* [PATCH 1/4] sev/i386: Add initial support for SEV-ES
2020-08-25 19:05 [PATCH 0/4] SEV-ES guest support Tom Lendacky
@ 2020-08-25 19:05 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-08-26 19:07 ` Connor Kuehl
2020-08-25 19:05 ` [PATCH 2/4] sev/i386: Allow AP booting under SEV-ES Tom Lendacky
` (3 subsequent siblings)
4 siblings, 1 reply; 12+ messages in thread
From: Tom Lendacky @ 2020-08-25 19:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: qemu-devel, kvm
Cc: Eduardo Habkost, Michael S . Tsirkin, Marcelo Tosatti,
Paolo Bonzini, Jiri Slaby, Richard Henderson
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Provide initial support for SEV-ES. This includes creating a function to
indicate the guest is an SEV-ES guest (which will return false until all
support is in place), performing the proper SEV initialization and
ensuring that the guest CPU state is measured as part of the launch.
Co-developed-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
target/i386/cpu.c | 1 +
target/i386/sev-stub.c | 5 +++++
target/i386/sev.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
target/i386/sev_i386.h | 1 +
4 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/target/i386/cpu.c b/target/i386/cpu.c
index 588f32e136..bbbe581d35 100644
--- a/target/i386/cpu.c
+++ b/target/i386/cpu.c
@@ -5969,6 +5969,7 @@ void cpu_x86_cpuid(CPUX86State *env, uint32_t index, uint32_t count,
break;
case 0x8000001F:
*eax = sev_enabled() ? 0x2 : 0;
+ *eax |= sev_es_enabled() ? 0x8 : 0;
*ebx = sev_get_cbit_position();
*ebx |= sev_get_reduced_phys_bits() << 6;
*ecx = 0;
diff --git a/target/i386/sev-stub.c b/target/i386/sev-stub.c
index 88e3f39a1e..040ac90563 100644
--- a/target/i386/sev-stub.c
+++ b/target/i386/sev-stub.c
@@ -49,3 +49,8 @@ SevCapability *sev_get_capabilities(Error **errp)
error_setg(errp, "SEV is not available in this QEMU");
return NULL;
}
+
+bool sev_es_enabled(void)
+{
+ return false;
+}
diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
index c3ecf86704..6c9cd0854b 100644
--- a/target/i386/sev.c
+++ b/target/i386/sev.c
@@ -359,6 +359,12 @@ sev_enabled(void)
return !!sev_guest;
}
+bool
+sev_es_enabled(void)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
uint64_t
sev_get_me_mask(void)
{
@@ -578,6 +584,22 @@ sev_launch_update_data(SevGuestState *sev, uint8_t *addr, uint64_t len)
return ret;
}
+static int
+sev_launch_update_vmsa(SevGuestState *sev)
+{
+ int ret, fw_error;
+
+ ret = sev_ioctl(sev->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA, NULL, &fw_error);
+ if (ret) {
+ error_report("%s: LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'",
+ __func__, ret, fw_error, fw_error_to_str(fw_error));
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+err:
+ return ret;
+}
+
static void
sev_launch_get_measure(Notifier *notifier, void *unused)
{
@@ -590,6 +612,14 @@ sev_launch_get_measure(Notifier *notifier, void *unused)
return;
}
+ if (sev_es_enabled()) {
+ /* measure all the VM save areas before getting launch_measure */
+ ret = sev_launch_update_vmsa(sev);
+ if (ret) {
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ }
+
measurement = g_new0(struct kvm_sev_launch_measure, 1);
/* query the measurement blob length */
@@ -684,7 +714,7 @@ sev_guest_init(const char *id)
{
SevGuestState *sev;
char *devname;
- int ret, fw_error;
+ int ret, fw_error, cmd;
uint32_t ebx;
uint32_t host_cbitpos;
struct sev_user_data_status status = {};
@@ -745,8 +775,20 @@ sev_guest_init(const char *id)
sev->api_major = status.api_major;
sev->api_minor = status.api_minor;
+ if (sev_es_enabled()) {
+ if (!(status.flags & SEV_STATUS_FLAGS_CONFIG_ES)) {
+ error_report("%s: guest policy requires SEV-ES, but "
+ "host SEV-ES support unavailable",
+ __func__);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ cmd = KVM_SEV_ES_INIT;
+ } else {
+ cmd = KVM_SEV_INIT;
+ }
+
trace_kvm_sev_init();
- ret = sev_ioctl(sev->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_INIT, NULL, &fw_error);
+ ret = sev_ioctl(sev->sev_fd, cmd, NULL, &fw_error);
if (ret) {
error_report("%s: failed to initialize ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'",
__func__, ret, fw_error, fw_error_to_str(fw_error));
diff --git a/target/i386/sev_i386.h b/target/i386/sev_i386.h
index 4db6960f60..4f9a5e9b21 100644
--- a/target/i386/sev_i386.h
+++ b/target/i386/sev_i386.h
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
#define SEV_POLICY_SEV 0x20
extern bool sev_enabled(void);
+extern bool sev_es_enabled(void);
extern uint64_t sev_get_me_mask(void);
extern SevInfo *sev_get_info(void);
extern uint32_t sev_get_cbit_position(void);
--
2.28.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 1/4] sev/i386: Add initial support for SEV-ES
2020-08-25 19:05 ` [PATCH 1/4] sev/i386: Add initial support for SEV-ES Tom Lendacky
@ 2020-08-26 19:07 ` Connor Kuehl
2020-08-26 19:24 ` Tom Lendacky
0 siblings, 1 reply; 12+ messages in thread
From: Connor Kuehl @ 2020-08-26 19:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tom Lendacky, qemu-devel, kvm
Cc: Eduardo Habkost, Michael S . Tsirkin, Marcelo Tosatti,
Paolo Bonzini, Jiri Slaby, Richard Henderson
On 8/25/20 2:05 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>
> Provide initial support for SEV-ES. This includes creating a function to
> indicate the guest is an SEV-ES guest (which will return false until all
> support is in place), performing the proper SEV initialization and
> ensuring that the guest CPU state is measured as part of the launch.
>
> Co-developed-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Hi Tom!
Overall I think the patch set looks good. I mainly just have 1 question
regarding some error handling and a couple of checkpatch related messages.
