From: "Xing, Cedric" <cedric.xing@intel.com>
To: "Christopherson, Sean J" <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
"Jarkko Sakkinen" <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
LSM List <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
Eric Paris <eparis@parisplace.org>,
"selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
Jethro Beekman <jethro@fortanix.com>,
"Hansen, Dave" <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>,
"linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org" <linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
"nhorman@redhat.com" <nhorman@redhat.com>,
"npmccallum@redhat.com" <npmccallum@redhat.com>,
"Ayoun, Serge" <serge.ayoun@intel.com>,
"Katz-zamir, Shay" <shay.katz-zamir@intel.com>,
"Huang, Haitao" <haitao.huang@intel.com>,
"Andy Shevchenko" <andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com>,
"Svahn, Kai" <kai.svahn@intel.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Josh Triplett <josh@joshtriplett.org>,
"Huang, Kai" <kai.huang@intel.com>,
David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
"Roberts, William C" <william.c.roberts@intel.com>,
"Tricca, Philip B" <philip.b.tricca@intel.com>
Subject: RE: [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX
Date: Mon, 3 Jun 2019 06:28:04 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <960B34DE67B9E140824F1DCDEC400C0F654ECC11@ORSMSX116.amr.corp.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190531233159.30992-9-sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
> From: Christopherson, Sean J
> Sent: Friday, May 31, 2019 4:32 PM
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index
> 659071c2e57c..2f7925eeef7e 100644
> --- a/include/linux/security.h
> +++ b/include/linux/security.h
> @@ -392,6 +392,8 @@ void security_inode_invalidate_secctx(struct inode *inode); int
> security_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen); int
> security_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen); int
> security_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
> +int security_enclave_load(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long prot,
> + unsigned long *allowed_prot);
Per my comments to the cover letter, security_enclave_load() should have a signature similar to the following:
int security_enclave_load(struct file *enclave_fd, unsigned long linear_address, unsigned long nr_pages, int prot, struct vm_area_struct *source_vma);
@enclave_fd identifies the enclave to which new pages are being added.
@linear_address/@nr_pages specifies the linear range of pages being added.
@prot specifies the initial protection of those newly added pages. It is taken from the vma covering the target range.
@source_vma covers the source pages in the case of EADD. An LSM is expected to make sure security_file_mprotect(source_vma, prot, prot) would succeed before checking anything else, unless @source_vma is NULL, indicating pages are being EAUG'ed. In all cases, LSM is expected to "remember" @prot for all those pages to be checked in future security_file_mprotect() invocations.
> #else /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-06-03 6:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 77+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-05-31 23:31 [RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM Sean Christopherson
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [RFC PATCH 1/9] x86/sgx: Remove unused local variable in sgx_encl_release() Sean Christopherson
2019-06-04 11:41 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [RFC PATCH 2/9] x86/sgx: Do not naturally align MAP_FIXED address Sean Christopherson
2019-06-04 11:49 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-04 20:16 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-04 22:10 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-05 14:08 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-05 15:17 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-05 20:14 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-06 15:37 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-13 13:48 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-13 16:47 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-13 17:14 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-14 15:18 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-05 15:15 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [RFC PATCH 3/9] x86/sgx: Allow userspace to add multiple pages in single ioctl() Sean Christopherson
2019-06-03 6:26 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-03 20:08 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-03 20:39 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-03 23:45 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-04 0:54 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-04 20:18 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-04 22:02 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-03 20:14 ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-03 20:37 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-03 20:39 ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-03 23:48 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-04 0:55 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-04 11:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [RFC PATCH 4/9] mm: Introduce vm_ops->mprotect() Sean Christopherson
2019-06-03 6:27 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-04 12:24 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-04 14:51 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [RFC PATCH 5/9] x86/sgx: Restrict mapping without an enclave page to PROT_NONE Sean Christopherson
2019-06-03 6:28 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-04 15:32 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [RFC PATCH 6/9] x86/sgx: Require userspace to provide allowed prots to ADD_PAGES Sean Christopherson
2019-06-03 6:28 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-04 16:23 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-04 16:45 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-05 15:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-04 20:23 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-05 11:10 ` Ayoun, Serge
2019-06-05 23:58 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [RFC PATCH 7/9] x86/sgx: Enforce noexec filesystem restriction for enclaves Sean Christopherson
2019-06-03 6:29 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-04 20:26 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-04 16:25 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-04 20:25 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-04 20:34 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-04 21:54 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-05 15:10 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2019-06-06 1:01 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [RFC PATCH 8/9] LSM: x86/sgx: Introduce ->enclave_load() hook for Intel SGX Sean Christopherson
2019-06-03 6:28 ` Xing, Cedric [this message]
2019-06-03 14:19 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-03 14:42 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-03 18:38 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-03 18:45 ` Dave Hansen
2019-06-04 20:29 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-04 20:36 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-04 21:43 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-06 2:04 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-05-31 23:31 ` [RFC PATCH 9/9] security/selinux: Add enclave_load() implementation Sean Christopherson
2019-06-03 15:01 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-03 15:50 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-02 7:29 ` [RFC PATCH 0/9] security: x86/sgx: SGX vs. LSM Xing, Cedric
2019-06-03 17:15 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-03 18:30 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-04 1:36 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-04 15:33 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-04 16:30 ` Sean Christopherson
2019-06-04 21:38 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-03 17:47 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-03 18:02 ` Xing, Cedric
2019-06-04 11:15 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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