From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>,
"Wei Liu" <wl@xen.org>, "Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 03/16] x86/traps: Factor out exception_fixup() and make printing consistent
Date: Wed, 27 May 2020 09:01:31 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <0d19ed8a-d1f5-930c-3958-a34a69b7a24e@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <9c939815-a4f9-75d7-3b6b-b8921de6cdb9@citrix.com>
On 26.05.2020 20:06, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 12/05/2020 14:05, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> [CAUTION - EXTERNAL EMAIL] DO NOT reply, click links, or open attachments unless you have verified the sender and know the content is safe.
>>
>> On 11.05.2020 17:14, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>>> On 04/05/2020 14:20, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> On 02.05.2020 00:58, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>>>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
>>>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
>>>>> @@ -774,10 +774,27 @@ static void do_reserved_trap(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
>>>>> trapnr, vec_name(trapnr), regs->error_code);
>>>>> }
>>>>>
>>>>> +static bool exception_fixup(struct cpu_user_regs *regs, bool print)
>>>>> +{
>>>>> + unsigned long fixup = search_exception_table(regs);
>>>>> +
>>>>> + if ( unlikely(fixup == 0) )
>>>>> + return false;
>>>>> +
>>>>> + /* Can currently be triggered by guests. Make sure we ratelimit. */
>>>>> + if ( IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG) && print )
>>>> I didn't think we consider dprintk()-s a possible security issue.
>>>> Why would we consider so a printk() hidden behind
>>>> IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG)? IOW I think one of XENLOG_GUEST and
>>>> IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG) wants dropping.
>>> Who said anything about a security issue?
>> The need to rate limit is (among other aspects) to prevent a
>> (logspam) security issue, isn't it?
>
> Rate limiting (from a security aspect) is a stopgap solution to relieve
> incidental pressure on the various global spinlocks involved.
>
> It specifically does not prevent a guest from trivially filling the
> console ring with junk, or for that junk to be written to
> /var/log/xen/hypervisor.log at an alarming rate, both of which are
> issues in production setups, but not security issues.
IOW you assert that e.g. XSA-141 should not have been issued?
> Technical solutions to these problems do exist, such as deleting the
> offending printk(), or maintaining per-guest console rings, but both
> come with downsides in terms of usability, which similarly impacts
> production setups.
>
>
> What ratelimiting even in debug builds gets you is a quick spate of
> printks() (e.g. any new sshd connection on an AMD system where the
> MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL patch is still uncommitted, and the default WRMSR
> behaviour breaking wrmsr_safe() logic in Linux) not wasting an
> unreasonable quantity of space in the console ring.
Hmm, okay, I can accept this perspective. Since the other comment I
gave has been taken care of by re-arrangements in a separate patch:
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Jan
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-05-27 7:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 66+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-05-01 22:58 [PATCH 00/16] x86: Support for CET Supervisor Shadow Stacks Andrew Cooper
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 01/16] x86/traps: Drop last_extable_addr Andrew Cooper
2020-05-04 12:44 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-11 14:53 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-11 15:00 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 02/16] x86/traps: Clean up printing in do_reserved_trap()/fatal_trap() Andrew Cooper
2020-05-04 13:08 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-11 15:01 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-11 15:09 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-18 16:54 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-19 8:50 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-26 15:38 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-27 6:54 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 03/16] x86/traps: Factor out exception_fixup() and make printing consistent Andrew Cooper
2020-05-04 13:20 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-11 15:14 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-12 13:05 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-26 18:06 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-27 7:01 ` Jan Beulich [this message]
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 04/16] x86/smpboot: Write the top-of-stack block in cpu_smpboot_alloc() Andrew Cooper
2020-05-04 13:22 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 05/16] x86/shstk: Introduce Supervisor Shadow Stack support Andrew Cooper
2020-05-04 13:52 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-11 15:46 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-12 13:54 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-15 16:21 ` Anthony PERARD
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 06/16] x86/traps: Implement #CP handler and extend #PF for shadow stacks Andrew Cooper
2020-05-04 14:10 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-11 17:20 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-12 13:58 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 07/16] x86/shstk: Re-layout the stack block " Andrew Cooper
2020-05-04 14:24 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-11 17:48 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-12 14:07 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 08/16] x86/shstk: Create " Andrew Cooper
2020-05-04 14:55 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-04 15:08 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 09/16] x86/cpu: Adjust enable_nmis() to be shadow stack compatible Andrew Cooper
2020-05-05 14:48 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-11 18:48 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 10/16] x86/cpu: Adjust reset_stack_and_jump() " Andrew Cooper
2020-05-07 13:17 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-11 20:07 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 11/16] x86/spec-ctrl: Adjust DO_OVERWRITE_RSB " Andrew Cooper
2020-05-07 13:22 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-07 13:25 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-07 13:38 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 12/16] x86/extable: Adjust extable handling " Andrew Cooper
2020-05-07 13:35 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-11 21:09 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-12 14:31 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-12 16:14 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-13 9:22 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 13/16] x86/ioemul: Rewrite stub generation " Andrew Cooper
2020-05-07 13:46 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 14/16] x86/alt: Adjust _alternative_instructions() to not create shadow stacks Andrew Cooper
2020-05-07 13:49 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 15/16] x86/entry: Adjust guest paths to be shadow stack compatible Andrew Cooper
2020-05-07 14:12 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-07 15:50 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-07 16:15 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-11 21:45 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-12 14:56 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 16/16] x86/shstk: Activate Supervisor Shadow Stacks Andrew Cooper
2020-05-07 14:54 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-11 23:46 ` Andrew Cooper
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