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From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, Sami Tolvanen <samitolvanen@google.com>,
	Joao Moreira <joao@overdrivepizza.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/ibt: Implement FineIBT
Date: Tue, 18 Oct 2022 21:59:02 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <Y08FhjK3fKsfRAaw@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <202210181020.79AF7F7@keescook>

On Tue, Oct 18, 2022 at 11:09:13AM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:

> An improvement for kCFI would be to mutate all the hashes both at build
> time (perhaps using the same seed infrastructure that randstruct depends
> on for sharing a seed across compilation units), and at boot time, so
> an actual .text content exposure is needed to find the target hash value.

What's the purpose of the build time randomization? Find here the boot
time randomization (on top of my other patch).

---
Subject: x86/cfi: Add boot time hash randomization
From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Date: Tue Oct 18 21:50:58 CEST 2022

In order to avoid known hashes (from knowing the boot image),
randomize the CFI hashes with a per-boot random seed.

Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c |  104 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 92 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
@@ -711,6 +711,8 @@ enum cfi_mode {
 };
 
 static enum cfi_mode cfi_mode __ro_after_init = CFI_DEFAULT;
+static bool cfi_rand __ro_after_init = true;
+static u32  cfi_seed __ro_after_init;
 
 static __init int cfi_parse_cmdline(char *str)
 {
@@ -732,6 +734,8 @@ static __init int cfi_parse_cmdline(char
 			cfi_mode = CFI_KCFI;
 		} else if (!strcmp(str, "fineibt")) {
 			cfi_mode = CFI_FINEIBT;
+		} else if (!strcmp(str, "norand")) {
+			cfi_rand = false;
 		} else {
 			pr_err("Ignoring unknown cfi option (%s).", str);
 		}
@@ -856,7 +860,50 @@ static int cfi_disable_callers(s32 *star
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int cfi_enable_callers(s32 *start, s32 *end)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Re-enable kCFI, undo what cfi_disable_callers() did.
+	 */
+	const u8 mov[] = { 0x41, 0xba };
+	s32 *s;
+
+	for (s = start; s < end; s++) {
+		void *addr = (void *)s + *s;
+		u32 hash;
+
+		addr -= fineibt_caller_size;
+		hash = decode_caller_hash(addr);
+		if (!hash) /* nocfi callers */
+			continue;
+
+		text_poke_early(addr, mov, 2);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 /* .cfi_sites */
+static int cfi_rand_preamble(s32 *start, s32 *end)
+{
+	s32 *s;
+
+	for (s = start; s < end; s++) {
+		void *addr = (void *)s + *s;
+		u32 hash;
+
+		hash = decode_preamble_hash(addr);
+		if (WARN(!hash, "no CFI hash found at: %pS %px %*ph\n",
+			 addr, addr, 5, addr))
+			return -EINVAL;
+
+		hash ^= cfi_seed;
+		text_poke_early(addr + 1, &hash, 4);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int cfi_rewrite_preamble(s32 *start, s32 *end)
 {
 	s32 *s;
@@ -879,6 +926,26 @@ static int cfi_rewrite_preamble(s32 *sta
 }
 
 /* .retpoline_sites */
+static int cfi_rand_callers(s32 *start, s32 *end)
+{
+	s32 *s;
+
+	for (s = start; s < end; s++) {
+		void *addr = (void *)s + *s;
+		u32 hash;
+
+		addr -= fineibt_caller_size;
+		hash = decode_caller_hash(addr);
+		if (hash) {
+			hash ^= cfi_seed;
+			hash = -hash;
+			text_poke_early(addr + 2, &hash, 4);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int cfi_rewrite_callers(s32 *start, s32 *end)
 {
 	s32 *s;
@@ -915,31 +982,44 @@ static void __apply_fineibt(s32 *start_r
 			cfi_mode = CFI_FINEIBT;
 	}
 
-	switch (cfi_mode) {
-	case CFI_OFF:
-		ret = cfi_disable_callers(start_retpoline, end_retpoline);
+	/*
+	 * Rewrite the callers to not use the __cfi_ stubs, such that we might
+	 * rewrite them. This disables all CFI. If this succeeds but any of the
+	 * later stages fails, we're without CFI.
+	 */
+	ret = cfi_disable_callers(start_retpoline, end_retpoline);
+	if (ret)
+		goto err;
+
+	if (cfi_rand) {
+		if (builtin)
+			cfi_seed = get_random_u32();
+
+		ret = cfi_rand_preamble(start_cfi, end_cfi);
 		if (ret)
 			goto err;
 
+		ret = cfi_rand_callers(start_retpoline, end_retpoline);
+		if (ret)
+			goto err;
+	}
+
+	switch (cfi_mode) {
+	case CFI_OFF:
 		if (builtin)
 			pr_info("Disabling CFI\n");
 		return;
 
 	case CFI_KCFI:
+		ret = cfi_enable_callers(start_retpoline, end_retpoline);
+		if (ret)
+			goto err;
+
 		if (builtin)
 			pr_info("Using kCFI\n");
 		return;
 
 	case CFI_FINEIBT:
-		/*
-		 * Rewrite the callers to not use the __cfi_ stubs, such that we might
-		 * rewrite them. This disables all CFI. If this succeeds but any of the
-		 * later stages fails, we're without CFI.
-		 */
-		ret = cfi_disable_callers(start_retpoline, end_retpoline);
-		if (ret)
-			goto err;
-
 		ret = cfi_rewrite_preamble(start_cfi, end_cfi);
 		if (ret)
 			goto err;

  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-10-18 19:59 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 44+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-10-18 13:35 [PATCH] x86/ibt: Implement FineIBT Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-18 14:43 ` David Laight
2022-10-18 15:58   ` Joao Moreira
2022-10-18 17:20     ` Kees Cook
2022-10-18 20:09       ` Joao Moreira
2022-10-19  5:33         ` Kees Cook
2022-10-18 21:27     ` David Laight
2022-10-18 14:47 ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-18 18:09 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-18 19:56   ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-18 23:31     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2022-10-19  5:22       ` Kees Cook
2022-10-19 11:38       ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-19  5:14     ` Kees Cook
2022-10-18 19:59   ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2022-10-18 21:09     ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-19  5:05     ` Kees Cook
2022-10-19 12:03       ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-19 15:22         ` Sami Tolvanen
2022-10-20 11:04           ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-18 19:59   ` Joao Moreira
2022-10-19  5:32     ` Kees Cook
2022-10-19 19:35       ` Joao Moreira
2022-10-18 20:05   ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-19  5:00     ` Kees Cook
2022-10-18 20:09   ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-18 20:17     ` Joao Moreira
2022-10-18 20:30       ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-19  4:48         ` Joao Moreira
2022-10-19  5:19           ` Kees Cook
2022-10-31 19:13             ` Joao Moreira
2022-11-01 21:39               ` Kees Cook
2022-11-01 21:50                 ` Joao Moreira
2024-05-06 17:36                   ` Kees Cook
2024-05-07  1:45                     ` Joao Moreira
2022-10-19  5:18         ` Kees Cook
2022-10-19  5:16     ` Kees Cook
2022-10-20 11:05   ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-18 23:38 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2022-10-19  7:29   ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-21 23:08 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2022-10-22 15:03   ` Peter Zijlstra
2022-10-24 17:15     ` Sami Tolvanen
2022-10-24 18:38       ` Joao Moreira

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