* [PATCH v10 01/13] landlock: Make ruleset's access masks more generic
2023-03-23 8:52 [PATCH v10 00/13] Network support for Landlock Konstantin Meskhidze
@ 2023-03-23 8:52 ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 02/13] landlock: Allow filesystem layout changes for domains without such rule type Konstantin Meskhidze
` (11 subsequent siblings)
12 siblings, 0 replies; 48+ messages in thread
From: Konstantin Meskhidze @ 2023-03-23 8:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: mic
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel, gnoack3000, linux-security-module, netdev,
netfilter-devel, yusongping, artem.kuzin
To support network type rules, this modification renames ruleset's
access masks and modifies it's type to access_masks_t. This patch
adds filesystem helper functions to add and get filesystem mask.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
---
Changes since v9:
* None.
Changes since v8:
* Minor fixes.
Changes since v7:
* Refactors commit message.
Changes since v6:
* Adds a new access_masks_t for struct ruleset.
* Renames landlock_set_fs_access_mask() to landlock_add_fs_access_mask()
because it OR values.
* Makes landlock_add_fs_access_mask() more resilient incorrect values.
* Refactors landlock_get_fs_access_mask().
Changes since v6:
* Adds a new access_masks_t for struct ruleset.
* Renames landlock_set_fs_access_mask() to landlock_add_fs_access_mask()
because it OR values.
* Makes landlock_add_fs_access_mask() more resilient incorrect values.
* Refactors landlock_get_fs_access_mask().
Changes since v5:
* Changes access_mask_t to u32.
* Formats code with clang-format-14.
Changes since v4:
* Deletes struct landlock_access_mask.
Changes since v3:
* Splits commit.
* Adds get_mask, set_mask helpers for filesystem.
* Adds new struct landlock_access_mask.
---
security/landlock/fs.c | 10 +++++-----
security/landlock/limits.h | 1 +
security/landlock/ruleset.c | 17 +++++++++--------
security/landlock/ruleset.h | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
security/landlock/syscalls.c | 7 ++++---
5 files changed, 49 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
index adcea0fe7e68..0d57c6479d29 100644
--- a/security/landlock/fs.c
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
@@ -178,9 +178,9 @@ int landlock_append_fs_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
return -EINVAL;
/* Transforms relative access rights to absolute ones. */
- access_rights |=
- LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS &
- ~(ruleset->fs_access_masks[0] | ACCESS_INITIALLY_DENIED);
+ access_rights |= LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS &
+ ~(landlock_get_fs_access_mask(ruleset, 0) |
+ ACCESS_INITIALLY_DENIED);
object = get_inode_object(d_backing_inode(path->dentry));
if (IS_ERR(object))
return PTR_ERR(object);
@@ -294,7 +294,7 @@ get_handled_accesses(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain)
size_t layer_level;
for (layer_level = 0; layer_level < domain->num_layers; layer_level++)
- access_dom |= domain->fs_access_masks[layer_level];
+ access_dom |= landlock_get_fs_access_mask(domain, layer_level);
return access_dom & LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS;
}
@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ init_layer_masks(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
* access rights.
*/
if (BIT_ULL(access_bit) &
- (domain->fs_access_masks[layer_level] |
+ (landlock_get_fs_access_mask(domain, layer_level) |
ACCESS_INITIALLY_DENIED)) {
(*layer_masks)[access_bit] |=
BIT_ULL(layer_level);
diff --git a/security/landlock/limits.h b/security/landlock/limits.h
index 82288f0e9e5e..bafb3b8dc677 100644
--- a/security/landlock/limits.h
+++ b/security/landlock/limits.h
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE
#define LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS ((LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_FS << 1) - 1)
#define LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS __const_hweight64(LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS)
+#define LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_FS 0
/* clang-format on */
diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.c b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
index 996484f98bfd..1f3188b4e313 100644
--- a/security/landlock/ruleset.c
+++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ static struct landlock_ruleset *create_ruleset(const u32 num_layers)
struct landlock_ruleset *new_ruleset;
new_ruleset =
- kzalloc(struct_size(new_ruleset, fs_access_masks, num_layers),
+ kzalloc(struct_size(new_ruleset, access_masks, num_layers),
GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
if (!new_ruleset)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ static struct landlock_ruleset *create_ruleset(const u32 num_layers)
/*
* hierarchy = NULL
* num_rules = 0
- * fs_access_masks[] = 0
+ * access_masks[] = 0
*/
return new_ruleset;
}
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ landlock_create_ruleset(const access_mask_t fs_access_mask)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMSG);
new_ruleset = create_ruleset(1);
if (!IS_ERR(new_ruleset))
- new_ruleset->fs_access_masks[0] = fs_access_mask;
+ landlock_add_fs_access_mask(new_ruleset, fs_access_mask, 0);
return new_ruleset;
}
@@ -117,11 +117,12 @@ static void build_check_ruleset(void)
.num_rules = ~0,
.num_layers = ~0,
};
- typeof(ruleset.fs_access_masks[0]) fs_access_mask = ~0;
+ typeof(ruleset.access_masks[0]) access_masks = ~0;
BUILD_BUG_ON(ruleset.num_rules < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_RULES);
BUILD_BUG_ON(ruleset.num_layers < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS);
- BUILD_BUG_ON(fs_access_mask < LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(access_masks <
+ (LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS << LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_FS));
}
/**
@@ -281,7 +282,7 @@ static int merge_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const dst,
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
}
- dst->fs_access_masks[dst->num_layers - 1] = src->fs_access_masks[0];
+ dst->access_masks[dst->num_layers - 1] = src->access_masks[0];
/* Merges the @src tree. */
rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe(walker_rule, next_rule, &src->root,
@@ -340,8 +341,8 @@ static int inherit_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const parent,
goto out_unlock;
}
/* Copies the parent layer stack and leaves a space for the new layer. */
- memcpy(child->fs_access_masks, parent->fs_access_masks,
- flex_array_size(parent, fs_access_masks, parent->num_layers));
+ memcpy(child->access_masks, parent->access_masks,
+ flex_array_size(parent, access_masks, parent->num_layers));
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!parent->hierarchy)) {
err = -EINVAL;
diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.h b/security/landlock/ruleset.h
index d43231b783e4..e900b84d915f 100644
--- a/security/landlock/ruleset.h
+++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.h
@@ -25,6 +25,11 @@ static_assert(BITS_PER_TYPE(access_mask_t) >= LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS);
/* Makes sure for_each_set_bit() and for_each_clear_bit() calls are OK. */
static_assert(sizeof(unsigned long) >= sizeof(access_mask_t));
+/* Ruleset access masks. */
+typedef u16 access_masks_t;
+/* Makes sure all ruleset access rights can be stored. */
+static_assert(BITS_PER_TYPE(access_masks_t) >= LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS);
+
typedef u16 layer_mask_t;
/* Makes sure all layers can be checked. */
static_assert(BITS_PER_TYPE(layer_mask_t) >= LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS);
@@ -110,7 +115,7 @@ struct landlock_ruleset {
* section. This is only used by
* landlock_put_ruleset_deferred() when @usage reaches zero.
* The fields @lock, @usage, @num_rules, @num_layers and
- * @fs_access_masks are then unused.
+ * @access_masks are then unused.
*/
struct work_struct work_free;
struct {
@@ -137,7 +142,7 @@ struct landlock_ruleset {
*/
u32 num_layers;
/**
- * @fs_access_masks: Contains the subset of filesystem
+ * @access_masks: Contains the subset of filesystem
* actions that are restricted by a ruleset. A domain
* saves all layers of merged rulesets in a stack
* (FAM), starting from the first layer to the last
@@ -148,13 +153,13 @@ struct landlock_ruleset {
* layers are set once and never changed for the
* lifetime of the ruleset.
*/
- access_mask_t fs_access_masks[];
+ access_masks_t access_masks[];
};
};
};
struct landlock_ruleset *
-landlock_create_ruleset(const access_mask_t fs_access_mask);
+landlock_create_ruleset(const access_mask_t access_mask);
void landlock_put_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset);
void landlock_put_ruleset_deferred(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset);
@@ -177,4 +182,25 @@ static inline void landlock_get_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset)
refcount_inc(&ruleset->usage);
}
+static inline void
+landlock_add_fs_access_mask(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
+ const access_mask_t fs_access_mask,
+ const u16 layer_level)
+{
+ access_mask_t fs_mask = fs_access_mask & LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS;
+
+ /* Should already be checked in sys_landlock_create_ruleset(). */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(fs_access_mask != fs_mask);
+ ruleset->access_masks[layer_level] |=
+ (fs_mask << LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_FS);
+}
+
+static inline access_mask_t
+landlock_get_fs_access_mask(const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
+ const u16 layer_level)
+{
+ return (ruleset->access_masks[layer_level] >>
+ LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_FS) &
+ LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS;
+}
#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_RULESET_H */
diff --git a/security/landlock/syscalls.c b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
index 245cc650a4dc..71aca7f990bc 100644
--- a/security/landlock/syscalls.c
+++ b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
@@ -346,10 +346,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(landlock_add_rule, const int, ruleset_fd,
}
/*
* Checks that allowed_access matches the @ruleset constraints
- * (ruleset->fs_access_masks[0] is automatically upgraded to 64-bits).
+ * (ruleset->access_masks[0] is automatically upgraded to 64-bits).
*/
- if ((path_beneath_attr.allowed_access | ruleset->fs_access_masks[0]) !=
- ruleset->fs_access_masks[0]) {
+ if ((path_beneath_attr.allowed_access |
+ landlock_get_fs_access_mask(ruleset, 0)) !=
+ landlock_get_fs_access_mask(ruleset, 0)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_put_ruleset;
}
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 48+ messages in thread* [PATCH v10 02/13] landlock: Allow filesystem layout changes for domains without such rule type
2023-03-23 8:52 [PATCH v10 00/13] Network support for Landlock Konstantin Meskhidze
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 01/13] landlock: Make ruleset's access masks more generic Konstantin Meskhidze
@ 2023-03-23 8:52 ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2023-04-16 16:09 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 03/13] landlock: Remove unnecessary inlining Konstantin Meskhidze
` (10 subsequent siblings)
12 siblings, 1 reply; 48+ messages in thread
From: Konstantin Meskhidze @ 2023-03-23 8:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: mic
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel, gnoack3000, linux-security-module, netdev,
netfilter-devel, yusongping, artem.kuzin
From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Allow mount point and root directory changes when there is no filesystem
rule tied to the current Landlock domain. This doesn't change anything
for now because a domain must have at least a (filesystem) rule, but
this will change when other rule types will come. For instance, a
domain only restricting the network should have no impact on filesystem
restrictions.
Add a new get_current_fs_domain() helper to quickly check filesystem
rule existence for all filesystem LSM hooks.
Remove unnecessary inlining.
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
---
Changes since v9:
* Refactors documentaion landlock.rst.
* Changes ACCESS_FS_INITIALLY_DENIED constant
to LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_INITIALLY_DENIED.
* Gets rid of unnecessary masking of access_dom in
get_raw_handled_fs_accesses() function.
Changes since v8:
* Refactors get_handled_fs_accesses().
* Adds landlock_get_raw_fs_access_mask() helper.
---
Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 6 +-
security/landlock/fs.c | 78 ++++++++++++------------
security/landlock/ruleset.h | 25 +++++++-
security/landlock/syscalls.c | 6 +-
4 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
index d8cd8cd9ce25..f6a7da21708a 100644
--- a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
+++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
@@ -387,9 +387,9 @@ Current limitations
Filesystem topology modification
--------------------------------
-As for file renaming and linking, a sandboxed thread cannot modify its
-filesystem topology, whether via :manpage:`mount(2)` or
-:manpage:`pivot_root(2)`. However, :manpage:`chroot(2)` calls are not denied.
+Threads sandboxed with filesystem restrictions cannot modify filesystem
+topology, whether via :manpage:`mount(2)` or :manpage:`pivot_root(2)`.
+However, :manpage:`chroot(2)` calls are not denied.
Special filesystems
-------------------
diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
index 0d57c6479d29..05a339bf2a7c 100644
--- a/security/landlock/fs.c
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
@@ -150,16 +150,6 @@ static struct landlock_object *get_inode_object(struct inode *const inode)
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE)
/* clang-format on */
-/*
- * All access rights that are denied by default whether they are handled or not
- * by a ruleset/layer. This must be ORed with all ruleset->fs_access_masks[]
- * entries when we need to get the absolute handled access masks.
- */
-/* clang-format off */
-#define ACCESS_INITIALLY_DENIED ( \
- LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER)
-/* clang-format on */
-
/*
* @path: Should have been checked by get_path_from_fd().
*/
@@ -179,8 +169,7 @@ int landlock_append_fs_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
/* Transforms relative access rights to absolute ones. */
access_rights |= LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS &
- ~(landlock_get_fs_access_mask(ruleset, 0) |
- ACCESS_INITIALLY_DENIED);
+ ~landlock_get_fs_access_mask(ruleset, 0);
object = get_inode_object(d_backing_inode(path->dentry));
if (IS_ERR(object))
return PTR_ERR(object);
@@ -287,15 +276,16 @@ static inline bool is_nouser_or_private(const struct dentry *dentry)
unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry))));
}
-static inline access_mask_t
-get_handled_accesses(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain)
+static access_mask_t
+get_raw_handled_fs_accesses(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain)
{
- access_mask_t access_dom = ACCESS_INITIALLY_DENIED;
+ access_mask_t access_dom = 0;
size_t layer_level;
for (layer_level = 0; layer_level < domain->num_layers; layer_level++)
- access_dom |= landlock_get_fs_access_mask(domain, layer_level);
- return access_dom & LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS;
+ access_dom |=
+ landlock_get_raw_fs_access_mask(domain, layer_level);
+ return access_dom;
}
/**
@@ -331,13 +321,8 @@ init_layer_masks(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
for_each_set_bit(access_bit, &access_req,
ARRAY_SIZE(*layer_masks)) {
- /*
- * Artificially handles all initially denied by default
- * access rights.
- */
if (BIT_ULL(access_bit) &
- (landlock_get_fs_access_mask(domain, layer_level) |
- ACCESS_INITIALLY_DENIED)) {
+ landlock_get_fs_access_mask(domain, layer_level)) {
(*layer_masks)[access_bit] |=
BIT_ULL(layer_level);
handled_accesses |= BIT_ULL(access_bit);
@@ -347,6 +332,25 @@ init_layer_masks(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
return handled_accesses;
}
+static access_mask_t
+get_handled_fs_accesses(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain)
+{
+ /* Handles all initially denied by default access rights. */
+ return get_raw_handled_fs_accesses(domain) |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_INITIALLY_DENIED;
+}
+
+static const struct landlock_ruleset *get_current_fs_domain(void)
+{
+ const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
+ landlock_get_current_domain();
+
+ if (!dom || !get_raw_handled_fs_accesses(dom))
+ return NULL;
+
+ return dom;
+}
+
/*
* Check that a destination file hierarchy has more restrictions than a source
* file hierarchy. This is only used for link and rename actions.
@@ -519,7 +523,7 @@ static bool is_access_to_paths_allowed(
* a superset of the meaningful requested accesses).
*/
access_masked_parent1 = access_masked_parent2 =
- get_handled_accesses(domain);
+ get_handled_fs_accesses(domain);
is_dom_check = true;
} else {
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(dentry_child1 || dentry_child2))
@@ -648,11 +652,10 @@ static inline int check_access_path(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
return -EACCES;
}
-static inline int current_check_access_path(const struct path *const path,
- const access_mask_t access_request)
+static int current_check_access_path(const struct path *const path,
+ const access_mask_t access_request)
{
- const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
- landlock_get_current_domain();
+ const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = get_current_fs_domain();
if (!dom)
return 0;
@@ -815,8 +818,7 @@ static int current_check_refer_path(struct dentry *const old_dentry,
struct dentry *const new_dentry,
const bool removable, const bool exchange)
{
- const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
- landlock_get_current_domain();
+ const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = get_current_fs_domain();
bool allow_parent1, allow_parent2;
access_mask_t access_request_parent1, access_request_parent2;
struct path mnt_dir;
@@ -1050,7 +1052,7 @@ static int hook_sb_mount(const char *const dev_name,
const struct path *const path, const char *const type,
const unsigned long flags, void *const data)
{
- if (!landlock_get_current_domain())
+ if (!get_current_fs_domain())
return 0;
return -EPERM;
}
@@ -1058,7 +1060,7 @@ static int hook_sb_mount(const char *const dev_name,
static int hook_move_mount(const struct path *const from_path,
const struct path *const to_path)
{
- if (!landlock_get_current_domain())
+ if (!get_current_fs_domain())
return 0;
return -EPERM;
}
@@ -1069,14 +1071,14 @@ static int hook_move_mount(const struct path *const from_path,
*/
static int hook_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *const mnt, const int flags)
{
- if (!landlock_get_current_domain())
+ if (!get_current_fs_domain())
return 0;
return -EPERM;
}
static int hook_sb_remount(struct super_block *const sb, void *const mnt_opts)
{
- if (!landlock_get_current_domain())
+ if (!get_current_fs_domain())
return 0;
return -EPERM;
}
@@ -1092,7 +1094,7 @@ static int hook_sb_remount(struct super_block *const sb, void *const mnt_opts)
static int hook_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *const old_path,
const struct path *const new_path)
{
- if (!landlock_get_current_domain())
+ if (!get_current_fs_domain())
return 0;
return -EPERM;
}
@@ -1128,8 +1130,7 @@ static int hook_path_mknod(const struct path *const dir,
struct dentry *const dentry, const umode_t mode,
const unsigned int dev)
{
- const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
- landlock_get_current_domain();
+ const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = get_current_fs_domain();
if (!dom)
return 0;
@@ -1208,8 +1209,7 @@ static int hook_file_open(struct file *const file)
layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = {};
access_mask_t open_access_request, full_access_request, allowed_access;
const access_mask_t optional_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE;
- const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
- landlock_get_current_domain();
+ const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom = get_current_fs_domain();
if (!dom)
return 0;
diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.h b/security/landlock/ruleset.h
index e900b84d915f..baef84071f37 100644
--- a/security/landlock/ruleset.h
+++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.h
@@ -15,10 +15,21 @@
#include <linux/rbtree.h>
#include <linux/refcount.h>
#include <linux/workqueue.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/landlock.h>
#include "limits.h"
#include "object.h"
+/*
+ * All access rights that are denied by default whether they are handled or not
+ * by a ruleset/layer. This must be ORed with all ruleset->access_masks[]
+ * entries when we need to get the absolute handled access masks.
+ */
+/* clang-format off */
+#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_INITIALLY_DENIED ( \
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER)
+/* clang-format on */
+
typedef u16 access_mask_t;
/* Makes sure all filesystem access rights can be stored. */
static_assert(BITS_PER_TYPE(access_mask_t) >= LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS);
@@ -196,11 +207,21 @@ landlock_add_fs_access_mask(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
}
static inline access_mask_t
-landlock_get_fs_access_mask(const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
- const u16 layer_level)
+landlock_get_raw_fs_access_mask(const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
+ const u16 layer_level)
{
return (ruleset->access_masks[layer_level] >>
LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_FS) &
LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS;
}
+
+static inline access_mask_t
+landlock_get_fs_access_mask(const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
+ const u16 layer_level)
+{
+ /* Handles all initially denied by default access rights. */
+ return landlock_get_raw_fs_access_mask(ruleset, layer_level) |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_INITIALLY_DENIED;
+}
+
#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_RULESET_H */
diff --git a/security/landlock/syscalls.c b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
index 71aca7f990bc..d35cd5d304db 100644
--- a/security/landlock/syscalls.c
+++ b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
@@ -310,6 +310,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(landlock_add_rule, const int, ruleset_fd,
struct path path;
struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset;
int res, err;
+ access_mask_t mask;
if (!landlock_initialized)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
@@ -348,9 +349,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(landlock_add_rule, const int, ruleset_fd,
* Checks that allowed_access matches the @ruleset constraints
* (ruleset->access_masks[0] is automatically upgraded to 64-bits).
*/
- if ((path_beneath_attr.allowed_access |
- landlock_get_fs_access_mask(ruleset, 0)) !=
- landlock_get_fs_access_mask(ruleset, 0)) {
+ mask = landlock_get_raw_fs_access_mask(ruleset, 0);
+ if ((path_beneath_attr.allowed_access | mask) != mask) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_put_ruleset;
}
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 48+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v10 02/13] landlock: Allow filesystem layout changes for domains without such rule type
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 02/13] landlock: Allow filesystem layout changes for domains without such rule type Konstantin Meskhidze
@ 2023-04-16 16:09 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-20 11:42 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
0 siblings, 1 reply; 48+ messages in thread
From: Mickaël Salaün @ 2023-04-16 16:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Konstantin Meskhidze
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel, gnoack3000, linux-security-module, netdev,
netfilter-devel, yusongping, artem.kuzin
On 23/03/2023 09:52, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
> From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
>
> Allow mount point and root directory changes when there is no filesystem
> rule tied to the current Landlock domain. This doesn't change anything
> for now because a domain must have at least a (filesystem) rule, but
> this will change when other rule types will come. For instance, a
> domain only restricting the network should have no impact on filesystem
> restrictions.
>
> Add a new get_current_fs_domain() helper to quickly check filesystem
> rule existence for all filesystem LSM hooks.
>
> Remove unnecessary inlining.
>
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
> ---
>
> Changes since v9:
> * Refactors documentaion landlock.rst.
> * Changes ACCESS_FS_INITIALLY_DENIED constant
> to LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_INITIALLY_DENIED.
> * Gets rid of unnecessary masking of access_dom in
> get_raw_handled_fs_accesses() function.
>
> Changes since v8:
> * Refactors get_handled_fs_accesses().
> * Adds landlock_get_raw_fs_access_mask() helper.
>
> ---
> Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 6 +-
> security/landlock/fs.c | 78 ++++++++++++------------
> security/landlock/ruleset.h | 25 +++++++-
> security/landlock/syscalls.c | 6 +-
> 4 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-)
>
[...]
> diff --git a/security/landlock/syscalls.c b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
> index 71aca7f990bc..d35cd5d304db 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/syscalls.c
> +++ b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
> @@ -310,6 +310,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(landlock_add_rule, const int, ruleset_fd,
> struct path path;
> struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset;
> int res, err;
> + access_mask_t mask;
>
> if (!landlock_initialized)
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> @@ -348,9 +349,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(landlock_add_rule, const int, ruleset_fd,
> * Checks that allowed_access matches the @ruleset constraints
> * (ruleset->access_masks[0] is automatically upgraded to 64-bits).
> */
> - if ((path_beneath_attr.allowed_access |
> - landlock_get_fs_access_mask(ruleset, 0)) !=
> - landlock_get_fs_access_mask(ruleset, 0)) {
> + mask = landlock_get_raw_fs_access_mask(ruleset, 0);
> + if ((path_beneath_attr.allowed_access | mask) != mask) {
This hunk can be moved to the previous patch (i.e. mask = …). This patch
should only contains the new landlock_get_raw_fs_access_mask() call.
> err = -EINVAL;
> goto out_put_ruleset;
> }
> --
> 2.25.1
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 48+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v10 02/13] landlock: Allow filesystem layout changes for domains without such rule type
2023-04-16 16:09 ` Mickaël Salaün
@ 2023-04-20 11:42 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
2023-04-20 17:32 ` Mickaël Salaün
0 siblings, 1 reply; 48+ messages in thread
From: Konstantin Meskhidze (A) @ 2023-04-20 11:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mickaël Salaün
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel, gnoack3000, linux-security-module, netdev,
netfilter-devel, yusongping, artem.kuzin
4/16/2023 7:09 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
>
> On 23/03/2023 09:52, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
>> From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
>>
>> Allow mount point and root directory changes when there is no filesystem
>> rule tied to the current Landlock domain. This doesn't change anything
>> for now because a domain must have at least a (filesystem) rule, but
>> this will change when other rule types will come. For instance, a
>> domain only restricting the network should have no impact on filesystem
>> restrictions.
>>
>> Add a new get_current_fs_domain() helper to quickly check filesystem
>> rule existence for all filesystem LSM hooks.
>>
>> Remove unnecessary inlining.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
>> ---
>>
>> Changes since v9:
>> * Refactors documentaion landlock.rst.
>> * Changes ACCESS_FS_INITIALLY_DENIED constant
>> to LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_INITIALLY_DENIED.
>> * Gets rid of unnecessary masking of access_dom in
>> get_raw_handled_fs_accesses() function.
>>
>> Changes since v8:
>> * Refactors get_handled_fs_accesses().
>> * Adds landlock_get_raw_fs_access_mask() helper.
>>
>> ---
>> Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 6 +-
>> security/landlock/fs.c | 78 ++++++++++++------------
>> security/landlock/ruleset.h | 25 +++++++-
>> security/landlock/syscalls.c | 6 +-
>> 4 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-)
>>
>
> [...]
>
>> diff --git a/security/landlock/syscalls.c b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
>> index 71aca7f990bc..d35cd5d304db 100644
>> --- a/security/landlock/syscalls.c
>> +++ b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
>> @@ -310,6 +310,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(landlock_add_rule, const int, ruleset_fd,
>> struct path path;
>> struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset;
>> int res, err;
>> + access_mask_t mask;
>>
>> if (!landlock_initialized)
>> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>> @@ -348,9 +349,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(landlock_add_rule, const int, ruleset_fd,
>> * Checks that allowed_access matches the @ruleset constraints
>> * (ruleset->access_masks[0] is automatically upgraded to 64-bits).
>> */
>> - if ((path_beneath_attr.allowed_access |
>> - landlock_get_fs_access_mask(ruleset, 0)) !=
>> - landlock_get_fs_access_mask(ruleset, 0)) {
>> + mask = landlock_get_raw_fs_access_mask(ruleset, 0);
>> + if ((path_beneath_attr.allowed_access | mask) != mask) {
>
> This hunk can be moved to the previous patch (i.e. mask = …). This patch
> should only contains the new landlock_get_raw_fs_access_mask() call.
>
Sorry. Did not get this tip. Please can you explain what do you mean here?
>
>> err = -EINVAL;
>> goto out_put_ruleset;
>> }
>> --
>> 2.25.1
>>
> .
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 48+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v10 02/13] landlock: Allow filesystem layout changes for domains without such rule type
2023-04-20 11:42 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
@ 2023-04-20 17:32 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-21 7:54 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
0 siblings, 1 reply; 48+ messages in thread
From: Mickaël Salaün @ 2023-04-20 17:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel, gnoack3000, linux-security-module, netdev,
netfilter-devel, yusongping, artem.kuzin
On 20/04/2023 13:42, Konstantin Meskhidze (A) wrote:
>
>
> 4/16/2023 7:09 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
>>
>> On 23/03/2023 09:52, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
>>> From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
>>>
>>> Allow mount point and root directory changes when there is no filesystem
>>> rule tied to the current Landlock domain. This doesn't change anything
>>> for now because a domain must have at least a (filesystem) rule, but
>>> this will change when other rule types will come. For instance, a
>>> domain only restricting the network should have no impact on filesystem
>>> restrictions.
>>>
>>> Add a new get_current_fs_domain() helper to quickly check filesystem
>>> rule existence for all filesystem LSM hooks.
>>>
>>> Remove unnecessary inlining.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
>>> ---
>>>
>>> Changes since v9:
>>> * Refactors documentaion landlock.rst.
>>> * Changes ACCESS_FS_INITIALLY_DENIED constant
>>> to LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_INITIALLY_DENIED.
>>> * Gets rid of unnecessary masking of access_dom in
>>> get_raw_handled_fs_accesses() function.
>>>
>>> Changes since v8:
>>> * Refactors get_handled_fs_accesses().
>>> * Adds landlock_get_raw_fs_access_mask() helper.
>>>
>>> ---
>>> Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 6 +-
>>> security/landlock/fs.c | 78 ++++++++++++------------
>>> security/landlock/ruleset.h | 25 +++++++-
>>> security/landlock/syscalls.c | 6 +-
>>> 4 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-)
>>>
>>
>> [...]
>>
>>> diff --git a/security/landlock/syscalls.c b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
>>> index 71aca7f990bc..d35cd5d304db 100644
>>> --- a/security/landlock/syscalls.c
>>> +++ b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
>>> @@ -310,6 +310,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(landlock_add_rule, const int, ruleset_fd,
>>> struct path path;
>>> struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset;
>>> int res, err;
>>> + access_mask_t mask;
>>>
>>> if (!landlock_initialized)
>>> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>>> @@ -348,9 +349,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(landlock_add_rule, const int, ruleset_fd,
>>> * Checks that allowed_access matches the @ruleset constraints
>>> * (ruleset->access_masks[0] is automatically upgraded to 64-bits).
>>> */
>>> - if ((path_beneath_attr.allowed_access |
>>> - landlock_get_fs_access_mask(ruleset, 0)) !=
>>> - landlock_get_fs_access_mask(ruleset, 0)) {
>>> + mask = landlock_get_raw_fs_access_mask(ruleset, 0);
>>> + if ((path_beneath_attr.allowed_access | mask) != mask) {
>>
>> This hunk can be moved to the previous patch (i.e. mask = …). This patch
>> should only contains the new landlock_get_raw_fs_access_mask() call.
>>
>
> Sorry. Did not get this tip. Please can you explain what do you mean here?
You can squash this part in the previous patch:
- if ((path_beneath_attr.allowed_access |
- landlock_get_fs_access_mask(ruleset, 0)) !=
- landlock_get_fs_access_mask(ruleset, 0)) {
+ mask = landlock_get_fs_access_mask(ruleset, 0);
+ if ((path_beneath_attr.allowed_access | mask) != mask) {
And this patch will then only include this part:
- mask = landlock_get_fs_access_mask(ruleset, 0);
+ mask = landlock_get_raw_fs_access_mask(ruleset, 0);
>>
>>> err = -EINVAL;
>>> goto out_put_ruleset;
>>> }
>>> --
>>> 2.25.1
>>>
>> .
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 48+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v10 02/13] landlock: Allow filesystem layout changes for domains without such rule type
2023-04-20 17:32 ` Mickaël Salaün
@ 2023-04-21 7:54 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
0 siblings, 0 replies; 48+ messages in thread
From: Konstantin Meskhidze (A) @ 2023-04-21 7:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mickaël Salaün
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel, gnoack3000, linux-security-module, netdev,
netfilter-devel, yusongping, artem.kuzin
4/20/2023 8:32 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
>
> On 20/04/2023 13:42, Konstantin Meskhidze (A) wrote:
>>
>>
>> 4/16/2023 7:09 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
>>>
>>> On 23/03/2023 09:52, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
>>>> From: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
>>>>
>>>> Allow mount point and root directory changes when there is no filesystem
>>>> rule tied to the current Landlock domain. This doesn't change anything
>>>> for now because a domain must have at least a (filesystem) rule, but
>>>> this will change when other rule types will come. For instance, a
>>>> domain only restricting the network should have no impact on filesystem
>>>> restrictions.
>>>>
>>>> Add a new get_current_fs_domain() helper to quickly check filesystem
>>>> rule existence for all filesystem LSM hooks.
>>>>
>>>> Remove unnecessary inlining.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
>>>> ---
>>>>
>>>> Changes since v9:
>>>> * Refactors documentaion landlock.rst.
>>>> * Changes ACCESS_FS_INITIALLY_DENIED constant
>>>> to LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_INITIALLY_DENIED.
>>>> * Gets rid of unnecessary masking of access_dom in
>>>> get_raw_handled_fs_accesses() function.
>>>>
>>>> Changes since v8:
>>>> * Refactors get_handled_fs_accesses().
>>>> * Adds landlock_get_raw_fs_access_mask() helper.
>>>>
>>>> ---
>>>> Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 6 +-
>>>> security/landlock/fs.c | 78 ++++++++++++------------
>>>> security/landlock/ruleset.h | 25 +++++++-
>>>> security/landlock/syscalls.c | 6 +-
>>>> 4 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-)
>>>>
>>>
>>> [...]
>>>
>>>> diff --git a/security/landlock/syscalls.c b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
>>>> index 71aca7f990bc..d35cd5d304db 100644
>>>> --- a/security/landlock/syscalls.c
>>>> +++ b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
>>>> @@ -310,6 +310,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(landlock_add_rule, const int, ruleset_fd,
>>>> struct path path;
>>>> struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset;
>>>> int res, err;
>>>> + access_mask_t mask;
>>>>
>>>> if (!landlock_initialized)
>>>> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>>>> @@ -348,9 +349,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(landlock_add_rule, const int, ruleset_fd,
>>>> * Checks that allowed_access matches the @ruleset constraints
>>>> * (ruleset->access_masks[0] is automatically upgraded to 64-bits).
>>>> */
>>>> - if ((path_beneath_attr.allowed_access |
>>>> - landlock_get_fs_access_mask(ruleset, 0)) !=
>>>> - landlock_get_fs_access_mask(ruleset, 0)) {
>>>> + mask = landlock_get_raw_fs_access_mask(ruleset, 0);
>>>> + if ((path_beneath_attr.allowed_access | mask) != mask) {
>>>
>>> This hunk can be moved to the previous patch (i.e. mask = …). This patch
>>> should only contains the new landlock_get_raw_fs_access_mask() call.
>>>
>>
>> Sorry. Did not get this tip. Please can you explain what do you mean here?
>
> You can squash this part in the previous patch:
>
> - if ((path_beneath_attr.allowed_access |
> - landlock_get_fs_access_mask(ruleset, 0)) !=
> - landlock_get_fs_access_mask(ruleset, 0)) {
> + mask = landlock_get_fs_access_mask(ruleset, 0);
> + if ((path_beneath_attr.allowed_access | mask) != mask) {
Ok. Thanks.
>
> And this patch will then only include this part:
>
> - mask = landlock_get_fs_access_mask(ruleset, 0);
> + mask = landlock_get_raw_fs_access_mask(ruleset, 0);
>
Got it.
>
>>>
>>>> err = -EINVAL;
>>>> goto out_put_ruleset;
>>>> }
>>>> --
>>>> 2.25.1
>>>>
>>> .
> .
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 48+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v10 03/13] landlock: Remove unnecessary inlining
2023-03-23 8:52 [PATCH v10 00/13] Network support for Landlock Konstantin Meskhidze
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 01/13] landlock: Make ruleset's access masks more generic Konstantin Meskhidze
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 02/13] landlock: Allow filesystem layout changes for domains without such rule type Konstantin Meskhidze
@ 2023-03-23 8:52 ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2023-04-16 16:09 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 04/13] landlock: Refactor landlock_find_rule/insert_rule Konstantin Meskhidze
` (9 subsequent siblings)
12 siblings, 1 reply; 48+ messages in thread
From: Konstantin Meskhidze @ 2023-03-23 8:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: mic
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel, gnoack3000, linux-security-module, netdev,
netfilter-devel, yusongping, artem.kuzin
Remove all "inline" keywords in all .c files. This should be simple
for the compiler to inline them automatically, and it makes the
code cleaner.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
---
Changes since v9:
* Splits commit.
---
security/landlock/fs.c | 26 +++++++++++++-------------
security/landlock/ruleset.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
index 05a339bf2a7c..b5fa6f56665f 100644
--- a/security/landlock/fs.c
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ int landlock_append_fs_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
*
* Returns NULL if no rule is found or if @dentry is negative.
*/
-static inline const struct landlock_rule *
+static const struct landlock_rule *
find_rule(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
const struct dentry *const dentry)
{
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ find_rule(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
* Returns true if the request is allowed (i.e. relevant layer masks for the
* request are empty).
*/
-static inline bool
+static bool
unmask_layers(const struct landlock_rule *const rule,
const access_mask_t access_request,
layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks)[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS])
@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ unmask_layers(const struct landlock_rule *const rule,
* sockfs, pipefs), but can still be reachable through
* /proc/<pid>/fd/<file-descriptor>
*/
-static inline bool is_nouser_or_private(const struct dentry *dentry)
+static bool is_nouser_or_private(const struct dentry *dentry)
{
return (dentry->d_sb->s_flags & SB_NOUSER) ||
(d_is_positive(dentry) &&
@@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ get_raw_handled_fs_accesses(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain)
* Returns: An access mask where each access right bit is set which is handled
* in any of the active layers in @domain.
*/
-static inline access_mask_t
+static access_mask_t
init_layer_masks(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
const access_mask_t access_request,
layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks)[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS])
@@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ static const struct landlock_ruleset *get_current_fs_domain(void)
*
* @layer_masks_child2: Optional child masks.
*/
-static inline bool no_more_access(
+static bool no_more_access(
const layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks_parent1)[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS],
const layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks_child1)[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS],
const bool child1_is_directory,
@@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ static inline bool no_more_access(
*
* Returns true if the request is allowed, false otherwise.
*/
-static inline bool
+static bool
scope_to_request(const access_mask_t access_request,
layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks)[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS])
{
@@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ scope_to_request(const access_mask_t access_request,
* Returns true if there is at least one access right different than
* LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER.
*/
-static inline bool
+static bool
is_eacces(const layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks)[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS],
const access_mask_t access_request)
{
@@ -639,9 +639,9 @@ static bool is_access_to_paths_allowed(
return allowed_parent1 && allowed_parent2;
}
-static inline int check_access_path(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
- const struct path *const path,
- access_mask_t access_request)
+static int check_access_path(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
+ const struct path *const path,
+ access_mask_t access_request)
{
layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = {};
@@ -662,7 +662,7 @@ static int current_check_access_path(const struct path *const path,
return check_access_path(dom, path, access_request);
}
-static inline access_mask_t get_mode_access(const umode_t mode)
+static access_mask_t get_mode_access(const umode_t mode)
{
switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
case S_IFLNK:
@@ -687,7 +687,7 @@ static inline access_mask_t get_mode_access(const umode_t mode)
}
}
-static inline access_mask_t maybe_remove(const struct dentry *const dentry)
+static access_mask_t maybe_remove(const struct dentry *const dentry)
{
if (d_is_negative(dentry))
return 0;
@@ -1171,7 +1171,7 @@ static int hook_path_truncate(const struct path *const path)
* Returns the access rights that are required for opening the given file,
* depending on the file type and open mode.
*/
-static inline access_mask_t
+static access_mask_t
get_required_file_open_access(const struct file *const file)
{
access_mask_t access = 0;
diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.c b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
index 1f3188b4e313..1f432a809ad5 100644
--- a/security/landlock/ruleset.c
+++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ int landlock_insert_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
return insert_rule(ruleset, object, &layers, ARRAY_SIZE(layers));
}
-static inline void get_hierarchy(struct landlock_hierarchy *const hierarchy)
+static void get_hierarchy(struct landlock_hierarchy *const hierarchy)
{
if (hierarchy)
refcount_inc(&hierarchy->usage);
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 48+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v10 03/13] landlock: Remove unnecessary inlining
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 03/13] landlock: Remove unnecessary inlining Konstantin Meskhidze
@ 2023-04-16 16:09 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-20 11:45 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
0 siblings, 1 reply; 48+ messages in thread
From: Mickaël Salaün @ 2023-04-16 16:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Konstantin Meskhidze
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel, gnoack3000, linux-security-module, netdev,
netfilter-devel, yusongping, artem.kuzin
Unfortunately this patch could not be easily backported because it
changes too much as the same time, and it would then be an issue for
patches on top of it that would need to be backported. Please remove
this patch for the next series, but keep the required changes for the
function that are modified by the following patches, i.e.
opportunistically remove inline function when changing their signature
(which should be a subset of the same patch for v9). I'll take care of
doing the remaining clean up.
On 23/03/2023 09:52, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
> Remove all "inline" keywords in all .c files. This should be simple
> for the compiler to inline them automatically, and it makes the
> code cleaner.
>
> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
> ---
>
> Changes since v9:
> * Splits commit.
>
> ---
> security/landlock/fs.c | 26 +++++++++++++-------------
> security/landlock/ruleset.c | 2 +-
> 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
> index 05a339bf2a7c..b5fa6f56665f 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/fs.c
> +++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
> @@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ int landlock_append_fs_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
> *
> * Returns NULL if no rule is found or if @dentry is negative.
> */
> -static inline const struct landlock_rule *
> +static const struct landlock_rule *
> find_rule(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
> const struct dentry *const dentry)
> {
> @@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ find_rule(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
> * Returns true if the request is allowed (i.e. relevant layer masks for the
> * request are empty).
> */
> -static inline bool
> +static bool
> unmask_layers(const struct landlock_rule *const rule,
> const access_mask_t access_request,
> layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks)[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS])
> @@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ unmask_layers(const struct landlock_rule *const rule,
> * sockfs, pipefs), but can still be reachable through
> * /proc/<pid>/fd/<file-descriptor>
> */
> -static inline bool is_nouser_or_private(const struct dentry *dentry)
> +static bool is_nouser_or_private(const struct dentry *dentry)
> {
> return (dentry->d_sb->s_flags & SB_NOUSER) ||
> (d_is_positive(dentry) &&
> @@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ get_raw_handled_fs_accesses(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain)
> * Returns: An access mask where each access right bit is set which is handled
> * in any of the active layers in @domain.
> */
> -static inline access_mask_t
> +static access_mask_t
> init_layer_masks(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
> const access_mask_t access_request,
> layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks)[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS])
> @@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ static const struct landlock_ruleset *get_current_fs_domain(void)
> *
> * @layer_masks_child2: Optional child masks.
> */
> -static inline bool no_more_access(
> +static bool no_more_access(
> const layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks_parent1)[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS],
> const layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks_child1)[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS],
> const bool child1_is_directory,
> @@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ static inline bool no_more_access(
> *
> * Returns true if the request is allowed, false otherwise.
> */
> -static inline bool
> +static bool
> scope_to_request(const access_mask_t access_request,
> layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks)[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS])
> {
> @@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ scope_to_request(const access_mask_t access_request,
> * Returns true if there is at least one access right different than
> * LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER.
> */
> -static inline bool
> +static bool
> is_eacces(const layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks)[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS],
> const access_mask_t access_request)
> {
> @@ -639,9 +639,9 @@ static bool is_access_to_paths_allowed(
> return allowed_parent1 && allowed_parent2;
> }
>
> -static inline int check_access_path(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
> - const struct path *const path,
> - access_mask_t access_request)
> +static int check_access_path(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
> + const struct path *const path,
> + access_mask_t access_request)
> {
> layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = {};
>
> @@ -662,7 +662,7 @@ static int current_check_access_path(const struct path *const path,
> return check_access_path(dom, path, access_request);
> }
>
> -static inline access_mask_t get_mode_access(const umode_t mode)
> +static access_mask_t get_mode_access(const umode_t mode)
> {
> switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
> case S_IFLNK:
> @@ -687,7 +687,7 @@ static inline access_mask_t get_mode_access(const umode_t mode)
> }
> }
>
> -static inline access_mask_t maybe_remove(const struct dentry *const dentry)
> +static access_mask_t maybe_remove(const struct dentry *const dentry)
> {
> if (d_is_negative(dentry))
> return 0;
> @@ -1171,7 +1171,7 @@ static int hook_path_truncate(const struct path *const path)
> * Returns the access rights that are required for opening the given file,
> * depending on the file type and open mode.
> */
> -static inline access_mask_t
> +static access_mask_t
> get_required_file_open_access(const struct file *const file)
> {
> access_mask_t access = 0;
> diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.c b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
> index 1f3188b4e313..1f432a809ad5 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/ruleset.c
> +++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
> @@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ int landlock_insert_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
> return insert_rule(ruleset, object, &layers, ARRAY_SIZE(layers));
> }
>
> -static inline void get_hierarchy(struct landlock_hierarchy *const hierarchy)
> +static void get_hierarchy(struct landlock_hierarchy *const hierarchy)
> {
> if (hierarchy)
> refcount_inc(&hierarchy->usage);
> --
> 2.25.1
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 48+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v10 03/13] landlock: Remove unnecessary inlining
2023-04-16 16:09 ` Mickaël Salaün
@ 2023-04-20 11:45 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
0 siblings, 0 replies; 48+ messages in thread
From: Konstantin Meskhidze (A) @ 2023-04-20 11:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mickaël Salaün
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel, gnoack3000, linux-security-module, netdev,
netfilter-devel, yusongping, artem.kuzin
4/16/2023 7:09 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
> Unfortunately this patch could not be easily backported because it
> changes too much as the same time, and it would then be an issue for
> patches on top of it that would need to be backported. Please remove
> this patch for the next series, but keep the required changes for the
> function that are modified by the following patches, i.e.
> opportunistically remove inline function when changing their signature
> (which should be a subset of the same patch for v9). I'll take care of
> doing the remaining clean up.
Ok. I will remove inlining for the functions I deal with.
>
>
> On 23/03/2023 09:52, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
>> Remove all "inline" keywords in all .c files. This should be simple
>> for the compiler to inline them automatically, and it makes the
>> code cleaner.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
>> ---
>>
>> Changes since v9:
>> * Splits commit.
>>
>> ---
>> security/landlock/fs.c | 26 +++++++++++++-------------
>> security/landlock/ruleset.c | 2 +-
>> 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
>> index 05a339bf2a7c..b5fa6f56665f 100644
>> --- a/security/landlock/fs.c
>> +++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
>> @@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ int landlock_append_fs_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
>> *
>> * Returns NULL if no rule is found or if @dentry is negative.
>> */
>> -static inline const struct landlock_rule *
>> +static const struct landlock_rule *
>> find_rule(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
>> const struct dentry *const dentry)
>> {
>> @@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ find_rule(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
>> * Returns true if the request is allowed (i.e. relevant layer masks for the
>> * request are empty).
>> */
>> -static inline bool
>> +static bool
>> unmask_layers(const struct landlock_rule *const rule,
>> const access_mask_t access_request,
>> layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks)[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS])
>> @@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ unmask_layers(const struct landlock_rule *const rule,
>> * sockfs, pipefs), but can still be reachable through
>> * /proc/<pid>/fd/<file-descriptor>
>> */
>> -static inline bool is_nouser_or_private(const struct dentry *dentry)
>> +static bool is_nouser_or_private(const struct dentry *dentry)
>> {
>> return (dentry->d_sb->s_flags & SB_NOUSER) ||
>> (d_is_positive(dentry) &&
>> @@ -301,7 +301,7 @@ get_raw_handled_fs_accesses(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain)
>> * Returns: An access mask where each access right bit is set which is handled
>> * in any of the active layers in @domain.
>> */
>> -static inline access_mask_t
>> +static access_mask_t
>> init_layer_masks(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
>> const access_mask_t access_request,
>> layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks)[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS])
>> @@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ static const struct landlock_ruleset *get_current_fs_domain(void)
>> *
>> * @layer_masks_child2: Optional child masks.
>> */
>> -static inline bool no_more_access(
>> +static bool no_more_access(
>> const layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks_parent1)[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS],
>> const layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks_child1)[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS],
>> const bool child1_is_directory,
>> @@ -409,7 +409,7 @@ static inline bool no_more_access(
>> *
>> * Returns true if the request is allowed, false otherwise.
>> */
>> -static inline bool
>> +static bool
>> scope_to_request(const access_mask_t access_request,
>> layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks)[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS])
>> {
>> @@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ scope_to_request(const access_mask_t access_request,
>> * Returns true if there is at least one access right different than
>> * LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER.
>> */
>> -static inline bool
>> +static bool
>> is_eacces(const layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks)[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS],
>> const access_mask_t access_request)
>> {
>> @@ -639,9 +639,9 @@ static bool is_access_to_paths_allowed(
>> return allowed_parent1 && allowed_parent2;
>> }
>>
>> -static inline int check_access_path(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
>> - const struct path *const path,
>> - access_mask_t access_request)
>> +static int check_access_path(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
>> + const struct path *const path,
>> + access_mask_t access_request)
>> {
>> layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = {};
>>
>> @@ -662,7 +662,7 @@ static int current_check_access_path(const struct path *const path,
>> return check_access_path(dom, path, access_request);
>> }
>>
>> -static inline access_mask_t get_mode_access(const umode_t mode)
>> +static access_mask_t get_mode_access(const umode_t mode)
>> {
>> switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
>> case S_IFLNK:
>> @@ -687,7 +687,7 @@ static inline access_mask_t get_mode_access(const umode_t mode)
>> }
>> }
>>
>> -static inline access_mask_t maybe_remove(const struct dentry *const dentry)
>> +static access_mask_t maybe_remove(const struct dentry *const dentry)
>> {
>> if (d_is_negative(dentry))
>> return 0;
>> @@ -1171,7 +1171,7 @@ static int hook_path_truncate(const struct path *const path)
>> * Returns the access rights that are required for opening the given file,
>> * depending on the file type and open mode.
>> */
>> -static inline access_mask_t
>> +static access_mask_t
>> get_required_file_open_access(const struct file *const file)
>> {
>> access_mask_t access = 0;
>> diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.c b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
>> index 1f3188b4e313..1f432a809ad5 100644
>> --- a/security/landlock/ruleset.c
>> +++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
>> @@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ int landlock_insert_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
>> return insert_rule(ruleset, object, &layers, ARRAY_SIZE(layers));
>> }
>>
>> -static inline void get_hierarchy(struct landlock_hierarchy *const hierarchy)
>> +static void get_hierarchy(struct landlock_hierarchy *const hierarchy)
>> {
>> if (hierarchy)
>> refcount_inc(&hierarchy->usage);
>> --
>> 2.25.1
>>
> .
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 48+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v10 04/13] landlock: Refactor landlock_find_rule/insert_rule
2023-03-23 8:52 [PATCH v10 00/13] Network support for Landlock Konstantin Meskhidze
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 03/13] landlock: Remove unnecessary inlining Konstantin Meskhidze
@ 2023-03-23 8:52 ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 05/13] landlock: Refactor merge/inherit_ruleset functions Konstantin Meskhidze
` (8 subsequent siblings)
12 siblings, 0 replies; 48+ messages in thread
From: Konstantin Meskhidze @ 2023-03-23 8:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: mic
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel, gnoack3000, linux-security-module, netdev,
netfilter-devel, yusongping, artem.kuzin
Add a new landlock_key union and landlock_id structure to support
a socket port rule type. A struct landlock_id identifies a unique entry
in a ruleset: either a kernel object (e.g inode) or typed data (e.g TCP
port). There is one red-black tree per key type.
This patch also adds is_object_pointer() and get_root() helpers.
is_object_pointer() returns true if key type is LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE.
get_root() helper returns a red_black tree root pointer according to
a key type.
Refactor landlock_insert_rule() and landlock_find_rule() to support coming
network modifications. Adding or searching a rule in ruleset can now be
done thanks to a Landlock ID argument passed to these helpers.
Co-developed-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
---
Changes since v9:
* Splits commit.
* Refactors commit message.
* Minor fixes.
Changes since v8:
* Refactors commit message.
* Removes inlining.
* Minor fixes.
Changes since v7:
* Completes all the new field descriptions landlock_key,
landlock_key_type, landlock_id.
* Refactors commit message, adds a co-developer.
Changes since v6:
* Adds union landlock_key, enum landlock_key_type, and struct
landlock_id.
* Refactors ruleset functions and improves switch/cases: create_rule(),
insert_rule(), get_root(), is_object_pointer(), free_rule(),
landlock_find_rule().
* Refactors landlock_append_fs_rule() functions to support new
landlock_id type.
Changes since v5:
* Formats code with clang-format-14.
Changes since v4:
* Refactors insert_rule() and create_rule() functions by deleting
rule_type from their arguments list, it helps to reduce useless code.
Changes since v3:
* Splits commit.
* Refactors landlock_insert_rule and landlock_find_rule functions.
* Rename new_ruleset->root_inode.
---
security/landlock/fs.c | 21 +++---
security/landlock/ruleset.c | 134 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
security/landlock/ruleset.h | 65 ++++++++++++++---
3 files changed, 166 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
index b5fa6f56665f..6f9c463b291e 100644
--- a/security/landlock/fs.c
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
@@ -158,7 +158,9 @@ int landlock_append_fs_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
access_mask_t access_rights)
{
int err;
- struct landlock_object *object;
+ struct landlock_id id = {
+ .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE,
+ };
/* Files only get access rights that make sense. */
if (!d_is_dir(path->dentry) &&
@@ -170,17 +172,17 @@ int landlock_append_fs_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
/* Transforms relative access rights to absolute ones. */
access_rights |= LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS &
~landlock_get_fs_access_mask(ruleset, 0);
- object = get_inode_object(d_backing_inode(path->dentry));
- if (IS_ERR(object))
- return PTR_ERR(object);
+ id.key.object = get_inode_object(d_backing_inode(path->dentry));
+ if (IS_ERR(id.key.object))
+ return PTR_ERR(id.key.object);
mutex_lock(&ruleset->lock);
- err = landlock_insert_rule(ruleset, object, access_rights);
+ err = landlock_insert_rule(ruleset, id, access_rights);
mutex_unlock(&ruleset->lock);
/*
* No need to check for an error because landlock_insert_rule()
* increments the refcount for the new object if needed.
*/
- landlock_put_object(object);
+ landlock_put_object(id.key.object);
return err;
}
@@ -197,6 +199,9 @@ find_rule(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
{
const struct landlock_rule *rule;
const struct inode *inode;
+ struct landlock_id id = {
+ .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE,
+ };
/* Ignores nonexistent leafs. */
if (d_is_negative(dentry))
@@ -204,8 +209,8 @@ find_rule(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);
rcu_read_lock();
- rule = landlock_find_rule(
- domain, rcu_dereference(landlock_inode(inode)->object));
+ id.key.object = rcu_dereference(landlock_inode(inode)->object);
+ rule = landlock_find_rule(domain, id);
rcu_read_unlock();
return rule;
}
diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.c b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
index 1f432a809ad5..d3859d5e7306 100644
--- a/security/landlock/ruleset.c
+++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ static struct landlock_ruleset *create_ruleset(const u32 num_layers)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
refcount_set(&new_ruleset->usage, 1);
mutex_init(&new_ruleset->lock);
- new_ruleset->root = RB_ROOT;
+ new_ruleset->root_inode = RB_ROOT;
new_ruleset->num_layers = num_layers;
/*
* hierarchy = NULL
@@ -68,8 +68,18 @@ static void build_check_rule(void)
BUILD_BUG_ON(rule.num_layers < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS);
}
+static bool is_object_pointer(const enum landlock_key_type key_type)
+{
+ switch (key_type) {
+ case LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE:
+ return true;
+ }
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+ return false;
+}
+
static struct landlock_rule *
-create_rule(struct landlock_object *const object,
+create_rule(const struct landlock_id id,
const struct landlock_layer (*const layers)[], const u32 num_layers,
const struct landlock_layer *const new_layer)
{
@@ -90,8 +100,13 @@ create_rule(struct landlock_object *const object,
if (!new_rule)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
RB_CLEAR_NODE(&new_rule->node);
- landlock_get_object(object);
- new_rule->object = object;
+ if (is_object_pointer(id.type)) {
+ /* This should be catched by insert_rule(). */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(!id.key.object);
+ landlock_get_object(id.key.object);
+ }
+
+ new_rule->key = id.key;
new_rule->num_layers = new_num_layers;
/* Copies the original layer stack. */
memcpy(new_rule->layers, layers,
@@ -102,12 +117,29 @@ create_rule(struct landlock_object *const object,
return new_rule;
}
-static void free_rule(struct landlock_rule *const rule)
+static struct rb_root *get_root(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
+ const enum landlock_key_type key_type)
+{
+ struct rb_root *root = NULL;
+
+ switch (key_type) {
+ case LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE:
+ root = &ruleset->root_inode;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!root))
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+ return root;
+}
+
+static void free_rule(struct landlock_rule *const rule,
+ const enum landlock_key_type key_type)
{
might_sleep();
if (!rule)
return;
- landlock_put_object(rule->object);
+ if (is_object_pointer(key_type))
+ landlock_put_object(rule->key.object);
kfree(rule);
}
@@ -129,8 +161,8 @@ static void build_check_ruleset(void)
* insert_rule - Create and insert a rule in a ruleset
*
* @ruleset: The ruleset to be updated.
- * @object: The object to build the new rule with. The underlying kernel
- * object must be held by the caller.
+ * @id: The ID to build the new rule with. The underlying kernel object, if
+ * any, must be held by the caller.
* @layers: One or multiple layers to be copied into the new rule.
* @num_layers: The number of @layers entries.
*
@@ -144,26 +176,37 @@ static void build_check_ruleset(void)
* access rights.
*/
static int insert_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
- struct landlock_object *const object,
+ const struct landlock_id id,
const struct landlock_layer (*const layers)[],
- size_t num_layers)
+ const size_t num_layers)
{
struct rb_node **walker_node;
struct rb_node *parent_node = NULL;
struct landlock_rule *new_rule;
+ struct rb_root *root;
might_sleep();
lockdep_assert_held(&ruleset->lock);
- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!object || !layers))
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!layers))
return -ENOENT;
- walker_node = &(ruleset->root.rb_node);
+
+ if (is_object_pointer(id.type)) {
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!id.key.object))
+ return -ENOENT;
+ }
+
+ root = get_root(ruleset, id.type);
+ if (IS_ERR(root))
+ return PTR_ERR(root);
+
+ walker_node = &root->rb_node;
while (*walker_node) {
struct landlock_rule *const this =
rb_entry(*walker_node, struct landlock_rule, node);
- if (this->object != object) {
+ if (this->key.data != id.key.data) {
parent_node = *walker_node;
- if (this->object < object)
+ if (this->key.data < id.key.data)
walker_node = &((*walker_node)->rb_right);
else
walker_node = &((*walker_node)->rb_left);
@@ -195,24 +238,24 @@ static int insert_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
* Intersects access rights when it is a merge between a
* ruleset and a domain.
