From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org, Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Subject: [PATCH 5.4 08/18] x86/speculation: Update link to AMD speculation whitepaper
Date: Wed, 9 Mar 2022 16:59:57 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220309155856.799858164@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220309155856.552503355@linuxfoundation.org>
From: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
commit e9b6013a7ce31535b04b02ba99babefe8a8599fa upstream.
Update the link to the "Software Techniques for Managing Speculation
on AMD Processors" whitepaper.
Signed-off-by: Kim Phillips <kim.phillips@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
@@ -60,8 +60,8 @@ privileged data touched during the specu
Spectre variant 1 attacks take advantage of speculative execution of
conditional branches, while Spectre variant 2 attacks use speculative
execution of indirect branches to leak privileged memory.
-See :ref:`[1] <spec_ref1>` :ref:`[5] <spec_ref5>` :ref:`[7] <spec_ref7>`
-:ref:`[10] <spec_ref10>` :ref:`[11] <spec_ref11>`.
+See :ref:`[1] <spec_ref1>` :ref:`[5] <spec_ref5>` :ref:`[6] <spec_ref6>`
+:ref:`[7] <spec_ref7>` :ref:`[10] <spec_ref10>` :ref:`[11] <spec_ref11>`.
Spectre variant 1 (Bounds Check Bypass)
---------------------------------------
@@ -746,7 +746,7 @@ AMD white papers:
.. _spec_ref6:
-[6] `Software techniques for managing speculation on AMD processors <https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/90343-B_SoftwareTechniquesforManagingSpeculation_WP_7-18Update_FNL.pdf>`_.
+[6] `Software techniques for managing speculation on AMD processors <https://developer.amd.com/wp-content/resources/Managing-Speculation-on-AMD-Processors.pdf>`_.
ARM white papers:
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-03-09 16:09 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-03-09 15:59 [PATCH 5.4 00/18] 5.4.184-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.4 01/18] x86/speculation: Merge one test in spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.4 02/18] x86,bugs: Unconditionally allow spectre_v2=retpoline,amd Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.4 03/18] x86/speculation: Rename RETPOLINE_AMD to RETPOLINE_LFENCE Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.4 04/18] x86/speculation: Add eIBRS + Retpoline options Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.4 05/18] Documentation/hw-vuln: Update spectre doc Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.4 06/18] x86/speculation: Include unprivileged eBPF status in Spectre v2 mitigation reporting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.4 07/18] x86/speculation: Use generic retpoline by default on AMD Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.4 09/18] x86/speculation: Warn about Spectre v2 LFENCE mitigation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 15:59 ` [PATCH 5.4 10/18] x86/speculation: Warn about eIBRS + LFENCE + Unprivileged eBPF + SMT Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.4 11/18] arm/arm64: Provide a wrapper for SMCCC 1.1 calls Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.4 12/18] arm/arm64: smccc/psci: add arm_smccc_1_1_get_conduit() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.4 13/18] ARM: report Spectre v2 status through sysfs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.4 14/18] ARM: early traps initialisation Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.4 15/18] ARM: use LOADADDR() to get load address of sections Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.4 16/18] ARM: Spectre-BHB workaround Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.4 17/18] ARM: include unprivileged BPF status in Spectre V2 reporting Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 16:00 ` [PATCH 5.4 18/18] ARM: fix build error when BPF_SYSCALL is disabled Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 17:38 ` [PATCH 5.4 00/18] 5.4.184-rc1 review Florian Fainelli
2022-03-09 17:50 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2022-03-09 19:27 ` Guenter Roeck
2022-03-09 20:25 ` Shuah Khan
2022-03-09 20:50 ` Daniel Díaz
2022-03-10 3:20 ` Samuel Zou
2022-03-10 4:01 ` Florian Fainelli
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20220309155856.799858164@linuxfoundation.org \
--to=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
--cc=bp@suse.de \
--cc=kim.phillips@amd.com \
--cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).