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From: Max Reitz <mreitz@redhat.com>
To: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>, qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Cc: "Kevin Wolf" <kwolf@redhat.com>,
	"Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>,
	qemu-block@nongnu.org, "Markus Armbruster" <armbru@redhat.com>,
	"John Snow" <jsnow@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 05/11] block/crypto: implement the encryption key management
Date: Fri, 4 Oct 2019 20:41:29 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <bcc8844d-ec0f-93d1-209b-7b7af4f2c24a@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190912223028.18496-6-mlevitsk@redhat.com>


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On 13.09.19 00:30, Maxim Levitsky wrote:
> This implements the encryption key management
> using the generic code in qcrypto layer
> (currently only for qemu-img amend)
> 
> This code adds another 'write_func' because the initialization
> write_func works directly on the underlying file,
> because during the creation, there is no open instance
> of the luks driver, but during regular use, we have it,
> and should use it instead.
> 
> 
> This commit also adds a	'hack/workaround' I and	Kevin Wolf (thanks)
> made to	make the driver	still support write sharing,
> but be safe against concurrent  metadata update (the keys)
> Eventually write sharing for luks driver will be deprecated
> and removed together with this hack.
> 
> The hack is that we ask	(as a format driver) for
> BLK_PERM_CONSISTENT_READ always
> (technically always unless opened with BDRV_O_NO_IO)
> 
> and then when we want to update	the keys, we
> unshare	that permission. So if someone else
> has the	image open, even readonly, this	will fail.
> 
> Also thanks to Daniel Berrange for the variant of
> that hack that involves	asking for read,
> rather that write permission
> 
> Signed-off-by: Maxim Levitsky <mlevitsk@redhat.com>
> ---
>  block/crypto.c | 118 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
>  1 file changed, 115 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/block/crypto.c b/block/crypto.c
> index a6a3e1f1d8..f42fa057e6 100644
> --- a/block/crypto.c
> +++ b/block/crypto.c
> @@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ typedef struct BlockCrypto BlockCrypto;
>  
>  struct BlockCrypto {
>      QCryptoBlock *block;
> +    bool updating_keys;
>  };
>  
>  
> @@ -70,6 +71,24 @@ static ssize_t block_crypto_read_func(QCryptoBlock *block,
>      return ret;
>  }
>  
> +static ssize_t block_crypto_write_func(QCryptoBlock *block,
> +                                       size_t offset,
> +                                       const uint8_t *buf,
> +                                       size_t buflen,
> +                                       void *opaque,
> +                                       Error **errp)

There’s already a function of this name for creation.

> +{
> +    BlockDriverState *bs = opaque;
> +    ssize_t ret;
> +
> +    ret = bdrv_pwrite(bs->file, offset, buf, buflen);
> +    if (ret < 0) {
> +        error_setg_errno(errp, -ret, "Could not write encryption header");
> +        return ret;
> +    }
> +    return ret;
> +}
> +
>  
>  struct BlockCryptoCreateData {
>      BlockBackend *blk;

[...]

> +static void
> +block_crypto_child_perms(BlockDriverState *bs, BdrvChild *c,
> +                         const BdrvChildRole *role,
> +                         BlockReopenQueue *reopen_queue,
> +                         uint64_t perm, uint64_t shared,
> +                         uint64_t *nperm, uint64_t *nshared)
> +{
> +
> +    BlockCrypto *crypto = bs->opaque;
> +
> +    /*
> +     * Ask for consistent read permission so that if
> +     * someone else tries to open this image with this permission
> +     * neither will be able to edit encryption keys
> +     */
> +    if (!(bs->open_flags & BDRV_O_NO_IO)) {
> +        perm |= BLK_PERM_CONSISTENT_READ;
> +    }
> +
> +    /*
> +     * This driver doesn't modify LUKS metadata except
> +     * when updating the encryption slots.
> +     * Thus unlike a proper format driver we don't ask for
> +     * shared write permission. However we need it
> +     * when we area updating keys, to ensure that only we
> +     * had opened the device r/w
> +     *
> +     * Encryption update will set the crypto->updating_keys
> +     * during that period and refresh permissions
> +     *
> +     */
> +
> +    if (crypto->updating_keys) {
> +        /*need exclusive write access for header update  */
> +        perm |= BLK_PERM_WRITE;
> +        shared &= ~(BLK_PERM_CONSISTENT_READ | BLK_PERM_WRITE);
> +    }
> +
> +    bdrv_filter_default_perms(bs, c, role, reopen_queue,
> +            perm, shared, nperm, nshared);
> +}

This will probably work, but usually drivers do it the other way around:
First call any of the default_perms(), and then adjust *nperm and
*nshared as required.

