might make sense (below). Depends on how much we want to
make sure kasan_arch_is_ready() could be useful for other modes (which
I don't think it makes sense).

> --
>
> I discuss the justfication for this later in the series. Also,
> both previous RFCs for ppc64 - by 2 different people - have
> needed this trick! See:
>  - https://lore.kernel.org/patchwork/patch/592820/ # ppc64 hash series
>  - https://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/795211/      # ppc radix series
> ---
>  mm/kasan/common.c  | 4 ++++
>  mm/kasan/generic.c | 3 +++
>  mm/kasan/kasan.h   | 4 ++++
>  mm/kasan/shadow.c  | 8 ++++++++
>  4 files changed, 19 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/common.c b/mm/kasan/common.c
> index 10177cc26d06..0ad615f3801d 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/common.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/common.c
> @@ -331,6 +331,10 @@ static inline bool ____kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
>         u8 tag;
>         void *tagged_object;
>
> +       /* Bail if the arch isn't ready */
> +       if (!kasan_arch_is_ready())
> +               return false;
> +
>         tag = get_tag(object);
>         tagged_object = object;
>         object = kasan_reset_tag(object);
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/generic.c b/mm/kasan/generic.c
> index 53cbf28859b5..c3f5ba7a294a 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/generic.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/generic.c
> @@ -163,6 +163,9 @@ static __always_inline bool check_region_inline(unsigned long addr,
>                                                 size_t size, bool write,
>                                                 unsigned long ret_ip)
>  {
> +       if (!kasan_arch_is_ready())
> +               return true;
> +
>         if (unlikely(size == 0))
>                 return true;
>
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/kasan.h b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
> index 8f450bc28045..19323a3d5975 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/kasan.h
> +++ b/mm/kasan/kasan.h
> @@ -449,6 +449,10 @@ static inline void kasan_poison_last_granule(const void *address, size_t size) {
>
>  #endif /* CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC */
>
> +#ifndef kasan_arch_is_ready
> +static inline bool kasan_arch_is_ready(void)   { return true; }
> +#endif
> +

I've been trying to think of a way to make it clear this is only for
KASAN_GENERIC mode, and not the others. An arch can always define this
function, but of course it might not be used. One way would be to add
an '#ifndef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC' in the #else case and #error if it's
not generic mode.

I think trying to make this do anything useful for SW_TAGS or HW_TAGS
modes does not make sense (at least right now).

>  /*
>   * Exported functions for interfaces called from assembly or from generated
>   * code. Declarations here to avoid warning about missing declarations.
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/shadow.c b/mm/kasan/shadow.c
> index 082ee5b6d9a1..3c7f7efe6f68 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/shadow.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/shadow.c
> @@ -73,6 +73,10 @@ void kasan_poison(const void *addr, size_t size, u8 value, bool init)
>  {
>         void *shadow_start, *shadow_end;
>
> +       /* Don't touch the shadow memory if arch isn't ready */
> +       if (!kasan_arch_is_ready())
> +               return;
> +
>         /*
>          * Perform shadow offset calculation based on untagged address, as
>          * some of the callers (e.g. kasan_poison_object_data) pass tagged
> @@ -99,6 +103,10 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(kasan_poison);
>  #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN_GENERIC
>  void kasan_poison_last_granule(const void *addr, size_t size)
>  {
> +       /* Don't touch the shadow memory if arch isn't ready */
> +       if (!kasan_arch_is_ready())
> +               return;
> +
>         if (size & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK) {
>                 u8 *shadow = (u8 *)kasan_mem_to_shadow(addr + size);
>                 *shadow = size & KASAN_GRANULE_MASK;
> --
> 2.30.2
>
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[PATCH v13 3/3] kasan: define and use MAX_PTRS_PER_* for early shadow tables

[Daniel Axtens]

powerpc has a variable number of PTRS_PER_*, set at runtime based
on the MMU that the kernel is booted under.

This means the PTRS_PER_* are no longer constants, and therefore
breaks the build.

Define default MAX_PTRS_PER_*s in the same style as MAX_PTRS_PER_P4D.
As KASAN is the only user at the moment, just define them in the kasan
header, and have them default to PTRS_PER_* unless overridden in arch
code.

