From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: matthew.garrett@nebula.com, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk, linux-pci@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org Subject: [PATCH 12/24] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down Date: Wed, 05 Apr 2017 21:16:18 +0100 [thread overview] Message-ID: <149142337836.5101.13971561682218232219.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw) In-Reply-To: <149142326734.5101.4596394505987813763.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com> Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down in order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to modify kernel code, allowing them to circumvent disabled module loading or module signing. Default to paranoid - in future we can potentially relax this for sufficiently IOMMU-isolated devices. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org --- drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c | 9 +++++++++ drivers/pci/proc.c | 8 +++++++- drivers/pci/syscall.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c index 25d010d449a3..f70b3668036f 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c +++ b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c @@ -727,6 +727,9 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_config(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj, loff_t init_off = off; u8 *data = (u8 *) buf; + if (kernel_is_locked_down()) + return -EPERM; + if (off > dev->cfg_size) return 0; if (off + count > dev->cfg_size) { @@ -1018,6 +1021,9 @@ static int pci_mmap_resource(struct kobject *kobj, struct bin_attribute *attr, resource_size_t start, end; int i; + if (kernel_is_locked_down()) + return -EPERM; + for (i = 0; i < PCI_ROM_RESOURCE; i++) if (res == &pdev->resource[i]) break; @@ -1117,6 +1123,9 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_resource_io(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj, struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buf, loff_t off, size_t count) { + if (kernel_is_locked_down()) + return -EPERM; + return pci_resource_io(filp, kobj, attr, buf, off, count, true); } diff --git a/drivers/pci/proc.c b/drivers/pci/proc.c index f82710a8694d..139d6f09ae7b 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/proc.c +++ b/drivers/pci/proc.c @@ -116,6 +116,9 @@ static ssize_t proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, int size = dev->cfg_size; int cnt; + if (kernel_is_locked_down()) + return -EPERM; + if (pos >= size) return 0; if (nbytes >= size) @@ -195,6 +198,9 @@ static long proc_bus_pci_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, #endif /* HAVE_PCI_MMAP */ int ret = 0; + if (kernel_is_locked_down()) + return -EPERM; + switch (cmd) { case PCIIOC_CONTROLLER: ret = pci_domain_nr(dev->bus); @@ -233,7 +239,7 @@ static int proc_bus_pci_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) struct pci_filp_private *fpriv = file->private_data; int i, ret, write_combine; - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || kernel_is_locked_down()) return -EPERM; /* Make sure the caller is mapping a real resource for this device */ diff --git a/drivers/pci/syscall.c b/drivers/pci/syscall.c index 9bf993e1f71e..c09524738ceb 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/syscall.c +++ b/drivers/pci/syscall.c @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(pciconfig_write, unsigned long, bus, unsigned long, dfn, u32 dword; int err = 0; - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || kernel_is_locked_down()) return -EPERM; dev = pci_get_bus_and_slot(bus, dfn);
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: dhowells@redhat.com (David Howells) To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH 12/24] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down Date: Wed, 05 Apr 2017 21:16:18 +0100 [thread overview] Message-ID: <149142337836.5101.13971561682218232219.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw) In-Reply-To: <149142326734.5101.4596394505987813763.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com> Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down in order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to modify kernel code, allowing them to circumvent disabled module loading or module signing. Default to paranoid - in future we can potentially relax this for sufficiently IOMMU-isolated devices. Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: linux-pci at vger.kernel.org --- drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c | 9 +++++++++ drivers/pci/proc.c | 8 +++++++- drivers/pci/syscall.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c index 25d010d449a3..f70b3668036f 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c +++ b/drivers/pci/pci-sysfs.c @@ -727,6 +727,9 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_config(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj, loff_t init_off = off; u8 *data = (u8 *) buf; + if (kernel_is_locked_down()) + return -EPERM; + if (off > dev->cfg_size) return 0; if (off + count > dev->cfg_size) { @@ -1018,6 +1021,9 @@ static int pci_mmap_resource(struct kobject *kobj, struct bin_attribute *attr, resource_size_t start, end; int i; + if (kernel_is_locked_down()) + return -EPERM; + for (i = 0; i < PCI_ROM_RESOURCE; i++) if (res == &pdev->resource[i]) break; @@ -1117,6 +1123,9 @@ static ssize_t pci_write_resource_io(struct file *filp, struct kobject *kobj, struct bin_attribute *attr, char *buf, loff_t off, size_t count) { + if (kernel_is_locked_down()) + return -EPERM; + return pci_resource_io(filp, kobj, attr, buf, off, count, true); } diff --git a/drivers/pci/proc.c b/drivers/pci/proc.c index f82710a8694d..139d6f09ae7b 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/proc.c +++ b/drivers/pci/proc.c @@ -116,6 +116,9 @@ static ssize_t proc_bus_pci_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, int size = dev->cfg_size; int cnt; + if (kernel_is_locked_down()) + return -EPERM; + if (pos >= size) return 0; if (nbytes >= size) @@ -195,6 +198,9 @@ static long proc_bus_pci_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd, #endif /* HAVE_PCI_MMAP */ int ret = 0; + if (kernel_is_locked_down()) + return -EPERM; + switch (cmd) { case PCIIOC_CONTROLLER: ret = pci_domain_nr(dev->bus); @@ -233,7 +239,7 @@ static int proc_bus_pci_mmap(struct file *file, struct vm_area_struct *vma) struct pci_filp_private *fpriv = file->private_data; int i, ret, write_combine; - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO)) + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_RAWIO) || kernel_is_locked_down()) return -EPERM; /* Make sure the caller is mapping a real resource for this device */ diff --git a/drivers/pci/syscall.c b/drivers/pci/syscall.c index 9bf993e1f71e..c09524738ceb 100644 --- a/drivers/pci/syscall.c +++ b/drivers/pci/syscall.c @@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(pciconfig_write, unsigned long, bus, unsigned long, dfn, u32 dword; int err = 0; - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || kernel_is_locked_down()) return -EPERM; dev = pci_get_bus_and_slot(bus, dfn); -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-04-05 20:16 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 213+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2017-04-05 20:14 [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown David Howells 2017-04-05 20:14 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 20:14 ` [PATCH 01/24] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit David Howells 2017-04-05 20:14 ` David Howells 2017-04-06 8:26 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-04-06 8:26 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-04-06 8:48 ` David Howells 2017-04-06 8:48 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 20:14 ` [PATCH 02/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image David Howells 2017-04-05 20:14 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 20:14 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 20:14 ` [PATCH 03/24] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode David Howells 2017-04-05 20:14 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 20:15 ` [PATCH 04/24] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down David Howells 2017-04-05 20:15 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 20:15 ` [PATCH 05/24] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when " David Howells 2017-04-05 20:15 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 20:15 ` [PATCH 06/24] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode David Howells 2017-04-05 20:15 ` David Howells 2017-04-14 18:05 ` Thomas Gleixner 2017-04-14 18:05 ` Thomas Gleixner 2017-04-14 18:05 ` Thomas Gleixner 2017-04-14 18:15 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-04-14 18:15 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-04-14 18:15 