*/
- new_rule = create_rule(object, &this->layers, this->num_layers,
+ new_rule = create_rule(id, &this->layers, this->num_layers,
&(*layers)[0]);
if (IS_ERR(new_rule))
return PTR_ERR(new_rule);
- rb_replace_node(&this->node, &new_rule->node, &ruleset->root);
- free_rule(this);
+ rb_replace_node(&this->node, &new_rule->node, root);
+ free_rule(this, id.type);
return 0;
}
- /* There is no match for @object. */
+ /* There is no match for @id. */
build_check_ruleset();
if (ruleset->num_rules >= LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_RULES)
return -E2BIG;
- new_rule = create_rule(object, layers, num_layers, NULL);
+ new_rule = create_rule(id, layers, num_layers, NULL);
if (IS_ERR(new_rule))
return PTR_ERR(new_rule);
rb_link_node(&new_rule->node, parent_node, walker_node);
- rb_insert_color(&new_rule->node, &ruleset->root);
+ rb_insert_color(&new_rule->node, root);
ruleset->num_rules++;
return 0;
}
@@ -230,7 +273,7 @@ static void build_check_layer(void)
/* @ruleset must be locked by the caller. */
int landlock_insert_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
- struct landlock_object *const object,
+ const struct landlock_id id,
const access_mask_t access)
{
struct landlock_layer layers[] = { {
@@ -240,7 +283,7 @@ int landlock_insert_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
} };
build_check_layer();
- return insert_rule(ruleset, object, &layers, ARRAY_SIZE(layers));
+ return insert_rule(ruleset, id, &layers, ARRAY_SIZE(layers));
}
static void get_hierarchy(struct landlock_hierarchy *const hierarchy)
@@ -263,6 +306,7 @@ static int merge_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const dst,
struct landlock_ruleset *const src)
{
struct landlock_rule *walker_rule, *next_rule;
+ struct rb_root *src_root;
int err = 0;
might_sleep();
@@ -273,6 +317,10 @@ static int merge_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const dst,
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!dst || !dst->hierarchy))
return -EINVAL;
+ src_root = get_root(src, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE);
+ if (IS_ERR(src_root))
+ return PTR_ERR(src_root);
+
/* Locks @dst first because we are its only owner. */
mutex_lock(&dst->lock);
mutex_lock_nested(&src->lock, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
@@ -285,11 +333,15 @@ static int merge_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const dst,
dst->access_masks[dst->num_layers - 1] = src->access_masks[0];
/* Merges the @src tree. */
- rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe(walker_rule, next_rule, &src->root,
+ rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe(walker_rule, next_rule, src_root,
node) {
struct landlock_layer layers[] = { {
.level = dst->num_layers,
} };
+ const struct landlock_id id = {
+ .key = walker_rule->key,
+ .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE,
+ };
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(walker_rule->num_layers != 1)) {
err = -EINVAL;
@@ -300,8 +352,8 @@ static int merge_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const dst,
goto out_unlock;
}
layers[0].access = walker_rule->layers[0].access;
- err = insert_rule(dst, walker_rule->object, &layers,
- ARRAY_SIZE(layers));
+
+ err = insert_rule(dst, id, &layers, ARRAY_SIZE(layers));
if (err)
goto out_unlock;
}
@@ -316,21 +368,29 @@ static int inherit_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const parent,
struct landlock_ruleset *const child)
{
struct landlock_rule *walker_rule, *next_rule;
+ struct rb_root *parent_root;
int err = 0;
might_sleep();
if (!parent)
return 0;
+ parent_root = get_root(parent, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE);
+ if (IS_ERR(parent_root))
+ return PTR_ERR(parent_root);
+
/* Locks @child first because we are its only owner. */
mutex_lock(&child->lock);
mutex_lock_nested(&parent->lock, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
/* Copies the @parent tree. */
rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe(walker_rule, next_rule,
- &parent->root, node) {
- err = insert_rule(child, walker_rule->object,
- &walker_rule->layers,
+ parent_root, node) {
+ const struct landlock_id id = {
+ .key = walker_rule->key,
+ .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE,
+ };
+ err = insert_rule(child, id, &walker_rule->layers,
walker_rule->num_layers);
if (err)
goto out_unlock;
@@ -362,8 +422,9 @@ static void free_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset)
struct landlock_rule *freeme, *next;
might_sleep();
- rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe(freeme, next, &ruleset->root, node)
- free_rule(freeme);
+ rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe(freeme, next, &ruleset->root_inode,
+ node)
+ free_rule(freeme, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE);
put_hierarchy(ruleset->hierarchy);
kfree(ruleset);
}
@@ -454,20 +515,23 @@ landlock_merge_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const parent,
*/
const struct landlock_rule *
landlock_find_rule(const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
- const struct landlock_object *const object)
+ const struct landlock_id id)
{
+ const struct rb_root *root;
const struct rb_node *node;
- if (!object)
+ root = get_root((struct landlock_ruleset *)ruleset, id.type);
+ if (IS_ERR(root))
return NULL;
- node = ruleset->root.rb_node;
+ node = root->rb_node;
+
while (node) {
struct landlock_rule *this =
rb_entry(node, struct landlock_rule, node);
- if (this->object == object)
+ if (this->key.data == id.key.data)
return this;
- if (this->object < object)
+ if (this->key.data < id.key.data)
node = node->rb_right;
else
node = node->rb_left;
diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.h b/security/landlock/ruleset.h
index baef84071f37..5e1b1b25def0 100644
--- a/security/landlock/ruleset.h
+++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.h
@@ -60,6 +60,47 @@ struct landlock_layer {
access_mask_t access;
};
+/**
+ * union landlock_key - Key of a ruleset's red-black tree
+ */
+union landlock_key {
+ /**
+ * @object: Pointer to identify a kernel object (e.g. an inode).
+ */
+ struct landlock_object *object;
+ /**
+ * @data: Raw data to identify an arbitrary 32-bit value
+ * (e.g. a TCP port).
+ */
+ uintptr_t data;
+};
+
+/**
+ * enum landlock_key_type - Type of &union landlock_key
+ */
+enum landlock_key_type {
+ /**
+ * @LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE: Type of &landlock_ruleset.root_inode's node
+ * keys.
+ */
+ LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE = 1,
+};
+
+/**
+ * struct landlock_id - Unique rule identifier for a ruleset
+ */
+struct landlock_id {
+ /**
+ * @key: Identifies either a kernel object (e.g. an inode) or
+ * a raw value (e.g. a TCP port).
+ */
+ union landlock_key key;
+ /**
+ * @type: Type of a landlock_ruleset's root tree.
+ */
+ const enum landlock_key_type type;
+};
+
/**
* struct landlock_rule - Access rights tied to an object
*/
@@ -69,12 +110,13 @@ struct landlock_rule {
*/
struct rb_node node;
/**
- * @object: Pointer to identify a kernel object (e.g. an inode). This
- * is used as a key for this ruleset element. This pointer is set once
- * and never modified. It always points to an allocated object because
- * each rule increments the refcount of its object.
+ * @key: A union to identify either a kernel object (e.g. an inode) or
+ * a raw data value (e.g. a network socket port). This is used as a key
+ * for this ruleset element. The pointer is set once and never
+ * modified. It always points to an allocated object because each rule
+ * increments the refcount of its object.
*/
- struct landlock_object *object;
+ union landlock_key key;
/**
* @num_layers: Number of entries in @layers.
*/
@@ -110,11 +152,12 @@ struct landlock_hierarchy {
*/
struct landlock_ruleset {
/**
- * @root: Root of a red-black tree containing &struct landlock_rule
- * nodes. Once a ruleset is tied to a process (i.e. as a domain), this
- * tree is immutable until @usage reaches zero.
+ * @root_inode: Root of a red-black tree containing &struct
+ * landlock_rule nodes with inode object. Once a ruleset is tied to a
+ * process (i.e. as a domain), this tree is immutable until @usage
+ * reaches zero.
*/
- struct rb_root root;
+ struct rb_root root_inode;
/**
* @hierarchy: Enables hierarchy identification even when a parent
* domain vanishes. This is needed for the ptrace protection.
@@ -176,7 +219,7 @@ void landlock_put_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset);
void landlock_put_ruleset_deferred(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset);
int landlock_insert_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
- struct landlock_object *const object,
+ const struct landlock_id id,
const access_mask_t access);
struct landlock_ruleset *
@@ -185,7 +228,7 @@ landlock_merge_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const parent,
const struct landlock_rule *
landlock_find_rule(const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
- const struct landlock_object *const object);
+ const struct landlock_id id);
static inline void landlock_get_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset)
{
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 48+ messages in thread* [PATCH v10 05/13] landlock: Refactor merge/inherit_ruleset functions
2023-03-23 8:52 [PATCH v10 00/13] Network support for Landlock Konstantin Meskhidze
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 04/13] landlock: Refactor landlock_find_rule/insert_rule Konstantin Meskhidze
@ 2023-03-23 8:52 ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2023-04-16 16:09 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 06/13] landlock: Move and rename layer helpers Konstantin Meskhidze
` (7 subsequent siblings)
12 siblings, 1 reply; 48+ messages in thread
From: Konstantin Meskhidze @ 2023-03-23 8:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: mic
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel, gnoack3000, linux-security-module, netdev,
netfilter-devel, yusongping, artem.kuzin
Refactor merge_ruleset() and inherit_ruleset() functions to support
new rule types. This patch adds merge_tree() and inherit_tree()
helpers. They use a specific ruleset's red-black tree according to
a key type argument.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
---
Changes since v9:
* None
Changes since v8:
* Refactors commit message.
* Minor fixes.
Changes since v7:
* Adds missed lockdep_assert_held it inherit_tree() and merge_tree().
* Fixes comment.
Changes since v6:
* Refactors merge_ruleset() and inherit_ruleset() functions to support
new rule types.
* Renames tree_merge() to merge_tree() (and reorder arguments), and
tree_copy() to inherit_tree().
Changes since v5:
* Refactors some logic errors.
* Formats code with clang-format-14.
Changes since v4:
* None
---
security/landlock/ruleset.c | 110 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
1 file changed, 73 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.c b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
index d3859d5e7306..2579c9bbedbc 100644
--- a/security/landlock/ruleset.c
+++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
@@ -302,36 +302,22 @@ static void put_hierarchy(struct landlock_hierarchy *hierarchy)
}
}
-static int merge_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const dst,
- struct landlock_ruleset *const src)
+static int merge_tree(struct landlock_ruleset *const dst,
+ struct landlock_ruleset *const src,
+ const enum landlock_key_type key_type)
{
struct landlock_rule *walker_rule, *next_rule;
struct rb_root *src_root;
int err = 0;
might_sleep();
- /* Should already be checked by landlock_merge_ruleset() */
- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!src))
- return 0;
- /* Only merge into a domain. */
- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!dst || !dst->hierarchy))
- return -EINVAL;
+ lockdep_assert_held(&dst->lock);
+ lockdep_assert_held(&src->lock);
- src_root = get_root(src, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE);
+ src_root = get_root(src, key_type);
if (IS_ERR(src_root))
return PTR_ERR(src_root);
- /* Locks @dst first because we are its only owner. */
- mutex_lock(&dst->lock);
- mutex_lock_nested(&src->lock, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
-
- /* Stacks the new layer. */
- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(src->num_layers != 1 || dst->num_layers < 1)) {
- err = -EINVAL;
- goto out_unlock;
- }
- dst->access_masks[dst->num_layers - 1] = src->access_masks[0];
-
/* Merges the @src tree. */
rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe(walker_rule, next_rule, src_root,
node) {
@@ -340,23 +326,52 @@ static int merge_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const dst,
} };
const struct landlock_id id = {
.key = walker_rule->key,
- .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE,
+ .type = key_type,
};
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(walker_rule->num_layers != 1)) {
err = -EINVAL;
- goto out_unlock;
}
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(walker_rule->layers[0].level != 0)) {
err = -EINVAL;
- goto out_unlock;
}
layers[0].access = walker_rule->layers[0].access;
err = insert_rule(dst, id, &layers, ARRAY_SIZE(layers));
if (err)
- goto out_unlock;
+ return err;
+ }
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int merge_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const dst,
+ struct landlock_ruleset *const src)
+{
+ int err = 0;
+
+ might_sleep();
+ /* Should already be checked by landlock_merge_ruleset() */
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!src))
+ return 0;
+ /* Only merge into a domain. */
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!dst || !dst->hierarchy))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Locks @dst first because we are its only owner. */
+ mutex_lock(&dst->lock);
+ mutex_lock_nested(&src->lock, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
+
+ /* Stacks the new layer. */
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(src->num_layers != 1 || dst->num_layers < 1)) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto out_unlock;
}
+ dst->access_masks[dst->num_layers - 1] = src->access_masks[0];
+
+ /* Merges the @src inode tree. */
+ err = merge_tree(dst, src, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_unlock;
out_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&src->lock);
@@ -364,43 +379,64 @@ static int merge_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const dst,
return err;
}
-static int inherit_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const parent,
- struct landlock_ruleset *const child)
+static int inherit_tree(struct landlock_ruleset *const parent,
+ struct landlock_ruleset *const child,
+ const enum landlock_key_type key_type)
{
struct landlock_rule *walker_rule, *next_rule;
struct rb_root *parent_root;
int err = 0;
might_sleep();
- if (!parent)
- return 0;
+ lockdep_assert_held(&parent->lock);
+ lockdep_assert_held(&child->lock);
- parent_root = get_root(parent, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE);
+ parent_root = get_root(parent, key_type);
if (IS_ERR(parent_root))
return PTR_ERR(parent_root);
- /* Locks @child first because we are its only owner. */
- mutex_lock(&child->lock);
- mutex_lock_nested(&parent->lock, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
-
- /* Copies the @parent tree. */
+ /* Copies the @parent inode or network tree. */
rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe(walker_rule, next_rule,
parent_root, node) {
const struct landlock_id id = {
.key = walker_rule->key,
- .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE,
+ .type = key_type,
};
+
err = insert_rule(child, id, &walker_rule->layers,
walker_rule->num_layers);
if (err)
- goto out_unlock;
+ return err;
}
+ return err;
+}
+
+static int inherit_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const parent,
+ struct landlock_ruleset *const child)
+{
+ int err = 0;
+
+ might_sleep();
+ if (!parent)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Locks @child first because we are its only owner. */
+ mutex_lock(&child->lock);
+ mutex_lock_nested(&parent->lock, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
+
+ /* Copies the @parent inode tree. */
+ err = inherit_tree(parent, child, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_unlock;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(child->num_layers <= parent->num_layers)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
}
- /* Copies the parent layer stack and leaves a space for the new layer. */
+ /*
+ * Copies the parent layer stack and leaves a space
+ * for the new layer.
+ */
memcpy(child->access_masks, parent->access_masks,
flex_array_size(parent, access_masks, parent->num_layers));
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 48+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v10 05/13] landlock: Refactor merge/inherit_ruleset functions
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 05/13] landlock: Refactor merge/inherit_ruleset functions Konstantin Meskhidze
@ 2023-04-16 16:09 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-20 11:46 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
0 siblings, 1 reply; 48+ messages in thread
From: Mickaël Salaün @ 2023-04-16 16:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Konstantin Meskhidze
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel, gnoack3000, linux-security-module, netdev,
netfilter-devel, yusongping, artem.kuzin
On 23/03/2023 09:52, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
> Refactor merge_ruleset() and inherit_ruleset() functions to support
> new rule types. This patch adds merge_tree() and inherit_tree()
> helpers. They use a specific ruleset's red-black tree according to
> a key type argument.
>
> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
> ---
>
> Changes since v9:
> * None
>
> Changes since v8:
> * Refactors commit message.
> * Minor fixes.
>
> Changes since v7:
> * Adds missed lockdep_assert_held it inherit_tree() and merge_tree().
> * Fixes comment.
>
> Changes since v6:
> * Refactors merge_ruleset() and inherit_ruleset() functions to support
> new rule types.
> * Renames tree_merge() to merge_tree() (and reorder arguments), and
> tree_copy() to inherit_tree().
>
> Changes since v5:
> * Refactors some logic errors.
> * Formats code with clang-format-14.
>
> Changes since v4:
> * None
>
> ---
> security/landlock/ruleset.c | 110 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
> 1 file changed, 73 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.c b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
> index d3859d5e7306..2579c9bbedbc 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/ruleset.c
> +++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
> @@ -302,36 +302,22 @@ static void put_hierarchy(struct landlock_hierarchy *hierarchy)
> }
> }
>
> -static int merge_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const dst,
> - struct landlock_ruleset *const src)
> +static int merge_tree(struct landlock_ruleset *const dst,
> + struct landlock_ruleset *const src,
> + const enum landlock_key_type key_type)
> {
> struct landlock_rule *walker_rule, *next_rule;
> struct rb_root *src_root;
> int err = 0;
>
> might_sleep();
> - /* Should already be checked by landlock_merge_ruleset() */
> - if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!src))
> - return 0;
> - /* Only merge into a domain. */
> - if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!dst || !dst->hierarchy))
> - return -EINVAL;
> + lockdep_assert_held(&dst->lock);
> + lockdep_assert_held(&src->lock);
>
> - src_root = get_root(src, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE);
> + src_root = get_root(src, key_type);
> if (IS_ERR(src_root))
> return PTR_ERR(src_root);
>
> - /* Locks @dst first because we are its only owner. */
> - mutex_lock(&dst->lock);
> - mutex_lock_nested(&src->lock, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
> -
> - /* Stacks the new layer. */
> - if (WARN_ON_ONCE(src->num_layers != 1 || dst->num_layers < 1)) {
> - err = -EINVAL;
> - goto out_unlock;
> - }
> - dst->access_masks[dst->num_layers - 1] = src->access_masks[0];
> -
> /* Merges the @src tree. */
> rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe(walker_rule, next_rule, src_root,
> node) {
> @@ -340,23 +326,52 @@ static int merge_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const dst,
> } };
> const struct landlock_id id = {
> .key = walker_rule->key,
> - .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE,
> + .type = key_type,
> };
>
> if (WARN_ON_ONCE(walker_rule->num_layers != 1)) {
> err = -EINVAL;
> - goto out_unlock;
This should be replaced with `return -EINVAL;` and the `{` `}` after the
if condition are not needed anymore.
> }
> if (WARN_ON_ONCE(walker_rule->layers[0].level != 0)) {
> err = -EINVAL;
> - goto out_unlock;
ditto
> }
> layers[0].access = walker_rule->layers[0].access;
>
> err = insert_rule(dst, id, &layers, ARRAY_SIZE(layers));
> if (err)
> - goto out_unlock;
> + return err;
> + }
> + return err;
> +}
> +
> +static int merge_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const dst,
> + struct landlock_ruleset *const src)
> +{
> + int err = 0;
> +
> + might_sleep();
> + /* Should already be checked by landlock_merge_ruleset() */
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!src))
> + return 0;
> + /* Only merge into a domain. */
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!dst || !dst->hierarchy))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + /* Locks @dst first because we are its only owner. */
> + mutex_lock(&dst->lock);
> + mutex_lock_nested(&src->lock, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
> +
> + /* Stacks the new layer. */
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(src->num_layers != 1 || dst->num_layers < 1)) {
> + err = -EINVAL;
> + goto out_unlock;
> }
> + dst->access_masks[dst->num_layers - 1] = src->access_masks[0];
> +
> + /* Merges the @src inode tree. */
> + err = merge_tree(dst, src, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE);
> + if (err)
> + goto out_unlock;
>
> out_unlock:
> mutex_unlock(&src->lock);
> @@ -364,43 +379,64 @@ static int merge_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const dst,
> return err;
> }
>
> -static int inherit_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const parent,
> - struct landlock_ruleset *const child)
> +static int inherit_tree(struct landlock_ruleset *const parent,
> + struct landlock_ruleset *const child,
> + const enum landlock_key_type key_type)
> {
> struct landlock_rule *walker_rule, *next_rule;
> struct rb_root *parent_root;
> int err = 0;
>
> might_sleep();
> - if (!parent)
> - return 0;
> + lockdep_assert_held(&parent->lock);
> + lockdep_assert_held(&child->lock);
>
> - parent_root = get_root(parent, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE);
> + parent_root = get_root(parent, key_type);
> if (IS_ERR(parent_root))
> return PTR_ERR(parent_root);
>
> - /* Locks @child first because we are its only owner. */
> - mutex_lock(&child->lock);
> - mutex_lock_nested(&parent->lock, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
> -
> - /* Copies the @parent tree. */
> + /* Copies the @parent inode or network tree. */
> rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe(walker_rule, next_rule,
> parent_root, node) {
> const struct landlock_id id = {
> .key = walker_rule->key,
> - .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE,
> + .type = key_type,
> };
> +
> err = insert_rule(child, id, &walker_rule->layers,
> walker_rule->num_layers);
> if (err)
> - goto out_unlock;
> + return err;
> }
> + return err;
> +}
> +
> +static int inherit_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const parent,
> + struct landlock_ruleset *const child)
> +{
> + int err = 0;
> +
> + might_sleep();
> + if (!parent)
> + return 0;
> +
> + /* Locks @child first because we are its only owner. */
> + mutex_lock(&child->lock);
> + mutex_lock_nested(&parent->lock, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
> +
> + /* Copies the @parent inode tree. */
> + err = inherit_tree(parent, child, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE);
> + if (err)
> + goto out_unlock;
>
> if (WARN_ON_ONCE(child->num_layers <= parent->num_layers)) {
> err = -EINVAL;
> goto out_unlock;
> }
> - /* Copies the parent layer stack and leaves a space for the new layer. */
> + /*
> + * Copies the parent layer stack and leaves a space
> + * for the new layer.
> + */
> memcpy(child->access_masks, parent->access_masks,
> flex_array_size(parent, access_masks, parent->num_layers));
>
> --
> 2.25.1
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 48+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v10 05/13] landlock: Refactor merge/inherit_ruleset functions
2023-04-16 16:09 ` Mickaël Salaün
@ 2023-04-20 11:46 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
0 siblings, 0 replies; 48+ messages in thread
From: Konstantin Meskhidze (A) @ 2023-04-20 11:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mickaël Salaün
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel, gnoack3000, linux-security-module, netdev,
netfilter-devel, yusongping, artem.kuzin
4/16/2023 7:09 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
>
> On 23/03/2023 09:52, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
>> Refactor merge_ruleset() and inherit_ruleset() functions to support
>> new rule types. This patch adds merge_tree() and inherit_tree()
>> helpers. They use a specific ruleset's red-black tree according to
>> a key type argument.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
>> ---
>>
>> Changes since v9:
>> * None
>>
>> Changes since v8:
>> * Refactors commit message.
>> * Minor fixes.
>>
>> Changes since v7:
>> * Adds missed lockdep_assert_held it inherit_tree() and merge_tree().
>> * Fixes comment.
>>
>> Changes since v6:
>> * Refactors merge_ruleset() and inherit_ruleset() functions to support
>> new rule types.
>> * Renames tree_merge() to merge_tree() (and reorder arguments), and
>> tree_copy() to inherit_tree().
>>
>> Changes since v5:
>> * Refactors some logic errors.
>> * Formats code with clang-format-14.
>>
>> Changes since v4:
>> * None
>>
>> ---
>> security/landlock/ruleset.c | 110 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
>> 1 file changed, 73 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.c b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
>> index d3859d5e7306..2579c9bbedbc 100644
>> --- a/security/landlock/ruleset.c
>> +++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
>> @@ -302,36 +302,22 @@ static void put_hierarchy(struct landlock_hierarchy *hierarchy)
>> }
>> }
>>
>> -static int merge_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const dst,
>> - struct landlock_ruleset *const src)
>> +static int merge_tree(struct landlock_ruleset *const dst,
>> + struct landlock_ruleset *const src,
>> + const enum landlock_key_type key_type)
>> {
>> struct landlock_rule *walker_rule, *next_rule;
>> struct rb_root *src_root;
>> int err = 0;
>>
>> might_sleep();
>> - /* Should already be checked by landlock_merge_ruleset() */
>> - if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!src))
>> - return 0;
>> - /* Only merge into a domain. */
>> - if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!dst || !dst->hierarchy))
>> - return -EINVAL;
>> + lockdep_assert_held(&dst->lock);
>> + lockdep_assert_held(&src->lock);
>>
>> - src_root = get_root(src, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE);
>> + src_root = get_root(src, key_type);
>> if (IS_ERR(src_root))
>> return PTR_ERR(src_root);
>>
>> - /* Locks @dst first because we are its only owner. */
>> - mutex_lock(&dst->lock);
>> - mutex_lock_nested(&src->lock, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
>> -
>> - /* Stacks the new layer. */
>> - if (WARN_ON_ONCE(src->num_layers != 1 || dst->num_layers < 1)) {
>> - err = -EINVAL;
>> - goto out_unlock;
>> - }
>> - dst->access_masks[dst->num_layers - 1] = src->access_masks[0];
>> -
>> /* Merges the @src tree. */
>> rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe(walker_rule, next_rule, src_root,
>> node) {
>> @@ -340,23 +326,52 @@ static int merge_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const dst,
>> } };
>> const struct landlock_id id = {
>> .key = walker_rule->key,
>> - .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE,
>> + .type = key_type,
>> };
>>
>> if (WARN_ON_ONCE(walker_rule->num_layers != 1)) {
>> err = -EINVAL;
>> - goto out_unlock;
>
> This should be replaced with `return -EINVAL;` and the `{` `}` after the
> if condition are not needed anymore.
>
Ok. Will be changed.
>
>> }
>> if (WARN_ON_ONCE(walker_rule->layers[0].level != 0)) {
>> err = -EINVAL;
>> - goto out_unlock;
>
> ditto
Got it.
>
>> }
>> layers[0].access = walker_rule->layers[0].access;
>>
>> err = insert_rule(dst, id, &layers, ARRAY_SIZE(layers));
>> if (err)
>> - goto out_unlock;
>> + return err;
>> + }
>> + return err;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int merge_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const dst,
>> + struct landlock_ruleset *const src)
>> +{
>> + int err = 0;
>> +
>> + might_sleep();
>> + /* Should already be checked by landlock_merge_ruleset() */
>> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!src))
>> + return 0;
>> + /* Only merge into a domain. */
>> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!dst || !dst->hierarchy))
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> +
>> + /* Locks @dst first because we are its only owner. */
>> + mutex_lock(&dst->lock);
>> + mutex_lock_nested(&src->lock, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
>> +
>> + /* Stacks the new layer. */
>> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(src->num_layers != 1 || dst->num_layers < 1)) {
>> + err = -EINVAL;
>> + goto out_unlock;
>> }
>> + dst->access_masks[dst->num_layers - 1] = src->access_masks[0];
>> +
>> + /* Merges the @src inode tree. */
>> + err = merge_tree(dst, src, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE);
>> + if (err)
>> + goto out_unlock;
>>
>> out_unlock:
>> mutex_unlock(&src->lock);
>> @@ -364,43 +379,64 @@ static int merge_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const dst,
>> return err;
>> }
>>
>> -static int inherit_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const parent,
>> - struct landlock_ruleset *const child)
>> +static int inherit_tree(struct landlock_ruleset *const parent,
>> + struct landlock_ruleset *const child,
>> + const enum landlock_key_type key_type)
>> {
>> struct landlock_rule *walker_rule, *next_rule;
>> struct rb_root *parent_root;
>> int err = 0;
>>
>> might_sleep();
>> - if (!parent)
>> - return 0;
>> + lockdep_assert_held(&parent->lock);
>> + lockdep_assert_held(&child->lock);
>>
>> - parent_root = get_root(parent, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE);
>> + parent_root = get_root(parent, key_type);
>> if (IS_ERR(parent_root))
>> return PTR_ERR(parent_root);
>>
>> - /* Locks @child first because we are its only owner. */
>> - mutex_lock(&child->lock);
>> - mutex_lock_nested(&parent->lock, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
>> -
>> - /* Copies the @parent tree. */
>> + /* Copies the @parent inode or network tree. */
>> rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe(walker_rule, next_rule,
>> parent_root, node) {
>> const struct landlock_id id = {
>> .key = walker_rule->key,
>> - .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE,
>> + .type = key_type,
>> };
>> +
>> err = insert_rule(child, id, &walker_rule->layers,
>> walker_rule->num_layers);
>> if (err)
>> - goto out_unlock;
>> + return err;
>> }
>> + return err;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int inherit_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const parent,
>> + struct landlock_ruleset *const child)
>> +{
>> + int err = 0;
>> +
>> + might_sleep();
>> + if (!parent)
>> + return 0;
>> +
>> + /* Locks @child first because we are its only owner. */
>> + mutex_lock(&child->lock);
>> + mutex_lock_nested(&parent->lock, SINGLE_DEPTH_NESTING);
>> +
>> + /* Copies the @parent inode tree. */
>> + err = inherit_tree(parent, child, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE);
>> + if (err)
>> + goto out_unlock;
>>
>> if (WARN_ON_ONCE(child->num_layers <= parent->num_layers)) {
>> err = -EINVAL;
>> goto out_unlock;
>> }
>> - /* Copies the parent layer stack and leaves a space for the new layer. */
>> + /*
>> + * Copies the parent layer stack and leaves a space
>> + * for the new layer.
>> + */
>> memcpy(child->access_masks, parent->access_masks,
>> flex_array_size(parent, access_masks, parent->num_layers));
>>
>> --
>> 2.25.1
>>
> .
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 48+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v10 06/13] landlock: Move and rename layer helpers
2023-03-23 8:52 [PATCH v10 00/13] Network support for Landlock Konstantin Meskhidze
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 05/13] landlock: Refactor merge/inherit_ruleset functions Konstantin Meskhidze
@ 2023-03-23 8:52 ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 07/13] landlock: Refactor " Konstantin Meskhidze
` (6 subsequent siblings)
12 siblings, 0 replies; 48+ messages in thread
From: Konstantin Meskhidze @ 2023-03-23 8:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: mic
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel, gnoack3000, linux-security-module, netdev,
netfilter-devel, yusongping, artem.kuzin
This patch renames and moves landlock_unmask_layers() and
landlock_init_layer_masks() helpers to ruleset.c to share
them with Landlock network implementation in following commits.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
---
Changes since v9:
* Minor fixes.
Changes since v8:
* Refactors commit message.
* Adds "landlock_" prefix for moved helpers.
Changes since v7:
* Refactors commit message.
Changes since v6:
* Moves get_handled_accesses() helper from ruleset.c back to fs.c,
cause it's not used in coming network commits.
Changes since v5:
* Splits commit.
* Moves init_layer_masks() and get_handled_accesses() helpers
to ruleset.c and makes then non-static.
* Formats code with clang-format-14.
---
security/landlock/fs.c | 136 ++++++------------------------------
security/landlock/ruleset.c | 98 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
security/landlock/ruleset.h | 9 +++
3 files changed, 128 insertions(+), 115 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
index 6f9c463b291e..10ba5000ce9a 100644
--- a/security/landlock/fs.c
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
@@ -215,60 +215,6 @@ find_rule(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
return rule;
}
-/*
- * @layer_masks is read and may be updated according to the access request and
- * the matching rule.
- *
- * Returns true if the request is allowed (i.e. relevant layer masks for the
- * request are empty).
- */
-static bool
-unmask_layers(const struct landlock_rule *const rule,
- const access_mask_t access_request,
- layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks)[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS])
-{
- size_t layer_level;
-
- if (!access_request || !layer_masks)
- return true;
- if (!rule)
- return false;
-
- /*
- * An access is granted if, for each policy layer, at least one rule
- * encountered on the pathwalk grants the requested access,
- * regardless of its position in the layer stack. We must then check
- * the remaining layers for each inode, from the first added layer to
- * the last one. When there is multiple requested accesses, for each
- * policy layer, the full set of requested accesses may not be granted
- * by only one rule, but by the union (binary OR) of multiple rules.
- * E.g. /a/b <execute> + /a <read> => /a/b <execute + read>
- */
- for (layer_level = 0; layer_level < rule->num_layers; layer_level++) {
- const struct landlock_layer *const layer =
- &rule->layers[layer_level];
- const layer_mask_t layer_bit = BIT_ULL(layer->level - 1);
- const unsigned long access_req = access_request;
- unsigned long access_bit;
- bool is_empty;
-
- /*
- * Records in @layer_masks which layer grants access to each
- * requested access.
- */
- is_empty = true;
- for_each_set_bit(access_bit, &access_req,
- ARRAY_SIZE(*layer_masks)) {
- if (layer->access & BIT_ULL(access_bit))
- (*layer_masks)[access_bit] &= ~layer_bit;
- is_empty = is_empty && !(*layer_masks)[access_bit];
- }
- if (is_empty)
- return true;
- }
- return false;
-}
-
/*
* Allows access to pseudo filesystems that will never be mountable (e.g.
* sockfs, pipefs), but can still be reachable through
@@ -293,50 +239,6 @@ get_raw_handled_fs_accesses(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain)
return access_dom;
}
-/**
- * init_layer_masks - Initialize layer masks from an access request
- *
- * Populates @layer_masks such that for each access right in @access_request,
- * the bits for all the layers are set where this access right is handled.
- *
- * @domain: The domain that defines the current restrictions.
- * @access_request: The requested access rights to check.
- * @layer_masks: The layer masks to populate.
- *
- * Returns: An access mask where each access right bit is set which is handled
- * in any of the active layers in @domain.
- */
-static access_mask_t
-init_layer_masks(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
- const access_mask_t access_request,
- layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks)[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS])
-{
- access_mask_t handled_accesses = 0;
- size_t layer_level;
-
- memset(layer_masks, 0, sizeof(*layer_masks));
- /* An empty access request can happen because of O_WRONLY | O_RDWR. */
- if (!access_request)
- return 0;
-
- /* Saves all handled accesses per layer. */
- for (layer_level = 0; layer_level < domain->num_layers; layer_level++) {
- const unsigned long access_req = access_request;
- unsigned long access_bit;
-
- for_each_set_bit(access_bit, &access_req,
- ARRAY_SIZE(*layer_masks)) {
- if (BIT_ULL(access_bit) &
- landlock_get_fs_access_mask(domain, layer_level)) {
- (*layer_masks)[access_bit] |=
- BIT_ULL(layer_level);
- handled_accesses |= BIT_ULL(access_bit);
- }
- }
- }
- return handled_accesses;
-}
-
static access_mask_t
get_handled_fs_accesses(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain)
{
@@ -540,18 +442,20 @@ static bool is_access_to_paths_allowed(
}
if (unlikely(dentry_child1)) {
- unmask_layers(find_rule(domain, dentry_child1),
- init_layer_masks(domain, LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS,
+ landlock_unmask_layers(find_rule(domain, dentry_child1),
+ landlock_init_layer_masks(
+ domain, LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS,
&_layer_masks_child1),
- &_layer_masks_child1);
+ &_layer_masks_child1);
layer_masks_child1 = &_layer_masks_child1;
child1_is_directory = d_is_dir(dentry_child1);
}
if (unlikely(dentry_child2)) {
- unmask_layers(find_rule(domain, dentry_child2),
- init_layer_masks(domain, LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS,
+ landlock_unmask_layers(find_rule(domain, dentry_child2),
+ landlock_init_layer_masks(
+ domain, LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS,
&_layer_masks_child2),
- &_layer_masks_child2);
+ &_layer_masks_child2);
layer_masks_child2 = &_layer_masks_child2;
child2_is_directory = d_is_dir(dentry_child2);
}
@@ -603,10 +507,10 @@ static bool is_access_to_paths_allowed(
}
rule = find_rule(domain, walker_path.dentry);
- allowed_parent1 = unmask_layers(rule, access_masked_parent1,
- layer_masks_parent1);
- allowed_parent2 = unmask_layers(rule, access_masked_parent2,
- layer_masks_parent2);
+ allowed_parent1 = landlock_unmask_layers(
+ rule, access_masked_parent1, layer_masks_parent1);
+ allowed_parent2 = landlock_unmask_layers(
+ rule, access_masked_parent2, layer_masks_parent2);
/* Stops when a rule from each layer grants access. */
if (allowed_parent1 && allowed_parent2)
@@ -650,7 +554,8 @@ static int check_access_path(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
{
layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = {};
- access_request = init_layer_masks(domain, access_request, &layer_masks);
+ access_request =
+ landlock_init_layer_masks(domain, access_request, &layer_masks);
if (is_access_to_paths_allowed(domain, path, access_request,
&layer_masks, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL))
return 0;
@@ -735,16 +640,16 @@ static bool collect_domain_accesses(
if (is_nouser_or_private(dir))
return true;
- access_dom = init_layer_masks(domain, LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS,
- layer_masks_dom);
+ access_dom = landlock_init_layer_masks(domain, LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS,
+ layer_masks_dom);
dget(dir);
while (true) {
struct dentry *parent_dentry;
/* Gets all layers allowing all domain accesses. */
- if (unmask_layers(find_rule(domain, dir), access_dom,
- layer_masks_dom)) {
+ if (landlock_unmask_layers(find_rule(domain, dir), access_dom,
+ layer_masks_dom)) {
/*
* Stops when all handled accesses are allowed by at
* least one rule in each layer.
@@ -857,7 +762,7 @@ static int current_check_refer_path(struct dentry *const old_dentry,
* The LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER access right is not required
* for same-directory referer (i.e. no reparenting).
*/
- access_request_parent1 = init_layer_masks(
+ access_request_parent1 = landlock_init_layer_masks(
dom, access_request_parent1 | access_request_parent2,
&layer_masks_parent1);
if (is_access_to_paths_allowed(
@@ -1234,7 +1139,8 @@ static int hook_file_open(struct file *const file)
if (is_access_to_paths_allowed(
dom, &file->f_path,
- init_layer_masks(dom, full_access_request, &layer_masks),
+ landlock_init_layer_masks(dom, full_access_request,
+ &layer_masks),
&layer_masks, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL)) {
allowed_access = full_access_request;
} else {
diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.c b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
index 2579c9bbedbc..969ff8c4baff 100644
--- a/security/landlock/ruleset.c
+++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
@@ -574,3 +574,101 @@ landlock_find_rule(const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
}
return NULL;
}
+
+/*
+ * @layer_masks is read and may be updated according to the access request and
+ * the matching rule.
+ *
+ * Returns true if the request is allowed (i.e. relevant layer masks for the
+ * request are empty).
+ */
+bool landlock_unmask_layers(
+ const struct landlock_rule *const rule,
+ const access_mask_t access_request,
+ layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks)[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS])
+{
+ size_t layer_level;
+
+ if (!access_request || !layer_masks)
+ return true;
+ if (!rule)
+ return false;
+
+ /*
+ * An access is granted if, for each policy layer, at least one rule
+ * encountered on the pathwalk grants the requested access,
+ * regardless of its position in the layer stack. We must then check
+ * the remaining layers for each inode, from the first added layer to
+ * the last one. When there is multiple requested accesses, for each
+ * policy layer, the full set of requested accesses may not be granted
+ * by only one rule, but by the union (binary OR) of multiple rules.
+ * E.g. /a/b <execute> + /a <read> => /a/b <execute + read>
+ */
+ for (layer_level = 0; layer_level < rule->num_layers; layer_level++) {
+ const struct landlock_layer *const layer =
+ &rule->layers[layer_level];
+ const layer_mask_t layer_bit = BIT_ULL(layer->level - 1);
+ const unsigned long access_req = access_request;
+ unsigned long access_bit;
+ bool is_empty;
+
+ /*
+ * Records in @layer_masks which layer grants access to each
+ * requested access.
+ */
+ is_empty = true;
+ for_each_set_bit(access_bit, &access_req,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(*layer_masks)) {
+ if (layer->access & BIT_ULL(access_bit))
+ (*layer_masks)[access_bit] &= ~layer_bit;
+ is_empty = is_empty && !(*layer_masks)[access_bit];
+ }
+ if (is_empty)
+ return true;
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * landlock_init_layer_masks - Initialize layer masks from an access request
+ *
+ * Populates @layer_masks such that for each access right in @access_request,
+ * the bits for all the layers are set where this access right is handled.
+ *
+ * @domain: The domain that defines the current restrictions.
+ * @access_request: The requested access rights to check.
+ * @layer_masks: The layer masks to populate.
+ *
+ * Returns: An access mask where each access right bit is set which is handled
+ * in any of the active layers in @domain.
+ */
+access_mask_t landlock_init_layer_masks(
+ const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
+ const access_mask_t access_request,
+ layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks)[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS])
+{
+ access_mask_t handled_accesses = 0;
+ size_t layer_level;
+
+ memset(layer_masks, 0, sizeof(*layer_masks));
+ /* An empty access request can happen because of O_WRONLY | O_RDWR. */
+ if (!access_request)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Saves all handled accesses per layer. */
+ for (layer_level = 0; layer_level < domain->num_layers; layer_level++) {
+ const unsigned long access_req = access_request;
+ unsigned long access_bit;
+
+ for_each_set_bit(access_bit, &access_req,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(*layer_masks)) {
+ if (BIT_ULL(access_bit) &
+ landlock_get_fs_access_mask(domain, layer_level)) {
+ (*layer_masks)[access_bit] |=
+ BIT_ULL(layer_level);
+ handled_accesses |= BIT_ULL(access_bit);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return handled_accesses;
+}
diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.h b/security/landlock/ruleset.h
index 5e1b1b25def0..3635e709b20d 100644
--- a/security/landlock/ruleset.h
+++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.h
@@ -266,5 +266,14 @@ landlock_get_fs_access_mask(const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
return landlock_get_raw_fs_access_mask(ruleset, layer_level) |
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_INITIALLY_DENIED;
}
+bool landlock_unmask_layers(
+ const struct landlock_rule *const rule,
+ const access_mask_t access_request,
+ layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks)[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS]);
+
+access_mask_t landlock_init_layer_masks(
+ const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
+ const access_mask_t access_request,
+ layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks)[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS]);
#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_RULESET_H */
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 48+ messages in thread* [PATCH v10 07/13] landlock: Refactor layer helpers
2023-03-23 8:52 [PATCH v10 00/13] Network support for Landlock Konstantin Meskhidze
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 06/13] landlock: Move and rename layer helpers Konstantin Meskhidze
@ 2023-03-23 8:52 ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2023-04-16 16:11 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 08/13] landlock: Refactor landlock_add_rule() syscall Konstantin Meskhidze
` (5 subsequent siblings)
12 siblings, 1 reply; 48+ messages in thread
From: Konstantin Meskhidze @ 2023-03-23 8:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: mic
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel, gnoack3000, linux-security-module, netdev,
netfilter-devel, yusongping, artem.kuzin
Add new key_type argument to the landlock_init_layer_masks() helper.
Add a masks_array_size argument to the landlock_unmask_layers() helper.
These modifications support implementing new rule types in the next
Landlock versions.
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
---
Changes since v9:
* Refactors commit message.
Changes since v8:
* None.
Changes since v7:
* Refactors commit message, adds a co-developer.
* Minor fixes.
Changes since v6:
* Removes masks_size attribute from init_layer_masks().
* Refactors init_layer_masks() with new landlock_key_type.
Changes since v5:
* Splits commit.
* Formats code with clang-format-14.
Changes since v4:
* Refactors init_layer_masks(), get_handled_accesses()
and unmask_layers() functions to support multiple rule types.
* Refactors landlock_get_fs_access_mask() function with
LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS mask.
Changes since v3:
* Splits commit.
* Refactors landlock_unmask_layers functions.
---
security/landlock/fs.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++--------------
security/landlock/ruleset.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
security/landlock/ruleset.h | 17 +++++++------
3 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
index 10ba5000ce9a..91683dc5769a 100644
--- a/security/landlock/fs.c
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
@@ -442,20 +442,22 @@ static bool is_access_to_paths_allowed(
}
if (unlikely(dentry_child1)) {
- landlock_unmask_layers(find_rule(domain, dentry_child1),
- landlock_init_layer_masks(
- domain, LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS,
- &_layer_masks_child1),
- &_layer_masks_child1);
+ landlock_unmask_layers(
+ find_rule(domain, dentry_child1),
+ landlock_init_layer_masks(
+ domain, LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS,
+ &_layer_masks_child1, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE),
+ &_layer_masks_child1, ARRAY_SIZE(_layer_masks_child1));
layer_masks_child1 = &_layer_masks_child1;
child1_is_directory = d_is_dir(dentry_child1);
}
if (unlikely(dentry_child2)) {
- landlock_unmask_layers(find_rule(domain, dentry_child2),
- landlock_init_layer_masks(
- domain, LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS,
- &_layer_masks_child2),
- &_layer_masks_child2);
+ landlock_unmask_layers(
+ find_rule(domain, dentry_child2),
+ landlock_init_layer_masks(
+ domain, LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS,
+ &_layer_masks_child2, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE),
+ &_layer_masks_child2, ARRAY_SIZE(_layer_masks_child2));
layer_masks_child2 = &_layer_masks_child2;
child2_is_directory = d_is_dir(dentry_child2);
}
@@ -508,14 +510,15 @@ static bool is_access_to_paths_allowed(
rule = find_rule(domain, walker_path.dentry);
allowed_parent1 = landlock_unmask_layers(
- rule, access_masked_parent1, layer_masks_parent1);
+ rule, access_masked_parent1, layer_masks_parent1,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(*layer_masks_parent1));
allowed_parent2 = landlock_unmask_layers(
- rule, access_masked_parent2, layer_masks_parent2);
+ rule, access_masked_parent2, layer_masks_parent2,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(*layer_masks_parent2));
/* Stops when a rule from each layer grants access. */
if (allowed_parent1 && allowed_parent2)
break;
-
jump_up:
if (walker_path.dentry == walker_path.mnt->mnt_root) {
if (follow_up(&walker_path)) {
@@ -554,8 +557,8 @@ static int check_access_path(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
{
layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS] = {};
- access_request =
- landlock_init_layer_masks(domain, access_request, &layer_masks);
+ access_request = landlock_init_layer_masks(
+ domain, access_request, &layer_masks, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE);
if (is_access_to_paths_allowed(domain, path, access_request,
&layer_masks, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL))
return 0;
@@ -641,7 +644,8 @@ static bool collect_domain_accesses(
return true;
access_dom = landlock_init_layer_masks(domain, LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS,
- layer_masks_dom);
+ layer_masks_dom,
+ LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE);
dget(dir);
while (true) {
@@ -649,7 +653,8 @@ static bool collect_domain_accesses(
/* Gets all layers allowing all domain accesses. */
if (landlock_unmask_layers(find_rule(domain, dir), access_dom,
- layer_masks_dom)) {
+ layer_masks_dom,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(*layer_masks_dom))) {
/*
* Stops when all handled accesses are allowed by at
* least one rule in each layer.
@@ -764,7 +769,7 @@ static int current_check_refer_path(struct dentry *const old_dentry,
*/
access_request_parent1 = landlock_init_layer_masks(
dom, access_request_parent1 | access_request_parent2,
- &layer_masks_parent1);
+ &layer_masks_parent1, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE);
if (is_access_to_paths_allowed(
dom, new_dir, access_request_parent1,
&layer_masks_parent1, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL))
@@ -1140,7 +1145,7 @@ static int hook_file_open(struct file *const file)
if (is_access_to_paths_allowed(
dom, &file->f_path,
landlock_init_layer_masks(dom, full_access_request,
- &layer_masks),
+ &layer_masks, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE),
&layer_masks, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL)) {
allowed_access = full_access_request;
} else {
diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.c b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
index 969ff8c4baff..14207b666095 100644
--- a/security/landlock/ruleset.c
+++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
@@ -578,14 +578,15 @@ landlock_find_rule(const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
/*
* @layer_masks is read and may be updated according to the access request and
* the matching rule.
+ * @masks_array_size must be equal to ARRAY_SIZE(*layer_masks).
*
* Returns true if the request is allowed (i.e. relevant layer masks for the
* request are empty).
*/
-bool landlock_unmask_layers(
- const struct landlock_rule *const rule,
- const access_mask_t access_request,
- layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks)[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS])
+bool landlock_unmask_layers(const struct landlock_rule *const rule,
+ const access_mask_t access_request,
+ layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks)[],
+ const size_t masks_array_size)
{
size_t layer_level;
@@ -617,8 +618,7 @@ bool landlock_unmask_layers(
* requested access.
*/
is_empty = true;
- for_each_set_bit(access_bit, &access_req,
- ARRAY_SIZE(*layer_masks)) {
+ for_each_set_bit(access_bit, &access_req, masks_array_size) {
if (layer->access & BIT_ULL(access_bit))
(*layer_masks)[access_bit] &= ~layer_bit;
is_empty = is_empty && !(*layer_masks)[access_bit];
@@ -629,7 +629,11 @@ bool landlock_unmask_layers(
return false;
}
-/**
+typedef access_mask_t
+get_access_mask_t(const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
+ const u16 layer_level);
+
+/*
* landlock_init_layer_masks - Initialize layer masks from an access request
*
* Populates @layer_masks such that for each access right in @access_request,
@@ -638,19 +642,34 @@ bool landlock_unmask_layers(
* @domain: The domain that defines the current restrictions.
* @access_request: The requested access rights to check.
* @layer_masks: The layer masks to populate.
+ * @key_type: The key type to switch between access masks of different types.
*
* Returns: An access mask where each access right bit is set which is handled
* in any of the active layers in @domain.
*/
-access_mask_t landlock_init_layer_masks(
- const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
- const access_mask_t access_request,
- layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks)[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS])
+access_mask_t
+landlock_init_layer_masks(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
+ const access_mask_t access_request,
+ layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks)[],
+ const enum landlock_key_type key_type)
{
access_mask_t handled_accesses = 0;
- size_t layer_level;
+ size_t layer_level, num_access;
+ get_access_mask_t *get_access_mask;
+
+ switch (key_type) {
+ case LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE:
+ get_access_mask = landlock_get_fs_access_mask;
+ num_access = LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS;
+ break;
+ default:
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ memset(layer_masks, 0,
+ array_size(sizeof((*layer_masks)[0]), num_access));
- memset(layer_masks, 0, sizeof(*layer_masks));
/* An empty access request can happen because of O_WRONLY | O_RDWR. */
if (!access_request)
return 0;
@@ -660,10 +679,9 @@ access_mask_t landlock_init_layer_masks(
const unsigned long access_req = access_request;
unsigned long access_bit;
- for_each_set_bit(access_bit, &access_req,
- ARRAY_SIZE(*layer_masks)) {
+ for_each_set_bit(access_bit, &access_req, num_access) {
if (BIT_ULL(access_bit) &
- landlock_get_fs_access_mask(domain, layer_level)) {
+ get_access_mask(domain, layer_level)) {
(*layer_masks)[access_bit] |=
BIT_ULL(layer_level);
handled_accesses |= BIT_ULL(access_bit);
diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.h b/security/landlock/ruleset.h
index 3635e709b20d..2251e6048ccf 100644
--- a/security/landlock/ruleset.h
+++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.h
@@ -266,14 +266,15 @@ landlock_get_fs_access_mask(const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
return landlock_get_raw_fs_access_mask(ruleset, layer_level) |
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_INITIALLY_DENIED;
}
-bool landlock_unmask_layers(
- const struct landlock_rule *const rule,
- const access_mask_t access_request,
- layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks)[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS]);
+bool landlock_unmask_layers(const struct landlock_rule *const rule,
+ const access_mask_t access_request,
+ layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks)[],
+ const size_t masks_array_size);
-access_mask_t landlock_init_layer_masks(
- const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
- const access_mask_t access_request,
- layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks)[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS]);
+access_mask_t
+landlock_init_layer_masks(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
+ const access_mask_t access_request,
+ layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks)[],
+ const enum landlock_key_type key_type);
#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_RULESET_H */
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 48+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v10 07/13] landlock: Refactor layer helpers
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 07/13] landlock: Refactor " Konstantin Meskhidze
@ 2023-04-16 16:11 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-20 16:05 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
0 siblings, 1 reply; 48+ messages in thread
From: Mickaël Salaün @ 2023-04-16 16:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Konstantin Meskhidze
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel, gnoack3000, linux-security-module, netdev,
netfilter-devel, yusongping, artem.kuzin
On 23/03/2023 09:52, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
> Add new key_type argument to the landlock_init_layer_masks() helper.
> Add a masks_array_size argument to the landlock_unmask_layers() helper.
> These modifications support implementing new rule types in the next
> Landlock versions.
>
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
> ---
>
> Changes since v9:
> * Refactors commit message.
>
> Changes since v8:
> * None.
>
> Changes since v7:
> * Refactors commit message, adds a co-developer.
> * Minor fixes.
>
> Changes since v6:
> * Removes masks_size attribute from init_layer_masks().
> * Refactors init_layer_masks() with new landlock_key_type.
>
> Changes since v5:
> * Splits commit.
> * Formats code with clang-format-14.
>
> Changes since v4:
> * Refactors init_layer_masks(), get_handled_accesses()
> and unmask_layers() functions to support multiple rule types.
> * Refactors landlock_get_fs_access_mask() function with
> LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS mask.
>
> Changes since v3:
> * Splits commit.
> * Refactors landlock_unmask_layers functions.
>
> ---
> security/landlock/fs.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++--------------
> security/landlock/ruleset.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
> security/landlock/ruleset.h | 17 +++++++------
> 3 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
>
[...]
> @@ -629,7 +629,11 @@ bool landlock_unmask_layers(
> return false;
> }
>
> -/**
> +typedef access_mask_t
> +get_access_mask_t(const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
> + const u16 layer_level);
> +
> +/*
Please keep the "/**"
> * landlock_init_layer_masks - Initialize layer masks from an access request
> *
> * Populates @layer_masks such that for each access right in @access_request,
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 48+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v10 07/13] landlock: Refactor layer helpers
2023-04-16 16:11 ` Mickaël Salaün
@ 2023-04-20 16:05 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
0 siblings, 0 replies; 48+ messages in thread
From: Konstantin Meskhidze (A) @ 2023-04-20 16:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mickaël Salaün
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel, gnoack3000, linux-security-module, netdev,
netfilter-devel, yusongping, artem.kuzin
4/16/2023 7:11 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
>
> On 23/03/2023 09:52, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
>> Add new key_type argument to the landlock_init_layer_masks() helper.
>> Add a masks_array_size argument to the landlock_unmask_layers() helper.
>> These modifications support implementing new rule types in the next
>> Landlock versions.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
>> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
>> ---
>>
>> Changes since v9:
>> * Refactors commit message.
>>
>> Changes since v8:
>> * None.
>>
>> Changes since v7:
>> * Refactors commit message, adds a co-developer.
>> * Minor fixes.
>>
>> Changes since v6:
>> * Removes masks_size attribute from init_layer_masks().
>> * Refactors init_layer_masks() with new landlock_key_type.
>>
>> Changes since v5:
>> * Splits commit.
>> * Formats code with clang-format-14.
>>
>> Changes since v4:
>> * Refactors init_layer_masks(), get_handled_accesses()
>> and unmask_layers() functions to support multiple rule types.
>> * Refactors landlock_get_fs_access_mask() function with
>> LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS mask.
>>
>> Changes since v3:
>> * Splits commit.
>> * Refactors landlock_unmask_layers functions.
>>
>> ---
>> security/landlock/fs.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++--------------
>> security/landlock/ruleset.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
>> security/landlock/ruleset.h | 17 +++++++------
>> 3 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
>>
>
> [...]
>
>> @@ -629,7 +629,11 @@ bool landlock_unmask_layers(
>> return false;
>> }
>>
>> -/**
>> +typedef access_mask_t
>> +get_access_mask_t(const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
>> + const u16 layer_level);
>> +
>> +/*
>
> Please keep the "/**"
Got it. Thanks.
>
>
>> * landlock_init_layer_masks - Initialize layer masks from an access request
>> *
>> * Populates @layer_masks such that for each access right in @access_request,
> .
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 48+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v10 08/13] landlock: Refactor landlock_add_rule() syscall
2023-03-23 8:52 [PATCH v10 00/13] Network support for Landlock Konstantin Meskhidze
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 07/13] landlock: Refactor " Konstantin Meskhidze
@ 2023-03-23 8:52 ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 09/13] landlock: Add network rules and TCP hooks support Konstantin Meskhidze
` (4 subsequent siblings)
12 siblings, 0 replies; 48+ messages in thread
From: Konstantin Meskhidze @ 2023-03-23 8:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: mic
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel, gnoack3000, linux-security-module, netdev,
netfilter-devel, yusongping, artem.kuzin
Change the landlock_add_rule() syscall to support new rule types
in future Landlock versions. Add the add_rule_path_beneath() helper
to support current filesystem rules.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
---
Changes since v9:
* Minor fixes:
- deletes unnecessary curly braces.
- deletes unnecessary empty line.
Changes since v8:
* Refactors commit message.
* Minor fixes.
Changes since v7:
* None
Changes since v6:
* None
Changes since v5:
* Refactors syscall landlock_add_rule() and add_rule_path_beneath() helper
to make argument check ordering consistent and get rid of partial revertings
in following patches.
* Rolls back refactoring base_test.c seltest.
* Formats code with clang-format-14.
Changes since v4:
* Refactors add_rule_path_beneath() and landlock_add_rule() functions
to optimize code usage.
* Refactors base_test.c seltest: adds LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH
rule type in landlock_add_rule() call.
Changes since v3:
* Split commit.
* Refactors landlock_add_rule syscall.
---
security/landlock/syscalls.c | 92 +++++++++++++++++++-----------------
1 file changed, 48 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/landlock/syscalls.c b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
index d35cd5d304db..8a54e87dbb17 100644
--- a/security/landlock/syscalls.c
+++ b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
@@ -274,6 +274,47 @@ static int get_path_from_fd(const s32 fd, struct path *const path)
return err;
}
+static int add_rule_path_beneath(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
+ const void __user *const rule_attr)
+{
+ struct landlock_path_beneath_attr path_beneath_attr;
+ struct path path;
+ int res, err;
+ access_mask_t mask;
+
+ /* Copies raw user space buffer, only one type for now. */
+ res = copy_from_user(&path_beneath_attr, rule_attr,
+ sizeof(path_beneath_attr));
+ if (res)
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ /*
+ * Informs about useless rule: empty allowed_access (i.e. deny rules)
+ * are ignored in path walks.