Suggested-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Suggested-by: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Christophe Leroy <christophe.leroy@csgroup.eu>
Reviewed-by: Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
---
 include/linux/kasan.h | 18 +++++++++++++++---
 mm/kasan/init.c       |  6 +++---
 2 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h
index 768d7d342757..fd65f477ac92 100644
--- a/include/linux/kasan.h
+++ b/include/linux/kasan.h
@@ -40,10 +40,22 @@ struct kunit_kasan_expectation {
 #define PTE_HWTABLE_PTRS 0
 #endif
 
+#ifndef MAX_PTRS_PER_PTE
+#define MAX_PTRS_PER_PTE PTRS_PER_PTE
+#endif
+
+#ifndef MAX_PTRS_PER_PMD
+#define MAX_PTRS_PER_PMD PTRS_PER_PMD
+#endif
+
+#ifndef MAX_PTRS_PER_PUD
+#define MAX_PTRS_PER_PUD PTRS_PER_PUD
+#endif
+
 extern unsigned char kasan_early_shadow_page[PAGE_SIZE];
-extern pte_t kasan_early_shadow_pte[PTRS_PER_PTE + PTE_HWTABLE_PTRS];
-extern pmd_t kasan_early_shadow_pmd[PTRS_PER_PMD];
-extern pud_t kasan_early_shadow_pud[PTRS_PER_PUD];
+extern pte_t kasan_early_shadow_pte[MAX_PTRS_PER_PTE + PTE_HWTABLE_PTRS];
+extern pmd_t kasan_early_shadow_pmd[MAX_PTRS_PER_PMD];
+extern pud_t kasan_early_shadow_pud[MAX_PTRS_PER_PUD];
 extern p4d_t kasan_early_shadow_p4d[MAX_PTRS_PER_P4D];
 
 int kasan_populate_early_shadow(const void *shadow_start,
diff --git a/mm/kasan/init.c b/mm/kasan/init.c
index 348f31d15a97..cc64ed6858c6 100644
--- a/mm/kasan/init.c
+++ b/mm/kasan/init.c
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ static inline bool kasan_p4d_table(pgd_t pgd)
 }
 #endif
 #if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS > 3
-pud_t kasan_early_shadow_pud[PTRS_PER_PUD] __page_aligned_bss;
+pud_t kasan_early_shadow_pud[MAX_PTRS_PER_PUD] __page_aligned_bss;
 static inline bool kasan_pud_table(p4d_t p4d)
 {
 	return p4d_page(p4d) == virt_to_page(lm_alias(kasan_early_shadow_pud));
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ static inline bool kasan_pud_table(p4d_t p4d)
 }
 #endif
 #if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS > 2
-pmd_t kasan_early_shadow_pmd[PTRS_PER_PMD] __page_aligned_bss;
+pmd_t kasan_early_shadow_pmd[MAX_PTRS_PER_PMD] __page_aligned_bss;
 static inline bool kasan_pmd_table(pud_t pud)
 {
 	return pud_page(pud) == virt_to_page(lm_alias(kasan_early_shadow_pmd));
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ static inline bool kasan_pmd_table(pud_t pud)
 	return false;
 }
 #endif
-pte_t kasan_early_shadow_pte[PTRS_PER_PTE + PTE_HWTABLE_PTRS]
+pte_t kasan_early_shadow_pte[MAX_PTRS_PER_PTE + PTE_HWTABLE_PTRS]
 	__page_aligned_bss;
 
 static inline bool kasan_pte_table(pmd_t pmd)
-- 
2.30.2

Re: [PATCH v13 3/3] kasan: define and use MAX_PTRS_PER_* for early shadow tables

[Marco Elver]

On Wed, 16 Jun 2021 at 10:03, Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> wrote:
[...]
> diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h
> index 768d7d342757..fd65f477ac92 100644
> --- a/include/linux/kasan.h
> +++ b/include/linux/kasan.h
> @@ -40,10 +40,22 @@ struct kunit_kasan_expectation {
>  #define PTE_HWTABLE_PTRS 0
>  #endif
>
> +#ifndef MAX_PTRS_PER_PTE
> +#define MAX_PTRS_PER_PTE PTRS_PER_PTE
> +#endif
> +
> +#ifndef MAX_PTRS_PER_PMD
> +#define MAX_PTRS_PER_PMD PTRS_PER_PMD
> +#endif
> +
> +#ifndef MAX_PTRS_PER_PUD
> +#define MAX_PTRS_PER_PUD PTRS_PER_PUD
> +#endif

