All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kyle McMartin <kyle@redhat.com>,
	linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk,
	gregkh@linuxfoundation.org, x86@kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org,
	matthew.garrett@nebula.com
Subject: [PATCH 06/24] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode
Date: Wed, 05 Apr 2017 21:15:24 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <149142332458.5101.14654616837280513947.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <149142326734.5101.4596394505987813763.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>

From: Kyle McMartin <kyle@redhat.com>

Make sysrq+x exit secure boot mode on x86_64, thereby allowing the running
kernel image to be modified.  This lifts the lockdown.

Signed-off-by: Kyle McMartin <kyle@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: x86@kernel.org
---

 arch/x86/Kconfig            |   10 ++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/setup.c     |   31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/input/misc/uinput.c |    1 +
 drivers/tty/sysrq.c         |   19 +++++++++++++------
 include/linux/input.h       |    5 +++++
 include/linux/sysrq.h       |    8 +++++++-
 kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c |    2 +-
 7 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 21f39855661d..457c04971849 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1829,6 +1829,16 @@ config EFI_SECURE_BOOT_LOCK_DOWN
 	  image.  Say Y here to automatically lock down the kernel when a
 	  system boots with UEFI Secure Boot enabled.
 
+config EFI_ALLOW_SECURE_BOOT_EXIT
+	def_bool n
+	depends on EFI_SECURE_BOOT_LOCK_DOWN && MAGIC_SYSRQ
+	select ALLOW_LOCKDOWN_LIFT
+	prompt "Allow secure boot mode to be exited with SysRq+x on a keyboard"
+	---help---
+	  Allow secure boot mode to be exited and the kernel lockdown lifted by
+	  typing SysRq+x on a keyboard attached to the system (not permitted
+	  through procfs).
+
 config SECCOMP
 	def_bool y
 	prompt "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index 85dfa745c442..a415a4817684 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -71,6 +71,11 @@
 #include <linux/jiffies.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
 
+#include <linux/fips.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/sysrq.h>
+#include <linux/init_task.h>
+
 #include <video/edid.h>
 
 #include <asm/mtrr.h>
@@ -1330,6 +1335,32 @@ void __init i386_reserve_resources(void)
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_X86_32 */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_ALLOW_SECURE_BOOT_EXIT
+
+static void sysrq_handle_secure_boot(int key)
+{
+	if (!efi_enabled(EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
+		return;
+
+	pr_info("Secure boot disabled\n");
+	lift_kernel_lockdown();
+}
+static struct sysrq_key_op secure_boot_sysrq_op = {
+	.handler	=	sysrq_handle_secure_boot,
+	.help_msg	=	"unSB(x)",
+	.action_msg	=	"Disabling Secure Boot restrictions",
+	.enable_mask	=	SYSRQ_DISABLE_USERSPACE,
+};
+static int __init secure_boot_sysrq(void)
+{
+	if (efi_enabled(EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
+		register_sysrq_key('x', &secure_boot_sysrq_op);
+	return 0;
+}
+late_initcall(secure_boot_sysrq);
+#endif /*CONFIG_EFI_ALLOW_SECURE_BOOT_EXIT*/
+
+
 static struct notifier_block kernel_offset_notifier = {
 	.notifier_call = dump_kernel_offset
 };
diff --git a/drivers/input/misc/uinput.c b/drivers/input/misc/uinput.c
index 022be0e22eba..4a054a564636 100644
--- a/drivers/input/misc/uinput.c
+++ b/drivers/input/misc/uinput.c
@@ -387,6 +387,7 @@ static int uinput_allocate_device(struct uinput_device *udev)
 	if (!udev->dev)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
+	udev->dev->flags |= INPUTDEV_FLAGS_SYNTHETIC;
 	udev->dev->event = uinput_dev_event;
 	input_set_drvdata(udev->dev, udev);
 
diff --git a/drivers/tty/sysrq.c b/drivers/tty/sysrq.c
index c6fc7141d7b2..0c96cf60f1a6 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/sysrq.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/sysrq.c
@@ -481,6 +481,7 @@ static struct sysrq_key_op *sysrq_key_table[36] = {
 	/* x: May be registered on mips for TLB dump */
 	/* x: May be registered on ppc/powerpc for xmon */
 	/* x: May be registered on sparc64 for global PMU dump */
+	/* x: May be registered on x86_64 for disabling secure boot */
 	NULL,				/* x */
 	/* y: May be registered on sparc64 for global register dump */
 	NULL,				/* y */
@@ -524,7 +525,7 @@ static void __sysrq_put_key_op(int key, struct sysrq_key_op *op_p)
                 sysrq_key_table[i] = op_p;
 }
 