> ---
> target/i386/cpu.c | 1 +
> target/i386/sev-stub.c | 5 +++++
> target/i386/sev.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
> target/i386/sev_i386.h | 1 +
> 4 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/target/i386/cpu.c b/target/i386/cpu.c
> index 588f32e136..bbbe581d35 100644
> --- a/target/i386/cpu.c
> +++ b/target/i386/cpu.c
> @@ -5969,6 +5969,7 @@ void cpu_x86_cpuid(CPUX86State *env, uint32_t index, uint32_t count,
> break;
> case 0x8000001F:
> *eax = sev_enabled() ? 0x2 : 0;
> + *eax |= sev_es_enabled() ? 0x8 : 0;
> *ebx = sev_get_cbit_position();
> *ebx |= sev_get_reduced_phys_bits() << 6;
> *ecx = 0;
> diff --git a/target/i386/sev-stub.c b/target/i386/sev-stub.c
> index 88e3f39a1e..040ac90563 100644
> --- a/target/i386/sev-stub.c
> +++ b/target/i386/sev-stub.c
> @@ -49,3 +49,8 @@ SevCapability *sev_get_capabilities(Error **errp)
> error_setg(errp, "SEV is not available in this QEMU");
> return NULL;
> }
> +
> +bool sev_es_enabled(void)
I don't think this bothers checkpatch, but it'd be consistent with the
rest of your series if this function put the return type on the line above.
> +{
> + return false;
> +}
> diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
> index c3ecf86704..6c9cd0854b 100644
> --- a/target/i386/sev.c
> +++ b/target/i386/sev.c
> @@ -359,6 +359,12 @@ sev_enabled(void)
> return !!sev_guest;
> }
>
> +bool
> +sev_es_enabled(void)
> +{
> + return false;
> +}
> +
> uint64_t
> sev_get_me_mask(void)
> {
> @@ -578,6 +584,22 @@ sev_launch_update_data(SevGuestState *sev, uint8_t *addr, uint64_t len)
> return ret;
> }
>
> +static int
> +sev_launch_update_vmsa(SevGuestState *sev)
> +{
> + int ret, fw_error;
> +
> + ret = sev_ioctl(sev->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA, NULL, &fw_error);
> + if (ret) {
> + error_report("%s: LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'",
> + __func__, ret, fw_error, fw_error_to_str(fw_error));
> + goto err;
> + }
> +
> +err:
> + return ret;
> +}
> +
> static void
> sev_launch_get_measure(Notifier *notifier, void *unused)
> {
> @@ -590,6 +612,14 @@ sev_launch_get_measure(Notifier *notifier, void *unused)
> return;
> }
>
> + if (sev_es_enabled()) {
> + /* measure all the VM save areas before getting launch_measure */
> + ret = sev_launch_update_vmsa(sev);
> + if (ret) {
> + exit(1);
Disclaimer: I'm still learning the QEMU source code, sorry if this comes
across as naive.
Is exit() what we want here? I was looking around the rest of the source
code and unfortunately the machine_init_done_notifiers mechanism doesn't
allow for a return value to indicate an error, so I'm wondering if
there's a more appropriate place in the initialization code to handle
these fallible operations and if so, propagate the error down. This way
if there are other resources that need to be cleaned up on the way out,
they can be. Thoughts?
> + }
> + }
> +
> measurement = g_new0(struct kvm_sev_launch_measure, 1);
>
> /* query the measurement blob length */
> @@ -684,7 +714,7 @@ sev_guest_init(const char *id)
> {
> SevGuestState *sev;
> char *devname;
> - int ret, fw_error;
> + int ret, fw_error, cmd;
> uint32_t ebx;
> uint32_t host_cbitpos;
> struct sev_user_data_status status = {};
> @@ -745,8 +775,20 @@ sev_guest_init(const char *id)
> sev->api_major = status.api_major;
> sev->api_minor = status.api_minor;
>
> + if (sev_es_enabled()) {
> + if (!(status.flags & SEV_STATUS_FLAGS_CONFIG_ES)) {
> + error_report("%s: guest policy requires SEV-ES, but "
> + "host SEV-ES support unavailable",
> + __func__);
> + goto err;
> + }
> + cmd = KVM_SEV_ES_INIT;
> + } else {
> + cmd = KVM_SEV_INIT;
> + }
> +
> trace_kvm_sev_init();
> - ret = sev_ioctl(sev->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_INIT, NULL, &fw_error);
> + ret = sev_ioctl(sev->sev_fd, cmd, NULL, &fw_error);
> if (ret) {
> error_report("%s: failed to initialize ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'",
> __func__, ret, fw_error, fw_error_to_str(fw_error));
> diff --git a/target/i386/sev_i386.h b/target/i386/sev_i386.h
> index 4db6960f60..4f9a5e9b21 100644
> --- a/target/i386/sev_i386.h
> +++ b/target/i386/sev_i386.h
> @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
> #define SEV_POLICY_SEV 0x20
>
> extern bool sev_enabled(void);
> +extern bool sev_es_enabled(void);
> extern uint64_t sev_get_me_mask(void);
> extern SevInfo *sev_get_info(void);
> extern uint32_t sev_get_cbit_position(void);
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 1/4] sev/i386: Add initial support for SEV-ES
2020-08-26 19:07 ` Connor Kuehl
@ 2020-08-26 19:24 ` Tom Lendacky
0 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Tom Lendacky @ 2020-08-26 19:24 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Connor Kuehl, qemu-devel, kvm
Cc: Eduardo Habkost, Michael S . Tsirkin, Marcelo Tosatti,
Paolo Bonzini, Jiri Slaby, Richard Henderson
On 8/26/20 2:07 PM, Connor Kuehl wrote:
> On 8/25/20 2:05 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>>
>> Provide initial support for SEV-ES. This includes creating a function to
>> indicate the guest is an SEV-ES guest (which will return false until all
>> support is in place), performing the proper SEV initialization and
>> ensuring that the guest CPU state is measured as part of the launch.
>>
>> Co-developed-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
>> Signed-off-by: Jiri Slaby <jslaby@suse.cz>
>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>
> Hi Tom!
Hi Connor,
>
> Overall I think the patch set looks good. I mainly just have 1 question
> regarding some error handling and a couple of checkpatch related messages.
Ugh, I was positive I ran checkpatch, but obviously I didn't.
