From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
To: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>,
Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Subject: [PATCH v4 0/4] x86/uaccess: Use pointer masking to limit uaccess speculation
Date: Tue, 4 May 2021 22:54:28 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <cover.1620186182.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com> (raw)
This one managed to fall through the cracks back in September. Here's a
fresh new version.
Ideally, we'd switch all access_ok() users to access_ok_mask() or
something, but that's a much bigger change.
I dropped all the ack/review tags because the rebase was significant.
Please review carefully :-)
v4 changes:
- Rebased on the latest.
- Split up into multiple logical patches.
- Renamed "force_user_ptr()" -> "mask_user_ptr()" to prevent confusing
it with '__force' casting. [based on Dan's comment]
- Instead of reusing array_index_nospec(), made a new separate inline
asm statement. Otherwise it fails the build on recent toolchains
and/or kernels because the "g" constraint in array_index_mask_nospec()
isn't big enough for TASK_SIZE_MAX. I could have changed "g" to "r",
but that would negatively impact code generation for the other users.
v3 was here:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1d06ed6485b66b9f674900368b63d7ef79f666ca.1599756789.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com/
Josh Poimboeuf (4):
uaccess: Always inline strn*_user() helper functions
uaccess: Fix __user annotations for copy_mc_to_user()
x86/uaccess: Use pointer masking to limit uaccess speculation
x86/nospec: Remove barrier_nospec()
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 6 +--
arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h | 3 --
arch/x86/include/asm/futex.h | 5 ++
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 48 +++++++++++++------
arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h | 12 ++---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c | 6 ++-
arch/x86/lib/copy_mc.c | 10 ++--
arch/x86/lib/csum-wrappers_64.c | 5 +-
arch/x86/lib/getuser.S | 16 ++-----
arch/x86/lib/putuser.S | 8 ++++
arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c | 6 +--
arch/x86/lib/usercopy_64.c | 7 +--
lib/iov_iter.c | 2 +-
lib/strncpy_from_user.c | 6 ++-
lib/strnlen_user.c | 4 +-
15 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
--
2.31.1
next reply other threads:[~2021-05-05 3:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-05-05 3:54 Josh Poimboeuf [this message]
2021-05-05 3:54 ` [PATCH v4 1/4] uaccess: Always inline strn*_user() helper functions Josh Poimboeuf
2021-05-05 3:54 ` [PATCH v4 2/4] uaccess: Fix __user annotations for copy_mc_to_user() Josh Poimboeuf
2021-05-05 3:54 ` [PATCH v4 3/4] x86/uaccess: Use pointer masking to limit uaccess speculation Josh Poimboeuf
2021-05-05 8:48 ` David Laight
2021-05-05 13:19 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2021-05-05 13:51 ` David Laight
2021-05-05 18:32 ` Linus Torvalds
2021-05-06 7:57 ` David Laight
2021-05-05 14:25 ` Mark Rutland
2021-05-05 14:48 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2021-05-05 14:49 ` David Laight
2021-05-05 15:45 ` Mark Rutland
2021-05-05 16:55 ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-05-06 8:36 ` David Laight
2021-05-06 12:05 ` Christoph Hellwig
2021-06-02 17:11 ` Sean Christopherson
2021-06-02 20:11 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2021-05-05 3:54 ` [PATCH v4 4/4] x86/nospec: Remove barrier_nospec() Josh Poimboeuf
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