-void __handle_sysrq(int key, bool check_mask)
+void __handle_sysrq(int key, unsigned int from)
 {
 	struct sysrq_key_op *op_p;
 	int orig_log_level;
@@ -544,11 +545,15 @@ void __handle_sysrq(int key, bool check_mask)
 
         op_p = __sysrq_get_key_op(key);
         if (op_p) {
+		/* Ban synthetic events from some sysrq functionality */
+		if ((from == SYSRQ_FROM_PROC || from == SYSRQ_FROM_SYNTHETIC) &&
+		    op_p->enable_mask & SYSRQ_DISABLE_USERSPACE)
+			printk("This sysrq operation is disabled from userspace.\n");
 		/*
 		 * Should we check for enabled operations (/proc/sysrq-trigger
 		 * should not) and is the invoked operation enabled?
 		 */
-		if (!check_mask || sysrq_on_mask(op_p->enable_mask)) {
+		if (from == SYSRQ_FROM_KERNEL || sysrq_on_mask(op_p->enable_mask)) {
 			pr_cont("%s\n", op_p->action_msg);
 			console_loglevel = orig_log_level;
 			op_p->handler(key);
@@ -580,7 +585,7 @@ void __handle_sysrq(int key, bool check_mask)
 void handle_sysrq(int key)
 {
 	if (sysrq_on())
-		__handle_sysrq(key, true);
+		__handle_sysrq(key, SYSRQ_FROM_KERNEL);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(handle_sysrq);
 
@@ -661,7 +666,7 @@ static void sysrq_do_reset(unsigned long _state)
 static void sysrq_handle_reset_request(struct sysrq_state *state)
 {
 	if (state->reset_requested)
-		__handle_sysrq(sysrq_xlate[KEY_B], false);
+		__handle_sysrq(sysrq_xlate[KEY_B], SYSRQ_FROM_KERNEL);
 
 	if (sysrq_reset_downtime_ms)
 		mod_timer(&state->keyreset_timer,
@@ -812,8 +817,10 @@ static bool sysrq_handle_keypress(struct sysrq_state *sysrq,
 
 	default:
 		if (sysrq->active && value && value != 2) {
+			int from = sysrq->handle.dev->flags & INPUTDEV_FLAGS_SYNTHETIC ?
+					SYSRQ_FROM_SYNTHETIC : 0;
 			sysrq->need_reinject = false;
-			__handle_sysrq(sysrq_xlate[code], true);
+			__handle_sysrq(sysrq_xlate[code], from);
 		}
 		break;
 	}
@@ -1097,7 +1104,7 @@ static ssize_t write_sysrq_trigger(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 
 		if (get_user(c, buf))
 			return -EFAULT;
-		__handle_sysrq(c, false);
+		__handle_sysrq(c, SYSRQ_FROM_PROC);
 	}
 
 	return count;
diff --git a/include/linux/input.h b/include/linux/input.h
index a65e3b24fb18..8b0357175049 100644
--- a/include/linux/input.h
+++ b/include/linux/input.h
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ struct input_value {
  * @phys: physical path to the device in the system hierarchy
  * @uniq: unique identification code for the device (if device has it)
  * @id: id of the device (struct input_id)
+ * @flags: input device flags (SYNTHETIC, etc.)
  * @propbit: bitmap of device properties and quirks
  * @evbit: bitmap of types of events supported by the device (EV_KEY,
  *	EV_REL, etc.)
@@ -124,6 +125,8 @@ struct input_dev {
 	const char *uniq;
 	struct input_id id;
 
+	unsigned int flags;
+
 	unsigned long propbit[BITS_TO_LONGS(INPUT_PROP_CNT)];
 
 	unsigned long evbit[BITS_TO_LONGS(EV_CNT)];
@@ -190,6 +193,8 @@ struct input_dev {
 };
 #define to_input_dev(d) container_of(d, struct input_dev, dev)
 