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-04-14 23:16 ` David Howells 2017-04-14 23:16 ` David Howells 2017-04-14 23:16 ` David Howells 2017-04-16 20:46 ` Matt Fleming 2017-04-16 20:46 ` Matt Fleming 2017-04-16 20:46 ` Matt Fleming 2017-04-05 20:15 ` [PATCH 07/24] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down David Howells 2017-04-05 20:15 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 20:15 ` David Howells 2017-04-07 3:07 ` Dave Young 2017-04-07 3:07 ` Dave Young 2017-04-07 3:07 ` Dave Young 2017-04-07 3:07 ` Dave Young 2017-04-05 20:15 ` [PATCH 08/24] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot David Howells 2017-04-05 20:15 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 20:15 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 20:15 ` [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set David Howells 2017-04-05 20:15 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 20:15 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 20:15 ` David Howells 2017-04-07 3:05 ` Dave Young 2017-04-07 3:05 ` Dave Young 2017-04-07 3:05 ` Dave Young 2017-04-07 3:05 ` Dave Young 2017-04-07 3:49 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-04-07 3:49 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-04-07 3:49 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-04-07 6:19 ` Dave Young 2017-04-07 6:19 ` Dave Young 2017-04-07 6:19 ` Dave Young 2017-04-07 6:19 ` Dave Young 2017-04-07 7:45 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-04-07 7:45 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-04-07 7:45 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-04-07 8:01 ` Dave Young 2017-04-07 8:01 ` Dave Young 2017-04-07 8:01 ` Dave Young 2017-04-07 7:07 ` David Howells 2017-04-07 7:07 ` David Howells 2017-04-07 7:07 ` David Howells 2017-04-07 7:41 ` Dave Young 2017-04-07 7:41 ` Dave Young 2017-04-07 7:41 ` Dave Young 2017-04-07 7:41 ` Dave Young 2017-04-07 8:28 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-04-07 8:28 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-04-07 8:28 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-04-07 8:28 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-04-07 8:42 ` Dave Young 2017-04-07 8:42 ` Dave Young 2017-04-07 8:42 ` Dave Young 2017-04-07 8:42 ` Dave Young 2017-04-07 7:09 ` David Howells 2017-04-07 7:09 ` David Howells 2017-04-07 7:09 ` David Howells 2017-04-07 7:46 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-04-07 7:46 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-04-07 7:46 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-04-07 9:17 ` David Howells 2017-04-07 9:17 ` David Howells 2017-04-07 9:17 ` David Howells 2017-04-07 12:36 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-04-07 12:36 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-04-07 12:36 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-04-10 13:19 ` David Howells 2017-04-10 13:19 ` David Howells 2017-04-10 13:19 ` David Howells 2017-05-02 19:01 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-05-02 19:01 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-05-02 19:01 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-05-02 19:01 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 10/24] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down David Howells 2017-04-05 20:16 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: " David Howells 2017-04-05 20:16 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 23:38 ` Rafael J. Wysocki 2017-04-05 23:38 ` Rafael J. Wysocki 2017-04-05 23:38 ` Rafael J. Wysocki 2017-04-06 6:39 ` Oliver Neukum 2017-04-06 6:39 ` Oliver Neukum 2017-04-06 8:41 ` David Howells 2017-04-06 8:41 ` David Howells 2017-04-06 20:09 ` Rafael J. Wysocki 2017-04-06 20:09 ` Rafael J. Wysocki 2017-04-06 20:09 ` Rafael J. Wysocki 2017-04-06 20:12 ` Rafael J. Wysocki 2017-04-06 20:12 ` Rafael J. Wysocki 2017-04-06 20:25 ` Jiri Kosina 2017-04-06 20:25 ` Jiri Kosina 2017-04-08 3:28 ` poma 2017-04-08 3:28 ` poma 2017-04-12 13:44 ` joeyli 2017-04-12 13:44 ` joeyli 2017-04-06 6:55 ` David Howells 2017-04-06 6:55 ` David Howells 2017-04-06 20:07 ` Rafael J. Wysocki 2017-04-06 20:07 ` Rafael J. Wysocki 2017-04-05 20:16 ` David Howells [this message] 2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 12/24] PCI: Lock down BAR access " David Howells 2017-04-18 17:50 ` Bjorn Helgaas 2017-04-18 17:50 ` Bjorn Helgaas 2017-04-18 17:50 ` Bjorn Helgaas 