This is introducing new global constants in a <linux/..> header. It
feels like this should be in <linux/pgtable.h> together with a
comment. Because <linux/kasan.h> is actually included in
<linux/slab.h>, most of the kernel will get these new definitions.
That in itself is fine, but it feels wrong that the KASAN header
introduces these.

Thoughts?

Sorry for only realizing this now.

Thanks,
-- Marco

>  extern unsigned char kasan_early_shadow_page[PAGE_SIZE];
> -extern pte_t kasan_early_shadow_pte[PTRS_PER_PTE + PTE_HWTABLE_PTRS];
> -extern pmd_t kasan_early_shadow_pmd[PTRS_PER_PMD];
> -extern pud_t kasan_early_shadow_pud[PTRS_PER_PUD];
> +extern pte_t kasan_early_shadow_pte[MAX_PTRS_PER_PTE + PTE_HWTABLE_PTRS];
> +extern pmd_t kasan_early_shadow_pmd[MAX_PTRS_PER_PMD];
> +extern pud_t kasan_early_shadow_pud[MAX_PTRS_PER_PUD];
>  extern p4d_t kasan_early_shadow_p4d[MAX_PTRS_PER_P4D];
>
>  int kasan_populate_early_shadow(const void *shadow_start,
> diff --git a/mm/kasan/init.c b/mm/kasan/init.c
> index 348f31d15a97..cc64ed6858c6 100644
> --- a/mm/kasan/init.c
> +++ b/mm/kasan/init.c
> @@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ static inline bool kasan_p4d_table(pgd_t pgd)
>  }
>  #endif
>  #if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS > 3
> -pud_t kasan_early_shadow_pud[PTRS_PER_PUD] __page_aligned_bss;
> +pud_t kasan_early_shadow_pud[MAX_PTRS_PER_PUD] __page_aligned_bss;
>  static inline bool kasan_pud_table(p4d_t p4d)
>  {
>         return p4d_page(p4d) == virt_to_page(lm_alias(kasan_early_shadow_pud));
> @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ static inline bool kasan_pud_table(p4d_t p4d)
>  }
>  #endif
>  #if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS > 2
> -pmd_t kasan_early_shadow_pmd[PTRS_PER_PMD] __page_aligned_bss;
> +pmd_t kasan_early_shadow_pmd[MAX_PTRS_PER_PMD] __page_aligned_bss;
>  static inline bool kasan_pmd_table(pud_t pud)
>  {
>         return pud_page(pud) == virt_to_page(lm_alias(kasan_early_shadow_pmd));
> @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ static inline bool kasan_pmd_table(pud_t pud)
>         return false;
>  }
>  #endif
> -pte_t kasan_early_shadow_pte[PTRS_PER_PTE + PTE_HWTABLE_PTRS]
> +pte_t kasan_early_shadow_pte[MAX_PTRS_PER_PTE + PTE_HWTABLE_PTRS]
>         __page_aligned_bss;
>
>  static inline bool kasan_pte_table(pmd_t pmd)
> --
> 2.30.2
>
> --
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Re: [PATCH v13 3/3] kasan: define and use MAX_PTRS_PER_* for early shadow tables

[Christophe Leroy]