>
>> ---
>> target/i386/cpu.c | 1 +
>> target/i386/sev-stub.c | 5 +++++
>> target/i386/sev.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>> target/i386/sev_i386.h | 1 +
>> 4 files changed, 51 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/target/i386/cpu.c b/target/i386/cpu.c
>> index 588f32e136..bbbe581d35 100644
>> --- a/target/i386/cpu.c
>> +++ b/target/i386/cpu.c
>> @@ -5969,6 +5969,7 @@ void cpu_x86_cpuid(CPUX86State *env, uint32_t
>> index, uint32_t count,
>> break;
>> case 0x8000001F:
>> *eax = sev_enabled() ? 0x2 : 0;
>> + *eax |= sev_es_enabled() ? 0x8 : 0;
>> *ebx = sev_get_cbit_position();
>> *ebx |= sev_get_reduced_phys_bits() << 6;
>> *ecx = 0;
>> diff --git a/target/i386/sev-stub.c b/target/i386/sev-stub.c
>> index 88e3f39a1e..040ac90563 100644
>> --- a/target/i386/sev-stub.c
>> +++ b/target/i386/sev-stub.c
>> @@ -49,3 +49,8 @@ SevCapability *sev_get_capabilities(Error **errp)
>> error_setg(errp, "SEV is not available in this QEMU");
>> return NULL;
>> }
>> +
>> +bool sev_es_enabled(void)
>
> I don't think this bothers checkpatch, but it'd be consistent with the
> rest of your series if this function put the return type on the line above.
I was being consistent with the file that it is in where all the other
functions are defined this way.
>
>> +{
>> + return false;
>> +}
>> diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
>> index c3ecf86704..6c9cd0854b 100644
>> --- a/target/i386/sev.c
>> +++ b/target/i386/sev.c
>> @@ -359,6 +359,12 @@ sev_enabled(void)
>> return !!sev_guest;
>> }
>> +bool
>> +sev_es_enabled(void)
>> +{
>> + return false;
>> +}
>> +
>> uint64_t
>> sev_get_me_mask(void)
>> {
>> @@ -578,6 +584,22 @@ sev_launch_update_data(SevGuestState *sev, uint8_t
>> *addr, uint64_t len)
>> return ret;
>> }
>> +static int
>> +sev_launch_update_vmsa(SevGuestState *sev)
>> +{
>> + int ret, fw_error;
>> +
>> + ret = sev_ioctl(sev->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA, NULL,
>> &fw_error);
>> + if (ret) {
>> + error_report("%s: LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'",
>> + __func__, ret, fw_error, fw_error_to_str(fw_error));
>> + goto err;
>> + }
>> +
>> +err:
>> + return ret;
>> +}
>> +
>> static void
>> sev_launch_get_measure(Notifier *notifier, void *unused)
>> {
>> @@ -590,6 +612,14 @@ sev_launch_get_measure(Notifier *notifier, void
>> *unused)
>> return;
>> }
>> + if (sev_es_enabled()) {
>> + /* measure all the VM save areas before getting launch_measure */
>> + ret = sev_launch_update_vmsa(sev);
>> + if (ret) {
>> + exit(1);
>
> Disclaimer: I'm still learning the QEMU source code, sorry if this comes
> across as naive.
>
> Is exit() what we want here? I was looking around the rest of the source
> code and unfortunately the machine_init_done_notifiers mechanism doesn't
> allow for a return value to indicate an error, so I'm wondering if there's
> a more appropriate place in the initialization code to handle these
> fallible operations and if so, propagate the error down. This way if there
> are other resources that need to be cleaned up on the way out, they can
> be. Thoughts?
I was following the existing method of terminating that is being performed
in this file. I'll see if others have an idea about how to handle these
types of errors, which could probably be addressed as a separate patch series.
Thanks,
Tom
>
>> + }
>> + }
>> +
>> measurement = g_new0(struct kvm_sev_launch_measure, 1);
>> /* query the measurement blob length */
>> @@ -684,7 +714,7 @@ sev_guest_init(const char *id)
>> {
>> SevGuestState *sev;
>> char *devname;
>> - int ret, fw_error;
>> + int ret, fw_error, cmd;
>> uint32_t ebx;
>> uint32_t host_cbitpos;
>> struct sev_user_data_status status = {};
>> @@ -745,8 +775,20 @@ sev_guest_init(const char *id)
>> sev->api_major = status.api_major;
>> sev->api_minor = status.api_minor;
>> + if (sev_es_enabled()) {
>> + if (!(status.flags & SEV_STATUS_FLAGS_CONFIG_ES)) {
>> + error_report("%s: guest policy requires SEV-ES, but "
>> + "host SEV-ES support unavailable",
>> + __func__);
>> + goto err;
>> + }
>> + cmd = KVM_SEV_ES_INIT;
>> + } else {
>> + cmd = KVM_SEV_INIT;
>> + }
>> +
>> trace_kvm_sev_init();
>> - ret = sev_ioctl(sev->sev_fd, KVM_SEV_INIT, NULL, &fw_error);
>> + ret = sev_ioctl(sev->sev_fd, cmd, NULL, &fw_error);
>> if (ret) {
>> error_report("%s: failed to initialize ret=%d fw_error=%d '%s'",
>> __func__, ret, fw_error, fw_error_to_str(fw_error));
>> diff --git a/target/i386/sev_i386.h b/target/i386/sev_i386.h
>> index 4db6960f60..4f9a5e9b21 100644
>> --- a/target/i386/sev_i386.h
>> +++ b/target/i386/sev_i386.h
>> @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
>> #define SEV_POLICY_SEV 0x20
>> extern bool sev_enabled(void);
>> +extern bool sev_es_enabled(void);
>> extern uint64_t sev_get_me_mask(void);
>> extern SevInfo *sev_get_info(void);
>> extern uint32_t sev_get_cbit_position(void);
>>
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 2/4] sev/i386: Allow AP booting under SEV-ES
2020-08-25 19:05 [PATCH 0/4] SEV-ES guest support Tom Lendacky
2020-08-25 19:05 ` [PATCH 1/4] sev/i386: Add initial support for SEV-ES Tom Lendacky
@ 2020-08-25 19:05 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-08-26 19:07 ` Connor Kuehl
2020-08-25 19:05 ` [PATCH 3/4] sev/i386: Don't allow a system reset under an SEV-ES guest Tom Lendacky
` (2 subsequent siblings)
4 siblings, 1 reply; 12+ messages in thread
From: Tom Lendacky @ 2020-08-25 19:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: qemu-devel, kvm
Cc: Eduardo Habkost, Michael S . Tsirkin, Marcelo Tosatti,
Paolo Bonzini, Jiri Slaby, Richard Henderson
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
When SEV-ES is enabled, it is not possible modify the guests register
state after it has been initially created, encrypted and measured.
