From: Christophe de Dinechin <christophe.de.dinechin@gmail.com>
To: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Andi Kleen" <ak@linux.intel.com>,
"Andrea Arcangeli" <aarcange@redhat.com>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
"Arjan van de Ven" <arjan@linux.intel.com>,
"Ashok Raj" <ashok.raj@intel.com>,
"Asit Mallick" <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
"Borislav Petkov" <bp@suse.de>,
"Dan Williams" <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
"Dave Hansen" <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
"David Woodhouse" <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
"Greg Kroah-Hartman" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"Janakarajan Natarajan" <Janakarajan.Natarajan@amd.com>,
"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
"Jun Nakajima" <jun.nakajima@intel.com>,
"Laura Abbott" <labbott@redhat.com>,
"Linus Torvalds" <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
"Masami Hiramatsu" <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>,
"Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Tim Chen" <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
"Tom Lendacky" <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
kvm@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC 05/10] x86/speculation: Add basic IBRS support infrastructure
Date: Wed, 31 Jan 2018 11:03:21 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <m1y3ke1h2j.fsf@dinechin.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1516476182-5153-6-git-send-email-karahmed@amazon.de>
KarimAllah Ahmed writes:
> From: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
>
> Not functional yet; just add the handling for it in the Spectre v2
> mitigation selection, and the X86_FEATURE_IBRS flag which will control
> the code to be added in later patches.
>
> Also take the #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE from around the RSB-stuffing; IBRS
> mode will want that too.
>
> For now we are auto-selecting IBRS on Skylake. We will probably end up
> changing that but for now let's default to the safest option.
>
> XX: Do we want a microcode blacklist?
>
> [karahmed: simplify the switch block and get rid of all the magic]
>
> Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>
> Signed-off-by: KarimAllah Ahmed <karahmed@amazon.de>
> ---
> Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 1 +
> arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 +
> arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 2 -
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 108 +++++++++++++++---------
> 4 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> index 8122b5f..e597650 100644
> --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
> @@ -3932,6 +3932,7 @@
> retpoline - replace indirect branches
> retpoline,generic - google's original retpoline
> retpoline,amd - AMD-specific minimal thunk
> + ibrs - Intel: Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation
>
> Not specifying this option is equivalent to
> spectre_v2=auto.
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> index 8ec9588..ae86ad9 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
> @@ -211,6 +211,7 @@
> #define X86_FEATURE_AMD_PRED_CMD ( 7*32+17) /* Prediction Command MSR (AMD) */
> #define X86_FEATURE_MBA ( 7*32+18) /* Memory Bandwidth Allocation */
> #define X86_FEATURE_RSB_CTXSW ( 7*32+19) /* Fill RSB on context switches */
> +#define X86_FEATURE_IBRS ( 7*32+21) /* Use IBRS for Spectre v2 safety */
>
> /* Virtualization flags: Linux defined, word 8 */
> #define X86_FEATURE_TPR_SHADOW ( 8*32+ 0) /* Intel TPR Shadow */
> diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
> index c333c95..8759449 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
> +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
> @@ -205,7 +205,6 @@ extern char __indirect_thunk_end[];
> */
> static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
> {
> -#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
> unsigned long loops;
>
> asm volatile (ANNOTATE_NOSPEC_ALTERNATIVE
> @@ -215,7 +214,6 @@ static inline void vmexit_fill_RSB(void)
> "910:"
> : "=r" (loops), ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT
> : : "memory" );
> -#endif
> }
>
> static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void)
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> index 96548ff..1d5e12f 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
> @@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd {
> SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE,
> SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC,
> SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD,
> + SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS,
> };
>
> static const char *spectre_v2_strings[] = {
> @@ -87,6 +88,7 @@ static const char *spectre_v2_strings[] = {
> [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD] = "Vulnerable: Minimal AMD ASM retpoline",
> [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC] = "Mitigation: Full generic retpoline",
> [SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD] = "Mitigation: Full AMD retpoline",
> + [SPECTRE_V2_IBRS] = "Mitigation: Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation",
> };
>
> #undef pr_fmt
> @@ -132,9 +134,17 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
> spec2_print_if_secure("force enabled on command line.");
> return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE;
> } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "retpoline")) {
> + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) {
> + pr_err("retpoline selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n");
> + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
> + }
> spec2_print_if_insecure("retpoline selected on command line.");
> return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE;
> } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "retpoline,amd")) {
> + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) {
> + pr_err("retpoline,amd selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n");
> + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
> + }
> if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD) {
> pr_err("retpoline,amd selected but CPU is not AMD. Switching to AUTO select\n");
> return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
> @@ -142,8 +152,19 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
> spec2_print_if_insecure("AMD retpoline selected on command line.");
> return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD;
> } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "retpoline,generic")) {
> + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) {
> + pr_err("retpoline,generic selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n");
> + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
> + }
> spec2_print_if_insecure("generic retpoline selected on command line.");
> return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC;
> + } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "ibrs")) {
> + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL)) {
> + pr_err("IBRS selected but no CPU support. Switching to AUTO select\n");
> + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
> + }
> + spec2_print_if_insecure("IBRS seleted on command line.");
> + return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS;
> } else if (match_option(arg, ret, "auto")) {
> return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
> }
> @@ -156,7 +177,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
> return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
> }
>
> -/* Check for Skylake-like CPUs (for RSB handling) */
> +/* Check for Skylake-like CPUs (for RSB and IBRS handling) */
> static bool __init is_skylake_era(void)
> {
> if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL &&
> @@ -178,55 +199,58 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
> enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = spectre_v2_parse_cmdline();
> enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode = SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
>
> - /*
> - * If the CPU is not affected and the command line mode is NONE or AUTO
> - * then nothing to do.
