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From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 3/4] x86/uaccess: Use pointer masking to limit uaccess speculation
Date: Wed, 2 Jun 2021 17:11:57 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <YLe73YcUeXBaLwHr@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <5ba93cdbf35ab40264a9265fc24575a9b2f813b3.1620186182.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com>

On Tue, May 04, 2021, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> The x86 uaccess code uses barrier_nospec() in various places to prevent
> speculative dereferencing of user-controlled pointers (which might be
> combined with further gadgets or CPU bugs to leak data).
> 
> There are some issues with the current implementation:
> 
> - The barrier_nospec() in copy_from_user() was inadvertently removed
>   with: 4b842e4e25b1 ("x86: get rid of small constant size cases in
>   raw_copy_{to,from}_user()")

Mostly out of curiosity, wasn't copy_{from,to}_user() flawed even before that
patch?  Non-constant sizes would go straight to copy_user_generic(), and even if
string ops are used and strings are magically not vulnerable, small sizes would
skip to normal loads/stores in _copy_short_string when using
copy_user_enhanced_fast_string().

  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-06-02 17:13 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-05-05  3:54 [PATCH v4 0/4] x86/uaccess: Use pointer masking to limit uaccess speculation Josh Poimboeuf
2021-05-05  3:54 ` [PATCH v4 1/4] uaccess: Always inline strn*_user() helper functions Josh Poimboeuf
2021-05-05  3:54 ` [PATCH v4 2/4] uaccess: Fix __user annotations for copy_mc_to_user() Josh Poimboeuf
2021-05-05  3:54 ` [PATCH v4 3/4] x86/uaccess: Use pointer masking to limit uaccess speculation Josh Poimboeuf
2021-05-05  8:48   ` David Laight
2021-05-05 13:19     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2021-05-05 13:51       ` David Laight
2021-05-05 18:32     ` Linus Torvalds
2021-05-06  7:57       ` David Laight
2021-05-05 14:25   ` Mark Rutland
2021-05-05 14:48     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2021-05-05 14:49     ` David Laight
2021-05-05 15:45       ` Mark Rutland
2021-05-05 16:55   ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-05-06  8:36     ` David Laight
2021-05-06 12:05       ` Christoph Hellwig
2021-06-02 17:11   ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2021-06-02 20:11     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2021-05-05  3:54 ` [PATCH v4 4/4] x86/nospec: Remove barrier_nospec() Josh Poimboeuf

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