From: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: zohar@linux.ibm.com, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com,
casey@schaufler-ca.com, agk@redhat.com, snitzer@redhat.com,
gmazyland@gmail.com, paul@paul-moore.com,
tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com, sashal@kernel.org,
nramas@linux.microsoft.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 8/8] selinux: measure state and hash of the policy using IMA
Date: Sat, 21 Nov 2020 13:05:23 +1100 (AEDT) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.21.2011211301340.18334@namei.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201119232611.30114-9-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
On Thu, 19 Nov 2020, Tushar Sugandhi wrote:
> an impact on the security guarantees provided by SELinux. Measuring
> such in-memory data structures through IMA subsystem provides a secure
> way for a remote attestation service to know the state of the system
> and also the runtime changes in the state of the system.
I think we need better clarity on the security model here than just "a
secure way...". Secure how and against what threats?
This looks to me like configuration assurance, i.e. you just want to know
that systems have been configured correctly, not to detect a competent
attack. Is that correct?
--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: Tushar Sugandhi <tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: sashal@kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com, snitzer@redhat.com,
selinux@vger.kernel.org, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, zohar@linux.ibm.com,
nramas@linux.microsoft.com,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
tyhicks@linux.microsoft.com, casey@schaufler-ca.com,
linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com,
gmazyland@gmail.com, agk@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [dm-devel] [PATCH v6 8/8] selinux: measure state and hash of the policy using IMA
Date: Sat, 21 Nov 2020 13:05:23 +1100 (AEDT) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.21.2011211301340.18334@namei.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201119232611.30114-9-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com>
On Thu, 19 Nov 2020, Tushar Sugandhi wrote:
> an impact on the security guarantees provided by SELinux. Measuring
> such in-memory data structures through IMA subsystem provides a secure
> way for a remote attestation service to know the state of the system
> and also the runtime changes in the state of the system.
I think we need better clarity on the security model here than just "a
secure way...". Secure how and against what threats?
This looks to me like configuration assurance, i.e. you just want to know
that systems have been configured correctly, not to detect a competent
attack. Is that correct?
--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>
--
dm-devel mailing list
dm-devel@redhat.com
https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-11-21 2:05 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 42+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-11-19 23:26 [PATCH v6 0/8] IMA: support for measuring kernel integrity critical data Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-19 23:26 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-19 23:26 ` [PATCH v6 1/8] IMA: generalize keyring specific measurement constructs Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-19 23:26 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-19 23:26 ` [PATCH v6 2/8] IMA: add support to measure buffer data hash Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-19 23:26 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-19 23:26 ` [PATCH v6 3/8] IMA: define a hook to measure kernel integrity critical data Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-19 23:26 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-19 23:26 ` [PATCH v6 4/8] IMA: add policy rule to measure " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-19 23:26 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-19 23:26 ` [PATCH v6 5/8] IMA: extend policy to add data sources as a critical data measurement constraint Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-19 23:26 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-19 23:26 ` [PATCH v6 6/8] IMA: add support to critical data hook to limit data sources for measurement Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-19 23:26 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-19 23:26 ` [PATCH v6 7/8] IMA: add a built-in policy rule for critical data measurement Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-19 23:26 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-20 14:30 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-11-20 14:30 ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar
2020-11-20 23:33 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2020-11-20 23:33 ` [dm-devel] " Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2020-11-19 23:26 ` [PATCH v6 8/8] selinux: measure state and hash of the policy using IMA Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-19 23:26 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-20 15:49 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-11-20 15:49 ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar
2020-11-20 23:40 ` Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2020-11-20 23:40 ` [dm-devel] " Lakshmi Ramasubramanian
2020-11-21 2:05 ` James Morris [this message]
2020-11-21 2:05 ` James Morris
2020-11-23 19:37 ` Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-23 19:37 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-20 12:46 ` [PATCH v6 0/8] IMA: support for measuring kernel integrity critical data Pavel Machek
2020-11-20 12:46 ` [dm-devel] " Pavel Machek
2020-11-22 20:53 ` Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-22 20:53 ` [dm-devel] " Tushar Sugandhi
2020-11-22 21:00 ` Pavel Machek
2020-11-22 21:00 ` [dm-devel] " Pavel Machek
2020-11-23 13:41 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-11-23 13:41 ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar
2020-11-23 17:18 ` Pavel Machek
2020-11-23 17:18 ` [dm-devel] " Pavel Machek
2020-11-23 19:49 ` Mimi Zohar
2020-11-23 19:49 ` [dm-devel] " Mimi Zohar
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