+ */
+ if (!path_beneath_attr.allowed_access)
+ return -ENOMSG;
+
+ /*
+ * Checks that allowed_access matches the @ruleset constraints
+ * (ruleset->access_masks[0] is automatically upgraded to 64-bits).
+ */
+ mask = landlock_get_raw_fs_access_mask(ruleset, 0);
+ if ((path_beneath_attr.allowed_access | mask) != mask)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Gets and checks the new rule. */
+ err = get_path_from_fd(path_beneath_attr.parent_fd, &path);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* Imports the new rule. */
+ err = landlock_append_fs_rule(ruleset, &path,
+ path_beneath_attr.allowed_access);
+ path_put(&path);
+ return err;
+}
+
/**
* sys_landlock_add_rule - Add a new rule to a ruleset
*
@@ -306,11 +347,8 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(landlock_add_rule, const int, ruleset_fd,
const enum landlock_rule_type, rule_type,
const void __user *const, rule_attr, const __u32, flags)
{
- struct landlock_path_beneath_attr path_beneath_attr;
- struct path path;
struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset;
- int res, err;
- access_mask_t mask;
+ int err;
if (!landlock_initialized)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
@@ -324,48 +362,14 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(landlock_add_rule, const int, ruleset_fd,
if (IS_ERR(ruleset))
return PTR_ERR(ruleset);
- if (rule_type != LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH) {
+ switch (rule_type) {
+ case LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH:
+ err = add_rule_path_beneath(ruleset, rule_attr);
+ break;
+ default:
err = -EINVAL;
- goto out_put_ruleset;
- }
-
- /* Copies raw user space buffer, only one type for now. */
- res = copy_from_user(&path_beneath_attr, rule_attr,
- sizeof(path_beneath_attr));
- if (res) {
- err = -EFAULT;
- goto out_put_ruleset;
+ break;
}
-
- /*
- * Informs about useless rule: empty allowed_access (i.e. deny rules)
- * are ignored in path walks.
- */
- if (!path_beneath_attr.allowed_access) {
- err = -ENOMSG;
- goto out_put_ruleset;
- }
- /*
- * Checks that allowed_access matches the @ruleset constraints
- * (ruleset->access_masks[0] is automatically upgraded to 64-bits).
- */
- mask = landlock_get_raw_fs_access_mask(ruleset, 0);
- if ((path_beneath_attr.allowed_access | mask) != mask) {
- err = -EINVAL;
- goto out_put_ruleset;
- }
-
- /* Gets and checks the new rule. */
- err = get_path_from_fd(path_beneath_attr.parent_fd, &path);
- if (err)
- goto out_put_ruleset;
-
- /* Imports the new rule. */
- err = landlock_append_fs_rule(ruleset, &path,
- path_beneath_attr.allowed_access);
- path_put(&path);
-
-out_put_ruleset:
landlock_put_ruleset(ruleset);
return err;
}
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 48+ messages in thread* [PATCH v10 09/13] landlock: Add network rules and TCP hooks support
2023-03-23 8:52 [PATCH v10 00/13] Network support for Landlock Konstantin Meskhidze
` (7 preceding siblings ...)
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 08/13] landlock: Refactor landlock_add_rule() syscall Konstantin Meskhidze
@ 2023-03-23 8:52 ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2023-03-31 17:24 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-16 16:11 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 10/13] selftests/landlock: Share enforce_ruleset() Konstantin Meskhidze
` (3 subsequent siblings)
12 siblings, 2 replies; 48+ messages in thread
From: Konstantin Meskhidze @ 2023-03-23 8:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: mic
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel, gnoack3000, linux-security-module, netdev,
netfilter-devel, yusongping, artem.kuzin
This commit adds network rules support in the ruleset management
helpers and the landlock_create_ruleset syscall.
Refactor user space API to support network actions. Add new network
access flags, network rule and network attributes. Increment Landlock
ABI version. Expand access_masks_t to u32 to be sure network access
rights can be stored. Implement socket_bind() and socket_connect()
LSM hooks, which enable to restrict TCP socket binding and connection
to specific ports.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
---
Changes since v9:
* Changes UAPI port field to __u64.
* Moves shared code into check_socket_access().
* Adds get_raw_handled_net_accesses() and
get_current_net_domain() helpers.
* Minor fixes.
Changes since v8:
* Squashes commits.
* Refactors commit message.
* Changes UAPI port field to __be16.
* Changes logic of bind/connect hooks with AF_UNSPEC families.
* Adds address length checking.
* Minor fixes.
Changes since v7:
* Squashes commits.
* Increments ABI version to 4.
* Refactors commit message.
* Minor fixes.
Changes since v6:
* Renames landlock_set_net_access_mask() to landlock_add_net_access_mask()
because it OR values.
* Makes landlock_add_net_access_mask() more resilient incorrect values.
* Refactors landlock_get_net_access_mask().
* Renames LANDLOCK_MASK_SHIFT_NET to LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_NET and use
LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS as value.
* Updates access_masks_t to u32 to support network access actions.
* Refactors landlock internal functions to support network actions with
landlock_key/key_type/id types.
Changes since v5:
* Gets rid of partial revert from landlock_add_rule
syscall.
* Formats code with clang-format-14.
Changes since v4:
* Refactors landlock_create_ruleset() - splits ruleset and
masks checks.
* Refactors landlock_create_ruleset() and landlock mask
setters/getters to support two rule types.
* Refactors landlock_add_rule syscall add_rule_path_beneath
function by factoring out get_ruleset_from_fd() and
landlock_put_ruleset().
Changes since v3:
* Splits commit.
* Adds network rule support for internal landlock functions.
* Adds set_mask and get_mask for network.
* Adds rb_root root_net_port.
---
include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 49 +++++
security/landlock/Kconfig | 1 +
security/landlock/Makefile | 2 +
security/landlock/limits.h | 6 +-
security/landlock/net.c | 198 +++++++++++++++++++
security/landlock/net.h | 26 +++
security/landlock/ruleset.c | 52 ++++-
security/landlock/ruleset.h | 63 +++++-
security/landlock/setup.c | 2 +
security/landlock/syscalls.c | 72 ++++++-
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 2 +-
11 files changed, 450 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.c
create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.h
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
index 81d09ef9aa50..09b70fb6a9a6 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
@@ -31,6 +31,13 @@ struct landlock_ruleset_attr {
* this access right.
*/
__u64 handled_access_fs;
+
+ /**
+ * @handled_access_net: Bitmask of actions (cf. `Network flags`_)
+ * that is handled by this ruleset and should then be forbidden if no
+ * rule explicitly allow them.
+ */
+ __u64 handled_access_net;
};
/*
@@ -54,6 +61,11 @@ enum landlock_rule_type {
* landlock_path_beneath_attr .
*/
LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH = 1,
+ /**
+ * @LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE: Type of a &struct
+ * landlock_net_service_attr .
+ */
+ LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE = 2,
};
/**
@@ -79,6 +91,24 @@ struct landlock_path_beneath_attr {
*/
} __attribute__((packed));
+/**
+ * struct landlock_net_service_attr - TCP subnet definition
+ *
+ * Argument of sys_landlock_add_rule().
+ */
+struct landlock_net_service_attr {
+ /**
+ * @allowed_access: Bitmask of allowed access network for services
+ * (cf. `Network flags`_).
+ */
+ __u64 allowed_access;
+ /**
+ * @port: Network port.
+ */
+ __u64 port;
+
+} __attribute__((packed));
+
/**
* DOC: fs_access
*
@@ -189,4 +219,23 @@ struct landlock_path_beneath_attr {
#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE (1ULL << 14)
/* clang-format on */
+/**
+ * DOC: net_access
+ *
+ * Network flags
+ * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+ *
+ * These flags enable to restrict a sandboxed process to a set of network
+ * actions.
+ *
+ * TCP sockets with allowed actions:
+ *
+ * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP: Bind a TCP socket to a local port.
+ * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP: Connect an active TCP socket to
+ * a remote port.
+ */
+/* clang-format off */
+#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP (1ULL << 0)
+#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP (1ULL << 1)
+/* clang-format on */
#endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H */
diff --git a/security/landlock/Kconfig b/security/landlock/Kconfig
index 8e33c4e8ffb8..10c099097533 100644
--- a/security/landlock/Kconfig
+++ b/security/landlock/Kconfig
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
config SECURITY_LANDLOCK
bool "Landlock support"
depends on SECURITY && !ARCH_EPHEMERAL_INODES
+ select SECURITY_NETWORK
select SECURITY_PATH
help
Landlock is a sandboxing mechanism that enables processes to restrict
diff --git a/security/landlock/Makefile b/security/landlock/Makefile
index 7bbd2f413b3e..53d3c92ae22e 100644
--- a/security/landlock/Makefile
+++ b/security/landlock/Makefile
@@ -2,3 +2,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) := landlock.o
landlock-y := setup.o syscalls.o object.o ruleset.o \
cred.o ptrace.o fs.o
+
+landlock-$(CONFIG_INET) += net.o
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/security/landlock/limits.h b/security/landlock/limits.h
index bafb3b8dc677..8a1a6463c64e 100644
--- a/security/landlock/limits.h
+++ b/security/landlock/limits.h
@@ -23,6 +23,10 @@
#define LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS __const_hweight64(LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS)
#define LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_FS 0
-/* clang-format on */
+#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_NET LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP
+#define LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET ((LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_NET << 1) - 1)
+#define LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET __const_hweight64(LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET)
+#define LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_NET LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS
+/* clang-format on */
#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LIMITS_H */
diff --git a/security/landlock/net.c b/security/landlock/net.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..e19c339906e7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/net.c
@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Landlock LSM - Network management and hooks
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2022 Huawei Tech. Co., Ltd.
+ * Copyright © 2022 Microsoft Corporation
+ */
+
+#include <linux/in.h>
+#include <linux/net.h>
+#include <linux/socket.h>
+#include <net/ipv6.h>
+
+#include "common.h"
+#include "cred.h"
+#include "limits.h"
+#include "net.h"
+#include "ruleset.h"
+
+int landlock_append_net_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
+ const u16 port, access_mask_t access_rights)
+{
+ int err;
+ const struct landlock_id id = {
+ .key.data = port,
+ .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT,
+ };
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(port) > sizeof(id.key.data));
+
+ /* Transforms relative access rights to absolute ones. */
+ access_rights |= LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET &
+ ~landlock_get_net_access_mask(ruleset, 0);
+
+ mutex_lock(&ruleset->lock);
+ err = landlock_insert_rule(ruleset, id, access_rights);
+ mutex_unlock(&ruleset->lock);
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+static access_mask_t
+get_raw_handled_net_accesses(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain)
+{
+ access_mask_t access_dom = 0;
+ size_t layer_level;
+
+ for (layer_level = 0; layer_level < domain->num_layers; layer_level++)
+ access_dom |= landlock_get_net_access_mask(domain, layer_level);
+ return access_dom;
+}
+
+static const struct landlock_ruleset *get_current_net_domain(void)
+{
+ const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
+ landlock_get_current_domain();
+
+ if (!dom || !get_raw_handled_net_accesses(dom))
+ return NULL;
+
+ return dom;
+}
+
+static int check_addrlen(const struct sockaddr *const address, int addrlen)
+{
+ if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ switch (address->sa_family) {
+ case AF_UNSPEC:
+ case AF_INET:
+ if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return 0;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+ case AF_INET6:
+ if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return 0;
+#endif
+ }
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static u16 get_port(const struct sockaddr *const address)
+{
+ /* Gets port value in host byte order. */
+ switch (address->sa_family) {
+ case AF_UNSPEC:
+ case AF_INET: {
+ const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr =
+ (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
+ return ntohs(sockaddr->sin_port);
+ }
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+ case AF_INET6: {
+ const struct sockaddr_in6 *const sockaddr_ip6 =
+ (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
+ return ntohs(sockaddr_ip6->sin6_port);
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int check_socket_access(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen, u16 port,
+ access_mask_t access_request)
+{
+ int ret;
+ bool allowed = false;
+ layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET] = {};
+ const struct landlock_rule *rule;
+ access_mask_t handled_access;
+ const struct landlock_id id = {
+ .key.data = port,
+ .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT,
+ };
+ const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain = get_current_net_domain();
+
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!domain))
+ return 0;
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(domain->num_layers < 1))
+ return -EACCES;
+ /* Check if it's a TCP socket. */
+ if (sock->type != SOCK_STREAM)
+ return 0;
+
+ ret = check_addrlen(address, addrlen);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
+
+ switch (address->sa_family) {
+ case AF_UNSPEC:
+ /*
+ * Connecting to an address with AF_UNSPEC dissolves the TCP
+ * association, which have the same effect as closing the
+ * connection while retaining the socket object (i.e., the file
+ * descriptor). As for dropping privileges, closing
+ * connections is always allowed.
+ */
+ if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * For compatibility reason, accept AF_UNSPEC for bind
+ * accesses (mapped to AF_INET) only if the address is
+ * INADDR_ANY (cf. __inet_bind). Checking the address is
+ * required to not wrongfully return -EACCES instead of
+ * -EAFNOSUPPORT.
+ */
+ if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP) {
+ const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr =
+ (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
+
+ if (sockaddr->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
+ return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
+ }
+
+ fallthrough;
+ case AF_INET:
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+ case AF_INET6:
+#endif
+ rule = landlock_find_rule(domain, id);
+ handled_access = landlock_init_layer_masks(
+ domain, access_request, &layer_masks,
+ LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT);
+ allowed = landlock_unmask_layers(rule, handled_access,
+ &layer_masks,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(layer_masks));
+ }
+ return allowed ? 0 : -EACCES;
+}
+
+static int hook_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
+ int addrlen)
+{
+ return check_socket_access(sock, address, addrlen, get_port(address),
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP);
+}
+
+static int hook_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
+ int addrlen)
+{
+ return check_socket_access(sock, address, addrlen, get_port(address),
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP);
+}
+
+static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, hook_socket_bind),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, hook_socket_connect),
+};
+
+__init void landlock_add_net_hooks(void)
+{
+ security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
+ LANDLOCK_NAME);
+}
diff --git a/security/landlock/net.h b/security/landlock/net.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..0da1d9dff5ab
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/landlock/net.h
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
+/*
+ * Landlock LSM - Network management and hooks
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2022 Huawei Tech. Co., Ltd.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_NET_H
+#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_NET_H
+
+#include "common.h"
+#include "ruleset.h"
+#include "setup.h"
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET)
+__init void landlock_add_net_hooks(void);
+
+int landlock_append_net_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
+ const u16 port, access_mask_t access_rights);
+#else /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
+static inline void landlock_add_net_hooks(void)
+{
+}
+#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
+
+#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_NET_H */
diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.c b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
index 14207b666095..53cb62701280 100644
--- a/security/landlock/ruleset.c
+++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
@@ -36,6 +36,9 @@ static struct landlock_ruleset *create_ruleset(const u32 num_layers)
refcount_set(&new_ruleset->usage, 1);
mutex_init(&new_ruleset->lock);
new_ruleset->root_inode = RB_ROOT;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET)
+ new_ruleset->root_net_port = RB_ROOT;
+#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
new_ruleset->num_layers = num_layers;
/*
* hierarchy = NULL
@@ -46,16 +49,21 @@ static struct landlock_ruleset *create_ruleset(const u32 num_layers)
}
struct landlock_ruleset *
-landlock_create_ruleset(const access_mask_t fs_access_mask)
+landlock_create_ruleset(const access_mask_t fs_access_mask,
+ const access_mask_t net_access_mask)
{
struct landlock_ruleset *new_ruleset;
/* Informs about useless ruleset. */
- if (!fs_access_mask)
+ if (!fs_access_mask && !net_access_mask)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMSG);
new_ruleset = create_ruleset(1);
- if (!IS_ERR(new_ruleset))
+ if (IS_ERR(new_ruleset))
+ return new_ruleset;
+ if (fs_access_mask)
landlock_add_fs_access_mask(new_ruleset, fs_access_mask, 0);
+ if (net_access_mask)
+ landlock_add_net_access_mask(new_ruleset, net_access_mask, 0);
return new_ruleset;
}
@@ -73,6 +81,10 @@ static bool is_object_pointer(const enum landlock_key_type key_type)
switch (key_type) {
case LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE:
return true;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET)
+ case LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT:
+ return false;
+#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
}
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
return false;
@@ -126,6 +138,11 @@ static struct rb_root *get_root(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
case LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE:
root = &ruleset->root_inode;
break;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET)
+ case LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT:
+ root = &ruleset->root_net_port;
+ break;
+#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
}
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!root))
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
@@ -154,7 +171,8 @@ static void build_check_ruleset(void)
BUILD_BUG_ON(ruleset.num_rules < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_RULES);
BUILD_BUG_ON(ruleset.num_layers < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS);
BUILD_BUG_ON(access_masks <
- (LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS << LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_FS));
+ ((LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS << LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_FS) |
+ (LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET << LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_NET)));
}
/**
@@ -373,6 +391,12 @@ static int merge_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const dst,
if (err)
goto out_unlock;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET)
+ /* Merges the @src network port tree. */
+ err = merge_tree(dst, src, LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_unlock;
+#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
out_unlock:
mutex_unlock(&src->lock);
mutex_unlock(&dst->lock);
@@ -429,6 +453,12 @@ static int inherit_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const parent,
if (err)
goto out_unlock;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET)
+ /* Copies the @parent network port tree. */
+ err = inherit_tree(parent, child, LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_unlock;
+#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(child->num_layers <= parent->num_layers)) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto out_unlock;
@@ -461,6 +491,11 @@ static void free_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset)
rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe(freeme, next, &ruleset->root_inode,
node)
free_rule(freeme, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE);
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET)
+ rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe(freeme, next,
+ &ruleset->root_net_port, node)
+ free_rule(freeme, LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT);
+#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
put_hierarchy(ruleset->hierarchy);
kfree(ruleset);
}
@@ -641,7 +676,8 @@ get_access_mask_t(const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
*
* @domain: The domain that defines the current restrictions.
* @access_request: The requested access rights to check.
- * @layer_masks: The layer masks to populate.
+ * @layer_masks: It must contain LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS or LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET
+ * elements according to @key_type.
* @key_type: The key type to switch between access masks of different types.
*
* Returns: An access mask where each access right bit is set which is handled
@@ -662,6 +698,12 @@ landlock_init_layer_masks(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
get_access_mask = landlock_get_fs_access_mask;
num_access = LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS;
break;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET)
+ case LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT:
+ get_access_mask = landlock_get_net_access_mask;
+ num_access = LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET;
+ break;
+#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
default:
WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
return 0;
diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.h b/security/landlock/ruleset.h
index 2251e6048ccf..dcf7fbac8367 100644
--- a/security/landlock/ruleset.h
+++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.h
@@ -33,13 +33,16 @@
typedef u16 access_mask_t;
/* Makes sure all filesystem access rights can be stored. */
static_assert(BITS_PER_TYPE(access_mask_t) >= LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS);
+/* Makes sure all network access rights can be stored. */
+static_assert(BITS_PER_TYPE(access_mask_t) >= LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET);
/* Makes sure for_each_set_bit() and for_each_clear_bit() calls are OK. */
static_assert(sizeof(unsigned long) >= sizeof(access_mask_t));
/* Ruleset access masks. */
-typedef u16 access_masks_t;
+typedef u32 access_masks_t;
/* Makes sure all ruleset access rights can be stored. */
-static_assert(BITS_PER_TYPE(access_masks_t) >= LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS);
+static_assert(BITS_PER_TYPE(access_masks_t) >=
+ LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS + LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET);
typedef u16 layer_mask_t;
/* Makes sure all layers can be checked. */
@@ -84,6 +87,13 @@ enum landlock_key_type {
* keys.
*/
LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE = 1,
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET)
+ /**
+ * @LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT: Type of &landlock_ruleset.root_net_port's
+ * node keys.
+ */
+ LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT = 2,
+#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
};
/**
@@ -158,6 +168,15 @@ struct landlock_ruleset {
* reaches zero.
*/
struct rb_root root_inode;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET)
+ /**
+ * @root_net_port: Root of a red-black tree containing &struct
+ * landlock_rule nodes with network port. Once a ruleset is tied to a
+ * process (i.e. as a domain), this tree is immutable until @usage
+ * reaches zero.
+ */
+ struct rb_root root_net_port;
+#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
/**
* @hierarchy: Enables hierarchy identification even when a parent
* domain vanishes. This is needed for the ptrace protection.
@@ -196,13 +215,13 @@ struct landlock_ruleset {
*/
u32 num_layers;
/**
- * @access_masks: Contains the subset of filesystem
- * actions that are restricted by a ruleset. A domain
- * saves all layers of merged rulesets in a stack
- * (FAM), starting from the first layer to the last
- * one. These layers are used when merging rulesets,
- * for user space backward compatibility (i.e.
- * future-proof), and to properly handle merged
+ * @access_masks: Contains the subset of filesystem and
+ * network actions that are restricted by a ruleset.
+ * A domain saves all layers of merged rulesets in a
+ * stack (FAM), starting from the first layer to the
+ * last one. These layers are used when merging
+ * rulesets, for user space backward compatibility
+ * (i.e. future-proof), and to properly handle merged
* rulesets without overlapping access rights. These
* layers are set once and never changed for the
* lifetime of the ruleset.
@@ -213,7 +232,8 @@ struct landlock_ruleset {
};
struct landlock_ruleset *
-landlock_create_ruleset(const access_mask_t access_mask);
+landlock_create_ruleset(const access_mask_t access_mask_fs,
+ const access_mask_t access_mask_net);
void landlock_put_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset);
void landlock_put_ruleset_deferred(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset);
@@ -249,6 +269,19 @@ landlock_add_fs_access_mask(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
(fs_mask << LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_FS);
}
+static inline void
+landlock_add_net_access_mask(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
+ const access_mask_t net_access_mask,
+ const u16 layer_level)
+{
+ access_mask_t net_mask = net_access_mask & LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET;
+
+ /* Should already be checked in sys_landlock_create_ruleset(). */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(net_access_mask != net_mask);
+ ruleset->access_masks[layer_level] |=
+ (net_mask << LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_NET);
+}
+
static inline access_mask_t
landlock_get_raw_fs_access_mask(const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
const u16 layer_level)
@@ -266,6 +299,16 @@ landlock_get_fs_access_mask(const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
return landlock_get_raw_fs_access_mask(ruleset, layer_level) |
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_INITIALLY_DENIED;
}
+
+static inline access_mask_t
+landlock_get_net_access_mask(const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
+ const u16 layer_level)
+{
+ return (ruleset->access_masks[layer_level] >>
+ LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_NET) &
+ LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET;
+}
+
bool landlock_unmask_layers(const struct landlock_rule *const rule,
const access_mask_t access_request,
layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks)[],
diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.c b/security/landlock/setup.c
index 3f196d2ce4f9..7e4a598177b8 100644
--- a/security/landlock/setup.c
+++ b/security/landlock/setup.c
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include "fs.h"
#include "ptrace.h"
#include "setup.h"
+#include "net.h"
bool landlock_initialized __lsm_ro_after_init = false;
@@ -29,6 +30,7 @@ static int __init landlock_init(void)
landlock_add_cred_hooks();
landlock_add_ptrace_hooks();
landlock_add_fs_hooks();
+ landlock_add_net_hooks();
landlock_initialized = true;
pr_info("Up and running.\n");
return 0;
diff --git a/security/landlock/syscalls.c b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
index 8a54e87dbb17..1f0edd605bc4 100644
--- a/security/landlock/syscalls.c
+++ b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
#include "cred.h"
#include "fs.h"
#include "limits.h"
+#include "net.h"
#include "ruleset.h"
#include "setup.h"
@@ -74,7 +75,8 @@ static void build_check_abi(void)
{
struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr;
struct landlock_path_beneath_attr path_beneath_attr;
- size_t ruleset_size, path_beneath_size;
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_attr;
+ size_t ruleset_size, path_beneath_size, net_service_size;
/*
* For each user space ABI structures, first checks that there is no
@@ -82,13 +84,19 @@ static void build_check_abi(void)
* struct size.
*/
ruleset_size = sizeof(ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs);
+ ruleset_size += sizeof(ruleset_attr.handled_access_net);
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ruleset_attr) != ruleset_size);
- BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ruleset_attr) != 8);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ruleset_attr) != 16);
path_beneath_size = sizeof(path_beneath_attr.allowed_access);
path_beneath_size += sizeof(path_beneath_attr.parent_fd);
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(path_beneath_attr) != path_beneath_size);
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(path_beneath_attr) != 12);
+
+ net_service_size = sizeof(net_service_attr.allowed_access);
+ net_service_size += sizeof(net_service_attr.port);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(net_service_attr) != net_service_size);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(net_service_attr) != 16);
}
/* Ruleset handling */
@@ -129,7 +137,7 @@ static const struct file_operations ruleset_fops = {
.write = fop_dummy_write,
};
-#define LANDLOCK_ABI_VERSION 3
+#define LANDLOCK_ABI_VERSION 4
/**
* sys_landlock_create_ruleset - Create a new ruleset
@@ -188,8 +196,14 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(landlock_create_ruleset,
LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS)
return -EINVAL;
+ /* Checks network content (and 32-bits cast). */
+ if ((ruleset_attr.handled_access_net | LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET) !=
+ LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
/* Checks arguments and transforms to kernel struct. */
- ruleset = landlock_create_ruleset(ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs);
+ ruleset = landlock_create_ruleset(ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs,
+ ruleset_attr.handled_access_net);
if (IS_ERR(ruleset))
return PTR_ERR(ruleset);
@@ -315,13 +329,54 @@ static int add_rule_path_beneath(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
return err;
}
+static int add_rule_net_service(struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset,
+ const void __user *const rule_attr)
+{
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET)
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_attr;
+ int res;
+ access_mask_t mask;
+
+ /* Copies raw user space buffer, only one type for now. */
+ res = copy_from_user(&net_service_attr, rule_attr,
+ sizeof(net_service_attr));
+ if (res)
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ /*
+ * Informs about useless rule: empty allowed_access (i.e. deny rules)
+ * are ignored by network actions.
+ */
+ if (!net_service_attr.allowed_access)
+ return -ENOMSG;
+
+ /*
+ * Checks that allowed_access matches the @ruleset constraints
+ * (ruleset->access_masks[0] is automatically upgraded to 64-bits).
+ */
+ mask = landlock_get_net_access_mask(ruleset, 0);
+ if ((net_service_attr.allowed_access | mask) != mask)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Denies inserting a rule with port 0 or more than U16_MAX. */
+ if ((net_service_attr.port == 0) || (net_service_attr.port > U16_MAX))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Imports the new rule. */
+ return landlock_append_net_rule(ruleset, net_service_attr.port,
+ net_service_attr.allowed_access);
+#else /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
+ return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
+#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
+}
+
/**
* sys_landlock_add_rule - Add a new rule to a ruleset
*
* @ruleset_fd: File descriptor tied to the ruleset that should be extended
* with the new rule.
- * @rule_type: Identify the structure type pointed to by @rule_attr (only
- * %LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH for now).
+ * @rule_type: Identify the structure type pointed to by @rule_attr:
+ * %LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH or %LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE.
* @rule_attr: Pointer to a rule (only of type &struct
* landlock_path_beneath_attr for now).
* @flags: Must be 0.
@@ -332,6 +387,8 @@ static int add_rule_path_beneath(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
* Possible returned errors are:
*
* - %EOPNOTSUPP: Landlock is supported by the kernel but disabled at boot time;
+ * - %EAFNOSUPPORT: @rule_type is LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE but TCP/IP is not
+ * supported by the running kernel;
* - %EINVAL: @flags is not 0, or inconsistent access in the rule (i.e.
* &landlock_path_beneath_attr.allowed_access is not a subset of the
* ruleset handled accesses);
@@ -366,6 +423,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(landlock_add_rule, const int, ruleset_fd,
case LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH:
err = add_rule_path_beneath(ruleset, rule_attr);
break;
+ case LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE:
+ err = add_rule_net_service(ruleset, rule_attr);
+ break;
default:
err = -EINVAL;
break;
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c
index 792c3f0a59b4..646f778dfb1e 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ TEST(abi_version)
const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
.handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE,
};
- ASSERT_EQ(3, landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 0,
+ ASSERT_EQ(4, landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 0,
LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION));
ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, 0,
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 48+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v10 09/13] landlock: Add network rules and TCP hooks support
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 09/13] landlock: Add network rules and TCP hooks support Konstantin Meskhidze
@ 2023-03-31 17:24 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-03-31 17:30 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-04 9:31 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
2023-04-16 16:11 ` Mickaël Salaün
1 sibling, 2 replies; 48+ messages in thread
From: Mickaël Salaün @ 2023-03-31 17:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Konstantin Meskhidze
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel, gnoack3000, linux-security-module, netdev,
netfilter-devel, yusongping, artem.kuzin
On 23/03/2023 09:52, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
> This commit adds network rules support in the ruleset management
> helpers and the landlock_create_ruleset syscall.
> Refactor user space API to support network actions. Add new network
> access flags, network rule and network attributes. Increment Landlock
> ABI version. Expand access_masks_t to u32 to be sure network access
> rights can be stored. Implement socket_bind() and socket_connect()
> LSM hooks, which enable to restrict TCP socket binding and connection
> to specific ports.
>
> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
> ---
>
> Changes since v9:
> * Changes UAPI port field to __u64.
> * Moves shared code into check_socket_access().
> * Adds get_raw_handled_net_accesses() and
> get_current_net_domain() helpers.
> * Minor fixes.
>
> Changes since v8:
> * Squashes commits.
> * Refactors commit message.
> * Changes UAPI port field to __be16.
> * Changes logic of bind/connect hooks with AF_UNSPEC families.
> * Adds address length checking.
> * Minor fixes.
>
> Changes since v7:
> * Squashes commits.
> * Increments ABI version to 4.
> * Refactors commit message.
> * Minor fixes.
>
> Changes since v6:
> * Renames landlock_set_net_access_mask() to landlock_add_net_access_mask()
> because it OR values.
> * Makes landlock_add_net_access_mask() more resilient incorrect values.
> * Refactors landlock_get_net_access_mask().
> * Renames LANDLOCK_MASK_SHIFT_NET to LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_NET and use
> LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS as value.
> * Updates access_masks_t to u32 to support network access actions.
> * Refactors landlock internal functions to support network actions with
> landlock_key/key_type/id types.
>
> Changes since v5:
> * Gets rid of partial revert from landlock_add_rule
> syscall.
> * Formats code with clang-format-14.
>
> Changes since v4:
> * Refactors landlock_create_ruleset() - splits ruleset and
> masks checks.
> * Refactors landlock_create_ruleset() and landlock mask
> setters/getters to support two rule types.
> * Refactors landlock_add_rule syscall add_rule_path_beneath
> function by factoring out get_ruleset_from_fd() and
> landlock_put_ruleset().
>
> Changes since v3:
> * Splits commit.
> * Adds network rule support for internal landlock functions.
> * Adds set_mask and get_mask for network.
> * Adds rb_root root_net_port.
>
> ---
> include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 49 +++++
> security/landlock/Kconfig | 1 +
> security/landlock/Makefile | 2 +
> security/landlock/limits.h | 6 +-
> security/landlock/net.c | 198 +++++++++++++++++++
> security/landlock/net.h | 26 +++
> security/landlock/ruleset.c | 52 ++++-
> security/landlock/ruleset.h | 63 +++++-
> security/landlock/setup.c | 2 +
> security/landlock/syscalls.c | 72 ++++++-
> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 2 +-
> 11 files changed, 450 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.c
> create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.h
[...]
> diff --git a/security/landlock/net.c b/security/landlock/net.c
[...]
> +static int check_addrlen(const struct sockaddr *const address, int addrlen)
const int addrlen
> +{
> + if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
> + return -EINVAL;
> + switch (address->sa_family) {
> + case AF_UNSPEC:
> + case AF_INET:
> + if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
> + return -EINVAL;
> + return 0;
> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
> + case AF_INET6:
> + if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
> + return -EINVAL;
> + return 0;
> +#endif
> + }
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static u16 get_port(const struct sockaddr *const address)
> +{
> + /* Gets port value in host byte order. */
> + switch (address->sa_family) {
> + case AF_UNSPEC:
> + case AF_INET: {
> + const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr =
> + (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
> + return ntohs(sockaddr->sin_port);
Storing ports in big endian (in rulesets) would avoid converting them
every time the kernel checks a socket port. The above comment should
then be updated too.
> + }
> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
> + case AF_INET6: {
> + const struct sockaddr_in6 *const sockaddr_ip6 =
> + (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
> + return ntohs(sockaddr_ip6->sin6_port);
> + }
> +#endif
> + }
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int check_socket_access(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen, u16 port,
> + access_mask_t access_request)
> +{
> + int ret;
> + bool allowed = false;
> + layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET] = {};
> + const struct landlock_rule *rule;
> + access_mask_t handled_access;
> + const struct landlock_id id = {
> + .key.data = port,
> + .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT,
> + };
> + const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain = get_current_net_domain();
> +
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!domain))
> + return 0;
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(domain->num_layers < 1))
> + return -EACCES;
> + /* Check if it's a TCP socket. */
> + if (sock->type != SOCK_STREAM)
> + return 0;
> +
> + ret = check_addrlen(address, addrlen);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
> +
> + switch (address->sa_family) {
> + case AF_UNSPEC:
> + /*
> + * Connecting to an address with AF_UNSPEC dissolves the TCP
> + * association, which have the same effect as closing the
> + * connection while retaining the socket object (i.e., the file
> + * descriptor). As for dropping privileges, closing
> + * connections is always allowed.
> + */
> + if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP)
> + return 0;
> +
> + /*
> + * For compatibility reason, accept AF_UNSPEC for bind
> + * accesses (mapped to AF_INET) only if the address is
> + * INADDR_ANY (cf. __inet_bind). Checking the address is
> + * required to not wrongfully return -EACCES instead of
> + * -EAFNOSUPPORT.
> + */
> + if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP) {
> + const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr =
> + (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
> +
> + if (sockaddr->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
> + return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
> + }
> +
> + fallthrough;
> + case AF_INET:
> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
> + case AF_INET6:
> +#endif
> + rule = landlock_find_rule(domain, id);
> + handled_access = landlock_init_layer_masks(
> + domain, access_request, &layer_masks,
> + LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT);
> + allowed = landlock_unmask_layers(rule, handled_access,
> + &layer_masks,
> + ARRAY_SIZE(layer_masks));
> + }
> + return allowed ? 0 : -EACCES;
> +}
> +
> +static int hook_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
> + int addrlen)
> +{
> + return check_socket_access(sock, address, addrlen, get_port(address),
> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP);
> +}
> +
> +static int hook_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
> + int addrlen)
> +{
> + return check_socket_access(sock, address, addrlen, get_port(address),
> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP);
> +}
[...]
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 48+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v10 09/13] landlock: Add network rules and TCP hooks support
2023-03-31 17:24 ` Mickaël Salaün
@ 2023-03-31 17:30 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-04 9:33 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
2023-04-04 9:31 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
1 sibling, 1 reply; 48+ messages in thread
From: Mickaël Salaün @ 2023-03-31 17:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Konstantin Meskhidze
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel, gnoack3000, linux-security-module, netdev,
netfilter-devel, yusongping, artem.kuzin
On 31/03/2023 19:24, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>
> On 23/03/2023 09:52, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
>> This commit adds network rules support in the ruleset management
>> helpers and the landlock_create_ruleset syscall.
>> Refactor user space API to support network actions. Add new network
>> access flags, network rule and network attributes. Increment Landlock
>> ABI version. Expand access_masks_t to u32 to be sure network access
>> rights can be stored. Implement socket_bind() and socket_connect()
>> LSM hooks, which enable to restrict TCP socket binding and connection
>> to specific ports.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
>> ---
>>
>> Changes since v9:
>> * Changes UAPI port field to __u64.
>> * Moves shared code into check_socket_access().
>> * Adds get_raw_handled_net_accesses() and
>> get_current_net_domain() helpers.
>> * Minor fixes.
>>
>> Changes since v8:
>> * Squashes commits.
>> * Refactors commit message.
>> * Changes UAPI port field to __be16.
>> * Changes logic of bind/connect hooks with AF_UNSPEC families.
>> * Adds address length checking.
>> * Minor fixes.
>>
>> Changes since v7:
>> * Squashes commits.
>> * Increments ABI version to 4.
>> * Refactors commit message.
>> * Minor fixes.
>>
>> Changes since v6:
>> * Renames landlock_set_net_access_mask() to landlock_add_net_access_mask()
>> because it OR values.
>> * Makes landlock_add_net_access_mask() more resilient incorrect values.
>> * Refactors landlock_get_net_access_mask().
>> * Renames LANDLOCK_MASK_SHIFT_NET to LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_NET and use
>> LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS as value.
>> * Updates access_masks_t to u32 to support network access actions.
>> * Refactors landlock internal functions to support network actions with
>> landlock_key/key_type/id types.
>>
>> Changes since v5:
>> * Gets rid of partial revert from landlock_add_rule
>> syscall.
>> * Formats code with clang-format-14.
>>
>> Changes since v4:
>> * Refactors landlock_create_ruleset() - splits ruleset and
>> masks checks.
>> * Refactors landlock_create_ruleset() and landlock mask
>> setters/getters to support two rule types.
>> * Refactors landlock_add_rule syscall add_rule_path_beneath
>> function by factoring out get_ruleset_from_fd() and
>> landlock_put_ruleset().
>>
>> Changes since v3:
>> * Splits commit.
>> * Adds network rule support for internal landlock functions.
>> * Adds set_mask and get_mask for network.
>> * Adds rb_root root_net_port.
>>
>> ---
>> include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 49 +++++
>> security/landlock/Kconfig | 1 +
>> security/landlock/Makefile | 2 +
>> security/landlock/limits.h | 6 +-
>> security/landlock/net.c | 198 +++++++++++++++++++
>> security/landlock/net.h | 26 +++
>> security/landlock/ruleset.c | 52 ++++-
>> security/landlock/ruleset.h | 63 +++++-
>> security/landlock/setup.c | 2 +
>> security/landlock/syscalls.c | 72 ++++++-
>> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 2 +-
>> 11 files changed, 450 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
>> create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.c
>> create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.h
>
> [...]
>
>> diff --git a/security/landlock/net.c b/security/landlock/net.c
>
> [...]
>
>> +static int check_addrlen(const struct sockaddr *const address, int addrlen)
>
> const int addrlen
>
>> +{
>> + if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> + switch (address->sa_family) {
>> + case AF_UNSPEC:
>> + case AF_INET:
>> + if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> + return 0;
>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
>> + case AF_INET6:
>> + if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> + return 0;
>> +#endif
>> + }
>> + WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static u16 get_port(const struct sockaddr *const address)
>> +{
>> + /* Gets port value in host byte order. */
>> + switch (address->sa_family) {
>> + case AF_UNSPEC:
>> + case AF_INET: {
>> + const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr =
>> + (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
>> + return ntohs(sockaddr->sin_port);
>
> Storing ports in big endian (in rulesets) would avoid converting them
> every time the kernel checks a socket port. The above comment should
> then be updated too.
You can then return a __be16 type here and at least also use __be16 in
check_socket_access().
>
>
>> + }
>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
>> + case AF_INET6: {
>> + const struct sockaddr_in6 *const sockaddr_ip6 =
>> + (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
>> + return ntohs(sockaddr_ip6->sin6_port);
>> + }
>> +#endif
>> + }
>> + WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int check_socket_access(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen, u16 port,
>> + access_mask_t access_request)
>> +{
>> + int ret;
>> + bool allowed = false;
>> + layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET] = {};
>> + const struct landlock_rule *rule;
>> + access_mask_t handled_access;
>> + const struct landlock_id id = {
>> + .key.data = port,
>> + .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT,
>> + };
>> + const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain = get_current_net_domain();
>> +
>> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!domain))
>> + return 0;
>> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(domain->num_layers < 1))
>> + return -EACCES;
>> + /* Check if it's a TCP socket. */
>> + if (sock->type != SOCK_STREAM)
>> + return 0;
>> +
>> + ret = check_addrlen(address, addrlen);
>> + if (ret)
>> + return ret;
>> +
>> + switch (address->sa_family) {
>> + case AF_UNSPEC:
>> + /*
>> + * Connecting to an address with AF_UNSPEC dissolves the TCP
>> + * association, which have the same effect as closing the
>> + * connection while retaining the socket object (i.e., the file
>> + * descriptor). As for dropping privileges, closing
>> + * connections is always allowed.
>> + */
>> + if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP)
>> + return 0;
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * For compatibility reason, accept AF_UNSPEC for bind
>> + * accesses (mapped to AF_INET) only if the address is
>> + * INADDR_ANY (cf. __inet_bind). Checking the address is
>> + * required to not wrongfully return -EACCES instead of
>> + * -EAFNOSUPPORT.
>> + */
>> + if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP) {
>> + const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr =
>> + (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
>> +
>> + if (sockaddr->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
>> + return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
>> + }
>> +
>> + fallthrough;
>> + case AF_INET:
>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
>> + case AF_INET6:
>> +#endif
>> + rule = landlock_find_rule(domain, id);
>> + handled_access = landlock_init_layer_masks(
>> + domain, access_request, &layer_masks,
>> + LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT);
>> + allowed = landlock_unmask_layers(rule, handled_access,
>> + &layer_masks,
>> + ARRAY_SIZE(layer_masks));
>> + }
>> + return allowed ? 0 : -EACCES;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int hook_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
>> + int addrlen)
>> +{
>> + return check_socket_access(sock, address, addrlen, get_port(address),
>> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP);
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int hook_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
>> + int addrlen)
>> +{
>> + return check_socket_access(sock, address, addrlen, get_port(address),
>> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP);
>> +}
>
> [...]
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 48+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v10 09/13] landlock: Add network rules and TCP hooks support
2023-03-31 17:30 ` Mickaël Salaün
@ 2023-04-04 9:33 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
0 siblings, 0 replies; 48+ messages in thread
From: Konstantin Meskhidze (A) @ 2023-04-04 9:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mickaël Salaün
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel, gnoack3000, linux-security-module, netdev,
netfilter-devel, yusongping, artem.kuzin
3/31/2023 8:30 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
>
> On 31/03/2023 19:24, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>>
>> On 23/03/2023 09:52, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
>>> This commit adds network rules support in the ruleset management
>>> helpers and the landlock_create_ruleset syscall.
>>> Refactor user space API to support network actions. Add new network
>>> access flags, network rule and network attributes. Increment Landlock
>>> ABI version. Expand access_masks_t to u32 to be sure network access
>>> rights can be stored. Implement socket_bind() and socket_connect()
>>> LSM hooks, which enable to restrict TCP socket binding and connection
>>> to specific ports.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
>>> ---
>>>
>>> Changes since v9:
>>> * Changes UAPI port field to __u64.
>>> * Moves shared code into check_socket_access().
>>> * Adds get_raw_handled_net_accesses() and
>>> get_current_net_domain() helpers.
>>> * Minor fixes.
>>>
>>> Changes since v8:
>>> * Squashes commits.
>>> * Refactors commit message.
>>> * Changes UAPI port field to __be16.
>>> * Changes logic of bind/connect hooks with AF_UNSPEC families.
>>> * Adds address length checking.
>>> * Minor fixes.
>>>
>>> Changes since v7:
>>> * Squashes commits.
>>> * Increments ABI version to 4.
>>> * Refactors commit message.
>>> * Minor fixes.
>>>
>>> Changes since v6:
>>> * Renames landlock_set_net_access_mask() to landlock_add_net_access_mask()
>>> because it OR values.
>>> * Makes landlock_add_net_access_mask() more resilient incorrect values.
>>> * Refactors landlock_get_net_access_mask().
>>> * Renames LANDLOCK_MASK_SHIFT_NET to LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_NET and use
>>> LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS as value.
>>> * Updates access_masks_t to u32 to support network access actions.
>>> * Refactors landlock internal functions to support network actions with
>>> landlock_key/key_type/id types.
>>>
>>> Changes since v5:
>>> * Gets rid of partial revert from landlock_add_rule
>>> syscall.
>>> * Formats code with clang-format-14.
>>>
>>> Changes since v4:
>>> * Refactors landlock_create_ruleset() - splits ruleset and
>>> masks checks.
>>> * Refactors landlock_create_ruleset() and landlock mask
>>> setters/getters to support two rule types.
>>> * Refactors landlock_add_rule syscall add_rule_path_beneath
>>> function by factoring out get_ruleset_from_fd() and
>>> landlock_put_ruleset().
>>>
>>> Changes since v3:
>>> * Splits commit.
>>> * Adds network rule support for internal landlock functions.
>>> * Adds set_mask and get_mask for network.
>>> * Adds rb_root root_net_port.
>>>
>>> ---
>>> include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 49 +++++
>>> security/landlock/Kconfig | 1 +
>>> security/landlock/Makefile | 2 +
>>> security/landlock/limits.h | 6 +-
>>> security/landlock/net.c | 198 +++++++++++++++++++
>>> security/landlock/net.h | 26 +++
>>> security/landlock/ruleset.c | 52 ++++-
>>> security/landlock/ruleset.h | 63 +++++-
>>> security/landlock/setup.c | 2 +
>>> security/landlock/syscalls.c | 72 ++++++-
>>> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 2 +-
>>> 11 files changed, 450 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
>>> create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.c
>>> create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.h
>>
>> [...]
>>
>>> diff --git a/security/landlock/net.c b/security/landlock/net.c
>>
>> [...]
>>
>>> +static int check_addrlen(const struct sockaddr *const address, int addrlen)
>>
>> const int addrlen
>>
>>> +{
>>> + if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>> + switch (address->sa_family) {
>>> + case AF_UNSPEC:
>>> + case AF_INET:
>>> + if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>> + return 0;
>>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
>>> + case AF_INET6:
>>> + if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>> + return 0;
>>> +#endif
>>> + }
>>> + WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
>>> + return 0;
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +static u16 get_port(const struct sockaddr *const address)
>>> +{
>>> + /* Gets port value in host byte order. */
>>> + switch (address->sa_family) {
>>> + case AF_UNSPEC:
>>> + case AF_INET: {
>>> + const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr =
>>> + (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
>>> + return ntohs(sockaddr->sin_port);
>>
>> Storing ports in big endian (in rulesets) would avoid converting them
>> every time the kernel checks a socket port. The above comment should
>> then be updated too.
>
> You can then return a __be16 type here and at least also use __be16 in
> check_socket_access().
Do you mean we need to do port converting __be16 -> u16 in
check_socket_access()???
>
>>
>>
>>> + }
>>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
>>> + case AF_INET6: {
>>> + const struct sockaddr_in6 *const sockaddr_ip6 =
>>> + (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
>>> + return ntohs(sockaddr_ip6->sin6_port);
>>> + }
>>> +#endif
>>> + }
>>> + WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
>>> + return 0;
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +static int check_socket_access(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen, u16 port,
>>> + access_mask_t access_request)
>>> +{
>>> + int ret;
>>> + bool allowed = false;
>>> + layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET] = {};
>>> + const struct landlock_rule *rule;
>>> + access_mask_t handled_access;
>>> + const struct landlock_id id = {
>>> + .key.data = port,
>>> + .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT,
>>> + };
>>> + const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain = get_current_net_domain();
>>> +
>>> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!domain))
>>> + return 0;
>>> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(domain->num_layers < 1))
>>> + return -EACCES;
>>> + /* Check if it's a TCP socket. */
>>> + if (sock->type != SOCK_STREAM)
>>> + return 0;
>>> +
>>> + ret = check_addrlen(address, addrlen);
>>> + if (ret)
>>> + return ret;
>>> +
>>> + switch (address->sa_family) {
>>> + case AF_UNSPEC:
>>> + /*
>>> + * Connecting to an address with AF_UNSPEC dissolves the TCP
>>> + * association, which have the same effect as closing the
>>> + * connection while retaining the socket object (i.e., the file
>>> + * descriptor). As for dropping privileges, closing
>>> + * connections is always allowed.
>>> + */
>>> + if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP)
>>> + return 0;
>>> +
>>> + /*
>>> + * For compatibility reason, accept AF_UNSPEC for bind
>>> + * accesses (mapped to AF_INET) only if the address is
>>> + * INADDR_ANY (cf. __inet_bind). Checking the address is
>>> + * required to not wrongfully return -EACCES instead of
>>> + * -EAFNOSUPPORT.
>>> + */
>>> + if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP) {
>>> + const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr =
>>> + (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
>>> +
>>> + if (sockaddr->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
>>> + return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> + fallthrough;
>>> + case AF_INET:
>>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
>>> + case AF_INET6:
>>> +#endif
>>> + rule = landlock_find_rule(domain, id);
>>> + handled_access = landlock_init_layer_masks(
>>> + domain, access_request, &layer_masks,
>>> + LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT);
>>> + allowed = landlock_unmask_layers(rule, handled_access,
>>> + &layer_masks,
>>> + ARRAY_SIZE(layer_masks));
>>> + }
>>> + return allowed ? 0 : -EACCES;
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +static int hook_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
>>> + int addrlen)
>>> +{
>>> + return check_socket_access(sock, address, addrlen, get_port(address),
>>> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP);
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +static int hook_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
>>> + int addrlen)
>>> +{
>>> + return check_socket_access(sock, address, addrlen, get_port(address),
>>> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP);
>>> +}
>>
>> [...]
> .
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 48+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v10 09/13] landlock: Add network rules and TCP hooks support
2023-03-31 17:24 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-03-31 17:30 ` Mickaël Salaün
@ 2023-04-04 9:31 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
2023-04-04 16:42 ` Mickaël Salaün
1 sibling, 1 reply; 48+ messages in thread
From: Konstantin Meskhidze (A) @ 2023-04-04 9:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mickaël Salaün
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel, gnoack3000, linux-security-module, netdev,
netfilter-devel, yusongping, artem.kuzin
3/31/2023 8:24 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
>
> On 23/03/2023 09:52, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
>> This commit adds network rules support in the ruleset management
>> helpers and the landlock_create_ruleset syscall.
>> Refactor user space API to support network actions. Add new network
>> access flags, network rule and network attributes. Increment Landlock
>> ABI version. Expand access_masks_t to u32 to be sure network access
>> rights can be stored. Implement socket_bind() and socket_connect()
>> LSM hooks, which enable to restrict TCP socket binding and connection
>> to specific ports.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
>> ---
>>
>> Changes since v9:
>> * Changes UAPI port field to __u64.
>> * Moves shared code into check_socket_access().
>> * Adds get_raw_handled_net_accesses() and
>> get_current_net_domain() helpers.
>> * Minor fixes.
>>
>> Changes since v8:
>> * Squashes commits.
>> * Refactors commit message.
>> * Changes UAPI port field to __be16.
>> * Changes logic of bind/connect hooks with AF_UNSPEC families.
>> * Adds address length checking.
>> * Minor fixes.
>>
>> Changes since v7:
>> * Squashes commits.
>> * Increments ABI version to 4.
>> * Refactors commit message.
>> * Minor fixes.
>>
>> Changes since v6:
>> * Renames landlock_set_net_access_mask() to landlock_add_net_access_mask()
>> because it OR values.
>> * Makes landlock_add_net_access_mask() more resilient incorrect values.
>> * Refactors landlock_get_net_access_mask().
>> * Renames LANDLOCK_MASK_SHIFT_NET to LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_NET and use
>> LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS as value.
>> * Updates access_masks_t to u32 to support network access actions.
>> * Refactors landlock internal functions to support network actions with
>> landlock_key/key_type/id types.
>>
>> Changes since v5:
>> * Gets rid of partial revert from landlock_add_rule
>> syscall.
>> * Formats code with clang-format-14.
>>
>> Changes since v4:
>> * Refactors landlock_create_ruleset() - splits ruleset and
>> masks checks.
>> * Refactors landlock_create_ruleset() and landlock mask
>> setters/getters to support two rule types.
>> * Refactors landlock_add_rule syscall add_rule_path_beneath
>> function by factoring out get_ruleset_from_fd() and
>> landlock_put_ruleset().
>>
>> Changes since v3:
>> * Splits commit.
>> * Adds network rule support for internal landlock functions.
>> * Adds set_mask and get_mask for network.
>> * Adds rb_root root_net_port.
>>
>> ---
>> include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 49 +++++
>> security/landlock/Kconfig | 1 +
>> security/landlock/Makefile | 2 +
>> security/landlock/limits.h | 6 +-
>> security/landlock/net.c | 198 +++++++++++++++++++
>> security/landlock/net.h | 26 +++
>> security/landlock/ruleset.c | 52 ++++-
>> security/landlock/ruleset.h | 63 +++++-
>> security/landlock/setup.c | 2 +
>> security/landlock/syscalls.c | 72 ++++++-
>> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 2 +-
>> 11 files changed, 450 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
>> create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.c
>> create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.h
>
> [...]
>
>> diff --git a/security/landlock/net.c b/security/landlock/net.c
>
> [...]
>
>> +static int check_addrlen(const struct sockaddr *const address, int addrlen)
>
> const int addrlen
Got it.
>
>> +{
>> + if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> + switch (address->sa_family) {
>> + case AF_UNSPEC:
>> + case AF_INET:
>> + if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> + return 0;
>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
>> + case AF_INET6:
>> + if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> + return 0;
>> +#endif
>> + }
>> + WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static u16 get_port(const struct sockaddr *const address)
>> +{
>> + /* Gets port value in host byte order. */
>> + switch (address->sa_family) {
>> + case AF_UNSPEC:
>> + case AF_INET: {
>> + const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr =
>> + (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
>> + return ntohs(sockaddr->sin_port);
>
> Storing ports in big endian (in rulesets) would avoid converting them
> every time the kernel checks a socket port. The above comment should
> then be updated too.
I thought we came to a conclusion to stick to host endianess and
let kernel do the checks under the hood:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/278ab07f-7583-a4e0-3d37-1bacd091531d@digikod.net/
Did I misunderstand something?
>
>
>> + }
>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
>> + case AF_INET6: {
>> + const struct sockaddr_in6 *const sockaddr_ip6 =
>> + (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
>> + return ntohs(sockaddr_ip6->sin6_port);
>> + }
>> +#endif
>> + }
>> + WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int check_socket_access(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen, u16 port,
>> + access_mask_t access_request)
>> +{
>> + int ret;
>> + bool allowed = false;
>> + layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET] = {};
>> + const struct landlock_rule *rule;
>> + access_mask_t handled_access;
>> + const struct landlock_id id = {
>> + .key.data = port,
>> + .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT,
>> + };
>> + const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain = get_current_net_domain();
>> +
>> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!domain))
>> + return 0;
>> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(domain->num_layers < 1))
>> + return -EACCES;
>> + /* Check if it's a TCP socket. */
>> + if (sock->type != SOCK_STREAM)
>> + return 0;
>> +
>> + ret = check_addrlen(address, addrlen);
>> + if (ret)
>> + return ret;
>> +
>> + switch (address->sa_family) {
>> + case AF_UNSPEC:
>> + /*
>> + * Connecting to an address with AF_UNSPEC dissolves the TCP
>> + * association, which have the same effect as closing the
>> + * connection while retaining the socket object (i.e., the file
>> + * descriptor). As for dropping privileges, closing
>> + * connections is always allowed.
>> + */
>> + if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP)
>> + return 0;
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * For compatibility reason, accept AF_UNSPEC for bind
>> + * accesses (mapped to AF_INET) only if the address is
>> + * INADDR_ANY (cf. __inet_bind). Checking the address is
>> + * required to not wrongfully return -EACCES instead of
>> + * -EAFNOSUPPORT.
>> + */
>> + if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP) {
>> + const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr =
>> + (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
>> +
>> + if (sockaddr->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
>> + return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
>> + }
>> +
>> + fallthrough;
>> + case AF_INET:
>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
>> + case AF_INET6:
>> +#endif
>> + rule = landlock_find_rule(domain, id);
>> + handled_access = landlock_init_layer_masks(
>> + domain, access_request, &layer_masks,
>> + LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT);
>> + allowed = landlock_unmask_layers(rule, handled_access,
>> + &layer_masks,
>> + ARRAY_SIZE(layer_masks));
>> + }
>> + return allowed ? 0 : -EACCES;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int hook_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
>> + int addrlen)
>> +{
>> + return check_socket_access(sock, address, addrlen, get_port(address),
>> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP);
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int hook_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
>> + int addrlen)
>> +{
>> + return check_socket_access(sock, address, addrlen, get_port(address),
>> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP);
>> +}
>
> [...]
> .
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 48+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v10 09/13] landlock: Add network rules and TCP hooks support
2023-04-04 9:31 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
@ 2023-04-04 16:42 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-04 17:02 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-05 17:42 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
0 siblings, 2 replies; 48+ messages in thread
From: Mickaël Salaün @ 2023-04-04 16:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel, gnoack3000, linux-security-module, netdev,
netfilter-devel, yusongping, artem.kuzin
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 8854 bytes --]
On 04/04/2023 11:31, Konstantin Meskhidze (A) wrote:
>
>
> 3/31/2023 8:24 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
>>
>> On 23/03/2023 09:52, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
>>> This commit adds network rules support in the ruleset management
>>> helpers and the landlock_create_ruleset syscall.
>>> Refactor user space API to support network actions. Add new network
>>> access flags, network rule and network attributes. Increment Landlock
>>> ABI version. Expand access_masks_t to u32 to be sure network access
>>> rights can be stored. Implement socket_bind() and socket_connect()
>>> LSM hooks, which enable to restrict TCP socket binding and connection
>>> to specific ports.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
>>> ---
>>>
>>> Changes since v9:
>>> * Changes UAPI port field to __u64.
