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From: Oleksandr Tyshchenko <olekstysh@gmail.com>
To: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>,
	xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>,
	 Oleksandr Tyshchenko <oleksandr_tyshchenko@epam.com>,
	Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>,  Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>,
	Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	 George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>,
	Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>,
	 Volodymyr Babchuk <Volodymyr_Babchuk@epam.com>,
	Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	 Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH V1 04/12] xen/arm: Introduce arch specific bits for IOREQ/DM features
Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2020 23:39:48 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CAPD2p-n3ErCo0uFrW57P22409baU0Uq3s-7z4y+Q3xjKzX3j4g@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <b5497b00-2ee9-e6d8-ea4d-583a14b54522@gmail.com>

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Hi

Sorry for the possible format issue.

On Thu, Aug 13, 2020 at 9:42 PM Oleksandr <olekstysh@gmail.com> wrote:

>
> On 11.08.20 20:50, Julien Grall wrote:
>
> Hi Julien
>
> >
> >
> > On 11/08/2020 18:09, Oleksandr wrote:
> >>
> >> On 05.08.20 12:32, Julien Grall wrote:
> >>
> >> Hi Julien, Stefano
> >>
> >>>
> >>>>> diff --git a/xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h b/xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h
> >>>>> index 5fdb6e8..5823f11 100644
> >>>>> --- a/xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h
> >>>>> +++ b/xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h
> >>>>> @@ -385,10 +385,11 @@ static inline int
> >>>>> set_foreign_p2m_entry(struct domain *d, unsigned long gfn,
> >>>>>                                           mfn_t mfn)
> >>>>>   {
> >>>>>       /*
> >>>>> -     * NOTE: If this is implemented then proper reference
> >>>>> counting of
> >>>>> -     *       foreign entries will need to be implemented.
> >>>>> +     * XXX: handle properly reference. It looks like the page may
> >>>>> not always
> >>>>> +     * belong to d.
> >>>>
> >>>> Just as a reference, and without taking away anything from the
> >>>> comment,
> >>>> I think that QEMU is doing its own internal reference counting for
> >>>> these
> >>>> mappings.
> >>>
> >>> I am not sure how this matters here? We can't really trust the DM to
> >>> do the right thing if it is not running in dom0.
> >>>
> >>> But, IIRC, the problem is some of the pages doesn't belong to do a
> >>> domain, so it is not possible to treat them as foreign mapping (e.g.
> >>> you wouldn't be able to grab a reference). This investigation was
> >>> done a couple of years ago, so this may have changed in recent Xen.
> >>
> >> Well, emulator is going to be used in driver domain, so this TODO
> >> must be resolved. I suspect that the check for a hardware domain in
> >> acquire_resource() which I skipped in a hackish way [1] could be
> >> simply removed once proper reference counting is implemented in Xen,
> >> correct?
> >
> > It depends how you are going to solve it. If you manage to solve it in
> > a generic way, then yes you could resolve. If not (i.e. it is solved
> > in an arch-specific way), we would need to keep the check on arch that
