From: Andy Shevchenko <andy.shevchenko@gmail.com> To: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, matthew.garrett@nebula.com, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, One Thousand Gnomes <gnomes@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>, Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>, acpi4asus-user <acpi4asus-user@lists.sourceforge.net>, Platform Driver <platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org>, linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>, keyrings@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down Date: Fri, 7 Apr 2017 13:25:43 +0300 [thread overview] Message-ID: <CAHp75VfpsnCHVqnFnwwh3JHB0ccY66Gj88sMGhrA9W7rDxiY_Q@mail.gmail.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <149142340198.5101.8171352010918423590.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> On Wed, Apr 5, 2017 at 11:16 PM, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> wrote: > From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com> > > We have no way of validating what all of the Asus WMI methods do on a given > machine - and there's a risk that some will allow hardware state to be > manipulated in such a way that arbitrary code can be executed in the > kernel, circumventing module loading restrictions. Prevent that if the > kernel is locked down. > + if (kernel_is_locked_down()) > + return -EPERM; It looks a bit fragile when responsility of whatever reasons kernel can't serve become a driver burden. Can we fix this in debugfs framework instead? > + > err = asus_wmi_get_devstate(asus, asus->debug.dev_id, &retval); > > if (err < 0) > @@ -1916,6 +1919,9 @@ static int show_devs(struct seq_file *m, void *data) > int err; > u32 retval = -1; > > + if (kernel_is_locked_down()) > + return -EPERM; > + > err = asus_wmi_set_devstate(asus->debug.dev_id, asus->debug.ctrl_param, > &retval); > > @@ -1940,6 +1946,9 @@ static int show_call(struct seq_file *m, void *data) > union acpi_object *obj; > acpi_status status; > > + if (kernel_is_locked_down()) > + return -EPERM; > + > status = wmi_evaluate_method(ASUS_WMI_MGMT_GUID, > 1, asus->debug.method_id, > &input, &output); > -- With Best Regards, Andy Shevchenko
WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: andy.shevchenko@gmail.com (Andy Shevchenko) To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down Date: Fri, 7 Apr 2017 13:25:43 +0300 [thread overview] Message-ID: <CAHp75VfpsnCHVqnFnwwh3JHB0ccY66Gj88sMGhrA9W7rDxiY_Q@mail.gmail.com> (raw) In-Reply-To: <149142340198.5101.8171352010918423590.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> On Wed, Apr 5, 2017 at 11:16 PM, David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> wrote: > From: Matthew Garrett <matthew.garrett@nebula.com> > > We have no way of validating what all of the Asus WMI methods do on a given > machine - and there's a risk that some will allow hardware state to be > manipulated in such a way that arbitrary code can be executed in the > kernel, circumventing module loading restrictions. Prevent that if the > kernel is locked down. > + if (kernel_is_locked_down()) > + return -EPERM; It looks a bit fragile when responsility of whatever reasons kernel can't serve become a driver burden. Can we fix this in debugfs framework instead? > + > err = asus_wmi_get_devstate(asus, asus->debug.dev_id, &retval); > > if (err < 0) > @@ -1916,6 +1919,9 @@ static int show_devs(struct seq_file *m, void *data) > int err; > u32 retval = -1; > > + if (kernel_is_locked_down()) > + return -EPERM; > + > err = asus_wmi_set_devstate(asus->debug.dev_id, asus->debug.ctrl_param, > &retval); > > @@ -1940,6 +1946,9 @@ static int show_call(struct seq_file *m, void *data) > union acpi_object *obj; > acpi_status status; > > + if (kernel_is_locked_down()) > + return -EPERM; > + > status = wmi_evaluate_method(ASUS_WMI_MGMT_GUID, > 1, asus->debug.method_id, > &input, &output); > -- With Best Regards, Andy Shevchenko -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-04-07 10:25 UTC|newest] Thread overview: 213+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top 2017-04-05 20:14 [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown David Howells 2017-04-05 20:14 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 20:14 ` [PATCH 01/24] efi: Add EFI_SECURE_BOOT bit David Howells 2017-04-05 20:14 ` David Howells 2017-04-06 8:26 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-04-06 8:26 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-04-06 8:48 ` David Howells 2017-04-06 8:48 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 20:14 ` [PATCH 02/24] Add the ability to lock down access to the running kernel image David Howells 2017-04-05 20:14 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 20:14 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 20:14 ` [PATCH 