>>> * Moves shared code into check_socket_access().
>>> * Adds get_raw_handled_net_accesses() and
>>> get_current_net_domain() helpers.
>>> * Minor fixes.
>>>
>>> Changes since v8:
>>> * Squashes commits.
>>> * Refactors commit message.
>>> * Changes UAPI port field to __be16.
>>> * Changes logic of bind/connect hooks with AF_UNSPEC families.
>>> * Adds address length checking.
>>> * Minor fixes.
>>>
>>> Changes since v7:
>>> * Squashes commits.
>>> * Increments ABI version to 4.
>>> * Refactors commit message.
>>> * Minor fixes.
>>>
>>> Changes since v6:
>>> * Renames landlock_set_net_access_mask() to landlock_add_net_access_mask()
>>> because it OR values.
>>> * Makes landlock_add_net_access_mask() more resilient incorrect values.
>>> * Refactors landlock_get_net_access_mask().
>>> * Renames LANDLOCK_MASK_SHIFT_NET to LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_NET and use
>>> LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS as value.
>>> * Updates access_masks_t to u32 to support network access actions.
>>> * Refactors landlock internal functions to support network actions with
>>> landlock_key/key_type/id types.
>>>
>>> Changes since v5:
>>> * Gets rid of partial revert from landlock_add_rule
>>> syscall.
>>> * Formats code with clang-format-14.
>>>
>>> Changes since v4:
>>> * Refactors landlock_create_ruleset() - splits ruleset and
>>> masks checks.
>>> * Refactors landlock_create_ruleset() and landlock mask
>>> setters/getters to support two rule types.
>>> * Refactors landlock_add_rule syscall add_rule_path_beneath
>>> function by factoring out get_ruleset_from_fd() and
>>> landlock_put_ruleset().
>>>
>>> Changes since v3:
>>> * Splits commit.
>>> * Adds network rule support for internal landlock functions.
>>> * Adds set_mask and get_mask for network.
>>> * Adds rb_root root_net_port.
>>>
>>> ---
>>> include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 49 +++++
>>> security/landlock/Kconfig | 1 +
>>> security/landlock/Makefile | 2 +
>>> security/landlock/limits.h | 6 +-
>>> security/landlock/net.c | 198 +++++++++++++++++++
>>> security/landlock/net.h | 26 +++
>>> security/landlock/ruleset.c | 52 ++++-
>>> security/landlock/ruleset.h | 63 +++++-
>>> security/landlock/setup.c | 2 +
>>> security/landlock/syscalls.c | 72 ++++++-
>>> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 2 +-
>>> 11 files changed, 450 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
>>> create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.c
>>> create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.h
>>
>> [...]
>>
>>> diff --git a/security/landlock/net.c b/security/landlock/net.c
>>
>> [...]
>>
>>> +static int check_addrlen(const struct sockaddr *const address, int addrlen)
>>
>> const int addrlen
>
> Got it.
>>
>>> +{
>>> + if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>> + switch (address->sa_family) {
>>> + case AF_UNSPEC:
>>> + case AF_INET:
>>> + if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>> + return 0;
>>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
>>> + case AF_INET6:
>>> + if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>> + return 0;
>>> +#endif
>>> + }
>>> + WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
>>> + return 0;
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +static u16 get_port(const struct sockaddr *const address)
>>> +{
>>> + /* Gets port value in host byte order. */
>>> + switch (address->sa_family) {
>>> + case AF_UNSPEC:
>>> + case AF_INET: {
>>> + const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr =
>>> + (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
>>> + return ntohs(sockaddr->sin_port);
>>
>> Storing ports in big endian (in rulesets) would avoid converting them
>> every time the kernel checks a socket port. The above comment should
>> then be updated too.
>
> I thought we came to a conclusion to stick to host endianess and
> let kernel do the checks under the hood:
> https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/278ab07f-7583-a4e0-3d37-1bacd091531d@digikod.net/
>
> Did I misunderstand something?
We indeed stick to the host endianess for the UAPI/syscalls, but
internally the kernel has to do the conversion with as it is currently
done by calling ntohs(). To avoid calling ntohs() every time get_port()
is called, we can instead only call htons() when creating rules (i.e.
one-time htons call instead of multiple ntohs calls).
> Do you mean we need to do port converting __be16 -> u16 in
> check_socket_access()???
Removing the ntohs() call from get_port() enables to return __be16
instead of u16, and check_socket_access() will then need to use the same
type.
>>
>>
>>> + }
>>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
>>> + case AF_INET6: {
>>> + const struct sockaddr_in6 *const sockaddr_ip6 =
>>> + (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
>>> + return ntohs(sockaddr_ip6->sin6_port);
>>> + }
>>> +#endif
>>> + }
>>> + WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
>>> + return 0;
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +static int check_socket_access(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen, u16 port,
>>> + access_mask_t access_request)
>>> +{
>>> + int ret;
>>> + bool allowed = false;
>>> + layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET] = {};
>>> + const struct landlock_rule *rule;
>>> + access_mask_t handled_access;
>>> + const struct landlock_id id = {
>>> + .key.data = port,
>>> + .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT,
>>> + };
>>> + const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain = get_current_net_domain();
>>> +
>>> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!domain))
>>> + return 0;
>>> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(domain->num_layers < 1))
>>> + return -EACCES;
>>> + /* Check if it's a TCP socket. */
>>> + if (sock->type != SOCK_STREAM)
>>> + return 0;
>>> +
>>> + ret = check_addrlen(address, addrlen);
>>> + if (ret)
>>> + return ret;
>>> +
>>> + switch (address->sa_family) {
>>> + case AF_UNSPEC:
>>> + /*
>>> + * Connecting to an address with AF_UNSPEC dissolves the TCP
>>> + * association, which have the same effect as closing the
>>> + * connection while retaining the socket object (i.e., the file
>>> + * descriptor). As for dropping privileges, closing
>>> + * connections is always allowed.
>>> + */
>>> + if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP)
>>> + return 0;
>>> +
>>> + /*
>>> + * For compatibility reason, accept AF_UNSPEC for bind
>>> + * accesses (mapped to AF_INET) only if the address is
>>> + * INADDR_ANY (cf. __inet_bind). Checking the address is
>>> + * required to not wrongfully return -EACCES instead of
>>> + * -EAFNOSUPPORT.
>>> + */
>>> + if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP) {
>>> + const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr =
>>> + (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
>>> +
>>> + if (sockaddr->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
>>> + return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> + fallthrough;
>>> + case AF_INET:
>>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
>>> + case AF_INET6:
>>> +#endif
>>> + rule = landlock_find_rule(domain, id);
>>> + handled_access = landlock_init_layer_masks(
>>> + domain, access_request, &layer_masks,
>>> + LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT);
>>> + allowed = landlock_unmask_layers(rule, handled_access,
>>> + &layer_masks,
>>> + ARRAY_SIZE(layer_masks));
>>> + }
>>> + return allowed ? 0 : -EACCES;
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +static int hook_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
>>> + int addrlen)
>>> +{ >>> + return check_socket_access(sock, address, addrlen, get_port(address),
>>> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP);
get_port() is called before check_addrlen(), which is an issue.
You'll find attached a patch for these fixes, please squash it in this
one for the next version.
I'll send other reviews by the end of the week.
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +static int hook_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
>>> + int addrlen)
>>> +{
>>> + return check_socket_access(sock, address, addrlen, get_port(address),
>>> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP);
>>> +}
>>
>> [...]
>> .
[-- Attachment #2: 0001-PATCH-Fix-multiple-issues-in-net.c.patch --]
[-- Type: text/x-patch, Size: 4945 bytes --]
From d6e53ea318ddfa32e54532f447412911709a80e1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Micka=C3=ABl=20Sala=C3=BCn?= <mic@digikod.net>
Date: Tue, 4 Apr 2023 17:28:34 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] PATCH: Fix multiple issues in net.c
- Store ports in rulesets as __be16 to avoid runtime conversions.
- Constify arguments.
- Check address's length before dereferencing address to read the port.
- Fix and add comments.
- Format with clang-format.
---
security/landlock/net.c | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/landlock/net.c b/security/landlock/net.c
index e19c339906e7..663eee5920d5 100644
--- a/security/landlock/net.c
+++ b/security/landlock/net.c
@@ -22,9 +22,10 @@ int landlock_append_net_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
{
int err;
const struct landlock_id id = {
- .key.data = port,
+ .key.data = (__force uintptr_t)htons(port),
.type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT,
};
+
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(port) > sizeof(id.key.data));
/* Transforms relative access rights to absolute ones. */
@@ -60,20 +61,24 @@ static const struct landlock_ruleset *get_current_net_domain(void)
return dom;
}
-static int check_addrlen(const struct sockaddr *const address, int addrlen)
+static int check_addrlen(const struct sockaddr *const address,
+ const int addrlen)
{
if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
return -EINVAL;
+
switch (address->sa_family) {
case AF_UNSPEC:
case AF_INET:
if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
return -EINVAL;
+
return 0;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
case AF_INET6:
if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
return -EINVAL;
+
return 0;
#endif
}
@@ -81,7 +86,7 @@ static int check_addrlen(const struct sockaddr *const address, int addrlen)
return 0;
}
-static u16 get_port(const struct sockaddr *const address)
+static __be16 get_port(const struct sockaddr *const address)
{
/* Gets port value in host byte order. */
switch (address->sa_family) {
@@ -89,13 +94,13 @@ static u16 get_port(const struct sockaddr *const address)
case AF_INET: {
const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr =
(struct sockaddr_in *)address;
- return ntohs(sockaddr->sin_port);
+ return sockaddr->sin_port;
}
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
case AF_INET6: {
const struct sockaddr_in6 *const sockaddr_ip6 =
(struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
- return ntohs(sockaddr_ip6->sin6_port);
+ return sockaddr_ip6->sin6_port;
}
#endif
}
@@ -103,16 +108,18 @@ static u16 get_port(const struct sockaddr *const address)
return 0;
}
-static int check_socket_access(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen, u16 port,
- access_mask_t access_request)
+static int check_socket_access(struct socket *const sock,
+ struct sockaddr *const address,
+ const int addrlen,
+ const access_mask_t access_request)
{
- int ret;
+ int err;
+ __be16 port;
bool allowed = false;
layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET] = {};
const struct landlock_rule *rule;
access_mask_t handled_access;
- const struct landlock_id id = {
- .key.data = port,
+ struct landlock_id id = {
.type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT,
};
const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain = get_current_net_domain();
@@ -121,13 +128,20 @@ static int check_socket_access(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
return 0;
if (WARN_ON_ONCE(domain->num_layers < 1))
return -EACCES;
- /* Check if it's a TCP socket. */
+
+ /* Checks if it's a TCP socket. */
if (sock->type != SOCK_STREAM)
return 0;
- ret = check_addrlen(address, addrlen);
- if (ret)
- return ret;
+ /* Checks for minimal header length. */
+ err = check_addrlen(address, addrlen);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ /* It is now safe to read the port. */
+ port = get_port(address);
+ id.key.data = (__force uintptr_t)port;
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(port) > sizeof(id.key.data));
switch (address->sa_family) {
case AF_UNSPEC:
@@ -172,17 +186,18 @@ static int check_socket_access(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, in
return allowed ? 0 : -EACCES;
}
-static int hook_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
- int addrlen)
+static int hook_socket_bind(struct socket *const sock,
+ struct sockaddr *const address, const int addrlen)
{
- return check_socket_access(sock, address, addrlen, get_port(address),
+ return check_socket_access(sock, address, addrlen,
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP);
}
-static int hook_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
- int addrlen)
+static int hook_socket_connect(struct socket *const sock,
+ struct sockaddr *const address,
+ const int addrlen)
{
- return check_socket_access(sock, address, addrlen, get_port(address),
+ return check_socket_access(sock, address, addrlen,
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP);
}
--
2.39.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 48+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v10 09/13] landlock: Add network rules and TCP hooks support
2023-04-04 16:42 ` Mickaël Salaün
@ 2023-04-04 17:02 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-05 19:19 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
2023-04-05 17:42 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
1 sibling, 1 reply; 48+ messages in thread
From: Mickaël Salaün @ 2023-04-04 17:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel, gnoack3000, linux-security-module, netdev,
netfilter-devel, yusongping, artem.kuzin
On 04/04/2023 18:42, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>
> On 04/04/2023 11:31, Konstantin Meskhidze (A) wrote:
>>
>>
>> 3/31/2023 8:24 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
>>>
>>> On 23/03/2023 09:52, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
>>>> This commit adds network rules support in the ruleset management
>>>> helpers and the landlock_create_ruleset syscall.
>>>> Refactor user space API to support network actions. Add new network
>>>> access flags, network rule and network attributes. Increment Landlock
>>>> ABI version. Expand access_masks_t to u32 to be sure network access
>>>> rights can be stored. Implement socket_bind() and socket_connect()
>>>> LSM hooks, which enable to restrict TCP socket binding and connection
>>>> to specific ports.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
>>>> ---
>>>>
>>>> Changes since v9:
>>>> * Changes UAPI port field to __u64.
>>>> * Moves shared code into check_socket_access().
>>>> * Adds get_raw_handled_net_accesses() and
>>>> get_current_net_domain() helpers.
>>>> * Minor fixes.
>>>>
>>>> Changes since v8:
>>>> * Squashes commits.
>>>> * Refactors commit message.
>>>> * Changes UAPI port field to __be16.
>>>> * Changes logic of bind/connect hooks with AF_UNSPEC families.
>>>> * Adds address length checking.
>>>> * Minor fixes.
>>>>
>>>> Changes since v7:
>>>> * Squashes commits.
>>>> * Increments ABI version to 4.
>>>> * Refactors commit message.
>>>> * Minor fixes.
>>>>
>>>> Changes since v6:
>>>> * Renames landlock_set_net_access_mask() to landlock_add_net_access_mask()
>>>> because it OR values.
>>>> * Makes landlock_add_net_access_mask() more resilient incorrect values.
>>>> * Refactors landlock_get_net_access_mask().
>>>> * Renames LANDLOCK_MASK_SHIFT_NET to LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_NET and use
>>>> LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS as value.
>>>> * Updates access_masks_t to u32 to support network access actions.
>>>> * Refactors landlock internal functions to support network actions with
>>>> landlock_key/key_type/id types.
>>>>
>>>> Changes since v5:
>>>> * Gets rid of partial revert from landlock_add_rule
>>>> syscall.
>>>> * Formats code with clang-format-14.
>>>>
>>>> Changes since v4:
>>>> * Refactors landlock_create_ruleset() - splits ruleset and
>>>> masks checks.
>>>> * Refactors landlock_create_ruleset() and landlock mask
>>>> setters/getters to support two rule types.
>>>> * Refactors landlock_add_rule syscall add_rule_path_beneath
>>>> function by factoring out get_ruleset_from_fd() and
>>>> landlock_put_ruleset().
>>>>
>>>> Changes since v3:
>>>> * Splits commit.
>>>> * Adds network rule support for internal landlock functions.
>>>> * Adds set_mask and get_mask for network.
>>>> * Adds rb_root root_net_port.
>>>>
>>>> ---
>>>> include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 49 +++++
>>>> security/landlock/Kconfig | 1 +
>>>> security/landlock/Makefile | 2 +
>>>> security/landlock/limits.h | 6 +-
>>>> security/landlock/net.c | 198 +++++++++++++++++++
>>>> security/landlock/net.h | 26 +++
>>>> security/landlock/ruleset.c | 52 ++++-
>>>> security/landlock/ruleset.h | 63 +++++-
>>>> security/landlock/setup.c | 2 +
>>>> security/landlock/syscalls.c | 72 ++++++-
>>>> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 2 +-
>>>> 11 files changed, 450 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
>>>> create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.c
>>>> create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.h
>>>
>>> [...]
>>>
>>>> diff --git a/security/landlock/net.c b/security/landlock/net.c
>>>
>>> [...]
>>>> +static int check_socket_access(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen, u16 port,
>>>> + access_mask_t access_request)
>>>> +{
>>>> + int ret;
>>>> + bool allowed = false;
>>>> + layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET] = {};
>>>> + const struct landlock_rule *rule;
>>>> + access_mask_t handled_access;
>>>> + const struct landlock_id id = {
>>>> + .key.data = port,
>>>> + .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT,
>>>> + };
>>>> + const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain = get_current_net_domain();
>>>> +
>>>> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!domain))
>>>> + return 0;
>>>> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(domain->num_layers < 1))
>>>> + return -EACCES;
>>>> + /* Check if it's a TCP socket. */
>>>> + if (sock->type != SOCK_STREAM)
>>>> + return 0;
>>>> +
>>>> + ret = check_addrlen(address, addrlen);
>>>> + if (ret)
>>>> + return ret;
>>>> +
>>>> + switch (address->sa_family) {
>>>> + case AF_UNSPEC:
>>>> + /*
>>>> + * Connecting to an address with AF_UNSPEC dissolves the TCP
>>>> + * association, which have the same effect as closing the
>>>> + * connection while retaining the socket object (i.e., the file
>>>> + * descriptor). As for dropping privileges, closing
>>>> + * connections is always allowed.
>>>> + */
>>>> + if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP)
>>>> + return 0;
>>>> +
>>>> + /*
>>>> + * For compatibility reason, accept AF_UNSPEC for bind
>>>> + * accesses (mapped to AF_INET) only if the address is
>>>> + * INADDR_ANY (cf. __inet_bind). Checking the address is
>>>> + * required to not wrongfully return -EACCES instead of
>>>> + * -EAFNOSUPPORT.
>>>> + */
>>>> + if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP) {
>>>> + const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr =
>>>> + (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
>>>> +
>>>> + if (sockaddr->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
>>>> + return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
>>>> + }
>>>> +
>>>> + fallthrough;
>>>> + case AF_INET:
>>>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
>>>> + case AF_INET6:
>>>> +#endif
Some more fixes:
You can move the port/id.key.data block from my patch here, where it is
actually used.
>>>> + rule = landlock_find_rule(domain, id);
>>>> + handled_access = landlock_init_layer_masks(
>>>> + domain, access_request, &layer_masks,
>>>> + LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT);
>>>> + allowed = landlock_unmask_layers(rule, handled_access,
>>>> + &layer_masks,
>>>> + ARRAY_SIZE(layer_masks));
The `return allowed ? 0 : -EACCES;` should be here.
>>>> + }
>>>> + return allowed ? 0 : -EACCES;
We should have `return 0;` here.
We need a test for an sa_family different than AF_UNSPEC, AF_INET, and
AF_INET6 to make sure everything else is allowed (e.g. AF_UNIX with
SOCK_STREAM and another test with SOCK_DGRAM). Please make sure this new
test will not pass with SOCK_STREAM and the current patch series, but of
course it should pass with the next one.
>>>> +}
>>>> +
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 48+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v10 09/13] landlock: Add network rules and TCP hooks support
2023-04-04 17:02 ` Mickaël Salaün
@ 2023-04-05 19:19 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
2023-04-06 10:31 ` Mickaël Salaün
0 siblings, 1 reply; 48+ messages in thread
From: Konstantin Meskhidze (A) @ 2023-04-05 19:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mickaël Salaün
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel, gnoack3000, linux-security-module, netdev,
netfilter-devel, yusongping, artem.kuzin
4/4/2023 8:02 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
>
> On 04/04/2023 18:42, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>>
>> On 04/04/2023 11:31, Konstantin Meskhidze (A) wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> 3/31/2023 8:24 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
>>>>
>>>> On 23/03/2023 09:52, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
>>>>> This commit adds network rules support in the ruleset management
>>>>> helpers and the landlock_create_ruleset syscall.
>>>>> Refactor user space API to support network actions. Add new network
>>>>> access flags, network rule and network attributes. Increment Landlock
>>>>> ABI version. Expand access_masks_t to u32 to be sure network access
>>>>> rights can be stored. Implement socket_bind() and socket_connect()
>>>>> LSM hooks, which enable to restrict TCP socket binding and connection
>>>>> to specific ports.
>>>>>
>>>>> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
>>>>> ---
>>>>>
>>>>> Changes since v9:
>>>>> * Changes UAPI port field to __u64.
>>>>> * Moves shared code into check_socket_access().
>>>>> * Adds get_raw_handled_net_accesses() and
>>>>> get_current_net_domain() helpers.
>>>>> * Minor fixes.
>>>>>
>>>>> Changes since v8:
>>>>> * Squashes commits.
>>>>> * Refactors commit message.
>>>>> * Changes UAPI port field to __be16.
>>>>> * Changes logic of bind/connect hooks with AF_UNSPEC families.
>>>>> * Adds address length checking.
>>>>> * Minor fixes.
>>>>>
>>>>> Changes since v7:
>>>>> * Squashes commits.
>>>>> * Increments ABI version to 4.
>>>>> * Refactors commit message.
>>>>> * Minor fixes.
>>>>>
>>>>> Changes since v6:
>>>>> * Renames landlock_set_net_access_mask() to landlock_add_net_access_mask()
>>>>> because it OR values.
>>>>> * Makes landlock_add_net_access_mask() more resilient incorrect values.
>>>>> * Refactors landlock_get_net_access_mask().
>>>>> * Renames LANDLOCK_MASK_SHIFT_NET to LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_NET and use
>>>>> LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS as value.
>>>>> * Updates access_masks_t to u32 to support network access actions.
>>>>> * Refactors landlock internal functions to support network actions with
>>>>> landlock_key/key_type/id types.
>>>>>
>>>>> Changes since v5:
>>>>> * Gets rid of partial revert from landlock_add_rule
>>>>> syscall.
>>>>> * Formats code with clang-format-14.
>>>>>
>>>>> Changes since v4:
>>>>> * Refactors landlock_create_ruleset() - splits ruleset and
>>>>> masks checks.
>>>>> * Refactors landlock_create_ruleset() and landlock mask
>>>>> setters/getters to support two rule types.
>>>>> * Refactors landlock_add_rule syscall add_rule_path_beneath
>>>>> function by factoring out get_ruleset_from_fd() and
>>>>> landlock_put_ruleset().
>>>>>
>>>>> Changes since v3:
>>>>> * Splits commit.
>>>>> * Adds network rule support for internal landlock functions.
>>>>> * Adds set_mask and get_mask for network.
>>>>> * Adds rb_root root_net_port.
>>>>>
>>>>> ---
>>>>> include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 49 +++++
>>>>> security/landlock/Kconfig | 1 +
>>>>> security/landlock/Makefile | 2 +
>>>>> security/landlock/limits.h | 6 +-
>>>>> security/landlock/net.c | 198 +++++++++++++++++++
>>>>> security/landlock/net.h | 26 +++
>>>>> security/landlock/ruleset.c | 52 ++++-
>>>>> security/landlock/ruleset.h | 63 +++++-
>>>>> security/landlock/setup.c | 2 +
>>>>> security/landlock/syscalls.c | 72 ++++++-
>>>>> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 2 +-
>>>>> 11 files changed, 450 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
>>>>> create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.c
>>>>> create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.h
>>>>
>>>> [...]
>>>>
>>>>> diff --git a/security/landlock/net.c b/security/landlock/net.c
>>>>
>>>> [...]
>
>
>>>>> +static int check_socket_access(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen, u16 port,
>>>>> + access_mask_t access_request)
>>>>> +{
>>>>> + int ret;
>>>>> + bool allowed = false;
>>>>> + layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET] = {};
>>>>> + const struct landlock_rule *rule;
>>>>> + access_mask_t handled_access;
>>>>> + const struct landlock_id id = {
>>>>> + .key.data = port,
>>>>> + .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT,
>>>>> + };
>>>>> + const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain = get_current_net_domain();
>>>>> +
>>>>> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!domain))
>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(domain->num_layers < 1))
>>>>> + return -EACCES;
>>>>> + /* Check if it's a TCP socket. */
>>>>> + if (sock->type != SOCK_STREAM)
>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + ret = check_addrlen(address, addrlen);
>>>>> + if (ret)
>>>>> + return ret;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + switch (address->sa_family) {
>>>>> + case AF_UNSPEC:
>>>>> + /*
>>>>> + * Connecting to an address with AF_UNSPEC dissolves the TCP
>>>>> + * association, which have the same effect as closing the
>>>>> + * connection while retaining the socket object (i.e., the file
>>>>> + * descriptor). As for dropping privileges, closing
>>>>> + * connections is always allowed.
>>>>> + */
>>>>> + if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP)
>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + /*
>>>>> + * For compatibility reason, accept AF_UNSPEC for bind
>>>>> + * accesses (mapped to AF_INET) only if the address is
>>>>> + * INADDR_ANY (cf. __inet_bind). Checking the address is
>>>>> + * required to not wrongfully return -EACCES instead of
>>>>> + * -EAFNOSUPPORT.
>>>>> + */
>>>>> + if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP) {
>>>>> + const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr =
>>>>> + (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + if (sockaddr->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
>>>>> + return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
>>>>> + }
>>>>> +
>>>>> + fallthrough;
>>>>> + case AF_INET:
>>>>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
>>>>> + case AF_INET6:
>>>>> +#endif
>
> Some more fixes:
>
> You can move the port/id.key.data block from my patch here, where it is
> actually used.
>
Ok. Thank you. I will apply it.
>
>>>>> + rule = landlock_find_rule(domain, id);
>>>>> + handled_access = landlock_init_layer_masks(
>>>>> + domain, access_request, &layer_masks,
>>>>> + LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT);
>>>>> + allowed = landlock_unmask_layers(rule, handled_access,
>>>>> + &layer_masks,
>>>>> + ARRAY_SIZE(layer_masks));
>
> The `return allowed ? 0 : -EACCES;` should be here.
>
>>>>> + }
>>>>> + return allowed ? 0 : -EACCES;
>
> We should have `return 0;` here.
>
Got it. Thanks
> We need a test for an sa_family different than AF_UNSPEC, AF_INET, and
> AF_INET6 to make sure everything else is allowed (e.g. AF_UNIX with
> SOCK_STREAM and another test with SOCK_DGRAM). Please make sure this new
> test will not pass with SOCK_STREAM and the current patch series, but of
> course it should pass with the next one.
Do you mean AF_UNIX with SOCK_STREAM will not be passed as well as
AF_UNIX with SOCK_DGRAM?
>
>
>>>>> +}
>>>>> +
> .
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 48+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v10 09/13] landlock: Add network rules and TCP hooks support
2023-04-05 19:19 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
@ 2023-04-06 10:31 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-06 10:37 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
0 siblings, 1 reply; 48+ messages in thread
From: Mickaël Salaün @ 2023-04-06 10:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel, gnoack3000, linux-security-module, netdev,
netfilter-devel, yusongping, artem.kuzin
On 05/04/2023 21:19, Konstantin Meskhidze (A) wrote:
>
>
> 4/4/2023 8:02 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
>>
>> On 04/04/2023 18:42, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>>>
>>> On 04/04/2023 11:31, Konstantin Meskhidze (A) wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> 3/31/2023 8:24 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
>>>>>
>>>>> On 23/03/2023 09:52, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
>>>>>> This commit adds network rules support in the ruleset management
>>>>>> helpers and the landlock_create_ruleset syscall.
>>>>>> Refactor user space API to support network actions. Add new network
>>>>>> access flags, network rule and network attributes. Increment Landlock
>>>>>> ABI version. Expand access_masks_t to u32 to be sure network access
>>>>>> rights can be stored. Implement socket_bind() and socket_connect()
>>>>>> LSM hooks, which enable to restrict TCP socket binding and connection
>>>>>> to specific ports.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
>>>>>> ---
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Changes since v9:
>>>>>> * Changes UAPI port field to __u64.
>>>>>> * Moves shared code into check_socket_access().
>>>>>> * Adds get_raw_handled_net_accesses() and
>>>>>> get_current_net_domain() helpers.
>>>>>> * Minor fixes.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Changes since v8:
>>>>>> * Squashes commits.
>>>>>> * Refactors commit message.
>>>>>> * Changes UAPI port field to __be16.
>>>>>> * Changes logic of bind/connect hooks with AF_UNSPEC families.
>>>>>> * Adds address length checking.
>>>>>> * Minor fixes.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Changes since v7:
>>>>>> * Squashes commits.
>>>>>> * Increments ABI version to 4.
>>>>>> * Refactors commit message.
>>>>>> * Minor fixes.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Changes since v6:
>>>>>> * Renames landlock_set_net_access_mask() to landlock_add_net_access_mask()
>>>>>> because it OR values.
>>>>>> * Makes landlock_add_net_access_mask() more resilient incorrect values.
>>>>>> * Refactors landlock_get_net_access_mask().
>>>>>> * Renames LANDLOCK_MASK_SHIFT_NET to LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_NET and use
>>>>>> LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS as value.
>>>>>> * Updates access_masks_t to u32 to support network access actions.
>>>>>> * Refactors landlock internal functions to support network actions with
>>>>>> landlock_key/key_type/id types.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Changes since v5:
>>>>>> * Gets rid of partial revert from landlock_add_rule
>>>>>> syscall.
>>>>>> * Formats code with clang-format-14.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Changes since v4:
>>>>>> * Refactors landlock_create_ruleset() - splits ruleset and
>>>>>> masks checks.
>>>>>> * Refactors landlock_create_ruleset() and landlock mask
>>>>>> setters/getters to support two rule types.
>>>>>> * Refactors landlock_add_rule syscall add_rule_path_beneath
>>>>>> function by factoring out get_ruleset_from_fd() and
>>>>>> landlock_put_ruleset().
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Changes since v3:
>>>>>> * Splits commit.
>>>>>> * Adds network rule support for internal landlock functions.
>>>>>> * Adds set_mask and get_mask for network.
>>>>>> * Adds rb_root root_net_port.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ---
>>>>>> include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 49 +++++
>>>>>> security/landlock/Kconfig | 1 +
>>>>>> security/landlock/Makefile | 2 +
>>>>>> security/landlock/limits.h | 6 +-
>>>>>> security/landlock/net.c | 198 +++++++++++++++++++
>>>>>> security/landlock/net.h | 26 +++
>>>>>> security/landlock/ruleset.c | 52 ++++-
>>>>>> security/landlock/ruleset.h | 63 +++++-
>>>>>> security/landlock/setup.c | 2 +
>>>>>> security/landlock/syscalls.c | 72 ++++++-
>>>>>> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 2 +-
>>>>>> 11 files changed, 450 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
>>>>>> create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.c
>>>>>> create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.h
>>>>>
>>>>> [...]
>>>>>
>>>>>> diff --git a/security/landlock/net.c b/security/landlock/net.c
>>>>>
>>>>> [...]
>>
>>
>>>>>> +static int check_socket_access(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen, u16 port,
>>>>>> + access_mask_t access_request)
>>>>>> +{
>>>>>> + int ret;
>>>>>> + bool allowed = false;
>>>>>> + layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET] = {};
>>>>>> + const struct landlock_rule *rule;
>>>>>> + access_mask_t handled_access;
>>>>>> + const struct landlock_id id = {
>>>>>> + .key.data = port,
>>>>>> + .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT,
>>>>>> + };
>>>>>> + const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain = get_current_net_domain();
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!domain))
>>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>>> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(domain->num_layers < 1))
>>>>>> + return -EACCES;
>>>>>> + /* Check if it's a TCP socket. */
>>>>>> + if (sock->type != SOCK_STREAM)
>>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> + ret = check_addrlen(address, addrlen);
>>>>>> + if (ret)
>>>>>> + return ret;
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> + switch (address->sa_family) {
>>>>>> + case AF_UNSPEC:
>>>>>> + /*
>>>>>> + * Connecting to an address with AF_UNSPEC dissolves the TCP
>>>>>> + * association, which have the same effect as closing the
>>>>>> + * connection while retaining the socket object (i.e., the file
>>>>>> + * descriptor). As for dropping privileges, closing
>>>>>> + * connections is always allowed.
>>>>>> + */
>>>>>> + if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP)
>>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> + /*
>>>>>> + * For compatibility reason, accept AF_UNSPEC for bind
>>>>>> + * accesses (mapped to AF_INET) only if the address is
>>>>>> + * INADDR_ANY (cf. __inet_bind). Checking the address is
>>>>>> + * required to not wrongfully return -EACCES instead of
>>>>>> + * -EAFNOSUPPORT.
>>>>>> + */
>>>>>> + if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP) {
>>>>>> + const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr =
>>>>>> + (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> + if (sockaddr->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
>>>>>> + return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
>>>>>> + }
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> + fallthrough;
>>>>>> + case AF_INET:
>>>>>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
>>>>>> + case AF_INET6:
>>>>>> +#endif
>>
>> Some more fixes:
>>
>> You can move the port/id.key.data block from my patch here, where it is
>> actually used.
>>
> Ok. Thank you. I will apply it.
>>
>>>>>> + rule = landlock_find_rule(domain, id);
>>>>>> + handled_access = landlock_init_layer_masks(
>>>>>> + domain, access_request, &layer_masks,
>>>>>> + LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT);
>>>>>> + allowed = landlock_unmask_layers(rule, handled_access,
>>>>>> + &layer_masks,
>>>>>> + ARRAY_SIZE(layer_masks));
>>
>> The `return allowed ? 0 : -EACCES;` should be here.
>>
>>>>>> + }
>>>>>> + return allowed ? 0 : -EACCES;
>>
>> We should have `return 0;` here.
>>
> Got it. Thanks
>
>> We need a test for an sa_family different than AF_UNSPEC, AF_INET, and
>> AF_INET6 to make sure everything else is allowed (e.g. AF_UNIX with
>> SOCK_STREAM and another test with SOCK_DGRAM). Please make sure this new
>> test will not pass with SOCK_STREAM and the current patch series, but of
>> course it should pass with the next one.
>
> Do you mean AF_UNIX with SOCK_STREAM will not be passed as well as
> AF_UNIX with SOCK_DGRAM?
AF_UNIX with SOCK_STREAM would be denied with this patch series, which
is a bug. AF_UNIX with SOCK_DGRAM should always be allowed with this
patch series, which is correct.
AF_UNIX with SOCK_STREAM or SOCK_DGRAM should always be allowed, and the
next patch series should come with a new test to check this two kind of
sockets.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 48+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v10 09/13] landlock: Add network rules and TCP hooks support
2023-04-06 10:31 ` Mickaël Salaün
@ 2023-04-06 10:37 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
0 siblings, 0 replies; 48+ messages in thread
From: Konstantin Meskhidze (A) @ 2023-04-06 10:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mickaël Salaün
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel, gnoack3000, linux-security-module, netdev,
netfilter-devel, yusongping, artem.kuzin
4/6/2023 1:31 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
>
> On 05/04/2023 21:19, Konstantin Meskhidze (A) wrote:
>>
>>
>> 4/4/2023 8:02 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
>>>
>>> On 04/04/2023 18:42, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>>>>
>>>> On 04/04/2023 11:31, Konstantin Meskhidze (A) wrote:
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> 3/31/2023 8:24 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
>>>>>>
>>>>>> On 23/03/2023 09:52, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
>>>>>>> This commit adds network rules support in the ruleset management
>>>>>>> helpers and the landlock_create_ruleset syscall.
>>>>>>> Refactor user space API to support network actions. Add new network
>>>>>>> access flags, network rule and network attributes. Increment Landlock
>>>>>>> ABI version. Expand access_masks_t to u32 to be sure network access
>>>>>>> rights can be stored. Implement socket_bind() and socket_connect()
>>>>>>> LSM hooks, which enable to restrict TCP socket binding and connection
>>>>>>> to specific ports.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
>>>>>>> ---
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Changes since v9:
>>>>>>> * Changes UAPI port field to __u64.
>>>>>>> * Moves shared code into check_socket_access().
>>>>>>> * Adds get_raw_handled_net_accesses() and
>>>>>>> get_current_net_domain() helpers.
>>>>>>> * Minor fixes.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Changes since v8:
>>>>>>> * Squashes commits.
>>>>>>> * Refactors commit message.
>>>>>>> * Changes UAPI port field to __be16.
>>>>>>> * Changes logic of bind/connect hooks with AF_UNSPEC families.
>>>>>>> * Adds address length checking.
>>>>>>> * Minor fixes.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Changes since v7:
>>>>>>> * Squashes commits.
>>>>>>> * Increments ABI version to 4.
>>>>>>> * Refactors commit message.
>>>>>>> * Minor fixes.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Changes since v6:
>>>>>>> * Renames landlock_set_net_access_mask() to landlock_add_net_access_mask()
>>>>>>> because it OR values.
>>>>>>> * Makes landlock_add_net_access_mask() more resilient incorrect values.
>>>>>>> * Refactors landlock_get_net_access_mask().
>>>>>>> * Renames LANDLOCK_MASK_SHIFT_NET to LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_NET and use
>>>>>>> LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS as value.
>>>>>>> * Updates access_masks_t to u32 to support network access actions.
>>>>>>> * Refactors landlock internal functions to support network actions with
>>>>>>> landlock_key/key_type/id types.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Changes since v5:
>>>>>>> * Gets rid of partial revert from landlock_add_rule
>>>>>>> syscall.
>>>>>>> * Formats code with clang-format-14.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Changes since v4:
>>>>>>> * Refactors landlock_create_ruleset() - splits ruleset and
>>>>>>> masks checks.
>>>>>>> * Refactors landlock_create_ruleset() and landlock mask
>>>>>>> setters/getters to support two rule types.
>>>>>>> * Refactors landlock_add_rule syscall add_rule_path_beneath
>>>>>>> function by factoring out get_ruleset_from_fd() and
>>>>>>> landlock_put_ruleset().
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Changes since v3:
>>>>>>> * Splits commit.
>>>>>>> * Adds network rule support for internal landlock functions.
>>>>>>> * Adds set_mask and get_mask for network.
>>>>>>> * Adds rb_root root_net_port.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> ---
>>>>>>> include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 49 +++++
>>>>>>> security/landlock/Kconfig | 1 +
>>>>>>> security/landlock/Makefile | 2 +
>>>>>>> security/landlock/limits.h | 6 +-
>>>>>>> security/landlock/net.c | 198 +++++++++++++++++++
>>>>>>> security/landlock/net.h | 26 +++
>>>>>>> security/landlock/ruleset.c | 52 ++++-
>>>>>>> security/landlock/ruleset.h | 63 +++++-
>>>>>>> security/landlock/setup.c | 2 +
>>>>>>> security/landlock/syscalls.c | 72 ++++++-
>>>>>>> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 2 +-
>>>>>>> 11 files changed, 450 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
>>>>>>> create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.c
>>>>>>> create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.h
>>>>>>
>>>>>> [...]
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> diff --git a/security/landlock/net.c b/security/landlock/net.c
>>>>>>
>>>>>> [...]
>>>
>>>
>>>>>>> +static int check_socket_access(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen, u16 port,
>>>>>>> + access_mask_t access_request)
>>>>>>> +{
>>>>>>> + int ret;
>>>>>>> + bool allowed = false;
>>>>>>> + layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET] = {};
>>>>>>> + const struct landlock_rule *rule;
>>>>>>> + access_mask_t handled_access;
>>>>>>> + const struct landlock_id id = {
>>>>>>> + .key.data = port,
>>>>>>> + .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT,
>>>>>>> + };
>>>>>>> + const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain = get_current_net_domain();
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!domain))
>>>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>>>> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(domain->num_layers < 1))
>>>>>>> + return -EACCES;
>>>>>>> + /* Check if it's a TCP socket. */
>>>>>>> + if (sock->type != SOCK_STREAM)
>>>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + ret = check_addrlen(address, addrlen);
>>>>>>> + if (ret)
>>>>>>> + return ret;
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + switch (address->sa_family) {
>>>>>>> + case AF_UNSPEC:
>>>>>>> + /*
>>>>>>> + * Connecting to an address with AF_UNSPEC dissolves the TCP
>>>>>>> + * association, which have the same effect as closing the
>>>>>>> + * connection while retaining the socket object (i.e., the file
>>>>>>> + * descriptor). As for dropping privileges, closing
>>>>>>> + * connections is always allowed.
>>>>>>> + */
>>>>>>> + if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP)
>>>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + /*
>>>>>>> + * For compatibility reason, accept AF_UNSPEC for bind
>>>>>>> + * accesses (mapped to AF_INET) only if the address is
>>>>>>> + * INADDR_ANY (cf. __inet_bind). Checking the address is
>>>>>>> + * required to not wrongfully return -EACCES instead of
>>>>>>> + * -EAFNOSUPPORT.
>>>>>>> + */
>>>>>>> + if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP) {
>>>>>>> + const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr =
>>>>>>> + (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + if (sockaddr->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
>>>>>>> + return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
>>>>>>> + }
>>>>>>> +
>>>>>>> + fallthrough;
>>>>>>> + case AF_INET:
>>>>>>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
>>>>>>> + case AF_INET6:
>>>>>>> +#endif
>>>
>>> Some more fixes:
>>>
>>> You can move the port/id.key.data block from my patch here, where it is
>>> actually used.
>>>
>> Ok. Thank you. I will apply it.
>>>
>>>>>>> + rule = landlock_find_rule(domain, id);
>>>>>>> + handled_access = landlock_init_layer_masks(
>>>>>>> + domain, access_request, &layer_masks,
>>>>>>> + LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT);
>>>>>>> + allowed = landlock_unmask_layers(rule, handled_access,
>>>>>>> + &layer_masks,
>>>>>>> + ARRAY_SIZE(layer_masks));
>>>
>>> The `return allowed ? 0 : -EACCES;` should be here.
>>>
>>>>>>> + }
>>>>>>> + return allowed ? 0 : -EACCES;
>>>
>>> We should have `return 0;` here.
>>>
>> Got it. Thanks
>>
>>> We need a test for an sa_family different than AF_UNSPEC, AF_INET, and
>>> AF_INET6 to make sure everything else is allowed (e.g. AF_UNIX with
>>> SOCK_STREAM and another test with SOCK_DGRAM). Please make sure this new
>>> test will not pass with SOCK_STREAM and the current patch series, but of
>>> course it should pass with the next one.
>>
>> Do you mean AF_UNIX with SOCK_STREAM will not be passed as well as
>> AF_UNIX with SOCK_DGRAM?
>
> AF_UNIX with SOCK_STREAM would be denied with this patch series, which
> is a bug. AF_UNIX with SOCK_DGRAM should always be allowed with this
> patch series, which is correct.
>
> AF_UNIX with SOCK_STREAM or SOCK_DGRAM should always be allowed, and the
> next patch series should come with a new test to check this two kind of
> sockets.
Got it. Thanks.
> .
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 48+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v10 09/13] landlock: Add network rules and TCP hooks support
2023-04-04 16:42 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-04 17:02 ` Mickaël Salaün
@ 2023-04-05 17:42 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
2023-04-06 10:28 ` Mickaël Salaün
1 sibling, 1 reply; 48+ messages in thread
From: Konstantin Meskhidze (A) @ 2023-04-05 17:42 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mickaël Salaün
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel, gnoack3000, linux-security-module, netdev,
netfilter-devel, yusongping, artem.kuzin
4/4/2023 7:42 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
>
> On 04/04/2023 11:31, Konstantin Meskhidze (A) wrote:
>>
>>
>> 3/31/2023 8:24 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
>>>
>>> On 23/03/2023 09:52, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
>>>> This commit adds network rules support in the ruleset management
>>>> helpers and the landlock_create_ruleset syscall.
>>>> Refactor user space API to support network actions. Add new network
>>>> access flags, network rule and network attributes. Increment Landlock
>>>> ABI version. Expand access_masks_t to u32 to be sure network access
>>>> rights can be stored. Implement socket_bind() and socket_connect()
>>>> LSM hooks, which enable to restrict TCP socket binding and connection
>>>> to specific ports.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
>>>> ---
>>>>
>>>> Changes since v9:
>>>> * Changes UAPI port field to __u64.
>>>> * Moves shared code into check_socket_access().
>>>> * Adds get_raw_handled_net_accesses() and
>>>> get_current_net_domain() helpers.
>>>> * Minor fixes.
>>>>
>>>> Changes since v8:
>>>> * Squashes commits.
>>>> * Refactors commit message.
>>>> * Changes UAPI port field to __be16.
>>>> * Changes logic of bind/connect hooks with AF_UNSPEC families.
>>>> * Adds address length checking.
>>>> * Minor fixes.
>>>>
>>>> Changes since v7:
>>>> * Squashes commits.
>>>> * Increments ABI version to 4.
>>>> * Refactors commit message.
>>>> * Minor fixes.
>>>>
>>>> Changes since v6:
>>>> * Renames landlock_set_net_access_mask() to landlock_add_net_access_mask()
>>>> because it OR values.
>>>> * Makes landlock_add_net_access_mask() more resilient incorrect values.
>>>> * Refactors landlock_get_net_access_mask().
>>>> * Renames LANDLOCK_MASK_SHIFT_NET to LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_NET and use
>>>> LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS as value.
>>>> * Updates access_masks_t to u32 to support network access actions.
>>>> * Refactors landlock internal functions to support network actions with
>>>> landlock_key/key_type/id types.
>>>>
>>>> Changes since v5:
>>>> * Gets rid of partial revert from landlock_add_rule
>>>> syscall.
>>>> * Formats code with clang-format-14.
>>>>
>>>> Changes since v4:
>>>> * Refactors landlock_create_ruleset() - splits ruleset and
>>>> masks checks.
>>>> * Refactors landlock_create_ruleset() and landlock mask
>>>> setters/getters to support two rule types.
>>>> * Refactors landlock_add_rule syscall add_rule_path_beneath
>>>> function by factoring out get_ruleset_from_fd() and
>>>> landlock_put_ruleset().
>>>>
>>>> Changes since v3:
>>>> * Splits commit.
>>>> * Adds network rule support for internal landlock functions.
>>>> * Adds set_mask and get_mask for network.
>>>> * Adds rb_root root_net_port.
>>>>
>>>> ---
>>>> include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 49 +++++
>>>> security/landlock/Kconfig | 1 +
>>>> security/landlock/Makefile | 2 +
>>>> security/landlock/limits.h | 6 +-
>>>> security/landlock/net.c | 198 +++++++++++++++++++
>>>> security/landlock/net.h | 26 +++
>>>> security/landlock/ruleset.c | 52 ++++-
>>>> security/landlock/ruleset.h | 63 +++++-
>>>> security/landlock/setup.c | 2 +
>>>> security/landlock/syscalls.c | 72 ++++++-
>>>> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 2 +-
>>>> 11 files changed, 450 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
>>>> create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.c
>>>> create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.h
>>>
>>> [...]
>>>
>>>> diff --git a/security/landlock/net.c b/security/landlock/net.c
>>>
>>> [...]
>>>
>>>> +static int check_addrlen(const struct sockaddr *const address, int addrlen)
>>>
>>> const int addrlen
>>
>> Got it.
>>>
>>>> +{
>>>> + if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
>>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>>> + switch (address->sa_family) {
>>>> + case AF_UNSPEC:
>>>> + case AF_INET:
>>>> + if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
>>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>>> + return 0;
>>>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
>>>> + case AF_INET6:
>>>> + if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
>>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>>> + return 0;
>>>> +#endif
>>>> + }
>>>> + WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
>>>> + return 0;
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>> +static u16 get_port(const struct sockaddr *const address)
>>>> +{
>>>> + /* Gets port value in host byte order. */
>>>> + switch (address->sa_family) {
>>>> + case AF_UNSPEC:
>>>> + case AF_INET: {
>>>> + const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr =
>>>> + (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
>>>> + return ntohs(sockaddr->sin_port);
>>>
>>> Storing ports in big endian (in rulesets) would avoid converting them
>>> every time the kernel checks a socket port. The above comment should
>>> then be updated too.
>>
>> I thought we came to a conclusion to stick to host endianess and
>> let kernel do the checks under the hood:
>> https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/278ab07f-7583-a4e0-3d37-1bacd091531d@digikod.net/
>>
>> Did I misunderstand something?
>
> We indeed stick to the host endianess for the UAPI/syscalls, but
> internally the kernel has to do the conversion with as it is currently
> done by calling ntohs(). To avoid calling ntohs() every time get_port()
> is called, we can instead only call htons() when creating rules (i.e.
> one-time htons call instead of multiple ntohs calls).
>
Do you mean we need to covert port in landlock_append_net_rule():
...
int err;
const struct landlock_id id = {
.key.data = ntohs(port),
.type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT,
};
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(port) > sizeof(id.key.data));
...
????
>
>> Do you mean we need to do port converting __be16 -> u16 in
>> check_socket_access()???
>
> Removing the ntohs() call from get_port() enables to return __be16
> instead of u16, and check_socket_access() will then need to use the same
> type.
Ok. I got it. Thanks.
>
>
>>>
>>>
>>>> + }
>>>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
>>>> + case AF_INET6: {
>>>> + const struct sockaddr_in6 *const sockaddr_ip6 =
>>>> + (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
>>>> + return ntohs(sockaddr_ip6->sin6_port);
>>>> + }
>>>> +#endif
>>>> + }
>>>> + WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
>>>> + return 0;
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>> +static int check_socket_access(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen, u16 port,
>>>> + access_mask_t access_request)
>>>> +{
>>>> + int ret;
>>>> + bool allowed = false;
>>>> + layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET] = {};
>>>> + const struct landlock_rule *rule;
>>>> + access_mask_t handled_access;
>>>> + const struct landlock_id id = {
>>>> + .key.data = port,
>>>> + .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT,
>>>> + };
>>>> + const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain = get_current_net_domain();
>>>> +
>>>> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!domain))
>>>> + return 0;
>>>> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(domain->num_layers < 1))
>>>> + return -EACCES;
>>>> + /* Check if it's a TCP socket. */
>>>> + if (sock->type != SOCK_STREAM)
>>>> + return 0;
>>>> +
>>>> + ret = check_addrlen(address, addrlen);
>>>> + if (ret)
>>>> + return ret;
>>>> +
>>>> + switch (address->sa_family) {
>>>> + case AF_UNSPEC:
>>>> + /*
>>>> + * Connecting to an address with AF_UNSPEC dissolves the TCP
>>>> + * association, which have the same effect as closing the
>>>> + * connection while retaining the socket object (i.e., the file
>>>> + * descriptor). As for dropping privileges, closing
>>>> + * connections is always allowed.
>>>> + */
>>>> + if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP)
>>>> + return 0;
>>>> +
>>>> + /*
>>>> + * For compatibility reason, accept AF_UNSPEC for bind
>>>> + * accesses (mapped to AF_INET) only if the address is
>>>> + * INADDR_ANY (cf. __inet_bind). Checking the address is
>>>> + * required to not wrongfully return -EACCES instead of
>>>> + * -EAFNOSUPPORT.
>>>> + */
>>>> + if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP) {
>>>> + const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr =
>>>> + (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
>>>> +
>>>> + if (sockaddr->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
>>>> + return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
>>>> + }
>>>> +
>>>> + fallthrough;
>>>> + case AF_INET:
>>>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
>>>> + case AF_INET6:
>>>> +#endif
>>>> + rule = landlock_find_rule(domain, id);
>>>> + handled_access = landlock_init_layer_masks(
>>>> + domain, access_request, &layer_masks,
>>>> + LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT);
>>>> + allowed = landlock_unmask_layers(rule, handled_access,
>>>> + &layer_masks,
>>>> + ARRAY_SIZE(layer_masks));
>>>> + }
>>>> + return allowed ? 0 : -EACCES;
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>> +static int hook_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
>>>> + int addrlen)
>>>> +{ >>> + return check_socket_access(sock, address, addrlen, get_port(address),
>>>> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP);
>
> get_port() is called before check_addrlen(), which is an issue.
>
> You'll find attached a patch for these fixes, please squash it in this
> one for the next version.
>
> I'll send other reviews by the end of the week.
>
>
>>>> +}
>>>> +
>>>> +static int hook_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
>>>> + int addrlen)
>>>> +{
>>>> + return check_socket_access(sock, address, addrlen, get_port(address),
>>>> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP);
>>>> +}
>>>
>>> [...]
>>> .
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 48+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v10 09/13] landlock: Add network rules and TCP hooks support
2023-04-05 17:42 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
@ 2023-04-06 10:28 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-06 10:30 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
0 siblings, 1 reply; 48+ messages in thread
From: Mickaël Salaün @ 2023-04-06 10:28 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel, gnoack3000, linux-security-module, netdev,
netfilter-devel, yusongping, artem.kuzin
On 05/04/2023 19:42, Konstantin Meskhidze (A) wrote:
>
>
> 4/4/2023 7:42 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
>>
>> On 04/04/2023 11:31, Konstantin Meskhidze (A) wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> 3/31/2023 8:24 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
>>>>
>>>> On 23/03/2023 09:52, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
>>>>> This commit adds network rules support in the ruleset management
>>>>> helpers and the landlock_create_ruleset syscall.
>>>>> Refactor user space API to support network actions. Add new network
>>>>> access flags, network rule and network attributes. Increment Landlock
>>>>> ABI version. Expand access_masks_t to u32 to be sure network access
>>>>> rights can be stored. Implement socket_bind() and socket_connect()
>>>>> LSM hooks, which enable to restrict TCP socket binding and connection
>>>>> to specific ports.
>>>>>
>>>>> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
>>>>> ---
>>>>>
>>>>> Changes since v9:
>>>>> * Changes UAPI port field to __u64.
>>>>> * Moves shared code into check_socket_access().
>>>>> * Adds get_raw_handled_net_accesses() and
>>>>> get_current_net_domain() helpers.
>>>>> * Minor fixes.
>>>>>
>>>>> Changes since v8:
>>>>> * Squashes commits.
>>>>> * Refactors commit message.
>>>>> * Changes UAPI port field to __be16.
>>>>> * Changes logic of bind/connect hooks with AF_UNSPEC families.
>>>>> * Adds address length checking.
>>>>> * Minor fixes.
>>>>>
>>>>> Changes since v7:
>>>>> * Squashes commits.
>>>>> * Increments ABI version to 4.
>>>>> * Refactors commit message.
>>>>> * Minor fixes.
>>>>>
>>>>> Changes since v6:
>>>>> * Renames landlock_set_net_access_mask() to landlock_add_net_access_mask()
>>>>> because it OR values.
>>>>> * Makes landlock_add_net_access_mask() more resilient incorrect values.
>>>>> * Refactors landlock_get_net_access_mask().
>>>>> * Renames LANDLOCK_MASK_SHIFT_NET to LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_NET and use
>>>>> LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS as value.
>>>>> * Updates access_masks_t to u32 to support network access actions.
>>>>> * Refactors landlock internal functions to support network actions with
>>>>> landlock_key/key_type/id types.
>>>>>
>>>>> Changes since v5:
>>>>> * Gets rid of partial revert from landlock_add_rule
>>>>> syscall.
>>>>> * Formats code with clang-format-14.
>>>>>
>>>>> Changes since v4:
>>>>> * Refactors landlock_create_ruleset() - splits ruleset and
>>>>> masks checks.
>>>>> * Refactors landlock_create_ruleset() and landlock mask
>>>>> setters/getters to support two rule types.
>>>>> * Refactors landlock_add_rule syscall add_rule_path_beneath
>>>>> function by factoring out get_ruleset_from_fd() and
>>>>> landlock_put_ruleset().
>>>>>
>>>>> Changes since v3:
>>>>> * Splits commit.
>>>>> * Adds network rule support for internal landlock functions.
>>>>> * Adds set_mask and get_mask for network.
>>>>> * Adds rb_root root_net_port.
>>>>>
>>>>> ---
>>>>> include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 49 +++++
>>>>> security/landlock/Kconfig | 1 +
>>>>> security/landlock/Makefile | 2 +
>>>>> security/landlock/limits.h | 6 +-
>>>>> security/landlock/net.c | 198 +++++++++++++++++++
>>>>> security/landlock/net.h | 26 +++
>>>>> security/landlock/ruleset.c | 52 ++++-
>>>>> security/landlock/ruleset.h | 63 +++++-
>>>>> security/landlock/setup.c | 2 +
>>>>> security/landlock/syscalls.c | 72 ++++++-
>>>>> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 2 +-
>>>>> 11 files changed, 450 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
>>>>> create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.c
>>>>> create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.h
>>>>
>>>> [...]
>>>>
>>>>> diff --git a/security/landlock/net.c b/security/landlock/net.c
>>>>
>>>> [...]
>>>>
>>>>> +static int check_addrlen(const struct sockaddr *const address, int addrlen)
>>>>
>>>> const int addrlen
>>>
>>> Got it.
>>>>
>>>>> +{
>>>>> + if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
>>>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>>>> + switch (address->sa_family) {
>>>>> + case AF_UNSPEC:
>>>>> + case AF_INET:
>>>>> + if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
>>>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
>>>>> + case AF_INET6:
>>>>> + if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
>>>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>> +#endif
>>>>> + }
>>>>> + WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>> +}
>>>>> +
>>>>> +static u16 get_port(const struct sockaddr *const address)
>>>>> +{
>>>>> + /* Gets port value in host byte order. */
>>>>> + switch (address->sa_family) {
>>>>> + case AF_UNSPEC:
>>>>> + case AF_INET: {
>>>>> + const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr =
>>>>> + (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
>>>>> + return ntohs(sockaddr->sin_port);
>>>>
>>>> Storing ports in big endian (in rulesets) would avoid converting them
>>>> every time the kernel checks a socket port. The above comment should
>>>> then be updated too.
>>>
>>> I thought we came to a conclusion to stick to host endianess and
>>> let kernel do the checks under the hood:
>>> https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/278ab07f-7583-a4e0-3d37-1bacd091531d@digikod.net/
>>>
>>> Did I misunderstand something?