+#define	INPUTDEV_FLAGS_SYNTHETIC	0x000000001
+
 /*
  * Verify that we are in sync with input_device_id mod_devicetable.h #defines
  */
diff --git a/include/linux/sysrq.h b/include/linux/sysrq.h
index 387fa7d05c98..f7c52a9ea394 100644
--- a/include/linux/sysrq.h
+++ b/include/linux/sysrq.h
@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
 #define SYSRQ_ENABLE_BOOT	0x0080
 #define SYSRQ_ENABLE_RTNICE	0x0100
 
+#define SYSRQ_DISABLE_USERSPACE	0x00010000
+
 struct sysrq_key_op {
 	void (*handler)(int);
 	char *help_msg;
@@ -42,8 +44,12 @@ struct sysrq_key_op {
  * are available -- else NULL's).
  */
 
+#define SYSRQ_FROM_KERNEL	0x0001
+#define SYSRQ_FROM_PROC		0x0002
+#define SYSRQ_FROM_SYNTHETIC	0x0004
+
 void handle_sysrq(int key);
-void __handle_sysrq(int key, bool check_mask);
+void __handle_sysrq(int key, unsigned int from);
 int register_sysrq_key(int key, struct sysrq_key_op *op);
 int unregister_sysrq_key(int key, struct sysrq_key_op *op);
 struct sysrq_key_op *__sysrq_get_key_op(int key);
diff --git a/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c b/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c
index c8146d53ca67..b480cadf9272 100644
--- a/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c
+++ b/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c
@@ -1970,7 +1970,7 @@ static int kdb_sr(int argc, const char **argv)
 		return KDB_ARGCOUNT;
 
 	kdb_trap_printk++;
-	__handle_sysrq(*argv[1], check_mask);
+	__handle_sysrq(*argv[1], check_mask ? SYSRQ_FROM_KERNEL : 0);
 	kdb_trap_printk--;
 
 	return 0;

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: dhowells@redhat.com (David Howells)
To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 06/24] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode
Date: Wed, 05 Apr 2017 21:15:24 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <149142332458.5101.14654616837280513947.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <149142326734.5101.4596394505987813763.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk>

From: Kyle McMartin <kyle@redhat.com>

Make sysrq+x exit secure boot mode on x86_64, thereby allowing the running
kernel image to be modified.  This lifts the lockdown.

Signed-off-by: Kyle McMartin <kyle@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: x86 at kernel.org
---

 arch/x86/Kconfig            |   10 ++++++++++
 arch/x86/kernel/setup.c     |   31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/input/misc/uinput.c |    1 +
 drivers/tty/sysrq.c         |   19 +++++++++++++------
 include/linux/input.h       |    5 +++++
 include/linux/sysrq.h       |    8 +++++++-
 kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c |    2 +-
 7 files changed, 68 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 21f39855661d..457c04971849 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -1829,6 +1829,16 @@ config EFI_SECURE_BOOT_LOCK_DOWN
 	  image.  Say Y here to automatically lock down the kernel when a
 	  system boots with UEFI Secure Boot enabled.
 
+config EFI_ALLOW_SECURE_BOOT_EXIT
+	def_bool n
+	depends on EFI_SECURE_BOOT_LOCK_DOWN && MAGIC_SYSRQ
+	select ALLOW_LOCKDOWN_LIFT
+	prompt "Allow secure boot mode to be exited with SysRq+x on a keyboard"
+	---help---
+	  Allow secure boot mode to be exited and the kernel lockdown lifted by
+	  typing SysRq+x on a keyboard attached to the system (not permitted
+	  through procfs).
+
 config SECCOMP
 	def_bool y
 	prompt "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode"
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
index 85dfa745c442..a415a4817684 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/setup.c
@@ -71,6 +71,11 @@
 #include <linux/jiffies.h>
 #include <linux/security.h>
 
+#include <linux/fips.h>
+#include <linux/cred.h>
+#include <linux/sysrq.h>
+#include <linux/init_task.h>
+
 #include <video/edid.h>
 
 #include <asm/mtrr.h>
@@ -1330,6 +1335,32 @@ void __init i386_reserve_resources(void)
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_X86_32 */
 
