From: rgb@redhat.com (Richard Guy Briggs) To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH V4 04/10] capabilities: use root_priveleged inline to clarify logic Date: Tue, 5 Sep 2017 02:46:04 -0400 [thread overview] Message-ID: <f74d6dd6691ab4bd2cc7bee1ac8f1c77614e459a.1504591358.git.rgb@redhat.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <cover.1504591358.git.rgb@redhat.com> Introduce inline root_privileged() to make use of SECURE_NONROOT easier to read. Suggested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> --- security/commoncap.c | 9 +++++---- 1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index 623f251..1904f49 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -472,14 +472,14 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_f return rc; } +static inline bool root_privileged(void) { return !issecure(SECURE_NOROOT); } + static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_fcap, bool *effective, kuid_t root_uid) { const struct cred *old = current_cred(); struct cred *new = bprm->cred; - if (issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) - return; /* * If the legacy file capability is set, then don't set privs * for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user. Do set it @@ -536,7 +536,8 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) root_uid = make_kuid(new->user_ns, 0); - handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_fcap, &effective, root_uid); + if (root_privileged()) + handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_fcap, &effective, root_uid); /* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */ if (__cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) @@ -602,7 +603,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) if (__cap_grew(effective, ambient, new)) { if (!__cap_full(effective, new) || !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) || - issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) { + !root_privileged()) { ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old); if (ret < 0) return ret; -- 1.7.1 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org More majordomo info@ http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com Cc: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com>, Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>, Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>, Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>, Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com> Subject: [PATCH V4 04/10] capabilities: use root_priveleged inline to clarify logic Date: Tue, 5 Sep 2017 02:46:04 -0400 [thread overview] Message-ID: <f74d6dd6691ab4bd2cc7bee1ac8f1c77614e459a.1504591358.git.rgb@redhat.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <cover.1504591358.git.rgb@redhat.com> In-Reply-To: <cover.1504591358.git.rgb@redhat.com> Introduce inline root_privileged() to make use of SECURE_NONROOT easier to read. Suggested-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com> Acked-by: James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com> --- security/commoncap.c | 9 +++++---- 1 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index 623f251..1904f49 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -472,14 +472,14 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_f return rc; } +static inline bool root_privileged(void) { return !issecure(SECURE_NOROOT); } + static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_fcap, bool *effective, kuid_t root_uid) { const struct cred *old = current_cred(); struct cred *new = bprm->cred; - if (issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) - return; /* * If the legacy file capability is set, then don't set privs * for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user. Do set it @@ -536,7 +536,8 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) root_uid = make_kuid(new->user_ns, 0); - handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_fcap, &effective, root_uid); + if (root_privileged()) + handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_fcap, &effective, root_uid); /* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */ if (__cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) @@ -602,7 +603,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) if (__cap_grew(effective, ambient, new)) { if (!__cap_full(effective, new) || !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) || - issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) { + !root_privileged()) { ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old); if (ret < 0) return ret; -- 1.7.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-09-05 6:46 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 60+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2017-09-05 6:46 [PATCH V4 00/10] capabilities: do not audit log BPRM_FCAPS on set*id Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-05 6:46 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-05 6:46 ` [PATCH V4 01/10] capabilities: factor out cap_bprm_set_creds privileged root Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-05 6:46 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-06 6:05 ` James Morris 2017-09-06 6:05 ` James Morris 2017-09-07 19:42 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-07 19:42 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-05 6:46 ` [PATCH V4 02/10] capabilities: intuitive names for cap gain status Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-05 6:46 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-07 19:57 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-07 19:57 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-05 6:46 ` [PATCH V4 03/10] capabilities: rename has_cap to has_fcap Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-05 6:46 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-08 18:15 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-08 18:15 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-05 6:46 ` Richard Guy Briggs [this message] 2017-09-05 6:46 ` [PATCH V4 04/10] capabilities: use root_priveleged inline to clarify logic Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-08 18:18 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-08 18:18 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-05 6:46 ` [PATCH V4 05/10] capabilities: use intuitive names for id changes Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-05 6:46 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-08 18:22 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-08 18:22 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-05 6:46 ` [PATCH V4 06/10] capabilities: move audit log decision to function Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-05 6:46 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-08 18:23 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-08 18:23 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-05 6:46 ` [PATCH V4 07/10] capabilities: remove a layer of conditional logic Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-05 6:46 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-08 18:26 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-08 18:26 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-05 6:46 ` [PATCH V4 08/10] capabilities: invert logic for clarity Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-05 6:46 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-08 18:27 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-08 18:27 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-05 6:46 ` [PATCH V4 09/10] capabilities: fix logic for effective root or real root Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-05 6:46 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-08 18:34 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-08 18:34 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-20 22:11 ` Paul Moore 2017-09-20 22:11 ` Paul Moore 2017-09-20 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-20 22:25 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-20 22:27 ` Paul Moore 2017-09-20 22:27 ` Paul Moore 2017-09-05 6:46 ` [PATCH V4 10/10] capabilities: audit log other surprising conditions Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-05 6:46 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-08 18:36 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-08 18:36 ` Kees Cook 2017-09-20 22:22 ` Paul Moore 2017-09-20 22:22 ` Paul Moore 2017-09-08 17:02 ` [PATCH V4 00/10] capabilities: do not audit log BPRM_FCAPS on set*id Paul Moore 2017-09-08 17:02 ` Paul Moore 2017-09-14 5:54 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-14 5:54 ` Richard Guy Briggs 2017-09-14 6:46 ` Paul Moore 2017-09-14 6:46 ` Paul Moore 2017-09-14 6:49 ` Paul Moore 2017-09-14 6:49 ` Paul Moore
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