Normally, an INIT-SIPI-SIPI request is used to boot the AP. However, the
hypervisor cannot emulate this because it cannot update the AP register
state. For the very first boot by an AP, the reset vector CS segment
value and the EIP value must be programmed before the register has been
encrypted and measured.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
accel/kvm/kvm-all.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
accel/stubs/kvm-stub.c | 5 ++++
hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c | 10 ++++++-
include/sysemu/kvm.h | 16 +++++++++++
include/sysemu/sev.h | 2 ++
target/i386/kvm.c | 2 ++
target/i386/sev.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
7 files changed, 141 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
index 63ef6af9a1..54e8fd098d 100644
--- a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
+++ b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
#include "qemu/main-loop.h"
#include "trace.h"
#include "hw/irq.h"
+#include "sysemu/kvm.h"
#include "sysemu/sev.h"
#include "qapi/visitor.h"
#include "qapi/qapi-types-common.h"
@@ -120,6 +121,11 @@ struct KVMState
/* memory encryption */
void *memcrypt_handle;
int (*memcrypt_encrypt_data)(void *handle, uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len);
+ int (*memcrypt_save_reset_vector)(void *handle, void *flash_ptr, uint64_t flash_size, uint32_t *addr);
+
+ unsigned int reset_cs;
+ unsigned int reset_ip;
+ bool reset_valid;
/* For "info mtree -f" to tell if an MR is registered in KVM */
int nr_as;
@@ -239,6 +245,59 @@ int kvm_memcrypt_encrypt_data(uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len)
return 1;
}
+void kvm_memcrypt_set_reset_vector(CPUState *cpu)
+{
+ X86CPU *x86;
+ CPUX86State *env;
+
+ /* Only update if we have valid reset information */
+ if (!kvm_state->reset_valid)
+ return;
+
+ /* Do not update the BSP reset state */
+ if (cpu->cpu_index == 0)
+ return;
+
+ x86 = X86_CPU(cpu);
+ env = &x86->env;
+
+ cpu_x86_load_seg_cache(env, R_CS, 0xf000, kvm_state->reset_cs, 0xffff,
+ DESC_P_MASK | DESC_S_MASK | DESC_CS_MASK |
+ DESC_R_MASK | DESC_A_MASK);
+
+ env->eip = kvm_state->reset_ip;
+}
+
+int kvm_memcrypt_save_reset_vector(void *flash_ptr, uint64_t flash_size)
+{
+ CPUState *cpu;
+ uint32_t addr;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (kvm_memcrypt_enabled() &&
+ kvm_state->memcrypt_save_reset_vector) {
+
+ addr = 0;
+ ret = kvm_state->memcrypt_save_reset_vector(kvm_state->memcrypt_handle,
+ flash_ptr, flash_size, &addr);
+ if (ret) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ if (addr) {
+ kvm_state->reset_cs = addr & 0xffff0000;
+ kvm_state->reset_ip = addr & 0x0000ffff;
+ kvm_state->reset_valid = true;
+
+ CPU_FOREACH(cpu) {
+ kvm_memcrypt_set_reset_vector(cpu);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* Called with KVMMemoryListener.slots_lock held */
static KVMSlot *kvm_get_free_slot(KVMMemoryListener *kml)
{
@@ -2193,6 +2252,7 @@ static int kvm_init(MachineState *ms)
}
kvm_state->memcrypt_encrypt_data = sev_encrypt_data;
+ kvm_state->memcrypt_save_reset_vector = sev_es_save_reset_vector;
}
ret = kvm_arch_init(ms, s);
diff --git a/accel/stubs/kvm-stub.c b/accel/stubs/kvm-stub.c
index 82f118d2df..3aece9b513 100644
--- a/accel/stubs/kvm-stub.c
+++ b/accel/stubs/kvm-stub.c
@@ -114,6 +114,11 @@ int kvm_memcrypt_encrypt_data(uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len)
return 1;
}
+int kvm_memcrypt_save_reset_vector(void *flash_ptr, uint64_t flash_size)
+{
+ return -ENOSYS;
+}
+
#ifndef CONFIG_USER_ONLY
int kvm_irqchip_add_msi_route(KVMState *s, int vector, PCIDevice *dev)
{
diff --git a/hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c b/hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c
index b6c0822fe3..321ff94261 100644
--- a/hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c
+++ b/hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c
@@ -156,7 +156,8 @@ static void pc_system_flash_map(PCMachineState *pcms,
PFlashCFI01 *system_flash;
MemoryRegion *flash_mem;
void *flash_ptr;
- int ret, flash_size;
+ uint64_t flash_size;
+ int ret;
assert(PC_MACHINE_GET_CLASS(pcms)->pci_enabled);
@@ -204,6 +205,13 @@ static void pc_system_flash_map(PCMachineState *pcms,
if (kvm_memcrypt_enabled()) {
flash_ptr = memory_region_get_ram_ptr(flash_mem);
flash_size = memory_region_size(flash_mem);
+
+ ret = kvm_memcrypt_save_reset_vector(flash_ptr, flash_size);
+ if (ret) {
+ error_report("failed to locate and/or save reset vector");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+
ret = kvm_memcrypt_encrypt_data(flash_ptr, flash_size);
if (ret) {
error_report("failed to encrypt pflash rom");
diff --git a/include/sysemu/kvm.h b/include/sysemu/kvm.h
index b4174d941c..f74cfa85ab 100644
--- a/include/sysemu/kvm.h
+++ b/include/sysemu/kvm.h
@@ -247,6 +247,22 @@ bool kvm_memcrypt_enabled(void);
*/
int kvm_memcrypt_encrypt_data(uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len);
+/**
+ * kvm_memcrypt_set_reset_vector - sets the CS/IP value for the AP if SEV-ES
+ * is active.
+ */
+void kvm_memcrypt_set_reset_vector(CPUState *cpu);
+
+/**
+ * kvm_memcrypt_save_reset_vector - locates and saves the reset vector to be
+ * used as the initial CS/IP value for APs
+ * if SEV-ES is active.