>>
>> We indeed stick to the host endianess for the UAPI/syscalls, but
>> internally the kernel has to do the conversion with as it is currently
>> done by calling ntohs(). To avoid calling ntohs() every time get_port()
>> is called, we can instead only call htons() when creating rules (i.e.
>> one-time htons call instead of multiple ntohs calls).
>>
> Do you mean we need to covert port in landlock_append_net_rule():
>
> ...
>
> int err;
> const struct landlock_id id = {
> .key.data = ntohs(port),
> .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT,
> };
> BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(port) > sizeof(id.key.data));
> ...
> ????
landlock_append_net_rule() takes a u16 (host endianess, which is the
case with this patch series) and should store a big endian 16-bit
integer. See my patch:
const struct landlock_id id = {
- .key.data = port,
+ .key.data = (__force uintptr_t)htons(port),
.type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT,
};
>>
>>> Do you mean we need to do port converting __be16 -> u16 in
>>> check_socket_access()???
>>
>> Removing the ntohs() call from get_port() enables to return __be16
>> instead of u16, and check_socket_access() will then need to use the same
>> type.
>
> Ok. I got it. Thanks.
>>
>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>> + }
>>>>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
>>>>> + case AF_INET6: {
>>>>> + const struct sockaddr_in6 *const sockaddr_ip6 =
>>>>> + (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
>>>>> + return ntohs(sockaddr_ip6->sin6_port);
>>>>> + }
>>>>> +#endif
>>>>> + }
>>>>> + WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>> +}
>>>>> +
>>>>> +static int check_socket_access(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen, u16 port,
>>>>> + access_mask_t access_request)
>>>>> +{
>>>>> + int ret;
>>>>> + bool allowed = false;
>>>>> + layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET] = {};
>>>>> + const struct landlock_rule *rule;
>>>>> + access_mask_t handled_access;
>>>>> + const struct landlock_id id = {
>>>>> + .key.data = port,
>>>>> + .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT,
>>>>> + };
>>>>> + const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain = get_current_net_domain();
>>>>> +
>>>>> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!domain))
>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(domain->num_layers < 1))
>>>>> + return -EACCES;
>>>>> + /* Check if it's a TCP socket. */
>>>>> + if (sock->type != SOCK_STREAM)
>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + ret = check_addrlen(address, addrlen);
>>>>> + if (ret)
>>>>> + return ret;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + switch (address->sa_family) {
>>>>> + case AF_UNSPEC:
>>>>> + /*
>>>>> + * Connecting to an address with AF_UNSPEC dissolves the TCP
>>>>> + * association, which have the same effect as closing the
>>>>> + * connection while retaining the socket object (i.e., the file
>>>>> + * descriptor). As for dropping privileges, closing
>>>>> + * connections is always allowed.
>>>>> + */
>>>>> + if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP)
>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + /*
>>>>> + * For compatibility reason, accept AF_UNSPEC for bind
>>>>> + * accesses (mapped to AF_INET) only if the address is
>>>>> + * INADDR_ANY (cf. __inet_bind). Checking the address is
>>>>> + * required to not wrongfully return -EACCES instead of
>>>>> + * -EAFNOSUPPORT.
>>>>> + */
>>>>> + if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP) {
>>>>> + const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr =
>>>>> + (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + if (sockaddr->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
>>>>> + return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
>>>>> + }
>>>>> +
>>>>> + fallthrough;
>>>>> + case AF_INET:
>>>>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
>>>>> + case AF_INET6:
>>>>> +#endif
>>>>> + rule = landlock_find_rule(domain, id);
>>>>> + handled_access = landlock_init_layer_masks(
>>>>> + domain, access_request, &layer_masks,
>>>>> + LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT);
>>>>> + allowed = landlock_unmask_layers(rule, handled_access,
>>>>> + &layer_masks,
>>>>> + ARRAY_SIZE(layer_masks));
>>>>> + }
>>>>> + return allowed ? 0 : -EACCES;
>>>>> +}
>>>>> +
>>>>> +static int hook_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
>>>>> + int addrlen)
>>>>> +{ >>> + return check_socket_access(sock, address, addrlen, get_port(address),
>>>>> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP);
>>
>> get_port() is called before check_addrlen(), which is an issue.
>>
>> You'll find attached a patch for these fixes, please squash it in this
>> one for the next version.
>>
>> I'll send other reviews by the end of the week.
>>
>>
>>>>> +}
>>>>> +
>>>>> +static int hook_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
>>>>> + int addrlen)
>>>>> +{
>>>>> + return check_socket_access(sock, address, addrlen, get_port(address),
>>>>> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP);
>>>>> +}
>>>>
>>>> [...]
>>>> .
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 48+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v10 09/13] landlock: Add network rules and TCP hooks support
2023-04-06 10:28 ` Mickaël Salaün
@ 2023-04-06 10:30 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
0 siblings, 0 replies; 48+ messages in thread
From: Konstantin Meskhidze (A) @ 2023-04-06 10:30 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mickaël Salaün
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel, gnoack3000, linux-security-module, netdev,
netfilter-devel, yusongping, artem.kuzin
4/6/2023 1:28 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
>
> On 05/04/2023 19:42, Konstantin Meskhidze (A) wrote:
>>
>>
>> 4/4/2023 7:42 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
>>>
>>> On 04/04/2023 11:31, Konstantin Meskhidze (A) wrote:
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> 3/31/2023 8:24 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
>>>>>
>>>>> On 23/03/2023 09:52, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
>>>>>> This commit adds network rules support in the ruleset management
>>>>>> helpers and the landlock_create_ruleset syscall.
>>>>>> Refactor user space API to support network actions. Add new network
>>>>>> access flags, network rule and network attributes. Increment Landlock
>>>>>> ABI version. Expand access_masks_t to u32 to be sure network access
>>>>>> rights can be stored. Implement socket_bind() and socket_connect()
>>>>>> LSM hooks, which enable to restrict TCP socket binding and connection
>>>>>> to specific ports.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
>>>>>> ---
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Changes since v9:
>>>>>> * Changes UAPI port field to __u64.
>>>>>> * Moves shared code into check_socket_access().
>>>>>> * Adds get_raw_handled_net_accesses() and
>>>>>> get_current_net_domain() helpers.
>>>>>> * Minor fixes.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Changes since v8:
>>>>>> * Squashes commits.
>>>>>> * Refactors commit message.
>>>>>> * Changes UAPI port field to __be16.
>>>>>> * Changes logic of bind/connect hooks with AF_UNSPEC families.
>>>>>> * Adds address length checking.
>>>>>> * Minor fixes.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Changes since v7:
>>>>>> * Squashes commits.
>>>>>> * Increments ABI version to 4.
>>>>>> * Refactors commit message.
>>>>>> * Minor fixes.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Changes since v6:
>>>>>> * Renames landlock_set_net_access_mask() to landlock_add_net_access_mask()
>>>>>> because it OR values.
>>>>>> * Makes landlock_add_net_access_mask() more resilient incorrect values.
>>>>>> * Refactors landlock_get_net_access_mask().
>>>>>> * Renames LANDLOCK_MASK_SHIFT_NET to LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_NET and use
>>>>>> LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS as value.
>>>>>> * Updates access_masks_t to u32 to support network access actions.
>>>>>> * Refactors landlock internal functions to support network actions with
>>>>>> landlock_key/key_type/id types.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Changes since v5:
>>>>>> * Gets rid of partial revert from landlock_add_rule
>>>>>> syscall.
>>>>>> * Formats code with clang-format-14.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Changes since v4:
>>>>>> * Refactors landlock_create_ruleset() - splits ruleset and
>>>>>> masks checks.
>>>>>> * Refactors landlock_create_ruleset() and landlock mask
>>>>>> setters/getters to support two rule types.
>>>>>> * Refactors landlock_add_rule syscall add_rule_path_beneath
>>>>>> function by factoring out get_ruleset_from_fd() and
>>>>>> landlock_put_ruleset().
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Changes since v3:
>>>>>> * Splits commit.
>>>>>> * Adds network rule support for internal landlock functions.
>>>>>> * Adds set_mask and get_mask for network.
>>>>>> * Adds rb_root root_net_port.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> ---
>>>>>> include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 49 +++++
>>>>>> security/landlock/Kconfig | 1 +
>>>>>> security/landlock/Makefile | 2 +
>>>>>> security/landlock/limits.h | 6 +-
>>>>>> security/landlock/net.c | 198 +++++++++++++++++++
>>>>>> security/landlock/net.h | 26 +++
>>>>>> security/landlock/ruleset.c | 52 ++++-
>>>>>> security/landlock/ruleset.h | 63 +++++-
>>>>>> security/landlock/setup.c | 2 +
>>>>>> security/landlock/syscalls.c | 72 ++++++-
>>>>>> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 2 +-
>>>>>> 11 files changed, 450 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
>>>>>> create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.c
>>>>>> create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.h
>>>>>
>>>>> [...]
>>>>>
>>>>>> diff --git a/security/landlock/net.c b/security/landlock/net.c
>>>>>
>>>>> [...]
>>>>>
>>>>>> +static int check_addrlen(const struct sockaddr *const address, int addrlen)
>>>>>
>>>>> const int addrlen
>>>>
>>>> Got it.
>>>>>
>>>>>> +{
>>>>>> + if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
>>>>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>>>>> + switch (address->sa_family) {
>>>>>> + case AF_UNSPEC:
>>>>>> + case AF_INET:
>>>>>> + if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
>>>>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
>>>>>> + case AF_INET6:
>>>>>> + if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
>>>>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>>> +#endif
>>>>>> + }
>>>>>> + WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
>>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>>> +}
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> +static u16 get_port(const struct sockaddr *const address)
>>>>>> +{
>>>>>> + /* Gets port value in host byte order. */
>>>>>> + switch (address->sa_family) {
>>>>>> + case AF_UNSPEC:
>>>>>> + case AF_INET: {
>>>>>> + const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr =
>>>>>> + (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
>>>>>> + return ntohs(sockaddr->sin_port);
>>>>>
>>>>> Storing ports in big endian (in rulesets) would avoid converting them
>>>>> every time the kernel checks a socket port. The above comment should
>>>>> then be updated too.
>>>>
>>>> I thought we came to a conclusion to stick to host endianess and
>>>> let kernel do the checks under the hood:
>>>> https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/278ab07f-7583-a4e0-3d37-1bacd091531d@digikod.net/
>>>>
>>>> Did I misunderstand something?
>>>
>>> We indeed stick to the host endianess for the UAPI/syscalls, but
>>> internally the kernel has to do the conversion with as it is currently
>>> done by calling ntohs(). To avoid calling ntohs() every time get_port()
>>> is called, we can instead only call htons() when creating rules (i.e.
>>> one-time htons call instead of multiple ntohs calls).
>>>
>> Do you mean we need to covert port in landlock_append_net_rule():
>>
>> ...
>>
>> int err;
>> const struct landlock_id id = {
>> .key.data = ntohs(port),
>> .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT,
>> };
>> BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(port) > sizeof(id.key.data));
>> ...
>> ????
>
> landlock_append_net_rule() takes a u16 (host endianess, which is the
> case with this patch series) and should store a big endian 16-bit
> integer. See my patch:
>
> const struct landlock_id id = {
> - .key.data = port,
> + .key.data = (__force uintptr_t)htons(port),
> .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT,
> };
>
Thanks. Already took a look.
>
>
>>>
>>>> Do you mean we need to do port converting __be16 -> u16 in
>>>> check_socket_access()???
>>>
>>> Removing the ntohs() call from get_port() enables to return __be16
>>> instead of u16, and check_socket_access() will then need to use the same
>>> type.
>>
>> Ok. I got it. Thanks.
>>>
>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> + }
>>>>>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
>>>>>> + case AF_INET6: {
>>>>>> + const struct sockaddr_in6 *const sockaddr_ip6 =
>>>>>> + (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
>>>>>> + return ntohs(sockaddr_ip6->sin6_port);
>>>>>> + }
>>>>>> +#endif
>>>>>> + }
>>>>>> + WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
>>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>>> +}
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> +static int check_socket_access(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen, u16 port,
>>>>>> + access_mask_t access_request)
>>>>>> +{
>>>>>> + int ret;
>>>>>> + bool allowed = false;
>>>>>> + layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET] = {};
>>>>>> + const struct landlock_rule *rule;
>>>>>> + access_mask_t handled_access;
>>>>>> + const struct landlock_id id = {
>>>>>> + .key.data = port,
>>>>>> + .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT,
>>>>>> + };
>>>>>> + const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain = get_current_net_domain();
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!domain))
>>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>>> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(domain->num_layers < 1))
>>>>>> + return -EACCES;
>>>>>> + /* Check if it's a TCP socket. */
>>>>>> + if (sock->type != SOCK_STREAM)
>>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> + ret = check_addrlen(address, addrlen);
>>>>>> + if (ret)
>>>>>> + return ret;
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> + switch (address->sa_family) {
>>>>>> + case AF_UNSPEC:
>>>>>> + /*
>>>>>> + * Connecting to an address with AF_UNSPEC dissolves the TCP
>>>>>> + * association, which have the same effect as closing the
>>>>>> + * connection while retaining the socket object (i.e., the file
>>>>>> + * descriptor). As for dropping privileges, closing
>>>>>> + * connections is always allowed.
>>>>>> + */
>>>>>> + if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP)
>>>>>> + return 0;
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> + /*
>>>>>> + * For compatibility reason, accept AF_UNSPEC for bind
>>>>>> + * accesses (mapped to AF_INET) only if the address is
>>>>>> + * INADDR_ANY (cf. __inet_bind). Checking the address is
>>>>>> + * required to not wrongfully return -EACCES instead of
>>>>>> + * -EAFNOSUPPORT.
>>>>>> + */
>>>>>> + if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP) {
>>>>>> + const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr =
>>>>>> + (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> + if (sockaddr->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
>>>>>> + return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
>>>>>> + }
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> + fallthrough;
>>>>>> + case AF_INET:
>>>>>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
>>>>>> + case AF_INET6:
>>>>>> +#endif
>>>>>> + rule = landlock_find_rule(domain, id);
>>>>>> + handled_access = landlock_init_layer_masks(
>>>>>> + domain, access_request, &layer_masks,
>>>>>> + LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT);
>>>>>> + allowed = landlock_unmask_layers(rule, handled_access,
>>>>>> + &layer_masks,
>>>>>> + ARRAY_SIZE(layer_masks));
>>>>>> + }
>>>>>> + return allowed ? 0 : -EACCES;
>>>>>> +}
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> +static int hook_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
>>>>>> + int addrlen)
>>>>>> +{ >>> + return check_socket_access(sock, address, addrlen, get_port(address),
>>>>>> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP);
>>>
>>> get_port() is called before check_addrlen(), which is an issue.
>>>
>>> You'll find attached a patch for these fixes, please squash it in this
>>> one for the next version.
>>>
>>> I'll send other reviews by the end of the week.
>>>
>>>
>>>>>> +}
>>>>>> +
>>>>>> +static int hook_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
>>>>>> + int addrlen)
>>>>>> +{
>>>>>> + return check_socket_access(sock, address, addrlen, get_port(address),
>>>>>> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP);
>>>>>> +}
>>>>>
>>>>> [...]
>>>>> .
> .
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 48+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v10 09/13] landlock: Add network rules and TCP hooks support
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 09/13] landlock: Add network rules and TCP hooks support Konstantin Meskhidze
2023-03-31 17:24 ` Mickaël Salaün
@ 2023-04-16 16:11 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-21 9:39 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
1 sibling, 1 reply; 48+ messages in thread
From: Mickaël Salaün @ 2023-04-16 16:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Konstantin Meskhidze
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel, gnoack3000, linux-security-module, netdev,
netfilter-devel, yusongping, artem.kuzin
On 23/03/2023 09:52, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
> This commit adds network rules support in the ruleset management
> helpers and the landlock_create_ruleset syscall.
> Refactor user space API to support network actions. Add new network
> access flags, network rule and network attributes. Increment Landlock
> ABI version. Expand access_masks_t to u32 to be sure network access
> rights can be stored. Implement socket_bind() and socket_connect()
> LSM hooks, which enable to restrict TCP socket binding and connection
"which enables to"
> to specific ports.
>
> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
> ---
>
> Changes since v9:
> * Changes UAPI port field to __u64.
> * Moves shared code into check_socket_access().
> * Adds get_raw_handled_net_accesses() and
> get_current_net_domain() helpers.
> * Minor fixes.
>
> Changes since v8:
> * Squashes commits.
> * Refactors commit message.
> * Changes UAPI port field to __be16.
> * Changes logic of bind/connect hooks with AF_UNSPEC families.
> * Adds address length checking.
> * Minor fixes.
>
> Changes since v7:
> * Squashes commits.
> * Increments ABI version to 4.
> * Refactors commit message.
> * Minor fixes.
>
> Changes since v6:
> * Renames landlock_set_net_access_mask() to landlock_add_net_access_mask()
> because it OR values.
> * Makes landlock_add_net_access_mask() more resilient incorrect values.
> * Refactors landlock_get_net_access_mask().
> * Renames LANDLOCK_MASK_SHIFT_NET to LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_NET and use
> LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS as value.
> * Updates access_masks_t to u32 to support network access actions.
> * Refactors landlock internal functions to support network actions with
> landlock_key/key_type/id types.
>
> Changes since v5:
> * Gets rid of partial revert from landlock_add_rule
> syscall.
> * Formats code with clang-format-14.
>
> Changes since v4:
> * Refactors landlock_create_ruleset() - splits ruleset and
> masks checks.
> * Refactors landlock_create_ruleset() and landlock mask
> setters/getters to support two rule types.
> * Refactors landlock_add_rule syscall add_rule_path_beneath
> function by factoring out get_ruleset_from_fd() and
> landlock_put_ruleset().
>
> Changes since v3:
> * Splits commit.
> * Adds network rule support for internal landlock functions.
> * Adds set_mask and get_mask for network.
> * Adds rb_root root_net_port.
>
> ---
> include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 49 +++++
> security/landlock/Kconfig | 1 +
> security/landlock/Makefile | 2 +
> security/landlock/limits.h | 6 +-
> security/landlock/net.c | 198 +++++++++++++++++++
> security/landlock/net.h | 26 +++
> security/landlock/ruleset.c | 52 ++++-
> security/landlock/ruleset.h | 63 +++++-
> security/landlock/setup.c | 2 +
> security/landlock/syscalls.c | 72 ++++++-
> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 2 +-
> 11 files changed, 450 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
> create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.c
> create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.h
>
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
> index 81d09ef9aa50..09b70fb6a9a6 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
> @@ -31,6 +31,13 @@ struct landlock_ruleset_attr {
> * this access right.
> */
> __u64 handled_access_fs;
> +
> + /**
> + * @handled_access_net: Bitmask of actions (cf. `Network flags`_)
> + * that is handled by this ruleset and should then be forbidden if no
> + * rule explicitly allow them.
> + */
> + __u64 handled_access_net;
> };
>
> /*
> @@ -54,6 +61,11 @@ enum landlock_rule_type {
> * landlock_path_beneath_attr .
> */
> LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH = 1,
> + /**
> + * @LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE: Type of a &struct
> + * landlock_net_service_attr .
> + */
> + LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE = 2,
> };
>
> /**
> @@ -79,6 +91,24 @@ struct landlock_path_beneath_attr {
> */
> } __attribute__((packed));
>
> +/**
> + * struct landlock_net_service_attr - TCP subnet definition
> + *
> + * Argument of sys_landlock_add_rule().
> + */
> +struct landlock_net_service_attr {
> + /**
> + * @allowed_access: Bitmask of allowed access network for services
> + * (cf. `Network flags`_).
> + */
> + __u64 allowed_access;
> + /**
> + * @port: Network port.
> + */
> + __u64 port;
> +
> +} __attribute__((packed));
You can remove the empty line and the packed attribute.
> +
> /**
> * DOC: fs_access
> *
> @@ -189,4 +219,23 @@ struct landlock_path_beneath_attr {
> #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE (1ULL << 14)
> /* clang-format on */
>
> +/**
> + * DOC: net_access
> + *
> + * Network flags
> + * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
> + *
> + * These flags enable to restrict a sandboxed process to a set of network
> + * actions.
> + *
> + * TCP sockets with allowed actions:
> + *
> + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP: Bind a TCP socket to a local port.
> + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP: Connect an active TCP socket to
> + * a remote port.
> + */
> +/* clang-format off */
> +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP (1ULL << 0)
> +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP (1ULL << 1)
> +/* clang-format on */
> #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H */
> diff --git a/security/landlock/Kconfig b/security/landlock/Kconfig
> index 8e33c4e8ffb8..10c099097533 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/landlock/Kconfig
> @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
> config SECURITY_LANDLOCK
> bool "Landlock support"
> depends on SECURITY && !ARCH_EPHEMERAL_INODES
> + select SECURITY_NETWORK
> select SECURITY_PATH
> help
> Landlock is a sandboxing mechanism that enables processes to restrict
> diff --git a/security/landlock/Makefile b/security/landlock/Makefile
> index 7bbd2f413b3e..53d3c92ae22e 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/Makefile
> +++ b/security/landlock/Makefile
> @@ -2,3 +2,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) := landlock.o
>
> landlock-y := setup.o syscalls.o object.o ruleset.o \
> cred.o ptrace.o fs.o
> +
> +landlock-$(CONFIG_INET) += net.o
> \ No newline at end of file
> diff --git a/security/landlock/limits.h b/security/landlock/limits.h
> index bafb3b8dc677..8a1a6463c64e 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/limits.h
> +++ b/security/landlock/limits.h
> @@ -23,6 +23,10 @@
> #define LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS __const_hweight64(LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS)
> #define LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_FS 0
>
> -/* clang-format on */
> +#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_NET LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP
> +#define LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET ((LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_NET << 1) - 1)
> +#define LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET __const_hweight64(LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET)
> +#define LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_NET LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS
>
> +/* clang-format on */
> #endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LIMITS_H */
> diff --git a/security/landlock/net.c b/security/landlock/net.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..e19c339906e7
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/security/landlock/net.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
> +/*
> + * Landlock LSM - Network management and hooks
> + *
> + * Copyright © 2022 Huawei Tech. Co., Ltd.
> + * Copyright © 2022 Microsoft Corporation
> + */
> +
> +#include <linux/in.h>
> +#include <linux/net.h>
> +#include <linux/socket.h>
> +#include <net/ipv6.h>
> +
> +#include "common.h"
> +#include "cred.h"
> +#include "limits.h"
> +#include "net.h"
> +#include "ruleset.h"
> +
> +int landlock_append_net_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
> + const u16 port, access_mask_t access_rights)
> +{
> + int err;
> + const struct landlock_id id = {
> + .key.data = port,
> + .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT,
> + };
> + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(port) > sizeof(id.key.data));
> +
> + /* Transforms relative access rights to absolute ones. */
> + access_rights |= LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET &
> + ~landlock_get_net_access_mask(ruleset, 0);
> +
> + mutex_lock(&ruleset->lock);
> + err = landlock_insert_rule(ruleset, id, access_rights);
> + mutex_unlock(&ruleset->lock);
> +
> + return err;
> +}
> +
> +static access_mask_t
> +get_raw_handled_net_accesses(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain)
> +{
> + access_mask_t access_dom = 0;
> + size_t layer_level;
> +
> + for (layer_level = 0; layer_level < domain->num_layers; layer_level++)
> + access_dom |= landlock_get_net_access_mask(domain, layer_level);
> + return access_dom;
> +}
> +
> +static const struct landlock_ruleset *get_current_net_domain(void)
> +{
> + const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
> + landlock_get_current_domain();
> +
> + if (!dom || !get_raw_handled_net_accesses(dom))
> + return NULL;
> +
> + return dom;
> +}
> +
> +static int check_addrlen(const struct sockaddr *const address, int addrlen)
> +{
> + if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
> + return -EINVAL;
> + switch (address->sa_family) {
> + case AF_UNSPEC:
> + case AF_INET:
> + if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
> + return -EINVAL;
> + return 0;
> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
> + case AF_INET6:
> + if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
> + return -EINVAL;
> + return 0;
> +#endif
> + }
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
> + return 0;
With this code, using any non-TCP socket would print a warning.
All these switch/case make difficult to check consistency across
check_addrlen() and get_port() helpers, they should be inlined into
check_socket_access(), with only one switch statement, but we need to be
careful about the return error orders: first EINVAL and after
EAFNOSUPPORT. Inlining all this also enables to get rid of impossible
cases (that lead to these WARN_ON_ONCE calls).
> +}
> +
> +static u16 get_port(const struct sockaddr *const address)
> +{
> + /* Gets port value in host byte order. */
> + switch (address->sa_family) {
> + case AF_UNSPEC:
> + case AF_INET: {
> + const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr =
> + (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
> + return ntohs(sockaddr->sin_port);
> + }
> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
> + case AF_INET6: {
> + const struct sockaddr_in6 *const sockaddr_ip6 =
> + (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
> + return ntohs(sockaddr_ip6->sin6_port);
> + }
> +#endif
> + }
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> +static int check_socket_access(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen, u16 port,
> + access_mask_t access_request)
> +{
> + int ret;
> + bool allowed = false;
> + layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET] = {};
> + const struct landlock_rule *rule;
> + access_mask_t handled_access;
> + const struct landlock_id id = {
> + .key.data = port,
> + .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT,
> + };
> + const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain = get_current_net_domain();
> +
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!domain))
> + return 0;
> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(domain->num_layers < 1))
> + return -EACCES;
> + /* Check if it's a TCP socket. */
> + if (sock->type != SOCK_STREAM)
> + return 0;
> +
> + ret = check_addrlen(address, addrlen);
> + if (ret)
> + return ret;
As explained above, this should be replaced with:
if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
return -EINVAL;
> +
> + switch (address->sa_family) {
This below block should be moved after the generic switch statement
(i.e. once port is checked).
> + case AF_UNSPEC:
> + /*
> + * Connecting to an address with AF_UNSPEC dissolves the TCP
> + * association, which have the same effect as closing the
> + * connection while retaining the socket object (i.e., the file
> + * descriptor). As for dropping privileges, closing
> + * connections is always allowed.
> + */
> + if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP)
> + return 0;
> +
> + /*
> + * For compatibility reason, accept AF_UNSPEC for bind
> + * accesses (mapped to AF_INET) only if the address is
> + * INADDR_ANY (cf. __inet_bind). Checking the address is
> + * required to not wrongfully return -EACCES instead of
> + * -EAFNOSUPPORT.
> + */
> + if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP) {
> + const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr =
> + (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
> +
> + if (sockaddr->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
> + return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
> + }
> +
> + fallthrough;
case AF_UNSPEC:
> + case AF_INET:
if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
return -EINVAL;
port = ((struct sockaddr_in *)address)->sin_port;
break;
> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
> + case AF_INET6:
if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
return -EINVAL;
port = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)address)->sin6_port;
break;
> +#endif
/* Allows unhandled protocols. */
default:
return 0;
}
if (address->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC) {
// Add here the above AF_UNSPEC checks to be consistent with the
EINVAL/EAFNOSUPPORT return ordering.
}
id.key.data = (__force uintprt_t)port;
BUID_BUG_ON(...);
> + rule = landlock_find_rule(domain, id);
> + handled_access = landlock_init_layer_masks(
> + domain, access_request, &layer_masks,
> + LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT);
> + allowed = landlock_unmask_layers(rule, handled_access,
> + &layer_masks,
> + ARRAY_SIZE(layer_masks));
> + }
This curly brace can now be removed and the following return line is now OK.
> + return allowed ? 0 : -EACCES;
> +}
> +
> +static int hook_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
> + int addrlen)
> +{
> + return check_socket_access(sock, address, addrlen, get_port(address),
> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP);
> +}
> +
> +static int hook_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
> + int addrlen)
> +{
> + return check_socket_access(sock, address, addrlen, get_port(address),
> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP);
> +}
> +
> +static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, hook_socket_bind),
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, hook_socket_connect),
> +};
> +
> +__init void landlock_add_net_hooks(void)
> +{
> + security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
> + LANDLOCK_NAME);
> +}
> diff --git a/security/landlock/net.h b/security/landlock/net.h
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..0da1d9dff5ab
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/security/landlock/net.h
> @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
> +/*
> + * Landlock LSM - Network management and hooks
> + *
> + * Copyright © 2022 Huawei Tech. Co., Ltd.
> + */
> +
> +#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_NET_H
> +#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_NET_H
> +
> +#include "common.h"
> +#include "ruleset.h"
> +#include "setup.h"
> +
> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET)
> +__init void landlock_add_net_hooks(void);
> +
> +int landlock_append_net_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
> + const u16 port, access_mask_t access_rights);
> +#else /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
> +static inline void landlock_add_net_hooks(void)
> +{
> +}
> +#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
> +
> +#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_NET_H */
> diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.c b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
> index 14207b666095..53cb62701280 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/ruleset.c
> +++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
> @@ -36,6 +36,9 @@ static struct landlock_ruleset *create_ruleset(const u32 num_layers)
> refcount_set(&new_ruleset->usage, 1);
> mutex_init(&new_ruleset->lock);
> new_ruleset->root_inode = RB_ROOT;
> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET)
> + new_ruleset->root_net_port = RB_ROOT;
> +#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
> new_ruleset->num_layers = num_layers;
> /*
> * hierarchy = NULL
> @@ -46,16 +49,21 @@ static struct landlock_ruleset *create_ruleset(const u32 num_layers)
> }
>
> struct landlock_ruleset *
> -landlock_create_ruleset(const access_mask_t fs_access_mask)
> +landlock_create_ruleset(const access_mask_t fs_access_mask,
> + const access_mask_t net_access_mask)
> {
> struct landlock_ruleset *new_ruleset;
>
> /* Informs about useless ruleset. */
> - if (!fs_access_mask)
> + if (!fs_access_mask && !net_access_mask)
> return ERR_PTR(-ENOMSG);
> new_ruleset = create_ruleset(1);
> - if (!IS_ERR(new_ruleset))
> + if (IS_ERR(new_ruleset))
> + return new_ruleset;
> + if (fs_access_mask)
> landlock_add_fs_access_mask(new_ruleset, fs_access_mask, 0);
> + if (net_access_mask)
> + landlock_add_net_access_mask(new_ruleset, net_access_mask, 0);
> return new_ruleset;
> }
>
> @@ -73,6 +81,10 @@ static bool is_object_pointer(const enum landlock_key_type key_type)
> switch (key_type) {
> case LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE:
> return true;
> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET)
> + case LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT:
> + return false;
> +#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
> }
> WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
> return false;
> @@ -126,6 +138,11 @@ static struct rb_root *get_root(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
> case LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE:
> root = &ruleset->root_inode;
> break;
> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET)
> + case LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT:
> + root = &ruleset->root_net_port;
> + break;
> +#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
> }
> if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!root))
> return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
> @@ -154,7 +171,8 @@ static void build_check_ruleset(void)
> BUILD_BUG_ON(ruleset.num_rules < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_RULES);
> BUILD_BUG_ON(ruleset.num_layers < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS);
> BUILD_BUG_ON(access_masks <
> - (LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS << LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_FS));
> + ((LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS << LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_FS) |
> + (LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET << LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_NET)));
> }
>
> /**
> @@ -373,6 +391,12 @@ static int merge_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const dst,
> if (err)
> goto out_unlock;
>
> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET)
> + /* Merges the @src network port tree. */
> + err = merge_tree(dst, src, LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT);
> + if (err)
> + goto out_unlock;
> +#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
> out_unlock:
> mutex_unlock(&src->lock);
> mutex_unlock(&dst->lock);
> @@ -429,6 +453,12 @@ static int inherit_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const parent,
> if (err)
> goto out_unlock;
>
> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET)
> + /* Copies the @parent network port tree. */
> + err = inherit_tree(parent, child, LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT);
> + if (err)
> + goto out_unlock;
> +#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
> if (WARN_ON_ONCE(child->num_layers <= parent->num_layers)) {
> err = -EINVAL;
> goto out_unlock;
> @@ -461,6 +491,11 @@ static void free_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset)
> rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe(freeme, next, &ruleset->root_inode,
> node)
> free_rule(freeme, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE);
> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET)
> + rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe(freeme, next,
> + &ruleset->root_net_port, node)
> + free_rule(freeme, LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT);
> +#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
> put_hierarchy(ruleset->hierarchy);
> kfree(ruleset);
> }
> @@ -641,7 +676,8 @@ get_access_mask_t(const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
> *
> * @domain: The domain that defines the current restrictions.
> * @access_request: The requested access rights to check.
> - * @layer_masks: The layer masks to populate.
> + * @layer_masks: It must contain LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS or LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET
> + * elements according to @key_type.
> * @key_type: The key type to switch between access masks of different types.
> *
> * Returns: An access mask where each access right bit is set which is handled
> @@ -662,6 +698,12 @@ landlock_init_layer_masks(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
> get_access_mask = landlock_get_fs_access_mask;
> num_access = LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS;
> break;
> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET)
> + case LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT:
> + get_access_mask = landlock_get_net_access_mask;
> + num_access = LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET;
> + break;
> +#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
> default:
> WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
> return 0;
> diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.h b/security/landlock/ruleset.h
> index 2251e6048ccf..dcf7fbac8367 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/ruleset.h
> +++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.h
> @@ -33,13 +33,16 @@
> typedef u16 access_mask_t;
> /* Makes sure all filesystem access rights can be stored. */
> static_assert(BITS_PER_TYPE(access_mask_t) >= LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS);
> +/* Makes sure all network access rights can be stored. */
> +static_assert(BITS_PER_TYPE(access_mask_t) >= LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET);
> /* Makes sure for_each_set_bit() and for_each_clear_bit() calls are OK. */
> static_assert(sizeof(unsigned long) >= sizeof(access_mask_t));
>
> /* Ruleset access masks. */
> -typedef u16 access_masks_t;
> +typedef u32 access_masks_t;
> /* Makes sure all ruleset access rights can be stored. */
> -static_assert(BITS_PER_TYPE(access_masks_t) >= LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS);
> +static_assert(BITS_PER_TYPE(access_masks_t) >=
> + LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS + LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET);
>
> typedef u16 layer_mask_t;
> /* Makes sure all layers can be checked. */
> @@ -84,6 +87,13 @@ enum landlock_key_type {
> * keys.
> */
> LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE = 1,
> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET)
> + /**
> + * @LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT: Type of &landlock_ruleset.root_net_port's
> + * node keys.
> + */
> + LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT = 2,
> +#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
> };
>
> /**
> @@ -158,6 +168,15 @@ struct landlock_ruleset {
> * reaches zero.
> */
> struct rb_root root_inode;
> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET)
> + /**
> + * @root_net_port: Root of a red-black tree containing &struct
> + * landlock_rule nodes with network port. Once a ruleset is tied to a
> + * process (i.e. as a domain), this tree is immutable until @usage
> + * reaches zero.
> + */
> + struct rb_root root_net_port;
> +#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
> /**
> * @hierarchy: Enables hierarchy identification even when a parent
> * domain vanishes. This is needed for the ptrace protection.
> @@ -196,13 +215,13 @@ struct landlock_ruleset {
> */
> u32 num_layers;
> /**
> - * @access_masks: Contains the subset of filesystem
> - * actions that are restricted by a ruleset. A domain
> - * saves all layers of merged rulesets in a stack
> - * (FAM), starting from the first layer to the last
> - * one. These layers are used when merging rulesets,
> - * for user space backward compatibility (i.e.
> - * future-proof), and to properly handle merged
> + * @access_masks: Contains the subset of filesystem and
> + * network actions that are restricted by a ruleset.
> + * A domain saves all layers of merged rulesets in a
> + * stack (FAM), starting from the first layer to the
> + * last one. These layers are used when merging
> + * rulesets, for user space backward compatibility
> + * (i.e. future-proof), and to properly handle merged
> * rulesets without overlapping access rights. These
> * layers are set once and never changed for the
> * lifetime of the ruleset.
> @@ -213,7 +232,8 @@ struct landlock_ruleset {
> };
>
> struct landlock_ruleset *
> -landlock_create_ruleset(const access_mask_t access_mask);
> +landlock_create_ruleset(const access_mask_t access_mask_fs,
> + const access_mask_t access_mask_net);
>
> void landlock_put_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset);
> void landlock_put_ruleset_deferred(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset);
> @@ -249,6 +269,19 @@ landlock_add_fs_access_mask(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
> (fs_mask << LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_FS);
> }
>
> +static inline void
> +landlock_add_net_access_mask(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
> + const access_mask_t net_access_mask,
> + const u16 layer_level)
> +{
> + access_mask_t net_mask = net_access_mask & LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET;
> +
> + /* Should already be checked in sys_landlock_create_ruleset(). */
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(net_access_mask != net_mask);
> + ruleset->access_masks[layer_level] |=
> + (net_mask << LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_NET);
> +}
> +
> static inline access_mask_t
> landlock_get_raw_fs_access_mask(const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
> const u16 layer_level)
> @@ -266,6 +299,16 @@ landlock_get_fs_access_mask(const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
> return landlock_get_raw_fs_access_mask(ruleset, layer_level) |
> LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_INITIALLY_DENIED;
> }
> +
> +static inline access_mask_t
> +landlock_get_net_access_mask(const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
> + const u16 layer_level)
> +{
> + return (ruleset->access_masks[layer_level] >>
> + LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_NET) &
> + LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET;
> +}
> +
> bool landlock_unmask_layers(const struct landlock_rule *const rule,
> const access_mask_t access_request,
> layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks)[],
> diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.c b/security/landlock/setup.c
> index 3f196d2ce4f9..7e4a598177b8 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/setup.c
> +++ b/security/landlock/setup.c
> @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
> #include "fs.h"
> #include "ptrace.h"
> #include "setup.h"
> +#include "net.h"
>
> bool landlock_initialized __lsm_ro_after_init = false;
>
> @@ -29,6 +30,7 @@ static int __init landlock_init(void)
> landlock_add_cred_hooks();
> landlock_add_ptrace_hooks();
> landlock_add_fs_hooks();
> + landlock_add_net_hooks();
> landlock_initialized = true;
> pr_info("Up and running.\n");
> return 0;
> diff --git a/security/landlock/syscalls.c b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
> index 8a54e87dbb17..1f0edd605bc4 100644
> --- a/security/landlock/syscalls.c
> +++ b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
> @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
> #include "cred.h"
> #include "fs.h"
> #include "limits.h"
> +#include "net.h"
> #include "ruleset.h"
> #include "setup.h"
>
> @@ -74,7 +75,8 @@ static void build_check_abi(void)
> {
> struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr;
> struct landlock_path_beneath_attr path_beneath_attr;
> - size_t ruleset_size, path_beneath_size;
> + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_attr;
> + size_t ruleset_size, path_beneath_size, net_service_size;
>
> /*
> * For each user space ABI structures, first checks that there is no
> @@ -82,13 +84,19 @@ static void build_check_abi(void)
> * struct size.
> */
> ruleset_size = sizeof(ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs);
> + ruleset_size += sizeof(ruleset_attr.handled_access_net);
> BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ruleset_attr) != ruleset_size);
> - BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ruleset_attr) != 8);
> + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ruleset_attr) != 16);
>
> path_beneath_size = sizeof(path_beneath_attr.allowed_access);
> path_beneath_size += sizeof(path_beneath_attr.parent_fd);
> BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(path_beneath_attr) != path_beneath_size);
> BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(path_beneath_attr) != 12);
> +
> + net_service_size = sizeof(net_service_attr.allowed_access);
> + net_service_size += sizeof(net_service_attr.port);
> + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(net_service_attr) != net_service_size);
> + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(net_service_attr) != 16);
> }
>
> /* Ruleset handling */
> @@ -129,7 +137,7 @@ static const struct file_operations ruleset_fops = {
> .write = fop_dummy_write,
> };
>
> -#define LANDLOCK_ABI_VERSION 3
> +#define LANDLOCK_ABI_VERSION 4
>
> /**
> * sys_landlock_create_ruleset - Create a new ruleset
> @@ -188,8 +196,14 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(landlock_create_ruleset,
> LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> + /* Checks network content (and 32-bits cast). */
> + if ((ruleset_attr.handled_access_net | LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET) !=
> + LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> /* Checks arguments and transforms to kernel struct. */
> - ruleset = landlock_create_ruleset(ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs);
> + ruleset = landlock_create_ruleset(ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs,
> + ruleset_attr.handled_access_net);
> if (IS_ERR(ruleset))
> return PTR_ERR(ruleset);
>
> @@ -315,13 +329,54 @@ static int add_rule_path_beneath(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
> return err;
> }
>
> +static int add_rule_net_service(struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset,
> + const void __user *const rule_attr)
> +{
> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET)
> + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_attr;
> + int res;
> + access_mask_t mask;
> +
> + /* Copies raw user space buffer, only one type for now. */
> + res = copy_from_user(&net_service_attr, rule_attr,
> + sizeof(net_service_attr));
> + if (res)
> + return -EFAULT;
> +
> + /*
> + * Informs about useless rule: empty allowed_access (i.e. deny rules)
> + * are ignored by network actions.
> + */
> + if (!net_service_attr.allowed_access)
> + return -ENOMSG;
> +
> + /*
> + * Checks that allowed_access matches the @ruleset constraints
> + * (ruleset->access_masks[0] is automatically upgraded to 64-bits).
> + */
> + mask = landlock_get_net_access_mask(ruleset, 0);
> + if ((net_service_attr.allowed_access | mask) != mask)
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + /* Denies inserting a rule with port 0 or more than U16_MAX. */
"Denies inserting a rule with port 0 or higher than 65535."
A test should check that it works with 65535 but not with 65536.
> + if ((net_service_attr.port == 0) || (net_service_attr.port > U16_MAX))
> + return -EINVAL;
> +
> + /* Imports the new rule. */
> + return landlock_append_net_rule(ruleset, net_service_attr.port,
> + net_service_attr.allowed_access);
> +#else /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
> + return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
> +#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
> +}
> +
> /**
> * sys_landlock_add_rule - Add a new rule to a ruleset
> *
> * @ruleset_fd: File descriptor tied to the ruleset that should be extended
> * with the new rule.
> - * @rule_type: Identify the structure type pointed to by @rule_attr (only
> - * %LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH for now).
> + * @rule_type: Identify the structure type pointed to by @rule_attr:
> + * %LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH or %LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE.
> * @rule_attr: Pointer to a rule (only of type &struct
> * landlock_path_beneath_attr for now).
> * @flags: Must be 0.
> @@ -332,6 +387,8 @@ static int add_rule_path_beneath(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
> * Possible returned errors are:
> *
> * - %EOPNOTSUPP: Landlock is supported by the kernel but disabled at boot time;
> + * - %EAFNOSUPPORT: @rule_type is LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE but TCP/IP is not
> + * supported by the running kernel;
> * - %EINVAL: @flags is not 0, or inconsistent access in the rule (i.e.
> * &landlock_path_beneath_attr.allowed_access is not a subset of the
> * ruleset handled accesses);
> @@ -366,6 +423,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(landlock_add_rule, const int, ruleset_fd,
> case LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH:
> err = add_rule_path_beneath(ruleset, rule_attr);
> break;
> + case LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE:
> + err = add_rule_net_service(ruleset, rule_attr);
> + break;
> default:
> err = -EINVAL;
> break;
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c
> index 792c3f0a59b4..646f778dfb1e 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c
> @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ TEST(abi_version)
> const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
> .handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE,
> };
> - ASSERT_EQ(3, landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 0,
> + ASSERT_EQ(4, landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 0,
> LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION));
>
> ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, 0,
> --
> 2.25.1
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 48+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v10 09/13] landlock: Add network rules and TCP hooks support
2023-04-16 16:11 ` Mickaël Salaün
@ 2023-04-21 9:39 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
2023-04-26 14:15 ` Mickaël Salaün
0 siblings, 1 reply; 48+ messages in thread
From: Konstantin Meskhidze (A) @ 2023-04-21 9:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mickaël Salaün
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel, gnoack3000, linux-security-module, netdev,
netfilter-devel, yusongping, artem.kuzin
4/16/2023 7:11 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
>
> On 23/03/2023 09:52, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
>> This commit adds network rules support in the ruleset management
>> helpers and the landlock_create_ruleset syscall.
>> Refactor user space API to support network actions. Add new network
>> access flags, network rule and network attributes. Increment Landlock
>> ABI version. Expand access_masks_t to u32 to be sure network access
>> rights can be stored. Implement socket_bind() and socket_connect()
>> LSM hooks, which enable to restrict TCP socket binding and connection
>
> "which enables to"
>
Got it.
>
>> to specific ports.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
>> ---
>>
>> Changes since v9:
>> * Changes UAPI port field to __u64.
>> * Moves shared code into check_socket_access().
>> * Adds get_raw_handled_net_accesses() and
>> get_current_net_domain() helpers.
>> * Minor fixes.
>>
>> Changes since v8:
>> * Squashes commits.
>> * Refactors commit message.
>> * Changes UAPI port field to __be16.
>> * Changes logic of bind/connect hooks with AF_UNSPEC families.
>> * Adds address length checking.
>> * Minor fixes.
>>
>> Changes since v7:
>> * Squashes commits.
>> * Increments ABI version to 4.
>> * Refactors commit message.
>> * Minor fixes.
>>
>> Changes since v6:
>> * Renames landlock_set_net_access_mask() to landlock_add_net_access_mask()
>> because it OR values.
>> * Makes landlock_add_net_access_mask() more resilient incorrect values.
>> * Refactors landlock_get_net_access_mask().
>> * Renames LANDLOCK_MASK_SHIFT_NET to LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_NET and use
>> LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS as value.
>> * Updates access_masks_t to u32 to support network access actions.
>> * Refactors landlock internal functions to support network actions with
>> landlock_key/key_type/id types.
>>
>> Changes since v5:
>> * Gets rid of partial revert from landlock_add_rule
>> syscall.
>> * Formats code with clang-format-14.
>>
>> Changes since v4:
>> * Refactors landlock_create_ruleset() - splits ruleset and
>> masks checks.
>> * Refactors landlock_create_ruleset() and landlock mask
>> setters/getters to support two rule types.
>> * Refactors landlock_add_rule syscall add_rule_path_beneath
>> function by factoring out get_ruleset_from_fd() and
>> landlock_put_ruleset().
>>
>> Changes since v3:
>> * Splits commit.
>> * Adds network rule support for internal landlock functions.
>> * Adds set_mask and get_mask for network.
>> * Adds rb_root root_net_port.
>>
>> ---
>> include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 49 +++++
>> security/landlock/Kconfig | 1 +
>> security/landlock/Makefile | 2 +
>> security/landlock/limits.h | 6 +-
>> security/landlock/net.c | 198 +++++++++++++++++++
>> security/landlock/net.h | 26 +++
>> security/landlock/ruleset.c | 52 ++++-
>> security/landlock/ruleset.h | 63 +++++-
>> security/landlock/setup.c | 2 +
>> security/landlock/syscalls.c | 72 ++++++-
>> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 2 +-
>> 11 files changed, 450 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
>> create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.c
>> create mode 100644 security/landlock/net.h
>>
>> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
>> index 81d09ef9aa50..09b70fb6a9a6 100644
>> --- a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
>> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
>> @@ -31,6 +31,13 @@ struct landlock_ruleset_attr {
>> * this access right.
>> */
>> __u64 handled_access_fs;
>> +
>> + /**
>> + * @handled_access_net: Bitmask of actions (cf. `Network flags`_)
>> + * that is handled by this ruleset and should then be forbidden if no
>> + * rule explicitly allow them.
>> + */
>> + __u64 handled_access_net;
>> };
>>
>> /*
>> @@ -54,6 +61,11 @@ enum landlock_rule_type {
>> * landlock_path_beneath_attr .
>> */
>> LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH = 1,
>> + /**
>> + * @LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE: Type of a &struct
>> + * landlock_net_service_attr .
>> + */
>> + LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE = 2,
>> };
>>
>> /**
>> @@ -79,6 +91,24 @@ struct landlock_path_beneath_attr {
>> */
>> } __attribute__((packed));
>>
>> +/**
>> + * struct landlock_net_service_attr - TCP subnet definition
>> + *
>> + * Argument of sys_landlock_add_rule().
>> + */
>> +struct landlock_net_service_attr {
>> + /**
>> + * @allowed_access: Bitmask of allowed access network for services
>> + * (cf. `Network flags`_).
>> + */
>> + __u64 allowed_access;
>> + /**
>> + * @port: Network port.
>> + */
>> + __u64 port;
>> +
>> +} __attribute__((packed));
>
> You can remove the empty line and the packed attribute.
>
Ok. Thanks.
>
>> +
>> /**
>> * DOC: fs_access
>> *
>> @@ -189,4 +219,23 @@ struct landlock_path_beneath_attr {
>> #define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE (1ULL << 14)
>> /* clang-format on */
>>
>> +/**
>> + * DOC: net_access
>> + *
>> + * Network flags
>> + * ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> + *
>> + * These flags enable to restrict a sandboxed process to a set of network
>> + * actions.
>> + *
>> + * TCP sockets with allowed actions:
>> + *
>> + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP: Bind a TCP socket to a local port.
>> + * - %LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP: Connect an active TCP socket to
>> + * a remote port.
>> + */
>> +/* clang-format off */
>> +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP (1ULL << 0)
>> +#define LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP (1ULL << 1)
>> +/* clang-format on */
>> #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H */
>> diff --git a/security/landlock/Kconfig b/security/landlock/Kconfig
>> index 8e33c4e8ffb8..10c099097533 100644
>> --- a/security/landlock/Kconfig
>> +++ b/security/landlock/Kconfig
>> @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
>> config SECURITY_LANDLOCK
>> bool "Landlock support"
>> depends on SECURITY && !ARCH_EPHEMERAL_INODES
>> + select SECURITY_NETWORK
>> select SECURITY_PATH
>> help
>> Landlock is a sandboxing mechanism that enables processes to restrict
>> diff --git a/security/landlock/Makefile b/security/landlock/Makefile
>> index 7bbd2f413b3e..53d3c92ae22e 100644
>> --- a/security/landlock/Makefile
>> +++ b/security/landlock/Makefile
>> @@ -2,3 +2,5 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK) := landlock.o
>>
>> landlock-y := setup.o syscalls.o object.o ruleset.o \
>> cred.o ptrace.o fs.o
>> +
>> +landlock-$(CONFIG_INET) += net.o
>> \ No newline at end of file
>> diff --git a/security/landlock/limits.h b/security/landlock/limits.h
>> index bafb3b8dc677..8a1a6463c64e 100644
>> --- a/security/landlock/limits.h
>> +++ b/security/landlock/limits.h
>> @@ -23,6 +23,10 @@
>> #define LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS __const_hweight64(LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS)
>> #define LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_FS 0
>>
>> -/* clang-format on */
>> +#define LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_NET LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP
>> +#define LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET ((LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_NET << 1) - 1)
>> +#define LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET __const_hweight64(LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET)
>> +#define LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_NET LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS
>>
>> +/* clang-format on */
>> #endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LIMITS_H */
>> diff --git a/security/landlock/net.c b/security/landlock/net.c
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 000000000000..e19c339906e7
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/security/landlock/net.c
>> @@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
>> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
>> +/*
>> + * Landlock LSM - Network management and hooks
>> + *
>> + * Copyright © 2022 Huawei Tech. Co., Ltd.
>> + * Copyright © 2022 Microsoft Corporation
>> + */
>> +
>> +#include <linux/in.h>
>> +#include <linux/net.h>
>> +#include <linux/socket.h>
>> +#include <net/ipv6.h>
>> +
>> +#include "common.h"
>> +#include "cred.h"
>> +#include "limits.h"
>> +#include "net.h"
>> +#include "ruleset.h"
>> +
>> +int landlock_append_net_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
>> + const u16 port, access_mask_t access_rights)
>> +{
>> + int err;
>> + const struct landlock_id id = {
>> + .key.data = port,
>> + .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT,
>> + };
>> + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(port) > sizeof(id.key.data));
>> +
>> + /* Transforms relative access rights to absolute ones. */
>> + access_rights |= LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET &
>> + ~landlock_get_net_access_mask(ruleset, 0);
>> +
>> + mutex_lock(&ruleset->lock);
>> + err = landlock_insert_rule(ruleset, id, access_rights);
>> + mutex_unlock(&ruleset->lock);
>> +
>> + return err;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static access_mask_t
>> +get_raw_handled_net_accesses(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain)
>> +{
>> + access_mask_t access_dom = 0;
>> + size_t layer_level;
>> +
>> + for (layer_level = 0; layer_level < domain->num_layers; layer_level++)
>> + access_dom |= landlock_get_net_access_mask(domain, layer_level);
>> + return access_dom;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static const struct landlock_ruleset *get_current_net_domain(void)
>> +{
>> + const struct landlock_ruleset *const dom =
>> + landlock_get_current_domain();
>> +
>> + if (!dom || !get_raw_handled_net_accesses(dom))
>> + return NULL;
>> +
>> + return dom;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int check_addrlen(const struct sockaddr *const address, int addrlen)
>> +{
>> + if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> + switch (address->sa_family) {
>> + case AF_UNSPEC:
>> + case AF_INET:
>> + if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> + return 0;
>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
>> + case AF_INET6:
>> + if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> + return 0;
>> +#endif
>> + }
>> + WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
>> + return 0;
>
> With this code, using any non-TCP socket would print a warning.
>
Yep. Already got this warning printed in tests with unix sockets.
I will refactor this part as you suggest below.
> All these switch/case make difficult to check consistency across
> check_addrlen() and get_port() helpers, they should be inlined into
> check_socket_access(), with only one switch statement, but we need to be
> careful about the return error orders: first EINVAL and after
> EAFNOSUPPORT. Inlining all this also enables to get rid of impossible
> cases (that lead to these WARN_ON_ONCE calls).
>
Got it. Thanks.
>
>
>> +}
>> +
>> +static u16 get_port(const struct sockaddr *const address)
>> +{
>> + /* Gets port value in host byte order. */
>> + switch (address->sa_family) {
>> + case AF_UNSPEC:
>> + case AF_INET: {
>> + const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr =
>> + (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
>> + return ntohs(sockaddr->sin_port);
>> + }
>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
>> + case AF_INET6: {
>> + const struct sockaddr_in6 *const sockaddr_ip6 =
>> + (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
>> + return ntohs(sockaddr_ip6->sin6_port);
>> + }
>> +#endif
>> + }
>> + WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
>> + return 0;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int check_socket_access(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen, u16 port,
>> + access_mask_t access_request)
>> +{
>> + int ret;
>> + bool allowed = false;
>> + layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET] = {};
>> + const struct landlock_rule *rule;
>> + access_mask_t handled_access;
>> + const struct landlock_id id = {
>> + .key.data = port,
>> + .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT,
>> + };
>> + const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain = get_current_net_domain();
>> +
>> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!domain))
>> + return 0;
>> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(domain->num_layers < 1))
>> + return -EACCES;
>> + /* Check if it's a TCP socket. */
>> + if (sock->type != SOCK_STREAM)
>> + return 0;
>> +
>> + ret = check_addrlen(address, addrlen);
>> + if (ret)
>> + return ret;
>
> As explained above, this should be replaced with:
>
> if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
> return -EINVAL;
>
Ok.
>
>> +
>> + switch (address->sa_family) {
>
>
> This below block should be moved after the generic switch statement
> (i.e. once port is checked).
>
Do you mean checking address family after a port has been checked??
>
>
>> + case AF_UNSPEC:
>> + /*
>> + * Connecting to an address with AF_UNSPEC dissolves the TCP
>> + * association, which have the same effect as closing the
>> + * connection while retaining the socket object (i.e., the file
>> + * descriptor). As for dropping privileges, closing
>> + * connections is always allowed.
>> + */
>> + if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP)
>> + return 0;
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * For compatibility reason, accept AF_UNSPEC for bind
>> + * accesses (mapped to AF_INET) only if the address is
>> + * INADDR_ANY (cf. __inet_bind). Checking the address is
>> + * required to not wrongfully return -EACCES instead of
>> + * -EAFNOSUPPORT.
>> + */
>> + if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP) {
>> + const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr =
>> + (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
>> +
>> + if (sockaddr->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
>> + return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
>> + }
>> +
>> + fallthrough;
>
>
>
> case AF_UNSPEC:
>
>> + case AF_INET:
>
> if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
> return -EINVAL;
>
> port = ((struct sockaddr_in *)address)->sin_port;
> break;
>
>
>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
>> + case AF_INET6:
>
> if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
> return -EINVAL;
>
> port = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)address)->sin6_port;
> break;
>
>
>> +#endif
>
> /* Allows unhandled protocols. */
> default:
> return 0;
> }
>
> if (address->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC) {
>
> // Add here the above AF_UNSPEC checks to be consistent with the
> EINVAL/EAFNOSUPPORT return ordering.
>
> }
>
> id.key.data = (__force uintprt_t)port;
> BUID_BUG_ON(...);
>
Will be refactored. Thanks.
>
>
>> + rule = landlock_find_rule(domain, id);
>> + handled_access = landlock_init_layer_masks(
>> + domain, access_request, &layer_masks,
>> + LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT);
>> + allowed = landlock_unmask_layers(rule, handled_access,
>> + &layer_masks,
>> + ARRAY_SIZE(layer_masks));
>> + }
>
> This curly brace can now be removed and the following return line is now OK.
>
Ok. Got it.
>
>> + return allowed ? 0 : -EACCES;
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int hook_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
>> + int addrlen)
>> +{
>> + return check_socket_access(sock, address, addrlen, get_port(address),
>> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP);
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int hook_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
>> + int addrlen)
>> +{
>> + return check_socket_access(sock, address, addrlen, get_port(address),
>> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP);
>> +}
>> +
>> +static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
>> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, hook_socket_bind),
>> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, hook_socket_connect),
>> +};
>> +
>> +__init void landlock_add_net_hooks(void)
>> +{
>> + security_add_hooks(landlock_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(landlock_hooks),
>> + LANDLOCK_NAME);
>> +}
>> diff --git a/security/landlock/net.h b/security/landlock/net.h
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 000000000000..0da1d9dff5ab
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/security/landlock/net.h
>> @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
>> +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */
>> +/*
>> + * Landlock LSM - Network management and hooks
>> + *
>> + * Copyright © 2022 Huawei Tech. Co., Ltd.