2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 13/24] x86: Lock down IO port " David Howells 2017-04-05 20:16 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 20:16 ` David Howells 2017-04-14 18:28 ` Thomas Gleixner 2017-04-14 18:28 ` Thomas Gleixner 2017-04-14 18:28 ` Thomas Gleixner 2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 14/24] x86: Restrict MSR " David Howells 2017-04-05 20:16 ` David Howells 2017-04-14 18:30 ` Thomas Gleixner 2017-04-14 18:30 ` Thomas Gleixner 2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface " David Howells 2017-04-05 20:16 ` David Howells 2017-04-07 10:25 ` Andy Shevchenko 2017-04-07 10:25 ` Andy Shevchenko 2017-04-07 12:50 ` David Howells 2017-04-07 12:50 ` David Howells 2017-04-09 11:10 ` Andy Shevchenko 2017-04-09 11:10 ` Andy Shevchenko 2017-04-10 13:16 ` David Howells 2017-04-10 13:16 ` David Howells 2017-04-18 6:06 ` Andy Shevchenko 2017-04-18 6:06 ` Andy Shevchenko 2017-04-18 6:06 ` Andy Shevchenko 2017-04-18 14:34 ` Ben Hutchings 2017-04-18 14:34 ` Ben Hutchings 2017-04-18 14:55 ` David Howells 2017-04-18 14:55 ` David Howells 2017-04-18 14:55 ` David Howells 2017-04-18 15:19 ` Ben Hutchings 2017-04-18 15:19 ` Ben Hutchings 2017-04-18 15:34 ` David Howells 2017-04-18 15:34 ` David Howells 2017-04-18 15:34 ` David Howells 2017-04-18 15:30 ` David Howells 2017-04-18 15:30 ` David Howells 2017-04-18 17:39 ` Ben Hutchings 2017-04-18 17:39 ` Ben Hutchings 2017-04-18 17:39 ` Ben Hutchings 2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 16/24] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " David Howells 2017-04-05 20:16 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 17/24] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " David Howells 2017-04-05 20:16 ` David Howells 2017-04-06 19:43 ` Rafael J. Wysocki 2017-04-06 19:43 ` Rafael J. Wysocki 2017-04-07 6:31 ` Dave Young 2017-04-07 6:31 ` Dave Young [not found] ` <20170407063107.GA10451-0VdLhd/A9Pl+NNSt+8eSiB/sF2h8X+2i0E9HWUfgJXw@public.gmane.org> 2017-04-07 7:05 ` David Howells 2017-04-07 7:05 ` David Howells 2017-04-07 7:05 ` David Howells 2017-04-07 7:39 ` Dave Young 2017-04-07 7:39 ` Dave Young 2017-04-05 20:17 ` [PATCH 18/24] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " David Howells 2017-04-05 20:17 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 20:17 ` [PATCH 19/24] acpi: Disable APEI error injection " David Howells 2017-04-05 20:17 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 20:17 ` [PATCH 20/24] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when " David Howells 2017-04-05 20:17 ` David Howells 2017-04-06 12:29 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2017-04-06 12:29 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2017-04-06 12:40 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-04-06 12:40 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-04-12 14:57 ` joeyli 2017-04-12 14:57 ` joeyli 2017-04-12 14:57 ` joeyli 2017-04-13 8:46 ` David Howells 2017-04-13 8:46 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 20:17 ` [PATCH 21/24] scsi: Lock down the eata driver David Howells 2017-04-05 20:17 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 20:17 ` [PATCH 22/24] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down David Howells 2017-04-05 20:17 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 20:17 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 20:17 ` [PATCH 23/24] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL David Howells 2017-04-05 20:17 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 20:17 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 20:18 ` [PATCH 24/24] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) David Howells 2017-04-05 20:18 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 20:18 ` David Howells 2017-04-07 15:59 ` [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown Austin S. Hemmelgarn 2017-04-07 15:59 ` Austin S. Hemmelgarn 2017-04-07 16:29 ` Justin Forbes 2017-04-07 16:29 ` Justin Forbes 2017-04-07 16:29 ` Justin Forbes 2017-04-10 23:15 ` Why kernel lockdown? David Howells 2017-04-10 23:15 ` David Howells -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below -- 2017-04-05 17:09 [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown David Howells 2017-04-05 17:11 ` [PATCH 12/24] PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down David Howells 2017-04-05 17:11 ` David Howells
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