From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: <linux-arch@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-efi@vger.kernel.org>,
<kvm@vger.kernel.org>, <linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>,
<x86@kernel.org>, <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
<kasan-dev@googlegroups.com>, <linux-mm@kvack.org>,
<iommu@lists.linux-foundation.org>
Cc: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>,
"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
"Jonathan Corbet" <corbet@lwn.net>,
"Matt Fleming" <matt@codeblueprint.co.uk>,
"Joerg Roedel" <joro@8bytes.org>,
"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
"Andrey Ryabinin" <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>,
"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@redhat.com>,
"Borislav Petkov" <bp@alien8.de>,
"Andy Lutomirski" <luto@kernel.org>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
"Paolo Bonzini" <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
"Alexander Potapenko" <glider@google.com>,
"Thomas Gleixner" <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"Dmitry Vyukov" <dvyukov@google.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v2 12/20] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute
Date: Mon, 22 Aug 2016 17:37:49 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20160822223749.29880.10183.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160822223529.29880.50884.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>
This patch adds support to be change the memory encryption attribute for
one or more memory pages.
Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h | 3 +
arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h | 13 ++++++
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
4 files changed, 134 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h
index 61518cf..bfb08e5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cacheflush.h
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
* Executability : eXeutable, NoteXecutable
* Read/Write : ReadOnly, ReadWrite
* Presence : NotPresent
+ * Encryption : ENCrypted, DECrypted
*
* Within a category, the attributes are mutually exclusive.
*
@@ -48,6 +49,8 @@ int set_memory_ro(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
int set_memory_rw(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
int set_memory_np(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
int set_memory_4k(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
+int set_memory_enc(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
+int set_memory_dec(unsigned long addr, int numpages);
int set_memory_array_uc(unsigned long *addr, int addrinarray);
int set_memory_array_wc(unsigned long *addr, int addrinarray);
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index 2785493..5616ed1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@ extern unsigned long sme_me_mask;
u8 sme_get_me_loss(void);
+int sme_set_mem_enc(void *vaddr, unsigned long size);
+int sme_set_mem_dec(void *vaddr, unsigned long size);
+
void __init sme_early_mem_enc(resource_size_t paddr,
unsigned long size);
void __init sme_early_mem_dec(resource_size_t paddr,
@@ -44,6 +47,16 @@ static inline u8 sme_get_me_loss(void)
return 0;
}
+static inline int sme_set_mem_enc(void *vaddr, unsigned long size)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int sme_set_mem_dec(void *vaddr, unsigned long size)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
static inline void __init sme_early_mem_enc(resource_size_t paddr,
unsigned long size)
{
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index f35a646..b0f39c5 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -14,12 +14,55 @@
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <asm/mem_encrypt.h>
+#include <asm/cacheflush.h>
#include <asm/tlbflush.h>
#include <asm/fixmap.h>
/* Buffer used for early in-place encryption by BSP, no locking needed */
static char me_early_buffer[PAGE_SIZE] __aligned(PAGE_SIZE);
+int sme_set_mem_enc(void *vaddr, unsigned long size)
+{
+ unsigned long addr, numpages;
+
+ if (!sme_me_mask)
+ return 0;
+
+ addr = (unsigned long)vaddr & PAGE_MASK;
+ numpages = PAGE_ALIGN(size) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+ /*
+ * The set_memory_xxx functions take an integer for numpages, make
+ * sure it doesn't exceed that.
+ */
+ if (numpages > INT_MAX)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return set_memory_enc(addr, numpages);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sme_set_mem_enc);
+
+int sme_set_mem_dec(void *vaddr, unsigned long size)
+{
+ unsigned long addr, numpages;
+
+ if (!sme_me_mask)
+ return 0;
+
+ addr = (unsigned long)vaddr & PAGE_MASK;
+ numpages = PAGE_ALIGN(size) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+ /*
+ * The set_memory_xxx functions take an integer for numpages, make
+ * sure it doesn't exceed that.
+ */
+ if (numpages > INT_MAX)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ return set_memory_dec(addr, numpages);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(sme_set_mem_dec);
+
/*
* This routine does not change the underlying encryption setting of the
* page(s) that map this memory. It assumes that eventually the memory is
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
index 72c292d..0ba9382 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pageattr.c
@@ -1728,6 +1728,81 @@ int set_memory_4k(unsigned long addr, int numpages)
__pgprot(0), 1, 0, NULL);
}
+static int __set_memory_enc_dec(struct cpa_data *cpa)
+{
+ unsigned long addr;
+ int numpages;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (*cpa->vaddr & ~PAGE_MASK) {
+ *cpa->vaddr &= PAGE_MASK;
+
+ /* People should not be passing in unaligned addresses */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
+ }
+
+ addr = *cpa->vaddr;
+ numpages = cpa->numpages;
+
+ /* Must avoid aliasing mappings in the highmem code */
+ kmap_flush_unused();
+ vm_unmap_aliases();
+
+ ret = __change_page_attr_set_clr(cpa, 1);
+
+ /* Check whether we really changed something */
+ if (!(cpa->flags & CPA_FLUSHTLB))
+ goto out;
+
+ /*
+ * On success we use CLFLUSH, when the CPU supports it to
+ * avoid the WBINVD.