>> + */
>> +
>> +#ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_NET_H
>> +#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_NET_H
>> +
>> +#include "common.h"
>> +#include "ruleset.h"
>> +#include "setup.h"
>> +
>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET)
>> +__init void landlock_add_net_hooks(void);
>> +
>> +int landlock_append_net_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
>> + const u16 port, access_mask_t access_rights);
>> +#else /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
>> +static inline void landlock_add_net_hooks(void)
>> +{
>> +}
>> +#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
>> +
>> +#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_NET_H */
>> diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.c b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
>> index 14207b666095..53cb62701280 100644
>> --- a/security/landlock/ruleset.c
>> +++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
>> @@ -36,6 +36,9 @@ static struct landlock_ruleset *create_ruleset(const u32 num_layers)
>> refcount_set(&new_ruleset->usage, 1);
>> mutex_init(&new_ruleset->lock);
>> new_ruleset->root_inode = RB_ROOT;
>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET)
>> + new_ruleset->root_net_port = RB_ROOT;
>> +#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
>> new_ruleset->num_layers = num_layers;
>> /*
>> * hierarchy = NULL
>> @@ -46,16 +49,21 @@ static struct landlock_ruleset *create_ruleset(const u32 num_layers)
>> }
>>
>> struct landlock_ruleset *
>> -landlock_create_ruleset(const access_mask_t fs_access_mask)
>> +landlock_create_ruleset(const access_mask_t fs_access_mask,
>> + const access_mask_t net_access_mask)
>> {
>> struct landlock_ruleset *new_ruleset;
>>
>> /* Informs about useless ruleset. */
>> - if (!fs_access_mask)
>> + if (!fs_access_mask && !net_access_mask)
>> return ERR_PTR(-ENOMSG);
>> new_ruleset = create_ruleset(1);
>> - if (!IS_ERR(new_ruleset))
>> + if (IS_ERR(new_ruleset))
>> + return new_ruleset;
>> + if (fs_access_mask)
>> landlock_add_fs_access_mask(new_ruleset, fs_access_mask, 0);
>> + if (net_access_mask)
>> + landlock_add_net_access_mask(new_ruleset, net_access_mask, 0);
>> return new_ruleset;
>> }
>>
>> @@ -73,6 +81,10 @@ static bool is_object_pointer(const enum landlock_key_type key_type)
>> switch (key_type) {
>> case LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE:
>> return true;
>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET)
>> + case LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT:
>> + return false;
>> +#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
>> }
>> WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
>> return false;
>> @@ -126,6 +138,11 @@ static struct rb_root *get_root(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
>> case LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE:
>> root = &ruleset->root_inode;
>> break;
>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET)
>> + case LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT:
>> + root = &ruleset->root_net_port;
>> + break;
>> +#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
>> }
>> if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!root))
>> return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
>> @@ -154,7 +171,8 @@ static void build_check_ruleset(void)
>> BUILD_BUG_ON(ruleset.num_rules < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_RULES);
>> BUILD_BUG_ON(ruleset.num_layers < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS);
>> BUILD_BUG_ON(access_masks <
>> - (LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS << LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_FS));
>> + ((LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS << LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_FS) |
>> + (LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET << LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_NET)));
>> }
>>
>> /**
>> @@ -373,6 +391,12 @@ static int merge_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const dst,
>> if (err)
>> goto out_unlock;
>>
>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET)
>> + /* Merges the @src network port tree. */
>> + err = merge_tree(dst, src, LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT);
>> + if (err)
>> + goto out_unlock;
>> +#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
>> out_unlock:
>> mutex_unlock(&src->lock);
>> mutex_unlock(&dst->lock);
>> @@ -429,6 +453,12 @@ static int inherit_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const parent,
>> if (err)
>> goto out_unlock;
>>
>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET)
>> + /* Copies the @parent network port tree. */
>> + err = inherit_tree(parent, child, LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT);
>> + if (err)
>> + goto out_unlock;
>> +#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
>> if (WARN_ON_ONCE(child->num_layers <= parent->num_layers)) {
>> err = -EINVAL;
>> goto out_unlock;
>> @@ -461,6 +491,11 @@ static void free_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset)
>> rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe(freeme, next, &ruleset->root_inode,
>> node)
>> free_rule(freeme, LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE);
>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET)
>> + rbtree_postorder_for_each_entry_safe(freeme, next,
>> + &ruleset->root_net_port, node)
>> + free_rule(freeme, LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT);
>> +#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
>> put_hierarchy(ruleset->hierarchy);
>> kfree(ruleset);
>> }
>> @@ -641,7 +676,8 @@ get_access_mask_t(const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
>> *
>> * @domain: The domain that defines the current restrictions.
>> * @access_request: The requested access rights to check.
>> - * @layer_masks: The layer masks to populate.
>> + * @layer_masks: It must contain LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS or LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET
>> + * elements according to @key_type.
>> * @key_type: The key type to switch between access masks of different types.
>> *
>> * Returns: An access mask where each access right bit is set which is handled
>> @@ -662,6 +698,12 @@ landlock_init_layer_masks(const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain,
>> get_access_mask = landlock_get_fs_access_mask;
>> num_access = LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS;
>> break;
>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET)
>> + case LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT:
>> + get_access_mask = landlock_get_net_access_mask;
>> + num_access = LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET;
>> + break;
>> +#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
>> default:
>> WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
>> return 0;
>> diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.h b/security/landlock/ruleset.h
>> index 2251e6048ccf..dcf7fbac8367 100644
>> --- a/security/landlock/ruleset.h
>> +++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.h
>> @@ -33,13 +33,16 @@
>> typedef u16 access_mask_t;
>> /* Makes sure all filesystem access rights can be stored. */
>> static_assert(BITS_PER_TYPE(access_mask_t) >= LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS);
>> +/* Makes sure all network access rights can be stored. */
>> +static_assert(BITS_PER_TYPE(access_mask_t) >= LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET);
>> /* Makes sure for_each_set_bit() and for_each_clear_bit() calls are OK. */
>> static_assert(sizeof(unsigned long) >= sizeof(access_mask_t));
>>
>> /* Ruleset access masks. */
>> -typedef u16 access_masks_t;
>> +typedef u32 access_masks_t;
>> /* Makes sure all ruleset access rights can be stored. */
>> -static_assert(BITS_PER_TYPE(access_masks_t) >= LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS);
>> +static_assert(BITS_PER_TYPE(access_masks_t) >=
>> + LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_FS + LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET);
>>
>> typedef u16 layer_mask_t;
>> /* Makes sure all layers can be checked. */
>> @@ -84,6 +87,13 @@ enum landlock_key_type {
>> * keys.
>> */
>> LANDLOCK_KEY_INODE = 1,
>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET)
>> + /**
>> + * @LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT: Type of &landlock_ruleset.root_net_port's
>> + * node keys.
>> + */
>> + LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT = 2,
>> +#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
>> };
>>
>> /**
>> @@ -158,6 +168,15 @@ struct landlock_ruleset {
>> * reaches zero.
>> */
>> struct rb_root root_inode;
>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET)
>> + /**
>> + * @root_net_port: Root of a red-black tree containing &struct
>> + * landlock_rule nodes with network port. Once a ruleset is tied to a
>> + * process (i.e. as a domain), this tree is immutable until @usage
>> + * reaches zero.
>> + */
>> + struct rb_root root_net_port;
>> +#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
>> /**
>> * @hierarchy: Enables hierarchy identification even when a parent
>> * domain vanishes. This is needed for the ptrace protection.
>> @@ -196,13 +215,13 @@ struct landlock_ruleset {
>> */
>> u32 num_layers;
>> /**
>> - * @access_masks: Contains the subset of filesystem
>> - * actions that are restricted by a ruleset. A domain
>> - * saves all layers of merged rulesets in a stack
>> - * (FAM), starting from the first layer to the last
>> - * one. These layers are used when merging rulesets,
>> - * for user space backward compatibility (i.e.
>> - * future-proof), and to properly handle merged
>> + * @access_masks: Contains the subset of filesystem and
>> + * network actions that are restricted by a ruleset.
>> + * A domain saves all layers of merged rulesets in a
>> + * stack (FAM), starting from the first layer to the
>> + * last one. These layers are used when merging
>> + * rulesets, for user space backward compatibility
>> + * (i.e. future-proof), and to properly handle merged
>> * rulesets without overlapping access rights. These
>> * layers are set once and never changed for the
>> * lifetime of the ruleset.
>> @@ -213,7 +232,8 @@ struct landlock_ruleset {
>> };
>>
>> struct landlock_ruleset *
>> -landlock_create_ruleset(const access_mask_t access_mask);
>> +landlock_create_ruleset(const access_mask_t access_mask_fs,
>> + const access_mask_t access_mask_net);
>>
>> void landlock_put_ruleset(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset);
>> void landlock_put_ruleset_deferred(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset);
>> @@ -249,6 +269,19 @@ landlock_add_fs_access_mask(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
>> (fs_mask << LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_FS);
>> }
>>
>> +static inline void
>> +landlock_add_net_access_mask(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
>> + const access_mask_t net_access_mask,
>> + const u16 layer_level)
>> +{
>> + access_mask_t net_mask = net_access_mask & LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET;
>> +
>> + /* Should already be checked in sys_landlock_create_ruleset(). */
>> + WARN_ON_ONCE(net_access_mask != net_mask);
>> + ruleset->access_masks[layer_level] |=
>> + (net_mask << LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_NET);
>> +}
>> +
>> static inline access_mask_t
>> landlock_get_raw_fs_access_mask(const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
>> const u16 layer_level)
>> @@ -266,6 +299,16 @@ landlock_get_fs_access_mask(const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
>> return landlock_get_raw_fs_access_mask(ruleset, layer_level) |
>> LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_INITIALLY_DENIED;
>> }
>> +
>> +static inline access_mask_t
>> +landlock_get_net_access_mask(const struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
>> + const u16 layer_level)
>> +{
>> + return (ruleset->access_masks[layer_level] >>
>> + LANDLOCK_SHIFT_ACCESS_NET) &
>> + LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET;
>> +}
>> +
>> bool landlock_unmask_layers(const struct landlock_rule *const rule,
>> const access_mask_t access_request,
>> layer_mask_t (*const layer_masks)[],
>> diff --git a/security/landlock/setup.c b/security/landlock/setup.c
>> index 3f196d2ce4f9..7e4a598177b8 100644
>> --- a/security/landlock/setup.c
>> +++ b/security/landlock/setup.c
>> @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
>> #include "fs.h"
>> #include "ptrace.h"
>> #include "setup.h"
>> +#include "net.h"
>>
>> bool landlock_initialized __lsm_ro_after_init = false;
>>
>> @@ -29,6 +30,7 @@ static int __init landlock_init(void)
>> landlock_add_cred_hooks();
>> landlock_add_ptrace_hooks();
>> landlock_add_fs_hooks();
>> + landlock_add_net_hooks();
>> landlock_initialized = true;
>> pr_info("Up and running.\n");
>> return 0;
>> diff --git a/security/landlock/syscalls.c b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
>> index 8a54e87dbb17..1f0edd605bc4 100644
>> --- a/security/landlock/syscalls.c
>> +++ b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
>> @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
>> #include "cred.h"
>> #include "fs.h"
>> #include "limits.h"
>> +#include "net.h"
>> #include "ruleset.h"
>> #include "setup.h"
>>
>> @@ -74,7 +75,8 @@ static void build_check_abi(void)
>> {
>> struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr;
>> struct landlock_path_beneath_attr path_beneath_attr;
>> - size_t ruleset_size, path_beneath_size;
>> + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_attr;
>> + size_t ruleset_size, path_beneath_size, net_service_size;
>>
>> /*
>> * For each user space ABI structures, first checks that there is no
>> @@ -82,13 +84,19 @@ static void build_check_abi(void)
>> * struct size.
>> */
>> ruleset_size = sizeof(ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs);
>> + ruleset_size += sizeof(ruleset_attr.handled_access_net);
>> BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ruleset_attr) != ruleset_size);
>> - BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ruleset_attr) != 8);
>> + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(ruleset_attr) != 16);
>>
>> path_beneath_size = sizeof(path_beneath_attr.allowed_access);
>> path_beneath_size += sizeof(path_beneath_attr.parent_fd);
>> BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(path_beneath_attr) != path_beneath_size);
>> BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(path_beneath_attr) != 12);
>> +
>> + net_service_size = sizeof(net_service_attr.allowed_access);
>> + net_service_size += sizeof(net_service_attr.port);
>> + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(net_service_attr) != net_service_size);
>> + BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(net_service_attr) != 16);
>> }
>>
>> /* Ruleset handling */
>> @@ -129,7 +137,7 @@ static const struct file_operations ruleset_fops = {
>> .write = fop_dummy_write,
>> };
>>
>> -#define LANDLOCK_ABI_VERSION 3
>> +#define LANDLOCK_ABI_VERSION 4
>>
>> /**
>> * sys_landlock_create_ruleset - Create a new ruleset
>> @@ -188,8 +196,14 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(landlock_create_ruleset,
>> LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_FS)
>> return -EINVAL;
>>
>> + /* Checks network content (and 32-bits cast). */
>> + if ((ruleset_attr.handled_access_net | LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET) !=
>> + LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET)
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> +
>> /* Checks arguments and transforms to kernel struct. */
>> - ruleset = landlock_create_ruleset(ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs);
>> + ruleset = landlock_create_ruleset(ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs,
>> + ruleset_attr.handled_access_net);
>> if (IS_ERR(ruleset))
>> return PTR_ERR(ruleset);
>>
>> @@ -315,13 +329,54 @@ static int add_rule_path_beneath(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
>> return err;
>> }
>>
>> +static int add_rule_net_service(struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset,
>> + const void __user *const rule_attr)
>> +{
>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET)
>> + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_attr;
>> + int res;
>> + access_mask_t mask;
>> +
>> + /* Copies raw user space buffer, only one type for now. */
>> + res = copy_from_user(&net_service_attr, rule_attr,
>> + sizeof(net_service_attr));
>> + if (res)
>> + return -EFAULT;
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Informs about useless rule: empty allowed_access (i.e. deny rules)
>> + * are ignored by network actions.
>> + */
>> + if (!net_service_attr.allowed_access)
>> + return -ENOMSG;
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Checks that allowed_access matches the @ruleset constraints
>> + * (ruleset->access_masks[0] is automatically upgraded to 64-bits).
>> + */
>> + mask = landlock_get_net_access_mask(ruleset, 0);
>> + if ((net_service_attr.allowed_access | mask) != mask)
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> +
>> + /* Denies inserting a rule with port 0 or more than U16_MAX. */
> "Denies inserting a rule with port 0 or higher than 65535."
>
> A test should check that it works with 65535 but not with 65536.
Got it.
>
>
>> + if ((net_service_attr.port == 0) || (net_service_attr.port > U16_MAX))
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> +
>> + /* Imports the new rule. */
>> + return landlock_append_net_rule(ruleset, net_service_attr.port,
>> + net_service_attr.allowed_access);
>> +#else /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
>> + return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
>> +#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INET) */
>> +}
>> +
>> /**
>> * sys_landlock_add_rule - Add a new rule to a ruleset
>> *
>> * @ruleset_fd: File descriptor tied to the ruleset that should be extended
>> * with the new rule.
>> - * @rule_type: Identify the structure type pointed to by @rule_attr (only
>> - * %LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH for now).
>> + * @rule_type: Identify the structure type pointed to by @rule_attr:
>> + * %LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH or %LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE.
>> * @rule_attr: Pointer to a rule (only of type &struct
>> * landlock_path_beneath_attr for now).
>> * @flags: Must be 0.
>> @@ -332,6 +387,8 @@ static int add_rule_path_beneath(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
>> * Possible returned errors are:
>> *
>> * - %EOPNOTSUPP: Landlock is supported by the kernel but disabled at boot time;
>> + * - %EAFNOSUPPORT: @rule_type is LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE but TCP/IP is not
>> + * supported by the running kernel;
>> * - %EINVAL: @flags is not 0, or inconsistent access in the rule (i.e.
>> * &landlock_path_beneath_attr.allowed_access is not a subset of the
>> * ruleset handled accesses);
>> @@ -366,6 +423,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(landlock_add_rule, const int, ruleset_fd,
>> case LANDLOCK_RULE_PATH_BENEATH:
>> err = add_rule_path_beneath(ruleset, rule_attr);
>> break;
>> + case LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE:
>> + err = add_rule_net_service(ruleset, rule_attr);
>> + break;
>> default:
>> err = -EINVAL;
>> break;
>> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c
>> index 792c3f0a59b4..646f778dfb1e 100644
>> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c
>> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c
>> @@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ TEST(abi_version)
>> const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
>> .handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE,
>> };
>> - ASSERT_EQ(3, landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 0,
>> + ASSERT_EQ(4, landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 0,
>> LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION));
>>
>> ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, 0,
>> --
>> 2.25.1
>>
> .
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 48+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v10 09/13] landlock: Add network rules and TCP hooks support
2023-04-21 9:39 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
@ 2023-04-26 14:15 ` Mickaël Salaün
0 siblings, 0 replies; 48+ messages in thread
From: Mickaël Salaün @ 2023-04-26 14:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel, gnoack3000, linux-security-module, netdev,
netfilter-devel, yusongping, artem.kuzin
On 21/04/2023 11:39, Konstantin Meskhidze (A) wrote:
>
>
> 4/16/2023 7:11 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
>>
>> On 23/03/2023 09:52, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
>>> This commit adds network rules support in the ruleset management
>>> helpers and the landlock_create_ruleset syscall.
>>> Refactor user space API to support network actions. Add new network
>>> access flags, network rule and network attributes. Increment Landlock
>>> ABI version. Expand access_masks_t to u32 to be sure network access
>>> rights can be stored. Implement socket_bind() and socket_connect()
>>> LSM hooks, which enable to restrict TCP socket binding and connection
>>
>> "which enables to"
>>
> Got it.
>>
>>> to specific ports.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
>>> ---
[...]
>>> +static u16 get_port(const struct sockaddr *const address)
>>> +{
>>> + /* Gets port value in host byte order. */
>>> + switch (address->sa_family) {
>>> + case AF_UNSPEC:
>>> + case AF_INET: {
>>> + const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr =
>>> + (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
>>> + return ntohs(sockaddr->sin_port);
>>> + }
>>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
>>> + case AF_INET6: {
>>> + const struct sockaddr_in6 *const sockaddr_ip6 =
>>> + (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
>>> + return ntohs(sockaddr_ip6->sin6_port);
>>> + }
>>> +#endif
>>> + }
>>> + WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
>>> + return 0;
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> +static int check_socket_access(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen, u16 port,
>>> + access_mask_t access_request)
>>> +{
>>> + int ret;
>>> + bool allowed = false;
>>> + layer_mask_t layer_masks[LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET] = {};
>>> + const struct landlock_rule *rule;
>>> + access_mask_t handled_access;
>>> + const struct landlock_id id = {
>>> + .key.data = port,
>>> + .type = LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT,
>>> + };
>>> + const struct landlock_ruleset *const domain = get_current_net_domain();
>>> +
>>> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!domain))
>>> + return 0;
>>> + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(domain->num_layers < 1))
>>> + return -EACCES;
>>> + /* Check if it's a TCP socket. */
>>> + if (sock->type != SOCK_STREAM)
>>> + return 0;
>>> +
>>> + ret = check_addrlen(address, addrlen);
>>> + if (ret)
>>> + return ret;
>>
>> As explained above, this should be replaced with:
>>
>> if (addrlen < offsetofend(struct sockaddr, sa_family))
>> return -EINVAL;
>>
> Ok.
>>
>>> +
>>> + switch (address->sa_family) {
>>
>>
>> This below block should be moved after the generic switch statement
>> (i.e. once port is checked).
>>
> Do you mean checking address family after a port has been checked??
These specific AF_UNSPEC checks should be in an `if (address->sa_family
== AF_UNSPEC)` block after the generic AF_UNSPEC, AF_INET, and AF_INET6
checks in the address->sa_family switch/case, because the checks and
errors order must be consistent whatever the sa_family. The AF_UNSPEC
checks are really an exception to the AF_INET ones, and should then come
after.
This may look like this:
switch (address->sa_family) {
case AF_UNSPEC:
case AF_INET:
port = ...;
break;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
case AF_INET6:
port = ...;
break;
#endif
default:
return 0;
}
/* Specific AF_UNSPEC handling. */
if (address->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC) {
...
if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP)
return 0;
...
}
id.key.data = (__force uintptr_t)port;
BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(port) > sizeof(id.key.data));
rule = landlock_find_rule(domain, id);
handled_access = landlock_init_layer_masks(
domain, access_request, &layer_masks,
LANDLOCK_KEY_NET_PORT);
if (landlock_unmask_layers(rule, handled_access,
&layer_masks,
ARRAY_SIZE(layer_masks)))
return 0;
return -EACCES;
>
>>
>>
>>> + case AF_UNSPEC:
>>> + /*
>>> + * Connecting to an address with AF_UNSPEC dissolves the TCP
>>> + * association, which have the same effect as closing the
>>> + * connection while retaining the socket object (i.e., the file
>>> + * descriptor). As for dropping privileges, closing
>>> + * connections is always allowed.
>>> + */
>>> + if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP)
>>> + return 0;
>>> +
>>> + /*
>>> + * For compatibility reason, accept AF_UNSPEC for bind
>>> + * accesses (mapped to AF_INET) only if the address is
>>> + * INADDR_ANY (cf. __inet_bind). Checking the address is
>>> + * required to not wrongfully return -EACCES instead of
>>> + * -EAFNOSUPPORT.
>>> + */
>>> + if (access_request == LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP) {
>>> + const struct sockaddr_in *const sockaddr =
>>> + (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
>>> +
>>> + if (sockaddr->sin_addr.s_addr != htonl(INADDR_ANY))
>>> + return -EAFNOSUPPORT;
>>> + }
>>> +
>>> + fallthrough;
>>
>>
>>
>> case AF_UNSPEC:
>>
>>> + case AF_INET:
>>
>> if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
>> return -EINVAL;
>>
>> port = ((struct sockaddr_in *)address)->sin_port;
>> break;
>>
>>
>>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
>>> + case AF_INET6:
>>
>> if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
>> return -EINVAL;
>>
>> port = ((struct sockaddr_in6 *)address)->sin6_port;
>> break;
>>
>>
>>> +#endif
>>
>> /* Allows unhandled protocols. */
>> default:
>> return 0;
>> }
>>
>> if (address->sa_family == AF_UNSPEC) {
>>
>> // Add here the above AF_UNSPEC checks to be consistent with the
>> EINVAL/EAFNOSUPPORT return ordering.
>>
>> }
>>
>> id.key.data = (__force uintprt_t)port;
>> BUID_BUG_ON(...);
>>
> Will be refactored. Thanks.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 48+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v10 10/13] selftests/landlock: Share enforce_ruleset()
2023-03-23 8:52 [PATCH v10 00/13] Network support for Landlock Konstantin Meskhidze
` (8 preceding siblings ...)
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 09/13] landlock: Add network rules and TCP hooks support Konstantin Meskhidze
@ 2023-03-23 8:52 ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2023-04-16 16:12 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 11/13] selftests/landlock: Add 10 new test suites dedicated to network Konstantin Meskhidze
` (2 subsequent siblings)
12 siblings, 1 reply; 48+ messages in thread
From: Konstantin Meskhidze @ 2023-03-23 8:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: mic
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel, gnoack3000, linux-security-module, netdev,
netfilter-devel, yusongping, artem.kuzin
This commit moves enforce_ruleset() helper function to common.h so that
to be used both by filesystem tests and network ones.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
---
Changes since v9:
* None.
Changes since v8:
* Adds __maybe_unused attribute for enforce_ruleset() helper.
Changes since v7:
* Refactors commit message.
Changes since v6:
* None.
Changes since v5:
* Splits commit.
* Moves enforce_ruleset helper into common.h
* Formats code with clang-format-14.
---
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h | 10 ++++++++++
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 10 ----------
2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h
index d7987ae8d7fc..0fd6c4cf5e6f 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h
@@ -256,3 +256,13 @@ static int __maybe_unused send_fd(int usock, int fd_tx)
return -errno;
return 0;
}
+
+static void __maybe_unused
+enforce_ruleset(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata, const int ruleset_fd)
+{
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_restrict_self(ruleset_fd, 0))
+ {
+ TH_LOG("Failed to enforce ruleset: %s", strerror(errno));
+ }
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
index b6c4be3faf7a..b762b5419a89 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
@@ -598,16 +598,6 @@ static int create_ruleset(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
return ruleset_fd;
}
-static void enforce_ruleset(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
- const int ruleset_fd)
-{
- ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0));
- ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_restrict_self(ruleset_fd, 0))
- {
- TH_LOG("Failed to enforce ruleset: %s", strerror(errno));
- }
-}
-
TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_nsfs)
{
const struct rule rules[] = {
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 48+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v10 10/13] selftests/landlock: Share enforce_ruleset()
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 10/13] selftests/landlock: Share enforce_ruleset() Konstantin Meskhidze
@ 2023-04-16 16:12 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-20 16:06 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
0 siblings, 1 reply; 48+ messages in thread
From: Mickaël Salaün @ 2023-04-16 16:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Konstantin Meskhidze
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel, gnoack3000, linux-security-module, netdev,
netfilter-devel, yusongping, artem.kuzin
On 23/03/2023 09:52, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
> This commit moves enforce_ruleset() helper function to common.h so that
> to be used both by filesystem tests and network ones.
"so that it can be used"
>
> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
> ---
>
> Changes since v9:
> * None.
>
> Changes since v8:
> * Adds __maybe_unused attribute for enforce_ruleset() helper.
>
> Changes since v7:
> * Refactors commit message.
>
> Changes since v6:
> * None.
>
> Changes since v5:
> * Splits commit.
> * Moves enforce_ruleset helper into common.h
> * Formats code with clang-format-14.
>
> ---
> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h | 10 ++++++++++
> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 10 ----------
> 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h
> index d7987ae8d7fc..0fd6c4cf5e6f 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h
> @@ -256,3 +256,13 @@ static int __maybe_unused send_fd(int usock, int fd_tx)
> return -errno;
> return 0;
> }
> +
> +static void __maybe_unused
> +enforce_ruleset(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata, const int ruleset_fd)
> +{
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0));
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_restrict_self(ruleset_fd, 0))
> + {
> + TH_LOG("Failed to enforce ruleset: %s", strerror(errno));
> + }
> +}
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
> index b6c4be3faf7a..b762b5419a89 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
> @@ -598,16 +598,6 @@ static int create_ruleset(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
> return ruleset_fd;
> }
>
> -static void enforce_ruleset(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
> - const int ruleset_fd)
> -{
> - ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0));
> - ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_restrict_self(ruleset_fd, 0))
> - {
> - TH_LOG("Failed to enforce ruleset: %s", strerror(errno));
> - }
> -}
> -
> TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_nsfs)
> {
> const struct rule rules[] = {
> --
> 2.25.1
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 48+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v10 10/13] selftests/landlock: Share enforce_ruleset()
2023-04-16 16:12 ` Mickaël Salaün
@ 2023-04-20 16:06 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
0 siblings, 0 replies; 48+ messages in thread
From: Konstantin Meskhidze (A) @ 2023-04-20 16:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mickaël Salaün
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel, gnoack3000, linux-security-module, netdev,
netfilter-devel, yusongping, artem.kuzin
4/16/2023 7:12 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
>
> On 23/03/2023 09:52, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
>> This commit moves enforce_ruleset() helper function to common.h so that
>> to be used both by filesystem tests and network ones.
>
> "so that it can be used"
Got it.
>
>
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
>> ---
>>
>> Changes since v9:
>> * None.
>>
>> Changes since v8:
>> * Adds __maybe_unused attribute for enforce_ruleset() helper.
>>
>> Changes since v7:
>> * Refactors commit message.
>>
>> Changes since v6:
>> * None.
>>
>> Changes since v5:
>> * Splits commit.
>> * Moves enforce_ruleset helper into common.h
>> * Formats code with clang-format-14.
>>
>> ---
>> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h | 10 ++++++++++
>> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 10 ----------
>> 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h
>> index d7987ae8d7fc..0fd6c4cf5e6f 100644
>> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h
>> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/common.h
>> @@ -256,3 +256,13 @@ static int __maybe_unused send_fd(int usock, int fd_tx)
>> return -errno;
>> return 0;
>> }
>> +
>> +static void __maybe_unused
>> +enforce_ruleset(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata, const int ruleset_fd)
>> +{
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0));
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_restrict_self(ruleset_fd, 0))
>> + {
>> + TH_LOG("Failed to enforce ruleset: %s", strerror(errno));
>> + }
>> +}
>> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
>> index b6c4be3faf7a..b762b5419a89 100644
>> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
>> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
>> @@ -598,16 +598,6 @@ static int create_ruleset(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
>> return ruleset_fd;
>> }
>>
>> -static void enforce_ruleset(struct __test_metadata *const _metadata,
>> - const int ruleset_fd)
>> -{
>> - ASSERT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0));
>> - ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_restrict_self(ruleset_fd, 0))
>> - {
>> - TH_LOG("Failed to enforce ruleset: %s", strerror(errno));
>> - }
>> -}
>> -
>> TEST_F_FORK(layout1, proc_nsfs)
>> {
>> const struct rule rules[] = {
>> --
>> 2.25.1
>>
> .
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 48+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v10 11/13] selftests/landlock: Add 10 new test suites dedicated to network
2023-03-23 8:52 [PATCH v10 00/13] Network support for Landlock Konstantin Meskhidze
` (9 preceding siblings ...)
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 10/13] selftests/landlock: Share enforce_ruleset() Konstantin Meskhidze
@ 2023-03-23 8:52 ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2023-04-16 16:13 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 12/13] samples/landlock: Add network demo Konstantin Meskhidze
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 13/13] landlock: Document Landlock's network support Konstantin Meskhidze
12 siblings, 1 reply; 48+ messages in thread
From: Konstantin Meskhidze @ 2023-03-23 8:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: mic
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel, gnoack3000, linux-security-module, netdev,
netfilter-devel, yusongping, artem.kuzin
These test suites try to check edge cases for TCP sockets
bind() and connect() actions.
socket:
* bind: Tests with non-landlocked/landlocked ipv4 and ipv6 sockets.
* connect: Tests with non-landlocked/landlocked ipv4 and ipv6 sockets.
* bind_afunspec: Tests with non-landlocked/landlocked restrictions
for bind action with AF_UNSPEC socket family.
* connect_afunspec: Tests with non-landlocked/landlocked restrictions
for connect action with AF_UNSPEC socket family.
* ruleset_overlap: Tests with overlapping rules for one port.
* ruleset_expanding: Tests with expanding rulesets in which rules are
gradually added one by one, restricting sockets' connections.
* inval: Tests with invalid user space supplied data:
- out of range ruleset attribute;
- unhandled allowed access;
- zero port value;
- zero access value;
- legitimate access values;
* bind_connect_inval_addrlen: Tests with invalid address length.
* inval_port_format: Tests with wrong port format for ipv4/ipv6 sockets
and with port values more than U16_MAX.
layout1:
* with_net: Tests with network bind() socket action within
filesystem directory access test.
Test coverage for security/landlock is 94.5% of 945 lines according
to gcc/gcov-11.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
---
Changes since v9:
* Fixes mixing code declaration and code.
* Refactors FIXTURE_TEARDOWN() with clang-format.
* Replaces struct _fixture_variant_socket with
FIXTURE_VARIANT(socket).
* Deletes useless condition if (variant->is_sandboxed)
in multiple locations.
* Deletes zero_size argument in bind_variant() and
connect_variant().
* Adds tests for port values exceeding U16_MAX.
Changes since v8:
* Adds is_sandboxed const for FIXTURE_VARIANT(socket).
* Refactors AF_UNSPEC tests.
* Adds address length checking tests.
* Convert ports in all tests to __be16.
* Adds invalid port values tests.
* Minor fixes.
Changes since v7:
* Squashes all selftest commits.
* Adds fs test with network bind() socket action.
* Minor fixes.
---
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config | 4 +
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 64 +
tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c | 1176 +++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 1244 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config
index 0f0a65287bac..71f7e9a8a64c 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config
@@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
+CONFIG_INET=y
+CONFIG_IPV6=y
+CONFIG_NET=y
+CONFIG_NET_NS=y
CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS=y
CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK=y
CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH=y
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
index b762b5419a89..9dfbef276e4e 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
@@ -8,8 +8,10 @@
*/
#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <linux/landlock.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <sched.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
@@ -17,6 +19,7 @@
#include <sys/mount.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <sys/sendfile.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/sysmacros.h>
#include <unistd.h>
@@ -4413,4 +4416,65 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout2_overlay, same_content_different_file)
}
}
+#define IP_ADDRESS "127.0.0.1"
+
+TEST_F_FORK(layout1, with_net)
+{
+ const struct rule rules[] = {
+ {
+ .path = dir_s1d2,
+ .access = ACCESS_RO,
+ },
+ {},
+ };
+ int sockfd;
+ int sock_port = 15000;
+ struct sockaddr_in addr4;
+
+ struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr_net = {
+ .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+ };
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+
+ .port = sock_port,
+ };
+
+ addr4.sin_family = AF_INET;
+ addr4.sin_port = htons(sock_port);
+ addr4.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(IP_ADDRESS);
+ memset(&addr4.sin_zero, '\0', 8);
+
+ /* Creates ruleset for network access. */
+ const int ruleset_fd_net = landlock_create_ruleset(
+ &ruleset_attr_net, sizeof(ruleset_attr_net), 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_net);
+
+ /* Adds a network rule. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0,
+ landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd_net, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service, 0));
+
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd_net);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd_net));
+
+ const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+
+ /* Tests on a directory with the network rule loaded. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d2, O_RDONLY));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d2, O_RDONLY));
+
+ sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
+ /* Binds a socket to port 15000. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, bind(sockfd, &addr4, sizeof(addr4)));
+
+ /* Closes bounded socket. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
+}
+
TEST_HARNESS_MAIN
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d15a93c5b2c3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1176 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Landlock tests - Network
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2022 Huawei Tech. Co., Ltd.
+ */
+
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <linux/landlock.h>
+#include <linux/in.h>
+#include <sched.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#define MAX_SOCKET_NUM 10
+
+#define SOCK_PORT_START 3470
+#define SOCK_PORT_ADD 10
+
+#define IP_ADDRESS_IPV4 "127.0.0.1"
+#define IP_ADDRESS_IPV6 "::1"
+#define SOCK_PORT 15000
+
+/* Number pending connections queue to be hold. */
+#define BACKLOG 10
+
+const struct sockaddr addr_unspec = { .sa_family = AF_UNSPEC };
+
+/* Invalid attribute, out of landlock network access range. */
+#define LANDLOCK_INVAL_ATTR 7
+
+FIXTURE(socket)
+{
+ uint port[MAX_SOCKET_NUM];
+ struct sockaddr_in addr4[MAX_SOCKET_NUM];
+ struct sockaddr_in6 addr6[MAX_SOCKET_NUM];
+};
+
+FIXTURE_VARIANT(socket)
+{
+ const bool is_ipv4;
+ const bool is_sandboxed;
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(socket, ipv4) {
+ /* clang-format on */
+ .is_ipv4 = true,
+ .is_sandboxed = false,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(socket, ipv4_sandboxed) {
+ /* clang-format on */
+ .is_ipv4 = true,
+ .is_sandboxed = true,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(socket, ipv6) {
+ /* clang-format on */
+ .is_ipv4 = false,
+ .is_sandboxed = false,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(socket, ipv6_sandboxed) {
+ /* clang-format on */
+ .is_ipv4 = false,
+ .is_sandboxed = true,
+};
+
+static int create_socket_variant(const FIXTURE_VARIANT(socket) * const variant,
+ const int type)
+{
+ if (variant->is_ipv4)
+ return socket(AF_INET, type | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0);
+ else
+ return socket(AF_INET6, type | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0);
+}
+
+static int bind_variant(const FIXTURE_VARIANT(socket) * const variant,
+ const int sockfd,
+ const struct _test_data_socket *const self,
+ const size_t index)
+{
+ if (variant->is_ipv4)
+ return bind(sockfd, &self->addr4[index],
+ sizeof(self->addr4[index]));
+ else
+ return bind(sockfd, &self->addr6[index],
+ sizeof(self->addr6[index]));
+}
+
+static int connect_variant(const FIXTURE_VARIANT(socket) * const variant,
+ const int sockfd,
+ const struct _test_data_socket *const self,
+ const size_t index)
+{
+ if (variant->is_ipv4)
+ return connect(sockfd, &self->addr4[index],
+ sizeof(self->addr4[index]));
+ else
+ return connect(sockfd, &self->addr6[index],
+ sizeof(self->addr6[index]));
+}
+
+FIXTURE_SETUP(socket)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ /* Creates IPv4 socket addresses. */
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_SOCKET_NUM; i++) {
+ self->port[i] = SOCK_PORT_START + SOCK_PORT_ADD * i;
+ self->addr4[i].sin_family = AF_INET;
+ self->addr4[i].sin_port = htons(self->port[i]);
+ self->addr4[i].sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(IP_ADDRESS_IPV4);
+ memset(&(self->addr4[i].sin_zero), '\0', 8);
+ }
+
+ /* Creates IPv6 socket addresses. */
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_SOCKET_NUM; i++) {
+ self->port[i] = SOCK_PORT_START + SOCK_PORT_ADD * i;
+ self->addr6[i].sin6_family = AF_INET6;
+ self->addr6[i].sin6_port = htons(self->port[i]);
+ inet_pton(AF_INET6, IP_ADDRESS_IPV6,
+ &(self->addr6[i].sin6_addr));
+ }
+
+ set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, unshare(CLONE_NEWNET));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, system("ip link set dev lo up"));
+ clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+};
+
+FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(socket)
+{
+}
+
+FIXTURE(socket_standalone)
+{
+ uint port[MAX_SOCKET_NUM];
+ struct sockaddr_in addr4[MAX_SOCKET_NUM];
+ struct sockaddr_in6 addr6[MAX_SOCKET_NUM];
+};
+
+FIXTURE_VARIANT(socket_standalone)
+{
+ const bool is_sandboxed;
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(socket_standalone, none_sandboxed) {
+ /* clang-format on */
+ .is_sandboxed = false,
+};
+
+/* clang-format off */
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(socket_standalone, sandboxed) {
+ /* clang-format on */
+ .is_sandboxed = true,
+};
+
+FIXTURE_SETUP(socket_standalone)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ /* Creates IPv4 socket addresses. */
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_SOCKET_NUM; i++) {
+ self->port[i] = SOCK_PORT_START + SOCK_PORT_ADD * i;
+ self->addr4[i].sin_family = AF_INET;
+ self->addr4[i].sin_port = htons(self->port[i]);
+ self->addr4[i].sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(IP_ADDRESS_IPV4);
+ memset(&(self->addr4[i].sin_zero), '\0', 8);
+ }
+
+ /* Creates IPv6 socket addresses. */
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_SOCKET_NUM; i++) {
+ self->port[i] = SOCK_PORT_START + SOCK_PORT_ADD * i;
+ self->addr6[i].sin6_family = AF_INET6;
+ self->addr6[i].sin6_port = htons(self->port[i]);
+ inet_pton(AF_INET6, IP_ADDRESS_IPV6,
+ &(self->addr6[i].sin6_addr));
+ }
+
+ set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, unshare(CLONE_NEWNET));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, system("ip link set dev lo up"));
+ clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
+};
+
+FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(socket_standalone)
+{
+}
+
+TEST_F_FORK(socket, bind)
+{
+ int sockfd;
+
+ struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
+ .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+ };
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_1 = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+ .port = self->port[0],
+ };
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_2 = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+ .port = self->port[1],
+ };
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_3 = {
+ .allowed_access = 0,
+ .port = self->port[2],
+ };
+ int ruleset_fd, ret;
+
+ if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
+ ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr,
+ sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+
+ /*
+ * Allows connect and bind operations to the port[0]
+ * socket.
+ */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+ LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service_1, 0));
+ /*
+ * Allows connect and deny bind operations to the port[1]
+ * socket.
+ */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+ LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service_2, 0));
+ /*
+ * Empty allowed_access (i.e. deny rules) are ignored in
+ * network actions for port[2] socket.
+ */
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+ LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service_3, 0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(ENOMSG, errno);
+
+ /* Enforces the ruleset. */
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ }
+
+ sockfd = create_socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
+ /* Binds a socket to port[0]. */
+ ret = bind_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ /* Closes bounded socket. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
+
+ sockfd = create_socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
+ /* Binds a socket to port[1]. */
+ ret = bind_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 1);
+ if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, ret);
+ ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+ } else {
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ }
+
+ sockfd = create_socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
+ /* Binds a socket to port[2]. */
+ ret = bind_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 2);
+ if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, ret);
+ ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+ } else {
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ }
+}
+
+TEST_F_FORK(socket, connect)
+{
+ int new_fd;
+ int sockfd_1, sockfd_2;
+ pid_t child_1, child_2;
+ int status;
+ int ruleset_fd, ret;
+
+ struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
+ .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+ };
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_1 = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+ .port = self->port[0],
+ };
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_2 = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+ .port = self->port[1],
+ };
+
+ if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
+ ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr,
+ sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+
+ /*
+ * Allows connect and bind operations to the port[0]
+ * socket.
+ */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+ LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service_1, 0));
+ /*
+ * Allows connect and deny bind operations to the port[1]
+ * socket.
+ */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+ LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service_2, 0));
+
+ /* Enforces the ruleset. */
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ }
+
+ /* Creates a server socket 1. */
+ sockfd_1 = create_socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_1);
+
+ /* Binds the socket 1 to address with port[0]. */
+ ret = bind_variant(variant, sockfd_1, self, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ /* Makes listening socket 1. */
+ ret = listen(sockfd_1, BACKLOG);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ child_1 = fork();
+ ASSERT_LE(0, child_1);
+ if (child_1 == 0) {
+ int child_sockfd, ret;
+
+ /* Closes listening socket for the child. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd_1));
+ /* Creates a stream client socket. */
+ child_sockfd = create_socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, child_sockfd);
+
+ /* Makes connection to the listening socket with port[0]. */
+ ret = connect_variant(variant, child_sockfd, self, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ _exit(_metadata->passed ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE);
+ return;
+ }
+ /* Accepts connection from the child 1. */
+ new_fd = accept(sockfd_1, NULL, 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, new_fd);
+
+ /* Closes connection. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(new_fd));
+
+ /* Closes listening socket 1 for the parent. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd_1));
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(child_1, waitpid(child_1, &status, 0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(1, WIFEXITED(status));
+ ASSERT_EQ(EXIT_SUCCESS, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+
+ /* Creates a server socket 2. */
+ sockfd_2 = create_socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_2);
+
+ /* Binds the socket 2 to address with port[1]. */
+ ret = bind_variant(variant, sockfd_2, self, 1);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ /* Makes listening socket 2. */
+ ret = listen(sockfd_2, BACKLOG);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ child_2 = fork();
+ ASSERT_LE(0, child_2);
+ if (child_2 == 0) {
+ int child_sockfd, ret;
+
+ /* Closes listening socket for the child. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd_2));
+ /* Creates a stream client socket. */
+ child_sockfd = create_socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, child_sockfd);
+
+ /* Makes connection to the listening socket with port[1]. */
+ ret = connect_variant(variant, child_sockfd, self, 1);
+ if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, ret);
+ ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+ } else {
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ }
+ _exit(_metadata->passed ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (!variant->is_sandboxed) {
+ /* Accepts connection from the child 2. */
+ new_fd = accept(sockfd_1, NULL, 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, new_fd);
+
+ /* Closes connection. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(new_fd));
+ }
+
+ /* Closes listening socket 2 for the parent. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd_2));
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(child_2, waitpid(child_2, &status, 0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(1, WIFEXITED(status));
+ ASSERT_EQ(EXIT_SUCCESS, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+}
+
+TEST_F_FORK(socket_standalone, bind_afunspec)
+{
+ int sockfd_unspec;
+ struct sockaddr_in addr4_unspec;
+ int ruleset_fd_net, ret;
+
+ struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr_net = {
+ .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+ };
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+
+ .port = SOCK_PORT,
+ };
+
+ addr4_unspec.sin_family = AF_UNSPEC;
+ addr4_unspec.sin_port = htons(SOCK_PORT);
+ addr4_unspec.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY);
+ memset(&addr4_unspec.sin_zero, '\0', 8);
+
+ if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
+ /* Creates ruleset for network access. */
+ ruleset_fd_net = landlock_create_ruleset(
+ &ruleset_attr_net, sizeof(ruleset_attr_net), 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_net);
+
+ /* Adds a network rule. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd_net,
+ LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service, 0));
+
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd_net);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd_net));
+ }
+
+ sockfd_unspec = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_unspec);
+
+ /* Binds a socket to port SOCK_PORT with INADDR_ANY address. */
+ ret = bind(sockfd_unspec, &addr4_unspec, sizeof(addr4_unspec));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ /* Closes bounded socket. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd_unspec));
+
+ /* Changes to a specific address. */
+ addr4_unspec.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(IP_ADDRESS_IPV4);
+
+ sockfd_unspec = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_unspec);
+
+ /* Binds a socket to port SOCK_PORT with the specific address. */
+ ret = bind(sockfd_unspec, &addr4_unspec, sizeof(addr4_unspec));
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, ret);
+ ASSERT_EQ(EAFNOSUPPORT, errno);
+
+ /* Closes bounded socket. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd_unspec));
+}
+
+TEST_F_FORK(socket, connect_afunspec)
+{
+ int sockfd;
+ pid_t child;
+ int status;
+ int ruleset_fd_1, ruleset_fd_2;
+ int ret;
+
+ struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr_1 = {
+ .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+ };
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_1 = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+
+ .port = self->port[0],
+ };
+
+ struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr_2 = {
+ .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+ };
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_2 = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+
+ .port = self->port[0],
+ };
+
+ if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
+ ruleset_fd_1 = landlock_create_ruleset(
+ &ruleset_attr_1, sizeof(ruleset_attr_1), 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_1);
+
+ /* Allows bind operations to the port[0] socket. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd_1,
+ LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service_1, 0));
+
+ /* Enforces the ruleset. */
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd_1);
+ }
+
+ /* Creates a server socket 1. */
+ sockfd = create_socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
+
+ /* Binds the socket 1 to address with port[0]. */
+ ret = bind_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ /* Makes connection to socket with port[0]. */
+ ret = connect_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
+ ruleset_fd_2 = landlock_create_ruleset(
+ &ruleset_attr_2, sizeof(ruleset_attr_2), 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_2);
+
+ /* Allows connect and bind operations to the port[0] socket. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd_2,
+ LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service_2, 0));
+
+ /* Enforces the ruleset. */
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd_2);
+ }
+
+ child = fork();
+ ASSERT_LE(0, child);
+ if (child == 0) {
+ int ret;
+
+ /* Child tries to disconnect already connected socket. */
+ ret = connect(sockfd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr_unspec,
+ sizeof(addr_unspec));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ _exit(_metadata->passed ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE);
+ return;
+ }
+ /* Closes listening socket 1 for the parent. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
+
+ ASSERT_EQ(child, waitpid(child, &status, 0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(1, WIFEXITED(status));
+ ASSERT_EQ(EXIT_SUCCESS, WEXITSTATUS(status));
+}
+
+TEST_F_FORK(socket, ruleset_overlap)
+{
+ int sockfd;
+ int one = 1;
+
+ struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
+ .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+ };
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_1 = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+
+ .port = self->port[0],
+ };
+
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_2 = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+
+ .port = self->port[0],
+ };
+
+ int ruleset_fd =
+ landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+
+ /* Allows bind operations to the port[0] socket. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service_1, 0));
+ /* Allows connect and bind operations to the port[0] socket. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service_2, 0));
+
+ /* Enforces the ruleset. */
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+
+ /* Creates a server socket. */
+ sockfd = create_socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
+ /* Allows to reuse of local address. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &one,
+ sizeof(one)));
+
+ /* Binds the socket to address with port[0]. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, bind_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 0));
+
+ /* Makes connection to socket with port[0]. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, connect_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 0));
+
+ /* Closes socket. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
+
+ /* Creates another ruleset layer. */
+ ruleset_fd =
+ landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+
+ /*
+ * Allows bind operations to the port[0] socket in
+ * the new ruleset layer.
+ */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service_1, 0));
+
+ /* Enforces the new ruleset. */
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+
+ /* Creates a server socket. */
+ sockfd = create_socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
+ /* Allows to reuse of local address. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &one,
+ sizeof(one)));
+
+ /* Binds the socket to address with port[0]. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, bind_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 0));
+
+ /*
+ * Forbids to connect the socket to address with port[0],
+ * as just one ruleset layer has connect() access rule.
+ */
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, connect_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+
+ /* Closes socket. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
+}
+
+TEST_F_FORK(socket, ruleset_expanding)
+{
+ int sockfd_1, sockfd_2;
+ int one = 1;
+
+ struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr_1 = {
+ .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+ };
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_1 = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+
+ .port = self->port[0],
+ };
+
+ const int ruleset_fd_1 = landlock_create_ruleset(
+ &ruleset_attr_1, sizeof(ruleset_attr_1), 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_1);
+
+ /* Adds rule to port[0] socket. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd_1, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service_1, 0));
+
+ /* Enforces the ruleset. */
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd_1);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd_1));
+
+ /* Creates a socket 1. */
+ sockfd_1 = create_socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_1);
+ /* Allows to reuse of local address. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, setsockopt(sockfd_1, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &one,
+ sizeof(one)));
+
+ /* Binds the socket 1 to address with port[0]. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, bind_variant(variant, sockfd_1, self, 0));
+
+ /* Makes connection to socket 1 with port[0]. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, connect_variant(variant, sockfd_1, self, 0));
+
+ /* Closes socket 1. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd_1));
+
+ /* Creates a socket 2. */
+ sockfd_2 = create_socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_2);
+ /* Allows to reuse of local address. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, setsockopt(sockfd_2, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &one,
+ sizeof(one)));
+
+ /*
+ * Forbids to bind the socket 2 to address with port[1],
+ * since there is no rule with bind() access for port[1].
+ */
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, bind_variant(variant, sockfd_2, self, 1));
+ ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+
+ /* Expands network mask. */
+ struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr_2 = {
+ .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+ };
+
+ /* Adds connect() access to port[0]. */
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_2 = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+
+ .port = self->port[0],
+ };
+ /* Adds bind() access to port[1]. */
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_3 = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+
+ .port = self->port[1],
+ };
+
+ const int ruleset_fd_2 = landlock_create_ruleset(
+ &ruleset_attr_2, sizeof(ruleset_attr_2), 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_2);
+
+ /* Adds rule to port[0] socket. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd_2, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service_2, 0));
+ /* Adds rule to port[1] socket. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd_2, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service_3, 0));
+
+ /* Enforces the ruleset. */
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd_2);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd_2));
+
+ /* Creates a socket 1. */
+ sockfd_1 = create_socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_1);
+ /* Allows to reuse of local address. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, setsockopt(sockfd_1, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &one,
+ sizeof(one)));
+
+ /* Binds the socket 1 to address with port[0]. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, bind_variant(variant, sockfd_1, self, 0));
+
+ /* Makes connection to socket 1 with port[0]. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, connect_variant(variant, sockfd_1, self, 0));
+
+ /* Closes socket 1. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd_1));
+
+ /* Creates a socket 2. */
+ sockfd_2 = create_socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_2);
+ /* Allows to reuse of local address. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, setsockopt(sockfd_2, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &one,
+ sizeof(one)));
+
+ /*
+ * Forbids to bind the socket 2 to address with port[1],
+ * because just one layer has bind() access rule.
+ */
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, bind_variant(variant, sockfd_1, self, 1));
+ ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+
+ /* Expands network mask. */
+ struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr_3 = {
+ .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+ };
+
+ /* Restricts connect() access to port[0]. */
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_4 = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+
+ .port = self->port[0],
+ };
+
+ const int ruleset_fd_3 = landlock_create_ruleset(
+ &ruleset_attr_3, sizeof(ruleset_attr_3), 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_3);
+
+ /* Adds rule to port[0] socket. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd_3, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service_4, 0));
+
+ /* Enforces the ruleset. */
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd_3);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd_3));
+
+ /* Creates a socket 1. */
+ sockfd_1 = create_socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_1);
+ /* Allows to reuse of local address. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, setsockopt(sockfd_1, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &one,
+ sizeof(one)));
+
+ /* Binds the socket 1 to address with port[0]. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, bind_variant(variant, sockfd_1, self, 0));
+
+ /*
+ * Forbids to connect the socket 1 to address with port[0],
+ * as just one layer has connect() access rule.
+ */
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, connect_variant(variant, sockfd_1, self, 0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+
+ /* Closes socket 1. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd_1));
+}
+
+/* clang-format off */
+
+#define ACCESS_LAST LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP
+
+#define ACCESS_ALL ( \
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP | \
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP)
+
+/* clang-format on */
+
+TEST_F_FORK(socket_standalone, inval)
+{
+ __u64 access;
+
+ struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
+ .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP
+ };
+ struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr_inval = {
+ .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_INVAL_ATTR
+ };
+ struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr_all = { .handled_access_net =
+ ACCESS_ALL };
+
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_1 = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+ .port = self->port[0],
+ };
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_2 = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+ .port = 0,
+ };
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_3 = {
+ .allowed_access = 0,
+ .port = self->port[1],
+ };
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_4 = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+ .port = self->port[2],
+ };
+
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_5 = {};
+
+ if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
+ /* Checks invalid ruleset attribute. */
+ const int ruleset_fd_inv = landlock_create_ruleset(
+ &ruleset_attr_inval, sizeof(ruleset_attr_inval), 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, ruleset_fd_inv);
+ ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
+
+ /* Gets ruleset. */
+ const int ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(
+ &ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+
+ /* Checks unhandled allowed_access. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+ LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service_1, 0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
+
+ /* Checks zero port value. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+ LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service_2, 0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
+
+ /* Checks zero access value. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+ LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service_3, 0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(ENOMSG, errno);
+
+ /* Adds with legitimate values. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+ LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service_4, 0));
+
+ const int ruleset_fd_all = landlock_create_ruleset(
+ &ruleset_attr_all, sizeof(ruleset_attr_all), 0);
+
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_all);
+
+ /* Tests access rights for all network rules */
+ for (access = 1; access <= ACCESS_LAST; access <<= 1) {
+ net_service_5.allowed_access = access;
+ net_service_5.port = self->port[3];
+ ASSERT_EQ(0,
+ landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd_all,
+ LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service_5, 0));
+ }
+
+ /* Enforces the ruleset. */
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
+
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd_all);
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd_all));
+ }
+}
+
+TEST_F_FORK(socket_standalone, bind_connect_inval_addrlen)
+{
+ int sockfd;
+ int ruleset_fd, ret;
+ struct sockaddr_in addr4;
+ int one = 1;
+
+ struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
+ .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+ };
+
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+
+ .port = SOCK_PORT,
+ };
+
+ addr4.sin_family = AF_INET;
+ addr4.sin_port = htons(SOCK_PORT);
+ addr4.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY);
+ memset(&addr4.sin_zero, '\0', 8);
+
+ if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
+ ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr,
+ sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+
+ /* Allows bind/connect actions for socket with SOCK_PORT. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+ LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service, 0));
+
+ /* Enforces the ruleset. */
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ }
+
+ /* Creates a socket 1. */
+ sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
+ /* Allows to reuse of local address. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &one,
+ sizeof(one)));
+
+ /* Binds the socket to SOCK_PORT with zero addrlen. */
+ ret = bind(sockfd, &addr4, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, ret);
+ ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
+
+ /* Connects the socket to the listening port with zero addrlen. */
+ ret = connect(sockfd, &addr4, 0);
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, ret);
+ ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
+
+ /* Binds the socket to SOCK_PORT with correct addrlen. */
+ ret = bind(sockfd, &addr4, sizeof(addr4));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ /* Connects the socket to the listening port with correct addrlen. */
+ ret = connect(sockfd, &addr4, sizeof(addr4));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ /* Closes the connection*/
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
+}
+
+TEST_F_FORK(socket, inval_port_format)
+{
+ int sockfd;
+ int ruleset_fd, ret;
+ struct sockaddr_in addr4;
+ int one = 1;
+ bool little_endian = false;
+ unsigned int i = 1;
+
+ struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
+ .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
+ };
+
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_1 = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+ /* Wrong port format. */
+ .port = htons(self->port[0]),
+ };
+
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_2 = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+ /* Correct port format. */
+ .port = self->port[1],
+ };
+
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_3 = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+ .port = UINT16_MAX,
+ };
+
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_4 = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+ .port = UINT16_MAX + 1,
+ };
+
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_5 = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+ .port = UINT16_MAX + 2,
+ };
+
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_6 = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+ .port = UINT32_MAX + 1UL,
+ };
+
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_7 = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+ .port = UINT32_MAX + 2UL,
+ };
+
+ if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
+ ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr,
+ sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
+
+ /* Allows bind action for socket with wrong port format. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+ LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service_1, 0));
+
+ /* Allows bind action for socket with correct port format. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+ LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service_2, 0));
+
+ /* Allows bind action for socket with port U16_MAX. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+ LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service_3, 0));
+
+ /* Denies bind action for socket with port U16_MAX + 1. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+ LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service_4, 0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
+
+ /* Denies bind action for socket with port U16_MAX + 2. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+ LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service_5, 0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
+
+ /* Denies bind action for socket with port U32_MAX + 1. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+ LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service_6, 0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
+
+ /* Denies bind action for socket with port U32_MAX + 2. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
+ LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service_7, 0));
+ ASSERT_EQ(EINVAL, errno);
+
+ /* Enforces the ruleset. */
+ enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
+ }
+
+ /* Checks endianness. */
+ char *c = (char *)&i;
+
+ if (*c)
+ little_endian = true;
+
+ /* Creates a socket. */
+ sockfd = create_socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
+ /* Allows to reuse of local address. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &one,
+ sizeof(one)));
+
+ /* Binds the socket to port[0] with wrong format . */
+ ret = bind_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 0);
+ if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
+ if (little_endian) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(-1, ret);
+ ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
+ } else {
+ /* No error for big-endinan cpu by default. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ }
+ } else {
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ }
+
+ /* Closes the connection*/
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
+
+ sockfd = create_socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
+ /* Allows to reuse of local address. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &one,
+ sizeof(one)));
+
+ /* Binds the socket to port[1] with correct format. */
+ ret = bind_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 1);
+ if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
+ if (little_endian) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ } else {
+ /* No error for big-endinan cpu by default. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ }
+ } else {
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+ }
+
+ /* Closes the connection*/
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
+
+ addr4.sin_family = AF_INET;
+ addr4.sin_port = htons(UINT16_MAX);
+ addr4.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY);
+ memset(&addr4.sin_zero, '\0', 8);
+
+ /* Creates a socket. */
+ sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0);
+ ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
+ /* Allows to reuse of local address. */
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &one,
+ sizeof(one)));
+
+ /* Binds the socket to UINT16_MAX. */
+ ret = bind(sockfd, &addr4, sizeof(addr4));
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
+
+ /* Closes the connection*/
+ ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
+}
+TEST_HARNESS_MAIN
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 48+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v10 11/13] selftests/landlock: Add 10 new test suites dedicated to network
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 11/13] selftests/landlock: Add 10 new test suites dedicated to network Konstantin Meskhidze
@ 2023-04-16 16:13 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-21 10:02 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
0 siblings, 1 reply; 48+ messages in thread
From: Mickaël Salaün @ 2023-04-16 16:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Konstantin Meskhidze
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel, gnoack3000, linux-security-module, netdev,
netfilter-devel, yusongping, artem.kuzin
First batch of the tests review:
On 23/03/2023 09:52, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
> These test suites try to check edge cases for TCP sockets
> bind() and connect() actions.
