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From: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
To: "Eric W . Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 05/10] ovl: simplify file splice
Date: Mon,  7 Dec 2020 17:32:50 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201207163255.564116-6-mszeredi@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201207163255.564116-1-mszeredi@redhat.com>

generic_file_splice_read() and iter_file_splice_write() will call back into
f_op->iter_read() and f_op->iter_write() respectively.  These already do
the real file lookup and cred override.  So the code in ovl_splice_read()
and ovl_splice_write() is redundant.

In addition the ovl_file_accessed() call in ovl_splice_write() is
incorrect, though probably harmless.

Fix by calling generic_file_splice_read() and iter_file_splice_write()
directly.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@redhat.com>
---
 fs/overlayfs/file.c | 46 ++-------------------------------------------
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/file.c b/fs/overlayfs/file.c
index 3cd1590f2030..dc767034d37b 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/file.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/file.c
@@ -397,48 +397,6 @@ static ssize_t ovl_write_iter(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter)
 	return ret;
 }
 
-static ssize_t ovl_splice_read(struct file *in, loff_t *ppos,
-			 struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, size_t len,
-			 unsigned int flags)
-{
-	ssize_t ret;
-	struct fd real;
-	const struct cred *old_cred;
-
-	ret = ovl_real_fdget(in, &real);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-
-	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(file_inode(in)->i_sb);
-	ret = generic_file_splice_read(real.file, ppos, pipe, len, flags);
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
-
-	ovl_file_accessed(in);
-	fdput(real);
-	return ret;
-}
-
-static ssize_t
-ovl_splice_write(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, struct file *out,
-			  loff_t *ppos, size_t len, unsigned int flags)
-{
-	struct fd real;
-	const struct cred *old_cred;
-	ssize_t ret;
-
-	ret = ovl_real_fdget(out, &real);
-	if (ret)
-		return ret;
-
-	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(file_inode(out)->i_sb);
-	ret = iter_file_splice_write(pipe, real.file, ppos, len, flags);
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
-
-	ovl_file_accessed(out);
-	fdput(real);
-	return ret;
-}
-
 static int ovl_fsync(struct file *file, loff_t start, loff_t end, int datasync)
 {
 	struct fd real;
@@ -732,8 +690,8 @@ const struct file_operations ovl_file_operations = {
 #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
 	.compat_ioctl	= ovl_compat_ioctl,
 #endif
-	.splice_read    = ovl_splice_read,
-	.splice_write   = ovl_splice_write,
+	.splice_read    = generic_file_splice_read,
+	.splice_write   = iter_file_splice_write,
 
 	.copy_file_range	= ovl_copy_file_range,
 	.remap_file_range	= ovl_remap_file_range,
-- 
2.26.2


  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-12-07 16:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-12-07 16:32 [PATCH v2 00/10] allow unprivileged overlay mounts Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-07 16:32 ` [PATCH v2 01/10] vfs: move cap_convert_nscap() call into vfs_setxattr() Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-09  1:53   ` James Morris
2021-01-01 17:35   ` Eric W. Biederman
2021-01-11 13:49     ` Miklos Szeredi
2021-01-12  0:14       ` Eric W. Biederman
2021-01-12  9:43         ` Miklos Szeredi
2021-01-12 10:04           ` Miklos Szeredi
2021-01-12 18:36           ` Eric W. Biederman
2021-01-12 18:49             ` Eric W. Biederman
2020-12-07 16:32 ` [PATCH v2 02/10] vfs: verify source area in vfs_dedupe_file_range_one() Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-07 16:32 ` [PATCH v2 03/10] ovl: check privs before decoding file handle Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-08 13:49   ` Amir Goldstein
2020-12-09 10:13     ` Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-09 16:20       ` Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-09 18:16         ` Amir Goldstein
2020-12-07 16:32 ` [PATCH v2 04/10] ovl: make ioctl() safe Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-08 11:11   ` Amir Goldstein
2020-12-10 15:18     ` Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-14  5:44       ` Amir Goldstein
2020-12-14 13:23         ` Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-14 14:47           ` Amir Goldstein
2020-12-09  1:57   ` James Morris
2020-12-10 15:19     ` Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-07 16:32 ` Miklos Szeredi [this message]
2020-12-07 16:32 ` [PATCH v2 06/10] ovl: user xattr Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-08 13:10   ` Amir Goldstein
2020-12-11 14:55     ` Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-14  5:13       ` Amir Goldstein
2020-12-07 16:32 ` [PATCH v2 07/10] ovl: do not fail when setting origin xattr Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-07 16:32 ` [PATCH v2 08/10] ovl: do not fail because of O_NOATIME Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-08 11:29   ` Amir Goldstein
2020-12-11 14:44     ` Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-14  5:49       ` Amir Goldstein
2020-12-07 16:32 ` [PATCH v2 09/10] ovl: do not get metacopy for userxattr Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-07 16:32 ` [PATCH v2 10/10] ovl: unprivieged mounts Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-08 10:27 ` [PATCH v2 00/10] allow unprivileged overlay mounts Tetsuo Handa
2020-12-10  8:56   ` John Johansen
2020-12-10  9:39     ` Miklos Szeredi
2020-12-15 11:03       ` John Johansen

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