From: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> To: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: zohar@linux.ibm.com, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com, gmazyland@gmail.com, paul@paul-moore.com, tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com, sashal@kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, nramas@linux.microsoft.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 0/8] IMA: support for measuring kernel integrity critical data Date: Sun, 22 Nov 2020 12:53:35 -0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <aadf6e35-39bc-74d4-6ca3-d708860738a5@linux.microsoft.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20201120124657.GA31468@duo.ucw.cz> Thanks Pavel for looking at this series. On 2020-11-20 4:46 a.m., Pavel Machek wrote: > On Thu 2020-11-19 15:26:03, Tushar Sugandhi wrote: >> Kernel integrity critical data can be defined as the in-memory kernel >> data which if accidentally or maliciously altered, can compromise the >> integrity of the system. > > Is that an useful definition? I will rework on the definition in the next iteration. Meanwhile, if you have any feedback on what can we add to the definition, that would help is. > >> There are several kernel subsystems that contain integrity critical >> data - e.g. LSMs like SELinux, or AppArmor; or device-mapper targets >> like dm-crypt, dm-verity etc. Examples of critical data could be kernel >> in-memory r/o structures, hash of the memory structures, or data that >> represents a linux kernel subsystem state. >> >> This patch set defines a new IMA hook namely ima_measure_critical_data() >> to measure the critical data. Kernel subsystems can use this >> functionality, to take advantage of IMA's measuring and quoting >> abilities - thus ultimately enabling remote attestation for the >> subsystem specific information stored in the kernel memory. > > How is it supposed to be useful? > > I'm pretty sure there are critical data that are not measured by > proposed module... and that are written under normal circumstances. > The goal of this series is to introduce the IMA hook measure_critical_data() and the necessary policies to use it; and illustrate that use with one example (SELinux). It is not scalable to identify and update all the critical data sources to use the proposed module at once. A piecemeal approach to add more critical data measurement in subsequent patches would be easy to implement and review. Please let me know if you have more thoughts on this. (what critical data you think would be useful to measure etc.) ~Tushar > Best regards, > > Pavel >
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> To: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz> Cc: sashal@kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com, snitzer@redhat.com, selinux@vger.kernel.org, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, jmorris@namei.org, zohar@linux.ibm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, nramas@linux.microsoft.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com, gmazyland@gmail.com, agk@redhat.com Subject: Re: [dm-devel] [PATCH v6 0/8] IMA: support for measuring kernel integrity critical data Date: Sun, 22 Nov 2020 12:53:35 -0800 [thread overview] Message-ID: <aadf6e35-39bc-74d4-6ca3-d708860738a5@linux.microsoft.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <20201120124657.GA31468@duo.ucw.cz> Thanks Pavel for looking at this series. On 2020-11-20 4:46 a.m., Pavel Machek wrote: > On Thu 2020-11-19 15:26:03, Tushar Sugandhi wrote: >> Kernel integrity critical data can be defined as the in-memory kernel >> data which if accidentally or maliciously altered, can compromise the >> integrity of the system. > > Is that an useful definition? I will rework on the definition in the next iteration. Meanwhile, if you have any feedback on what can we add to the definition, that would help is. > >> There are several kernel subsystems that contain integrity critical >> data - e.g. LSMs like SELinux, or AppArmor; or device-mapper targets >> like dm-crypt, dm-verity etc. Examples of critical data could be kernel >> in-memory r/o structures, hash of the memory structures, or data that >> represents a linux kernel subsystem state. >> >> This patch set defines a new IMA hook namely ima_measure_critical_data() >> to measure the critical data. Kernel subsystems can use this >> functionality, to take advantage of IMA's measuring and quoting >> abilities - thus ultimately enabling remote attestation for the >> subsystem specific information stored in the kernel memory. > > How is it supposed to be useful? > > I'm pretty sure there are critical data that are not measured by > proposed module... and that are written under normal circumstances. > The goal of this series is to introduce the IMA hook measure_critical_data() and the necessary policies to use it; and illustrate that use with one example (SELinux). It is not scalable to identify and update all the critical data sources to use the proposed module at once. A piecemeal approach to add more critical data measurement in subsequent patches would be easy to implement and review. Please let me know if you have more thoughts on this. (what critical data you think would be useful to measure etc.) ~Tushar > Best regards, > > Pavel > -- dm-devel mailing list dm-devel@redhat.com https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-11-22 20:54 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2020-11-19 23:26 [PATCH v6 0/8] IMA: support for measuring kernel integrity critical data Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [PATCH v6 1/8] IMA: generalize keyring specific measurement constructs Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [PATCH v6 2/8] IMA: add support to measure buffer data hash Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [PATCH v6 3/8] IMA: define a hook to measure kernel integrity critical data Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [PATCH v6 4/8] IMA: add policy rule to measure " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [PATCH v6 5/8] IMA: extend policy to add data sources as a critical data measurement constraint Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [PATCH v6 6/8] IMA: add support to critical data hook to limit data sources for measurement Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [PATCH v6 7/8] IMA: add a built-in policy rule for critical data measurement Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-20 14:30 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-11-20 14:30 ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar 2020-11-20 23:33 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian 2020-11-20 23:33 ` [dm-devel] " Lakshmi Ramasubramanian 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [PATCH v6 8/8] selinux: measure state and hash of the policy using IMA Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-19 23:26 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-20 15:49 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-11-20 15:49 ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar 2020-11-20 23:40 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian 2020-11-20 23:40 ` [dm-devel] " Lakshmi Ramasubramanian 2020-11-21 2:05 ` James Morris 2020-11-21 2:05 ` [dm-devel] " James Morris 2020-11-23 19:37 ` Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-23 19:37 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-20 12:46 ` [PATCH v6 0/8] IMA: support for measuring kernel integrity critical data Pavel Machek 2020-11-20 12:46 ` [dm-devel] " Pavel Machek 2020-11-22 20:53 ` Tushar Sugandhi [this message] 2020-11-22 20:53 ` Tushar Sugandhi 2020-11-22 21:00 ` Pavel Machek 2020-11-22 21:00 ` [dm-devel] " Pavel Machek 2020-11-23 13:41 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-11-23 13:41 ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar 2020-11-23 17:18 ` Pavel Machek 2020-11-23 17:18 ` [dm-devel] " Pavel Machek 2020-11-23 19:49 ` Mimi Zohar 2020-11-23 19:49 ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar
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