03/24] efi: Lock down the kernel if booted in secure boot mode David Howells 2017-04-05 20:14 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 20:15 ` [PATCH 04/24] Enforce module signatures if the kernel is locked down David Howells 2017-04-05 20:15 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 20:15 ` [PATCH 05/24] Restrict /dev/mem and /dev/kmem when " David Howells 2017-04-05 20:15 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 20:15 ` [PATCH 06/24] Add a sysrq option to exit secure boot mode David Howells 2017-04-05 20:15 ` David Howells 2017-04-14 18:05 ` Thomas Gleixner 2017-04-14 18:05 ` Thomas Gleixner 2017-04-14 18:05 ` Thomas Gleixner 2017-04-14 18:15 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-04-14 18:15 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-04-14 18:15 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-04-14 23:16 ` David Howells 2017-04-14 23:16 ` David Howells 2017-04-14 23:16 ` David Howells 2017-04-16 20:46 ` Matt Fleming 2017-04-16 20:46 ` Matt Fleming 2017-04-16 20:46 ` Matt Fleming 2017-04-05 20:15 ` [PATCH 07/24] kexec: Disable at runtime if the kernel is locked down David Howells 2017-04-05 20:15 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 20:15 ` David Howells 2017-04-07 3:07 ` Dave Young 2017-04-07 3:07 ` Dave Young 2017-04-07 3:07 ` Dave Young 2017-04-07 3:07 ` Dave Young 2017-04-05 20:15 ` [PATCH 08/24] Copy secure_boot flag in boot params across kexec reboot David Howells 2017-04-05 20:15 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 20:15 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 20:15 ` [PATCH 09/24] kexec_file: Disable at runtime if securelevel has been set David Howells 2017-04-05 20:15 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 20:15 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 20:15 ` David Howells 2017-04-07 3:05 ` Dave Young 2017-04-07 3:05 ` Dave Young 2017-04-07 3:05 ` Dave Young 2017-04-07 3:05 ` Dave Young 2017-04-07 3:49 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-04-07 3:49 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-04-07 3:49 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-04-07 6:19 ` Dave Young 2017-04-07 6:19 ` Dave Young 2017-04-07 6:19 ` Dave Young 2017-04-07 6:19 ` Dave Young 2017-04-07 7:45 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-04-07 7:45 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-04-07 7:45 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-04-07 8:01 ` Dave Young 2017-04-07 8:01 ` Dave Young 2017-04-07 8:01 ` Dave Young 2017-04-07 7:07 ` David Howells 2017-04-07 7:07 ` David Howells 2017-04-07 7:07 ` David Howells 2017-04-07 7:41 ` Dave Young 2017-04-07 7:41 ` Dave Young 2017-04-07 7:41 ` Dave Young 2017-04-07 7:41 ` Dave Young 2017-04-07 8:28 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-04-07 8:28 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-04-07 8:28 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-04-07 8:28 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-04-07 8:42 ` Dave Young 2017-04-07 8:42 ` Dave Young 2017-04-07 8:42 ` Dave Young 2017-04-07 8:42 ` Dave Young 2017-04-07 7:09 ` David Howells 2017-04-07 7:09 ` David Howells 2017-04-07 7:09 ` David Howells 2017-04-07 7:46 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-04-07 7:46 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-04-07 7:46 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-04-07 9:17 ` David Howells 2017-04-07 9:17 ` David Howells 2017-04-07 9:17 ` David Howells 2017-04-07 12:36 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-04-07 12:36 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-04-07 12:36 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-04-10 13:19 ` David Howells 2017-04-10 13:19 ` David Howells 2017-04-10 13:19 ` David Howells 2017-05-02 19:01 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-05-02 19:01 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-05-02 19:01 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-05-02 19:01 ` Mimi Zohar 2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 10/24] hibernate: Disable when the kernel is locked down David Howells 2017-04-05 20:16 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 11/24] uswsusp: " David Howells 2017-04-05 20:16 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 23:38 ` Rafael J. Wysocki 2017-04-05 23:38 ` Rafael J. Wysocki 2017-04-05 23:38 ` Rafael J. Wysocki 2017-04-06 6:39 ` Oliver Neukum 2017-04-06 6:39 ` Oliver Neukum 2017-04-06 8:41 ` David Howells 2017-04-06 8:41 ` David Howells 2017-04-06 20:09 ` Rafael J. Wysocki 2017-04-06 20:09 ` Rafael J. Wysocki 2017-04-06 20:09 ` Rafael J. Wysocki 2017-04-06 20:12 ` Rafael J. Wysocki 2017-04-06 20:12 ` Rafael J. Wysocki 2017-04-06 20:25 ` Jiri Kosina 2017-04-06 20:25 ` Jiri Kosina 2017-04-08 