+ */
+ if (!ret && static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLFLUSH))
+ cpa_flush_range(addr, numpages, 1);
+ else
+ cpa_flush_all(1);
+
+out:
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int set_memory_enc(unsigned long addr, int numpages)
+{
+ struct cpa_data cpa;
+
+ if (!sme_me_mask)
+ return 0;
+
+ memset(&cpa, 0, sizeof(cpa));
+ cpa.vaddr = &addr;
+ cpa.numpages = numpages;
+ cpa.mask_set = __pgprot(_PAGE_ENC);
+ cpa.mask_clr = __pgprot(0);
+ cpa.pgd = init_mm.pgd;
+
+ return __set_memory_enc_dec(&cpa);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_memory_enc);
+
+int set_memory_dec(unsigned long addr, int numpages)
+{
+ struct cpa_data cpa;
+
+ if (!sme_me_mask)
+ return 0;
+
+ memset(&cpa, 0, sizeof(cpa));
+ cpa.vaddr = &addr;
+ cpa.numpages = numpages;
+ cpa.mask_set = __pgprot(0);
+ cpa.mask_clr = __pgprot(_PAGE_ENC);
+ cpa.pgd = init_mm.pgd;
+
+ return __set_memory_enc_dec(&cpa);
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_memory_dec);
+
int set_pages_uc(struct page *page, int numpages)
{
unsigned long addr = (unsigned long)page_address(page);
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-08-22 23:11 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 82+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-08-22 22:35 [RFC PATCH v2 00/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (AMD) Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2 01/20] x86: Documentation for AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) Tom Lendacky
2016-09-02 8:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:02 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 15:23 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2 02/20] x86: Set the write-protect cache mode for full PAT support Tom Lendacky
2016-08-25 3:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:35 ` [RFC PATCH v2 03/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) build enablement Tom Lendacky
2016-09-02 11:03 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:03 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 04/20] x86: Secure Memory Encryption (SME) support Tom Lendacky
2016-08-25 13:04 ` Thomas Gleixner
2016-08-30 13:19 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-30 14:57 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-08-31 13:26 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 05/20] x86: Add the Secure Memory Encryption cpu feature Tom Lendacky
2016-09-02 14:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:07 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 06/20] x86: Handle reduction in physical address size with SME Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:36 ` [RFC PATCH v2 07/20] x86: Provide general kernel support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-09-02 18:14 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:11 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-05 8:48 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:16 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-05 15:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:19 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-06 9:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-07 14:30 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-07 15:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-08 13:26 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-08 13:55 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 13:43 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 08/20] x86: Extend the early_memmap support with additional attrs Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 09/20] x86: Add support for early encryption/decryption of memory Tom Lendacky
2016-09-06 16:12 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 10/20] x86: Insure that memory areas are encrypted when possible Tom Lendacky
2016-09-09 15:53 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 15:05 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:11 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 11/20] mm: Access BOOT related data in the clear Tom Lendacky
2016-09-09 16:38 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 15:14 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:35 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 16:55 ` Andy Lutomirski
2016-09-14 14:20 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-15 9:57 ` Matt Fleming
2016-09-15 16:52 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:37 ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2016-09-09 17:23 ` [RFC PATCH v2 12/20] x86: Add support for changing memory encryption attribute Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 15:41 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:37 ` [RFC PATCH v2 13/20] x86: Decrypt trampoline area if memory encryption is active Tom Lendacky
2016-09-09 17:34 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-12 15:43 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 14/20] x86: DMA support for memory encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 10:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 13:36 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 15/20] iommu/amd: AMD IOMMU " Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 11:45 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 13:45 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:41 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-15 16:57 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-16 7:08 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 16/20] x86: Check for memory encryption on the APs Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 12:17 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 13:50 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:43 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:12 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 17/20] x86: Do not specify encrypted memory for VGA mapping Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 18/20] x86/kvm: Enable Secure Memory Encryption of nested page tables Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 14:35 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:02 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-08-22 22:38 ` [RFC PATCH v2 19/20] x86: Access the setup data through debugfs un-encrypted Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 16:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:29 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-14 14:51 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-15 17:08 ` Tom Lendacky
2016-09-16 7:11 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-08-22 22:39 ` [RFC PATCH v2 20/20] x86: Add support to make use of Secure Memory Encryption Tom Lendacky
2016-09-12 17:08 ` Borislav Petkov
2016-09-14 14:31 ` Tom Lendacky
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