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From: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-bcache@vger.kernel.org,
	Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>,
	Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>,
	dm-devel@redhat.com, Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>,
	Richard Weinberger <richard.weinberger@gmail.com>,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-raid@vger.kernel.org,
	fuse-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,
	Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com>,
	linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, cgroups@vger.kernel.org,
	Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>
Subject: [PATCH v4 10/21] fs: Check for invalid i_uid in may_follow_link()
Date: Tue, 26 Apr 2016 14:36:23 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1461699396-33000-11-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1461699396-33000-1-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com>

Filesystem uids which don't map into a user namespace may result
in inode->i_uid being INVALID_UID. A symlink and its parent
could have different owners in the filesystem can both get
mapped to INVALID_UID, which may result in following a symlink
when this would not have otherwise been permitted when protected
symlinks are enabled.

Add a new helper function, uid_valid_eq(), and use this to
validate that the ids in may_follow_link() are both equal and
valid. Also add an equivalent helper for gids, which is
currently unused.

Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
---
 fs/namei.c             |  2 +-
 include/linux/uidgid.h | 10 ++++++++++
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index a29094c6f4a1..6fe8b0d8ca90 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -915,7 +915,7 @@ static inline int may_follow_link(struct nameidata *nd)
 		return 0;
 
 	/* Allowed if parent directory and link owner match. */
-	if (uid_eq(parent->i_uid, inode->i_uid))
+	if (uid_valid_eq(parent->i_uid, inode->i_uid))
 		return 0;
 
 	if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU)
diff --git a/include/linux/uidgid.h b/include/linux/uidgid.h
index 03835522dfcb..e09529fe2668 100644
--- a/include/linux/uidgid.h
+++ b/include/linux/uidgid.h
@@ -117,6 +117,16 @@ static inline bool gid_valid(kgid_t gid)
 	return __kgid_val(gid) != (gid_t) -1;
 }
 
+static inline bool uid_valid_eq(kuid_t left, kuid_t right)
+{
+	return uid_eq(left, right) && uid_valid(left);
+}
+
+static inline bool gid_valid_eq(kgid_t left, kgid_t right)
+{
+	return gid_eq(left, right) && gid_valid(left);
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
 
 extern kuid_t make_kuid(struct user_namespace *from, uid_t uid);
-- 
2.7.4


______________________________________________________
Linux MTD discussion mailing list
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-mtd/

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
To: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>,
	Richard Weinberger <richard.weinberger@gmail.com>,
	Austin S Hemmelgarn <ahferroin7@gmail.com>,
	Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>,
	Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-bcache@vger.kernel.org,
	dm-devel@redhat.com, linux-raid@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
	fuse-devel@lists.sourceforge.net,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov,
	cgroups@vger.kernel.org,
	Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Subject: [PATCH v4 10/21] fs: Check for invalid i_uid in may_follow_link()
Date: Tue, 26 Apr 2016 14:36:23 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1461699396-33000-11-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1461699396-33000-1-git-send-email-seth.forshee@canonical.com>

Filesystem uids which don't map into a user namespace may result
in inode->i_uid being INVALID_UID. A symlink and its parent
could have different owners in the filesystem can both get
mapped to INVALID_UID, which may result in following a symlink
when this would not have otherwise been permitted when protected
symlinks are enabled.

Add a new helper function, uid_valid_eq(), and use this to
validate that the ids in may_follow_link() are both equal and
valid. Also add an equivalent helper for gids, which is
currently unused.

Signed-off-by: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>
---
 fs/namei.c             |  2 +-
 include/linux/uidgid.h | 10 ++++++++++
 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index a29094c6f4a1..6fe8b0d8ca90 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -915,7 +915,7 @@ static inline int may_follow_link(struct nameidata *nd)
 		return 0;
 
 	/* Allowed if parent directory and link owner match. */
-	if (uid_eq(parent->i_uid, inode->i_uid))
+	if (uid_valid_eq(parent->i_uid, inode->i_uid))
 		return 0;
 
 	if (nd->flags & LOOKUP_RCU)
diff --git a/include/linux/uidgid.h b/include/linux/uidgid.h
index 03835522dfcb..e09529fe2668 100644
--- a/include/linux/uidgid.h
+++ b/include/linux/uidgid.h
@@ -117,6 +117,16 @@ static inline bool gid_valid(kgid_t gid)
 	return __kgid_val(gid) != (gid_t) -1;
 }
 