> > are not able to deal with it. See more below.
> >
> >>
> >> Could you please provide some pointers on that problem? Maybe some
> >> questions need to be investigated again? Unfortunately, it is not
> >> completely clear to me the direction to follow...
> >>
> >> ***
> >> I am wondering whether the similar problem exists on x86 as well?
> >
> > It is somewhat different. On Arm, we are able to handle properly
> > foreign mapping (i.e. mapping page from a another domain) as we would
> > grab a reference on the page (see XENMAPSPACE_gmfn_foreign handling in
> > xenmem_add_to_physmap()). The reference will then be released when the
> > entry is removed from the P2M (see p2m_free_entry()).
> >
> > If all the pages given to set_foreign_p2m_entry() belong to a domain,
> > then you could use the same approach.
> >
> > However, I remember to run into some issues in some of the cases. I
> > had a quick looked at the caller and I wasn't able to find any use
> > cases that may be an issue.
> >
> > The refcounting in the IOREQ code has changed after XSA-276 (this was
> > found while working on the Arm port). Probably the best way to figure
> > out if it works would be to try it and see if it fails.
> >
> > Note that set_foreign_p2m_entry() doesn't have a parameter for the
> > foreign domain. You would need to add a extra parameter for this.
> >
> >> The FIXME tag (before checking for a hardware domain in
> >> acquire_resource()) in the common code makes me think it is a common
> >> issue. From other side x86's
> >> implementation of set_foreign_p2m_entry() is exists unlike Arm's one
> >> (which returned -EOPNOTSUPP so far). Or these are unrelated?
> >
> > At the moment, x86 doesn't support refcounting for foreign mapping.
> > Hence the reason to restrict them to the hardware domain.
>
>
> Thank you for the pointers!
>
>
> I checked that all pages given to set_foreign_p2m_entry() belonged to a
> domain (at least in my use-case). I noticed two calls for acquiring
> resource at the DomU creation time, the first call was for grant table
> (single gfn)
> and the second for ioreq server which carried 2 gfns (for shared and
> buffered rings I assume). For the test purpose, I passed these gfns to
> get_page_from_gfn() in order to grab references on the pages, after that
> I tried to destroy DomU without calling put_page() for these pages. The
> fact that I couldn't destroy DomU completely (a zombie domain was
> observed) made me think that references were still taken, so worked as
> expected.
>
>
> I implemented a test patch (which uses approach from
> xenmem_add_to_physmap_one() for XENMAPSPACE_gmfn_foreign case) to check
> whether it would work.
>
>
> ---
>   xen/arch/arm/p2m.c        | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>   xen/common/memory.c       |  2 +-
>   xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h | 12 ++----------
>   3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
> index e9ccba8..7359715 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/arm/p2m.c
> @@ -1385,6 +1385,36 @@ int guest_physmap_remove_page(struct domain *d,
> gfn_t gfn, mfn_t mfn,
>       return p2m_remove_mapping(d, gfn, (1 << page_order), mfn);
>   }
>
> +int set_foreign_p2m_entry(struct domain *d, struct domain *fd,
> +                          unsigned long gfn, mfn_t mfn)
> +{
> +    struct page_info *page;
> +    p2m_type_t p2mt;
> +    int rc;