+#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_ALLOW_SECURE_BOOT_EXIT
+
+static void sysrq_handle_secure_boot(int key)
+{
+	if (!efi_enabled(EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
+		return;
+
+	pr_info("Secure boot disabled\n");
+	lift_kernel_lockdown();
+}
+static struct sysrq_key_op secure_boot_sysrq_op = {
+	.handler	=	sysrq_handle_secure_boot,
+	.help_msg	=	"unSB(x)",
+	.action_msg	=	"Disabling Secure Boot restrictions",
+	.enable_mask	=	SYSRQ_DISABLE_USERSPACE,
+};
+static int __init secure_boot_sysrq(void)
+{
+	if (efi_enabled(EFI_SECURE_BOOT))
+		register_sysrq_key('x', &secure_boot_sysrq_op);
+	return 0;
+}
+late_initcall(secure_boot_sysrq);
+#endif /*CONFIG_EFI_ALLOW_SECURE_BOOT_EXIT*/
+
+
 static struct notifier_block kernel_offset_notifier = {
 	.notifier_call = dump_kernel_offset
 };
diff --git a/drivers/input/misc/uinput.c b/drivers/input/misc/uinput.c
index 022be0e22eba..4a054a564636 100644
--- a/drivers/input/misc/uinput.c
+++ b/drivers/input/misc/uinput.c
@@ -387,6 +387,7 @@ static int uinput_allocate_device(struct uinput_device *udev)
 	if (!udev->dev)
 		return -ENOMEM;
 
+	udev->dev->flags |= INPUTDEV_FLAGS_SYNTHETIC;
 	udev->dev->event = uinput_dev_event;
 	input_set_drvdata(udev->dev, udev);
 
diff --git a/drivers/tty/sysrq.c b/drivers/tty/sysrq.c
index c6fc7141d7b2..0c96cf60f1a6 100644
--- a/drivers/tty/sysrq.c
+++ b/drivers/tty/sysrq.c
@@ -481,6 +481,7 @@ static struct sysrq_key_op *sysrq_key_table[36] = {
 	/* x: May be registered on mips for TLB dump */
 	/* x: May be registered on ppc/powerpc for xmon */
 	/* x: May be registered on sparc64 for global PMU dump */
+	/* x: May be registered on x86_64 for disabling secure boot */
 	NULL,				/* x */
 	/* y: May be registered on sparc64 for global register dump */
 	NULL,				/* y */
@@ -524,7 +525,7 @@ static void __sysrq_put_key_op(int key, struct sysrq_key_op *op_p)
                 sysrq_key_table[i] = op_p;
 }
 
-void __handle_sysrq(int key, bool check_mask)
+void __handle_sysrq(int key, unsigned int from)
 {
 	struct sysrq_key_op *op_p;
 	int orig_log_level;
@@ -544,11 +545,15 @@ void __handle_sysrq(int key, bool check_mask)
 
         op_p = __sysrq_get_key_op(key);
         if (op_p) {
+		/* Ban synthetic events from some sysrq functionality */
+		if ((from == SYSRQ_FROM_PROC || from == SYSRQ_FROM_SYNTHETIC) &&
+		    op_p->enable_mask & SYSRQ_DISABLE_USERSPACE)
+			printk("This sysrq operation is disabled from userspace.\n");
 		/*
 		 * Should we check for enabled operations (/proc/sysrq-trigger
 		 * should not) and is the invoked operation enabled?
 		 */
-		if (!check_mask || sysrq_on_mask(op_p->enable_mask)) {
+		if (from == SYSRQ_FROM_KERNEL || sysrq_on_mask(op_p->enable_mask)) {
 			pr_cont("%s\n", op_p->action_msg);
 			console_loglevel = orig_log_level;
 			op_p->handler(key);
@@ -580,7 +585,7 @@ void __handle_sysrq(int key, bool check_mask)
 void handle_sysrq(int key)
 {
 	if (sysrq_on())
-		__handle_sysrq(key, true);
+		__handle_sysrq(key, SYSRQ_FROM_KERNEL);
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(handle_sysrq);
 
