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From: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
To: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>,
	David Laight <David.Laight@aculab.com>,
	Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Subject: [PATCH v4 0/4] x86/uaccess: Use pointer masking to limit uaccess speculation
Date: Tue,  4 May 2021 22:54:28 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <cover.1620186182.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com> (raw)

This one managed to fall through the cracks back in September.  Here's a
fresh new version.

Ideally, we'd switch all access_ok() users to access_ok_mask() or
something, but that's a much bigger change.

I dropped all the ack/review tags because the rebase was significant.

Please review carefully :-)


v4 changes:

- Rebased on the latest.

- Split up into multiple logical patches.

- Renamed "force_user_ptr()" -> "mask_user_ptr()" to prevent confusing
  it with '__force' casting.  [based on Dan's comment]

- Instead of reusing array_index_nospec(), made a new separate inline
  asm statement.  Otherwise it fails the build on recent toolchains
  and/or kernels because the "g" constraint in array_index_mask_nospec()
  isn't big enough for TASK_SIZE_MAX.  I could have changed "g" to "r",
  but that would negatively impact code generation for the other users.


v3 was here:

  https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/1d06ed6485b66b9f674900368b63d7ef79f666ca.1599756789.git.jpoimboe@redhat.com/


Josh Poimboeuf (4):
  uaccess: Always inline strn*_user() helper functions
  uaccess: Fix __user annotations for copy_mc_to_user()
  x86/uaccess: Use pointer masking to limit uaccess speculation
  x86/nospec: Remove barrier_nospec()

 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst |  6 +--
 arch/x86/include/asm/barrier.h                |  3 --
 arch/x86/include/asm/futex.h                  |  5 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h                | 48 +++++++++++++------
 arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess_64.h             | 12 ++---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/virt.c                |  6 ++-
 arch/x86/lib/copy_mc.c                        | 10 ++--
 arch/x86/lib/csum-wrappers_64.c               |  5 +-
 arch/x86/lib/getuser.S                        | 16 ++-----
 arch/x86/lib/putuser.S                        |  8 ++++
 arch/x86/lib/usercopy_32.c                    |  6 +--
 arch/x86/lib/usercopy_64.c                    |  7 +--
 lib/iov_iter.c                                |  2 +-
 lib/strncpy_from_user.c                       |  6 ++-
 lib/strnlen_user.c                            |  4 +-
 15 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)

-- 
2.31.1


             reply	other threads:[~2021-05-05  3:54 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-05-05  3:54 Josh Poimboeuf [this message]
2021-05-05  3:54 ` [PATCH v4 1/4] uaccess: Always inline strn*_user() helper functions Josh Poimboeuf
2021-05-05  3:54 ` [PATCH v4 2/4] uaccess: Fix __user annotations for copy_mc_to_user() Josh Poimboeuf
2021-05-05  3:54 ` [PATCH v4 3/4] x86/uaccess: Use pointer masking to limit uaccess speculation Josh Poimboeuf
2021-05-05  8:48   ` David Laight
2021-05-05 13:19     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2021-05-05 13:51       ` David Laight
2021-05-05 18:32     ` Linus Torvalds
2021-05-06  7:57       ` David Laight
2021-05-05 14:25   ` Mark Rutland
2021-05-05 14:48     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2021-05-05 14:49     ` David Laight
2021-05-05 15:45       ` Mark Rutland
2021-05-05 16:55   ` Andy Lutomirski
2021-05-06  8:36     ` David Laight
2021-05-06 12:05       ` Christoph Hellwig
2021-06-02 17:11   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-06-02 20:11     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2021-05-05  3:54 ` [PATCH v4 4/4] x86/nospec: Remove barrier_nospec() Josh Poimboeuf

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