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From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Alan Cox <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
Cc: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 5/5] x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on fixed Intel processors
Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2018 19:02:51 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <bb364dbb-4f16-56ab-c306-d96edea94dad@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180123173312.1d8cf02f@alans-desktop>

On 23/01/18 18:45, Alan Cox wrote:
> On Tue, 23 Jan 2018 16:52:55 +0000
> David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk> wrote:
>
>> When they advertise the IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR and it has the RDCL_NO
>> bit set, they don't need KPTI either.
> This is starting to get messy because we will eventually need to integrate
>
> AMD processors		-	no meltdown but spectre
> VIA processors		-	probably no vulnerabilities at
> 				least on the old ones
> Intel with ND set	-	No meltdown
> Anybody with no speculation -	No meltdown, no spectre, no id bit
>
>
>
> and it expands a lot with all sorts of 32bit processors. Would it make
> more sense to make it table driven or do we want a separate function so
> we can do:
>
>                 if (!in_order_cpu()) {
>                 }
>
> around the whole lot ? I'm guessing the latter makes sense then
> somethhing like this patch I'm running on my old atom widgets in 64bit
> mode
>
> static __initdata struct x86_cpu_id cpu_in_order[] = {
>         { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CEDARVIEW, X86_FEATURE_ANY },
>         { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CLOVERVIEW, X86_FEATURE_ANY },
>         { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_LINCROFT, X86_FEATURE_ANY },
>         { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PENWELL, X86_FEATURE_ANY },
>         { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PINEVIEW, X86_FEATURE_ANY },
>         {}
> };
>
> static int in_order_cpu(void)
> {
> 	/* Processors with CPU id etc */
> 	if (x86_match_cpu(cpu_in_order))
> 		return 1;
> 	/* Other rules here */
> 	return 0;
> }

Why does in-order vs out-of-order matter?

There are leaky SP3 gadgets which satisfy in-order requirements, so long
as the processor is capable of speculating 3 instructions past an
unresolved branch.

What would (at a guess) save an in-order speculative processor from
being vulnerable is if memory reads are issued and resolve in program
order, but in that case, it is not the in-order property of the
processor which makes it safe.

~Andrew

  reply	other threads:[~2018-01-23 19:04 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 32+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-23 16:52 [PATCH v2 0/5] Basic Speculation Control feature support David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 16:52 ` [PATCH v2 1/5] x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 16:52 ` [PATCH v2 2/5] x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 18:43   ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-24  1:23     ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-24  1:28       ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-24  8:13         ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-23 16:52 ` [PATCH v2 3/5] x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD " David Woodhouse
2018-01-24  8:39   ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-01-24  8:40     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 16:52 ` [PATCH v2 4/5] x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 18:27   ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-23 18:31     ` Greg KH
2018-01-23 18:48       ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-23 16:52 ` [PATCH v2 5/5] x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on fixed Intel processors David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 18:12   ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-24  1:21     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 18:40   ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-24  1:27     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 18:41   ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-23 18:44     ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-23 18:45   ` Alan Cox
2018-01-23 19:02     ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2018-01-23 20:45       ` Alan Cox
2018-01-23 20:38     ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-23 20:50     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-24 16:25     ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-24 17:07       ` Alan Cox
2018-01-24 17:42         ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-24 18:40           ` Alan Cox
2018-01-24 18:59             ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-24 19:37             ` David Woodhouse

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