> +
> +    /*
> +     * Take reference to the foreign domain page. Reference will be
> released
> +     * in p2m_put_l3_page().
> +     */
> +    page = get_page_from_gfn(fd, gfn, &p2mt, P2M_ALLOC);
> +    if ( !page )
> +        return -EINVAL;
> +
> +    if ( p2m_is_ram(p2mt) )
> +        p2mt = (p2mt == p2m_ram_rw) ? p2m_map_foreign_rw :
> p2m_map_foreign_ro;
> +    else
> +    {
> +        put_page(page);
> +        return -EINVAL;
> +    }
> +
> +    rc = guest_physmap_add_entry(d, _gfn(gfn), mfn, 0, p2mt);
> +    if ( rc )
> +        put_page(page);
> +
> +    return 0;
> +}
> +
>   static struct page_info *p2m_allocate_root(void)
>   {
>       struct page_info *page;
> diff --git a/xen/common/memory.c b/xen/common/memory.c
> index 8d9f0a8..1de1d4f 100644
> --- a/xen/common/memory.c
> +++ b/xen/common/memory.c
> @@ -1171,7 +1171,7 @@ static int acquire_resource(
>
>           for ( i = 0; !rc && i < xmar.nr_frames; i++ )
>           {
> -            rc = set_foreign_p2m_entry(currd, gfn_list[i],
> +            rc = set_foreign_p2m_entry(currd, d, gfn_list[i],
>                                          _mfn(mfn_list[i]));
>               /* rc should be -EIO for any iteration other than the first
> */
>               if ( rc && i )
> diff --git a/xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h b/xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h
> index 5823f11..53ce373 100644
> --- a/xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h
> +++ b/xen/include/asm-arm/p2m.h
> @@ -381,16 +381,8 @@ static inline gfn_t gfn_next_boundary(gfn_t gfn,
> unsigned int order)
>       return gfn_add(gfn, 1UL << order);
>   }
>
> -static inline int set_foreign_p2m_entry(struct domain *d, unsigned long
> gfn,
> -                                        mfn_t mfn)
> -{
> -    /*
> -     * XXX: handle properly reference. It looks like the page may not
> always
> -     * belong to d.
> -     */
> -
> -    return guest_physmap_add_entry(d, _gfn(gfn), mfn, 0, p2m_ram_rw);
> -}
> +int set_foreign_p2m_entry(struct domain *d, struct domain *fd,
> +                          unsigned long gfn,  mfn_t mfn);
>
>   /*
>    * A vCPU has cache enabled only when the MMU is enabled and data cache
> --
> 2.7.4
>
>
> And with that patch applied I was facing a BUG when destroying/rebooting
> DomU. The call of put_page_alloc_ref() in hvm_free_ioreq_mfn() triggered
> that BUG:
>
>
> Rebooting domain 2
> root@generic-armv8-xt-dom0:~# (XEN) Xen BUG at
> ...tAUTOINC+bb71237a55-r0/git/xen/include/xen/mm.h:683
> (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.14.0  arm64  debug=y   Not tainted ]----
> (XEN) CPU:    3
> (XEN) PC:     0000000000246f28 ioreq.c#hvm_free_ioreq_mfn+0x68/0x6c
> (XEN) LR:     0000000000246ef0
> (XEN) SP:     0000800725eafd80
> (XEN) CPSR:   60000249 MODE:64-bit EL2h (Hypervisor, handler)
> (XEN)      X0: 0000000000000001  X1: 403fffffffffffff  X2: 000000000000001f
> (XEN)      X3: 0000000080000000  X4: 0000000000000000  X5: 0000000000400000
> (XEN)      X6: 0000800725eafe24  X7: 0000ffffd1ef3e08  X8: 0000000000000020
> (XEN)      X9: 0000000000000000 X10: 00e800008ecebf53 X11: 0400000000000000
> (XEN)     X12: ffff7e00013b3ac0 X13: 0000000000000002 X14: 0000000000000001
> (XEN)     X15: 0000000000000001 X16: 0000000000000029 X17: 0000ffff9badb3d0
> (XEN)     X18: 000000000000010f X19: 0000000810e60e38 X20: 0000800725e68ec0