>
> socket:
> * bind: Tests with non-landlocked/landlocked ipv4 and ipv6 sockets.
> * connect: Tests with non-landlocked/landlocked ipv4 and ipv6 sockets.
> * bind_afunspec: Tests with non-landlocked/landlocked restrictions
> for bind action with AF_UNSPEC socket family.
> * connect_afunspec: Tests with non-landlocked/landlocked restrictions
> for connect action with AF_UNSPEC socket family.
> * ruleset_overlap: Tests with overlapping rules for one port.
> * ruleset_expanding: Tests with expanding rulesets in which rules are
> gradually added one by one, restricting sockets' connections.
> * inval: Tests with invalid user space supplied data:
> - out of range ruleset attribute;
> - unhandled allowed access;
> - zero port value;
> - zero access value;
> - legitimate access values;
> * bind_connect_inval_addrlen: Tests with invalid address length.
> * inval_port_format: Tests with wrong port format for ipv4/ipv6 sockets
> and with port values more than U16_MAX.
>
> layout1:
> * with_net: Tests with network bind() socket action within
> filesystem directory access test.
>
> Test coverage for security/landlock is 94.5% of 945 lines according
> to gcc/gcov-11.
>
> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
> ---
>
> Changes since v9:
> * Fixes mixing code declaration and code.
> * Refactors FIXTURE_TEARDOWN() with clang-format.
> * Replaces struct _fixture_variant_socket with
> FIXTURE_VARIANT(socket).
I was pretty sure clang-format and checkpatch.pl were agree with
FIXTURE_VARIANT(), but that was not the case. You'll need to get back to
struct _fixture_variant_socket to pass both these checks, and also the
"/* struct _fixture_variant_socket */" comments.
> * Deletes useless condition if (variant->is_sandboxed)
> in multiple locations.
> * Deletes zero_size argument in bind_variant() and
> connect_variant().
> * Adds tests for port values exceeding U16_MAX.
>
> Changes since v8:
> * Adds is_sandboxed const for FIXTURE_VARIANT(socket).
> * Refactors AF_UNSPEC tests.
> * Adds address length checking tests.
> * Convert ports in all tests to __be16.
> * Adds invalid port values tests.
> * Minor fixes.
>
> Changes since v7:
> * Squashes all selftest commits.
> * Adds fs test with network bind() socket action.
> * Minor fixes.
>
> ---
> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config | 4 +
> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 64 +
> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c | 1176 +++++++++++++++++++
> 3 files changed, 1244 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
>
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config
> index 0f0a65287bac..71f7e9a8a64c 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config
> @@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
> +CONFIG_INET=y
> +CONFIG_IPV6=y
> +CONFIG_NET=y
> +CONFIG_NET_NS=y
> CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS=y
> CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK=y
> CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH=y
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
> index b762b5419a89..9dfbef276e4e 100644
> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
> @@ -8,8 +8,10 @@
> */
>
> #define _GNU_SOURCE
> +#include <arpa/inet.h>
> #include <fcntl.h>
> #include <linux/landlock.h>
> +#include <netinet/in.h>
> #include <sched.h>
> #include <stdio.h>
> #include <string.h>
> @@ -17,6 +19,7 @@
> #include <sys/mount.h>
> #include <sys/prctl.h>
> #include <sys/sendfile.h>
> +#include <sys/socket.h>
> #include <sys/stat.h>
> #include <sys/sysmacros.h>
> #include <unistd.h>
> @@ -4413,4 +4416,65 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout2_overlay, same_content_different_file)
> }
> }
>
> +#define IP_ADDRESS "127.0.0.1"
> +
> +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, with_net)
> +{
> + const struct rule rules[] = {
> + {
> + .path = dir_s1d2,
> + .access = ACCESS_RO,
> + },
> + {},
> + };
> + int sockfd;
> + int sock_port = 15000;
> + struct sockaddr_in addr4;
> +
> + struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr_net = {
> + .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
> + };
> + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service = {
> + .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
> +
> + .port = sock_port,
> + };
> +
> + addr4.sin_family = AF_INET;
> + addr4.sin_port = htons(sock_port);
> + addr4.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(IP_ADDRESS);
> + memset(&addr4.sin_zero, '\0', 8);
> +
> + /* Creates ruleset for network access. */
> + const int ruleset_fd_net = landlock_create_ruleset(
> + &ruleset_attr_net, sizeof(ruleset_attr_net), 0);
> + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_net);
> +
> + /* Adds a network rule. */
> + ASSERT_EQ(0,
> + landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd_net, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
> + &net_service, 0));
> +
> + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd_net);
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd_net));
> +
> + const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules);
> + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
> + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
> +
> + /* Tests on a directory with the network rule loaded. */
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d2, O_RDONLY));
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d2, O_RDONLY));
> +
> + sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0);
> + ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
> + /* Binds a socket to port 15000. */
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, bind(sockfd, &addr4, sizeof(addr4)));
> +
> + /* Closes bounded socket. */
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
> +}
> +
> TEST_HARNESS_MAIN
> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000000..d15a93c5b2c3
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,1176 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
> +/*
> + * Landlock tests - Network
> + *
> + * Copyright (C) 2022 Huawei Tech. Co., Ltd.
> + */
> +
> +#define _GNU_SOURCE
> +#include <arpa/inet.h>
> +#include <errno.h>
> +#include <fcntl.h>
> +#include <linux/landlock.h>
> +#include <linux/in.h>
> +#include <sched.h>
> +#include <stdint.h>
> +#include <string.h>
> +#include <sys/prctl.h>
> +#include <sys/socket.h>
> +
> +#include "common.h"
> +
> +#define MAX_SOCKET_NUM 10
You can define all other constants with either "const short" or const
char ...[]" instead of "#define" (and use lower case).
> +
> +#define SOCK_PORT_START 3470
> +#define SOCK_PORT_ADD 10
> +
> +#define IP_ADDRESS_IPV4 "127.0.0.1"
const char loopback_ipv4[] = "127.0.0.1";
> +#define IP_ADDRESS_IPV6 "::1"
> +#define SOCK_PORT 15000
> +
> +/* Number pending connections queue to be hold. */
> +#define BACKLOG 10
> +
> +const struct sockaddr addr_unspec = { .sa_family = AF_UNSPEC };
There is no need for this variable to be global.
> +
> +/* Invalid attribute, out of landlock network access range. */
> +#define LANDLOCK_INVAL_ATTR 7
> +
> +FIXTURE(socket)
> +{
> + uint port[MAX_SOCKET_NUM];
> + struct sockaddr_in addr4[MAX_SOCKET_NUM];
> + struct sockaddr_in6 addr6[MAX_SOCKET_NUM];
> +};
> +
> +FIXTURE_VARIANT(socket)
> +{
> + const bool is_ipv4;
> + const bool is_sandboxed;
> +};
> +
> +/* clang-format off */
> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(socket, ipv4) {
> + /* clang-format on */
> + .is_ipv4 = true,
> + .is_sandboxed = false,
> +};
> +
> +/* clang-format off */
> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(socket, ipv4_sandboxed) {
> + /* clang-format on */
> + .is_ipv4 = true,
> + .is_sandboxed = true,
> +};
> +
> +/* clang-format off */
> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(socket, ipv6) {
> + /* clang-format on */
> + .is_ipv4 = false,
> + .is_sandboxed = false,
> +};
> +
> +/* clang-format off */
> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(socket, ipv6_sandboxed) {
> + /* clang-format on */
> + .is_ipv4 = false,
> + .is_sandboxed = true,
> +};
> +
> +static int create_socket_variant(const FIXTURE_VARIANT(socket) * const variant,
> + const int type)
socket_variant() would be more consistent with other names.
> +{
> + if (variant->is_ipv4)
> + return socket(AF_INET, type | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0);
> + else
> + return socket(AF_INET6, type | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0);
> +}
> +
> +static int bind_variant(const FIXTURE_VARIANT(socket) * const variant,
> + const int sockfd,
> + const struct _test_data_socket *const self,
> + const size_t index)
> +{
> + if (variant->is_ipv4)
> + return bind(sockfd, &self->addr4[index],
> + sizeof(self->addr4[index]));
> + else
> + return bind(sockfd, &self->addr6[index],
> + sizeof(self->addr6[index]));
> +}
> +
> +static int connect_variant(const FIXTURE_VARIANT(socket) * const variant,
> + const int sockfd,
> + const struct _test_data_socket *const self,
> + const size_t index)
> +{
> + if (variant->is_ipv4)
> + return connect(sockfd, &self->addr4[index],
> + sizeof(self->addr4[index]));
> + else
> + return connect(sockfd, &self->addr6[index],
> + sizeof(self->addr6[index]));
> +}
> +
> +FIXTURE_SETUP(socket)
> +{
> + int i;
> +
> + /* Creates IPv4 socket addresses. */
> + for (i = 0; i < MAX_SOCKET_NUM; i++) {
> + self->port[i] = SOCK_PORT_START + SOCK_PORT_ADD * i;
> + self->addr4[i].sin_family = AF_INET;
> + self->addr4[i].sin_port = htons(self->port[i]);
> + self->addr4[i].sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(IP_ADDRESS_IPV4);
> + memset(&(self->addr4[i].sin_zero), '\0', 8);
> + }
> +
> + /* Creates IPv6 socket addresses. */
> + for (i = 0; i < MAX_SOCKET_NUM; i++) {
> + self->port[i] = SOCK_PORT_START + SOCK_PORT_ADD * i;
> + self->addr6[i].sin6_family = AF_INET6;
> + self->addr6[i].sin6_port = htons(self->port[i]);
> + inet_pton(AF_INET6, IP_ADDRESS_IPV6,
> + &(self->addr6[i].sin6_addr));
> + }
> +
> + set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, unshare(CLONE_NEWNET));
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, system("ip link set dev lo up"));
> + clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
> +};
> +
> +FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(socket)
> +{
> +}
> +
> +FIXTURE(socket_standalone)
> +{
> + uint port[MAX_SOCKET_NUM];
> + struct sockaddr_in addr4[MAX_SOCKET_NUM];
> + struct sockaddr_in6 addr6[MAX_SOCKET_NUM];
> +};
I think it would be better to remove the socket_standalone fixture and
replace it with the socket one, by replacing the "is_ipv4" field with a
"domain" field containing either AF_INET, AF_INET6 or AF_UNSPEC, and
adapting the related variant helpers. It would require to add exceptions
for AF_UNSPEC related operations (e.g. INADDR_ANY), but it should be
easier to follow than the current approach. Care must be taken to not
loose the current AF_UNSPEC specific tests which are good.
> +
> +FIXTURE_VARIANT(socket_standalone)
> +{
> + const bool is_sandboxed;
> +};
> +
> +/* clang-format off */
> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(socket_standalone, none_sandboxed) {
> + /* clang-format on */
> + .is_sandboxed = false,
> +};
> +
> +/* clang-format off */
> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(socket_standalone, sandboxed) {
> + /* clang-format on */
> + .is_sandboxed = true,
> +};
> +
> +FIXTURE_SETUP(socket_standalone)
> +{
> + int i;
> +
> + /* Creates IPv4 socket addresses. */
> + for (i = 0; i < MAX_SOCKET_NUM; i++) {
> + self->port[i] = SOCK_PORT_START + SOCK_PORT_ADD * i;
> + self->addr4[i].sin_family = AF_INET;
> + self->addr4[i].sin_port = htons(self->port[i]);
> + self->addr4[i].sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(IP_ADDRESS_IPV4);
> + memset(&(self->addr4[i].sin_zero), '\0', 8);
> + }
> +
> + /* Creates IPv6 socket addresses. */
> + for (i = 0; i < MAX_SOCKET_NUM; i++) {
> + self->port[i] = SOCK_PORT_START + SOCK_PORT_ADD * i;
> + self->addr6[i].sin6_family = AF_INET6;
> + self->addr6[i].sin6_port = htons(self->port[i]);
> + inet_pton(AF_INET6, IP_ADDRESS_IPV6,
> + &(self->addr6[i].sin6_addr));
> + }
> +
> + set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, unshare(CLONE_NEWNET));
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, system("ip link set dev lo up"));
> + clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
> +};
> +
> +FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(socket_standalone)
> +{
> +}
> +
> +TEST_F_FORK(socket, bind)
> +{
> + int sockfd;
> +
No need for this empty line, and you can include the other int variable
in the same declaration.
> + struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
> + .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
> + };
> + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_1 = {
Instead of net_service_1, it would be more readable to rename similar
variables to what they do: tcp_bind_connect, tcp_connect, tcp_denied.
Ditto for other net_service_* names.
> + .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
> + .port = self->port[0],
> + };
> + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_2 = {
> + .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
> + .port = self->port[1],
> + };
> + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_3 = {
> + .allowed_access = 0,
> + .port = self->port[2],
> + };
> + int ruleset_fd, ret;
> +
> + if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
> + ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr,
> + sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
> + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
> +
> + /*
> + * Allows connect and bind operations to the port[0]
> + * socket.
> + */
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
> + LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
> + &net_service_1, 0));
> + /*
> + * Allows connect and deny bind operations to the port[1]
> + * socket.
> + */
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
> + LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
> + &net_service_2, 0));
> + /*
> + * Empty allowed_access (i.e. deny rules) are ignored in
> + * network actions for port[2] socket.
> + */
> + ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
> + LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
> + &net_service_3, 0));
> + ASSERT_EQ(ENOMSG, errno);
> +
> + /* Enforces the ruleset. */
> + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
> + }
> +
> + sockfd = create_socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
> + ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
> + /* Binds a socket to port[0]. */
> + ret = bind_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 0);
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
> +
> + /* Closes bounded socket. */
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
> +
> + sockfd = create_socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
> + ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
> + /* Binds a socket to port[1]. */
> + ret = bind_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 1);
> + if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
> + ASSERT_EQ(-1, ret);
> + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
> + } else {
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
> + }
> +
> + sockfd = create_socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
> + ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
> + /* Binds a socket to port[2]. */
> + ret = bind_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 2);
> + if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
> + ASSERT_EQ(-1, ret);
> + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
> + } else {
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
> + }
> +}
> +
> +TEST_F_FORK(socket, connect)
> +{
> + int new_fd;
accept_fd would be more appropriate.
> + int sockfd_1, sockfd_2;
> + pid_t child_1, child_2;
> + int status;
> + int ruleset_fd, ret;
Please group similar type declarations for all these tests.
> +
> + struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
> + .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
> + };
> + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_1 = {
> + .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
> + .port = self->port[0],
> + };
> + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_2 = {
> + .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
> + .port = self->port[1],
> + };
Why not the same tcp_deny rule as for the bind test?
> +
> + if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
> + ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr,
> + sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
> + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
> +
> + /*
> + * Allows connect and bind operations to the port[0]
> + * socket.
> + */
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
> + LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
> + &net_service_1, 0));
> + /*
> + * Allows connect and deny bind operations to the port[1]
> + * socket.
> + */
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
> + LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
> + &net_service_2, 0));
> +
> + /* Enforces the ruleset. */
> + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
> + }
> +
> + /* Creates a server socket 1. */
> + sockfd_1 = create_socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
> + ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_1);
> +
> + /* Binds the socket 1 to address with port[0]. */
> + ret = bind_variant(variant, sockfd_1, self, 0);
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
> +
> + /* Makes listening socket 1. */
> + ret = listen(sockfd_1, BACKLOG);
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
> +
> + child_1 = fork();
> + ASSERT_LE(0, child_1);
> + if (child_1 == 0) {
> + int child_sockfd, ret;
> +
> + /* Closes listening socket for the child. */
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd_1));
> + /* Creates a stream client socket. */
> + child_sockfd = create_socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
> + ASSERT_LE(0, child_sockfd);
> +
> + /* Makes connection to the listening socket with port[0]. */
> + ret = connect_variant(variant, child_sockfd, self, 0);
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
> +
> + _exit(_metadata->passed ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE);
> + return;
> + }
> + /* Accepts connection from the child 1. */
> + new_fd = accept(sockfd_1, NULL, 0);
> + ASSERT_LE(0, new_fd);
> +
> + /* Closes connection. */
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(new_fd));
> +
> + /* Closes listening socket 1 for the parent. */
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd_1));
> +
> + ASSERT_EQ(child_1, waitpid(child_1, &status, 0));
> + ASSERT_EQ(1, WIFEXITED(status));
> + ASSERT_EQ(EXIT_SUCCESS, WEXITSTATUS(status));
> +
> + /* Creates a server socket 2. */
> + sockfd_2 = create_socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
> + ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_2);
> +
> + /* Binds the socket 2 to address with port[1]. */
> + ret = bind_variant(variant, sockfd_2, self, 1);
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
> +
> + /* Makes listening socket 2. */
> + ret = listen(sockfd_2, BACKLOG);
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
> +
> + child_2 = fork();
> + ASSERT_LE(0, child_2);
> + if (child_2 == 0) {
> + int child_sockfd, ret;
> +
> + /* Closes listening socket for the child. */
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd_2));
> + /* Creates a stream client socket. */
> + child_sockfd = create_socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
> + ASSERT_LE(0, child_sockfd);
> +
> + /* Makes connection to the listening socket with port[1]. */
> + ret = connect_variant(variant, child_sockfd, self, 1);
> + if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
> + ASSERT_EQ(-1, ret);
> + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
> + } else {
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
> + }
> + _exit(_metadata->passed ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE);
> + return;
> + }
> +
> + if (!variant->is_sandboxed) {
> + /* Accepts connection from the child 2. */
> + new_fd = accept(sockfd_1, NULL, 0);
> + ASSERT_LE(0, new_fd);
> +
> + /* Closes connection. */
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(new_fd));
> + }
> +
> + /* Closes listening socket 2 for the parent. */
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd_2));
> +
> + ASSERT_EQ(child_2, waitpid(child_2, &status, 0));
> + ASSERT_EQ(1, WIFEXITED(status));
> + ASSERT_EQ(EXIT_SUCCESS, WEXITSTATUS(status));
> +}
> +
> +TEST_F_FORK(socket_standalone, bind_afunspec)
This should then be part of the TEST_F_FORK(socket, bind) test.
> +{
> + int sockfd_unspec;
> + struct sockaddr_in addr4_unspec;
> + int ruleset_fd_net, ret;
> +
> + struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr_net = {
> + .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
> + };
> + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service = {
> + .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
> +
> + .port = SOCK_PORT,
> + };
> +
> + addr4_unspec.sin_family = AF_UNSPEC;
> + addr4_unspec.sin_port = htons(SOCK_PORT);
> + addr4_unspec.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY);
> + memset(&addr4_unspec.sin_zero, '\0', 8);
> +
> + if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
> + /* Creates ruleset for network access. */
> + ruleset_fd_net = landlock_create_ruleset(
> + &ruleset_attr_net, sizeof(ruleset_attr_net), 0);
> + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_net);
> +
> + /* Adds a network rule. */
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd_net,
> + LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
> + &net_service, 0));
> +
> + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd_net);
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd_net));
> + }
> +
> + sockfd_unspec = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0);
> + ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_unspec);
> +
> + /* Binds a socket to port SOCK_PORT with INADDR_ANY address. */
> + ret = bind(sockfd_unspec, &addr4_unspec, sizeof(addr4_unspec));
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
> +
> + /* Closes bounded socket. */
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd_unspec));
> +
> + /* Changes to a specific address. */
> + addr4_unspec.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(IP_ADDRESS_IPV4);
> +
> + sockfd_unspec = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0);
> + ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_unspec);
> +
> + /* Binds a socket to port SOCK_PORT with the specific address. */
> + ret = bind(sockfd_unspec, &addr4_unspec, sizeof(addr4_unspec));
> + ASSERT_EQ(-1, ret);
> + ASSERT_EQ(EAFNOSUPPORT, errno);
> +
> + /* Closes bounded socket. */
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd_unspec));
> +}
> +
> +TEST_F_FORK(socket, connect_afunspec)
> +{
> + int sockfd;
> + pid_t child;
> + int status;
> + int ruleset_fd_1, ruleset_fd_2;
> + int ret;
> +
> + struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr_1 = {
> + .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
> + };
> + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_1 = {
> + .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
> +
> + .port = self->port[0],
> + };
> +
> + struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr_2 = {
> + .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
> + };
> + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_2 = {
> + .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
> +
> + .port = self->port[0],
> + };
> +
> + if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
> + ruleset_fd_1 = landlock_create_ruleset(
> + &ruleset_attr_1, sizeof(ruleset_attr_1), 0);
> + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_1);
> +
> + /* Allows bind operations to the port[0] socket. */
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd_1,
> + LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
> + &net_service_1, 0));
> +
> + /* Enforces the ruleset. */
> + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd_1);
> + }
> +
> + /* Creates a server socket 1. */
> + sockfd = create_socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
> + ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
> +
> + /* Binds the socket 1 to address with port[0]. */
> + ret = bind_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 0);
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
> +
> + /* Makes connection to socket with port[0]. */
> + ret = connect_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 0);
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
> +
> + if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
> + ruleset_fd_2 = landlock_create_ruleset(
> + &ruleset_attr_2, sizeof(ruleset_attr_2), 0);
> + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_2);
> +
> + /* Allows connect and bind operations to the port[0] socket. */
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd_2,
> + LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
> + &net_service_2, 0));
> +
> + /* Enforces the ruleset. */
> + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd_2);
> + }
> +
> + child = fork();
> + ASSERT_LE(0, child);
> + if (child == 0) {
> + int ret;
> +
> + /* Child tries to disconnect already connected socket. */
> + ret = connect(sockfd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr_unspec,
> + sizeof(addr_unspec));
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
> +
> + _exit(_metadata->passed ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE);
> + return;
> + }
> + /* Closes listening socket 1 for the parent. */
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
> +
> + ASSERT_EQ(child, waitpid(child, &status, 0));
> + ASSERT_EQ(1, WIFEXITED(status));
> + ASSERT_EQ(EXIT_SUCCESS, WEXITSTATUS(status));
> +}
> +
> +TEST_F_FORK(socket, ruleset_overlap)
> +{
> + int sockfd;
> + int one = 1;
> +
> + struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
> + .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
> + };
> + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_1 = {
> + .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
> +
> + .port = self->port[0],
> + };
> +
Please don't add these extra line breaks for variable declarations.
All declarations should also be at the begening of the function, not
interleaved with code (cf. the following tests).
> + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_2 = {
Dittor for variable names.
> + .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
> +
> + .port = self->port[0],
> + };
> +
> + int ruleset_fd =
> + landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
> + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
I'll review the skipped tests with a following email.
[...]
> +TEST_F_FORK(socket, inval_port_format)
> +{
> + int sockfd;
> + int ruleset_fd, ret;
> + struct sockaddr_in addr4;
> + int one = 1;
> + bool little_endian = false;
> + unsigned int i = 1;
> +
> + struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
> + .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
> + };
> +
Please remove these line breaks.
> + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_1 = {
> + .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
> + /* Wrong port format. */
> + .port = htons(self->port[0]),
> + };
> +
[...]
> +
> + /* Closes the connection*/
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
> +
> + addr4.sin_family = AF_INET;
> + addr4.sin_port = htons(UINT16_MAX);
> + addr4.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY);
> + memset(&addr4.sin_zero, '\0', 8);
> +
> + /* Creates a socket. */
> + sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0);
Why not create_socket_variant()? Same question for all direct socket()
calls.
> + ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
> + /* Allows to reuse of local address. */
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &one,
> + sizeof(one)));
> +
> + /* Binds the socket to UINT16_MAX. */
> + ret = bind(sockfd, &addr4, sizeof(addr4));
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
> +
> + /* Closes the connection*/
> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
> +}
> +TEST_HARNESS_MAIN
> --
> 2.25.1
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 48+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v10 11/13] selftests/landlock: Add 10 new test suites dedicated to network
2023-04-16 16:13 ` Mickaël Salaün
@ 2023-04-21 10:02 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
2023-04-26 19:10 ` Mickaël Salaün
0 siblings, 1 reply; 48+ messages in thread
From: Konstantin Meskhidze (A) @ 2023-04-21 10:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mickaël Salaün
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel, gnoack3000, linux-security-module, netdev,
netfilter-devel, yusongping, artem.kuzin
4/16/2023 7:13 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
> First batch of the tests review:
>
> On 23/03/2023 09:52, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
>> These test suites try to check edge cases for TCP sockets
>> bind() and connect() actions.
>>
>> socket:
>> * bind: Tests with non-landlocked/landlocked ipv4 and ipv6 sockets.
>> * connect: Tests with non-landlocked/landlocked ipv4 and ipv6 sockets.
>> * bind_afunspec: Tests with non-landlocked/landlocked restrictions
>> for bind action with AF_UNSPEC socket family.
>> * connect_afunspec: Tests with non-landlocked/landlocked restrictions
>> for connect action with AF_UNSPEC socket family.
>> * ruleset_overlap: Tests with overlapping rules for one port.
>> * ruleset_expanding: Tests with expanding rulesets in which rules are
>> gradually added one by one, restricting sockets' connections.
>> * inval: Tests with invalid user space supplied data:
>> - out of range ruleset attribute;
>> - unhandled allowed access;
>> - zero port value;
>> - zero access value;
>> - legitimate access values;
>> * bind_connect_inval_addrlen: Tests with invalid address length.
>> * inval_port_format: Tests with wrong port format for ipv4/ipv6 sockets
>> and with port values more than U16_MAX.
>>
>> layout1:
>> * with_net: Tests with network bind() socket action within
>> filesystem directory access test.
>>
>> Test coverage for security/landlock is 94.5% of 945 lines according
>> to gcc/gcov-11.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
>> ---
>>
>> Changes since v9:
>> * Fixes mixing code declaration and code.
>> * Refactors FIXTURE_TEARDOWN() with clang-format.
>> * Replaces struct _fixture_variant_socket with
>> FIXTURE_VARIANT(socket).
>
> I was pretty sure clang-format and checkpatch.pl were agree with
> FIXTURE_VARIANT(), but that was not the case. You'll need to get back to
> struct _fixture_variant_socket to pass both these checks, and also the
> "/* struct _fixture_variant_socket */" comments.
>
Ok. I will refator this part. Thanks.
>
>> * Deletes useless condition if (variant->is_sandboxed)
>> in multiple locations.
>> * Deletes zero_size argument in bind_variant() and
>> connect_variant().
>> * Adds tests for port values exceeding U16_MAX.
>>
>> Changes since v8:
>> * Adds is_sandboxed const for FIXTURE_VARIANT(socket).
>> * Refactors AF_UNSPEC tests.
>> * Adds address length checking tests.
>> * Convert ports in all tests to __be16.
>> * Adds invalid port values tests.
>> * Minor fixes.
>>
>> Changes since v7:
>> * Squashes all selftest commits.
>> * Adds fs test with network bind() socket action.
>> * Minor fixes.
>>
>> ---
>> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config | 4 +
>> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 64 +
>> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c | 1176 +++++++++++++++++++
>> 3 files changed, 1244 insertions(+)
>> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
>>
>> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config
>> index 0f0a65287bac..71f7e9a8a64c 100644
>> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config
>> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config
>> @@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
>> +CONFIG_INET=y
>> +CONFIG_IPV6=y
>> +CONFIG_NET=y
>> +CONFIG_NET_NS=y
>> CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS=y
>> CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK=y
>> CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH=y
>> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
>> index b762b5419a89..9dfbef276e4e 100644
>> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
>> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
>> @@ -8,8 +8,10 @@
>> */
>>
>> #define _GNU_SOURCE
>> +#include <arpa/inet.h>
>> #include <fcntl.h>
>> #include <linux/landlock.h>
>> +#include <netinet/in.h>
>> #include <sched.h>
>> #include <stdio.h>
>> #include <string.h>
>> @@ -17,6 +19,7 @@
>> #include <sys/mount.h>
>> #include <sys/prctl.h>
>> #include <sys/sendfile.h>
>> +#include <sys/socket.h>
>> #include <sys/stat.h>
>> #include <sys/sysmacros.h>
>> #include <unistd.h>
>> @@ -4413,4 +4416,65 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout2_overlay, same_content_different_file)
>> }
>> }
>>
>> +#define IP_ADDRESS "127.0.0.1"
>> +
>> +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, with_net)
>> +{
>> + const struct rule rules[] = {
>> + {
>> + .path = dir_s1d2,
>> + .access = ACCESS_RO,
>> + },
>> + {},
>> + };
>> + int sockfd;
>> + int sock_port = 15000;
>> + struct sockaddr_in addr4;
>> +
>> + struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr_net = {
>> + .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
>> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
>> + };
>> + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service = {
>> + .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
>> +
>> + .port = sock_port,
>> + };
>> +
>> + addr4.sin_family = AF_INET;
>> + addr4.sin_port = htons(sock_port);
>> + addr4.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(IP_ADDRESS);
>> + memset(&addr4.sin_zero, '\0', 8);
>> +
>> + /* Creates ruleset for network access. */
>> + const int ruleset_fd_net = landlock_create_ruleset(
>> + &ruleset_attr_net, sizeof(ruleset_attr_net), 0);
>> + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_net);
>> +
>> + /* Adds a network rule. */
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0,
>> + landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd_net, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
>> + &net_service, 0));
>> +
>> + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd_net);
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd_net));
>> +
>> + const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules);
>> + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
>> + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
>> +
>> + /* Tests on a directory with the network rule loaded. */
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d2, O_RDONLY));
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d2, O_RDONLY));
>> +
>> + sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0);
>> + ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
>> + /* Binds a socket to port 15000. */
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, bind(sockfd, &addr4, sizeof(addr4)));
>> +
>> + /* Closes bounded socket. */
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
>> +}
>> +
>> TEST_HARNESS_MAIN
>> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 000000000000..d15a93c5b2c3
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
>> @@ -0,0 +1,1176 @@
>> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
>> +/*
>> + * Landlock tests - Network
>> + *
>> + * Copyright (C) 2022 Huawei Tech. Co., Ltd.
>> + */
>> +
>> +#define _GNU_SOURCE
>> +#include <arpa/inet.h>
>> +#include <errno.h>
>> +#include <fcntl.h>
>> +#include <linux/landlock.h>
>> +#include <linux/in.h>
>> +#include <sched.h>
>> +#include <stdint.h>
>> +#include <string.h>
>> +#include <sys/prctl.h>
>> +#include <sys/socket.h>
>> +
>> +#include "common.h"
>> +
>> +#define MAX_SOCKET_NUM 10
>
> You can define all other constants with either "const short" or const
> char ...[]" instead of "#define" (and use lower case).
>
Thanks for the tip.
>
>> +
>> +#define SOCK_PORT_START 3470
>> +#define SOCK_PORT_ADD 10
>> +
>> +#define IP_ADDRESS_IPV4 "127.0.0.1"
>
> const char loopback_ipv4[] = "127.0.0.1";
>
Ok.
>
>> +#define IP_ADDRESS_IPV6 "::1"
>> +#define SOCK_PORT 15000
>> +
>> +/* Number pending connections queue to be hold. */
>> +#define BACKLOG 10
>> +
>> +const struct sockaddr addr_unspec = { .sa_family = AF_UNSPEC };
>
> There is no need for this variable to be global.
Ok. Thanks.
>
>
>> +
>> +/* Invalid attribute, out of landlock network access range. */
>> +#define LANDLOCK_INVAL_ATTR 7
>> +
>> +FIXTURE(socket)
>> +{
>> + uint port[MAX_SOCKET_NUM];
>> + struct sockaddr_in addr4[MAX_SOCKET_NUM];
>> + struct sockaddr_in6 addr6[MAX_SOCKET_NUM];
>> +};
>> +
>> +FIXTURE_VARIANT(socket)
>> +{
>> + const bool is_ipv4;
>> + const bool is_sandboxed;
>> +};
>> +
>> +/* clang-format off */
>> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(socket, ipv4) {
>> + /* clang-format on */
>> + .is_ipv4 = true,
>> + .is_sandboxed = false,
>> +};
>> +
>> +/* clang-format off */
>> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(socket, ipv4_sandboxed) {
>> + /* clang-format on */
>> + .is_ipv4 = true,
>> + .is_sandboxed = true,
>> +};
>> +
>> +/* clang-format off */
>> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(socket, ipv6) {
>> + /* clang-format on */
>> + .is_ipv4 = false,
>> + .is_sandboxed = false,
>> +};
>> +
>> +/* clang-format off */
>> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(socket, ipv6_sandboxed) {
>> + /* clang-format on */
>> + .is_ipv4 = false,
>> + .is_sandboxed = true,
>> +};
>> +
>> +static int create_socket_variant(const FIXTURE_VARIANT(socket) * const variant,
>> + const int type)
>
> socket_variant() would be more consistent with other names.
Sorry. What do mean ".. other names" ???
>
>
>> +{
>> + if (variant->is_ipv4)
>> + return socket(AF_INET, type | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0);
>> + else
>> + return socket(AF_INET6, type | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0);
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int bind_variant(const FIXTURE_VARIANT(socket) * const variant,
>> + const int sockfd,
>> + const struct _test_data_socket *const self,
>> + const size_t index)
>> +{
>> + if (variant->is_ipv4)
>> + return bind(sockfd, &self->addr4[index],
>> + sizeof(self->addr4[index]));
>> + else
>> + return bind(sockfd, &self->addr6[index],
>> + sizeof(self->addr6[index]));
>> +}
>> +
>> +static int connect_variant(const FIXTURE_VARIANT(socket) * const variant,
>> + const int sockfd,
>> + const struct _test_data_socket *const self,
>> + const size_t index)
>> +{
>> + if (variant->is_ipv4)
>> + return connect(sockfd, &self->addr4[index],
>> + sizeof(self->addr4[index]));
>> + else
>> + return connect(sockfd, &self->addr6[index],
>> + sizeof(self->addr6[index]));
>> +}
>> +
>> +FIXTURE_SETUP(socket)
>> +{
>> + int i;
>> +
>> + /* Creates IPv4 socket addresses. */
>> + for (i = 0; i < MAX_SOCKET_NUM; i++) {
>> + self->port[i] = SOCK_PORT_START + SOCK_PORT_ADD * i;
>> + self->addr4[i].sin_family = AF_INET;
>> + self->addr4[i].sin_port = htons(self->port[i]);
>> + self->addr4[i].sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(IP_ADDRESS_IPV4);
>> + memset(&(self->addr4[i].sin_zero), '\0', 8);
>> + }
>> +
>> + /* Creates IPv6 socket addresses. */
>> + for (i = 0; i < MAX_SOCKET_NUM; i++) {
>> + self->port[i] = SOCK_PORT_START + SOCK_PORT_ADD * i;
>> + self->addr6[i].sin6_family = AF_INET6;
>> + self->addr6[i].sin6_port = htons(self->port[i]);
>> + inet_pton(AF_INET6, IP_ADDRESS_IPV6,
>> + &(self->addr6[i].sin6_addr));
>> + }
>> +
>> + set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, unshare(CLONE_NEWNET));
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, system("ip link set dev lo up"));
>> + clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
>> +};
>> +
>> +FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(socket)
>> +{
>> +}
>> +
>> +FIXTURE(socket_standalone)
>> +{
>> + uint port[MAX_SOCKET_NUM];
>> + struct sockaddr_in addr4[MAX_SOCKET_NUM];
>> + struct sockaddr_in6 addr6[MAX_SOCKET_NUM];
>> +};
>
> I think it would be better to remove the socket_standalone fixture and
> replace it with the socket one, by replacing the "is_ipv4" field with a
> "domain" field containing either AF_INET, AF_INET6 or AF_UNSPEC, and
> adapting the related variant helpers. It would require to add exceptions
> for AF_UNSPEC related operations (e.g. INADDR_ANY), but it should be
> easier to follow than the current approach. Care must be taken to not
> loose the current AF_UNSPEC specific tests which are good.
>
Got it. Will be refactored.
>
>> +
>> +FIXTURE_VARIANT(socket_standalone)
>> +{
>> + const bool is_sandboxed;
>> +};
>> +
>> +/* clang-format off */
>> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(socket_standalone, none_sandboxed) {
>> + /* clang-format on */
>> + .is_sandboxed = false,
>> +};
>> +
>> +/* clang-format off */
>> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(socket_standalone, sandboxed) {
>> + /* clang-format on */
>> + .is_sandboxed = true,
>> +};
>> +
>> +FIXTURE_SETUP(socket_standalone)
>> +{
>> + int i;
>> +
>> + /* Creates IPv4 socket addresses. */
>> + for (i = 0; i < MAX_SOCKET_NUM; i++) {
>> + self->port[i] = SOCK_PORT_START + SOCK_PORT_ADD * i;
>> + self->addr4[i].sin_family = AF_INET;
>> + self->addr4[i].sin_port = htons(self->port[i]);
>> + self->addr4[i].sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(IP_ADDRESS_IPV4);
>> + memset(&(self->addr4[i].sin_zero), '\0', 8);
>> + }
>> +
>> + /* Creates IPv6 socket addresses. */
>> + for (i = 0; i < MAX_SOCKET_NUM; i++) {
>> + self->port[i] = SOCK_PORT_START + SOCK_PORT_ADD * i;
>> + self->addr6[i].sin6_family = AF_INET6;
>> + self->addr6[i].sin6_port = htons(self->port[i]);
>> + inet_pton(AF_INET6, IP_ADDRESS_IPV6,
>> + &(self->addr6[i].sin6_addr));
>> + }
>> +
>> + set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, unshare(CLONE_NEWNET));
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, system("ip link set dev lo up"));
>> + clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
>> +};
>> +
>> +FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(socket_standalone)
>> +{
>> +}
>> +
>> +TEST_F_FORK(socket, bind)
>> +{
>> + int sockfd;
>> +
>
> No need for this empty line, and you can include the other int variable
> in the same declaration.
Ok.
>
>
>> + struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
>> + .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
>> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
>> + };
>> + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_1 = {
>
> Instead of net_service_1, it would be more readable to rename similar
> variables to what they do: tcp_bind_connect, tcp_connect, tcp_denied.
> Ditto for other net_service_* names.
Yep. that makes sense. Thanks for the tip.
>
>
>> + .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
>> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
>> + .port = self->port[0],
>> + };
>> + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_2 = {
>> + .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
>> + .port = self->port[1],
>> + };
>> + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_3 = {
>> + .allowed_access = 0,
>> + .port = self->port[2],
>> + };
>> + int ruleset_fd, ret;
>> +
>> + if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
>> + ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr,
>> + sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
>> + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Allows connect and bind operations to the port[0]
>> + * socket.
>> + */
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
>> + LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
>> + &net_service_1, 0));
>> + /*
>> + * Allows connect and deny bind operations to the port[1]
>> + * socket.
>> + */
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
>> + LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
>> + &net_service_2, 0));
>> + /*
>> + * Empty allowed_access (i.e. deny rules) are ignored in
>> + * network actions for port[2] socket.
>> + */
>> + ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
>> + LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
>> + &net_service_3, 0));
>> + ASSERT_EQ(ENOMSG, errno);
>> +
>> + /* Enforces the ruleset. */
>> + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
>> + }
>> +
>> + sockfd = create_socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
>> + ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
>> + /* Binds a socket to port[0]. */
>> + ret = bind_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 0);
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> +
>> + /* Closes bounded socket. */
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
>> +
>> + sockfd = create_socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
>> + ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
>> + /* Binds a socket to port[1]. */
>> + ret = bind_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 1);
>> + if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
>> + ASSERT_EQ(-1, ret);
>> + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
>> + } else {
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> + }
>> +
>> + sockfd = create_socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
>> + ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
>> + /* Binds a socket to port[2]. */
>> + ret = bind_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 2);
>> + if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
>> + ASSERT_EQ(-1, ret);
>> + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
>> + } else {
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> + }
>> +}
>> +
>> +TEST_F_FORK(socket, connect)
>> +{
>> + int new_fd;
>
> accept_fd would be more appropriate.
>
Got it.
>
>> + int sockfd_1, sockfd_2;
>> + pid_t child_1, child_2;
>> + int status;
>> + int ruleset_fd, ret;
>
> Please group similar type declarations for all these tests.
Will be done.
>
>
>> +
>> + struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
>> + .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
>> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
>> + };
>> + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_1 = {
>> + .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
>> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
>> + .port = self->port[0],
>> + };
>> + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_2 = {
>> + .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
>> + .port = self->port[1],
>> + };
>
> Why not the same tcp_deny rule as for the bind test?
I will change services' names to more appropriate ones.
>
>
>> +
>> + if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
>> + ruleset_fd = landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr,
>> + sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
>> + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
>> +
>> + /*
>> + * Allows connect and bind operations to the port[0]
>> + * socket.
>> + */
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
>> + LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
>> + &net_service_1, 0));
>> + /*
>> + * Allows connect and deny bind operations to the port[1]
>> + * socket.
>> + */
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd,
>> + LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
>> + &net_service_2, 0));
>> +
>> + /* Enforces the ruleset. */
>> + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
>> + }
>> +
>> + /* Creates a server socket 1. */
>> + sockfd_1 = create_socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
>> + ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_1);
>> +
>> + /* Binds the socket 1 to address with port[0]. */
>> + ret = bind_variant(variant, sockfd_1, self, 0);
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> +
>> + /* Makes listening socket 1. */
>> + ret = listen(sockfd_1, BACKLOG);
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> +
>> + child_1 = fork();
>> + ASSERT_LE(0, child_1);
>> + if (child_1 == 0) {
>> + int child_sockfd, ret;
>> +
>> + /* Closes listening socket for the child. */
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd_1));
>> + /* Creates a stream client socket. */
>> + child_sockfd = create_socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
>> + ASSERT_LE(0, child_sockfd);
>> +
>> + /* Makes connection to the listening socket with port[0]. */
>> + ret = connect_variant(variant, child_sockfd, self, 0);
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> +
>> + _exit(_metadata->passed ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE);
>> + return;
>> + }
>> + /* Accepts connection from the child 1. */
>> + new_fd = accept(sockfd_1, NULL, 0);
>> + ASSERT_LE(0, new_fd);
>> +
>> + /* Closes connection. */
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(new_fd));
>> +
>> + /* Closes listening socket 1 for the parent. */
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd_1));
>> +
>> + ASSERT_EQ(child_1, waitpid(child_1, &status, 0));
>> + ASSERT_EQ(1, WIFEXITED(status));
>> + ASSERT_EQ(EXIT_SUCCESS, WEXITSTATUS(status));
>> +
>> + /* Creates a server socket 2. */
>> + sockfd_2 = create_socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
>> + ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_2);
>> +
>> + /* Binds the socket 2 to address with port[1]. */
>> + ret = bind_variant(variant, sockfd_2, self, 1);
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> +
>> + /* Makes listening socket 2. */
>> + ret = listen(sockfd_2, BACKLOG);
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> +
>> + child_2 = fork();
>> + ASSERT_LE(0, child_2);
>> + if (child_2 == 0) {
>> + int child_sockfd, ret;
>> +
>> + /* Closes listening socket for the child. */
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd_2));
>> + /* Creates a stream client socket. */
>> + child_sockfd = create_socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
>> + ASSERT_LE(0, child_sockfd);
>> +
>> + /* Makes connection to the listening socket with port[1]. */
>> + ret = connect_variant(variant, child_sockfd, self, 1);
>> + if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
>> + ASSERT_EQ(-1, ret);
>> + ASSERT_EQ(EACCES, errno);
>> + } else {
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> + }
>> + _exit(_metadata->passed ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE);
>> + return;
>> + }
>> +
>> + if (!variant->is_sandboxed) {
>> + /* Accepts connection from the child 2. */
>> + new_fd = accept(sockfd_1, NULL, 0);
>> + ASSERT_LE(0, new_fd);
>> +
>> + /* Closes connection. */
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(new_fd));
>> + }
>> +
>> + /* Closes listening socket 2 for the parent. */
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd_2));
>> +
>> + ASSERT_EQ(child_2, waitpid(child_2, &status, 0));
>> + ASSERT_EQ(1, WIFEXITED(status));
>> + ASSERT_EQ(EXIT_SUCCESS, WEXITSTATUS(status));
>> +}
>> +
>> +TEST_F_FORK(socket_standalone, bind_afunspec)
>
> This should then be part of the TEST_F_FORK(socket, bind) test.
Got it.
>
>
>> +{
>> + int sockfd_unspec;
>> + struct sockaddr_in addr4_unspec;
>> + int ruleset_fd_net, ret;
>> +
>> + struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr_net = {
>> + .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
>> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
>> + };
>> + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service = {
>> + .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
>> +
>> + .port = SOCK_PORT,
>> + };
>> +
>> + addr4_unspec.sin_family = AF_UNSPEC;
>> + addr4_unspec.sin_port = htons(SOCK_PORT);
>> + addr4_unspec.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY);
>> + memset(&addr4_unspec.sin_zero, '\0', 8);
>> +
>> + if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
>> + /* Creates ruleset for network access. */
>> + ruleset_fd_net = landlock_create_ruleset(
>> + &ruleset_attr_net, sizeof(ruleset_attr_net), 0);
>> + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_net);
>> +
>> + /* Adds a network rule. */
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd_net,
>> + LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
>> + &net_service, 0));
>> +
>> + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd_net);
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd_net));
>> + }
>> +
>> + sockfd_unspec = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0);
>> + ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_unspec);
>> +
>> + /* Binds a socket to port SOCK_PORT with INADDR_ANY address. */
>> + ret = bind(sockfd_unspec, &addr4_unspec, sizeof(addr4_unspec));
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> +
>> + /* Closes bounded socket. */
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd_unspec));
>> +
>> + /* Changes to a specific address. */
>> + addr4_unspec.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(IP_ADDRESS_IPV4);
>> +
>> + sockfd_unspec = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0);
>> + ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd_unspec);
>> +
>> + /* Binds a socket to port SOCK_PORT with the specific address. */
>> + ret = bind(sockfd_unspec, &addr4_unspec, sizeof(addr4_unspec));
>> + ASSERT_EQ(-1, ret);
>> + ASSERT_EQ(EAFNOSUPPORT, errno);
>> +
>> + /* Closes bounded socket. */
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd_unspec));
>> +}
>> +
>> +TEST_F_FORK(socket, connect_afunspec)
>> +{
>> + int sockfd;
>> + pid_t child;
>> + int status;
>> + int ruleset_fd_1, ruleset_fd_2;
>> + int ret;
>> +
>> + struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr_1 = {
>> + .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
>> + };
>> + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_1 = {
>> + .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
>> +
>> + .port = self->port[0],
>> + };
>> +
>> + struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr_2 = {
>> + .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
>> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
>> + };
>> + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_2 = {
>> + .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
>> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
>> +
>> + .port = self->port[0],
>> + };
>> +
>> + if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
>> + ruleset_fd_1 = landlock_create_ruleset(
>> + &ruleset_attr_1, sizeof(ruleset_attr_1), 0);
>> + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_1);
>> +
>> + /* Allows bind operations to the port[0] socket. */
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd_1,
>> + LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
>> + &net_service_1, 0));
>> +
>> + /* Enforces the ruleset. */
>> + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd_1);
>> + }
>> +
>> + /* Creates a server socket 1. */
>> + sockfd = create_socket_variant(variant, SOCK_STREAM);
>> + ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
>> +
>> + /* Binds the socket 1 to address with port[0]. */
>> + ret = bind_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 0);
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> +
>> + /* Makes connection to socket with port[0]. */
>> + ret = connect_variant(variant, sockfd, self, 0);
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> +
>> + if (variant->is_sandboxed) {
>> + ruleset_fd_2 = landlock_create_ruleset(
>> + &ruleset_attr_2, sizeof(ruleset_attr_2), 0);
>> + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_2);
>> +
>> + /* Allows connect and bind operations to the port[0] socket. */
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd_2,
>> + LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
>> + &net_service_2, 0));
>> +
>> + /* Enforces the ruleset. */
>> + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd_2);
>> + }
>> +
>> + child = fork();
>> + ASSERT_LE(0, child);
>> + if (child == 0) {
>> + int ret;
>> +
>> + /* Child tries to disconnect already connected socket. */
>> + ret = connect(sockfd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr_unspec,
>> + sizeof(addr_unspec));
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> +
>> + _exit(_metadata->passed ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE);
>> + return;
>> + }
>> + /* Closes listening socket 1 for the parent. */
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
>> +
>> + ASSERT_EQ(child, waitpid(child, &status, 0));
>> + ASSERT_EQ(1, WIFEXITED(status));
>> + ASSERT_EQ(EXIT_SUCCESS, WEXITSTATUS(status));
>> +}
>> +
>> +TEST_F_FORK(socket, ruleset_overlap)
>> +{
>> + int sockfd;
>> + int one = 1;
>> +
>> + struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
>> + .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
>> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
>> + };
>> + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_1 = {
>> + .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
>> +
>> + .port = self->port[0],
>> + };
>> +
>
> Please don't add these extra line breaks for variable declarations.
>
> All declarations should also be at the begening of the function, not
> interleaved with code (cf. the following tests).
Got it. Thanks.
>
>
>> + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_2 = {
>
> Dittor for variable names.
Yep. Will be changed.
>
>
>> + .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
>> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
>> +
>> + .port = self->port[0],
>> + };
>> +
>> + int ruleset_fd =
>> + landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
>> + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
>
>
> I'll review the skipped tests with a following email.
Ok. Thank you.
>
> [...]
>
>
>
>> +TEST_F_FORK(socket, inval_port_format)
>> +{
>> + int sockfd;
>> + int ruleset_fd, ret;
>> + struct sockaddr_in addr4;
>> + int one = 1;
>> + bool little_endian = false;
>> + unsigned int i = 1;
>> +
>> + struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
>> + .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
>> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
>> + };
>> +
>
> Please remove these line breaks.
Ok.
>
>
>> + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service_1 = {
>> + .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
>> + /* Wrong port format. */
>> + .port = htons(self->port[0]),
>> + };
>> +
>
> [...]
>
>> +
>> + /* Closes the connection*/
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
>> +
>> + addr4.sin_family = AF_INET;
>> + addr4.sin_port = htons(UINT16_MAX);
>> + addr4.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY);
>> + memset(&addr4.sin_zero, '\0', 8);
>> +
>> + /* Creates a socket. */
>> + sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0);
>
> Why not create_socket_variant()? Same question for all direct socket()
> calls.
I thought it would be easier to add such specific tests than changing
create_socket_variant(), cause its needs to add more variabless in
FIXTURE_VARIANT(socket) and makes tests' logic more tricky.
>
>
>> + ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
>> + /* Allows to reuse of local address. */
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &one,
>> + sizeof(one)));
>> +
>> + /* Binds the socket to UINT16_MAX. */
>> + ret = bind(sockfd, &addr4, sizeof(addr4));
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>> +
>> + /* Closes the connection*/
>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
>> +}
>> +TEST_HARNESS_MAIN
>> --
>> 2.25.1
>>
> .
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 48+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v10 11/13] selftests/landlock: Add 10 new test suites dedicated to network
2023-04-21 10:02 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
@ 2023-04-26 19:10 ` Mickaël Salaün
0 siblings, 0 replies; 48+ messages in thread
From: Mickaël Salaün @ 2023-04-26 19:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel, gnoack3000, linux-security-module, netdev,
netfilter-devel, yusongping, artem.kuzin
On 21/04/2023 12:02, Konstantin Meskhidze (A) wrote:
>
>
> 4/16/2023 7:13 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
>> First batch of the tests review:
>>
>> On 23/03/2023 09:52, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
>>> These test suites try to check edge cases for TCP sockets
>>> bind() and connect() actions.
>>>
>>> socket:
>>> * bind: Tests with non-landlocked/landlocked ipv4 and ipv6 sockets.
>>> * connect: Tests with non-landlocked/landlocked ipv4 and ipv6 sockets.
>>> * bind_afunspec: Tests with non-landlocked/landlocked restrictions
>>> for bind action with AF_UNSPEC socket family.
>>> * connect_afunspec: Tests with non-landlocked/landlocked restrictions
>>> for connect action with AF_UNSPEC socket family.
>>> * ruleset_overlap: Tests with overlapping rules for one port.
>>> * ruleset_expanding: Tests with expanding rulesets in which rules are
>>> gradually added one by one, restricting sockets' connections.
>>> * inval: Tests with invalid user space supplied data:
>>> - out of range ruleset attribute;
>>> - unhandled allowed access;
>>> - zero port value;
>>> - zero access value;
>>> - legitimate access values;
>>> * bind_connect_inval_addrlen: Tests with invalid address length.
>>> * inval_port_format: Tests with wrong port format for ipv4/ipv6 sockets
>>> and with port values more than U16_MAX.
>>>
>>> layout1:
>>> * with_net: Tests with network bind() socket action within
>>> filesystem directory access test.
>>>
>>> Test coverage for security/landlock is 94.5% of 945 lines according
>>> to gcc/gcov-11.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
>>> ---
>>>
>>> Changes since v9:
>>> * Fixes mixing code declaration and code.
>>> * Refactors FIXTURE_TEARDOWN() with clang-format.
>>> * Replaces struct _fixture_variant_socket with
>>> FIXTURE_VARIANT(socket).
>>
>> I was pretty sure clang-format and checkpatch.pl were agree with
>> FIXTURE_VARIANT(), but that was not the case. You'll need to get back to
>> struct _fixture_variant_socket to pass both these checks, and also the
>> "/* struct _fixture_variant_socket */" comments.
>>
> Ok. I will refator this part. Thanks.
>>
>>> * Deletes useless condition if (variant->is_sandboxed)
>>> in multiple locations.
>>> * Deletes zero_size argument in bind_variant() and
>>> connect_variant().
>>> * Adds tests for port values exceeding U16_MAX.
>>>
>>> Changes since v8:
>>> * Adds is_sandboxed const for FIXTURE_VARIANT(socket).
>>> * Refactors AF_UNSPEC tests.
>>> * Adds address length checking tests.
>>> * Convert ports in all tests to __be16.
>>> * Adds invalid port values tests.
>>> * Minor fixes.
>>>
>>> Changes since v7:
>>> * Squashes all selftest commits.
>>> * Adds fs test with network bind() socket action.
>>> * Minor fixes.
