From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Cc: "Andrew Cooper" <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
"Wei Liu" <wl@xen.org>, "Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@suse.com>,
"Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Subject: [PATCH 02/16] x86/traps: Clean up printing in do_reserved_trap()/fatal_trap()
Date: Fri, 1 May 2020 23:58:24 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200501225838.9866-3-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200501225838.9866-1-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
For one, they render the vector in a different base.
Introduce X86_EXC_* constants and vec_name() to refer to exceptions by their
mnemonic, which starts bringing the code/diagnostics in line with the Intel
and AMD manuals.
Provide constants for every archtiecturally defined exception, even those not
implemented by Xen yet, as do_reserved_trap() is a catch-all handler.
Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
---
CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
CC: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
---
xen/arch/x86/traps.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++-----
xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h | 6 +-----
xen/include/asm-x86/x86-defns.h | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
index fe9457cdb6..e73f07f28a 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
@@ -686,6 +686,20 @@ const char *trapstr(unsigned int trapnr)
return trapnr < ARRAY_SIZE(strings) ? strings[trapnr] : "???";
}
+static const char *vec_name(unsigned int vec)
+{
+ static const char names[][4] = {
+#define N(x) [X86_EXC_ ## x] = #x
+ N(DE), N(DB), N(NMI), N(BP), N(OF), N(BR), N(UD), N(NM),
+ N(DF), N(CSO), N(TS), N(NP), N(SS), N(GP), N(PF), N(SPV),
+ N(MF), N(AC), N(MC), N(XM), N(VE), N(CP),
+ N(HV), N(VC), N(SX),
+#undef N
+ };
+
+ return (vec < ARRAY_SIZE(names) && names[vec][0]) ? names[vec] : "??";
+}
+
/*
* This is called for faults at very unexpected times (e.g., when interrupts
* are disabled). In such situations we can't do much that is safe. We try to
@@ -743,10 +757,9 @@ void fatal_trap(const struct cpu_user_regs *regs, bool show_remote)
}
}
- panic("FATAL TRAP: vector = %d (%s)\n"
- "[error_code=%04x] %s\n",
- trapnr, trapstr(trapnr), regs->error_code,
- (regs->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_IF) ? "" : ", IN INTERRUPT CONTEXT");
+ panic("FATAL TRAP: vec %u, #%s[%04x]%s\n",
+ trapnr, vec_name(trapnr), regs->error_code,
+ (regs->eflags & X86_EFLAGS_IF) ? "" : " IN INTERRUPT CONTEXT");
}
static void do_reserved_trap(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
@@ -757,7 +770,8 @@ static void do_reserved_trap(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
return;
show_execution_state(regs);
- panic("FATAL RESERVED TRAP %#x: %s\n", trapnr, trapstr(trapnr));
+ panic("FATAL RESERVED TRAP: vec %u, #%s[%04x]\n",
+ trapnr, vec_name(trapnr), regs->error_code);
}
static void do_trap(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h
index 8f6f5a97dd..12b55e1022 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h
@@ -43,11 +43,7 @@
#define TRAP_virtualisation 20
#define TRAP_nr 32
-#define TRAP_HAVE_EC \
- ((1u << TRAP_double_fault) | (1u << TRAP_invalid_tss) | \
- (1u << TRAP_no_segment) | (1u << TRAP_stack_error) | \
- (1u << TRAP_gp_fault) | (1u << TRAP_page_fault) | \
- (1u << TRAP_alignment_check))
+#define TRAP_HAVE_EC X86_EXC_HAVE_EC
/* Set for entry via SYSCALL. Informs return code to use SYSRETQ not IRETQ. */
/* NB. Same as VGCF_in_syscall. No bits in common with any other TRAP_ defn. */
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/x86-defns.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/x86-defns.h
index 8bf503220a..84e15b15be 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/x86-defns.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/x86-defns.h
@@ -118,4 +118,39 @@
#define X86_NR_VECTORS 256
+/* Exception Vectors */
+#define X86_EXC_DE 0 /* Divide Error. */
+#define X86_EXC_DB 1 /* Debug Exception. */
+#define X86_EXC_NMI 2 /* NMI. */
+#define X86_EXC_BP 3 /* Breakpoint. */
+#define X86_EXC_OF 4 /* Overflow. */
+#define X86_EXC_BR 5 /* BOUND Range. */
+#define X86_EXC_UD 6 /* Invalid Opcode. */
+#define X86_EXC_NM 7 /* Device Not Available. */
+#define X86_EXC_DF 8 /* Double Fault. */
+#define X86_EXC_CSO 9 /* Coprocessor Segment Overrun. */
+#define X86_EXC_TS 10 /* Invalid TSS. */
+#define X86_EXC_NP 11 /* Segment Not Present. */
+#define X86_EXC_SS 12 /* Stack-Segment Fault. */
+#define X86_EXC_GP 13 /* General Porection Fault. */
+#define X86_EXC_PF 14 /* Page Fault. */
+#define X86_EXC_SPV 15 /* PIC Spurious Interrupt Vector. */
+#define X86_EXC_MF 16 /* Maths fault (x87 FPU). */
+#define X86_EXC_AC 17 /* Alignment Check. */
+#define X86_EXC_MC 18 /* Machine Check. */
+#define X86_EXC_XM 19 /* SIMD Exception. */
+#define X86_EXC_VE 20 /* Virtualisation Exception. */
+#define X86_EXC_CP 21 /* Control-flow Protection. */
+#define X86_EXC_HV 28 /* Hypervisor Injection. */
+#define X86_EXC_VC 29 /* VMM Communication. */