@@ -661,7 +666,7 @@ static void sysrq_do_reset(unsigned long _state)
 static void sysrq_handle_reset_request(struct sysrq_state *state)
 {
 	if (state->reset_requested)
-		__handle_sysrq(sysrq_xlate[KEY_B], false);
+		__handle_sysrq(sysrq_xlate[KEY_B], SYSRQ_FROM_KERNEL);
 
 	if (sysrq_reset_downtime_ms)
 		mod_timer(&state->keyreset_timer,
@@ -812,8 +817,10 @@ static bool sysrq_handle_keypress(struct sysrq_state *sysrq,
 
 	default:
 		if (sysrq->active && value && value != 2) {
+			int from = sysrq->handle.dev->flags & INPUTDEV_FLAGS_SYNTHETIC ?
+					SYSRQ_FROM_SYNTHETIC : 0;
 			sysrq->need_reinject = false;
-			__handle_sysrq(sysrq_xlate[code], true);
+			__handle_sysrq(sysrq_xlate[code], from);
 		}
 		break;
 	}
@@ -1097,7 +1104,7 @@ static ssize_t write_sysrq_trigger(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
 
 		if (get_user(c, buf))
 			return -EFAULT;
-		__handle_sysrq(c, false);
+		__handle_sysrq(c, SYSRQ_FROM_PROC);
 	}
 
 	return count;
diff --git a/include/linux/input.h b/include/linux/input.h
index a65e3b24fb18..8b0357175049 100644
--- a/include/linux/input.h
+++ b/include/linux/input.h
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ struct input_value {
  * @phys: physical path to the device in the system hierarchy
  * @uniq: unique identification code for the device (if device has it)
  * @id: id of the device (struct input_id)
+ * @flags: input device flags (SYNTHETIC, etc.)
  * @propbit: bitmap of device properties and quirks
  * @evbit: bitmap of types of events supported by the device (EV_KEY,
  *	EV_REL, etc.)
@@ -124,6 +125,8 @@ struct input_dev {
 	const char *uniq;
 	struct input_id id;
 
+	unsigned int flags;
+
 	unsigned long propbit[BITS_TO_LONGS(INPUT_PROP_CNT)];
 
 	unsigned long evbit[BITS_TO_LONGS(EV_CNT)];
@@ -190,6 +193,8 @@ struct input_dev {
 };
 #define to_input_dev(d) container_of(d, struct input_dev, dev)
 
+#define	INPUTDEV_FLAGS_SYNTHETIC	0x000000001
+
 /*
  * Verify that we are in sync with input_device_id mod_devicetable.h #defines
  */
diff --git a/include/linux/sysrq.h b/include/linux/sysrq.h
index 387fa7d05c98..f7c52a9ea394 100644
--- a/include/linux/sysrq.h
+++ b/include/linux/sysrq.h
@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
 #define SYSRQ_ENABLE_BOOT	0x0080
 #define SYSRQ_ENABLE_RTNICE	0x0100
 
+#define SYSRQ_DISABLE_USERSPACE	0x00010000
+
 struct sysrq_key_op {
 	void (*handler)(int);
 	char *help_msg;
@@ -42,8 +44,12 @@ struct sysrq_key_op {
  * are available -- else NULL's).
  */
 
+#define SYSRQ_FROM_KERNEL	0x0001
+#define SYSRQ_FROM_PROC		0x0002
+#define SYSRQ_FROM_SYNTHETIC	0x0004
+
 void handle_sysrq(int key);
-void __handle_sysrq(int key, bool check_mask);
+void __handle_sysrq(int key, unsigned int from);
 int register_sysrq_key(int key, struct sysrq_key_op *op);
 int unregister_sysrq_key(int key, struct sysrq_key_op *op);
 struct sysrq_key_op *__sysrq_get_key_op(int key);
diff --git a/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c b/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c
index c8146d53ca67..b480cadf9272 100644
--- a/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c
+++ b/kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c
@@ -1970,7 +1970,7 @@ static int kdb_sr(int argc, const char **argv)
 		return KDB_ARGCOUNT;
 
 	kdb_trap_printk++;
-	__handle_sysrq(*argv[1], check_mask);
+	__handle_sysrq(*argv[1], check_mask ? SYSRQ_FROM_KERNEL : 0);
 	kdb_trap_printk--;
 
 	return 0;