Le 16/06/2021 à 11:07, Marco Elver a écrit :
> On Wed, 16 Jun 2021 at 10:03, Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net> wrote:
> [...]
>> diff --git a/include/linux/kasan.h b/include/linux/kasan.h
>> index 768d7d342757..fd65f477ac92 100644
>> --- a/include/linux/kasan.h
>> +++ b/include/linux/kasan.h
>> @@ -40,10 +40,22 @@ struct kunit_kasan_expectation {
>>   #define PTE_HWTABLE_PTRS 0
>>   #endif
>>
>> +#ifndef MAX_PTRS_PER_PTE
>> +#define MAX_PTRS_PER_PTE PTRS_PER_PTE
>> +#endif
>> +
>> +#ifndef MAX_PTRS_PER_PMD
>> +#define MAX_PTRS_PER_PMD PTRS_PER_PMD
>> +#endif
>> +
>> +#ifndef MAX_PTRS_PER_PUD
>> +#define MAX_PTRS_PER_PUD PTRS_PER_PUD
>> +#endif
> 
> This is introducing new global constants in a <linux/..> header. It
> feels like this should be in <linux/pgtable.h> together with a
> comment. Because <linux/kasan.h> is actually included in
> <linux/slab.h>, most of the kernel will get these new definitions.
> That in itself is fine, but it feels wrong that the KASAN header
> introduces these.
> 
> Thoughts?
> 
> Sorry for only realizing this now.

My idea here was to follow the same road as MAX_PTRS_PER_P4D, added by commit 
https://github.com/linuxppc/linux/commit/c65e774f

That commit spread MAX_PTRS_PER_P4D everywhere.

Instead of doing the same, we found that it would be better to define a fallback for when the 
architecture doesn't define MAX_PTRS_PER_PxD . Now, it can be made more global in pgtable.h, in that 
case I'd suggest to also include MAX_PTRS_PER_P4D in the dance and avoid architectures like s390 
having to define it, or even not defining it either in asm-generic/pgtable-nop4d.h

Christophe

> 
> Thanks,
> -- Marco
> 
>>   extern unsigned char kasan_early_shadow_page[PAGE_SIZE];
>> -extern pte_t kasan_early_shadow_pte[PTRS_PER_PTE + PTE_HWTABLE_PTRS];
>> -extern pmd_t kasan_early_shadow_pmd[PTRS_PER_PMD];
>> -extern pud_t kasan_early_shadow_pud[PTRS_PER_PUD];
>> +extern pte_t kasan_early_shadow_pte[MAX_PTRS_PER_PTE + PTE_HWTABLE_PTRS];
>> +extern pmd_t kasan_early_shadow_pmd[MAX_PTRS_PER_PMD];
>> +extern pud_t kasan_early_shadow_pud[MAX_PTRS_PER_PUD];
>>   extern p4d_t kasan_early_shadow_p4d[MAX_PTRS_PER_P4D];
>>
>>   int kasan_populate_early_shadow(const void *shadow_start,
>> diff --git a/mm/kasan/init.c b/mm/kasan/init.c
>> index 348f31d15a97..cc64ed6858c6 100644
>> --- a/mm/kasan/init.c
>> +++ b/mm/kasan/init.c
>> @@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ static inline bool kasan_p4d_table(pgd_t pgd)
>>   }
>>   #endif
>>   #if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS > 3
>> -pud_t kasan_early_shadow_pud[PTRS_PER_PUD] __page_aligned_bss;
>> +pud_t kasan_early_shadow_pud[MAX_PTRS_PER_PUD] __page_aligned_bss;
>>   static inline bool kasan_pud_table(p4d_t p4d)
>>   {
>>          return p4d_page(p4d) == virt_to_page(lm_alias(kasan_early_shadow_pud));
>> @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ static inline bool kasan_pud_table(p4d_t p4d)
>>   }
>>   #endif
>>   #if CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS > 2
>> -pmd_t kasan_early_shadow_pmd[PTRS_PER_PMD] __page_aligned_bss;
>> +pmd_t kasan_early_shadow_pmd[MAX_PTRS_PER_PMD] __page_aligned_bss;
>>   static inline bool kasan_pmd_table(pud_t pud)
>>   {
>>          return pud_page(pud) == virt_to_page(lm_alias(kasan_early_shadow_pmd));
>> @@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ static inline bool kasan_pmd_table(pud_t pud)
>>          return false;
>>   }
>>   #endif
>> -pte_t kasan_early_shadow_pte[PTRS_PER_PTE + PTE_HWTABLE_PTRS]
>> +pte_t kasan_early_shadow_pte[MAX_PTRS_PER_PTE + PTE_HWTABLE_PTRS]
>>          __page_aligned_bss;
>>
>>   static inline bool kasan_pte_table(pmd_t pmd)
>> --
>> 2.30.2
>>
>> --
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