linux-kernel.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
	<kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
	<x86@kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	<kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>, <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
	<iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
	"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
	"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
	"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
	"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
	"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v2 01/20] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME)
Date: Mon, 22 Aug 2016 17:35:39 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160822223539.29880.96739.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160822223529.29880.50884.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>

This patch adds a Documenation entry to decribe the AMD Secure Memory
Encryption (SME) feature.

Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
 Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.txt |   35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.txt

diff --git a/Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.txt b/Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f19c555
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/x86/amd-memory-encryption.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+Secure Memory Encryption (SME) is a feature found on AMD processors.
+
+SME provides the ability to mark individual pages of memory as encrypted using
+the standard x86 page tables.  A page that is marked encrpyted will be
+automatically decrypted when read from DRAM and encrypted when written to
+DRAM.  SME can therefore be used to protect the contents of DRAM from physical
+attacks on the system.
+
+Support for SME can be determined through the CPUID instruction. The CPUID
+function 0x8000001f reports information related to SME:
+
+	0x8000001f[eax]:
+		Bit[0] indicates support for SME
+	0x8000001f[ebx]:
+		Bit[5:0]  pagetable bit number used to enable memory encryption
+		Bit[11:6] reduction in physical address space, in bits, when
+			  memory encryption is enabled (this only affects system
+			  physical addresses, not guest physical addresses)
+
+If support for SME is present, MSR 0xc00100010 (SYS_CFG) can be used to
+determine if SME is enabled and/or to enable memory encryption:
+
+	0xc0010010:
+		Bit[23]   0 = memory encryption features are disabled
+			  1 = memory encryption features are enabled
+
+Linux relies on BIOS to set this bit if BIOS has determined that the reduction
+in the physical address space as a result of enabling memory encryption (see
+CPUID information above) will not conflict with the address space resource
+requirements for the system.  If this bit is not set upon Linux startup then
+Linux itself will not set it and memory encryption will not be possible.
+
+SME support is configurable in the kernel through the AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT config
+option. Additionally, the mem_encrypt=on command line parameter is required
+to activate memory encryption.

  reply	other threads:[~2016-08-22 23:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 82+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-08-22 22:35 [RFC PATCH v2 00/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35 ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2016-09-02  8:50   ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/20] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:02     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 15:23       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/20] x86: Set the write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
2016-08-25  3:58   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) build enablement Tom Lendacky
2016-09-02 11:03   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:03     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2016-08-25 13:04   ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-08-30 13:19     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-30 14:57       ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-31 13:26         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/20] x86: Add the Secure Memory Encryption cpu feature Tom Lendacky
2016-09-02 14:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:07     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/20] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/20] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-09-02 18:14   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:11     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-05  8:48   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:16     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-05 15:22   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:19     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-06  9:31   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:30     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 15:55       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-08 13:26         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-08 13:55           ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 13:43             ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/20] x86: Extend the early_memmap support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/20] x86: Add support for early encryption/decryption of memory Tom Lendacky
2016-09-06 16:12   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/20] x86: Insure that memory areas are encrypted when possible Tom Lendacky
2016-09-09 15:53   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 15:05     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:33       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:11         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/20] mm: Access BOOT related data in the clear Tom Lendacky
2016-09-09 16:38   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 15:14     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:35       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 16:55   ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-14 14:20     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-15  9:57       ` Matt Fleming
2016-09-15 16:52         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/20] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute Tom Lendacky
2016-09-09 17:23   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 15:41     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:41       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 13/20] x86: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2016-09-09 17:34   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 15:43     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 14/20] x86: DMA support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 10:58   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 13:36     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 15/20] iommu/amd: AMD IOMMU " Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 11:45   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 13:45     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:41       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-15 16:57         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-16  7:08           ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 16/20] x86: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 12:17   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 13:50     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:43   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:12     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 17/20] x86: Do not specify encrypted memory for VGA mapping Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 18/20] x86/kvm: Enable Secure Memory Encryption of nested page tables Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 14:35   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:02     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 19/20] x86: Access the setup data through debugfs un-encrypted Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:59   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:29     ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:51       ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-15 17:08         ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-16  7:11           ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:39 ` [RFC PATCH v2 20/20] x86: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 17:08   ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:31     ` Tom Lendacky

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20160822223539.29880.96739.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net \
    --to=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
    --cc=arnd@arndb.de \
    --cc=aryabinin@virtuozzo.com \
    --cc=bp@alien8.de \
    --cc=corbet@lwn.net \
    --cc=dvyukov@google.com \
    --cc=glider@google.com \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=joro@8bytes.org \
    --cc=kasan-dev@googlegroups.com \
    --cc=konrad.wilk@oracle.com \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-arch@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-doc@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-efi@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=luto@kernel.org \
    --cc=matt@codeblueprint.co.uk \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=rkrcmar@redhat.com \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).