From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Cedric Xing <cedric.xing@intel.com>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
selinux@vger.kernel.org, Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
nhorman@redhat.com, npmccallum@redhat.com,
Serge Ayoun <serge.ayoun@intel.com>,
Shay Katz-zamir <shay.katz-zamir@intel.com>,
Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@intel.com>,
Andy Shevchenko <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>,
Kai Svahn <kai.svahn@intel.com>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>,
Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>,
Philip Tricca <philip.b.tricca@intel.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH 7/9] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves
Date: Fri, 31 May 2019 16:31:57 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190531233159.30992-8-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190531233159.30992-1-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Do not allow an enclave page to be mapped with PROT_EXEC if the source
page is backed by a file on a noexec file system.
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 24 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c
index c30acd3fbbdd..5f71be7cbb01 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/driver/ioctl.c
@@ -576,6 +576,27 @@ static int __sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr,
return ret;
}
+static int sgx_encl_page_protect(unsigned long src, unsigned long prot,
+ unsigned long *allowed_prot)
+{
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+
+ if (!(*allowed_prot & VM_EXEC))
+ goto do_check;
+
+ down_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
+ vma = find_vma(current->mm, src);
+ if (!vma || (vma->vm_file && path_noexec(&vma->vm_file->f_path)))
+ *allowed_prot &= ~VM_EXEC;
+ up_read(¤t->mm->mmap_sem);
+
+do_check:
+ if (prot & ~*allowed_prot)
+ return -EACCES;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr,
unsigned long src, struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo,
unsigned int mrmask, unsigned int flags)
@@ -589,8 +610,9 @@ static int sgx_encl_add_page(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr,
BUILD_BUG_ON(SGX_SECINFO_R != VM_READ || SGX_SECINFO_W != VM_WRITE ||
SGX_SECINFO_X != VM_EXEC);
- if (prot & ~allowed_prot)
- return -EACCES;
+ ret = sgx_encl_page_protect(src, prot, &allowed_prot);
+ if (ret)
+ return ret;
data_page = alloc_page(GFP_HIGHUSER);
if (!data_page)
--
2.21.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-05-31 23:33 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 77+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-05-31 23:31 [RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM Sean Christopherson
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [RFC PATCH 1/9] x86/sgx: Remove unused local variable in sgx_encl_release() Sean Christopherson
2019-06-04 11:41 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address Sean Christopherson
2019-06-04 11:49 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-04 20:16 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-04 22:10 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-05 14:08 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-05 15:17 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-05 20:14 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-06 15:37 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-13 13:48 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-13 16:47 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-13 17:14 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-14 15:18 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-05 15:15 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl() Sean Christopherson
2019-06-03 6:26 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-03 20:08 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-03 20:39 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-03 23:45 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-04 0:54 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-04 20:18 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-04 22:02 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-03 20:14 ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-03 20:37 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-03 20:39 ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-03 23:48 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-04 0:55 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-04 11:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [RFC PATCH 4/9] mm: Introduce vm_ops->mprotect() Sean Christopherson
2019-06-03 6:27 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-04 12:24 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-04 14:51 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [RFC PATCH 5/9] x86/sgx: Restrict mapping without an enclave page to PROT_NONE Sean Christopherson
2019-06-03 6:28 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-04 15:32 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [RFC PATCH 6/9] x86/sgx: Require userspace to provide allowed prots to ADD_PAGES Sean Christopherson
2019-06-03 6:28 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-04 16:23 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-04 16:45 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-05 15:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-04 20:23 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-05 11:10 ` Ayoun, Serge
2019-06-05 23:58 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-05-31 23:31 ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2019-06-03 6:29 ` [RFC PATCH 7/9] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves Xing, Cedric
2019-06-04 20:26 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-04 16:25 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-04 20:25 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-04 20:34 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-04 21:54 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-05 15:10 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-06 1:01 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX Sean Christopherson
2019-06-03 6:28 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-03 14:19 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-03 14:42 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-03 18:38 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-03 18:45 ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-04 20:29 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-04 20:36 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-04 21:43 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-06 2:04 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [RFC PATCH 9/9] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation Sean Christopherson
2019-06-03 15:01 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-03 15:50 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-02 7:29 ` [RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM Xing, Cedric
2019-06-03 17:15 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-03 18:30 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-04 1:36 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-04 15:33 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-04 16:30 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-04 21:38 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-03 17:47 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-03 18:02 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-04 11:15 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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