--
To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org
More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-04-05 20:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 215+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-04-05 20:14 [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown David Howells
2017-04-05 20:14 ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:14 ` [PATCH 01/24] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit David Howells
2017-04-05 20:14   ` David Howells
2017-04-06  8:26   ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-04-06  8:26     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-04-06  8:48   ` David Howells
2017-04-06  8:48     ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:14 ` [PATCH 02/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image David Howells
2017-04-05 20:14   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:14   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:14 ` [PATCH 03/24] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode David Howells
2017-04-05 20:14   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:15 ` [PATCH 04/24] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-04-05 20:15   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:15 ` [PATCH 05/24] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when " David Howells
2017-04-05 20:15   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:15 ` David Howells [this message]
2017-04-05 20:15   ` [PATCH 06/24] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode David Howells
2017-04-14 18:05   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-04-14 18:05     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-04-14 18:05     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-04-14 18:15     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-04-14 18:15       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-04-14 18:15       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-04-14 23:16     ` David Howells
2017-04-14 23:16       ` David Howells
2017-04-14 23:16       ` David Howells
2017-04-16 20:46     ` Matt Fleming
2017-04-16 20:46       ` Matt Fleming
2017-04-16 20:46       ` Matt Fleming
2017-04-05 20:15 ` [PATCH 07/24] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-04-05 20:15   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:15   ` David Howells
2017-04-07  3:07   ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  3:07     ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  3:07     ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  3:07     ` Dave Young
2017-04-05 20:15 ` [PATCH 08/24] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot David Howells
2017-04-05 20:15   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:15   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:15 ` [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set David Howells
2017-04-05 20:15   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:15   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:15   ` David Howells
2017-04-07  3:05   ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  3:05     ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  3:05     ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  3:05     ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  3:49     ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-07  3:49       ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-07  3:49       ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-07  6:19       ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  6:19         ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  6:19         ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  6:19         ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  7:45         ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-07  7:45           ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-07  7:45           ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-07  8:01           ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  8:01             ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  8:01             ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  7:07       ` David Howells
2017-04-07  7:07         ` David Howells
2017-04-07  7:07         ` David Howells
2017-04-07  7:41         ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  7:41           ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  7:41           ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  7:41           ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  8:28           ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-07  8:28             ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-07  8:28             ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-07  8:28             ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-07  8:42             ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  8:42               ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  8:42               ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  8:42               ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  7:09     ` David Howells
2017-04-07  7:09       ` David Howells
2017-04-07  7:09       ` David Howells
2017-04-07  7:46       ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-07  7:46         ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-07  7:46         ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-07  9:17       ` David Howells
2017-04-07  9:17         ` David Howells
2017-04-07  9:17         ` David Howells
2017-04-07 12:36         ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-07 12:36           ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-07 12:36           ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-10 13:19         ` David Howells
2017-04-10 13:19           ` David Howells
2017-04-10 13:19           ` David Howells
2017-05-02 19:01           ` Mimi Zohar
2017-05-02 19:01             ` Mimi Zohar
2017-05-02 19:01             ` Mimi Zohar
2017-05-02 19:01             ` Mimi Zohar
2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 10/24] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-04-05 20:16   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: " David Howells
2017-04-05 20:16   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 23:38   ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2017-04-05 23:38     ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2017-04-05 23:38     ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2017-04-06  6:39     ` Oliver Neukum