+static inline bool uid_valid_eq(kuid_t left, kuid_t right)
+{
+	return uid_eq(left, right) && uid_valid(left);
+}
+
+static inline bool gid_valid_eq(kgid_t left, kgid_t right)
+{
+	return gid_eq(left, right) && gid_valid(left);
+}
+
 #ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
 
 extern kuid_t make_kuid(struct user_namespace *from, uid_t uid);
-- 
2.7.4

  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-04-26 19:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 50+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-04-26 19:36 [PATCH v4 00/21] Support fuse mounts in user namespaces Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36 ` Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36 ` [PATCH v4 01/21] fs: fix a posible leak of allocated superblock Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36 ` [PATCH v4 04/21] block_dev: Support checking inode permissions in lookup_bdev() Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36   ` Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36 ` [PATCH v4 05/21] block_dev: Check permissions towards block device inode when mounting Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36 ` [PATCH v4 06/21] fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36   ` Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36 ` [PATCH v4 08/21] userns: Replace in_userns with current_in_userns Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36   ` Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36 ` [PATCH v4 09/21] Smack: Handle labels consistently in untrusted mounts Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36 ` Seth Forshee [this message]
2016-04-26 19:36   ` [PATCH v4 10/21] fs: Check for invalid i_uid in may_follow_link() Seth Forshee
2016-05-24 15:55   ` Djalal Harouni
2016-04-26 19:36 ` [PATCH v4 11/21] cred: Reject inodes with invalid ids in set_create_file_as() Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36   ` Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36 ` [PATCH v4 15/21] fs: Don't remove suid for CAP_FSETID in s_user_ns Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36   ` Seth Forshee
     [not found] ` <1461699396-33000-1-git-send-email-seth.forshee-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>
2016-04-26 19:36   ` [PATCH v4 02/21] fs: Remove check of s_user_ns for existing mounts in fs_fully_visible() Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36     ` Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36   ` [PATCH v4 03/21] fs: Allow sysfs and cgroupfs to share super blocks between user namespaces Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36     ` Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36   ` [PATCH v4 07/21] selinux: Add support for unprivileged mounts from " Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36     ` Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36   ` [PATCH v4 12/21] fs: Refuse uid/gid changes which don't map into s_user_ns Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36     ` Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36   ` [PATCH v4 13/21] fs: Update posix_acl support to handle user namespace mounts Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36     ` Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36   ` [PATCH v4 14/21] fs: Allow superblock owner to change ownership of inodes with unmappable ids Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36     ` Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36   ` [PATCH v4 16/21] fs: Allow superblock owner to access do_remount_sb() Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36     ` Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36   ` [PATCH v4 17/21] capabilities: Allow privileged user in s_user_ns to set security.* xattrs Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36     ` Seth Forshee
     [not found]     ` <1461699396-33000-18-git-send-email-seth.forshee-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>
2016-04-27  7:22       ` James Morris
2016-04-27  7:22         ` James Morris
2016-04-26 19:36   ` [PATCH v4 18/21] fuse: Add support for pid namespaces Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36     ` Seth Forshee
2016-07-20  2:44     ` Sheng Yang
     [not found]       ` <CA+2rt426_pshAauQizcxkfAq16vmEpB4sJ4genW_ucosH3j=zQ-JsoAwUIsXosN+BqQ9rBEUg@public.gmane.org>
2016-07-20 12:52         ` Seth Forshee
2016-07-20 12:52           ` Seth Forshee
2016-07-20 22:28           ` Sheng Yang
2016-07-21  7:25           ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-07-21  7:25             ` Miklos Szeredi
2016-04-26 19:36   ` [PATCH v4 19/21] fuse: Support fuse filesystems outside of init_user_ns Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36     ` Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36 ` [PATCH v4 20/21] fuse: Restrict allow_other to the superblock's namespace or a descendant Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:36 ` [PATCH v4 21/21] fuse: Allow user namespace mounts Seth Forshee
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2016-04-26 19:30 [PATCH v4 00/21] Support fuse mounts in user namespaces Seth Forshee
     [not found] ` <1461699046-30485-1-git-send-email-seth.forshee-Z7WLFzj8eWMS+FvcfC7Uqw@public.gmane.org>
2016-04-26 19:30   ` [PATCH v4 10/21] fs: Check for invalid i_uid in may_follow_link() Seth Forshee
2016-04-26 19:30     ` Seth Forshee

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