+ *
+ * Return: 1 SEV-ES is active and failed to locate a valid reset vector
+ * 0 SEV-ES is not active or successfully located and saved the
+ * reset vector address
+ */
+int kvm_memcrypt_save_reset_vector(void *flash_prt, uint64_t flash_size);
#ifdef NEED_CPU_H
#include "cpu.h"
diff --git a/include/sysemu/sev.h b/include/sysemu/sev.h
index 98c1ec8d38..f48bfa55a7 100644
--- a/include/sysemu/sev.h
+++ b/include/sysemu/sev.h
@@ -18,4 +18,6 @@
void *sev_guest_init(const char *id);
int sev_encrypt_data(void *handle, uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len);
+int sev_es_save_reset_vector(void *handle, void *flash_ptr, uint64_t flash_size, uint32_t *addr);
+
#endif
diff --git a/target/i386/kvm.c b/target/i386/kvm.c
index 6f18d940a5..10eaba8943 100644
--- a/target/i386/kvm.c
+++ b/target/i386/kvm.c
@@ -1912,6 +1912,8 @@ void kvm_arch_reset_vcpu(X86CPU *cpu)
}
/* enabled by default */
env->poll_control_msr = 1;
+
+ kvm_memcrypt_set_reset_vector(CPU(cpu));
}
void kvm_arch_do_init_vcpu(X86CPU *cpu)
diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
index 6c9cd0854b..5146b788fb 100644
--- a/target/i386/sev.c
+++ b/target/i386/sev.c
@@ -70,6 +70,18 @@ struct SevGuestState {
#define DEFAULT_GUEST_POLICY 0x1 /* disable debug */
#define DEFAULT_SEV_DEVICE "/dev/sev"
+/* SEV Information Block GUID = 00f771de-1a7e-4fcb-890e-68c77e2fb44e */
+#define SEV_INFO_BLOCK_GUID "\xde\x71\xf7\x00\x7e\x1a\xcb\x4f\x89\x0e\x68\xc7\x7e\x2f\xb4\x4e"
+
+typedef struct __attribute__((__packed__)) SevInfoBlock {
+ /* SEV-ES Reset Vector Address */
+ uint32_t reset_addr;
+
+ /* SEV Information Block size and GUID */
+ uint16_t size;
+ char guid[16];
+} SevInfoBlock;
+
static SevGuestState *sev_guest;
static Error *sev_mig_blocker;
@@ -827,6 +839,41 @@ sev_encrypt_data(void *handle, uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len)
return 0;
}
+int
+sev_es_save_reset_vector(void *handle, void *flash_ptr, uint64_t flash_size, uint32_t *addr)
+{
+ SevInfoBlock *info;
+
+ assert(handle);
+
+ /* Initialize the address to zero. An address of zero with a sucessful
+ * return code indicates that SEV-ES is not active.
+ */
+ *addr = 0;
+ if (!sev_es_enabled()) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Extract the AP reset vector for SEV-ES guests by locating the SEV GUID.
+ * The SEV GUID is located 32 bytes from the end of the flash. Use this
+ * address to base the SEV information block.
+ */
+ info = flash_ptr + flash_size - 0x20 - sizeof(*info);
+ if (memcmp(info->guid, SEV_INFO_BLOCK_GUID, 16)) {
+ error_report("SEV information block not found in pflash rom");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (!info->reset_addr) {
+ error_report("SEV-ES reset address is zero");
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ *addr = info->reset_addr;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static void
sev_register_types(void)
{
--
2.28.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 2/4] sev/i386: Allow AP booting under SEV-ES
2020-08-25 19:05 ` [PATCH 2/4] sev/i386: Allow AP booting under SEV-ES Tom Lendacky
@ 2020-08-26 19:07 ` Connor Kuehl
2020-08-26 19:25 ` Tom Lendacky
0 siblings, 1 reply; 12+ messages in thread
From: Connor Kuehl @ 2020-08-26 19:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tom Lendacky, qemu-devel, kvm
Cc: Eduardo Habkost, Michael S . Tsirkin, Marcelo Tosatti,
Paolo Bonzini, Jiri Slaby, Richard Henderson
On 8/25/20 2:05 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>
> When SEV-ES is enabled, it is not possible modify the guests register
> state after it has been initially created, encrypted and measured.
>
> Normally, an INIT-SIPI-SIPI request is used to boot the AP. However, the
> hypervisor cannot emulate this because it cannot update the AP register
> state. For the very first boot by an AP, the reset vector CS segment
> value and the EIP value must be programmed before the register has been
> encrypted and measured.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> ---
> accel/kvm/kvm-all.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> accel/stubs/kvm-stub.c | 5 ++++
> hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c | 10 ++++++-
> include/sysemu/kvm.h | 16 +++++++++++
> include/sysemu/sev.h | 2 ++
> target/i386/kvm.c | 2 ++
> target/i386/sev.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 7 files changed, 141 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Just a heads-up: ./scripts/checkpatch.pl does report a couple of style
errors. I've seen other series go by where maintainers didn't mind the
line length errors, but there are a couple that have to do with braces
around if-statement contents that may need to be addressed.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 2/4] sev/i386: Allow AP booting under SEV-ES
2020-08-26 19:07 ` Connor Kuehl
@ 2020-08-26 19:25 ` Tom Lendacky
0 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Tom Lendacky @ 2020-08-26 19:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Connor Kuehl, qemu-devel, kvm
Cc: Eduardo Habkost, Michael S . Tsirkin, Marcelo Tosatti,
Paolo Bonzini, Jiri Slaby, Richard Henderson
On 8/26/20 2:07 PM, Connor Kuehl wrote:
> On 8/25/20 2:05 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
>> From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>>
>> When SEV-ES is enabled, it is not possible modify the guests register
>> state after it has been initially created, encrypted and measured.
>>
>> Normally, an INIT-SIPI-SIPI request is used to boot the AP. However, the
>> hypervisor cannot emulate this because it cannot update the AP register
>> state. For the very first boot by an AP, the reset vector CS segment
>> value and the EIP value must be programmed before the register has been
>> encrypted and measured.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>> ---
>> accel/kvm/kvm-all.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> accel/stubs/kvm-stub.c | 5 ++++
>> hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c | 10 ++++++-
>> include/sysemu/kvm.h | 16 +++++++++++
>> include/sysemu/sev.h | 2 ++
>> target/i386/kvm.c | 2 ++
>> target/i386/sev.c | 47 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> 7 files changed, 141 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> Just a heads-up: ./scripts/checkpatch.pl does report a couple of style
> errors. I've seen other series go by where maintainers didn't mind the
> line length errors, but there are a couple that have to do with braces
> around if-statement contents that may need to be addressed.
