Re: possible race in __inet_lookup_established()

[Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz>]

On Wed, Nov 20, 2019 at 08:12:10AM -0800, Eric Dumazet wrote:
> On Wed, Nov 20, 2019 at 12:39 AM Michal Kubecek <mkubecek@suse.cz> wrote:
> 
> > Hello Eric,
> >
> > we are investigating a crash in socket lookup in a distribution kernel
> > based on v4.12 but the possible problem we found seems to also apply to
> > current mainline (or net) code.
> >
> > The common pattern is:
> >
> > - the crash always happens in __inet_lookup_established() in
> >
> >         sk_nulls_for_each_rcu(sk, node, &head->chain) {
> >                 if (sk->sk_hash != hash)     <-----------------
> >                         continue;
> >
> >   as sk is an invalid pointer; in particular, &sk->sk_nulls_node is null
> >   so dereferencing sk->sk_hash faults
> >
> > - the reason is that previous sk value pointed to a listening socket
> >   rather than an established one; as listening socket uses sk_node, end
> >   of the chain is marked by a null pointer which is not detected as
> >   a chain end by sk_nulls_for_each_rcu()
> >
> > - there is no socket matching skb which is a TCP pure ACK having
> >   127.0.0.1 as both source and destination
> >
> > - the chain pointed to by head variable is empty
> >
> > Firo Yang came with the theory that this could be a race between socket
> > lookup and freing the socket and replacing it with a listening one:
> >
> > 1. CPU A gets a pointer to an established socket as sk in the
> > sk_nulls_for_each_rcu() loop in __inet_lookup_established() but does not
> > thake a reference to it.
> >
> > 2. CPU B frees the socket
> >
> > 3. Slab object pointed to by sk is reused for a new listening socket.
> > This socket has null sk->sk_node->next which uses the same spot as
> > sk->sk_nulls_node->next
> >
> > 4. CPU A tests sk->sk_nulls_node->next with is_a_nulls() (false) and
> > follows the pointer, resulting in a fault dereferencing sk->sk_hash.
> >
> > Unless we missed something, there is no protection against established
> > socket being freed and replaced by a new listening one while
> > __inet_lookup_established() has a pointer to it. The RCU loop only
> > prevents the slab object being reused for a different slab cache or
> > something completely different but as established and listening sockets
> > share the same slab cache, it does not protect us from switching from
> > established to listening.
> >
> > As far as I can say, this kind of race could have happened for quite
> > long but before your commit ou3b24d854cb35 ("tcp/dccp: do not touch
> > listener sk_refcnt under synflood"), the worst that could happen would
> > be switching to a chain in listener lookup table, following it to its
> > end and then (most likely) restarting the lookup or failing. Now that
> > established and listening sockets use different list types, replacing
> > one with the other can be deadly.
> >
> > Do you agree that this race is possible or is there something we missed
> > that would prevent it?
> >
> A listener is hashed on icsk_listen_portaddr_node, so I do not see how a
> listener could be found in the establish chain ?

It is not really in the chain. What we suspect is that between sk is
assigned pointer to an established socket in __inet_lookup_established()
and using sk->sk_nulls_node->next to go to the next (or stop if it's odd
nulls value), this established socket could be freed and its slab object
reused for a listening socket. As listening sockets no longer use a
nulls hashlist but a normal hashlist, in the most common case where the
socket is last in the chain, sk->sk_node->next (which occupies the same
place as sk->sk_nulls_node->next) would be NULL so that is_a_nulls()
does not recognize the chain end and the loop would go on to next socket
in the chain.

Michal

> 
> sock_copy() makes sure to not touch sk_node
> 
> sk_prot_clear_nulls() makes sure to not touch sk_node
> 
> So maybe you miss a backport or something ?