xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Cc: Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>,
	"Wei Liu" <wl@xen.org>, "Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 05/16] x86/shstk: Introduce Supervisor Shadow Stack support
Date: Mon, 4 May 2020 15:52:58 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <d0347fec-3ccb-daa7-5c4d-f0e74b5fb247@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200501225838.9866-6-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>

On 02.05.2020 00:58, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/Kconfig
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/Kconfig
> @@ -34,6 +34,9 @@ config ARCH_DEFCONFIG
>  config INDIRECT_THUNK
>  	def_bool $(cc-option,-mindirect-branch-register)
>  
> +config HAS_AS_CET
> +	def_bool $(as-instr,wrssq %rax$(comma)0;setssbsy;endbr64)

I see you add as-instr here as a side effect. Until the other
similar checks get converted, I think for the time being we should
use the old model, to have all such checks in one place. I realize
this means you can't have a Kconfig dependency then.

Also why do you check multiple insns, when just one (like we do
elsewhere) would suffice?

The crucial insns to check are those which got changed pretty
close before the release of 2.29 (in the cover letter you
mention 2.32): One of incssp{d,q}, setssbsy, or saveprevssp.
There weren't official binutils releases with the original
insns, but distros may still have picked up intermediate
snapshots.

> @@ -97,6 +100,20 @@ config HVM
>  
>  	  If unsure, say Y.
>  
> +config XEN_SHSTK
> +	bool "Supervisor Shadow Stacks"
> +	depends on HAS_AS_CET && EXPERT = "y"
> +	default y
> +        ---help---
> +          Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) is a set of features in
> +          hardware designed to combat Return-oriented Programming (ROP, also
> +          call/jump COP/JOP) attacks.  Shadow Stacks are one CET feature
> +          designed to provide return address protection.
> +
> +          This option arranges for Xen to use CET-SS for its own protection.
> +          When CET-SS is active, 32bit PV guests cannot be used.  Backwards
> +          compatiblity can be provided vai the PV Shim mechanism.

Indentation looks odd here - the whole help section should
start with hard tabs, I think.

> --- a/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/setup.c
> @@ -95,6 +95,36 @@ unsigned long __initdata highmem_start;
>  size_param("highmem-start", highmem_start);
>  #endif
>  
> +static bool __initdata opt_xen_shstk = true;
> +
> +static int parse_xen(const char *s)
> +{
> +    const char *ss;
> +    int val, rc = 0;
> +
> +    do {
> +        ss = strchr(s, ',');
> +        if ( !ss )
> +            ss = strchr(s, '\0');
> +
> +        if ( (val = parse_boolean("shstk", s, ss)) >= 0 )
> +        {
> +#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_SHSTK
> +            opt_xen_shstk = val;
> +#else
> +            no_config_param("XEN_SHSTK", "xen", s, ss);
> +#endif
> +        }
> +        else
> +            rc = -EINVAL;
> +
> +        s = ss + 1;
> +    } while ( *ss );
> +
> +    return rc;
> +}
> +custom_param("xen", parse_xen);

What's the idea here going forward, i.e. why the new top level
"xen" option? Almost all options are for Xen itself, after all.
Did you perhaps mean this to be "cet"?

Also you surely meant to document this new option?

> --- a/xen/scripts/Kconfig.include
> +++ b/xen/scripts/Kconfig.include
> @@ -31,6 +31,10 @@ cc-option = $(success,$(CC) -Werror $(CLANG_FLAGS) $(1) -E -x c /dev/null -o /de
>  # Return y if the linker supports <flag>, n otherwise
>  ld-option = $(success,$(LD) -v $(1))
>  
> +# $(as-instr,<instr>)
> +# Return y if the assembler supports <instr>, n otherwise
> +as-instr = $(success,printf "%b\n" "$(1)" | $(CC) $(CLANG_FLAGS) -c -x assembler -o /dev/null -)

CLANG_FLAGS caught my eye here, then noticing that cc-option
also uses it. Anthony - what's the deal with this? It doesn't
look to get defined anywhere, and I also don't see what clang-
specific about these constructs.

Jan


  reply	other threads:[~2020-05-04 13:53 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 66+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-05-01 22:58 [PATCH 00/16] x86: Support for CET Supervisor Shadow Stacks Andrew Cooper
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 01/16] x86/traps: Drop last_extable_addr Andrew Cooper
2020-05-04 12:44   ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-11 14:53     ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-11 15:00       ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 02/16] x86/traps: Clean up printing in do_reserved_trap()/fatal_trap() Andrew Cooper
2020-05-04 13:08   ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-11 15:01     ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-11 15:09       ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-18 16:54         ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-19  8:50           ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-26 15:38             ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-27  6:54               ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 03/16] x86/traps: Factor out exception_fixup() and make printing consistent Andrew Cooper
2020-05-04 13:20   ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-11 15:14     ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-12 13:05       ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-26 18:06         ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-27  7:01           ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 04/16] x86/smpboot: Write the top-of-stack block in cpu_smpboot_alloc() Andrew Cooper
2020-05-04 13:22   ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 05/16] x86/shstk: Introduce Supervisor Shadow Stack support Andrew Cooper
2020-05-04 13:52   ` Jan Beulich [this message]
2020-05-11 15:46     ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-12 13:54       ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-15 16:21     ` Anthony PERARD
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 06/16] x86/traps: Implement #CP handler and extend #PF for shadow stacks Andrew Cooper
2020-05-04 14:10   ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-11 17:20     ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-12 13:58       ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 07/16] x86/shstk: Re-layout the stack block " Andrew Cooper
2020-05-04 14:24   ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-11 17:48     ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-12 14:07       ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 08/16] x86/shstk: Create " Andrew Cooper
2020-05-04 14:55   ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-04 15:08     ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 09/16] x86/cpu: Adjust enable_nmis() to be shadow stack compatible Andrew Cooper
2020-05-05 14:48   ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-11 18:48     ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 10/16] x86/cpu: Adjust reset_stack_and_jump() " Andrew Cooper
2020-05-07 13:17   ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-11 20:07     ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 11/16] x86/spec-ctrl: Adjust DO_OVERWRITE_RSB " Andrew Cooper
2020-05-07 13:22   ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-07 13:25     ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-07 13:38       ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 12/16] x86/extable: Adjust extable handling " Andrew Cooper
2020-05-07 13:35   ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-11 21:09     ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-12 14:31       ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-12 16:14         ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-13  9:22           ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 13/16] x86/ioemul: Rewrite stub generation " Andrew Cooper
2020-05-07 13:46   ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 14/16] x86/alt: Adjust _alternative_instructions() to not create shadow stacks Andrew Cooper
2020-05-07 13:49   ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 15/16] x86/entry: Adjust guest paths to be shadow stack compatible Andrew Cooper
2020-05-07 14:12   ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-07 15:50     ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-07 16:15       ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-11 21:45         ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-12 14:56           ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 16/16] x86/shstk: Activate Supervisor Shadow Stacks Andrew Cooper
2020-05-07 14:54   ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-11 23:46     ` Andrew Cooper

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=d0347fec-3ccb-daa7-5c4d-f0e74b5fb247@suse.com \
    --to=jbeulich@suse.com \
    --cc=andrew.cooper3@citrix.com \
    --cc=anthony.perard@citrix.com \
    --cc=roger.pau@citrix.com \
    --cc=wl@xen.org \
    --cc=xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).