Yup, I'll run checkpatch and make the necessary changes.
Thanks,
Tom
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 3/4] sev/i386: Don't allow a system reset under an SEV-ES guest
2020-08-25 19:05 [PATCH 0/4] SEV-ES guest support Tom Lendacky
2020-08-25 19:05 ` [PATCH 1/4] sev/i386: Add initial support for SEV-ES Tom Lendacky
2020-08-25 19:05 ` [PATCH 2/4] sev/i386: Allow AP booting under SEV-ES Tom Lendacky
@ 2020-08-25 19:05 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-08-26 19:07 ` Connor Kuehl
2020-08-25 19:05 ` [PATCH 4/4] sev/i386: Enable an SEV-ES guest based on SEV policy Tom Lendacky
2020-08-27 15:53 ` [PATCH 0/4] SEV-ES guest support Tom Lendacky
4 siblings, 1 reply; 12+ messages in thread
From: Tom Lendacky @ 2020-08-25 19:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: qemu-devel, kvm
Cc: Eduardo Habkost, Michael S . Tsirkin, Marcelo Tosatti,
Paolo Bonzini, Jiri Slaby, Richard Henderson
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
An SEV-ES guest does not allow register state to be altered once it has
been measured. When a SEV-ES guest issues a reboot command, Qemu will
reset the vCPU state and resume the guest. This will cause failures under
SEV-ES, so prevent that from occurring.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
accel/kvm/kvm-all.c | 8 ++++++++
include/sysemu/cpus.h | 2 ++
include/sysemu/hw_accel.h | 4 ++++
include/sysemu/kvm.h | 2 ++
softmmu/cpus.c | 5 +++++
softmmu/vl.c | 5 ++++-
6 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
index 54e8fd098d..1d925821b2 100644
--- a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
+++ b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
@@ -2384,6 +2384,14 @@ void kvm_flush_coalesced_mmio_buffer(void)
s->coalesced_flush_in_progress = false;
}
+bool kvm_cpu_check_resettable(void)
+{
+ /* If we have a valid reset vector override, then SEV-ES is active
+ * and the CPU can't be reset.
+ */
+ return !kvm_state->reset_valid;
+}
+
static void do_kvm_cpu_synchronize_state(CPUState *cpu, run_on_cpu_data arg)
{
if (!cpu->vcpu_dirty) {
diff --git a/include/sysemu/cpus.h b/include/sysemu/cpus.h
index 3c1da6a018..6d688c757f 100644
--- a/include/sysemu/cpus.h
+++ b/include/sysemu/cpus.h
@@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ void dump_drift_info(void);
void qemu_cpu_kick_self(void);
void qemu_timer_notify_cb(void *opaque, QEMUClockType type);
+bool cpu_is_resettable(void);
+
void cpu_synchronize_all_states(void);
void cpu_synchronize_all_post_reset(void);
void cpu_synchronize_all_post_init(void);
diff --git a/include/sysemu/hw_accel.h b/include/sysemu/hw_accel.h
index e128f8b06b..1fddf4f5e1 100644
--- a/include/sysemu/hw_accel.h
+++ b/include/sysemu/hw_accel.h
@@ -17,6 +17,10 @@
#include "sysemu/hvf.h"
#include "sysemu/whpx.h"
+static inline bool cpu_check_resettable(void)
+{
+ return kvm_enabled() ? kvm_cpu_check_resettable() : true;
+}
static inline void cpu_synchronize_state(CPUState *cpu)
{
if (kvm_enabled()) {
diff --git a/include/sysemu/kvm.h b/include/sysemu/kvm.h
index f74cfa85ab..eb94bbbff9 100644
--- a/include/sysemu/kvm.h
+++ b/include/sysemu/kvm.h
@@ -494,6 +494,8 @@ int kvm_physical_memory_addr_from_host(KVMState *s, void *ram_addr,
#endif /* NEED_CPU_H */
+bool kvm_cpu_check_resettable(void);
+
void kvm_cpu_synchronize_state(CPUState *cpu);
void kvm_cpu_synchronize_post_reset(CPUState *cpu);
void kvm_cpu_synchronize_post_init(CPUState *cpu);
diff --git a/softmmu/cpus.c b/softmmu/cpus.c
index a802e899ab..32f286643f 100644
--- a/softmmu/cpus.c
+++ b/softmmu/cpus.c
@@ -927,6 +927,11 @@ void hw_error(const char *fmt, ...)
abort();
}
+bool cpu_is_resettable(void)
+{
+ return cpu_check_resettable();
+}
+
void cpu_synchronize_all_states(void)
{
CPUState *cpu;
diff --git a/softmmu/vl.c b/softmmu/vl.c
index 4eb9d1f7fd..422fbb1650 100644
--- a/softmmu/vl.c
+++ b/softmmu/vl.c
@@ -1475,7 +1475,10 @@ void qemu_system_guest_crashloaded(GuestPanicInformation *info)
void qemu_system_reset_request(ShutdownCause reason)
{
- if (no_reboot && reason != SHUTDOWN_CAUSE_SUBSYSTEM_RESET) {
+ if (!cpu_is_resettable()) {
+ error_report("cpus are not resettable, terminating");
+ shutdown_requested = reason;
+ } else if (no_reboot && reason != SHUTDOWN_CAUSE_SUBSYSTEM_RESET) {
shutdown_requested = reason;
} else {
reset_requested = reason;
--
2.28.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 3/4] sev/i386: Don't allow a system reset under an SEV-ES guest
2020-08-25 19:05 ` [PATCH 3/4] sev/i386: Don't allow a system reset under an SEV-ES guest Tom Lendacky
@ 2020-08-26 19:07 ` Connor Kuehl
0 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Connor Kuehl @ 2020-08-26 19:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tom Lendacky, qemu-devel, kvm
Cc: Eduardo Habkost, Michael S . Tsirkin, Marcelo Tosatti,
Paolo Bonzini, Jiri Slaby, Richard Henderson
On 8/25/20 2:05 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>
> An SEV-ES guest does not allow register state to be altered once it has
> been measured. When a SEV-ES guest issues a reboot command, Qemu will
> reset the vCPU state and resume the guest. This will cause failures under
> SEV-ES, so prevent that from occurring.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> ---
> accel/kvm/kvm-all.c | 8 ++++++++
> include/sysemu/cpus.h | 2 ++
> include/sysemu/hw_accel.h | 4 ++++
> include/sysemu/kvm.h | 2 ++
> softmmu/cpus.c | 5 +++++
> softmmu/vl.c | 5 ++++-
> 6 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
> index 54e8fd098d..1d925821b2 100644
> --- a/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
> +++ b/accel/kvm/kvm-all.c
> @@ -2384,6 +2384,14 @@ void kvm_flush_coalesced_mmio_buffer(void)
> s->coalesced_flush_in_progress = false;
> }
>
> +bool kvm_cpu_check_resettable(void)
> +{
> + /* If we have a valid reset vector override, then SEV-ES is active
> + * and the CPU can't be reset.
