From: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>, Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com, gmazyland@gmail.com, paul@paul-moore.com Cc: tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com, sashal@kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 8/8] selinux: measure state and hash of the policy using IMA Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2020 15:40:11 -0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <0fb07bd3-c877-ab0f-cd45-dcfbe1fec044@linux.microsoft.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <4634c6c12b2452849f73ed2d5a4d168707e0ac9a.camel@linux.ibm.com> On 11/20/20 7:49 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote: Hi Mimi, > > On Thu, 2020-11-19 at 15:26 -0800, Tushar Sugandhi wrote: >> From: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> >> >> IMA measures files and buffer data such as keys, command line arguments >> passed to the kernel on kexec system call, etc. While these measurements >> enable monitoring and validating the integrity of the system, it is not >> sufficient. > > The above paragraph would make a good cover letter introduction. Agreed - will add this paragraph to the cover letter as well. > >> In-memory data structures maintained by various kernel >> components store the current state and policies configured for >> the components. > > Various data structures, policies and state stored in kernel memory > also impact the integrity of the system. Will update. > > The 2nd paragraph could provide examples of such integrity critical > data. Will do. > > This patch set introduces a new IMA hook named > ima_measure_critical_data() to measure kernel integrity critical data. > *Question* I am not clear about this one - do you mean add the following line in the patch description for the selinux patch? "This patch introduces the first use of the new IMA hook namely ima_measures_critical_data() to measure the integrity critical data for SELinux" thanks, -lakshmi
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> To: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>, Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com, gmazyland@gmail.com, paul@paul-moore.com Cc: sashal@kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com, selinux@vger.kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [dm-devel] [PATCH v6 8/8] selinux: measure state and hash of the policy using IMA Date: Fri, 20 Nov 2020 15:40:11 -0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <0fb07bd3-c877-ab0f-cd45-dcfbe1fec044@linux.microsoft.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <4634c6c12b2452849f73ed2d5a4d168707e0ac9a.camel@linux.ibm.com> On 11/20/20 7:49 AM, Mimi Zohar wrote: Hi Mimi, > > On Thu, 2020-11-19 at 15:26 -0800, Tushar Sugandhi wrote: >> From: Lakshmi Ramasubramanian <nramas@linux.microsoft.com> >> >> IMA measures files and buffer data such as keys, command line arguments >> passed to the kernel on kexec system call, etc. While these measurements >> enable monitoring and validating the integrity of the system, it is not >> sufficient. > > The above paragraph would make a good cover letter introduction. Agreed - will add this paragraph to the cover letter as well. > >> In-memory data structures maintained by various kernel >> components store the current state and policies configured for >> the components. > > Various data structures, policies and state stored in kernel memory > also impact the integrity of the system. Will update. > > The 2nd paragraph could provide examples of such integrity critical > data. Will do. > > This patch set introduces a new IMA hook named > ima_measure_critical_data() to measure kernel integrity critical data. > *Question* I am not clear about this one - do you mean add the following line in the patch description for the selinux patch? "This patch introduces the first use of the new IMA hook namely ima_measures_critical_data() to measure the integrity critical data for SELinux" thanks, -lakshmi -- dm-devel mailing list dm-devel@redhat.com https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-11-20 23:40 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2020-11-19 23:26 [PATCH v6 0/8] IMA: support for measuring kernel integrity critical data Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [PATCH v6 1/8] IMA: generalize keyring specific measurement constructs Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [PATCH v6 2/8] IMA: add support to measure buffer data hash Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [PATCH v6 3/8] IMA: define a hook to measure kernel integrity critical data Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [PATCH v6 4/8] IMA: add policy rule to measure " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [PATCH v6 5/8] IMA: extend policy to add data sources as a critical data measurement constraint Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [PATCH v6 6/8] IMA: add support to critical data hook to limit data sources for measurement Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [PATCH v6 7/8] IMA: add a built-in policy rule for critical data measurement Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-20 14:30 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-11-20 14:30 ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar 2020-11-20 23:33 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian 2020-11-20 23:33 ` [dm-devel] " Lakshmi Ramasubramanian 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [PATCH v6 8/8] selinux: measure state and hash of the policy using IMA Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-20 15:49 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-11-20 15:49 ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar 2020-11-20 23:40 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian [this message] 2020-11-20 23:40 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian 2020-11-21 2:05 ` James Morris 2020-11-21 2:05 ` [dm-devel] " James Morris 2020-11-23 19:37 ` Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-23 19:37 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-20 12:46 ` [PATCH v6 0/8] IMA: support for measuring kernel integrity critical data Pavel Machek 2020-11-20 12:46 ` [dm-devel] " Pavel Machek 2020-11-22 20:53 ` Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-22 20:53 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-22 21:00 ` Pavel Machek 2020-11-22 21:00 ` [dm-devel] " Pavel Machek 2020-11-23 13:41 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-11-23 13:41 ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar 2020-11-23 17:18 ` Pavel Machek 2020-11-23 17:18 ` [dm-devel] " Pavel Machek 2020-11-23 19:49 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-11-23 19:49 ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar
Reply instructions: You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email using any one of the following methods: * Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client, and reply-to-all from there: mbox Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style * Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to switches of git-send-email(1): git send-email \ --in-reply-to=0fb07bd3-c877-ab0f-cd45-dcfbe1fec044@linux.microsoft.com \ --to=nramas@linux.microsoft.com \ --cc=agk@redhat.com \ --cc=casey@schaufler-ca.com \ --cc=dm-devel@redhat.com \ --cc=gmazyland@gmail.com \ --cc=jmorris@namei.org \ --cc=linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=paul@paul-moore.com \ --cc=sashal@kernel.org \ --cc=selinux@vger.kernel.org \ --cc=snitzer@redhat.com \ --cc=stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com \ --cc=tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com \ --cc=tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com \ --cc=zohar@linux.ibm.com \ /path/to/YOUR_REPLY https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html * If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header via mailto: links, try the mailto: linkBe sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes, see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror all data and code used by this external index.