> (XEN)     X21: 0000000000000000 X22: 00008004dc0404a0 X23: 000000005a000ea1
> (XEN)     X24: ffff8000460ec280 X25: 0000000000000124 X26: 000000000000001d
> (XEN)     X27: ffff000008ad1000 X28: ffff800052e65100  FP: ffff0000223dbd20
> (XEN)
> (XEN)   VTCR_EL2: 80023558
> (XEN)  VTTBR_EL2: 0002000765f04000
> (XEN)
> (XEN)  SCTLR_EL2: 30cd183d
> (XEN)    HCR_EL2: 000000008078663f
> (XEN)  TTBR0_EL2: 00000000781c5000
> (XEN)
> (XEN)    ESR_EL2: f2000001
> (XEN)  HPFAR_EL2: 0000000000030010
> (XEN)    FAR_EL2: ffff000008005f00
> (XEN)
> (XEN) Xen stack trace from sp=0000800725eafd80:
> (XEN)    0000800725e68ec0 0000000000247078 00008004dc040000
> 00000000002477c8
> (XEN)    ffffffffffffffea 0000000000000001 ffff8000460ec500
> 0000000000000002
> (XEN)    000000000024645c 00000000002462dc 0000800725eafeb0
> 0000800725eafeb0
> (XEN)    0000800725eaff30 0000000060000145 000000000027882c
> 0000800725eafeb0
> (XEN)    0000800725eafeb0 01ff00000935de80 00008004dc040000
> 0000000000000006
> (XEN)    ffff800000000000 0000000000000002 000000005a000ea1
> 000000019bc60002
> (XEN)    0000ffffd1ef3e08 0000000000000020 0000000000000004
> 000000000027c7d8
> (XEN)    000000005a000ea1 0000800725eafeb0 000000005a000ea1
> 0000000000279f98
> (XEN)    0000000000000000 ffff8000460ec200 0000800725eaffb8
> 0000000000262c58
> (XEN)    0000000000262c4c 07e0000160000249 0000000000000002
> 0000000000000001
> (XEN)    ffff8000460ec500 ffff8000460ec508 ffff8000460ec208
> ffff800052e65100
> (XEN)    000000005060b478 0000ffffd20f3000 ffff7e00013c77e0
> 0000000000000000
> (XEN)    00e800008ecebf53 0400000000000000 ffff7e00013b3ac0
> 0000000000000002
> (XEN)    0000000000000001 0000000000000001 0000000000000029
> 0000ffff9badb3d0
> (XEN)    000000000000010f ffff8000460ec210 ffff8000460ec200
> ffff8000460ec210
> (XEN)    0000000000000001 ffff8000460ec500 ffff8000460ec280
> 0000000000000124
> (XEN)    000000000000001d ffff000008ad1000 ffff800052e65100
> ffff0000223dbd20
> (XEN)    ffff000008537004 ffffffffffffffff ffff0000080c17e4
> 5a000ea160000145
> (XEN)    0000000060000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
> ffff800052e65100
> (XEN)    ffff0000223dbd20 0000ffff9badb3dc 0000000000000000
> 0000000000000000
> (XEN) Xen call trace:
> (XEN)    [<0000000000246f28>] ioreq.c#hvm_free_ioreq_mfn+0x68/0x6c (PC)
> (XEN)    [<0000000000246ef0>] ioreq.c#hvm_free_ioreq_mfn+0x30/0x6c (LR)
> (XEN)
> (XEN)
> (XEN) ****************************************
> (XEN) Panic on CPU 3:
> (XEN) Xen BUG at ...tAUTOINC+bb71237a55-r0/git/xen/include/xen/mm.h:683
> (XEN) ****************************************
> (XEN)
> (XEN) Reboot in five seconds...
> (XEN)
> (XEN) ****************************************
> (XEN) Panic on CPU 0:
> (XEN) PSCI cpu off failed for CPU0 err=-3
> (XEN) ****************************************
> (XEN)
> (XEN) Reboot in five seconds...
>
>
>
> Either I did something wrong (most likely) or there is an issue with
> page ref-counting in the IOREQ code. I am still trying to understand
> what is going on.
> Some notes on that:
> 1. I checked that put_page() was called for these pages in
> p2m_put_l3_page() when destroying domain. This happened before
> hvm_free_ioreq_mfn() execution.
> 2. There was no BUG detected if I passed "p2m_ram_rw" instead of
> "p2m_map_foreign_rw" in guest_physmap_add_entry(), but the DomU couldn't
> be fully destroyed because of the reference taken.
>