> + */
> + return !kvm_state->reset_valid;
> +}
> +
> static void do_kvm_cpu_synchronize_state(CPUState *cpu, run_on_cpu_data arg)
> {
> if (!cpu->vcpu_dirty) {
> diff --git a/include/sysemu/cpus.h b/include/sysemu/cpus.h
> index 3c1da6a018..6d688c757f 100644
> --- a/include/sysemu/cpus.h
> +++ b/include/sysemu/cpus.h
> @@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ void dump_drift_info(void);
> void qemu_cpu_kick_self(void);
> void qemu_timer_notify_cb(void *opaque, QEMUClockType type);
>
> +bool cpu_is_resettable(void);
> +
> void cpu_synchronize_all_states(void);
> void cpu_synchronize_all_post_reset(void);
> void cpu_synchronize_all_post_init(void);
> diff --git a/include/sysemu/hw_accel.h b/include/sysemu/hw_accel.h
> index e128f8b06b..1fddf4f5e1 100644
> --- a/include/sysemu/hw_accel.h
> +++ b/include/sysemu/hw_accel.h
> @@ -17,6 +17,10 @@
> #include "sysemu/hvf.h"
> #include "sysemu/whpx.h"
>
> +static inline bool cpu_check_resettable(void)
> +{
> + return kvm_enabled() ? kvm_cpu_check_resettable() : true;
> +}
There's a missing newline here that would separate the closing brace
from the function below this one.
> static inline void cpu_synchronize_state(CPUState *cpu)
> {
> if (kvm_enabled()) {
> diff --git a/include/sysemu/kvm.h b/include/sysemu/kvm.h
> index f74cfa85ab..eb94bbbff9 100644
> --- a/include/sysemu/kvm.h
> +++ b/include/sysemu/kvm.h
> @@ -494,6 +494,8 @@ int kvm_physical_memory_addr_from_host(KVMState *s, void *ram_addr,
>
> #endif /* NEED_CPU_H */
>
> +bool kvm_cpu_check_resettable(void);
> +
> void kvm_cpu_synchronize_state(CPUState *cpu);
> void kvm_cpu_synchronize_post_reset(CPUState *cpu);
> void kvm_cpu_synchronize_post_init(CPUState *cpu);
> diff --git a/softmmu/cpus.c b/softmmu/cpus.c
> index a802e899ab..32f286643f 100644
> --- a/softmmu/cpus.c
> +++ b/softmmu/cpus.c
> @@ -927,6 +927,11 @@ void hw_error(const char *fmt, ...)
> abort();
> }
>
> +bool cpu_is_resettable(void)
> +{
> + return cpu_check_resettable();
> +}
> +
> void cpu_synchronize_all_states(void)
> {
> CPUState *cpu;
> diff --git a/softmmu/vl.c b/softmmu/vl.c
> index 4eb9d1f7fd..422fbb1650 100644
> --- a/softmmu/vl.c
> +++ b/softmmu/vl.c
> @@ -1475,7 +1475,10 @@ void qemu_system_guest_crashloaded(GuestPanicInformation *info)
>
> void qemu_system_reset_request(ShutdownCause reason)
> {
> - if (no_reboot && reason != SHUTDOWN_CAUSE_SUBSYSTEM_RESET) {
> + if (!cpu_is_resettable()) {
> + error_report("cpus are not resettable, terminating");
> + shutdown_requested = reason;
> + } else if (no_reboot && reason != SHUTDOWN_CAUSE_SUBSYSTEM_RESET) {
> shutdown_requested = reason;
> } else {
> reset_requested = reason;
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread
* [PATCH 4/4] sev/i386: Enable an SEV-ES guest based on SEV policy
2020-08-25 19:05 [PATCH 0/4] SEV-ES guest support Tom Lendacky
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2020-08-25 19:05 ` [PATCH 3/4] sev/i386: Don't allow a system reset under an SEV-ES guest Tom Lendacky
@ 2020-08-25 19:05 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-08-26 19:07 ` Connor Kuehl
2020-08-27 15:53 ` [PATCH 0/4] SEV-ES guest support Tom Lendacky
4 siblings, 1 reply; 12+ messages in thread
From: Tom Lendacky @ 2020-08-25 19:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: qemu-devel, kvm
Cc: Eduardo Habkost, Michael S . Tsirkin, Marcelo Tosatti,
Paolo Bonzini, Jiri Slaby, Richard Henderson
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Update the sev_es_enabled() function return value to be based on the SEV
policy that has been specified. SEV-ES is enabled if SEV is enabled and
the SEV-ES policy bit is set in the policy object.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
target/i386/sev.c | 4 +++-
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
index 5146b788fb..153c2cba2c 100644
--- a/target/i386/sev.c
+++ b/target/i386/sev.c
@@ -70,6 +70,8 @@ struct SevGuestState {
#define DEFAULT_GUEST_POLICY 0x1 /* disable debug */
#define DEFAULT_SEV_DEVICE "/dev/sev"
+#define GUEST_POLICY_SEV_ES_BIT (1 << 2)
+
/* SEV Information Block GUID = 00f771de-1a7e-4fcb-890e-68c77e2fb44e */
#define SEV_INFO_BLOCK_GUID "\xde\x71\xf7\x00\x7e\x1a\xcb\x4f\x89\x0e\x68\xc7\x7e\x2f\xb4\x4e"
@@ -374,7 +376,7 @@ sev_enabled(void)
bool
sev_es_enabled(void)
{
- return false;
+ return (sev_enabled() && (sev_guest->policy & GUEST_POLICY_SEV_ES_BIT));
}
uint64_t
--
2.28.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH 4/4] sev/i386: Enable an SEV-ES guest based on SEV policy
2020-08-25 19:05 ` [PATCH 4/4] sev/i386: Enable an SEV-ES guest based on SEV policy Tom Lendacky
@ 2020-08-26 19:07 ` Connor Kuehl
0 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Connor Kuehl @ 2020-08-26 19:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tom Lendacky, qemu-devel, kvm
Cc: Eduardo Habkost, Michael S . Tsirkin, Marcelo Tosatti,
Paolo Bonzini, Jiri Slaby, Richard Henderson
On 8/25/20 2:05 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>
> Update the sev_es_enabled() function return value to be based on the SEV
> policy that has been specified. SEV-ES is enabled if SEV is enabled and
> the SEV-ES policy bit is set in the policy object.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> ---
> target/i386/sev.c | 4 +++-
> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
> index 5146b788fb..153c2cba2c 100644
> --- a/target/i386/sev.c
> +++ b/target/i386/sev.c
> @@ -70,6 +70,8 @@ struct SevGuestState {