> - */
> - if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2) &&
> - (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE || cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO))
> - return;
> -
> switch (cmd) {
> case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE:
> + if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
> + pr_err("kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!");
> return;
> -
> - case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE:
> - /* FALLTRHU */
> - case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO:
> - goto retpoline_auto;
> -
> - case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD:
> - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
> - goto retpoline_amd;
> - break;
> - case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC:
> - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
> - goto retpoline_generic;
> + case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS:
> + mode = SPECTRE_V2_IBRS;
> + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS);
> break;
> + case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO:
> + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
> + return;
> + /* Fall through */
> + case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_FORCE:
> + /*
> + * If we have IBRS support, and either Skylake or !RETPOLINE,
> + * then that's what we do.
> + */
> + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL) &&
> + (is_skylake_era() || !retp_compiler())) {
As per Eduardo's comments and followups, it's unclear this will play
well under virtualization. Putting this under a separate function
with a name making it clear that what we care about is the host, not
guest CPU.
Under virtualization, you may want to force is_skylake() to return
true (unless there is a way to get a more precise answer about the
host CPU at that stage?)
> + mode = SPECTRE_V2_IBRS;
> + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBRS);
> + break;
> + }
> + /* Fall through */
Given the complexity of the decision and the number of fall-through
cases, it's probably a good idea to add some printouts for system mgmt
or debugging.
> case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE:
> - if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE))
> - goto retpoline_auto;
> - break;
> - }
> - pr_err("kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!");
> - return;
> + case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_AMD:
> + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) &&
> + boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD) {
> + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)) {
> + mode = retp_compiler() ? SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD :
> + SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD;
> + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD);
> + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
> + break;
> + }
>
> -retpoline_auto:
> - if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD) {
> - retpoline_amd:
> - if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC)) {
> pr_err("LFENCE not serializing. Switching to generic retpoline\n");
> - goto retpoline_generic;
> }
> - mode = retp_compiler() ? SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_AMD :
> - SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL_AMD;
> - setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_AMD);
> - setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
> - } else {
> - retpoline_generic:
> - mode = retp_compiler() ? SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC :
> - SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL;
> - setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
> + /* Fall through */
> + case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC:
> + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) {
> + mode = retp_compiler() ? SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_GENERIC :
> + SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE_MINIMAL;
> + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE);
> + break;
> + }
> + /* Fall through */
> + default:
> + if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2))
> + pr_err("kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!");
> + return;
> }
>
> spectre_v2_enabled = mode;
--
Cheers,
Christophe de Dinechin (IRC c3d)
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-01-31 10:03 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 143+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-01-20 19:22 [RFC 00/10] Speculation Control feature support KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-01-20 19:22 ` [RFC 01/10] x86/speculation: Add basic support for IBPB KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-01-20 19:22 ` [RFC 02/10] x86/kvm: Add IBPB support KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-01-20 20:18 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-22 18:56 ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-22 19:31 ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-20 19:22 ` [RFC 03/10] x86/speculation: Use Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier in context switch KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-01-20 19:22 ` [RFC 04/10] x86/mm: Only flush indirect branches when switching into non dumpable process KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-01-20 21:06 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-22 18:29 ` Tim Chen
2018-01-21 11:22 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-21 12:04 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 14:07 ` H.J. Lu
2018-01-22 10:19 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-22 10:23 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 16:21 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-21 16:25 ` Arjan van de Ven
2018-01-21 22:20 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-29 6:35 ` Jon Masters
2018-01-29 14:07 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-20 19:22 ` [RFC 05/10] x86/speculation: Add basic IBRS support infrastructure KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-01-21 14:31 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-21 14:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-22 9:51 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-22 12:06 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-22 13:30 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-22 13:37 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-21 15:25 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 20:58 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 22:43 ` Johannes Erdfelt