I think I understand why BUG is triggered.

I checked "page->count_info & PGC_count_mask" and noticed
that get_page_from_gfn() doesn't seem to increase ref counter (but it
should?)

1. hvm_alloc_ioreq_mfn() -> ref 2
2. set_foreign_p2m_entry() -> ref still 2
3. p2m_put_l3_page() -> ref 1
4. hvm_free_ioreq_mfn() calls put_page_alloc_ref() with ref 1 which
triggers BUG


-- 
Regards,

Oleksandr Tyshchenko

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  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-08-13 20:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 140+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-08-03 18:21 [RFC PATCH V1 00/12] IOREQ feature (+ virtio-mmio) on Arm Oleksandr Tyshchenko
2020-08-03 18:21 ` [RFC PATCH V1 01/12] hvm/ioreq: Make x86's IOREQ feature common Oleksandr Tyshchenko
2020-08-04  7:45   ` Paul Durrant
2020-08-04 11:10     ` Oleksandr
2020-08-04 11:23       ` Paul Durrant
2020-08-04 11:51         ` Oleksandr
2020-08-04 13:18           ` Paul Durrant
2020-08-04 13:52       ` Julien Grall
2020-08-04 15:41         ` Jan Beulich
2020-08-04 19:11         ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-05  7:01           ` Jan Beulich
2020-08-06  0:37             ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-06  6:59               ` Jan Beulich
2020-08-06 20:32                 ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-07 13:19                   ` Oleksandr
2020-08-07 16:45               ` Oleksandr
2020-08-07 21:50                 ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-07 22:19                   ` Oleksandr
2020-08-10 13:41                     ` Oleksandr
2020-08-10 23:34                       ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-11  9:19                         ` Julien Grall
2020-08-11 10:10                           ` Oleksandr
2020-08-11 22:47                             ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-12 14:35                               ` Oleksandr
2020-08-12 23:08                                 ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-13 20:16                                   ` Julien Grall
2020-08-07 23:45                   ` Oleksandr
2020-08-10 23:34                     ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-05  8:33           ` Julien Grall
2020-08-06  0:37             ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-06  9:45               ` Julien Grall
2020-08-06 23:48                 ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-10 19:20                   ` Julien Grall
2020-08-10 23:34                     ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-11 11:28                       ` Julien Grall
2020-08-11 22:48                         ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-12  8:19                           ` Julien Grall
2020-08-20 19:14                             ` Oleksandr
2020-08-21  0:53                               ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-21 18:54                                 ` Julien Grall
2020-08-05 13:30   ` Julien Grall
2020-08-06 11:37     ` Oleksandr
2020-08-10 16:29       ` Julien Grall
2020-08-10 17:28         ` Oleksandr
2020-08-05 16:15   ` Andrew Cooper
2020-08-06  8:20     ` Oleksandr
2020-08-15 17:30   ` Julien Grall
2020-08-16 19:37     ` Oleksandr
2020-08-03 18:21 ` [RFC PATCH V1 02/12] hvm/dm: Make x86's DM " Oleksandr Tyshchenko
2020-08-03 18:21 ` [RFC PATCH V1 03/12] xen/mm: Make x86's XENMEM_resource_ioreq_server handling common Oleksandr Tyshchenko
2020-08-03 18:21 ` [RFC PATCH V1 04/12] xen/arm: Introduce arch specific bits for IOREQ/DM features Oleksandr Tyshchenko
2020-08-04  7:49   ` Paul Durrant
2020-08-04 14:01     ` Julien Grall
2020-08-04 23:22       ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-15 17:56       ` Julien Grall
2020-08-17 14:36         ` Oleksandr
2020-08-04 23:22   ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-05  7:05     ` Jan Beulich
2020-08-05 16:41       ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-05 19:45         ` Oleksandr
2020-08-05  9:32     ` Julien Grall
2020-08-05 15:41       ` Oleksandr
2020-08-06 10:19         ` Julien Grall