> #define DEFAULT_GUEST_POLICY 0x1 /* disable debug */
> #define DEFAULT_SEV_DEVICE "/dev/sev"
>
> +#define GUEST_POLICY_SEV_ES_BIT (1 << 2)
> +
> /* SEV Information Block GUID = 00f771de-1a7e-4fcb-890e-68c77e2fb44e */
> #define SEV_INFO_BLOCK_GUID "\xde\x71\xf7\x00\x7e\x1a\xcb\x4f\x89\x0e\x68\xc7\x7e\x2f\xb4\x4e"
>
> @@ -374,7 +376,7 @@ sev_enabled(void)
> bool
> sev_es_enabled(void)
> {
> - return false;
> + return (sev_enabled() && (sev_guest->policy & GUEST_POLICY_SEV_ES_BIT));
checkpatch wants these outer parentheses removed :-)
> }
>
> uint64_t
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 0/4] SEV-ES guest support
2020-08-25 19:05 [PATCH 0/4] SEV-ES guest support Tom Lendacky
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2020-08-25 19:05 ` [PATCH 4/4] sev/i386: Enable an SEV-ES guest based on SEV policy Tom Lendacky
@ 2020-08-27 15:53 ` Tom Lendacky
4 siblings, 0 replies; 12+ messages in thread
From: Tom Lendacky @ 2020-08-27 15:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: qemu-devel, kvm
Cc: Eduardo Habkost, Michael S . Tsirkin, Marcelo Tosatti,
Dr. David Alan Gilbert, Paolo Bonzini, Jiri Slaby,
Richard Henderson
On 8/25/20 2:05 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>
> This patch series provides support for launching an SEV-ES guest.
I've made the changes associated with the checkpatch script output. I'll
wait a few more days for other feedback before submitting a v2.
Sorry about the miss in regards to running checkpatch.
Thanks,
Tom
>
> Secure Encrypted Virtualization - Encrypted State (SEV-ES) expands on the
> SEV support to protect the guest register state from the hypervisor. See
> "AMD64 Architecture Programmer's Manual Volume 2: System Programming",
> section "15.35 Encrypted State (SEV-ES)" [1].
>
> In order to allow a hypervisor to perform functions on behalf of a guest,
> there is architectural support for notifying a guest's operating system
> when certain types of VMEXITs are about to occur. This allows the guest to
> selectively share information with the hypervisor to satisfy the requested
> function. The notification is performed using a new exception, the VMM
> Communication exception (#VC). The information is shared through the
> Guest-Hypervisor Communication Block (GHCB) using the VMGEXIT instruction.
> The GHCB format and the protocol for using it is documented in "SEV-ES
> Guest-Hypervisor Communication Block Standardization" [2].
>
> The main areas of the Qemu code that are updated to support SEV-ES are
> around the SEV guest launch process and AP booting in order to support
> booting multiple vCPUs.
>
> There are no new command line switches required. Instead, the desire for
> SEV-ES is presented using the SEV policy object. Bit 2 of the SEV policy
> object indicates that SEV-ES is required.
>
> The SEV launch process is updated in two ways. The first is that a the
> KVM_SEV_ES_INIT ioctl is used to initialize the guest instead of the
> standard KVM_SEV_INIT ioctl. The second is that before the SEV launch
> measurement is calculated, the LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA SEV API is invoked for
> each vCPU that Qemu has created. Once the LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA API has been
> invoked, no direct changes to the guest register state can be made.
>
> AP booting poses some interesting challenges. The INIT-SIPI-SIPI sequence
> is typically used to boot the APs. However, the hypervisor is not allowed
> to update the guest registers. For the APs, the reset vector must be known
> in advance. An OVMF method to provide a known reset vector address exists
> by providing an SEV information block, identified by UUID, near the end of
> the firmware [3]. OVMF will program the jump to the actual reset vector in
> this area of memory. Since the memory location is known in advance, an AP
> can be created with the known reset vector address as its starting CS:IP.
> The GHCB document [2] talks about how SMP booting under SEV-ES is
> performed.
>
> [1] https://www.amd.com/system/files/TechDocs/24593.pdf
> [2] https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/56421.pdf
> [3] 30937f2f98c4 ("OvmfPkg: Use the SEV-ES work area for the SEV-ES AP reset vector")
> https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/30937f2f98c42496f2f143fe8374ae7f7e684847
>
> ---
>
> These patches are based on commit:
> d0ed6a69d3 ("Update version for v5.1.0 release")
>
> (I tried basing on the latest Qemu commit, but I was having build issues
> that level)
>
> A version of the tree can be found at:
> https://github.com/AMDESE/qemu/tree/sev-es-v9
>
> Tom Lendacky (4):
> sev/i386: Add initial support for SEV-ES
> sev/i386: Allow AP booting under SEV-ES
> sev/i386: Don't allow a system reset under an SEV-ES guest
> sev/i386: Enable an SEV-ES guest based on SEV policy
>
> accel/kvm/kvm-all.c | 68 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> accel/stubs/kvm-stub.c | 5 +++
> hw/i386/pc_sysfw.c | 10 ++++-
> include/sysemu/cpus.h | 2 +
> include/sysemu/hw_accel.h | 4 ++
> include/sysemu/kvm.h | 18 ++++++++
> include/sysemu/sev.h | 2 +
> softmmu/cpus.c | 5 +++
> softmmu/vl.c | 5 ++-
> target/i386/cpu.c | 1 +
> target/i386/kvm.c | 2 +
> target/i386/sev-stub.c | 5 +++
> target/i386/sev.c | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> target/i386/sev_i386.h | 1 +
> 14 files changed, 219 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 12+ messages in thread