>>>
>>> ---
>>> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config | 4 +
>>> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c | 64 +
>>> tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c | 1176 +++++++++++++++++++
>>> 3 files changed, 1244 insertions(+)
>>> create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
>>>
>>> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config
>>> index 0f0a65287bac..71f7e9a8a64c 100644
>>> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config
>>> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/config
>>> @@ -1,3 +1,7 @@
>>> +CONFIG_INET=y
>>> +CONFIG_IPV6=y
>>> +CONFIG_NET=y
>>> +CONFIG_NET_NS=y
>>> CONFIG_OVERLAY_FS=y
>>> CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK=y
>>> CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH=y
>>> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
>>> index b762b5419a89..9dfbef276e4e 100644
>>> --- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
>>> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/fs_test.c
>>> @@ -8,8 +8,10 @@
>>> */
>>>
>>> #define _GNU_SOURCE
>>> +#include <arpa/inet.h>
>>> #include <fcntl.h>
>>> #include <linux/landlock.h>
>>> +#include <netinet/in.h>
>>> #include <sched.h>
>>> #include <stdio.h>
>>> #include <string.h>
>>> @@ -17,6 +19,7 @@
>>> #include <sys/mount.h>
>>> #include <sys/prctl.h>
>>> #include <sys/sendfile.h>
>>> +#include <sys/socket.h>
>>> #include <sys/stat.h>
>>> #include <sys/sysmacros.h>
>>> #include <unistd.h>
>>> @@ -4413,4 +4416,65 @@ TEST_F_FORK(layout2_overlay, same_content_different_file)
>>> }
>>> }
>>>
>>> +#define IP_ADDRESS "127.0.0.1"
>>> +
>>> +TEST_F_FORK(layout1, with_net)
>>> +{
>>> + const struct rule rules[] = {
>>> + {
>>> + .path = dir_s1d2,
>>> + .access = ACCESS_RO,
>>> + },
>>> + {},
>>> + };
>>> + int sockfd;
>>> + int sock_port = 15000;
>>> + struct sockaddr_in addr4;
>>> +
>>> + struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr_net = {
>>> + .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
>>> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
>>> + };
>>> + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service = {
>>> + .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
>>> +
>>> + .port = sock_port,
>>> + };
>>> +
>>> + addr4.sin_family = AF_INET;
>>> + addr4.sin_port = htons(sock_port);
>>> + addr4.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(IP_ADDRESS);
>>> + memset(&addr4.sin_zero, '\0', 8);
>>> +
>>> + /* Creates ruleset for network access. */
>>> + const int ruleset_fd_net = landlock_create_ruleset(
>>> + &ruleset_attr_net, sizeof(ruleset_attr_net), 0);
>>> + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd_net);
>>> +
>>> + /* Adds a network rule. */
>>> + ASSERT_EQ(0,
>>> + landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd_net, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
>>> + &net_service, 0));
>>> +
>>> + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd_net);
>>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd_net));
>>> +
>>> + const int ruleset_fd = create_ruleset(_metadata, ACCESS_RW, rules);
>>> + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd);
>>> + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd);
>>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd));
>>> +
>>> + /* Tests on a directory with the network rule loaded. */
>>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(dir_s1d2, O_RDONLY));
>>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, test_open(file1_s1d2, O_RDONLY));
>>> +
>>> + sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0);
>>> + ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
>>> + /* Binds a socket to port 15000. */
>>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, bind(sockfd, &addr4, sizeof(addr4)));
>>> +
>>> + /* Closes bounded socket. */
>>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
>>> +}
>>> +
>>> TEST_HARNESS_MAIN
>>> diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
>>> new file mode 100644
>>> index 000000000000..d15a93c5b2c3
>>> --- /dev/null
>>> +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/net_test.c
>>> @@ -0,0 +1,1176 @@
>>> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
>>> +/*
>>> + * Landlock tests - Network
>>> + *
>>> + * Copyright (C) 2022 Huawei Tech. Co., Ltd.
>>> + */
>>> +
>>> +#define _GNU_SOURCE
>>> +#include <arpa/inet.h>
>>> +#include <errno.h>
>>> +#include <fcntl.h>
>>> +#include <linux/landlock.h>
>>> +#include <linux/in.h>
>>> +#include <sched.h>
>>> +#include <stdint.h>
>>> +#include <string.h>
>>> +#include <sys/prctl.h>
>>> +#include <sys/socket.h>
>>> +
>>> +#include "common.h"
>>> +
>>> +#define MAX_SOCKET_NUM 10
>>
>> You can define all other constants with either "const short" or const
>> char ...[]" instead of "#define" (and use lower case).
>>
> Thanks for the tip.
>>
>>> +
>>> +#define SOCK_PORT_START 3470
>>> +#define SOCK_PORT_ADD 10
>>> +
>>> +#define IP_ADDRESS_IPV4 "127.0.0.1"
>>
>> const char loopback_ipv4[] = "127.0.0.1";
>>
> Ok.
>>
>>> +#define IP_ADDRESS_IPV6 "::1"
>>> +#define SOCK_PORT 15000
>>> +
>>> +/* Number pending connections queue to be hold. */
>>> +#define BACKLOG 10
>>> +
>>> +const struct sockaddr addr_unspec = { .sa_family = AF_UNSPEC };
>>
>> There is no need for this variable to be global.
>
> Ok. Thanks.
>>
>>
>>> +
>>> +/* Invalid attribute, out of landlock network access range. */
>>> +#define LANDLOCK_INVAL_ATTR 7
>>> +
>>> +FIXTURE(socket)
>>> +{
>>> + uint port[MAX_SOCKET_NUM];
>>> + struct sockaddr_in addr4[MAX_SOCKET_NUM];
>>> + struct sockaddr_in6 addr6[MAX_SOCKET_NUM];
>>> +};
>>> +
>>> +FIXTURE_VARIANT(socket)
>>> +{
>>> + const bool is_ipv4;
>>> + const bool is_sandboxed;
>>> +};
>>> +
>>> +/* clang-format off */
>>> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(socket, ipv4) {
>>> + /* clang-format on */
>>> + .is_ipv4 = true,
>>> + .is_sandboxed = false,
>>> +};
>>> +
>>> +/* clang-format off */
>>> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(socket, ipv4_sandboxed) {
>>> + /* clang-format on */
>>> + .is_ipv4 = true,
>>> + .is_sandboxed = true,
>>> +};
>>> +
>>> +/* clang-format off */
>>> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(socket, ipv6) {
>>> + /* clang-format on */
>>> + .is_ipv4 = false,
>>> + .is_sandboxed = false,
>>> +};
>>> +
>>> +/* clang-format off */
>>> +FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(socket, ipv6_sandboxed) {
>>> + /* clang-format on */
>>> + .is_ipv4 = false,
>>> + .is_sandboxed = true,
>>> +};
>>> +
>>> +static int create_socket_variant(const FIXTURE_VARIANT(socket) * const variant,
>>> + const int type)
>>
>> socket_variant() would be more consistent with other names.
>
> Sorry. What do mean ".. other names" ???
I meant with other *_variant() helpers. You can rename
create_socket_variant() to socket_variant() (i.e. original function name
+ _variant).
>> [...]
>>
>>> +
>>> + /* Closes the connection*/
>>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
>>> +
>>> + addr4.sin_family = AF_INET;
>>> + addr4.sin_port = htons(UINT16_MAX);
>>> + addr4.sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY);
>>> + memset(&addr4.sin_zero, '\0', 8);
>>> +
>>> + /* Creates a socket. */
>>> + sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM | SOCK_CLOEXEC, 0);
>>
>> Why not create_socket_variant()? Same question for all direct socket()
>> calls.
>
> I thought it would be easier to add such specific tests than changing
> create_socket_variant(), cause its needs to add more variabless in
> FIXTURE_VARIANT(socket) and makes tests' logic more tricky.
Hmm, running all variants for that would indeed not be useful. However,
you can remove the addr* fields from the FIXTURE(socket_standalone) struct.
Because there is no teardown, you should be able to replace all
TEST_F_FORK() with TEST_F().
BTW, the socket's `self->port` field should be an `unsigned short` type.
bind_afunspec doesn't need any fixture but only the `is_sandboxed`
variant, so you can use TEST_F(port, bind) instead, and declare a `port`
fixture with only a self->port data. This should also apply to
TEST_F(port, inval).
To be consistent, you can also rename the `socket` fixture into `inet`
because it defines a set of IP (address) properties.
>>
>>
>>> + ASSERT_LE(0, sockfd);
>>> + /* Allows to reuse of local address. */
>>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &one,
>>> + sizeof(one)));
>>> +
>>> + /* Binds the socket to UINT16_MAX. */
>>> + ret = bind(sockfd, &addr4, sizeof(addr4));
>>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, ret);
>>> +
>>> + /* Closes the connection*/
>>> + ASSERT_EQ(0, close(sockfd));
>>> +}
A line break here would be nice.
>>> +TEST_HARNESS_MAIN
>>> --
>>> 2.25.1
>>>
>> .
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 48+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v10 12/13] samples/landlock: Add network demo
2023-03-23 8:52 [PATCH v10 00/13] Network support for Landlock Konstantin Meskhidze
` (10 preceding siblings ...)
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 11/13] selftests/landlock: Add 10 new test suites dedicated to network Konstantin Meskhidze
@ 2023-03-23 8:52 ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2023-04-16 16:13 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 13/13] landlock: Document Landlock's network support Konstantin Meskhidze
12 siblings, 1 reply; 48+ messages in thread
From: Konstantin Meskhidze @ 2023-03-23 8:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: mic
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel, gnoack3000, linux-security-module, netdev,
netfilter-devel, yusongping, artem.kuzin
This commit adds network demo. It's possible to allow a sandboxer to
bind/connect to a list of particular ports restricting network
actions to the rest of ports.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
---
Changes since v9:
* Deletes ports converting.
* Minor fixes.
Changes since v8:
* Convert ports to __be16.
* Minor fixes.
Changes since v7:
* Removes network support if ABI < 4.
* Removes network support if not set by a user.
Changes since v6:
* Removes network support if ABI < 3.
Changes since v5:
* Makes network ports sandboxing optional.
* Fixes some logic errors.
* Formats code with clang-format-14.
Changes since v4:
* Adds ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME "LL_TCP_BIND" and
ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME "LL_TCP_CONNECT" variables
to insert TCP ports.
* Renames populate_ruleset() to populate_ruleset_fs().
* Adds populate_ruleset_net() and parse_port_num() helpers.
* Refactors main() to support network sandboxing.
---
samples/landlock/sandboxer.c | 130 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 118 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c b/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
index e2056c8b902c..b8f00e4dba95 100644
--- a/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
+++ b/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
*/
#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <linux/landlock.h>
@@ -51,6 +52,8 @@ static inline int landlock_restrict_self(const int ruleset_fd,
#define ENV_FS_RO_NAME "LL_FS_RO"
#define ENV_FS_RW_NAME "LL_FS_RW"
+#define ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME "LL_TCP_BIND"
+#define ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME "LL_TCP_CONNECT"
#define ENV_PATH_TOKEN ":"
static int parse_path(char *env_path, const char ***const path_list)
@@ -71,6 +74,20 @@ static int parse_path(char *env_path, const char ***const path_list)
return num_paths;
}
+static int parse_port_num(char *env_port)
+{
+ int i, num_ports = 0;
+
+ if (env_port) {
+ num_ports++;
+ for (i = 0; env_port[i]; i++) {
+ if (env_port[i] == ENV_PATH_TOKEN[0])
+ num_ports++;
+ }
+ }
+ return num_ports;
+}
+
/* clang-format off */
#define ACCESS_FILE ( \
@@ -81,8 +98,8 @@ static int parse_path(char *env_path, const char ***const path_list)
/* clang-format on */
-static int populate_ruleset(const char *const env_var, const int ruleset_fd,
- const __u64 allowed_access)
+static int populate_ruleset_fs(const char *const env_var, const int ruleset_fd,
+ const __u64 allowed_access)
{
int num_paths, i, ret = 1;
char *env_path_name;
@@ -143,6 +160,47 @@ static int populate_ruleset(const char *const env_var, const int ruleset_fd,
return ret;
}
+static int populate_ruleset_net(const char *const env_var, const int ruleset_fd,
+ const __u64 allowed_access)
+{
+ int num_ports, i, ret = 1;
+ char *env_port_name;
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service = {
+ .allowed_access = 0,
+ .port = 0,
+ };
+
+ env_port_name = getenv(env_var);
+ if (!env_port_name) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ env_port_name = strdup(env_port_name);
+ unsetenv(env_var);
+ num_ports = parse_port_num(env_port_name);
+
+ if (num_ports == 1 && (strtok(env_port_name, ENV_PATH_TOKEN) == NULL)) {
+ ret = 0;
+ goto out_free_name;
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_ports; i++) {
+ net_service.allowed_access = allowed_access;
+ net_service.port = atoi(strsep(&env_port_name, ENV_PATH_TOKEN));
+ if (landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service, 0)) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Failed to update the ruleset with port \"%lld\": %s\n",
+ net_service.port, strerror(errno));
+ goto out_free_name;
+ }
+ }
+ ret = 0;
+
+out_free_name:
+ free(env_port_name);
+ return ret;
+}
+
/* clang-format off */
#define ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_READ ( \
@@ -166,39 +224,58 @@ static int populate_ruleset(const char *const env_var, const int ruleset_fd,
/* clang-format on */
-#define LANDLOCK_ABI_LAST 3
+#define LANDLOCK_ABI_LAST 4
int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp)
{
const char *cmd_path;
char *const *cmd_argv;
int ruleset_fd, abi;
+ char *env_port_name;
__u64 access_fs_ro = ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_READ,
access_fs_rw = ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_READ | ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_WRITE;
+
struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
.handled_access_fs = access_fs_rw,
+ .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
};
if (argc < 2) {
fprintf(stderr,
- "usage: %s=\"...\" %s=\"...\" %s <cmd> [args]...\n\n",
- ENV_FS_RO_NAME, ENV_FS_RW_NAME, argv[0]);
+ "usage: %s=\"...\" %s=\"...\" %s=\"...\" %s=\"...\"%s "
+ "<cmd> [args]...\n\n",
+ ENV_FS_RO_NAME, ENV_FS_RW_NAME, ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME,
+ ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME, argv[0]);
fprintf(stderr,
"Launch a command in a restricted environment.\n\n");
- fprintf(stderr, "Environment variables containing paths, "
- "each separated by a colon:\n");
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Environment variables containing paths and ports "
+ "each separated by a colon:\n");
fprintf(stderr,
"* %s: list of paths allowed to be used in a read-only way.\n",
ENV_FS_RO_NAME);
fprintf(stderr,
- "* %s: list of paths allowed to be used in a read-write way.\n",
+ "* %s: list of paths allowed to be used in a read-write way.\n\n",
ENV_FS_RW_NAME);
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Environment variables containing ports are optional "
+ "and could be skipped.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "* %s: list of ports allowed to bind (server).\n",
+ ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME);
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "* %s: list of ports allowed to connect (client).\n",
+ ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME);
fprintf(stderr,
"\nexample:\n"
"%s=\"/bin:/lib:/usr:/proc:/etc:/dev/urandom\" "
"%s=\"/dev/null:/dev/full:/dev/zero:/dev/pts:/tmp\" "
+ "%s=\"9418\" "
+ "%s=\"80:443\" "
"%s bash -i\n\n",
- ENV_FS_RO_NAME, ENV_FS_RW_NAME, argv[0]);
+ ENV_FS_RO_NAME, ENV_FS_RW_NAME, ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME,
+ ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME, argv[0]);
fprintf(stderr,
"This sandboxer can use Landlock features "
"up to ABI version %d.\n",
@@ -255,7 +332,12 @@ int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp)
case 2:
/* Removes LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE for ABI < 3 */
ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE;
-
+ __attribute__((fallthrough));
+ case 3:
+ /* Removes network support for ABI < 4 */
+ ruleset_attr.handled_access_net &=
+ ~(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP);
fprintf(stderr,
"Hint: You should update the running kernel "
"to leverage Landlock features "
@@ -274,18 +356,42 @@ int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp)
access_fs_ro &= ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs;
access_fs_rw &= ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs;
+ /* Removes bind access attribute if not supported by a user. */
+ env_port_name = getenv(ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME);
+ if (!env_port_name) {
+ ruleset_attr.handled_access_net &=
+ ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP;
+ }
+ /* Removes connect access attribute if not supported by a user. */
+ env_port_name = getenv(ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME);
+ if (!env_port_name) {
+ ruleset_attr.handled_access_net &=
+ ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP;
+ }
+
ruleset_fd =
landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
if (ruleset_fd < 0) {
perror("Failed to create a ruleset");
return 1;
}
- if (populate_ruleset(ENV_FS_RO_NAME, ruleset_fd, access_fs_ro)) {
+
+ if (populate_ruleset_fs(ENV_FS_RO_NAME, ruleset_fd, access_fs_ro)) {
+ goto err_close_ruleset;
+ }
+ if (populate_ruleset_fs(ENV_FS_RW_NAME, ruleset_fd, access_fs_rw)) {
goto err_close_ruleset;
}
- if (populate_ruleset(ENV_FS_RW_NAME, ruleset_fd, access_fs_rw)) {
+
+ if (populate_ruleset_net(ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME, ruleset_fd,
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP)) {
goto err_close_ruleset;
}
+ if (populate_ruleset_net(ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME, ruleset_fd,
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP)) {
+ goto err_close_ruleset;
+ }
+
if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
perror("Failed to restrict privileges");
goto err_close_ruleset;
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 48+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v10 12/13] samples/landlock: Add network demo
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 12/13] samples/landlock: Add network demo Konstantin Meskhidze
@ 2023-04-16 16:13 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-21 10:04 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
0 siblings, 1 reply; 48+ messages in thread
From: Mickaël Salaün @ 2023-04-16 16:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Konstantin Meskhidze
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel, gnoack3000, linux-security-module, netdev,
netfilter-devel, yusongping, artem.kuzin
On 23/03/2023 09:52, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
> This commit adds network demo. It's possible to allow a sandboxer to
> bind/connect to a list of particular ports restricting network
> actions to the rest of ports.
>
> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
> ---
>
> Changes since v9:
> * Deletes ports converting.
> * Minor fixes.
>
> Changes since v8:
> * Convert ports to __be16.
> * Minor fixes.
>
> Changes since v7:
> * Removes network support if ABI < 4.
> * Removes network support if not set by a user.
>
> Changes since v6:
> * Removes network support if ABI < 3.
>
> Changes since v5:
> * Makes network ports sandboxing optional.
> * Fixes some logic errors.
> * Formats code with clang-format-14.
>
> Changes since v4:
> * Adds ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME "LL_TCP_BIND" and
> ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME "LL_TCP_CONNECT" variables
> to insert TCP ports.
> * Renames populate_ruleset() to populate_ruleset_fs().
> * Adds populate_ruleset_net() and parse_port_num() helpers.
> * Refactors main() to support network sandboxing.
>
> ---
> samples/landlock/sandboxer.c | 130 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
> 1 file changed, 118 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c b/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
> index e2056c8b902c..b8f00e4dba95 100644
> --- a/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
> +++ b/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
> @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
> */
>
> #define _GNU_SOURCE
> +#include <arpa/inet.h>
> #include <errno.h>
> #include <fcntl.h>
> #include <linux/landlock.h>
> @@ -51,6 +52,8 @@ static inline int landlock_restrict_self(const int ruleset_fd,
>
> #define ENV_FS_RO_NAME "LL_FS_RO"
> #define ENV_FS_RW_NAME "LL_FS_RW"
> +#define ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME "LL_TCP_BIND"
> +#define ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME "LL_TCP_CONNECT"
> #define ENV_PATH_TOKEN ":"
>
> static int parse_path(char *env_path, const char ***const path_list)
> @@ -71,6 +74,20 @@ static int parse_path(char *env_path, const char ***const path_list)
> return num_paths;
> }
>
> +static int parse_port_num(char *env_port)
> +{
> + int i, num_ports = 0;
> +
> + if (env_port) {
> + num_ports++;
> + for (i = 0; env_port[i]; i++) {
> + if (env_port[i] == ENV_PATH_TOKEN[0])
> + num_ports++;
> + }
> + }
> + return num_ports;
> +}
> +
> /* clang-format off */
>
> #define ACCESS_FILE ( \
> @@ -81,8 +98,8 @@ static int parse_path(char *env_path, const char ***const path_list)
>
> /* clang-format on */
>
> -static int populate_ruleset(const char *const env_var, const int ruleset_fd,
> - const __u64 allowed_access)
> +static int populate_ruleset_fs(const char *const env_var, const int ruleset_fd,
> + const __u64 allowed_access)
> {
> int num_paths, i, ret = 1;
> char *env_path_name;
> @@ -143,6 +160,47 @@ static int populate_ruleset(const char *const env_var, const int ruleset_fd,
> return ret;
> }
>
> +static int populate_ruleset_net(const char *const env_var, const int ruleset_fd,
> + const __u64 allowed_access)
> +{
> + int num_ports, i, ret = 1;
> + char *env_port_name;
> + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service = {
> + .allowed_access = 0,
.allowed_access = allowed_access,
> + .port = 0,
> + };
> +
> + env_port_name = getenv(env_var);
> + if (!env_port_name) {
> + return 0;
> + }
> + env_port_name = strdup(env_port_name);
> + unsetenv(env_var);
> + num_ports = parse_port_num(env_port_name);
> +
> + if (num_ports == 1 && (strtok(env_port_name, ENV_PATH_TOKEN) == NULL)) {
> + ret = 0;
> + goto out_free_name;
> + }
> +
> + for (i = 0; i < num_ports; i++) {
> + net_service.allowed_access = allowed_access;
This previous line can now be removed.
> + net_service.port = atoi(strsep(&env_port_name, ENV_PATH_TOKEN));
> + if (landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
> + &net_service, 0)) {
> + fprintf(stderr,
> + "Failed to update the ruleset with port \"%lld\": %s\n",
> + net_service.port, strerror(errno));
> + goto out_free_name;
> + }
> + }
> + ret = 0;
> +
> +out_free_name:
> + free(env_port_name);
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> /* clang-format off */
>
> #define ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_READ ( \
> @@ -166,39 +224,58 @@ static int populate_ruleset(const char *const env_var, const int ruleset_fd,
>
> /* clang-format on */
>
> -#define LANDLOCK_ABI_LAST 3
> +#define LANDLOCK_ABI_LAST 4
>
> int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp)
> {
> const char *cmd_path;
> char *const *cmd_argv;
> int ruleset_fd, abi;
> + char *env_port_name;
> __u64 access_fs_ro = ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_READ,
> access_fs_rw = ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_READ | ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_WRITE;
> +
> struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
> .handled_access_fs = access_fs_rw,
> + .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
> };
>
> if (argc < 2) {
> fprintf(stderr,
> - "usage: %s=\"...\" %s=\"...\" %s <cmd> [args]...\n\n",
> - ENV_FS_RO_NAME, ENV_FS_RW_NAME, argv[0]);
> + "usage: %s=\"...\" %s=\"...\" %s=\"...\" %s=\"...\"%s "
> + "<cmd> [args]...\n\n",
> + ENV_FS_RO_NAME, ENV_FS_RW_NAME, ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME,
> + ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME, argv[0]);
> fprintf(stderr,
> "Launch a command in a restricted environment.\n\n");
> - fprintf(stderr, "Environment variables containing paths, "
> - "each separated by a colon:\n");
> + fprintf(stderr,
> + "Environment variables containing paths and ports "
> + "each separated by a colon:\n");
> fprintf(stderr,
> "* %s: list of paths allowed to be used in a read-only way.\n",
> ENV_FS_RO_NAME);
> fprintf(stderr,
> - "* %s: list of paths allowed to be used in a read-write way.\n",
> + "* %s: list of paths allowed to be used in a read-write way.\n\n",
> ENV_FS_RW_NAME);
> + fprintf(stderr,
> + "Environment variables containing ports are optional "
> + "and could be skipped.\n");
> + fprintf(stderr,
> + "* %s: list of ports allowed to bind (server).\n",
> + ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME);
> + fprintf(stderr,
> + "* %s: list of ports allowed to connect (client).\n",
> + ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME);
> fprintf(stderr,
> "\nexample:\n"
> "%s=\"/bin:/lib:/usr:/proc:/etc:/dev/urandom\" "
> "%s=\"/dev/null:/dev/full:/dev/zero:/dev/pts:/tmp\" "
> + "%s=\"9418\" "
> + "%s=\"80:443\" "
> "%s bash -i\n\n",
> - ENV_FS_RO_NAME, ENV_FS_RW_NAME, argv[0]);
> + ENV_FS_RO_NAME, ENV_FS_RW_NAME, ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME,
> + ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME, argv[0]);
> fprintf(stderr,
> "This sandboxer can use Landlock features "
> "up to ABI version %d.\n",
> @@ -255,7 +332,12 @@ int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp)
> case 2:
> /* Removes LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE for ABI < 3 */
> ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE;
> -
> + __attribute__((fallthrough));
> + case 3:
> + /* Removes network support for ABI < 4 */
> + ruleset_attr.handled_access_net &=
> + ~(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP);
> fprintf(stderr,
> "Hint: You should update the running kernel "
> "to leverage Landlock features "
> @@ -274,18 +356,42 @@ int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp)
> access_fs_ro &= ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs;
> access_fs_rw &= ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs;
>
> + /* Removes bind access attribute if not supported by a user. */
> + env_port_name = getenv(ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME);
> + if (!env_port_name) {
> + ruleset_attr.handled_access_net &=
> + ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP;
> + }
> + /* Removes connect access attribute if not supported by a user. */
> + env_port_name = getenv(ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME);
> + if (!env_port_name) {
> + ruleset_attr.handled_access_net &=
> + ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP;
> + }
> +
> ruleset_fd =
> landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
> if (ruleset_fd < 0) {
> perror("Failed to create a ruleset");
> return 1;
> }
> - if (populate_ruleset(ENV_FS_RO_NAME, ruleset_fd, access_fs_ro)) {
> +
> + if (populate_ruleset_fs(ENV_FS_RO_NAME, ruleset_fd, access_fs_ro)) {
> + goto err_close_ruleset;
> + }
> + if (populate_ruleset_fs(ENV_FS_RW_NAME, ruleset_fd, access_fs_rw)) {
> goto err_close_ruleset;
> }
> - if (populate_ruleset(ENV_FS_RW_NAME, ruleset_fd, access_fs_rw)) {
> +
> + if (populate_ruleset_net(ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME, ruleset_fd,
> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP)) {
> goto err_close_ruleset;
> }
> + if (populate_ruleset_net(ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME, ruleset_fd,
> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP)) {
> + goto err_close_ruleset;
> + }
> +
> if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
> perror("Failed to restrict privileges");
> goto err_close_ruleset;
> --
> 2.25.1
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 48+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v10 12/13] samples/landlock: Add network demo
2023-04-16 16:13 ` Mickaël Salaün
@ 2023-04-21 10:04 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
0 siblings, 0 replies; 48+ messages in thread
From: Konstantin Meskhidze (A) @ 2023-04-21 10:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mickaël Salaün
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel, gnoack3000, linux-security-module, netdev,
netfilter-devel, yusongping, artem.kuzin
4/16/2023 7:13 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
>
> On 23/03/2023 09:52, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
>> This commit adds network demo. It's possible to allow a sandboxer to
>> bind/connect to a list of particular ports restricting network
>> actions to the rest of ports.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
>> ---
>>
>> Changes since v9:
>> * Deletes ports converting.
>> * Minor fixes.
>>
>> Changes since v8:
>> * Convert ports to __be16.
>> * Minor fixes.
>>
>> Changes since v7:
>> * Removes network support if ABI < 4.
>> * Removes network support if not set by a user.
>>
>> Changes since v6:
>> * Removes network support if ABI < 3.
>>
>> Changes since v5:
>> * Makes network ports sandboxing optional.
>> * Fixes some logic errors.
>> * Formats code with clang-format-14.
>>
>> Changes since v4:
>> * Adds ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME "LL_TCP_BIND" and
>> ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME "LL_TCP_CONNECT" variables
>> to insert TCP ports.
>> * Renames populate_ruleset() to populate_ruleset_fs().
>> * Adds populate_ruleset_net() and parse_port_num() helpers.
>> * Refactors main() to support network sandboxing.
>>
>> ---
>> samples/landlock/sandboxer.c | 130 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
>> 1 file changed, 118 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c b/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
>> index e2056c8b902c..b8f00e4dba95 100644
>> --- a/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
>> +++ b/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
>> @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
>> */
>>
>> #define _GNU_SOURCE
>> +#include <arpa/inet.h>
>> #include <errno.h>
>> #include <fcntl.h>
>> #include <linux/landlock.h>
>> @@ -51,6 +52,8 @@ static inline int landlock_restrict_self(const int ruleset_fd,
>>
>> #define ENV_FS_RO_NAME "LL_FS_RO"
>> #define ENV_FS_RW_NAME "LL_FS_RW"
>> +#define ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME "LL_TCP_BIND"
>> +#define ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME "LL_TCP_CONNECT"
>> #define ENV_PATH_TOKEN ":"
>>
>> static int parse_path(char *env_path, const char ***const path_list)
>> @@ -71,6 +74,20 @@ static int parse_path(char *env_path, const char ***const path_list)
>> return num_paths;
>> }
>>
>> +static int parse_port_num(char *env_port)
>> +{
>> + int i, num_ports = 0;
>> +
>> + if (env_port) {
>> + num_ports++;
>> + for (i = 0; env_port[i]; i++) {
>> + if (env_port[i] == ENV_PATH_TOKEN[0])
>> + num_ports++;
>> + }
>> + }
>> + return num_ports;
>> +}
>> +
>> /* clang-format off */
>>
>> #define ACCESS_FILE ( \
>> @@ -81,8 +98,8 @@ static int parse_path(char *env_path, const char ***const path_list)
>>
>> /* clang-format on */
>>
>> -static int populate_ruleset(const char *const env_var, const int ruleset_fd,
>> - const __u64 allowed_access)
>> +static int populate_ruleset_fs(const char *const env_var, const int ruleset_fd,
>> + const __u64 allowed_access)
>> {
>> int num_paths, i, ret = 1;
>> char *env_path_name;
>> @@ -143,6 +160,47 @@ static int populate_ruleset(const char *const env_var, const int ruleset_fd,
>> return ret;
>> }
>>
>> +static int populate_ruleset_net(const char *const env_var, const int ruleset_fd,
>> + const __u64 allowed_access)
>> +{
>> + int num_ports, i, ret = 1;
>> + char *env_port_name;
>> + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service = {
>> + .allowed_access = 0,
>
> .allowed_access = allowed_access,
Got it.
>
>> + .port = 0,
>> + };
>> +
>> + env_port_name = getenv(env_var);
>> + if (!env_port_name) {
>> + return 0;
>> + }
>> + env_port_name = strdup(env_port_name);
>> + unsetenv(env_var);
>> + num_ports = parse_port_num(env_port_name);
>> +
>> + if (num_ports == 1 && (strtok(env_port_name, ENV_PATH_TOKEN) == NULL)) {
>> + ret = 0;
>> + goto out_free_name;
>> + }
>> +
>> + for (i = 0; i < num_ports; i++) {
>> + net_service.allowed_access = allowed_access;
>
> This previous line can now be removed.
Ok. Thanks for the tip.
>
>
>> + net_service.port = atoi(strsep(&env_port_name, ENV_PATH_TOKEN));
>> + if (landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
>> + &net_service, 0)) {
>> + fprintf(stderr,
>> + "Failed to update the ruleset with port \"%lld\": %s\n",
>> + net_service.port, strerror(errno));
>> + goto out_free_name;
>> + }
>> + }
>> + ret = 0;
>> +
>> +out_free_name:
>> + free(env_port_name);
>> + return ret;
>> +}
>> +
>> /* clang-format off */
>>
>> #define ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_READ ( \
>> @@ -166,39 +224,58 @@ static int populate_ruleset(const char *const env_var, const int ruleset_fd,
>>
>> /* clang-format on */
>>
>> -#define LANDLOCK_ABI_LAST 3
>> +#define LANDLOCK_ABI_LAST 4
>>
>> int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp)
>> {
>> const char *cmd_path;
>> char *const *cmd_argv;
>> int ruleset_fd, abi;
>> + char *env_port_name;
>> __u64 access_fs_ro = ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_READ,
>> access_fs_rw = ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_READ | ACCESS_FS_ROUGHLY_WRITE;
>> +
>> struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
>> .handled_access_fs = access_fs_rw,
>> + .handled_access_net = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
>> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
>> };
>>
>> if (argc < 2) {
>> fprintf(stderr,
>> - "usage: %s=\"...\" %s=\"...\" %s <cmd> [args]...\n\n",
>> - ENV_FS_RO_NAME, ENV_FS_RW_NAME, argv[0]);
>> + "usage: %s=\"...\" %s=\"...\" %s=\"...\" %s=\"...\"%s "
>> + "<cmd> [args]...\n\n",
>> + ENV_FS_RO_NAME, ENV_FS_RW_NAME, ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME,
>> + ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME, argv[0]);
>> fprintf(stderr,
>> "Launch a command in a restricted environment.\n\n");
>> - fprintf(stderr, "Environment variables containing paths, "
>> - "each separated by a colon:\n");
>> + fprintf(stderr,
>> + "Environment variables containing paths and ports "
>> + "each separated by a colon:\n");
>> fprintf(stderr,
>> "* %s: list of paths allowed to be used in a read-only way.\n",
>> ENV_FS_RO_NAME);
>> fprintf(stderr,
>> - "* %s: list of paths allowed to be used in a read-write way.\n",
>> + "* %s: list of paths allowed to be used in a read-write way.\n\n",
>> ENV_FS_RW_NAME);
>> + fprintf(stderr,
>> + "Environment variables containing ports are optional "
>> + "and could be skipped.\n");
>> + fprintf(stderr,
>> + "* %s: list of ports allowed to bind (server).\n",
>> + ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME);
>> + fprintf(stderr,
>> + "* %s: list of ports allowed to connect (client).\n",
>> + ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME);
>> fprintf(stderr,
>> "\nexample:\n"
>> "%s=\"/bin:/lib:/usr:/proc:/etc:/dev/urandom\" "
>> "%s=\"/dev/null:/dev/full:/dev/zero:/dev/pts:/tmp\" "
>> + "%s=\"9418\" "
>> + "%s=\"80:443\" "
>> "%s bash -i\n\n",
>> - ENV_FS_RO_NAME, ENV_FS_RW_NAME, argv[0]);
>> + ENV_FS_RO_NAME, ENV_FS_RW_NAME, ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME,
>> + ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME, argv[0]);
>> fprintf(stderr,
>> "This sandboxer can use Landlock features "
>> "up to ABI version %d.\n",
>> @@ -255,7 +332,12 @@ int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp)
>> case 2:
>> /* Removes LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE for ABI < 3 */
>> ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE;
>> -
>> + __attribute__((fallthrough));
>> + case 3:
>> + /* Removes network support for ABI < 4 */
>> + ruleset_attr.handled_access_net &=
>> + ~(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
>> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP);
>> fprintf(stderr,
>> "Hint: You should update the running kernel "
>> "to leverage Landlock features "
>> @@ -274,18 +356,42 @@ int main(const int argc, char *const argv[], char *const *const envp)
>> access_fs_ro &= ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs;
>> access_fs_rw &= ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs;
>>
>> + /* Removes bind access attribute if not supported by a user. */
>> + env_port_name = getenv(ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME);
>> + if (!env_port_name) {
>> + ruleset_attr.handled_access_net &=
>> + ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP;
>> + }
>> + /* Removes connect access attribute if not supported by a user. */
>> + env_port_name = getenv(ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME);
>> + if (!env_port_name) {
>> + ruleset_attr.handled_access_net &=
>> + ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP;
>> + }
>> +
>> ruleset_fd =
>> landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, sizeof(ruleset_attr), 0);
>> if (ruleset_fd < 0) {
>> perror("Failed to create a ruleset");
>> return 1;
>> }
>> - if (populate_ruleset(ENV_FS_RO_NAME, ruleset_fd, access_fs_ro)) {
>> +
>> + if (populate_ruleset_fs(ENV_FS_RO_NAME, ruleset_fd, access_fs_ro)) {
>> + goto err_close_ruleset;
>> + }
>> + if (populate_ruleset_fs(ENV_FS_RW_NAME, ruleset_fd, access_fs_rw)) {
>> goto err_close_ruleset;
>> }
>> - if (populate_ruleset(ENV_FS_RW_NAME, ruleset_fd, access_fs_rw)) {
>> +
>> + if (populate_ruleset_net(ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME, ruleset_fd,
>> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP)) {
>> goto err_close_ruleset;
>> }
>> + if (populate_ruleset_net(ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME, ruleset_fd,
>> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP)) {
>> + goto err_close_ruleset;
>> + }
>> +
>> if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
>> perror("Failed to restrict privileges");
>> goto err_close_ruleset;
>> --
>> 2.25.1
>>
> .
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 48+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v10 13/13] landlock: Document Landlock's network support
2023-03-23 8:52 [PATCH v10 00/13] Network support for Landlock Konstantin Meskhidze
` (11 preceding siblings ...)
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 12/13] samples/landlock: Add network demo Konstantin Meskhidze
@ 2023-03-23 8:52 ` Konstantin Meskhidze
2023-04-16 16:13 ` Mickaël Salaün
12 siblings, 1 reply; 48+ messages in thread
From: Konstantin Meskhidze @ 2023-03-23 8:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: mic
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel, gnoack3000, linux-security-module, netdev,
netfilter-devel, yusongping, artem.kuzin
Describe network access rules for TCP sockets. Add network access
example in the tutorial. Add kernel configuration support for network.
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
---
Changes since v9:
* Minor refactoring.
Changes since v8:
* Minor refactoring.
Changes since v7:
* Fixes documentaion logic errors and typos as Mickaёl suggested:
https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/9f354862-2bc3-39ea-92fd-53803d9bbc21@digikod.net/
Changes since v6:
* Adds network support documentaion.
---
Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 69 ++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 54 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
index f6a7da21708a..0d640bfa3126 100644
--- a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
+++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
@@ -11,10 +11,10 @@ Landlock: unprivileged access control
:Date: October 2022
The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g. global
-filesystem access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock is a stackable
-LSM, it makes possible to create safe security sandboxes as new security layers
-in addition to the existing system-wide access-controls. This kind of sandbox
-is expected to help mitigate the security impact of bugs or
+filesystem or network access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock
+is a stackable LSM, it makes possible to create safe security sandboxes as new
+security layers in addition to the existing system-wide access-controls. This
+kind of sandbox is expected to help mitigate the security impact of bugs or
unexpected/malicious behaviors in user space applications. Landlock empowers
any process, including unprivileged ones, to securely restrict themselves.
@@ -30,8 +30,9 @@ Landlock rules
A Landlock rule describes an action on an object. An object is currently a
file hierarchy, and the related filesystem actions are defined with `access
-rights`_. A set of rules is aggregated in a ruleset, which can then restrict
-the thread enforcing it, and its future children.
+rights`_. Since ABI version 4 a port data appears with related network actions
+for TCP socket families. A set of rules is aggregated in a ruleset, which
+can then restrict the thread enforcing it, and its future children.
Defining and enforcing a security policy
----------------------------------------
@@ -41,7 +42,8 @@ example, the ruleset will contain rules that only allow read actions, but write
actions will be denied. The ruleset then needs to handle both of these kind of
actions. This is required for backward and forward compatibility (i.e. the
kernel and user space may not know each other's supported restrictions), hence
-the need to be explicit about the denied-by-default access rights.
+the need to be explicit about the denied-by-default access rights. Also, ruleset
+will have network rules for specific ports, so it should handle network actions.
.. code-block:: c
@@ -62,6 +64,9 @@ the need to be explicit about the denied-by-default access rights.
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM |
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER |
LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE,
+ .handled_access_net =
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
};
Because we may not know on which kernel version an application will be
@@ -70,14 +75,18 @@ should try to protect users as much as possible whatever the kernel they are
using. To avoid binary enforcement (i.e. either all security features or
none), we can leverage a dedicated Landlock command to get the current version
of the Landlock ABI and adapt the handled accesses. Let's check if we should
-remove the ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER`` or ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE``
-access rights, which are only supported starting with the second and third
-version of the ABI.
+remove the ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER`` or ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE`` or
+network access rights, which are only supported starting with the second,
+third and fourth version of the ABI.
.. code-block:: c
int abi;
+ #define ACCESS_NET_BIND_CONNECT ( \
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP | \
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP)
+
abi = landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 0, LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION);
if (abi < 0) {
/* Degrades gracefully if Landlock is not handled. */
@@ -92,6 +101,11 @@ version of the ABI.
case 2:
/* Removes LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE for ABI < 3 */
ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE;
+ case 3:
+ /* Removes network support for ABI < 4 */
+ ruleset_attr.handled_access_net &=
+ ~(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
+ LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP);
}
This enables to create an inclusive ruleset that will contain our rules.
@@ -143,10 +157,23 @@ for the ruleset creation, by filtering access rights according to the Landlock
ABI version. In this example, this is not required because all of the requested
``allowed_access`` rights are already available in ABI 1.
-We now have a ruleset with one rule allowing read access to ``/usr`` while
-denying all other handled accesses for the filesystem. The next step is to
-restrict the current thread from gaining more privileges (e.g. thanks to a SUID
-binary).
+For network access-control, we can add a set of rules that allow to use a port
+number for a specific action.
+
+.. code-block:: c
+
+ struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service = {
+ .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
+ .port = 8080,
+ };
+
+ err = landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
+ &net_service, 0);
+
+The next step is to restrict the current thread from gaining more privileges
+(e.g. through a SUID binary). We now have a ruleset with the first rule allowing
+read access to ``/usr`` while denying all other handled accesses for the filesystem,
+and a second rule allowing TCP binding on port 8080.
.. code-block:: c
@@ -355,7 +382,7 @@ Access rights
-------------
.. kernel-doc:: include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
- :identifiers: fs_access
+ :identifiers: fs_access net_access
Creating a new ruleset
----------------------
@@ -374,6 +401,7 @@ Extending a ruleset
.. kernel-doc:: include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
:identifiers: landlock_rule_type landlock_path_beneath_attr
+ landlock_net_service_attr
Enforcing a ruleset
-------------------
@@ -451,6 +479,12 @@ always allowed when using a kernel that only supports the first or second ABI.
Starting with the Landlock ABI version 3, it is now possible to securely control
truncation thanks to the new ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE`` access right.
+Network support (ABI < 4)
+-------------------------
+
+Starting with the Landlock ABI version 4, it is now possible to restrict TCP
+bind and connect actions to only a set of allowed ports.
+
.. _kernel_support:
Kernel support
@@ -469,6 +503,11 @@ still enable it by adding ``lsm=landlock,[...]`` to
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst thanks to the bootloader
configuration.
+To be able to explicitly allow TCP operations (e.g., adding a network rule with
+``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_TCP_BIND``), the kernel must support TCP (``CONFIG_INET=y``).
+Otherwise, sys_landlock_add_rule() returns an ``EAFNOSUPPORT`` error, which can
+safely be ignored because this kind of TCP operation is already not possible.
+
Questions and answers
=====================
--
2.25.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 48+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v10 13/13] landlock: Document Landlock's network support
2023-03-23 8:52 ` [PATCH v10 13/13] landlock: Document Landlock's network support Konstantin Meskhidze
@ 2023-04-16 16:13 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-04-21 10:07 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
0 siblings, 1 reply; 48+ messages in thread
From: Mickaël Salaün @ 2023-04-16 16:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Konstantin Meskhidze
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel, gnoack3000, linux-security-module, netdev,
netfilter-devel, yusongping, artem.kuzin
On 23/03/2023 09:52, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
> Describe network access rules for TCP sockets. Add network access
> example in the tutorial. Add kernel configuration support for network.
>
> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
> ---
>
> Changes since v9:
> * Minor refactoring.
>
> Changes since v8:
> * Minor refactoring.
>
> Changes since v7:
> * Fixes documentaion logic errors and typos as Mickaёl suggested:
> https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/9f354862-2bc3-39ea-92fd-53803d9bbc21@digikod.net/
>
> Changes since v6:
> * Adds network support documentaion.
>
> ---
> Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 69 ++++++++++++++++++------
> 1 file changed, 54 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
> index f6a7da21708a..0d640bfa3126 100644
> --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
> +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
> @@ -11,10 +11,10 @@ Landlock: unprivileged access control
> :Date: October 2022
>
> The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g. global
> -filesystem access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock is a stackable
> -LSM, it makes possible to create safe security sandboxes as new security layers
> -in addition to the existing system-wide access-controls. This kind of sandbox
> -is expected to help mitigate the security impact of bugs or
> +filesystem or network access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock
> +is a stackable LSM, it makes possible to create safe security sandboxes as new
> +security layers in addition to the existing system-wide access-controls. This
> +kind of sandbox is expected to help mitigate the security impact of bugs or
> unexpected/malicious behaviors in user space applications. Landlock empowers
> any process, including unprivileged ones, to securely restrict themselves.
>
> @@ -30,8 +30,9 @@ Landlock rules
>
> A Landlock rule describes an action on an object. An object is currently a
A Landlock rule describes an action on a kernel object. Filesystem
objects can be defined with a file hierarchy. Since the fourth ABI
version, TCP ports enable to identify inbound or outbound connections.
Actions on these kernel objects are defined according to `access
rights`_. A set of rules…
> file hierarchy, and the related filesystem actions are defined with `access
> -rights`_. A set of rules is aggregated in a ruleset, which can then restrict
> -the thread enforcing it, and its future children.
> +rights`_. Since ABI version 4 a port data appears with related network actions
> +for TCP socket families. A set of rules is aggregated in a ruleset, which
> +can then restrict the thread enforcing it, and its future children.
>
> Defining and enforcing a security policy
> ----------------------------------------
> @@ -41,7 +42,8 @@ example, the ruleset will contain rules that only allow read actions, but write
"the ruleset will contain rules that only allow filesystem read actions
and establish a specific TCP connection, but filesystem write actions
and other TCP actions will be denied."
> actions will be denied. The ruleset then needs to handle both of these kind of
> actions. This is required for backward and forward compatibility (i.e. the
> kernel and user space may not know each other's supported restrictions), hence
> -the need to be explicit about the denied-by-default access rights.
> +the need to be explicit about the denied-by-default access rights. Also, ruleset > +will have network rules for specific ports, so it should handle
network actions.
This hunk can then be removed.
>
> .. code-block:: c
>
> @@ -62,6 +64,9 @@ the need to be explicit about the denied-by-default access rights.
> LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM |
> LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER |
> LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE,
> + .handled_access_net =
> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
> };
>
> Because we may not know on which kernel version an application will be
> @@ -70,14 +75,18 @@ should try to protect users as much as possible whatever the kernel they are
> using. To avoid binary enforcement (i.e. either all security features or
> none), we can leverage a dedicated Landlock command to get the current version
> of the Landlock ABI and adapt the handled accesses. Let's check if we should
> -remove the ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER`` or ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE``
> -access rights, which are only supported starting with the second and third
> -version of the ABI.
> +remove the ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER`` or ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE`` or
> +network access rights, which are only supported starting with the second,
> +third and fourth version of the ABI.
>
> .. code-block:: c
>
> int abi;
>
> + #define ACCESS_NET_BIND_CONNECT ( \
> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP | \
> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP)
> +
> abi = landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 0, LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION);
> if (abi < 0) {
> /* Degrades gracefully if Landlock is not handled. */
> @@ -92,6 +101,11 @@ version of the ABI.
> case 2:
> /* Removes LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE for ABI < 3 */
> ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE;
> + case 3:
> + /* Removes network support for ABI < 4 */
> + ruleset_attr.handled_access_net &=
> + ~(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP);
> }
>
> This enables to create an inclusive ruleset that will contain our rules.
> @@ -143,10 +157,23 @@ for the ruleset creation, by filtering access rights according to the Landlock
> ABI version. In this example, this is not required because all of the requested
> ``allowed_access`` rights are already available in ABI 1.
>
> -We now have a ruleset with one rule allowing read access to ``/usr`` while
> -denying all other handled accesses for the filesystem. The next step is to
> -restrict the current thread from gaining more privileges (e.g. thanks to a SUID
> -binary).
> +For network access-control, we can add a set of rules that allow to use a port
> +number for a specific action.
It would be more useful to change this example with a TCP connection to
port 443 and explain that it will only allow to connect to HTTPS services.
"…for a specific action: HTTPS connections."
> +
> +.. code-block:: c
> +
> + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service = {
> + .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
NET_CONNECT_TCP
> + .port = 8080,
443
> + };
> +
> + err = landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
> + &net_service, 0);
> +
> +The next step is to restrict the current thread from gaining more privileges
> +(e.g. through a SUID binary). We now have a ruleset with the first rule allowing
> +read access to ``/usr`` while denying all other handled accesses for the filesystem,
> +and a second rule allowing TCP binding on port 8080.
"allowing HTTPS connections."
>
> .. code-block:: c
>
> @@ -355,7 +382,7 @@ Access rights
> -------------
>
> .. kernel-doc:: include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
> - :identifiers: fs_access
> + :identifiers: fs_access net_access
>
> Creating a new ruleset
> ----------------------
> @@ -374,6 +401,7 @@ Extending a ruleset
>
> .. kernel-doc:: include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
> :identifiers: landlock_rule_type landlock_path_beneath_attr
> + landlock_net_service_attr
>
> Enforcing a ruleset
> -------------------
> @@ -451,6 +479,12 @@ always allowed when using a kernel that only supports the first or second ABI.
> Starting with the Landlock ABI version 3, it is now possible to securely control
> truncation thanks to the new ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE`` access right.
>
> +Network support (ABI < 4)
> +-------------------------
> +
> +Starting with the Landlock ABI version 4, it is now possible to restrict TCP
> +bind and connect actions to only a set of allowed ports.
> +
> .. _kernel_support:
>
> Kernel support
> @@ -469,6 +503,11 @@ still enable it by adding ``lsm=landlock,[...]`` to
> Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst thanks to the bootloader
> configuration.
>
> +To be able to explicitly allow TCP operations (e.g., adding a network rule with
> +``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_TCP_BIND``), the kernel must support TCP (``CONFIG_INET=y``).
> +Otherwise, sys_landlock_add_rule() returns an ``EAFNOSUPPORT`` error, which can
> +safely be ignored because this kind of TCP operation is already not possible.
> +
> Questions and answers
> =====================
>
> --
> 2.25.1
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 48+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v10 13/13] landlock: Document Landlock's network support
2023-04-16 16:13 ` Mickaël Salaün
@ 2023-04-21 10:07 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
0 siblings, 0 replies; 48+ messages in thread
From: Konstantin Meskhidze (A) @ 2023-04-21 10:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mickaël Salaün
Cc: willemdebruijn.kernel, gnoack3000, linux-security-module, netdev,
netfilter-devel, yusongping, artem.kuzin
4/16/2023 7:13 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет:
>
> On 23/03/2023 09:52, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote:
>> Describe network access rules for TCP sockets. Add network access
>> example in the tutorial. Add kernel configuration support for network.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>
>> ---
>>
>> Changes since v9:
>> * Minor refactoring.
>>
>> Changes since v8:
>> * Minor refactoring.
>>
>> Changes since v7:
>> * Fixes documentaion logic errors and typos as Mickaёl suggested:
>> https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/9f354862-2bc3-39ea-92fd-53803d9bbc21@digikod.net/
>>
>> Changes since v6:
>> * Adds network support documentaion.
>>
>> ---
>> Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 69 ++++++++++++++++++------
>> 1 file changed, 54 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
>> index f6a7da21708a..0d640bfa3126 100644
>> --- a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
>> +++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
>> @@ -11,10 +11,10 @@ Landlock: unprivileged access control
>> :Date: October 2022
>>
>> The goal of Landlock is to enable to restrict ambient rights (e.g. global
>> -filesystem access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock is a stackable
>> -LSM, it makes possible to create safe security sandboxes as new security layers
>> -in addition to the existing system-wide access-controls. This kind of sandbox
>> -is expected to help mitigate the security impact of bugs or
>> +filesystem or network access) for a set of processes. Because Landlock
>> +is a stackable LSM, it makes possible to create safe security sandboxes as new
>> +security layers in addition to the existing system-wide access-controls. This
>> +kind of sandbox is expected to help mitigate the security impact of bugs or
>> unexpected/malicious behaviors in user space applications. Landlock empowers
>> any process, including unprivileged ones, to securely restrict themselves.
>>
>> @@ -30,8 +30,9 @@ Landlock rules
>>
>> A Landlock rule describes an action on an object. An object is currently a
>
> A Landlock rule describes an action on a kernel object. Filesystem
> objects can be defined with a file hierarchy. Since the fourth ABI
> version, TCP ports enable to identify inbound or outbound connections.
> Actions on these kernel objects are defined according to `access
> rights`_. A set of rules…
Ok. Thanks.
>
>
>> file hierarchy, and the related filesystem actions are defined with `access
>> -rights`_. A set of rules is aggregated in a ruleset, which can then restrict
>> -the thread enforcing it, and its future children.
>> +rights`_. Since ABI version 4 a port data appears with related network actions
>> +for TCP socket families. A set of rules is aggregated in a ruleset, which
>> +can then restrict the thread enforcing it, and its future children.
>>
>> Defining and enforcing a security policy
>> ----------------------------------------
>> @@ -41,7 +42,8 @@ example, the ruleset will contain rules that only allow read actions, but write
>
> "the ruleset will contain rules that only allow filesystem read actions
> and establish a specific TCP connection, but filesystem write actions
> and other TCP actions will be denied."
>
Got it.
>
>> actions will be denied. The ruleset then needs to handle both of these kind of
>> actions. This is required for backward and forward compatibility (i.e. the
>> kernel and user space may not know each other's supported restrictions), hence
>> -the need to be explicit about the denied-by-default access rights.
>> +the need to be explicit about the denied-by-default access rights. Also, ruleset > +will have network rules for specific ports, so it should handle
> network actions.
>
> This hunk can then be removed.
Ok. I will get rid of it.
>
>
>>
>> .. code-block:: c
>>
>> @@ -62,6 +64,9 @@ the need to be explicit about the denied-by-default access rights.
>> LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_MAKE_SYM |
>> LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER |
>> LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE,
>> + .handled_access_net =
>> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
>> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP,
>> };
>>
>> Because we may not know on which kernel version an application will be
>> @@ -70,14 +75,18 @@ should try to protect users as much as possible whatever the kernel they are
>> using. To avoid binary enforcement (i.e. either all security features or
>> none), we can leverage a dedicated Landlock command to get the current version
>> of the Landlock ABI and adapt the handled accesses. Let's check if we should
>> -remove the ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER`` or ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE``
>> -access rights, which are only supported starting with the second and third
>> -version of the ABI.
>> +remove the ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER`` or ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE`` or
>> +network access rights, which are only supported starting with the second,
>> +third and fourth version of the ABI.
>>
>> .. code-block:: c
>>
>> int abi;
>>
>> + #define ACCESS_NET_BIND_CONNECT ( \
>> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP | \
>> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP)
>> +
>> abi = landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 0, LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION);
>> if (abi < 0) {
>> /* Degrades gracefully if Landlock is not handled. */
>> @@ -92,6 +101,11 @@ version of the ABI.
>> case 2:
>> /* Removes LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE for ABI < 3 */
>> ruleset_attr.handled_access_fs &= ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE;
>> + case 3:
>> + /* Removes network support for ABI < 4 */
>> + ruleset_attr.handled_access_net &=
>> + ~(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP |
>> + LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP);
>> }
>>
>> This enables to create an inclusive ruleset that will contain our rules.
>> @@ -143,10 +157,23 @@ for the ruleset creation, by filtering access rights according to the Landlock
>> ABI version. In this example, this is not required because all of the requested
>> ``allowed_access`` rights are already available in ABI 1.
>>
>> -We now have a ruleset with one rule allowing read access to ``/usr`` while
>> -denying all other handled accesses for the filesystem. The next step is to
>> -restrict the current thread from gaining more privileges (e.g. thanks to a SUID
>> -binary).
>> +For network access-control, we can add a set of rules that allow to use a port
>> +number for a specific action.
>
> It would be more useful to change this example with a TCP connection to
> port 443 and explain that it will only allow to connect to HTTPS services.
>
> "…for a specific action: HTTPS connections."
>
Yep. Thanks.
>
>> +
>> +.. code-block:: c
>> +
>> + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service = {
>> + .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP,
>
> NET_CONNECT_TCP
Ok.
>
>> + .port = 8080,
>
> 443
Ok.
>
>
>> + };
>> +
>> + err = landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE,
>> + &net_service, 0);
>> +
>> +The next step is to restrict the current thread from gaining more privileges
>> +(e.g. through a SUID binary). We now have a ruleset with the first rule allowing
>> +read access to ``/usr`` while denying all other handled accesses for the filesystem,
>> +and a second rule allowing TCP binding on port 8080.
>
> "allowing HTTPS connections."
>
Got it.
>
>>
>> .. code-block:: c
>>
>> @@ -355,7 +382,7 @@ Access rights
>> -------------
>>
>> .. kernel-doc:: include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
>> - :identifiers: fs_access
>> + :identifiers: fs_access net_access
>>
>> Creating a new ruleset
>> ----------------------
>> @@ -374,6 +401,7 @@ Extending a ruleset
>>
>> .. kernel-doc:: include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
>> :identifiers: landlock_rule_type landlock_path_beneath_attr
>> + landlock_net_service_attr
>>
>> Enforcing a ruleset
>> -------------------
>> @@ -451,6 +479,12 @@ always allowed when using a kernel that only supports the first or second ABI.
>> Starting with the Landlock ABI version 3, it is now possible to securely control
>> truncation thanks to the new ``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_TRUNCATE`` access right.
>>
>> +Network support (ABI < 4)
>> +-------------------------
>> +
>> +Starting with the Landlock ABI version 4, it is now possible to restrict TCP
>> +bind and connect actions to only a set of allowed ports.
>> +
>> .. _kernel_support:
>>
>> Kernel support
>> @@ -469,6 +503,11 @@ still enable it by adding ``lsm=landlock,[...]`` to
>> Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.rst thanks to the bootloader
>> configuration.
>>
>> +To be able to explicitly allow TCP operations (e.g., adding a network rule with
>> +``LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_TCP_BIND``), the kernel must support TCP (``CONFIG_INET=y``).
>> +Otherwise, sys_landlock_add_rule() returns an ``EAFNOSUPPORT`` error, which can
>> +safely be ignored because this kind of TCP operation is already not possible.
>> +
>> Questions and answers
>> =====================
>>
>> --
>> 2.25.1
>>
> .
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 48+ messages in thread