2017-04-06  6:39       ` Oliver Neukum
2017-04-06  8:41     ` David Howells
2017-04-06  8:41       ` David Howells
2017-04-06 20:09       ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2017-04-06 20:09         ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2017-04-06 20:09         ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2017-04-06 20:12         ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2017-04-06 20:12           ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2017-04-06 20:25           ` Jiri Kosina
2017-04-06 20:25             ` Jiri Kosina
2017-04-08  3:28             ` poma
2017-04-08  3:28               ` poma
2017-04-12 13:44               ` joeyli
2017-04-12 13:44                 ` joeyli
2017-04-06  6:55   ` David Howells
2017-04-06  6:55     ` David Howells
2017-04-06 20:07     ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2017-04-06 20:07       ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 12/24] PCI: Lock down BAR access " David Howells
2017-04-05 20:16   ` David Howells
2017-04-18 17:50   ` Bjorn Helgaas
2017-04-18 17:50     ` Bjorn Helgaas
2017-04-18 17:50     ` Bjorn Helgaas
2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 13/24] x86: Lock down IO port " David Howells
2017-04-05 20:16   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:16   ` David Howells
2017-04-14 18:28   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-04-14 18:28     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-04-14 18:28     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 14/24] x86: Restrict MSR " David Howells
2017-04-05 20:16   ` David Howells
2017-04-14 18:30   ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-04-14 18:30     ` Thomas Gleixner
2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface " David Howells
2017-04-05 20:16   ` David Howells
2017-04-07 10:25   ` Andy Shevchenko
2017-04-07 10:25     ` Andy Shevchenko
2017-04-07 12:50   ` David Howells
2017-04-07 12:50     ` David Howells
2017-04-09 11:10     ` Andy Shevchenko
2017-04-09 11:10       ` Andy Shevchenko
2017-04-10 13:16     ` David Howells
2017-04-10 13:16       ` David Howells
2017-04-18  6:06       ` Andy Shevchenko
2017-04-18  6:06         ` Andy Shevchenko
2017-04-18  6:06         ` Andy Shevchenko
2017-04-18 14:34         ` Ben Hutchings
2017-04-18 14:34           ` Ben Hutchings
2017-04-18 14:55         ` David Howells
2017-04-18 14:55           ` David Howells
2017-04-18 14:55           ` David Howells
2017-04-18 15:19           ` Ben Hutchings
2017-04-18 15:19             ` Ben Hutchings
2017-04-18 15:34           ` David Howells
2017-04-18 15:34             ` David Howells
2017-04-18 15:34             ` David Howells
2017-04-18 15:30         ` David Howells
2017-04-18 15:30           ` David Howells
2017-04-18 17:39           ` Ben Hutchings
2017-04-18 17:39             ` Ben Hutchings
2017-04-18 17:39             ` Ben Hutchings
2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 16/24] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " David Howells
2017-04-05 20:16   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 17/24] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " David Howells
2017-04-05 20:16   ` David Howells
2017-04-06 19:43   ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2017-04-06 19:43     ` Rafael J. Wysocki
2017-04-07  6:31     ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  6:31       ` Dave Young
     [not found]     ` <20170407063107.GA10451-0VdLhd/A9Pl+NNSt+8eSiB/sF2h8X+2i0E9HWUfgJXw@public.gmane.org>
2017-04-07  7:05       ` David Howells
2017-04-07  7:05         ` David Howells
2017-04-07  7:05         ` David Howells
2017-04-07  7:39         ` Dave Young
2017-04-07  7:39           ` Dave Young
2017-04-05 20:17 ` [PATCH 18/24] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " David Howells
2017-04-05 20:17   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:17 ` [PATCH 19/24] acpi: Disable APEI error injection " David Howells
2017-04-05 20:17   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:17 ` [PATCH 20/24] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when " David Howells
2017-04-05 20:17   ` David Howells
2017-04-06 12:29   ` Alexei Starovoitov
2017-04-06 12:29     ` Alexei Starovoitov
2017-04-06 12:40     ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-04-06 12:40       ` Ard Biesheuvel
2017-04-12 14:57   ` joeyli
2017-04-12 14:57     ` joeyli
2017-04-12 14:57     ` joeyli
2017-04-13  8:46   ` David Howells
2017-04-13  8:46     ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:17 ` [PATCH 21/24] scsi: Lock down the eata driver David Howells
2017-04-05 20:17   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:17 ` [PATCH 22/24] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down David Howells
2017-04-05 20:17   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:17   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:17 ` [PATCH 23/24] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL David Howells
2017-04-05 20:17   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:17   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:18 ` [PATCH 24/24] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) David Howells
2017-04-05 20:18   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 20:18   ` David Howells
2017-04-07 15:59 ` [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown Austin S. Hemmelgarn
2017-04-07 15:59   ` Austin S. Hemmelgarn
2017-04-07 16:29   ` Justin Forbes
2017-04-07 16:29     ` Justin Forbes
2017-04-07 16:29     ` Justin Forbes
2017-04-10 23:15 ` Why kernel lockdown? David Howells
2017-04-10 23:15   ` David Howells
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2017-04-05 17:09 [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10 ` [PATCH 06/24] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode David Howells
2017-04-05 17:10   ` David Howells
2017-04-05 17:07 [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown David Howells
2017-04-05 17:07 ` [PATCH 06/24] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode David Howells
2017-04-05 17:07   ` David Howells

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=149142332458.5101.14654616837280513947.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk \
    --to=dhowells@redhat.com \
    --cc=gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk \
    --cc=gregkh@linuxfoundation.org \
    --cc=keyrings@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=kyle@redhat.com \
    --cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=matthew.garrett@nebula.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.