2018-01-24 8:47 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-24 9:02 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-24 9:10 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-24 15:09 ` Arjan van de Ven
2018-01-24 15:18 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-24 9:34 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-24 10:49 ` Henrique de Moraes Holschuh
2018-01-24 12:30 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-24 12:14 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-24 12:29 ` Peter Zijlstra
2018-01-24 12:58 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-29 20:14 ` [RFC,05/10] " Eduardo Habkost
2018-01-29 20:17 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-29 20:42 ` Eduardo Habkost
2018-01-29 20:44 ` Arjan van de Ven
2018-01-29 21:02 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-29 21:37 ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-29 21:50 ` Eduardo Habkost
2018-01-29 22:12 ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-30 1:22 ` Eduardo Habkost
2018-01-29 22:25 ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-30 1:37 ` Eduardo Habkost
2018-01-29 21:37 ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-29 21:44 ` Eduardo Habkost
2018-01-29 22:10 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-01-30 1:12 ` Eduardo Habkost
2018-01-30 0:23 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-30 1:03 ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-30 3:13 ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-31 15:03 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-31 15:07 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2018-01-30 1:32 ` Arjan van de Ven
2018-01-30 3:32 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-30 12:04 ` Eduardo Habkost
2018-01-30 13:54 ` Arjan van de Ven
2018-01-30 8:22 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-30 11:35 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-30 11:56 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2018-01-30 12:11 ` Christian Borntraeger
2018-01-30 14:46 ` Christophe de Dinechin
2018-01-30 14:52 ` Christian Borntraeger
2018-01-30 14:56 ` Christophe de Dinechin
2018-01-30 15:33 ` Christian Borntraeger
2018-01-30 20:46 ` Alan Cox
2018-01-31 10:05 ` Christophe de Dinechin
2018-01-31 10:15 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-31 11:04 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2018-01-31 11:52 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-31 12:30 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2018-01-31 13:18 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-31 14:04 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2018-01-31 14:44 ` Eduardo Habkost
2018-01-31 16:28 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-01-31 11:07 ` Christophe de Dinechin
2018-01-31 15:00 ` Eduardo Habkost
2018-01-31 15:11 ` Arjan van de Ven
2018-01-31 10:03 ` Christophe de Dinechin [this message]
2018-01-20 19:22 ` [RFC 06/10] x86/speculation: Add inlines to control Indirect Branch Speculation KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-01-20 19:22 ` [RFC 07/10] x86: Simplify spectre_v2 command line parsing KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-01-20 19:22 ` [RFC 08/10] x86/idle: Control Indirect Branch Speculation in idle KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-01-20 19:23 ` [RFC 09/10] x86/enter: Create macros to restrict/unrestrict Indirect Branch Speculation KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-01-21 19:14 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-23 16:12 ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-23 16:20 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-23 22:37 ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-23 22:49 ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-23 23:14 ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-23 23:22 ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-24 0:47 ` Tim Chen
2018-01-24 1:00 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-24 1:22 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-24 1:59 ` Van De Ven, Arjan
2018-01-24 3:25 ` Andy Lutomirski
2018-01-21 19:34 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-21 20:28 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 21:35 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-21 22:00 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-21 22:27 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-01-22 16:27 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 7:29 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-23 7:53 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-23 9:27 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-23 9:37 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 15:01 ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-23 9:30 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 10:15 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-23 10:27 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 10:44 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-23 10:57 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-23 10:23 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-23 10:35 ` David Woodhouse
2018-02-04 18:43 ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-02-04 20:22 ` David Woodhouse
2018-02-06 9:14 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-25 16:19 ` Mason
2018-01-25 17:16 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2018-01-29 11:59 ` Mason
2018-01-24 0:05 ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-23 20:16 ` Pavel Machek
2018-01-20 19:23 ` [RFC 10/10] x86/enter: Use IBRS on syscall and interrupts KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-01-21 13:50 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-01-21 14:40 ` KarimAllah Ahmed
2018-01-21 17:22 ` Dave Hansen
2018-01-21 14:02 ` [RFC 00/10] Speculation Control feature support Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-01-22 21:27 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-29 22:29 [RFC,05/10] x86/speculation: Add basic IBRS support infrastructure David Dunn
2018-01-29 22:41 ` Andi Kleen
2018-01-29 22:49 ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-30 1:10 ` Eduardo Habkost
2018-01-30 1:20 ` David Dunn
2018-01-30 1:30 ` Eduardo Habkost
2018-01-29 23:51 ` Fred Jacobs
2018-01-30 1:08 ` Eduardo Habkost
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