2020-08-10 18:09       ` Oleksandr
2020-08-10 18:21         ` Oleksandr
2020-08-10 19:00         ` Julien Grall
2020-08-10 20:29           ` Oleksandr
2020-08-10 22:37             ` Julien Grall
2020-08-11  6:13               ` Oleksandr
2020-08-12 15:08                 ` Oleksandr
2020-08-11 17:09       ` Oleksandr
2020-08-11 17:50         ` Julien Grall
2020-08-13 18:41           ` Oleksandr
2020-08-13 20:36             ` Julien Grall
2020-08-13 21:49               ` Oleksandr
2020-08-13 20:39             ` Oleksandr Tyshchenko [this message]
2020-08-13 22:14               ` Julien Grall
2020-08-14 12:08                 ` Oleksandr
2020-08-05 14:12   ` Julien Grall
2020-08-05 14:45     ` Jan Beulich
2020-08-05 19:30     ` Oleksandr
2020-08-06 11:08       ` Julien Grall
2020-08-06 11:29         ` Jan Beulich
2020-08-20 18:30           ` Oleksandr
2020-08-21  6:16             ` Jan Beulich
2020-08-21 11:13               ` Oleksandr
2020-08-06 13:27         ` Oleksandr
2020-08-10 18:25           ` Julien Grall
2020-08-10 19:58             ` Oleksandr
2020-08-05 16:13   ` Jan Beulich
2020-08-05 19:47     ` Oleksandr
2020-08-03 18:21 ` [RFC PATCH V1 05/12] hvm/dm: Introduce xendevicemodel_set_irq_level DM op Oleksandr Tyshchenko
2020-08-04 23:22   ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-05  9:39     ` Julien Grall
2020-08-06  0:37       ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-06 11:32         ` Julien Grall
2020-08-06 23:49           ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-07  8:43             ` Jan Beulich
2020-08-07 21:50               ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-08  9:27                 ` Julien Grall
2020-08-08  9:28                   ` Julien Grall
2020-08-10 23:34                   ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-11 13:04                     ` Julien Grall
2020-08-11 22:48                       ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-18  9:31                         ` Julien Grall
2020-08-21  0:53                           ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-17 15:23                 ` Jan Beulich
2020-08-17 22:56                   ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-18  8:03                     ` Jan Beulich
2020-08-05 16:15   ` Jan Beulich
2020-08-05 22:12     ` Oleksandr
2020-08-03 18:21 ` [RFC PATCH V1 06/12] libxl: Introduce basic virtio-mmio support on Arm Oleksandr Tyshchenko
2020-08-03 18:21 ` [RFC PATCH V1 07/12] A collection of tweaks to be able to run emulator in driver domain Oleksandr Tyshchenko
2020-08-05 16:19   ` Jan Beulich
2020-08-05 16:40     ` Paul Durrant
2020-08-06  9:22       ` Oleksandr
2020-08-06  9:27         ` Jan Beulich
2020-08-14 16:30           ` Oleksandr
2020-08-16 15:36             ` Julien Grall
2020-08-17 15:07               ` Oleksandr
2020-08-03 18:21 ` [RFC PATCH V1 08/12] xen/arm: Invalidate qemu mapcache on XENMEM_decrease_reservation Oleksandr Tyshchenko
2020-08-05 16:21   ` Jan Beulich
2020-08-06 11:35     ` Julien Grall
2020-08-06 11:50       ` Jan Beulich
2020-08-06 14:28         ` Oleksandr
2020-08-06 16:33           ` Jan Beulich
2020-08-06 16:57             ` Oleksandr
2020-08-03 18:21 ` [RFC PATCH V1 09/12] libxl: Handle virtio-mmio irq in more correct way Oleksandr Tyshchenko
2020-08-04 23:22   ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-05 20:51     ` Oleksandr
2020-08-03 18:21 ` [RFC PATCH V1 10/12] libxl: Add support for virtio-disk configuration Oleksandr Tyshchenko
2020-08-04 23:23   ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-05 21:12     ` Oleksandr
2020-08-06  0:37       ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-03 18:21 ` [RFC PATCH V1 11/12] libxl: Insert "dma-coherent" property into virtio-mmio device node Oleksandr Tyshchenko
2020-08-04 23:23   ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-05 20:35     ` Oleksandr
2020-08-03 18:21 ` [RFC PATCH V1 12/12] libxl: Fix duplicate memory node in DT Oleksandr Tyshchenko
2020-08-15 17:24 ` [RFC PATCH V1 00/12] IOREQ feature (+ virtio-mmio) on Arm Julien Grall
2020-08-16 19:34   ` Oleksandr

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