(perm/shared are what the parents need, *nperm/*nshared is what this
driver needs, so it makes more sense that way; and this way nobody has
to check whether the settings survived the default_perms() call.)

((But the permissions themselves do look correct.))

Max


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  reply	other threads:[~2019-10-04 18:52 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 52+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-09-12 22:30 [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 00/11] RFC crypto/luks: encryption key managment using amend interface Maxim Levitsky
2019-09-12 22:30 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 01/11] qcrypto: add suport for amend options Maxim Levitsky
2019-09-23 13:08   ` Eric Blake
2019-09-23 13:24     ` Maxim Levitsky
2019-09-12 22:30 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 02/11] qcrypto-luks: extend the create options for upcoming encryption key management Maxim Levitsky
2019-10-04 17:42   ` Max Reitz
2019-11-08  9:28     ` Maxim Levitsky
2019-11-08 10:48       ` Max Reitz
2019-11-08 11:48         ` Maxim Levitsky
2019-10-07  7:49   ` [Qemu-devel] " Markus Armbruster
2019-11-08  9:28     ` Maxim Levitsky
2019-10-10 13:44   ` Kevin Wolf
2019-11-08 10:04     ` Maxim Levitsky
2019-09-12 22:30 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 03/11] qcrypto-luks: implement the " Maxim Levitsky
2019-09-12 22:30 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 04/11] block: amend: add 'force' option Maxim Levitsky
2019-09-12 22:30 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 05/11] block/crypto: implement the encryption key management Maxim Levitsky
2019-10-04 18:41   ` Max Reitz [this message]
2019-11-08  9:30     ` Maxim Levitsky
2019-11-08 10:49       ` Max Reitz
2019-11-08 11:04         ` Maxim Levitsky
2019-11-08 13:12           ` Max Reitz
2019-11-08 13:20             ` Maxim Levitsky
2019-09-12 22:30 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 06/11] qcow2: implement crypto amend options Maxim Levitsky
2019-09-12 22:30 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 07/11] block: add x-blockdev-amend qmp command Maxim Levitsky
2019-10-04 18:53   ` Max Reitz
2019-11-08  9:26     ` Maxim Levitsky
2019-11-08 10:36       ` Max Reitz
2019-11-08 13:37         ` Maxim Levitsky
2019-11-08  9:27     ` Maxim Levitsky
2019-10-07  7:53   ` [Qemu-devel] " Markus Armbruster
2019-11-08 15:38     ` Maxim Levitsky
2019-09-12 22:30 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 08/11] block/crypto: implement blockdev-amend Maxim Levitsky
2019-10-07  7:58   ` Markus Armbruster
2019-11-08 15:36     ` Maxim Levitsky
2019-09-12 22:30 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 09/11] block/qcow2: " Maxim Levitsky
2019-10-04 19:03   ` Max Reitz
2019-10-07  8:04     ` Markus Armbruster
2019-11-08 15:14       ` Maxim Levitsky
2019-11-08 15:18     ` Maxim Levitsky
2019-09-12 22:30 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 10/11] iotests: filter few more luks specific create options Maxim Levitsky
2019-09-12 22:30 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 11/11] iotests : add tests for encryption key management Maxim Levitsky
2019-10-04 19:11   ` Max Reitz
2019-11-08  9:28     ` Maxim Levitsky
2019-09-20 21:14 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2 00/11] RFC crypto/luks: encryption key managment using amend interface John Snow
2019-09-22  8:17   ` Maxim Levitsky
2019-10-07  8:05     ` Markus Armbruster
2019-11-06 16:43       ` Maxim Levitsky
2019-09-30 17:11   ` Maxim Levitsky
2019-10-04 19:10 ` Max Reitz
2019-11-08 15:07   ` Maxim Levitsky
2019-11-12 11:58     ` Max Reitz
2019-11-12 12:07       ` Maxim Levitsky

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