+#define X86_EXC_SX 30 /* Security Exception. */
+
+/* Bitmap of exceptions which have error codes. */
+#define X86_EXC_HAVE_EC \
+ ((1u << X86_EXC_DF) | (1u << X86_EXC_TS) | (1u << X86_EXC_NP) | \
+ (1u << X86_EXC_SS) | (1u << X86_EXC_GP) | (1u << X86_EXC_PF) | \
+ (1u << X86_EXC_AC) | (1u << X86_EXC_CP) | \
+ (1u << X86_EXC_VC) | (1u << X86_EXC_SX))
+
+
#endif /* __XEN_X86_DEFNS_H__ */
--
2.11.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-05-01 22:59 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 66+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-05-01 22:58 [PATCH 00/16] x86: Support for CET Supervisor Shadow Stacks Andrew Cooper
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 01/16] x86/traps: Drop last_extable_addr Andrew Cooper
2020-05-04 12:44 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-11 14:53 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-11 15:00 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-01 22:58 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2020-05-04 13:08 ` [PATCH 02/16] x86/traps: Clean up printing in do_reserved_trap()/fatal_trap() Jan Beulich
2020-05-11 15:01 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-11 15:09 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-18 16:54 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-19 8:50 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-26 15:38 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-27 6:54 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 03/16] x86/traps: Factor out exception_fixup() and make printing consistent Andrew Cooper
2020-05-04 13:20 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-11 15:14 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-12 13:05 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-26 18:06 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-27 7:01 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 04/16] x86/smpboot: Write the top-of-stack block in cpu_smpboot_alloc() Andrew Cooper
2020-05-04 13:22 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 05/16] x86/shstk: Introduce Supervisor Shadow Stack support Andrew Cooper
2020-05-04 13:52 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-11 15:46 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-12 13:54 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-15 16:21 ` Anthony PERARD
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 06/16] x86/traps: Implement #CP handler and extend #PF for shadow stacks Andrew Cooper
2020-05-04 14:10 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-11 17:20 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-12 13:58 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 07/16] x86/shstk: Re-layout the stack block " Andrew Cooper
2020-05-04 14:24 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-11 17:48 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-12 14:07 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 08/16] x86/shstk: Create " Andrew Cooper
2020-05-04 14:55 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-04 15:08 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 09/16] x86/cpu: Adjust enable_nmis() to be shadow stack compatible Andrew Cooper
2020-05-05 14:48 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-11 18:48 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 10/16] x86/cpu: Adjust reset_stack_and_jump() " Andrew Cooper
2020-05-07 13:17 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-11 20:07 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 11/16] x86/spec-ctrl: Adjust DO_OVERWRITE_RSB " Andrew Cooper
2020-05-07 13:22 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-07 13:25 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-07 13:38 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 12/16] x86/extable: Adjust extable handling " Andrew Cooper
2020-05-07 13:35 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-11 21:09 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-12 14:31 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-12 16:14 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-13 9:22 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 13/16] x86/ioemul: Rewrite stub generation " Andrew Cooper
2020-05-07 13:46 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 14/16] x86/alt: Adjust _alternative_instructions() to not create shadow stacks Andrew Cooper
2020-05-07 13:49 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 15/16] x86/entry: Adjust guest paths to be shadow stack compatible Andrew Cooper
2020-05-07 14:12 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-07 15:50 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-07 16:15 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-11 21:45 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-12 14:56 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 16/16] x86/shstk: Activate Supervisor Shadow Stacks Andrew Cooper
2020-05-07 14:54 ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-11 23:46 ` Andrew Cooper
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