3:28 ` poma 2017-04-08 3:28 ` poma 2017-04-12 13:44 ` joeyli 2017-04-12 13:44 ` joeyli 2017-04-06 6:55 ` David Howells 2017-04-06 6:55 ` David Howells 2017-04-06 20:07 ` Rafael J. Wysocki 2017-04-06 20:07 ` Rafael J. Wysocki 2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 12/24] PCI: Lock down BAR access " David Howells 2017-04-05 20:16 ` David Howells 2017-04-18 17:50 ` Bjorn Helgaas 2017-04-18 17:50 ` Bjorn Helgaas 2017-04-18 17:50 ` Bjorn Helgaas 2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 13/24] x86: Lock down IO port " David Howells 2017-04-05 20:16 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 20:16 ` David Howells 2017-04-14 18:28 ` Thomas Gleixner 2017-04-14 18:28 ` Thomas Gleixner 2017-04-14 18:28 ` Thomas Gleixner 2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 14/24] x86: Restrict MSR " David Howells 2017-04-05 20:16 ` David Howells 2017-04-14 18:30 ` Thomas Gleixner 2017-04-14 18:30 ` Thomas Gleixner 2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface " David Howells 2017-04-05 20:16 ` David Howells 2017-04-07 10:25 ` Andy Shevchenko [this message] 2017-04-07 10:25 ` Andy Shevchenko 2017-04-07 12:50 ` David Howells 2017-04-07 12:50 ` David Howells 2017-04-09 11:10 ` Andy Shevchenko 2017-04-09 11:10 ` Andy Shevchenko 2017-04-10 13:16 ` David Howells 2017-04-10 13:16 ` David Howells 2017-04-18 6:06 ` Andy Shevchenko 2017-04-18 6:06 ` Andy Shevchenko 2017-04-18 6:06 ` Andy Shevchenko 2017-04-18 14:34 ` Ben Hutchings 2017-04-18 14:34 ` Ben Hutchings 2017-04-18 14:55 ` David Howells 2017-04-18 14:55 ` David Howells 2017-04-18 14:55 ` David Howells 2017-04-18 15:19 ` Ben Hutchings 2017-04-18 15:19 ` Ben Hutchings 2017-04-18 15:34 ` David Howells 2017-04-18 15:34 ` David Howells 2017-04-18 15:34 ` David Howells 2017-04-18 15:30 ` David Howells 2017-04-18 15:30 ` David Howells 2017-04-18 17:39 ` Ben Hutchings 2017-04-18 17:39 ` Ben Hutchings 2017-04-18 17:39 ` Ben Hutchings 2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 16/24] ACPI: Limit access to custom_method " David Howells 2017-04-05 20:16 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 20:16 ` [PATCH 17/24] acpi: Ignore acpi_rsdp kernel param when the kernel has been " David Howells 2017-04-05 20:16 ` David Howells 2017-04-06 19:43 ` Rafael J. Wysocki 2017-04-06 19:43 ` Rafael J. Wysocki 2017-04-07 6:31 ` Dave Young 2017-04-07 6:31 ` Dave Young [not found] ` <20170407063107.GA10451-0VdLhd/A9Pl+NNSt+8eSiB/sF2h8X+2i0E9HWUfgJXw@public.gmane.org> 2017-04-07 7:05 ` David Howells 2017-04-07 7:05 ` David Howells 2017-04-07 7:05 ` David Howells 2017-04-07 7:39 ` Dave Young 2017-04-07 7:39 ` Dave Young 2017-04-05 20:17 ` [PATCH 18/24] acpi: Disable ACPI table override if the kernel is " David Howells 2017-04-05 20:17 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 20:17 ` [PATCH 19/24] acpi: Disable APEI error injection " David Howells 2017-04-05 20:17 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 20:17 ` [PATCH 20/24] bpf: Restrict kernel image access functions when " David Howells 2017-04-05 20:17 ` David Howells 2017-04-06 12:29 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2017-04-06 12:29 ` Alexei Starovoitov 2017-04-06 12:40 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-04-06 12:40 ` Ard Biesheuvel 2017-04-12 14:57 ` joeyli 2017-04-12 14:57 ` joeyli 2017-04-12 14:57 ` joeyli 2017-04-13 8:46 ` David Howells 2017-04-13 8:46 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 20:17 ` [PATCH 21/24] scsi: Lock down the eata driver David Howells 2017-04-05 20:17 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 20:17 ` [PATCH 22/24] Prohibit PCMCIA CIS storage when the kernel is locked down David Howells 2017-04-05 20:17 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 20:17 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 20:17 ` [PATCH 23/24] Lock down TIOCSSERIAL David Howells 2017-04-05 20:17 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 20:17 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 20:18 ` [PATCH 24/24] Lock down module params that specify hardware parameters (eg. ioport) David Howells 2017-04-05 20:18 ` David Howells 2017-04-05 20:18 ` David Howells 2017-04-07 15:59 ` [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown Austin S. Hemmelgarn 2017-04-07 15:59 ` Austin S. Hemmelgarn 2017-04-07 16:29 ` Justin Forbes 2017-04-07 16:29 ` Justin Forbes 2017-04-07 16:29 ` Justin Forbes 2017-04-10 23:15 ` Why kernel lockdown? David Howells 2017-04-10 23:15 ` David Howells -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below -- 2017-04-05 17:09 [PATCH 00/24] Kernel lockdown David Howells 2017-04-05 17:12 ` [PATCH 15/24] asus-wmi: Restrict debugfs interface when the kernel is locked down David Howells 2017-04-05 17:12 ` David Howells
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